CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GFVEN IN 1891 BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE DG249 D64°" """"""' ""'"' V.I Hannibal; ,. 3 1924 030 986 438 olin Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030986438 :s^ • -"■■. d>^i "So THE AMERICAN SOLDIER WHO, SOT BBEC TO ARMS, BUT NUETUEED ET INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PEOCTDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORT ABE DEDICATED " Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annihal, Cisar, Gustave Adolpke, Turenne, le prince Eugene et Fr^d^ic ; lisez, reli- lisez Vhistoire de leur quatre-vingt-hxit campagnes ; modelez-vous sur eux, — c'est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et desurprendre le sicret de Part ; votre gSnie, ainsi iclairi, vousfera rejeterdes max- imes opposies tt celles de ces grands homines." — Napoleon. " La tactique, les Evolutions, la science de Vofficier de ginie, de Vofficier d'artilleriepeuvent s'apprendre dans les traites ; — mais la connaissance de la grande tactique ne sacquiert que par Vexphience etpar l' Etude de Vhistoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines" — Napoleon. PREFACE. In the study of the campaigns of Alexander, original research has been limited to a few travelers and geographers, or to military men conducting explorations under the aus- pices of some government and provided with facilities denied to most of us. In the case of Hannibal it is different. Spain and Italy are accessible, as Persia and Afghanistan are not, and the topography of the theatre of the Second Punic War can be readily examined and ascertained. No historian of Hannibal appears, however, to have studied his campaigns on the ground. Almost all accounts of his extraordinary marches, manoeuvres and battles borrow their topography, if they give any, from some predecessor equally limited in his facilities, or from very insufficient maps. Many errors have thus been propagated. The author has been fortunate enough repeatedly to visit the scenes of the Punic captain's achievements. With Po- lybius and Livy in the hand, he has followed Hannibal from Cartagena across the Pyrenees, the Rhone and the Alps, cross- ing every pass in the latter range by which the Carthaginian army could possibly have made its way ; he has visited every section of Italy and has compared the facts given by the ancient writers with the existing topography ; he has been able to consult the best authorities as to the geological changes which the centuries may have wrought : and what he has herein described is from diligent study of the authorities Till PREFACE. on the ground. This course has enabled him to correct some errors which naturally enough have crept into history, and to harmonize some of the statements of the old authors which have been deemed irreconcilable. In the case of Can- nae, for instance, all historians have found it necessary to discard one or more of the positive statements of Polybius and Livy. But a study of the battlefield has made it possi- ble to explain the positions and manoeuvres so as to coincide with every statement of these, our two most important au- thorities, as well as to accord with the probabilities. No modern historian of the Second Punic War has mapped out Hannibal's wonderful marches in Italy. Most histories are very inexpHoit as to the exact locations and routes. The charts in the text of these volumes will be found to show every essential topographical feature of Hannibal's movements over the length and breadth of the peninsula. Much of what was said in the preface to the volumes on Alexander applies to this. The best chroniclers of the war against Hannibal are Polybius and Livy, whose rela^ tions are full and explicit. The former exists in its entirety only down to the battle of Cannae ; the latter covers the whole period. Cornelius Nepos, Appian, and Plutarch in his lives of Fabius and Marcellus, give us many facts. The little which remains of Dion Cassius is useful. Floras and Orosius are meagre. Stray facts may be gleaned from ref- erences in Velleius Paterculus, Sallust, Justinus, Pausanias, Eutropius, Josephus and the Maccabees. To the opinions of the great modern historians and critics due heed has been given. Practically, however, Polybius and Livy are the source from which we draw all our information. In a few instances the author has been compelled to treat historical matter controversially. As in the case of the pas- sage of the Alps, upon which subject he has found some three PREFACE. ix hundred and fifty treatises, mostly devoted to the establish- ment of some pet theory, it has been sometimes impossible to state facts without controverting the opinions of others, if for no other reason than to show that they have not failed of due consideration. The first men who wrote exhaustively on the Little St. Bernard route were Wickham and Cramer. Their views have been stoutly combated, but most of them remain soimd. In the case of the battles of the Ticinus, the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae, the author has been led by the topography of the several fields to disagree with many of the most highly considered historians and critics ; but he has in all cases given his reasons for so doing. The author desires once more to disclaim the writing of a military text-book. Apart from the peculiar qualifications requisite for such work, it is doubtful whether history can be written on lines suitable for a treatise of the kind. History is a consecutive narrative of facts accompanied by suitable comment; a text -book should enunciate certain principles and select historical facts as illustrations. So far as history, pure and simple, is valuable to the military student, — and it has always been pronounced by great leaders and critics to be the most fruitful of studies, — so far will these volumes reach. But they aim rather, for the benefit of the general reader, to enlarge upon those military facts to which the histories devote small space, and thus narrate the origin and growth of the art of war, than to spread before the yoiing military student those principles which lie at the basis of the profession he proposes to embrace. In a few places the author has undertaken to show that Livy's statements are inexact. In such cases he has con- strued Livy by Livy, and has always taken the distinguished historian as a whole. No doubt has been cast on any partic- ular fact, unless Livy himself, taking every passage relating X PREFACE. to the subject into consideration, stows that such a fact is inconsistent with his own statements elsewhere. The author desires to acknowledge his special indebtedness to the learned work of Colonel Hennebert. It is perhaps impossible for a soldier to write about Han- nibal — or of the other great captains — without exhibiting some traces of hero worship. That the author is subject to the sentiment it is not attempted to conceal ; but he trusts that it is subordinated to the truth. There is not a fact connected with the history of Hannibal, nor a slur upon his character, which has not been duly weighed in writing this history. Nor is there any material fact, either making for or against him, which has not found its place in these pages. The sum of all which the ancient authors tell us describes a man and a captain on whom hero worship is not wasted. If, in the perusal, the reader will frequently refer to the table of dates, as well as the large map at the end of these volumes, so as to keep the skeleton of the entire Italian war in mind, the author believes that he will conceive a clear im- pression of the gigantic whole of Hannibal's unequaled campaigns. He can rely upon the legend at the head of each chapter as a fair summary of such portions as he desires to skip. TABLE OP CONTENTS. CHAPTER FAOE I. Carthage. 900-200 b. c 1 II. The Punic Akmy and Navy. 500-200 b. c. . . 11 III. Carthaginian Wars. 480-277 b. c 31 IV. The Early Army of Rome. SOO-350 b. c. . . 35 V. The Roman Army of the Third Century . . 48 VI. Rank and Discipline. — Equipments and Rations 73 VII. Fortification.' — Camp Duty. — War . . . .87 VIII. Early Roman Wars. 400-272 b. c. ... 102 IX. The First Punic War. — The Roman Navy. — Hamilcar Bakca. 2G4-218 b. c 122 X. The Lion's Brood. 241-220 b. c 143 XI. Saguntum. Spring to Fall, ,219 b. c. . . . 157 W XII. Hannibal starts fob Italy. May, 218 b. c. . 163 '^Xlll. Catalonia. July and August, 218 b. c. . . . 171 j>XIV. From the Rhone to the Alps. Fall, 218 b. c. . 176 L--XV. The Foothills of the Alps. October, 218 b. c. . 189 L-XVI. The Summit of the Alps. October, 218 B. c. . 215 '-'XVII. The Army op Italy on the Po. November, 218 B. c 238 XVIII. MANtEUVRING. NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 218 B. C. . 254 XIX. The Battle of the Trebia. December, 218 b. c. 266 XX. The Arnus Marshes. Spring, 217 b. c. . . . 278 XXI. A Flanking Man(Euvre. Spring, 217 b. c. . . 289 XXII. The Battle of Lake Trasimene. April, 217 b. c. . 298 XXIII. Fabius Cunctatob. Summer, 217 b. c. . . . 315 XXIV. A Curious Stratagem. Fall, 217 b. c. . . . 325 LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS. FASB PoKTEAiT OF Hannibal Frontispiece. Rome aud Carthage 2 Site of Carthage . • . . 4 Carthage and Vicinity 6 Section of Walls of Carthago 7 Plan of Carthage 8 Ground Plan of Walls of Carthage 9 i Carthaginian Helmet — supposed portrait of Hannibal ... 10 A Trireme Restored .......... 13 Sacred Band Footman of Carthage ...... 18 Sacred Band Cavalryman of Carthage ...... 19 ( - Spanish Sword . ......... 19 i,- Spanish Footman 20 (^Gallic Soldier ' .... 20 ^Slingers 21 ^^ight Footman .......... 22 Spanish Cavalry — horse with two riders 22 U^frican Footman .......... 23 t-Numidian Horseman 23 War Chariot 24 LWar Elephant 25 * — Phalanx — usual in Carthage ....... 27 (..--Roman Gladius — legionary's sword 30 Map of Sicily 31 Possessions of Carthage at Beginning of First Punic War . . 34 Early Legion . ......... 37 Testudo (from Column of Trajan) ....... 48 Consul with War Cloak 50 t^Roman Cavalryman 51 HRoman Velite 51 t. Roman Galeae — helmets for light troops 52 V.^oman Darts 52 l^Roman Ocrea — greaves - ... 52 j_,Boman Lorica — scale-armor 52 xiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. ffn ',- Roman Casses — helmets for legionaries • : Roman Scutum — curved shield ,..•••• ^ Roman Pilum — heavy lance Roman Gladius (from Pompeii) Roman Gladius ....••••'• t^'Ronian Hasta — casting spear ,.-■••• °* Roman Hasta-heads "'' Roman Princeps — legionary of second line "5 Roman Hastatus — legionary of first line 55 Roman Triarius — legionary of third line 66 Roman Cavalryman (Arch of Constantine) 56 ^ 323 The Oxen Stratagem 329 Campania to Geronium 331 HANNIBAL. CARTHAGE. 900-200 B. C. In the third century b. c. Rome and Carthag-e divided the pa-wer of the Med- iterranean world. Rome was first on laud, Carthag-e first at sea. Intolerant of powerful neighbors, Rome quarreled with Carthage, and in the First Punie War brought her to her knees. The Carthaginians were of Phcenician origin, one of the early settlements of Tyre- By their energy and intelligence they succeeded in acquiring the hegemony of all the Phoanician colonies on the Med- iterranean, as Tyre had done at home. The government was an aristocracy of capitalists, controlled by a senate. This ' ' London of antiquity ' ' gradually extended her conquests all around the western Mediterranean. The city was strongly walled and beautifully built ; and in addition possessed vast commer- cial works, harbors and arsenals. Agriculture was as highly esteemed and prac- ticed as commerce, and the land was worked by rich planters. The prosperity of the city was equally indebted to either art. Carthage wag really the capital of a great North African empu-e, as Rome was of the Italian peninsula. Two generations after the death of Alexander, Carthage and Rome divided the power of the Mediterranean world be- tween them. Carthage was the most powerful colony planted by Tyre, and inherited all the enterprise, intelligence and courage which the mother city showed in her extended com- merce and many wars, and notably against the great Mace- donian. Carthage was first at sea ; Rome on land. Rome, always intolerant of powerful neighbors, of necessity fell to quarreling with her great rival, unwilling to content herself with less than the supremacy on both elements. The first conflict between these cities was over the island of Sicily, 2 THE PHCENICIANS. situated midway between them. Rome, as usual, won, and at the end of the twenty-three years, during which lasted the First Punic War, imposed severe terms on her conquered ad- versary. This was in B. c. 241. The Phoenicians had originally been nomads inhabiting the plains which extend from the Mediterranean to the Tigris, but, pushed by the Egyptians and Jews into the narrow Rome and Carthage. region between Mt. Libanus and the seashore, they ended by making the sea their home. Libanus furnished them the best of shipbuilding material, and such was their native enter- prise that they soon commanded the entire commerce of the Mediterranean, as well as became its most active pirates. Of all the towns the chief in activity and size, Tyre eventually grew to the hegemony of the land. The PhcEnioians were in antiquity celebrated, among other products, for their wines, salted fish and mineral resources, as well as for distributing the products of the world ; and learning, the arts, mechanics and architecture grew to a great height among this enterpris- ing people. Occasional overgrowth, or discontent of some part of the TYEE. 3 population, lay at the root of emigration from Tyre. Gades (Cadiz) was founded a dozen centuries before Christ ; Utica soon after ; and from 1000 to COO B. C. Tyre founded many colonies — all naturally to the westward and upon the Med- iterranean coast. Herodotus, who visited Tyre about 450 b. c, gave the then age of the city as twenty-three hundred years. This is mere tradition. In the time of Joshua (1250 B. C.) Tyre was cer- tainly a town of respectable size. Originally a republic, in the years immediately preceding David and Solomon Tyre ap- pears to have been brought under the sway of a line of kings. The struggles between aristocrats and rich burghers were at all times fierce, but the strength of the city none the less grew apace. She resisted many sieges, notably those of the Scy- thians and Nebuchadnezzar, eventually to perish before the conquering hand of Alexander. The proud history of Tyre shows what it was that animated the Carthaginians in their vigorous growth, as well as their vigorous opposition to Eome ; for it is thought by some authorities to have been to an emigration of Tyrian aristocrats, and not mere traders, that the great metropolis owed her origin. And though we know little about the great city except from her enemies, it is cer- tain that a high degree of intelligence, culture and courage must have gone to raise her to her high estate. According to other writers Carthage (Karthada, or new town) was founded in the ninth century b. C, as a mere trading colony by the Tyrians, who were joined in the venture by some other Phcenician cities. The new colony carried on her affairs with considerable vigor and intelligence, and soon won the supremacy of all the cities of the African coast, as Tyre had done before her in Phoenicia. Her population was steadily increased by immigration from the mother country. Her form of government grew to be an aristocracy of capital- 4 SITE OF CARTHAGE. ists witi a limited popular sufPrage, controUed by a senate of one hundred and four members, — " a democracy inclining towards an oligarchy," says Aristotle, who has told us much vTUNlS Site o£ Carthage. about Carthage. The executive officers were two magistrates, who have been likened to the Spartan kings, and who were annually elected by the citizens. But there was a council of twenty-eight elders, elected at the same time, who really pos- sessed the power. During her period of prosperity, Carthage must have had a good government, however constituted. RUINS OF CARTHAGE. 5 Carthage was constantly at war, for commercial rather than international reasons, and in the sixth century b. c. Mago I. is said to have laid the foundation of her solid military or- ganization. This ruler was the progenitor of a remarkable line of generals, who made Carthage celebrated for one hun- dred and fifty years. The growth of this financially splendid city — " the London of antiquity " — warranted her in seek- ing constant accessions among the islands of the Mediter- ranean, and her commercial navy soon grew into a military arm of the most powerful description. Erom the beginning of the fifth to the middle of the third century B. c. Carthage was at the height of her power. The plateau of Byrsa, now the hill of St. Louis, on and at the foot of which Carthage was built, stands up nearly two hundred feet above the sea level, and commands a magnifi- cent view of the whole surrounding country. The situation of Carthage could not be improved for a city or for commerce, situated as it was at the narrows of the Mediterranean. Ap- pian gives us very interesting details of Carthage, but from them we can reconstruct the city only in part. The extent of the entire capital as it was when destroyed in 146 b. c. has been hidden by the ages. Excavations have so far been lim- ited ; but in the Middle Ages, Carthage, like other perished cities, became a quarry for the world. The Cathedral of Pisa, among many other vast structures, was built from blocks of marble dug from the ruins. That the works about Carthage were enormous is shown by the fact that the artificial harbors covered an area of some fifty acres, a much larger amount than those of any other ancient city. That the architecture of the city was splendid we know, and that there was a Phcenician style is shown by the fact that Tyrian architects were hired to build the temple of Solomon. Circular and semicircular and horseshoe-shaped 6 ARMS OF CARTHAGE. edifices seemed to be the rule, and stone work was fitted like carpentry in male and female joints, as well as held together by the famous cement which so long resisted Alexander's rams at Tyre. The arms of Carthage displayed a horse rest- ing under a palm-tree. The first emigrants to land on the heights of Byrsa are said to have dug up the skull of a horse at the foot of a tree, at the spot which commands the entire landscape, and to have adopted the emblem for the city they proposed to build. But, however splendid, Carthage was essentially of the earth, earthy. She was wrapped up in money-making ; there was a sad lack of higher motives and intelligence in her statecraft, though her social life was un- questionably of a high order. Albeit her commercial activity made her prosperous, Carthage was able only to propagate ; she could not create. Carthage had not been the first, but she was the most prom- HlPPO ZARTTUa '■j%,,i<'''/. Cai-thage and Vicinity. inent settlement of the Phoenicians in the west. A rich corn-growing district, peopled by siilendid agriculturists, on the greatest roadstead of Northern Africa, could not fail to AGRICULTURE. prosper. In expatiating upon the extended commerce of the Carthaginians, we must not forget that they were in the high- est degree remarkable as an agricultural people. The Car- thaginian territory was exception- ally rich by nature and by art, and extensive agricultural products not only assured a certainty of ex- portation, but kept the indigenous population prosperous and busy. Not only this, but their flocks and herds were of the best. Polybius calls Africa a land marvelous for grain and fruits and animals ; Scy- lax especially vaunts it. After Zama, it was agriculture to which the Carthaginians turned under the leadership of Hannibal, and it helped them to rise again as nothing else could. Irrigation was practiced in its best methods, and to-day the plains of Tunis are covered with the ruins of num- berless towns and villages, which only the most exceptional fertility could have sustained. Mago's treatise on agriculture was the best known of antiquity. It was used even by the Romans and is highly praised by Cato and Pliny. Carthage, like Tyre, was practically free, though she paid occasional tribute to the Great King. The Greek colonies and migrations struggled long with those emanating from Phoenicia, but finally bounds were set to further Grecian m O O I I 8 PHCENICIANS AND GREEKS. progress about 500 b. c. The towns of Hippo, Hadrume- tum, Thapsus, Leptis and others on the coast of Africa were made colonies of Carthage and paid her tribute. Utica was an earlier settlement than Carthage, had been her patron, and remained free. Carthage was reaUy the capital of a great North African empire, extending from the desert of Tripoli to the Atlantic, and protected inland by a chain of fortified posts. Gades, though earlier colonized by Tyre, fell under the hegemony of Carthage, as did all subsequent west- ern colonies of Phoenicia. EMPU OF |/t^CULAPlUS Plan of Ciirthag-e. About 500 B. c. Carthage appears to have been at war with the Greek colony of Massilia (Marseille), and to have got a foothold on Sardinia, ou the west and northwest coast of Sicily and on the adjacent islands. Finally, after much friction, the Greeks and Carthaginians agreed to tolerate each other, and by 300 B. c. Carthage controlled almost all WALLS OF CARTHAGE. 9 Sicily and fully monopolized the trade of the western Mediter- ranean. She had become the richest city in the world, says Polybius, and is by some authorities reckoned to have had a population of seven hundred thousand souls. It was indeed fortunate for Carthage that Alexander did not advance so far along the African coast after he had con- quered Egypt. The dis- tance from the then centre of the world — Babylon — had in like manner saved her from Cyrus. Carthage is said, however, to have sent a deputation to congratvilate Alexander on his return to Babylon. The city of Carthage was about twenty miles in circumference, including the citadel on the Byrsa, whose walls were two miles in extent. We know from Appian how these walls were made. That the en- gineers who could plan so good a profile would also make an admirable line of walls may be assumed ; and reentering and salient angles, curtains and tow- ers, arranged to give good cross-fire, were part of the mural scheme. Facing ^-,,7 „ c r^ ,.1. ° Ground Plan of Walls of Carthage as !&■ the sea, the citadel stood stored by Daux. 10 CITADEL. on an almost perpendicular line of rooks, where tlie waUs need be less strong. On tlie west and northwest there were triple walls, for here the lay of the land demanded strength. On the north and south were double walls, on the east but a single one. The citadel had accommodation for fifty thou- sand souls. The temjDle, used as a redoubt, could hold one thousand men. The walls were built of huge blocks of tufa, protected from the elements by bitumen, jointed and cemented. They were over thirty feet thick and nearly fifty feet high. The three lines had each the same profile. Three hundred ele- phants, four thousand horses and twenty thousand foot could be housed in them. In these walls were double vaulted pas- sages, used both for storage and barracks, and intended as well to break the vibration of the blows of rams. The tow- ers were usually of four stories. Along the wall was a ter- race thirty feet wide. The thickness of wall slopes and ditch was nearly six hundred feet. Recent excavations prove the accuracy of the description of Appian. The construction of these walls goes to show great military skill among the Car- thaginian engineers, as well as great ability in the builders. Silver Tetradrachma, with supposed head of Hannibal • probably not autlientic. II. THE PUNIC ARMY AND NAVY. 500-200 B. C. Carthage depended for both army and navy on mercenaries, wMcli she got from all her dependencies and the barbarian nations with which she traded. Her harbors were the largest of antiquity and the size of her fleet was enormous, consisting principally of triremes, but with many quinquiremes and still more transports. Few Carthaginian citizens served, except in the Sacred Band. The Liby-Phceniciaus, Iberians and Gauls made up the bulk of the army, supple- mented by light troops from all quarters. In peace, the cadres were kept afoot and the arsenals were full of war-material. This mercenary system was weak, in absolute contrast to the inherent strength of the Roman system of personal ser- vice ; for the mercenary had neither fealty nor a sense of honor ; nor was he to be quickly obtained in serious emergencies. The generals were under control of the war-council, which interfered with their freedom of action, to the great detri- ment of military operations. The Carthaginian army was organized on the Greek method, though foreign mercenaries were wont to retain their own habits. The heavy foot was phalangial, the light foot irregular. The heavy cavalry was good, the light, especially the Numidians, exceptionally valuable. The arms, equipment and discipline were inferior to the Roman. Chariots and ele- phants were in use. The train consisted of pack animals and was moderate in size. The army was able to march well, but was subject to epidemics, on account of the number of foreigners unused to caring for their health. In for- tification the Carthaginians excelled, but they did not intrench a daily camp until they came in contact with ttie Romans. In the time of the Barcas, the Carthaginian power was on the wane, but the remarkable ability of the Barca family gave it an impetus which all but carried it to success, and, under Hamil- car in Spain and Hannibal during the first few years in Italy, the Carthaginian army was of the highest order of material and discipline. Carthage preferred mercenary troops to a system of per- sonal military service. Her citizens being mostly traders or rich planters, wliose time was too valuable to the state; or whose social position was too high, to allow them to spend their years in the ranks, it was natural that a standing army 12 FLEET. should grow up by permitting substitution. Moreover tbe hiring, for such an army, of soldiers and sailors among the numerous semi-civilized tribes with which Carthage traded, kept up her pleasant relations with these tribes and enabled her gradually to extend her influence over their neighbors. Commerce with the barbarians was highly remunerative. The same rule applied to the navy, which was in like fashion manned by bought and hired crews. The harbor, dockyards and arsenal of Carthage were well fortified, and were the largest and finest of the times. They afforded an abundant refuge for their fleets, which were more numerous and efficient than any then afloat. The Lake of Tunis also afforded unlimited accommodation to any number of bottoms. Down to the Punic wars the warships of the Carthaginians were mostly triremes, — in number reaching in the third cen- tury over three hundred and fifty, — and were rowed by slaves and manned by land troops. The number of small vessels was enormous. In the treaty with Xerxes, 480 B. C, Carthage agreed to put afloat and at Xerxes' disposition two thousand war-vessels and three thousand transports. Even at the close of the Second Punic War she gave up five hundred vessels to the Bomans. The rowers were as a rule about three fourths of the crew, and were a standing force purchased by the government for this purpose. The vessels were commanded by naval officers who were only under the control of generals when associated with an army. Both land and sea forces were under the direct orders of the senate. The fleet was of necessity the more im- portant arm. We shall have, however, in narrating the Sec- ond Punic War, to deal almost exclusively with the land forces, though these were, as an element in the growth of Carthage, by far of less importance. THE NAVY. 13 That the navy of Carthage was much larger and more im- portant than the army was natural enough. The competition for power with Syracuse, the other Greek colonies in Sicily and with Rome, obliged Carthage to keep her marine, despite often great losses and depletion, on the highest footing. We find in Diodorus, Polybius, Appian and Aristotle much more detail regarding the navy than the army of Carthage. The splendid harbors and fleets and organization are fully Trireme Restored. set forth. As a ride the " long " or war ships were triremes, carrying some three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers ; but the use by Alexander of larger ships, and especially their increase in size by Demetrius Poliorcetes, gave an impetus to naval architecture everywhere, and we find quinquiremes and even a septireme in the war against Pyrrhus, and in the First Punic War. Quinquiremes were thencefor- ward common in the Carthaginian navy. The increase in rowers in these latter brought greater speed and ability to manoeuvre and made them much more dangerous in battle. On the whole, the Carthaginian ships were ahead of any others, and the size of their fleets was remarkable. In the battle against Eegulus, as we are told by Polybius, no less than three hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships were engaged, containing one hundred and fifty thousand rowers and soldiers, while Eegulus had three hundred and thirty galleys, with one hun- dred and forty thousand men aboard. Pifty Carthaginian galleys are said to have been sunk and thirty thousand men 14 THE CITIZEN. lost. This is hard to believe, and yet Polybius is our most credible authority. The width of a vessel of the first class in Carthage was, we happen to know, about seventeen feet. This, judging from the old delineations of warships, might give her a length of one hundred to one hundred and twenty feet. This is, however, a mere estimate. Appian tells us that the arsenals of Carthage held two hun- dred thousand complete suits of armor, an immense number of darts and javelins and two thousand catapults, and Strabo repeats the fact, making the number of engines three thou- sand. Trained artificers in these arsenals were able to turn out each day one hundred to one hundred and twenty shields or bucklers, three hundred swords, one thousand catapult- missiles, five hundred lances and a number of engines. The Carthaginian citizen was found only to a limited nu- merical extent in the army. But in the cavalry, where wealth was required and honor sought, and especially in a corps d' elite called the Sacred Band, — the body-guard of the com- mander-in-chief and a sort of training-school for officers like the Macedonian Pages, — and in the higher official berths, he was fairly weU represented. The Sacred Band, which con- sisted of fifteen hundred infantry, was sumptuously clad and equipped, and was noted for its courage and discipline. The cavalry, one thousand strong, came next in order of impor- tance, and appears to have formed an appendage to the Sacred Band. Thus but twenty-five hundred of those who were for- tunate enough to hold Carthaginian citizenship served in an army then numbering seventy thousand men. Though not commonly in the ranks, the citizen was in times of public danger held to service, and the city alone could put on foot an army of forty thousand hoplites and one thousand horse. The next grade of land troops came from the Liby-Phoeni- cians, peoples lying near by and tributary to Carthage, and SIZE OF ARMY. 15. the outcome of an admixture of the colonial and native blood. These tribes furnished a much higher number than Carthage herself. The foreign mercenaries were the bulk of the army. These last troops were recruited among all nations in Africa and Europe with which Carthage had commercial relations, with the idea, says Polybius, of avoiding conspiracies and mutiny by having no common political aspirations among the several divisions of the army. Indeed, the different bodies did not generally understand each other's language. They were apt to be devoted only to their immediate chief. These troops were got in bodies of hundreds and thousands by bar- gain and sale from the governments of their respective coun- tries. As a rule, some senator was sent as ambassador to such nations as it was desired to reach, and a given number of troops arranged for on given terms of payment. The best of these mercenary troops were the Iberians from the Spanish peninsula. Among the most recklessly brave were the half-naked Gauls, who at a very early period served for pay in the Carthaginian ranks. The most numerous were the nomad soldiers collected from every part of the African coast, from Egypt to the Pillars of Hercules. The general plan of recruitment was not dissimilar to the Persian. The Great King assembled under his banners aU the peoples of the East ; Carthage all the nations of the West. The numbers under arms have probably been vastly over- estimated by the ancient Greek and Roman historians. Still, no doubt Carthage could, with little effort, put under the colors a force of over one hundred thousand men. The wars in Sicily probably called out the largest force Carthage ever had in the field ; and at times she had numbers on foot much exceeding this estimate, though the sum of three hundred thousand men which has been given can scarcely be accepted as a reliable estimate of forces assembled at any one time for one campaign. 16 THE MERCENARY SYSTEM. In seasons of peace, the nucleus of the army was kept in. tact, with plenty of weapons in the arsenals, and horses and beasts of burden. The citadel was not only the centre of military defense, but the headquarters of the army as well. Here were the barracks for the troops ; and here the com- mander of the citadel and of the troops in garrison was in sole authority. It is unnecessary to point out how vastly such a mercenary organization as has been described must in the long run be inferior to the system of personal service, to the theory which makes every man's breast a bulwark for the honor and safety of the fatherland. It had its advantages. Mercenaries are apt to be of low stock, and with more animal than moral or intellectual qualities. But they enlist because they have more to gain than to lose, and are often of great reliabihty so long as they can clearly see their object. As above re- marked, the hiring of mercenaries kept Carthage on a very friendly footing with all the nations which it thus subsi- dized ; and so long as the state coffers were full, it mattered not what gaps were rent in the armies ; they could be quicldy patched with gold ; for the supply of men happy to serve for pay and plunder was unfailing among the barbarians. More- over, this system left the native Carthaginian free to pursue his lucrative commercial and agricultural schemes. On the other hand, the troops were without ties either to the state or among themselves. There could be no feeling of loyalty ; the better virtues, which are quite essential to make a perma- nently effective army, were absent. The various detachments were ready at any time to turn their arms against Carthage on the slightest pretext for dissatisfaction; the offer of a higher rate of pay would quickly deprive the city of their services, perhaps at a time of gravest danger. The depend- ence on hiring mercenaries might leave the state helpless THE GENERALS. 17 against a sudden invasion or insurrection, for it consumed time to bring together any considerable force of purchased soldiers. It may be said that the Carthaginian government was at the mercy of the men it paid. No nation can ever build a permanent structure, unless the individuals who govern are and remain themselves the defenders of the coun- try. But such an army was in strict keeping with the com- mercial and political aims and tendencies of Carthage, and after a fashion did very well, except in times of serious dan- ger. If a foreign enemy suddenly landed on its shores, Carthage could not always oppose him with a sufficiently large and well-disciplined army ; and in case of internal dis- sensions, all was uncertainty and confusion. The government was apt to be the victim of surprises. We shall see notable instances of this. The generals were chosen from the citizens by the people. The political system of Carthage from the earliest times was rotten, and money could buy anything. Capacity was by no means the primal reason for appointment. Popular fancy or the power of gold could procure military position, though it could not purchase the soldier's skiU or fame. Jealousies and fear lest a successful captain might turn his arms against the state made the senate an uncertain master, and the sen- ate was all-powerful. This fact was fraught with constant danger, for changes in command were by no means unusual, even in the midst of a campaign ; or the general had his hands tied by the withholding of supplies or reinforcements. Worse still, at the side of the general in command stood a deputy of the senate, who not only watched his proceedings, but to a certain extent might direct them. In the fifth cen- tury there had been an attempt by an army-commander named Malchus to seize the reins of government, and there was at once constituted the above-named gcrouda or Elders' 18 THE WAR COUNCIL. War Council of one hundred and four senators, who thereafter were the supreme commanders, and who directed and con- trolled all military operations, however distant, drew up the plans of campaig-n, required strict compliance with their de- mands, and rewarded or punished the successful or unsuccess- ful captains as they chose. Even a reasonable or necessary variation from their plan was sometimes mercilessly chastised. The War Council's plan could rarely accord with the ex- isting facts ; generals dared assume no responsibility ; their conduct was apt to be indecisive or weak ; and if a campaign was successful, it was in spite of the system. Over half-civ- ilized or quite barbarous nations victory could be easily won. But when the Carthaginians met even smaller armies of well- disciplined troops under good generals whose hands were free, they were apt to fail. The defeats they suffered at the hands of Gelon, the elder Dionysius and Timoleon abundantly prove this fact. In view of this thoroughly wrong-headed policy, it is a wonder that Carthage rose at all. But her growth was not a military growth like that of Rome. It was due strictly to successful commerce and rich agriculture, and to the fact that she stood in a location which kept her from contact with the stronger nations. Her military prosperity was due to the mere weight of gold and men, excepting always the few brilliant accidents, among them the star, Hannibal, which have shed eternal radiance upon the Car- thaginian arms, as well as thrown into relief the selfishness, ingratitude and lack of patriotism and virtue of the Car- thaginians as a race. Sacred Band Foot- man. THE SACRED BAND. 19 Sacred Band Cavalryroan. The Carthaginian foot and horse were each divided into heavy and light, regular and irregular. The weapons, equip- ment and manner of fight- ing were almost as various as the nationalities. Each petty detachment came to swell the host of irregulars with its own peculiar arms and habits. The Sacred Band was a body of heavy -armed in- fantry, composed, says Di- odorus, only of leading Car- thaginian citizens. Plainer citizens served in the pha- lanx when on duty. The infantry of the Sacred Band carried a large circular shield over three feet in diameter, a short sword and probably also a pike or lance ; were clad in a red tunic and wore sandals. Though not mentioned in the authorities, they no doubt wore armor. Others among the richer of the Carthaginians who entered service were ap- pointed to the heavy cavalry, a position which en- tailed great expense to maintain at a proper level. These cavalrymen were distinguished by wearing golden rings, one for each campaign served by them, and their weapons were a buckler, a longer and a shorter lance and a wide, short sword. They were clad in mail and wore a helmet and greaves. That Spanish there were so few of these leading Carthaginian citi- Sword. j,ens in a large army shows the system up in its weakest aspect. The Liby - Phoenicians fought mainly as heavy foot and horse. All these infantry troops carried a 20 SPANIARDS AND GAULS. heavy and long spear as their chief weapon, much like the Greek hoplite, on whom in- deed they were at this time patterned, so far as race peculiarities permitted. The Spanish infantry and horse were also classed as heavy, hut their chief weapon was a powerful cut-and- thrust sword for close quarters, in the use of which they were wonderfully expert. They wore white woolen tu- nics, with red edges, and carried a buckler made of bull's hide. The Spaniards were then, and have always been, under good generals, the making Spaniard. of excellent soldiers. The Gauls were of light complexion, and were fond of dyeing their hair red. They wore it long, hanging over the shoulders or tied in a knot at the top of the head. The men wore full beards, the officers only a mus- tache. Up to the time of the wars with Rome, the Gauls fought on foot, almost naked, with a sword good only for cutting, of no use ex- cept at swinging distance and apt to be dulled or bent by the first blow upon a good helmet or shield. The Roman soldier, who with gla- dius and scutum closed sharply with his man, had the Gaul at an utter disadvantage. The Gauls were noted for genial qualities and courage, but equally for inconstancy, wildness and brutality. When not in battle, they were clad in a shirt, loose tunic and cloak. Their helmets. Gaul. SLINGERS. 21 not always worn, were decked with horns or feathers, and were made of considerable height to give to the soldier a taller look and thus increase the terror of his aspect. They wore many bracelets, necklaces and rings. For additional arms they had slings, a lance with fire-sharpened point, a pike or halberd with curved blade and a club. They were most dan- Slingers. gerous as swordsmen, and Hannibal replaced all their other weapons with their one peculiar arm, manufacturing these in Cartagena, so as to give them the advantage of the best of material. They later adopted armor and a shield, which in early days they had despised. The next most valuable arm was the corps of two thousand Balacrean slingers, then peculiar to Carthage. They carried two slings, one for long, one for short distance firing. The distance and accuracy of their aim with pebble-stones and leaden buUets are so well vouched for that we are fain to believe the feats narrated of them, and can fully understand their military value. We know that the Jewish left-handed slingers could sling stones at a hair's breadth ; and on the Re- treat of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon was not satisfied with his light troops until he had organized a band of slingers, for these ssemed best able to keep the enemy at a distance 22 THE AFRICANS. when protecting the column. Their fire was more severe than that of the best archers of the day. The ordinary light footman had lance and javelins and a small round shield of hide-cov- ered wood. He was a fine marcher, and some of the men could keep pace with a galloping They and the Gauls were wont to indulge in fearful outcries in battle. They were very clever in casting darts, and were not apt to miss their aim at any fair dis- tance. The Africans were straight- Lig-ht Footman. featured, strong and hardy. They shaved their heads and left but a small fringe of beard. They tattooed extensively. They wore a red hood, a white woolen shirt hanging to the knees and belted at the waist. A bournous, or cloak, or the skin of a goat or some wild beast, covered their shoulders. Their legs were bare. A long lance, bow and arrows, a buck- ler of elephant's or bull's hide, sometimes a long sword, were their weapons. Some had special arms, such as flails, and harpoons held by a cord. Later, Hannibal armed these men with the Roman weapons picked up on the battle-fields of the Trebia and Trasimene and Canna;. The Africans were peculiarly tough, faithful and uncomplaining. They African. THE CAVALRY. 23 were hideously cruel to their prisoners, and hard to restrain from massacre ; but they were the best of material from which to make a de- voted army. The ordinary heavy cav- alry was African, Spanish and Gallic. The Span- iards had good horses, used to a hilly country, and these habitually car- ried two warriors, one to fight on foot and one on horseback. The Gallic Spanish Cavalryman. horse was better even than the foot. The African was, however, the best, and was exceedingly well mounted and equipped. The Numidian cavalry, under which name came the irregular light horse of scores of tribes, was the most numerous and perhaps the most useful of the Carthaginian soldiery. Their appear- ance, say Strabo and Ap- pian, belied their value. Almost naked, covered with but a leopard or tiger skin, which, hung over the left arm, served also as a shield with those who car- ried none, and armed with lance, casting darts and sword ; mounted on the small mean- looking runt of the steppes or desert, which, innocent of sad- dle or bridle, was guided solely by the voice or a slender rod, Numidian. 24 CHARIOTS AND ELEPHANTS. they were yet warlike, plucky, tireless, satisfied with little, and made up a wonderful body for partisan warfare. Useless if separated from their horses, so long as they were with them they were of distinct and unequivocal value. In attack they charged with fiery elan, but at once turned on meeting oppo- sition ; not, however, to fly, for they charged again and again, riding up into the very teeth of the foe, but never remaining to fight hand to hand with heavier troops. As a curtain for the army in which they served, and as an element to unsettle the morale of the enemy, they ranked among the best of light horse. They were equally useful on level or broken terrain, and were peculiarly clever in taking advantage of the acci- dents of the ground for ambush or temporary defense. In pursuit they never tired, and here they were the most dan- gerous of opponents. Like our own broncos or the Cossack horses, their little nags were wonderful for endurance and activity, and throve on food which would kill a civilized horse. On the other hand, they were cruel, reck- less and noted for plundering and rapa- city. Chariot In early times the Carthaginians employed chariots ; and after the war with Pyrrhus, elephants. It is not known whether they brought the habit of using chariots with them from Phoenicia, or found it in Africa. The employment of elephants they learned probably from the Epirot king, and made good use of it, as they could find an abundant supply of these animals in Africa. The elephants of the Carthaginian army were an uncertain feature. If they acted successfully they were, in conflict A PUNIC ARMY. 25 with nations which knew little about them, of untold moral value. If they lost their heads and turned, they might be stiU more dangerous to their own friends. For this reason, during the Second Punic War, their drivers carried maUet and spike to kill them in case they should grow unmanage- able or treacherous. A Carthaginian army presented a singular aspect. In the centre the heavy Cartha- ginian or Liby-Phoenician, Spanish or Gallic foot ; in front the Balaorean slingers, light troops and perhaps chariots ; on the flanks some heavy and swarms of Numidian cav- alry. The method in early days was not unlike that of the mobs of the Orient, but grew better by imi- tating Greelt models. StiU it was patched up of such di- verse elements that it is a wonder that even a good general could make it available. The train consisted generally of beasts of burden, mules, horses and beeves. In Italy, however, carts were often em- ployed. The management of the trains in the days of Han- nibal was extremely efficient, and at all times the trains were of moderate extent. The Carthaginian army .was quickly moved because not loaded down with baggage, nor consisting of much heavy ma- terial. It could march long distances, and its light troops preserved it from surprises. But these light troops at the same time devastated the country, making subsistence diffi- cult and retreat impossible ; and were often hard to control. Elephant. 26 FOR TIFICA TION. There was little organization, and under the every-day gen- eral little discipline. Owing to the vast numbers of cavalry- horses, and generally the presence of elephants, it could not be readily transported across sea ; and, like all armies full of unintelligent material, it was subject to severe epidem- ics of sickness. It must not be understood that such was the complexion of the army of Hamilcar or Hannibal. These partook pecul- iarly of the genius of their leaders, as armies always do. The above description applies to the Carthaginian army as a whole, and in most points not to those bodies which did such won- derful work in Spain and Italy. It is probable that the Carthaginians made use in fortificar tion and siege-proceedings of what was within the common knowledge of all civilized nations at that day. Castrameta- tion was certainly practiced. Troops, we know, were camped behind temporary fortifications when awaiting shipment or after disembarking. This is shown by the first commercial treaty with Rome in 509 b. c. But they did not fortify the daily camp. So far as minor tactics, arms, organization, and marches and battles are concerned, we do not know as much about those of the Carthaginians as about those of other nations. It is generally understood that, during the First Punic and down to the beginning of the Second Punic War, the heavy and regular foot and horse approximated largely to the Ma- cedonian type. Xanthippus, during the First Punic War, joined the Carthaginian army with a body of Greek mercena- ries. These of course retained the phalangial habit, and as they were the best troops in the army, and Xanthippus was placed in command of all the Carthaginian forces, the Greeks no doubt gave a phalangial training to the Carthaginians, whose foot was already set up somewhat after this fashion ; THE CARTHAGINIAN PHALANX. 27 for intercourse with Greece as well as the traditions of Tyre would no doubt accomplish so much ; and the knowledge of Alexander's wonderful successes would lead the Carthaginians to imitate his method, so far as they could learn it. The light and mercenary troops retained their own methods of combat, regulated by such masters as Hamilcar or Hannibal to suit the occasions which might arise. We shall see the latter introducing a number of Roman methods. The Carthaginian phalanx, then, like the Greek, was a mass designed to give one heavy shock. The details of the ' — 1014 P51L0I i^i^r^i^i i^-j^K,r-^ ! IVI^I\KI '■■' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SJS. CAVALRY flOSfc hoplites Jli CAVALHV □ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I IJO rr 1048 PELTASTS eOO FT. UO FT, Phalanx. phalangial organization have been given in describing the army of Philip and Alexander. The tetrarohia of sixty-four hoplites in four files sixteen deep, or the syntagma which contained four of these companies, that is, two hundred and fifty-six men in a body sixteen square, was the fighting unit. The smaller phalanx had sixteen syntagmas, or a total of four thousand and ninety-six hoplites or heavy infantrymen. In open or parade order the hoplites occupied six feet each way ; in close or battle order (the usual one), three feet ; in very close order to receive a charge, one and one-half feet, in which formation the whole was called a synapism. The hoplite had a shield and a pike from twelve to sixteen feet long, which the first three to five ranks held horizontally and the others vertically or slanted forward. The pike of even the fourth rank man projected beyond the first rank. That the Carthaginian soldier used the twenty-one foot Mace- 28 NUMBER IN THE PHALANX. donian sarissa is improbable. The Greeks never employed it. It required too much drill to use the sarissa to advan- tage. Whether the phalanx had, in addition to the hopHte, a somewhat less heavily armed soldier, like the Greek peltast, is not known. The peltast, midway between the hoplite and the light-armed footman, had sword, shield and lighter pike, and armor adapted to quicker movements. But it is highly probable that the peltast, or some equivalent of the peltast, was found in the Carthaginian phalanx, and it unquestion- ably had its light troops disposed like the Greek psiloi, to the extent of about half the hoplites in number, to fight as skir- mishers on front and flanks. There were practically no intervals in the phalanx. It was not a good body for hilly countries, lacking entirely the mobility of the Roman legion. Its advantages and disadvan- tages have been already discussed in the period of Alexander, and will be elsewhere in this. The cavalry, if organized on a Greek basis, was light and heavy, the former being mostly used in outpost duty. The heavy fought in a unit of sixteen ranks, four men deep, called an ile. How the Numidian and other light cavalry was organized is not known, but the Carthaginian army de- cidedly lacked homogeneity. The phalanx of this era had, in Greece, and probably in Carthage : — Heavy infantry 4,096 Light infantry 2,048 6,144 Heavy cavalry 512 6,656 Of light cavalry there was an indefinite number. Several of these phalanxes acting together in one line were known as a grand phalanx. That the Carthaginian army adopted POLITICAL ROTTENNESS. 29 exactly this formation is not known, but its organization was unquestionably phalangial. From the time of the First Punic War, the military power of Carthage was markedly on the wane. It was only the wonderful military capacity of Hamilcar Barca and his fam- ily which made the light to brighten — as it did indeed in a manner seen but a few times in the world's history — before it finally flickered and went out. According to Aristotle it was the corruption of the political atmosphere which led to this condition, the bald fact that everything had become pur- chasable, and that the same individual could hold more than one office. This circumstance, coupled to one other, that the government was, as it were, a shuttlecock between the two families headed by Hamilcar Barca, representing the patriotic aristocrats, and by Hanno, who marshaled the dem- ocratic peace-party, could terminate in but one way. It cannot be gainsaid that the successes of tiamilcar in Spain, brilliant as they were, contributed to the political de- cline of Carthage. The Iberian silver mines furnished means of purchasing what could not be otherwise got at home, and accelerated the growth of political dishonesty. Added to these causes was the fact that the Carthaginian fleet had suf- fered a fatal blow at the close of the First Punic War, from which it never raUied. All the efforts of the Carthaginians were unable to replace it on the proud plane it had occupied for generations. The power of Carthage had resided in its splendid fleet ; it now went over to its army, and this lay in Spain in the hands of the Barcas. Nothing so f uUy demon- strates the lack of vessels and the increased value of the army as the march of Hamilcar from Carthage to the PiUars of Hercules, and his crossing to Gades by transport. Two generations before, a Carthaginian army would have been transported by sea from the harbor of Carthage itself. 30 ABILITY OF THE BARCAS. But it must be noted, though the military power of Car- thage was about to expire, that, owing to the extraordinary military talent of the Barcas, Carthage never possessed an army so hardened by campaigns, so inured to discipline and so devoted to its chief as the one which Hannibal commanded when he left Spain on his way to Italy. This was in spite of the decadence of Carthage, and purely the individual work of this remarkable family. Military capacity is infrequently transmitted to posterity. The few exceptions to this rule shine with all the more radiance from their rarity. It is a curious fact that out of the six greatest captains of history, three, Alexander, Hannibal and Frederick, owe their armies to their fathers' skill as organizers, and the two former came honestly by their military genius. Gladius. III. CARTHAGINIAN WARS. 480-277 B. C. Bt 480 B. c. Carthage had acqtiired abundant territory in Africa, Spain, Sicily, the islands of the Western Mediterranean, and beyond the Pillars of Her- cules. Her main energies for over two centuries were devoted to the conquest of Sicily, in which scheme she was vigorously opposed by Syracuse. Through good and ill, Carthage ended by owning the western half of the island ; and during all this period she had repeated commercial treaties with Kome. It was her hold on Sicily which finally brought on the Punic wars, the result of Roman jealousy of her controlling influence so near the Italian peninsula. Before the beginning of the Sicilian wars, 480 b. c, Car- thage had won for herself a very substantial footing. She Sicily. had a large territory in Northern Africa ; possessed Sardinia, the Balearic Islands and some of the other smaller ones, a 32 CARTHAGE AND XERXES. part of Sicily, probably Corsica, Madeira and the Canaries; and had colonies on the coast of Spain and beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. Her naval accomplishments were extraordi- nary. A fleet under Hanno had sailed down the coast of Africa, it is thought as far as the equator, and his brother Imilco had at the same time sailed north to the shores of Great Britain, exploring the coast of Spain and France on the way. Her position Carthage is stated to have owed largely to the skill of Mago I., though its growth was proba- bly gradual. From this time to the First Punic War — the period of the greatest prosperity of Carthage — almost her entire energies were bent upon the sole ownership of Sicily. In this she was opposed by the city of Syracuse, whose pur- pose was the same ; and while Carthage nearly attained her object, she was eventually thwarted, and suffered meanwhile many bloody defeats. The first attempt of Carthage was made under orders of, or at least in connection with, Xerxes, whom she still acknowl- edged as Great King, and to whom, as above stated, she had occasionally paid tribute. This was in 480 B. c. WhUe Xerxes was to attack Greece from the east, Carthage would attack SicUy and prevent the Greeks of Sicily and southern Italy from aiding their countrymen at home. But the invar sion of Sicily by Carthage was repelled by Gelon, king of Syracuse, with a loss to the Carthaginians, according to Herodotus and Diodorus, of three hundred thousand men, — not a soul of this vast force returning to Carthage. This is not improbably an exaggeration. Sundry descents were thereafter made by Carthage on the island, with forces variously stated at from one hundred thou- sand to three hundred thousand men, and a not inconsider- able part of it was conquered or laid under contribution. Even Syracuse was besieged. But in 396 b. c. Dionysius, CAMPAIGNS IN SICILY. 33 tyrant of Syracuse, defeated the Carthaginians with a loss of one hundred and fifty thousand men, as we are informed by Diodorus and Plutarch. Not discouraged, the Carthaginians of the next generation renewed their attempts, and in B. c. 343 got possession of the town but not the citadel of Syracuse. Still this success was not lasting, and two years later the Carthaginians were all but driven from Sicily. Other invasions were made in 340 and 339 b. c, but had no better results. The Cartha- ginians were beaten back by Timoleon and finally begged for peace. This peace lasted nearly a generation. War then broke out again between Carthage and Syracuse, of which city Agathocles was tyrant. A Carthaginian army again besieged the town of Syracuse, and Agathocles replied by transporting his army to Africa and attacking Carthage. This resulted in relieving Syracuse, and brought Carthage to the verge of ruin (311-306 B. c). This carrying of the war into Africa is interesting as a prototype of the later invasions of the Romans. In 27&-276 b. C. the Carthaginians were again on foot and again besieged Syracuse. This city called to its aid Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, then in Italy. At first in a large measure successful, Pyrrhus was eventually compelled to leave Sicily. Carthage, however, retained much of her hold on the island, keeping her most important western city, Agri- gentum, and more than half its superficial area. Her next opponent in Sicily was Rome. In the wars thus summarized there is little of military in- terest. They are merely given to show with what equipment and experience in arms Carthage entered into her great struggle with Rome. The two great western cities had long had some connec- tion, brought about naturally enough by commercial matters. S4 TREATIES OF ROME AND CARTHAGE. The mariners of one nation were apt to be driven by storm; into tbe waters of the other, and as piracy and commero largely went hand in hand in those days, were not infre quently subjected to grievous hardships. To prevent or ti rectify these, the first treaty between Rome and Carthag was made in 509 B. c, followed by a second in 347 b. c. 1 synopsis of both is on record. They show that Carthage hel( a much stronger hand than Eome. A third, of which we havi no details, was made in 306 B. c. ; but it was manifest tha jealousy and friction between the rival cities was on the in crease. This was for the moment suspended by a fourtl Possessions of Carthage at the Beginning of the First Punic War. treaty, in 277 b. C, of an offensive and defensive natur against Pyrrhus, and Carthage offered to aid Rome with on hundred and thirty ships. It was not long after this that th first serious breach occurred, — a breach resulting in war which for generations bathed the territories of both in blood. IV, THE EARLY ARMY OF ROME. 500-350 B. C. From the most remote times the Romans were peculiarly patriotic and sub- ject to discipline. It was this which lay at the root of their strong military sys- tem. The earliest Roman organization was derived from the Greeks in southern Italy, and was practically the old Dorian phalanx. Serving TuUius divided the population into tribes, according to wealth, and every able-bodied citizen was bound to serve (or rather he alone had the privilege of serving), from seventeen to forty-five years of age. When the monarchy gave way to a republic, the consuls became the army-leaders instead of the kings. The youth of Rome ■was scrupulously trained to arms, and underwent a rigorous gymnastic di'ill. Both the Greeks and Romans began with the phalangial idea, which is rather a defensive than an offensive one. But the Romans had a peculiar way of tak- ing the initiative in war, and out of the phalanx they developed the germ of the legion, some time prior to 500 e. c. The heavy foot was set up in three lines, with intervals between centuries or companies, and the first and second lines cheekerwise, the horse on the flanks, and the light troops in front or rear, as needed. This enabled the second or third line to advance through the intervals to sustain the first and renew a failing combat. The number of men in the cen- tury and the legion was changed from time to time. Not till the Second Punic War was the legion the settled body which is commonly described, and even after this date it was materially altered. The Romans were good distance marchers, but careless in camp and outpost duty. In fortification and sieges they were behind the Greeks. But the one thing in which they excelled was in making every detail of their organization bend to the offensive idea, and in carrying this out with vigor and consistency. Their one rule was always to attack. There Las never been a people better adapted for war by nature and training than the Koman. At the root of this national aptitude lay two characteristics, intense love of Eome and unremitting zeal in subordinating all individual aspirations to the necessities of the state. These two virtues, patriotism and discipline, were infused into the Roman blood as early as the traditional time of the first kings. To trace 36 EARLY ROME. the details of the growth of the organization of the Roman army from the earliest era is an engrossing study, but it must here be done in brief space. The legion as it existed at the time of the war against Hannibal wiU be more fully treated. Eome under its earliest conditions was apparently little more than a den of robbers, a fortified asylum for adventur- ers, the rendezvous of all manner of roughs and outcasts. The heroes of remote antiquity were most of them of this stripe. The interesting traditions of the imperial city are inventions of later days. But this turbulent crowd showed one marked virtue. It had the good sense to perceive that by organization alone and the strictest of discipline could it hold its own in the midst of its warlike neighbors. This motley company of brigands by no means lacked leaders or intelligence, nor indeed high ambitions and admirable pur- pose, and out of their efforts to fit themselves to struggle against surrounding danger grew the most splendid military organization the world has ever seen. Whatever the early leaders may have been, or however named, they laid the foundation of an enduring people. The earliest Grseco-Italian military organization, from which Rome derived its own, was probably a Homeric collec- tion of the stoutest warriors on horseback. By the time of the kings this had, from the demands for greater numbers, changed to the Dorian phalanx of hoplites, with the horse- men on the flanks, and no doubt a few irregular skirmishers in front or flank. The entire population was early divided by the magnates of Rome into three tribes, each of which was held to furnish on call one thousand fully armed footmen, and one hundred horsemen, who should serve at their own cost and furnish arms and rations. This body of one thousand infantry was divided into ten centuries of one hundred men each, and the FIRST LEGION. 37 horse, generally made up of the richest citizens, into ten decuries of ten men each. The three thousand foot and three hundred horse thus provided for made up the legion which was the successor of the Dorian phalanx. There ap- LIGHT FOOT I n-rfi-ciwN-lMM-ffl I I t I I I 1 l -m i I I I I I I I 1 1 im'i I I' l I ^ I I MMJimiMtu ■ISO CAV. 1000 FOOT 1000 FOOT 1000 FOOT 'S" CAV. Early Legion. pears to have been a body-guard for the king or leader, con- sisting of three hundred specially selected mounted men, called celeres, who were paid and kept constantly on foot. These were the first standing force of Rome. Each thousand men were under a tribune, or colonel, each one hundred under a centurion or captain. Such was the bare skeleton upon which later changes were grafted. But what gave this body life was a singular spirit of discipline, subordination and patriotism, — an esprit de corps, — rarely equaled in the world's history. Gymnastic training and warlike exer- cises were of later growth. The early Roman was by his vagabond life already a vigorous soldier. To Servius Tullius (? 578-534 b. c.) is ascribed by tradi- tion the division of the population into classes according to wealth. The distinction between patricians and plebeians was already marked. There were raised from these classes, and armed according to the ability of each, one hundred and sixty-eight centuries of foot, or sixteen thousand eight hun- dred men, in four legions of forty-two hundred men each, two of juniors, seventeen to forty-five years old, and two of seniors, forty-six to sixty. There were also centuries of pioneers and musicians, and the total cavalry was twenty- four hundred strong. Every citizen must serve sixteen, or in case of need twenty, campaigns of six months each, if in the 38 SERVIAN CLASSES. foot, ten if in the horse ; no one might look for state employ- ment on less than ten years' service in the foot or five years in the horse, unless sooner disabled by honorable wounds. Service laid burdens upon the citizens, but brought honor and power in the state. None but citizens in good standing were permitted to bear arms. The Servian classes were cen- sus-tribes for both service and taxation. Political and mili- tary rights and duties ran side by side. The first class con- tained those who had farms of twenty jugera or more, or money to the amount of one hundred thousand asses or over. The value of the as (originally a pound's weight of copper or copper alloy) was very variable, being often reduced according to the necessities of the public treasury, — during the First Punic War to two, during the Second to one ounce, as Pliny tells us. Before the reduction, one hundred asses are stated to have been equal to nearly two dollars, which was the price of an ox. But this is quite unsatisfactory as a measure of value. The jugerum was about two thirds of an acre. The second class comprised those who had three fourths as much land or seventy-five thousand asses ; the third class, one half as much land or fifty thousand asses ; the fourth, one fourth as much land or twenty-five thousand asses ; the fifth, one eighth as much land or twelve thousand five hundred asses. Those belonging to the sixth class, who had less than this, were reckoned as supernumeraries. There were also classes of artificers and musicians. At the close of the Second Punic War, the sixth class was diminished by only exempting those who had but six thousand asses. The small area of the farms must have demanded considerable skill in cultivation ; judg- ing from the money qualification, even the fourth class was what we should call well-to-do. The arms of the first class were a helmet, breastplate or coat of mail, greaves, shield, sword and long lance ; the second class had no greaves, the PAY AND RATIONS. 89 third neither greaves nor breastplate, the fourth no metal helmet, and the fifth was, like the Greek psilos, armed alone with darts or bows. Under the kings, Kome had no soldiers who were not citizens ; but in the fifth century B. c. they began to make treaties with neighboring states, and these furnished legions to serve in connection with the Roman troops. These allies (sooii or civitates federatag) kept their own laws and cus- toms, but were bound to furnish each its quota of men, in legions assimilated to those of Rome. An army thus composed of soldiers called out in the spring, discharged in the fall, serving at their own cost and armed each according to his own fancy, was naturally subject to many inconveniences. It could not march far from home, could make no lengthy or distant campaigns, could not gar- rison captured cities. This weakness grew so marked that before the end of the siege of Veii, 405 B. C, the senate was forced to begin to pay, feed and equip the men. It is be- lieved by Niebuhr that the men were paid at a much earlier period. The pay was at first three and one third asses silver a day — one hundred asses a month — for a footman, twice as much for minor officers and cavalrymen, and thrice as much for a cavalryman who furnished his own horse. If the state- ment be true that one hundred asses would purchase an ox, this was a very high rate of pay ; but arms, equipments and rations may have been deducted from the pay. The rations consisted of corn, which the men ground themselves in hand- mills and made into porridge or a sort of pancake. And there were probably occasional meat rations as well. This step was the first towards the creation of a standing army in Rome ; for so long, as the soldier was fed, he was not restless if constrained to remain in the ranks, when he saw there was distinct need for his services. Longer campaigns could now 40 JUS MILITIA. be undertaken, and the leader of an army was less hampered in his manoeuvres. The change from kingdom to republic in no wise altered the military scheme of Eome. The commanders of the army were the two consuls instead of the kings. These, outside of Eome, had almost unlimited power. If there was but one army, the consuls drew lots for command. If two, each commanded one. If these two armies served together, each consul commanded on alternate days. This absurd habit continued for centuries, and, despite its absurdity, worked fairly well. On occasions of grave public danger, a dictator was chosen to take the entire military power in hand. This officer was then given full authority over army and state, peace and war, for the term of the war, but not usually for a period longer than six months. Associated with him was a master of the horse (magister equitum) whom he appointed, and who commanded the cavalry, as the dictator did spe- cifically the foot. To serve in the Koman army was looked upon rather in the light of a privilege than a duty, and was confined only to the worthy and to the free-born. The right to serve in the army was the exact complement to the duty to so serve ; to be a citizen meant to be a soldier. Stated shortly, the jus militim called all men into service between seventeen and forty-five years of age, with certain stated exceptions. No citizen under seventeen or over forty-five could be obliged to serve on active duty, though he might elect to do so and be perhaps accepted. After forty-five stiU remained service in the city - garrison (legiones urban*), or home guard-duty, which was confined to manning the defenses of the city or town in case of war. Men who reenlisted (emeriti or veterani) enjoyed especial honor and privileges. A citizen who had served twenty campaigns of six months THE RECRUIT. 41 each in the foot, or ten in the horse, was exempted. And as above stated, only he who had served half this number could aspire to any political office. Gallant service in war was the only stepping-stone to civic honors. Those physically wanting — generally not many among this plain and hearty people — were exempt. Small stature was not a grave objection. The burly Gauls laughed at the little Romans until they got to close quarters with them. The height was usually from five feet to five feet three inches. Men exceeding this height were not considered strong. Men under five feet were sooner accepted. Any disablement of hand or foot which rendered the man unable to wield his weapons, any weakness of sight or hearing, or any clear phys- ical defect exempted. The following was the man wanted, according to Vegetius, and a pretty good man he was, though the description belongs to a later period. " The recruit must have sharp eyes, a head carried erect, broad breast, stout shoulders, big fists, long hands, not a big belly, of well pro- portioned growth, feet and soles less fleshy than muscular. If he has all this, no stress need be laid on the height, for it is far more important that the soldier should be strongly built than tall." The man must also be of good moral char- acter, as, in this era of simple life and national virtues, was apt to be the rule. Citizens in the public service were exempt, but might vol- unteer. Priests and augurs were not expected to serve, un- less in Gallic invasions, when they must guard the treasury in the Capitol. In recognition of extraordinary services to the republic, citizens were sometimes exempted for a term of years, as were also at times towns or entire districts. No freedman or slave was allowed to serve, the latter be- ing considered on a level with the beasts of burden. But there were occasions in a later epoch when slaves were armed. 42 THE LEGION A PHALANX. served with distinguished credit and thereby earned their freedom. The bitterest punishment for a Eoman citizen was to be declared unworthy to serve. Whole provinces were thus punished on more than one occasion, as Bruttium, Lu- cania, Picenum and many cities, for joining Hannibal after Cannae, The youths of Rome were early trained to war. Under seventeen years of age, all boys were called tirones or re- cruits, and were systematically put through certain exercises by experienced drill-masters to fit them for their duty as sol- diers, namely, setting-up, marching, runnmg, jumping, climb- ing heights, swimming, the use of arms and bearing heavy weights. These exercises were constant and uninterrupted. The grown men kept up this training almost throughout life. From all this, of which the above is the baldest sketch, we can readily see why the Roman army grew to what it was. Not even the Spartans in their palmiest days had a system in which physique and personal devotion, added to broad intel- ligence, were thus united. Speaking in general terms, the arms and equipment of the Roman soldier were much like those of the Gi'eek. No doubt they came originally from the Greek colonists in Italy. No doubt, too, the original legion more nearly approached the phalanx than it did the legion of the later years of Rome. The three tribes were set up, each in ten centuries, without intervals, and the several classes of heavy troops stood close behind each other in two or three lines, while the light troops skirmished around the flanks and front, much as with the phalanx. The cavalry was uniformly on the flanks. Each levy-district furnished, by a regular system, an equal part of each century and each legion, so that the entire body and its several parts were homogeneous ; and the best men, that is, the non-commissioned officers, were in the front rank, so as ITS CHANGES. 43 to make the steel edge to the legion, as it had existed for centuries in the phalanx. The early Roman army was set up in eight to twelve ranks, and in a legion of three thousand men there were from two hundred and fifty to three hvindred and seventy-five files, covering a front of something less than a quarter of a mile. It was practically a phalanx. But starting from this com- mon point there was a divergence between Greek and Roman methods. The Greeks stuck to their one-shock idea, and used the light troops for duty requiring an open order. The Romans conceived the idea of a formation which would give each man more individual scope, and which would pro- vide for renewing a failing battle by bringing in fresh troops as occasion demanded. Out of this grew their later forma^ tion. The fourth and fifth class men were used as skirmishers, and the three first classes were set up as three lines, the best in the rear, the least good in front, and with the centuries at such intervals that the rear lines could advance through the leading ones to the attack, to relieve the others if over- matched, or to close up the line in one compact mass. This was an outgrowth of what originally was a phalangial order, and seems to have been already in use about 500 B. C. It was phalanx or legion, at wiU. It was reached by a process of individualizing. The Hellenic phalanx was a close order, and nothing else ; the Roman legion was an open order, which could be made close by the simple advance into the intervals of the rear lines. The pilum and gladius were the weapons repre- senting both distant and hand-to-hand fighting, and the use of the fortified camp allowed the offensive and defensive to be waged at wiU. This order was again improved, about the time of the siege of Veil, by making the intervals equal to the front of the cen- turies, thus forming a checkerwise line (quincuncialis) of great 44 THE THREE LINES. mobility. At the same time the arms of the men underwent a change from similar causes. The long pike of the Greek hoplite was shortened down to the hasta, to which was added a casting lance or pilum. Both could be used equally at long distance or hand to hand. Darts replaced bows and slings, except in special corps of light troops. All these changes tended towards closer quarters, and finally grew into making the sword the chief weapon of the heavy-armed for the final struggle ; and the sword was the terror of all who met the Roman legion. Many of these changes are ascribed to the Dictator Furius CamiUus. At the time of the second invasion of the Gauls (366 B. C.) he is said to have given to the Roman soldier steel helmets to resist the cut of the heavy Gallic sword, iron- rimmed shields and better lances, and to have drilled them in their use. About the middle of the fourth century B. C. the lines of the legion had got changed. The third class was now in the middle line, and the men were called hastati, from their long lance ; the second class, esteemed better-, was in front, and hence called principes. . This order gave the first blow with seasoned troops. The first or best class was in the third line, and hence called triarii. These three made up the heavy foot of the phalanx — or legion — which was still about three thousand strong, of which six hundred were triarii and twelve hundred each principes and hastati, more or less according to circumstances. The fourth and fifth classes were rorarii, young soldiers, and accensi, supernumeraries, who furnished the light troops. They varied from one thousand to sixteen hundred in number. In line they stood in the rear ; in battle they had no special place, but were used wherever needed. At a period not well established, each line was divided into INTERVALS. 45 fifteen centuries, but these had ceased to number one hundred men. Each century of principes and hastati had two cen- turions, sixty men in ten files six deep, a trumpeter and an ensign-bearer, sixty-four men in all. The centuries of the triarii had the same depth, but half the front and thus half the number. Intervals equaled century-fronts of the first two lines, and there were thirty to sixty paces between lines. The principes and hastati still stood checkerwise. After this the centuries were not again recruited up to one hundred. There were three hundred cavalry and three hundred sling- ers and archers attached to each legion. The cavalry, when in line, stood on the flanks ; in battle it was dispatched wher- ever it could be best employed. It sometimes fought dis- mounted to good effect. The archers and slingers had no specific place. Thus the legion had grown to consist of about forty-six hundred men, according to the numbers of the several bodies. The checkerwise formation, with the mobility it gave the several lines, must be considered a great advance in tactical formations, due to Jloman ingenuity and the spirit which prompted them to come to hand-to-hand work. In detail the formation was later much changed, but not in principle. In line of battle the Roman army thus had two lines and a reserve with the cavalry on the flanks. Often a reserve of supernumeraries was put between the lines, or the triarii were left to protect the camp. The cavalry was not infrequently placed in rear of flanks or centre, or indeed between the lines. The armies leaned their flanks on obstacles, woods, rivers or hills, but fought only in parallel order. They were not unapt to try to surround the enemy's flank, or to send out detachments to fall on his rear, by a circuit or from am- bush. An attack in mass on tiie centre to separate the enemy's wings was occasionally seen, but an oblique attack as 46 FOR TIFICA TION. practiced by Epaminondas and Alexander was not known to the Romans. Their tactics was simple. What is peculiarly marked in the tactics of the Romans, and worthy of repetition, is the fact that they always took the initiative ; they always attacked, never awaited attack. It was the defensive idea which bred the phalanx ; it was the offensive idea which out of the phalanx evolved the legion. The arrangement for renewing the fight with the fresh lines in the rear savored distinctly of the offensive. In camp, in early times, the Romans were careless. Their campaigns were undertaken only in summer, and they had not even tents. These they later made of sheepskin ; but in their stead they were apt to build huts of twigs and straw in permanent camps. There was at this early day no particular order of camping, nor any outpost-service deserving the name. Marches the Romans could, in all eras, make long and fast. They were used to their arms and carried their rations with them. But the extent of Roman territory was not great, nor the distance the armies had to move. Fortification and the art of sieges had not yet grown to any degree of perfection, though the Romans had got the general principle of the art from the Greeks. Though it was an ancient custom to do so, up to the time of the war with Pyr- rhus (beginning of the third century) the daily camp was not fortified with any system or regularity, says Livy. Cities were better fortified, in the manner usual with the ancients. Rome, from early times, was well protected by good walls. The old walls of Roma Quadrata on the Palatine had prob- ably no great strength ; but some king, Tarquinius Priscus it is said (? 616-678), surrounded the city with stone walls and towers, and began the construction of the Capitol or citadel. Under Servius Tullius the city counted its seven hills within a strong and massive wall. The kings of Rome spent a large part of the public treasure and booty in this way. SIEGES. 4T Testudo (from Column o£ Trajan Towns as a rule were taken by sudden attacks, by assault or ruse. In assaults, both ladders and tortoises were em- ployed in the early times, but gradually more skillful means came into use, no doubt learned from the Greeks. Undermin- ing walls and the use of man- telets and covers for the men date back to the fifth and sixth centuries. But the first real growth of which we have any record was at the siege of Veii, which lasted nine years, thus showing great inexpert- ness in management. Here the Romans first used walls of circumvallation around the town and contravallation against outside attack, as well as a movmd, all of which the Greeks had used at Platsea, thirty years before. Finally the town was taken (395 b. C.) by digging a subterranean passage which led to the citadel. From this time on larger progress was made. Catapults were soon introduced, having been adopted from Sicily, according to Diodorus. Rams came later. These siege devices have been fully described in connection with Alexander's army. On the whole the Romans had, from their adaptability and the necessity for being always ready for war, developed a system which promised far greater eventual results than the system of the Greeks. Such, briefly, was the growth of the art of war and its status among the Romans down to the siege of Veii and some- what later. At the time of the Punic wars there remained in principle the same system, but the details had been changed in many particulars. V. THE ROMAN AKMY OF THE THIRD CENTURY. The legions were raised by a rapid and careful system, which made the man- iples of even strength and material. The recruits took an oath, -were armed, and only then had the eagles delivered to their charge. The consul, powerless in Rome, was all-powerful in camp. Arrived at rendezvous, the organization was completed. The arms and equipment were helmet, shield, breastplate for the heavy foot, greaves, sword, pike and lance, all excellent of their kind. The special Roman weapon was the gladius. The cavalry was not as good as the foot, but during the Second Punic War it was much improved. The number of men in the legion varied in certain epochs from three thousand to six thou- sand men. The usual number was forty-two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The term legion meant one Roman and one allied legion, all told not far from ten thousand men, when f idl. The consular army was two legions, that is, from eighteen thousand to twenty-five thousand men. The early unit of ser- vice was the century, but each two centuries were later ployed together into a maniple ; and each set of maniples of principes, hastati and triarii, with its share of velites and horse, was a cohort. The cohort then became the unit. Inter- vals between maniples equaled their front, and the maniples of hastati and prin- cipes stood checkerwise. With cavalry on the flanks, a legion of ten thousand men covered a front of three quarters of a mile, and had a depth of about nine hundred feet. In line of battle, the Roman legions were in the centre, the allied on the flanks. The consular army covered a front of one and one half miles. The Romans were fast but careless marchers, and subject to surprises, until Hannibal taught them caution. They still invariably attacked. Battle was opened by the velites, followed up by the first line and decided by the second and third, the cavalry meanwhile fighting on the flanks. What lent the legion mobility was also a source of weakness, — the iutervals. When tliey met an enemy who was apt to penetrate into these, they advanced the second line into or close up to the intervals of the first. The youth were still trained as soldiers from their earliest years, and drilled not only in the "Tactics," but in mock combat and camp-fortification as well. Labor was unremitting. Tlie evolu- tions of the Romans at drill were much the same as to-day, and commands were given by the trumpets. The eagle of the legion was the rallying-point, as sacred as the " colors " of a regiment of modem days. RECRUITING. 49 In the epoch to which this volume is devoted, the Roman army had not undergone material alteration, but it had been much improved in its details. The jus militim was still un- changed. Only citizens, with the exceptions already existing, were allowed or compelled to serve. By constant use in war the organization had become better settled. Polybius tells us how the armies were recruited. When the consuls had been elected the war-tribunes were chosen, twenty-four in all, fourteen from those who had served five years and ten from those who had served ten. On the day set for the levy the citizens fit for military duty were as- sembled on the Capitoline hill, by means of a flag hoisted on the Capitol and public announcement by heralds. Later on, the field of Mars was the rendezvous. The arrivals grouped themselves in their tribes, at this time thirty-five in number. To raise the usual four legions, two for each consular army, the war-tribunes were first distributed by a sort of rote to the legions, six to each. The tribunes of each legion then by lot called up each tribe in turn and selected four men, as much alike in qualifications as was possible. One of these was assigned to each legion. This method proceeded by turn among the tribes until the required number had been chosen, and each legion was thus served as nearly alike as possible. The recruits then took the oath, one of their number speaking for all : "I swear that I wiU obey my superiors, and use all my strengtli to carry out that which they order," and the rest, coming close to him, one by one, repeated " I also." This oath varied at different epochs. No consul, by law, might exercise command within the boundary of the city of Rome. The chosen recruits were therefore assembled on a given day in their respective le- gions, unarmed, at the most convenient locality outside the 50 RAPID ORGANIZATION. city limits, were assigned to whatever part of the legion was legal or expedient, and armed and equipped according to as- signment. The quffistors then delivered to their keeping the eagles, which had been kept for safety in the treasury in the Capitol. The consul, before joining the army, paid certain rites at the Temple of Mars, shook the shield and lance of the statue of the war-god, and not until then assumed the appropriate garb of his office. He then joined the army. Before marching, the army cleansed itself by appropriate sacrifices (lus- tratio). War, as with the Greeks, was de- clared by heralds, who first formally demanded satisfaction for injury done, and in case of refusal cast a blood- stained spear ujjon the territory of the opponent. Battles were preceded by sacrifices and religious ceremonies, and after a victory sacrifices were re- newed. Such were the formal proceedings. But these were often shortened by the requirements of haste, or were simplified when large bodies were raised. The four consular legions, in- cluding the cavalry, coiUd be set on foot within twenty- four hours. L. Quintius Cincinnatus, dictator in 457 B. C, raised, armed and equipped the legions, and set forth on his march between sunrise and sunset of one day. One entire campaign in 445 b. c, beginning with the calling in of the tribes and including their armament, one day for the march out, the defeat of the enemy five miles beyond the boundary Consul with War Cloak. CAVALRY. 51 Koman Cavalrymau (from Column of Trajan). of Eoman territory, and one day for the march home, was comprised in the space of four days. In the cavalry only those linights (equites) could serve who were rated as own- ing fifty thousand asses. There was a general lack of horses and a decided preference for foot duty among the Romans, largely owing to the expense of cav- alry service. In early days the Roman cav- alry was very lightly armed, — much like ve- lites, in fact, — and was correspondingly ineffective ; later they were given helmet, breastplate, greaves, a shield, sword and stout lance, but none of these were as heavy as those of the infantry. The horsemen received their horses from the state. A gold ring was their badge. They stood (count- ing Romans and allies) in the ratio of about one to ten of the infantry, the same proportion as the three hundred cavalry to the old legion of three thousand men. They took the same oath. The raising of legions among the allies was undertaken at the call of the consuls in the same manner and at the same time, but by somewhat simpler means. They then marched to the rendezvous and joined the Roman legions. Velite. 62 ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. GaleEB. Arrived at rendezvous, the recruits were usually assigned by the tribunes : those from seventeen to twenty-five years old to the light foot, now all called velites ; those from twenty-five to thirty to the hastati ; those from thirty to forty to the principes ; those from forty to forty-five to the triarii. Exceptions were, how- ever, made in recognition of ability or service. The arms and equipment were then issued to all. To each of the ve- lites were given a leathern helmet (galea) lined with sponge and leather, a small round wooden shield (par- ma) three feet in diameter and a good protection against arrows or sling - stones, a sword and seven darts. These darts were usually thirty inches long and about the thickness of the finger, but their form va^ ried material- Darts, ly- Their tips were long and slender, and after they had struck an object were gener- ally so bent as to be useless to the enemy until repaired. To the legionaries, hastati and principes, were given as armor a leather helmet cov- ered or strengthened with Lorica. iron, and ornamented with red and black plumes (cassis); Oerea. THE GLADIUS. 53 a breastplate made of metal scales sewed upon stout leath- er, which covered shoulder, breast and abdomen (lorica) ; greaves for the legs (ocrea), much like the Greek, but particularly stout for the right leg — for the Roman legionary soldier calculated to go at the enemy with his sword more than any other weapon — and a large square, curved shield (scutum), semi - cylindrical on a radius of about nine inches, made of stout, well-fitted wood, leather- covered and iron-edged, and often having in the middle a knob with which the legionary was expert in pushing and striking his enemy. His weapons were the terrible gladius, a two-edged sword of Spanish origin, with twenty-inch blade two inches wide, used both to cut and thrust, and vastly better than Scutum (Trajan Column). =SS»- Pilum. the Greek sword, which was a mere knife ; a heavy lance (pilum) of cornel wood, whose dimensions are variously giveuy^ut probably two inches square, with rounded corners, 54 THE "OLD GUARD." at one time five and a half feet long in the shaft, with nine- inch iron, at another with three feet shaft and two and one half feet iron, of Italian invention ; and a lighter lance (hasta) of equal length. The head of the lances was apt to he made with hooks or fins, so that they could catch an ene- my's shield and pull it off his arm. The Eomans had first used square shields ; they then adopted from an Hellenic source a round shield ; and lastly took up, not from the Samnites as tradition says, but probably from the Greeks, the cylindrical scutum. The triarii, sometimes called pilani (and hence the hastati and principes antepilani), were the " Old Guard," to be called in to decide a victory or fore- stall defeat. They had, in lieu of the heavy lance, a pike which at times varied from ten to fourteen feet, and sometimes carried sev- Gladius (from ^^^\ ^^^.^^^ Jq tjjg left hand within the shield. Jrompeu). This whole equipment, which, however, was changed from epoch to epoch, so that it is difficult to define it at any one time, was excellent. Defensively, while pro- tecting the soldier, it allowed him the free use of body and limbs. The weapons were of thorough workmanship, and the sword, in the hands of the practiced soldier, could pene- trate any armor, as could the lance, well thrown. In the wars with Greece, Livy relates that the Romans inflicted 1-/U Gladiua. Hasta. POOR CAVALRY. 65 Hastffi. blows with the glaclius which cut off arms and legs, and even severed the head from the body of an oppo- nent. It was the favorite weapon. The sol- diers were trained to serve in any capacity, and the heavy legionaries could act as skir- mishers, the velites could charge in close or- der and the horse fight on foot. The cavalry was by no means as good. This arm had never been a favorite with the Romans. It was considered as a mere auxiliary to the foot. The horsemen's equip- ment was not as thoroughly made, nor were their weapons as well fashioned, as those of the foot. Even at the beginning of the Punic wars the horsemen had no armor, only leather shields which the rain weakened, poor swords, and lances far from stout enough. They pre- ferred to fight on foot rather than mounted. More- over, the Roman was not as natu- rally a horseman as were the wild tribes from which Hanni- bal drew his cav- alry. It was, in- deed, in this that Hannibal saw and used his great ad- vantage. But the Romans learned the lesson, and before the end of the Second Punic Wai Prmoeps. Hastatus. 56 EQUIPMENT OF CAVALRY. had placed their cavalry on an excellent footing, giving it helmets and armor, greaves and boots, darts, twelve- foot lances, sharp at both ends, and a curved sword. The cavalryman had neither saddle, which was intro- duced in the fourth century A. D., nor stirrups, which date from the sixth. He rode on two blankets, the inner one felt or leather, held in place and fastened together by surcingle, breast- strap and crupper. These were often ornamented to a high degree. A bridle completed the harness. In his left hand the cavalryman carried his shield and bri- dle, and kept his right free for sword or lance. No wonder, one might say, that the Roman cavalryman, thus burdened, was not effective. And yet Alexander's Companions, the most splendid body of cavalry of antiquity, were armed in like manner. Eather wonder that the ancient cavalryman ever was good. Triarius. Roman Cavalryman (from the Arch of Constantine). Exactly how much space the cavalryman took up in the FORCE OF LEGION. 57 ranks we do not know, but it is most credibly stated at five feet front by ten feet depth. Scipio Africanus later became the father of the Roman horseman, and made the arm effec- tive and reliable. The description of the arms of the Eo- man soldier is carefully made by the old authors ; the picto- rial delineation, such as the procession on the column of Trajan, varies much from the histories. This is to be re- ferred to the different eras of which the books and monu- ments treat. The variation is not material. The number of men in the legion varied considerably at different times. In the third century b. c. there were still supposed to be twelve hundred velites, twelve hundred prin- cipes, twelve hundred hastati and six hundred triarii, besides three hundred horse, or in allied legions six hundred horse. The number of the triarii and horse was apt to remain the same, but the others varied so much at times that the legion was all the way from four thousand two hundred to six thou- sand men. After Cannae there was five thousand foot in the legions ; Scipio in Africa had fifty-two hundred ; ^millius PauUus in Macedon six thousand. Two hundred of the horse of the allied legions, added to eight hundred and forty of the foot, made up a special body called extraordinarii, who, with those of the other legions, were a sort of reserve body under immediate command of the general. Of this body, one fifth — the best of the men (ablecti) — formed his body-guard. These were hostages for the fidelity of their respective cities. Other subject nations, not allies, were not figured in with the Roman legions, but their forces kept their own organi- zation, being used as auxiliaries merely, and having no set place in line. The term " legion " was apt to mean one Roman and one allied legion, nearly ten thousand men. Thus the usual consu- 58 ORIGIN OF THE MANIPLE. lar army of two legions was really two Roman and two allied legions, eighteen to twenty thousand men, of which eighteen hundred were horsemen. If the two consuls were together, they had, during the Second Punic War, not far from forty thousand men. In combat, the swaying to and fro of the lines often isola- ted the unit of service, separated as it was by intervals from its neighbors, and the Romans had gradually found that the century unit was somewhat too small to combat successfully on open ground with troops in more compact order. Though it had done abundantly well against the nations with some- ^^ what similar organization which it had had to meet, it had found difficulty in resisting the masses of the Gauls and the phalanxes of Pyrrhus, and before the Punic wars they had com- bined each two neighbor- ing centuries into one body, making a maniple. This added strength without loss dUN. CENTURION ° SEN OooddooOttoAoo ©CENTURION oooooooo eooo oTRUrlPETER oooooooo oooo oooooooo oooo oooooooo oooo oooooooo oooo oooooooooooo oooooooo OOoO oooooooo Oooo OOOO oooo oooo SUB CENTURIONS Maniple. of flexibility and ease of manoeuvring. The light troops and the cavalry remained as they were. The three lines were also changed so as again to put the hastati in the lead, then the principes, then the triarii. This gave the first shock in action with the youngest and presumably most fiery troops, and fol- lowed it up with the older and steadier. Each of the two first lines, not counting officers, was thus in ten maniples of one hundred and twenty men each, in twelve files ten deep, and each was still divisible into two centuries or twelve deeuries. The maniples of the triarii were but sixty strong, in six files ten deep. The velites, though numbered with the hastati and SPACE BETWEEN MEN. 59 the principes, sixty to each maniple, liad no special place in line. If the legion was nu- merically strengthened, it ^ " was done by adding more uvuuuuuuvuu 00000 OOOO 000000 000 Turma of Cavalry. men to each maniple of has- tati and principes. Thus, after Cannse, the legion, made up to over five thou- sand footmen, had sixteen hundred hastati, sixteen hundred principes, six hundred triarii, all in files ten deep, and from IT Tt JT QT] Ala of Cavalry. twelve hundred to sixteen hundred velites. The horse re- mained the same. The space allowed to each man is also variously stated. It seems to have been the ground he stood on, plus three feet between him and his neighbor, thus being- about five feet front by four feet and a half deep. This gave him ample room to use his weapons. It was nearly twice the space allowed the phalangite in battle order. He was drilled, however, to close this distance down to three or even one and a half feet to resist cavalry or to form a tortoise. The maniples still stood checkerwise in Hne of battle, and two hundred and fifty feet or more were be- tween the lines, as had been the case with the century for- mation. I '" I VEUTES TRIAAII TOTAL njRce «o Men Cohort. 60 THE COHORT. The cavalry of each legion was divided into ten turmse of thirty horsemen, and each turma into three decuriae of ten horsemen. The turmse stood in ten files three deep. The ten turmae in line were called a wing (ala). The maniples and turmse were all numbered, and a maniple oo.oootooo of l^astati, one of principes VZWVZ ""'"'' and one of triarii, from J front to rear, with the '^»(88?8!H!!s!Hs!rsisss!FJsr„^S«°^™^' velites who belonged to uo(sS8S8?S?S8SSSSSS8SSSSSSS8§S?SSf»iNciPEs them and one turma, were «<5 -UooooooooooooooooocoooooooooooTKiAKii termed a coliort. i^rom. oooo oooo ooao OOOOOOOOOOQOOOOOOOOOOOOaOOODOO o oQooooo 000 Qooooooo goo oooo oooo VELITES ooooooaoaooooooD the riglit, the first maniple ooooflooooooooooooQOogooo v/ELlTES 1 r 1 j. j_* ' * 8SSS8888§S8S8888S88SlSS8 each ol hastati, prmeipes Cohort in one Detaehment. and triarii, their velites and the first turma, made up the first cohort of the legion. There were thus ten cohorts in each legion, each cohort having troops of all arms and numbering four hundred and fifty men, namely, one hundred and twenty velites, one hun- dred and twenty hastati, one hundred and twenty principes, sixty triarii and thirty cavalry, or up to five hundred and ,100 fT - mmmmcDmmcnncp* % cnmcnraEricDmcniii m?* i • TRIARlt ■ » VELlTtd aDr:::D[:::in[-:Q::::[]r:::[]r:-g[-Qr::;Q[:n[J^ j- Infantry of the Legion. seventy men, namely, one hundred and sixty each of velites, hastati and principes, sixty triarii and thirty cavalry. In this fashion, either a maniple or a cohort could be treated as the tactical unit, according to the duty required. The cohort SPACE OCCUPIED BY LEGION. 61 was our battalion. Later its organization was materially changed. The front space occupied by a legion, that is, one Roman and one allied legion of forty-two hundred men each, plus three hundred Eoman and six hundred allied horse, total nine thousand three hundred men, may, in round numbers, be thus figured out : — Infantry, each maniple with 12 files, each of 5 feet front, making 60 feet front, or for 20 mani- ples, 10 in the Roman and 10 in the allied legion 1,200 feet To this add 20 intervals between the 10 mani- ples of 60 feet each, or 1,200 feet 2,400 feet Cavalry, 900 men in 3 ranks or 300 files, each file of 5 feet 1,500 feet Intervals between cavalry and infantry, say . . 100 feet Total 4,000 feet The velites took up no front space. The legion thus cov- ered about three quarters of a mile of front. This gave eight thousand four hundred infantry to a front- age of twenty-four hundred feet or seven hundred and forty metres. There were thus but eleven men to each metre front as against twenty-eight men in the phalanx, and six or seven men, including reserves, in modern armies. The depth of the legion may be thus reckoned : — The hastati, file of 10 men at 4^ feet ^ 45 feet, and the interval at its rear = 250 feet, say 295 feet The principes, do 295 feet The triarii, do _45 635 feet The velites when out in front may have taken up 265 feet Making the depth of the legion 900 feet The cavalry on the wings, if in one line, was less than forty feet deep. Thus the legion was a body of four thousand 62 THE CONSULAR ARMY. feet front largely made up of intervals, by some nine hundred feet depth, reckoned from the skirmishing line backward. In the line of battle of the consular army II the Roman legions occupied the centre, the II allied were on their right and left. The en- 11 tire cavalry was on the flanks of the army, a ^ & or in front or in rear as needed. At times, el B ° placed between the lines, it broke out through gl s I the intervals with good effect. The allied g« B a extraordiuarii and ablecti made up a special g = g, reserve, whose place was determined by the „ - g, leader, and was often between the flank of B D 1^ a Q the infantry and the cavalry. The consular army with its two Roman and two allied le- ^ I B d" «^ pions and intervals between them thus occu- ^- a f < pied a front space of a mile and a half or |, a -g ,| over, with a depth of nine hundred feet, ^r a I o The intervals between cavalry turmse, and B { B ■'a'"' -\ B a B B B §■ 13 B D B a B ff a ' ■•£ B B 1, a \ a B ^ B d a I B a 'a" "t a & a & a a a D a e Q a B D □ B 8. B b ^2 a f between foot and horse are uncertain. The ^i B J exact frontage cannot be determined, fi" B f Such was the formation of the legion dur- ?.---B— "I ing the Punic wars. Later, the prinoipes e g B were put back into the first line, the hastati in second, and the velites, if not in front, in e 5 g = a third line, while the triarii were held in a BE, f 8> sort of reserve still farther back or left to a ^ S, guard the camp or baggage. This change II was made from the experience of the Second 11 Punic War, which showed that fiery assault 11 alone was not enough. It must be stanch and lasting as well as gallant. Some modern authorities read the ancient authors to give the Roman soldier a total space of only three feet. Were this CXTnAQRQrNkflll Q & FOOT. Q ORDER OF MARCH. 63 so, the legion woidd occupy a correspondingly smaller front. The legion of Vegetius differs materially from those of Poly- bius and Livy, and the details are not reconcilable. The Eomans, up to the battle of Lake Trasimene, were care- less about their order of march. "° . . The armies moved from one camp to the next in any conven- ient manner and without precau- tions, and were liable to sur- prises and ambuscades. Fabius Cunctator did much to obliter- ate this evil, and there was in- troduced a regular method of march (agmen) in one or more columns, by cohorts, or variously by the flank. In front, as a van, went the extraordinarii and part of the velites ; then, if the army was marching by the right flank, the first allied legion, with its impedimenta ; then the first Roman legion, the second Ro- man legion, the second allied legion, each with its train. Fol- lowing was a rear-guard of the ablecti and the rest of the velites. By the left flank the order was reversed. The cavalry usually rode with the baggage train. In the front and on the flanks were thrown out a large number of scouts or flankers (specu- latores) to give notice of the presence of the enemy. In retreat the extraordinarii and part of the velites were the 00 ..i.riy n ^ 2 BAGGAGE •"■'" ;aS»CAVAlM 00 1«' KrtM 1.E610[« a a 00 t" noiUN § § LCaoM 00 O o ** CAVALAT 00 '»"»«U.ltD g 1 LC6I0H Agmen not near Enemy. 64 MARCH NEAR ENEMY. rear-guard. In passing a defile the column had to be ployed into smaller space. The above order of march was suited to the open country of a great part of Italy. But, except the presence of artillery, all the difficulties of marching an army to-day existed in greater measure in the time of the Punic wars. The order was changed from day to day, to make it easier for the troops and equalize the foraging. In open country, in the presence of the enemy, the march D /,■/ " dXs' D// ^-^^ > „\ D H =00 gj PACKED Si Order of March near Enemy. was conducted by the flank in three columns, hastati, prin- cipes, triarii, the baggage of each maniple preceding it, so that there would be no long train for the enemy to attack. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 65 The baggage could readily turn out of the ranks and park, and the legions quickly form front to right, left or forward. The presence of the enemy on the right or left would dictate whether the march should be left or right in front. The velites and cavalry shielded the front and exposed flank. As from earliest times, the Romans still always attacked. No nation ever grasped the idea of the initiative so firmly. Nothing but their dread of Hannibal ever altered this habit. The sign for battle having been given, the troops, duly pre- pared and often spurred on by a battle speech (allocutio) from the general, moved out of camp and drew up in line not far therefrom. They looked upon the intrenched camp as a fortress, and fought near by it if possible. All the baggage and heavy burden of the soldiers remained in camp under a specially detailed guard, — in time of great danger the triarii. Polybius and Vegetius tell us that the Romans had seven orders of battle. But these were the development of the books rather than the field. In the period to which we refer the orders were confined to the parallel and some variations running towards the oblique, as we shall see. As a rule, only the parallel was used, and the cavalry operated round the enemy's flanks. A wedge was sometimes formed to pierce the enemy's centre, and turning movements by detach- ments or by one wing were common. The oblique order, as taught by Epaminondas and Alexander, was not known. Battle was opened by the signal of the trumpets. At this, the army gave its battle-cry, from the sound of which the general could often foretell success or failure, or at least gauge the moral tone of the men. At the second signal the army advanced, at the quick-step. A third signal was some- times given at the proper distance for the line to take the double-quick, which it did with loud shouts, the clashing of lance on shield and the sounding of aU the horns and bugles, 66 COURSE OF A BATTLE. — the better to encourage the men and demoralize the enemy. The velites advanced in open order in front of the legion- aries, hurled their darts and attacked in small companies, to tire the enemy and bring him into disorder. When the le- gion advanced, the velites retired through the intervals, part falling back behind the triarii, and the rest sustaining the hastati and principes, furnishing tliem with darts and spears, and carrying the wounded to the rear. For the latter service there was also a special corps of deportates. The hastati now attacked the enemy, — or the principes, when these were in first line. At a distance of eight to ten paces from the enemy they hurled their spears, the javelins first and then the pike. The first ranks are described as bending slightly, to allow those in the rear to fire over their heads, thougli there was space enough between the men for this purpose. They then fell to with the sword. This attack might last a few minutes, or it might last for hours. If the first line was beaten back, it retired rapidly through the inter- vals of the second, or rather the second line advanced into or through its intervals, to sustain it or take its place. A tired line could be thus reinforced or entirely rested. The second line, or the first and second together, now attacked in like manner. If driven back, the triarii advanced to the attack. These veterans had been waiting their turn. They are por- trayed as having one knee on the ground, and holding their shields aloft to ward off the enemy's long-range missiles, though at their distance in the rear tliis would seem to be im- necessary. They now stood ready to make the third and final attack, either alone or in connection with the defeated lines, which may have formed in their intervals or in their rear, while the extraordinarii still remained for a last effort. The cavalry, during this time, had made its charges upon the WEAKNESS OF INTERVALS. 67 enemy's horse, and, if successful, followed it up or turned upon the flanks and rear of the enemy's line. The use of amhush on the enemy's flank or flanks was common. If the enemy was defeated, the cavalry followed him up with the velites, and the extraordinarii were in support. The legion followed after in three lines as before. In case of retreat, the cavalry, velites, extraordinarii and triarii cov- ered the movement. Of course all this was only the prescribed rule. As in all battles there was the usual wavering of the lines, the success of one group and the failure of its neighbors, the uncertainty and risk, the gallantry of some cohorts and the demoraliza- tion of others, the difficulty of managing a line perhaps two miles in length, and all the attendant features of armed con- flict. The rule was what should be done ; circumstances dic- tated what was done. Such was the technical battle-method. But the Romans more than any other people, even the Greeks, excepting al- ways Alexander and his lieutenants, paid heed to the ground on which they fought or the position of the enemy, and altered their dispositions accordingly. Their battles have a general similarity of character, but all vary much in detail. One decided weakness of the legion was the very thing which lent it mobility, — its intervals. In its conflict with the Gauls and Spaniards, whose preponderance of force was great and whose individual bravery was marked, it was sev- eral times compromised by the enemy making his way in groups between the intervals and taking the maniples in flank and rear. This danger the Romans learned to overcome by mov- ing the second line up into the intervals of the first, or by reducing the distance between the lines so as to cover these intervals effectually. We shall see quite another form of co- hort used by Marius and by Ctesar in his Gallic wars. But 68 TRAINING OF YOUTH. at this era, whatever the exceptional changes, the formation prescribed by the " Tactics " was with the intervals mentioned. To refer again to the groundwork of the Eoman plan of military organization, — the training of youth. In this they varied wholly from the Greeks. They did not teach the young citizen the theory of war, but gave him a practical drilling in what he would have to do when at seventeen years of age he would be drafted into the ranks. They had no schools or teachers of science ; they considered such learning unneces- sary — certainly less excellent than the habit of obedience, coupled with strength and the expert use of arms. Thus they laid the foundation of exemplary discipline and a prac- tical knowledge of what war was among the rank and file. The higher military education was left to the richer and more noble families to give by private instruction to their sons. But these sons, in common with all the rest, must report at given times on the field of Mars for drill. No exceptions were made. Here, under experienced drill - masters and headed by old soldiers, they were practiced in the soldier's set- ting-up, marching in correct time and style, the run, climbing heights and walls, singly and in squads, with and without arms and baggage, jumping ditches and obstacles, vaulting and swimming. They were taught the use of aU the weapons they would be called on to handle, for which purpose heavy posts were set up at which the youths shot with bows, cast darts and spears, and on which they made sham attacks with the sword ; and they were instructed how to use their shields so as to protect the body in every position. In these exer- cises all weapons were much heavier, Polybius says twice the weight of the actual ones, to inure the youth to his work. In addition to the above, heavy loads were carried, intrench- ments dug, camps fortified and such works attacked and defended. ROMAN TROOPS. 69 Once in service, the soldier had yet harder work to do. He was steadily drilled in the field, in camp and in garrison. But for proficiency here, handsome rewards were given. Con- stant occupation was believed to be the best means of keep- ing up the soldier's morale, — a truism which is not always acted on to-day. Hence practice-marches with full equip- ment and baggage, manoeuvres, fortification so far as it was essential for the camp, were common ; and the men were not infrequently put on public works. The vast amphitheatres, aqueducts and roads of Rome were largely the creation of the Roman soldier. Such preparation of youth and soldier enabled Rome speed- ily to raise large armies of men fully ready for their task, fit for immediate duty and able to undergo gi-eat fatigues and perform exceptional work in every weather and under all conditions. Moreover, the Romans seemed unusually free from sickness and camp epidemics, — the very reverse of the Carthaginians. AH this must be borne in mind when we come to the ques- tion of what troops Hannibal had to encounter. Historians are wont to refer to Hannibal's men as veterans and to the Romans as raw recruits. At the outset such were the condi- tions, but they did not long obtain. The Roman raw levies needed but one or two short campaigns and a slight degree of success to be superior as soldiers to all but a few of the best Punic troops. The tactical manoeuvres of the Romans did not vary much from those of the Greeks, from whom they were unquestion- ably derived. But in its drill the legion was much more elastic and quick in motion than the average phalanx, though it might be hard to draw a comparison between it and the phalanx of Philip and Alexander. It was wont to move forward and to the rear, and by either flank ; to open and (70 BUGLES. close order, ploy and deploy, double ranks and wteel; in short, perform all the operations known to modern minor-tac- tics. The ancient minor-tactics were very cleverly devised, and executed with the skiU which comes of constant prac- tice. The infantry common-time step was one hundred and twenty to the minute, the quick one hundred and forty-five, the double-quick and run according to circumstances. The cavalry-drill was in this period much simpler than the infantry. Not till after the Second Punic War did this arm attain much suppleness in manoeuvres. Scipio Africanus was the first to introduce good cavalry tactics, which he did in Spain. Polybius gives us interesting details of these. The individual was well drilled, alone and in squads, and Lituus. Buccina. Tuba. the turma was practiced in wheeling to right, left and rear ; in forming column to the right or left or forward from the centre ; in forming line with intervals or without ; in ploy- ing into column of more or less files, and in marching to the front or by the rear rank, with many other exercises. All these evolutions were practiced at every speed. The usual musical instruments employed by the Romans were four ; the lituus, which was a horn made of leather- BUGLE-CALLS. 71 Cornu. covered wood curved at the end, was chiefly used by the cav- alry ; the tuba, made of copper, two and a half feet long, straight, was the infantry bugle ; the buccina, a shell - shaped trumpet, and the cornu, also a curved trum- pet, lighter in shape, were in gen- eral use. The difference in tone of these several horns, and the variety of notes and calls which could be blown on them, made them very useful. They were employed in camp, on the march, in battle, to indicate various evolutions, call the men to certain duties or meals, or change guards, apparently much more than bugle-calls are used to-day. The leader had a special call, classicum, which he alone might use. Drills were performed by the sound of the trumpet. Com- mands for all the manoeuvres necessary in battle could be and were so given. The signal blown by the general-trumpeter was repeated throughout the command. There were no firearms or artillery to drown the trumpet-blast. The musicians belonged to the centuries, maniples, and cohorts, some generally to the legion, and each leader of a detachment had his special buglers. Flags, like ours, were used only to call troops together. The standard was origi- nally a simple affair, such as a bundle of hay tied on a lance ; later it was a carved human fist on a lance, — hence manipulus, a handful or squad. The " colors " of the legion were an eagle of silver or gold mounted on a staff, Cohort Standard. Maniple Standard. 72 THE "COLORS." with the number of the or- ganization affixed to it on a bit of stuff. The eagle of the legion was carried by the first centurion of the first maniple of the triarii. This man, called primipilus, was held in especial honor, and often commanded the legion un- der the tribunes. The eagle was more sacred than Vexillum (from Arch of Constantine). even the ColorS are to US. The principes and hastati were called antesignani. The cav- alry colors (vexiUum) were scarlet. Legionary Gagl VI. RANK AND DISCIPLINE. — EQUIPMENT AND RATIONS. Rank in the legion was : commander, viho was consul or prsetor ; legate, or general of division ; tribune, in turn battalion or brigade commander ; centu- rion or captain ; aub-centurion or lieutenant ; signifer, ensign ; decurion, corpo- ral. The staff comprised qusestors, "who were paymasters, quartermasters, com- missaries and ordnance oiEcers ; contubernales or aides-de-camp ; officers who were topographical engineera and scouts ; augurs and priests. The clothing was tunic, at times short trowsers, cloaks, sandals, the cost of all of which was deducted from the soldier's pay, as were also lost arms and horses. The cavalryman was held to a higher grade of character and vigor than the footman. Unground wheat and beef issues made up the ration, which the men cooked themselves. They eat morning and evening. The Roman soldier carried, in addition to the burden of the modem footman, two or more stakes for the wall of the daily camp. His load was fully half as much again as that of the modem soldier. Armed, equipped and loaded as he was, he had but to lay down his baggage and put on his helmet and he was ready for battle. The baggage-train consisted of pack-horses and occasionally carts, and the doctors, Bervants and artificers accompanied it. Women were excluded from camp. Dis- cipline was rigid. Rewards were generous, punishments immediate and cruel. The man's honor was strongly appealed to. He could gain much by good service ; be was sure to suffer by neglect or crime. The Romans were careless though rapid marchers, until Hannibal t-aught them logistics ; and their battle- method not only grew in art under the same g^eat master, but he first showed them what strategy could do. The successful general was saluted as Impera- tor and allowed a triumph. Booty was divided by a strict rule. The main structure of the legion did not change for centuries ; its details were frequently altered. At no one period can its every detail be given with certainty. Eank in the legion, from the lesser up, was as follows : — Decurions, set over the ten men of each file, — non-commis- sioned officers, — were the front men in the files, and made up the front rank of the maniple. Each maniple also had a standard-bearer (signifer), a chosen man who carried the 74 OFFICERS OF THE LEGION. maniple-flag (signum), and was distinguished by a helmet covered with a lion's or bear's head, and a trumpeter. Sub-centurions, commanders of half a cen- tury, — subalterns, — appointed by the war- C®j) tribunes at the suggestion of the centurions, ® and acting as file-closers in rear of the mani- ^„j pies, to see that the rear ranks did their \ij-i Centurions, originally set over the cen- tury of one hundred men, — captains, — ap- pointed by the general, upon choice of the Jf\^ war - tribunes. Each maniple had two, a senior and a junior, whose places were on ( j / the right and left of the decurions in the front rank. The centurion who was the -^ eagle - bearer had singular privileges. He Signifer. was a knight, and could attend councils of war. The above-named officers were selected for courage, experience and good sense, and all wore badges of rank on helmet and armor, and bore stout sticks of vine with ^^^^^ which to inflict summary chastise- '^'' ^^^-'- ment for minor of- f^^T~'^^''k fenses. In the cav- IvSi) i AYAI airy, each turma i/^r>/|t* _j. was commanded by /] \/j \\\ 'JC' . Jl\jii a decurio, having ., , as lieutenant a sub- decurio. There was \Jf 3^© at times a third ^^ Centurion. deCurio as well as Eagle-bearer. ROTATION IN COMMAND. 75 three file-closers. The senior decuiio commanded the whole body of horse in a legion. War-tribunes. Of these there were at first four to a le- gion — one senior and one of the juniors to each line ; later six, or two to each line ; still later ten, one for each cohort. They were nominated by the burgesses, and were in some respects like our staff-officers. The seniors sat in councils of war. The war-tribunes commanded the legion in turn, unless there was a legate in command. Legates. These were at first civil envoys of the senate, who should advise with the leader and his council, and re- place the leader in case of his death or disablement; later they were chosen by the general from among the war-trib- unes. They were like our general-officers, and were placed in command of detachments or legions. Thus the ranks, from the highest down, ran : consul, praa- tor or qusestor who was army-leader or general ; legates, gen- erals of division ; tribunes, who in turn acted as brigadiers or as colonels, or when there was one for each cohort, as battal- ion-chiefs or majors ; centurions or captains, sub-centurions or lieutenants ; signifers, ensigns or color-sergeants ; decurions or corporals. The rank was not as extended as in the Macedo- nian phalanx. The system of rotation in command obliged the higher officers to serve in subordinate capacity the most part of the time. This appears to have worked well among the Romans, though usually a bad plan. Curiously, the army -leader, according to Plutarch, must legally serve on foot, or at least must ask permission of the senate to serve mounted. He was thus held to give an ex- ample of subordination to the legions. If two consuls were present with the army, each as formerly commanded in turn for twenty-four hours. On occasions of grave necessity there was the dictator, and his magister equitum, or cav- 76 ARMY-LEADER. airy commander. In tliree hundred and sixty-four years (497 to 133 B. C.) there were eighty-two dictators, showing their frequent election. Prsefects commanded the allied legions and cohorts. The other of&cers of the allied legions were the same. In later days, when the Romans had many armies in the field, the command of these was given, in each province, to pro-consuls, pro-prsetors and pro-qusestors, men who had occupied and retired from the dignity of consul, praetor and quaestor. These were held to a strict accountability ; but the Roman senate wisely abstained from public investigation and punishment of mere misfortune in command, lest the gravity of the situation should alarm the Army-leader in Mantle. Lictor. legions, or the punishment should weaken the standing of their representative. In this they were more discreet than the Greeks or Carthaginians. The army-leader wore as a distinguishing mark a purple mantle, rode a horse very richly caparisoned, and was accom- panied by lictors, who varied in number, according to a fixed STAFF-CORPS. 77 rule, from two to twelve. These were a sort of non-commis- sioned staff, or provost-marshals, and had especially punish- ments under their control. They had as badge an axe tied in a bundle of rods, and came almost invariably from the lower classes, especially freedmen. The general staff consisted of qusestors, of equal rank with legates, who transacted the business of our paymasters, quartermasters, commissaries, and ordnance officers, and who, their number being limited, were not always with an army, and were then replaced by a legate ; of contuber- nales, tent-mates, who were our volunteer aides-de-camp ; of officers whose peculiar duty was to make and break camp, (mensores and censores) ; of those corresponding to our to- pographical engineers (ante-mensores and ante-censores) ; of exploratores and sulcatores, that is, scouts ; of assistants to the quaestors, or quartermaster and commissary sergeants ; and finally of the augurs and priests, who always accom- panied an army, and who foretold success or failure from the flight of birds, the feeding of hens, the entrails of sacrificial victims and other common occurrences. Nothing was under- taken without their advice and the customary divinations ; but the able leader frequently managed to make their opin- ions and divinations coincide with his own ideas. In early days, as above stated, the Roman soldiers had served without pay ; from 405 B. C. — or perhaps earlier — the pay of the soldier was three and one third asses a day for the foot, ten asses for the cavalry, when the man furnished his own horse, six and two thirds asses for sub-officers of infantry and other cavalrymen. This was raised during the Second Punic War, on account of a much greater reduction in value of the as, to five and a half, sixteen and a half and eleven respectively, and oO remained till Caesar's day. This scale only shows relative compensation, for the actual purchas- 78 CLOTHING AND RATIONS. ing value of the as at various times is quite indefinite. From this pay was deducted a given amount for arms, rations, horses, forage and other issues. The clothing was the woolen tunic, close fitting next the body to the waist, with long plaited skirt to the knee, and with a broad leather belt, to which, on the right side, hung the sword ; a field cloak, first square, later round, reaching to the knee, brownish-red for the men, white for officers, held by lacing or buttons at the shoulder or in front ; and for wet or cold weather hooded capes of wool, of several weights, accord- ing Jo the season. For foot gear, sandals. During the Em- pire the Roman soldier wore a species of short trowsers (braccse) to just below the knee. In earlier times his legs were bare. Braccae are shown in the monuments decorated with Roman military subjects, as these are mostly of the imperial era. The soldier cut his hair short and shaved. While the value of his clothing and rations were deducted from the man's pay, this was no hardship, for one or two days' pay was equivalent to a month's rations. The capture of much booty often resulted in these deductions being merely nominal. Lost arms or equipments the soldier was held to replace. The cavalryman was similarly dressed, but had a long white purple-edged cloak for occasions of ceremony. The arms have already been described. These were made by armorers especially employed, and later in arsenals duly equipped. To provide these was part of the quaestor's duty, and the manufacture appears to have been excellently organ- ized. They remained the same for centuries. The government furnished the cavalry horses. The cit izens serving in the cavalry were held to a high grade of physical and moral ability. A yearly inspection in midsum- mer was made, and rigid requirements were enforced. Any testimony showing lack of courage, or indolent or weakly RATIONS. 79 habits, inexorably excluded a knight from this service. The horses were individually inspected, and if an animal appeared to have been badly cared for he was rejected, and the knight lost his chance for honorable employment. After lapse of his ten years (or ten campaigns) the horse was returned by the knight to the government through the quEestors. The animal seems to have been hardy and serviceable. Unground wheat was issued as ration, once in eight to- thirty days, at the rate of four Roman measures, not far from one to one and a haK bushels a month for the foot-soldier. This was between one and a half and two pounds of wheat a day, — what we should call a very scanty ration, if this was the whole of it. But beef cattle were also used, and no doubt generously issued, and the foragers or countrymen brought into camp fresh fruits and vegetables whenever the season warranted. The cavalryman received thrice as much, for self and two servants, beside forage for three horses. The allies received somewhat less. This corn the men car- ried, ground in hand-mills, and made into the usual cakes or porridge. They eat morning and evening only, — the common custom, — a slight breakfast taken standing, and a heartier supper, at which the men reclined ; the latter was eaten in the first watch, six to nine P. M. Before an intended battle a more liberal breakfast was usual. The purchase of rations in bulk was the affair of the quses- tors. In the enemy's country rations were collected by forced contributions. Victual was stored in suitable magazines. The burden carried by the Roman soldier is scarcely cred- ible, though from youth up he was trained to bearing heavy loads at drill. The foot-soldier carried all through the cam- paign, on the right shoulder, two or more posts or palisades for the stockade of the nightly camp. These were quite long and two or three inches thick. Slung to the end of these was 80 THE SOLDIER'S LOAD. his bag of corn, calculated to last him at least two weeks. His shield, lance and as many as seven darts he carried on his left arm. The helmet, if not worn, hung by its strap upon the breast. At times he must also carry axe, saw, spade, scythe, a rope, a basket and a pot to cook his rations in. His cloak was rolled up and slung on his back. About extra clothing or sandals we do not hear. All this, with the armor, made up a weight which had to be borne under the sun, dust and sand of Italy or Africa, through the heavy mud of spring and fall, through the everlast- ing snows of the mountains. Legionary on the March. The weight carried in mod- ern days by the soldiers of various countries, including cloth- ing worn, runs from fifty -six to sixty-four pounds. It is made up roughly of the following items: Clothing, say 18 pounds ; rifle and cartridges, 20 pounds ; knapsack, packed, 13 pounds ; haversack, packed, 5 pounds ; intrench- ing tools, 4 pounds ; belts, etc., 2 pounds ; canteen, filled, 2 pounds. Total, 64 pounds. Including his clothing, the Ro- man soldier, with the load above given, must have carried something over eighty-five pounds, much more than half his own average weight. The Romans justly named the train-baggage impedimenta, and their constant effort was to increase the weight the sol- dier could bear and decrease what followed the army on wag- ons and beasts of burden. In case of sudden attack, the footman thus accoutred bad BAGGAGE TRAIN. 81 but to lay down his posts and baggage and put on his helmet, and he was ready for the fray. The palisades and baggage were often tempora- rily stuck up as breastworks against cavalry. Sumpter-animals, horses, mules or ass- es, generally carried the tents and camp and garrison - equi- page, intrenching tools and necessary utensils. One pack Army Cart (from Trajan Column). animal per century is said to have been the ordinary allow- ance, though this seems very small. Everything was cal- culated to give the Romans a capacity to march quick and far, which was all but unequaled by any nation of anti- quity. But it took all the strength derived from constant work, as well as discipline rigidly enforced, to do it. Among the non-combatants were doctors, the servants and slaves of the knights and offi- cers, and about two hundred artificers per legion. Women were absolutely forbidden to be seen in camp. This was a vast improvement on the habit of Alexander's army. Pack Horse (from Trajan Column). Obedience was more strictly enforced and persisted in among the Romans than among any nation- of any age. The wisdom and skill of the found- ers of the Roman republic is in nothing more pointedly 82 PUNISHMENTS. shown than the placing upon the shoulders of a raw, obsti- nate and fiery population the yoke of such military discipline. The groundwork of it rested on a judicious compounding of rewards and punishments. A review of the victories and defeats of the Romans wiU show that so long as subordi- nation was maintained at its proper standard, so long was success assured. While some Greek nations at times ap- proached Rome in their army discipline, no nation ever pos- sessed it combined with so much common sense and intelli- gence, or kept it through so many centuries. His name and the number of each man's century — later cohort — was painted on his shield, all shields of the same century or cohort being of the same color, so that he was easily identified. No soldier might be used for private pur- poses, but all fatigue-duties were performed by the troops. One mile beyond the limits of the city, the Roman general had absolute power of life and death over every man and officer in his army, — himself alone the judge, though indeed it was usual for him to call a Council of War in important cases. Punishments were immediate and severe. Stripes were cruel ; the Roman soldier was beaten with rods, the allied with sticks. Death was inflicted by beheading, hang- ing and flogging ; the fustuarium was a species of running the gauntlet of his fellow soldiers, who stoned or beat the criminal, whom, if he escaped with his life, no one, not even his family, thereafter dared harbor. By the law of the Twelve Tables (449 b. c), he was condemned to death who instigated war on Rome, betrayed a citizen to the enemy, fought in battle without keeping his proper order, left his cen- tury or post, failed in his duty, deserted his post or his colors, threw away his weapons or mutinied. A body of men who fled in battle was deciifiated, that is, each tenth, eighth or even fifth man was executed ; the troops were not allowed to REWARDS. 83 camp thereafter with the others, and in lieu of wheat re- ceived harley as rations. Misappropriation of booty was vis- ited with banishment, sometimes death ; deserters were beaten and sold into slavery ; going over to the enemy — which any soldier was held to do who wandered beyond sound of trum- pet — was punished with crucifixion in a Roman citizen, decapitation in an ally. Open disobedience was death. Sleep- ing on post or infraction of any rules of field or garrison- duty, stealing, false witness and minor neglects met with stripes, or even f ustuarium. False claiming of an act of prow- ess in war was deemed stealing. Petty infractions were fined. From dishonorable dismissal, exposure in the stocks, the wearing of torn clothes as a badge of misconduct, equally with the severer penalties, no rank or influence could save any officer or soldier. Nor were these mere written statutes. They were carried out, and in such a manner that no nation of antiquity ever rivaled the Roman army in its perfect sub- ordination and devotion to duty. It must, however, be ob- served that, in the early periods, the Roman citizen was of so simple a habit, so warm in his love of country, so earnest in his daily labors, so honorable and upright, that military crimes were rare and punishments infrequently ordered. The law was preventive rather than punitive. It did not always remain so. Rewards were equally pronounced, and designed to heighten military aspirations. They consisted of promotion in rank or to a higher arm, increase of pay, presents of money, fine armor, silver and gold wreaths, necklaces, bracelets, deeds of land, freedom from taxes, pensions and shortening of service- years. Whole bodies were often thus rewarded, as weU as had their standards peculiarly decorated. For freeing a body sur- rounded by the enemy or saving the life of a citizen, a wreath of grass or oak leaves, often ornamented with gold, was 84 BA TTLE-TA CTICS. awarded ; for first mounting a breach, a wreath of beech- leaves wrought in gold ; for first entering the enemy's camp, a golden crown in the form of palisades ; for any extraordi- nary deed of valor, a golden crown inscribed with its recital. Whoso wounded an enemy in single combat received a spear or lance ; whoso thus killed one a necklace, arms of honor, or, if a knight, costly horse-equipments ; and there were many others, often selected by the commander. All such distinc- tions were publicly conferred, and gave the recipients pecul- iar honor at all times. Aged and crippled soldiers were supported by the state or given land or positions in Eoman colonies. Until taught by bitter experience in their defeats by Han- nibal, the Romans practiced logistics little. They moved from camp to camp without any particular order or precaution, and were quite open to surprises. Outpost-duty was not well done, but the Romans at aU periods were rapid and untiring marchers. After Trasimene, Fabius Cunctator saw the neces- sity of precaution, and the Roman marches were thereafter more carefully conducted, with a proper van and rear-guard, and flankers. In consequence of the salutary lessons given the Romans by Hannibal, battle-tactics became more scientific. But though lacking science, the Romans, as no one else did, knew the value of and practiced the offensive in battle. The no- tice to get ready for battle was the hanging of the general's purple mantle in front of his tent. The troops prepared their armor and weapons, ate and then moved into line in front of the camp. The baggage was left in camp under a special guard ; the soldier went out with only his arms. The course of a battle has already been described. It remained the same until, at a later day, the cohort formation was changed. The camp enabled the Roman army to accept or refuse battle at will. TRIUMPHS AND BOOTY. 85 The successful general was sometimes saluted by his troops as Imperator, and was allowed by the senate a triumph, greater or lesser (triumphus or ovatio). The former was a crowned entry into Rome and a march up to the Capitol, clad in purple and riding in a chariot, preceded by captives and spoil and followed by his army ; the latter was a simpler entry on horseback, accompanied only by the plaudits of the people. Booty, on the capture of a city, was collected and taken in charge by regular details and deposited in one place. Here it was sold by the quaestors and divided by strict rule, a set part being kept for the obsequies of the slain and other pur- poses, a third part going to the state and a third part to the leader. All received their share, those on detail and the sick as well as the combatants. When the custom grew of re- warding soldiers in land, all booty was placed at the disposal of the leader or in the state treasury. Part of it was em- ployed for public games, monuments and other general uses. It goes without saying that all the above mentioned rules were altered by circumstances. The Romans were quick to ap- prehend the desirability of change and to make it, while hold- ing fast to the excellent structure of their military body. The above is but a synopsis of what is treated of at great length by the old authors. Like all manuals, the Roman " Tactics " was largely made up of exceptions. There is a vast deal of disagreement as to details in all the ancient writers, each one being apt to speak about a period with which he was most familiar. Vegetius, Onosander, Polybius and Livy are ut- terly at variance on many points. A life's work could not reconcile all their differences ; nor is it worth while. One can come very close to the truth, and this is all that is called for. One finds at times in modern books the formation of the legion set down with dogmatic accuracy. We must 86 CHANGES IN THE LEGION. remember that the legion was a slow growth, and that in the course of five or six centuries a great many changes were siu'e to be made. Its minute details cannot be given with absolute reliability for any one period, except perhaps Cae- sar's. But the germ of the legion remained unaltered imtil the time of Marius ; the variation in minutiae in no wise affected its general features. Boimm Mounted Officer (from Statue in Naples). vn. FORTIFICATION. — CAMP DUTY. —WAR. Camps and toTms had always been fortified by the Romans. Of the eamp- intrenchments we have full particidars. The daily camp, during war, was invariably fortified. It was square, always of the same shape and details, and every man knew just what his part of the work was. It had a ditch, and a ■wall surmounted by the palisades carried by the legionaries. Its interior arrangements were convenient. There was a regular guard, outside and inside ; and everything went by clock-work. The cities of It^aly were fortified much like the Greek. Siege operations were about the same, but did not rise to as much perfection as under Alexander. The fighting force on which Rome could call, in case of emergency, at the beginning of the Second Punic War, was over three quarters of a million men. One fifth of the whole population could bear arms in some way. The Romans were active in studying out the problems of any war they proposed to undertake. They stood defeat and adversity bravely, and learned from each, its appropriate lesson. Their army was usually only the consular one of four legions, but in the Gallic wars it rose to twenty-two legions. The Romans difEered from the Greeks in their practical good sense. Less learned in war, they did better what they knew, and the army was constantly in superior condition. They always took the initiative, and came to battle as soon as possible. When the Greeks and Romans clashed, all the Greek science coidd not save them, from the Roman hard knocks. The Romans were wont from comparatively early days to fortify both their towns and camps ; and probably long before the time of the Punic wars a system bad grown up whicb we must presume to have reached a high grade of perfection. Pyrrhus was much surprised at the art displayed in the Ro- man camp - intrenchments. Polybius and Hyginus — the latter himself a specialist, a topographical engineer in fact — have given us a good deal of detail on this subject, in which the Romans were easily ahead of all ancient nations. Poly- bius gives the most satisfactory description of the Roman 88 LOCATION OF CAMP. camp; but Hyginus enters into detail from which we can give the profile of the breastworks and similar facts. Just how far advanced the art was in the period of the Second Punic War we must estimate. It is probable that the camp was then about as carefuHy fortified as at any time prior to Marius' day. At the end of a day's march, in time of war, the Romans invariably fortified their camp. They calculated to finish their distance in season to prepare the camp with all due care. The position chosen was preferably quite open ground, near '\,,,,,.'V,,,.,,,,-.'''>v.,..-i.i''>j,,,^^ ,,,,,,,,,,.,,, JJ*> Fleet Camp. ports, or " round " ships. In battle the Romans preferred boarding and hand-to-hand work. But despite success at sea, whenever it was possible they held it better to do their work on land. One or two of the battles in the First Punic War are note- worthy as illustrating the conflict between the Grecian and Roman systems. Carthage had practically the phalangial idea, though the numerous bodies of frequently changed mer- cenary troops of divers nationalities made it impracticable for her to introduce perfect tactics. After varying fortunes by land and sea, when the Roman fleet had won its great victory of Ecnomus in 256 b. c, had 128 XANTHIPPUS. piished aside the Carthaginian fleet and landed on African soil, the consul Eegulus, having won an initial success, was unwise enough, in the common Koman fashion, to try to im- pose terms too harsh upon the Carthaginians, and was met by crisp refusal. Eegulus was unable to enforce his tenns on the instant. The Carthaginians sent to Greece for mercena- ries, and the Spartan general Xanthippus entered their ser- vice. At thi» time the art of war was better preserved in Sparta than elsewhere in Greece. Xanthippus was an able leader. He saw that the situation to which Carthage had been brought was more due to blundering policy than lack of material strength. His knowledge and skill infused confi- dence into government and people alike, and he was given the supreme command of the army. Kegulua, meanwhile, had subdued the surrounding country, — which, as all the cities had been deprived of their walls liy Carthage, in her system of preserving her own preeminence, was no great ta.sk, — and was steadily approaching the capitaL Xanthip- pus, having organized and drilled the Carthaginian foot in Laceda;monian fashion, and raised their enprit de cf/rps to a high pitch, marched out of Carthage with twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and one hundred elephants, pur- posing to seek the Romans on the plains, where cavalry and elephants could have free play. R^gulus was somewhat surprised at this new phase of Car- thaginian affairs, but, nothing loath, he took up the challenge and advanced to meet Xanthippus. The armies came to- gether near Tunes, in 2oo b. c. The Carthaginians were in high spirits, of which fac-t Xanthippus took advantage, and drew np in line with perfect confidence. His heavy Cartha- ginian foot, eight to nine thousand strong, was in a sixteen- deep phalanx in the centre, in one mor-a divided into four lochoi, Lacedamonian fashion, and under officers selected by THE ORDER OF BATTLE. 129 himself. The rest of his foot, three to four thousand merce- naries, was partly heavy, partly light. The heavy mercenar ries Xanthippus placed on the right of the phalanx. In front of this line of foot, well advanced, he put the elephants in one line, close together, so as to cover exactly the front of CARTHAGINIANS pTuTES _.' ooooooaooooaaao •'•'•tll I ,_' ; •' "=J/ 2 ,o'" n' and by cleverly ma- tNT-ENCHMCNT ^ t = ^o"" • f -r ° *,„, g" noeuvring tor some '-?_' ; '^ v.- -,,?,•>•,, .; S"i' weeks, without com- "5 '•■ /P'''^\!s' "'•^'"'; '■''-'' ing to a battle, he so ..,'""' 1 /• ^5^ v,'"' , wrought up the Libyan \ '-'.':,.,;■.'' .■' hot blood to the pitch ^^. __.--' of frenzied desire to Hamilcar's Defile. ^^'^ t^=^* ^^^ w\>&\% followed him about from day to day, wherever he chose to turn. Acting on this fact, Hamilcar managed to lure them to a defile on the cape which incloses the bay of Tunes on the east, which defile he had previously reconnoitred with care. So soon as the enemy, to the number of forty thousand men, had entered THE ILLYRIANS. 137 the defile, Hamilcar closed its rear exit with a body of men hidden for the purpose, which quickly threw up works at a chosen narrow spot, — while he, with the main body, turned on the rebels at the other exit, which was rugged enough to hold without much effort. This too he fortified, and here, in an immense trap, he had his enemy at his mercy. Here too he ended the war, — with a terrible massacre, to be sure, but one not then unusual, and perhaps well earned by the rebels. This manoeuvre leads one to think that his great son in later years, at Trasimene, had his father in mind when he laid his stratagem to trap the Roman consul. The interval between the First and Second Punic Wars (241 to 218 B. c.) was fuUy occupied by the Romans in con- tests with the Gauls, Ligurians and lUyrians. The war with Theatre of Gallic and Illyrian Wars. the latter originated in the piratical expeditions of this peo- ple, which kept the Adriatic in a constant ferment. They were thoroughly subdued, and during this war — noteworthy 138 THE GAULS. for this, if for notiing else — Eome first got acquainted with Greece. It was not long before her avaricious grasp was ex- tended thither. The war with the Gauls included both the cis- and transpadane Gauls, and Eome, during this struggle, put two hundred thousand men on foot, showing a vast in- crease in military ability, — despite the abnormal exertions of the First Punic War. The allied Gauls concentrated on Theatre of Gallic Wars. the Po and advanced through Etruria, plundering and devas- tating, and winning a battle at Fsesulse against the praetor in command of the province. Learning of the disaster, Jllmil- ius Papus set out from Ariminum to relieve his colleague. The Gauls intended to retire with their booty along the Tyrrhenian coast. Meanwhile, Caius Atilius Regulus had landed from Sardinia at Pisa, and with thirty-seven thousand men advanced upon them, thus cutting off their retreat, which must be across the Apennines, not far from the Gulf A QUESTIONABLE POSITION. 139 of Genoa. They had no choice, for at this point there was no other way open. The seventy thousand Gauls were shut in between the eighty thousand men of Papus and the army, half as large, of Regulus. At Telamon, near the sea, and south of the Umbro, a bat- tle occurred, which is interesting from its double lines. The oaoaaaaaoQoaooaaaoDDOOODciiiaaaaDDotiaDDDOo QDODQMiDooaaDooaaoooaQoaaaaoDDDaDaooODOD □ mDoaoaooooaoaODODODDaaaaoQa I 3 1 ' =1 1 ' | i ' I 17171[71?i£r BOO ^ n^^DoaQDOoDDaoaggoDaDaQaotiaaDooaoaaDDDOODCia ^g^^^S ''"'"i-rv DaaDaDoaoaaaoooaaDOQaaaDooaaoooooaDaaoaa BattLo of Telamon. Gauls made ready to fight for their booty and for retreat, and took up a position between coast and hills. Their foot, as usual, was in deep masses and now in two lines, back to back. Facing Papus were the Gaesatse and Insubrians ; facing Eegulus, the Bolaus and Tauriscans. Their cavalry was on the flanks of the infantry, facing in similar manner, and the flanks of the cavalry they protected with chariots, headed outward. Their train laden with booty they placed on a height to the east, under strong guard. Here was a good formation in which to fight for life, but as bad an one to get beaten in as could well be devised. Kegulus drew up on the northerly front of the Gauls, and seeing a small height on their western flank, he occupied it with a strong body of cavalry, sustained by foot. This body the Gauls tried repeatedly to dislodge, but every assault on the hill was driven back. From this hill Regulus could see the army of Papus and signal to it, and both consuls prepared to act in concert. Papus began the battle by sending some cavalry to fall on the western flank of the Gauls, who were assaulting the hill held by Eegulus. Here occurred some 140 MASSACRE OF GAULS. stout fighting, in which Kegulus was killed. Meanwhile, the line of battle advanced on the southerly front of the Gauls, where, despite the terrible aspect of the naked barbarians, — for the Gauls always stripped for battle, wearing solely their leggings, and ornamented with their golden bracelets and necklaces, — and the hideous din of trumpets and battle song, the legion made a serious impression upon it. The velites acted weU, and drove the van of the Gauls back on the main line, thus producing some confusion in the enemy's ranks at the moment when the legions were advancing to the charge. Papus sent a body from his right to seize the train-camp on the hill. The Gauls made a splendid resistance ; but the Roman cavalry hemmed in and defeated the Gallic horse, and then turned and fell upon the flanks of the footmen. This soon broke their formation and power of resistance ; they were huddled together so as to lose their capacity to fight, and were cut to pieces. It is said that forty thousand were killed or took their own lives, and that ten thousand were captured. This battle is interesting as showing the difference between the ancient and modern art. One can scarcely expect the Gauls to develop a science of war, but had they first moved sharply on Regulus, whom they outnumbered two to one, they might well have beaten him, and would then have been ready to turn on Papus with the consciousness of victory and equal forces, and with their line of retreat open and booty safe, of itself no mean provocative of courage. Or, indeed, with a skillful rear-guard, after defeating Regulus, they might have made good their retreat with all their booty. For the road afforded numberless positions suitable for defense. The battle of Telamon was the beginning of a series of victories by which the Romans not only gained control of aU northern Italy to the confines of the mountains, but ROME AND CARTHAGE. 141 learned to cope with a foe whom they were to meet under Hannibal. In order to hold the line of the Po they planted military colonies at Cremona, Placentia, Mutina and a num- ber of other places. These came into play, as we shall see, when Hannibal, a few years later, debouched upon the Pa- dane valley from the Alps. By 220 B. c. Rome had placed her hand on the entire Italian peninsula, and held the seas on its either side, with Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and other contiguous islands. This century had wrought great changes in her standing. But Rome was to be called on again to fight for her holding, and this time as never before. Had it not been for her sensible institutions and sound body-politic, she must have succumbed before the Carthaginian captain. Rome was liberal to her colonies, all of whom in conse- quence desired her success ; Carthage ground hers down with heavy tribute, so that they would really be benefited hy her fall. Carthage destroyed the walls of her colonies because she feared them ; Rome kept those of her colonies, and as a result possessed a rampart of fortified posts. An enemy landing on Roman soil had just begun his task ; an enemy landing in Africa had all but completed his. In Carthage the land was owned by planters and tilled by slaves ; in Rome the citizen himself tilled the soil. In Rome the landed interest was the highest ; in Carthage the moneyed interest controlled everything. Rome was governed by men who fairly represented the people ; the small farmer was a distinct power in the land ; Carthage was governed by rich merchants or planters, whose money gave them influence, and who cared for nothing else. The Roman was simple ; the Carthaginian luxurious. The Carthaginian citizen was averse to military duty ; it was the pride of the Roman. The Roman senate and its generals worked in unison ; the Carthaginian senate 142 ROME SOUND. CARTHAGE ROTTEN. and its officers were invariably at odds. Eome was sound ; Carthage was rotten. The revenues of Rome were but a tithe of those of Carthage, but the Carthaginian system of war was by far the more expensive. We shall see which system worked the better. Legionary (Column of Sepliminfl Sevenis). THE LION'S BROOD. 241-220 B. C. Two factions controlled Carthag-e, the Barcine or -war-faction, and the Hanno or peace party. Hamilcar, the head of the former, planned to conquer Spain in order to replace Sicily, and in 236 B. c. led an expedition thither. In the succeeding- eight years, Hamilcar, basing on Gades, suhdued a, considerable part of western Iberia. He was succeeded by Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, -who continued his wise and energetic policy, and largely increased the Carthaginian holding. Hannibal was Hasdrubal's cavalry-commander, and in 221b. c, on Hasdrubal's death, became head of the Iberian army. Saguntum, chief of the Greek colonies on the eastern coast, fearing the extension of Cai-thaginian power, applied to Rome for protection. This Rome gave her, and notified Carthage that her forces must not cross the- Ebro, to which idtimatum Carthage was fain to agree. Hannibal had inherited from his father, not only an army, but the purpose to use it for an invasion of Italy overland. He was not strong enough at once to undertake this, and his first two years in Spain were spent in consolidating his conquests there. In this he showed wisdom, energy and in- telligence ; and in one of his campaigns when the barbarians, relying on his youth, had rebelled and cut him off from Cartagena, he showed the qualities of an Alexander in dealing with such enemies, and defeated them on the Tagus with great slaughter. Titus Livius, his bitterest enemy, has left us a pen-pic- ture of the young commander, which testifies to his splendid attributes. There were, as stated in a former chapter, two factions in Carthage. The one was headed by Hamilcar Barca, the leader of the liberal or aristocratic or patriotic party, so to speak, which was wedded to a war policy or policy of resist- ance, despite the late defeat and the serious condition of Car- thage. The other was led by Hanno, the head of the demo- crats or conservatives, who represented conciliation and peace, or in other words the acceptance of the situation, and was sus- pected of playing into the hands of the Romans. The usual 144 SPAIN INSTEAD OF SICILY. roles of aristocrats and democrats seem to have been re- versed. Hamiloar well knew that peace with Eome meant oppression by Eome and the extinction of all national growth and pride; and his life-work was a constant, unremitting effort to prepare the nation for war and then to make war upon this one arch-enemy of his country. The hatred he bore the great Italian city became a family instinct as well as a family purpose, rendered only the more keen by internal opposition ; and the destiny of the Barca family was to ex- press its hatred in war and to bury itself in its last great struggle with Eome. And, though eventually a failure, this policy was clearly shown by more than one unworthy and oppressive act of Eome to have been the true one for Car- thage to pursue. It failed because of the half-heartedness of its support. With this end in view, Hamilcar, still a young man, little over thirty, developed a plan to make good to Carthage its losses in Sicily by the conquest of Spain. This plan was at once undertaken, with the most statesmanlike method. Iberia had long been not only a recruiting ground of Car- thage, but from time immemorial had lured the Phoenicians to its fertile shores. Gades was the earliest of the Tyrian ventures ; and Hamilcar was merely carrying out, with a vigor no one else had shown, a part of the old national pol- icy, at a time when such a man and such energy in the proper direction were essential to save Carthage from dying out. Iberia was a country of great natural resources. Abun- dant forests, large navigable rivers and inexhaustible mines were both a prize worth contending for, and a means by which, in addition to its mountainous territory, the strong warlike native poptdation could indefinitely resist invasion. But Hamilcar felt in himself the strength to overcome these obstacles for the sake of the prize, and he foresaw that the VALUE OF SPAIN. 145 peninsula might some day furnish him a base from which, with the aid of the brave Iberians, as well as the Rome-hating Gauls, both of which peoples had figured largely in the list of Carthaginian mercenaries, he might carry the war into Italy and attack his hereditary foe at his own hearth. The plan and the man were each worthy the other. And, de- spite the opposition of the Hanno faction, aided largely by the sentiment of the populace and by money, which was the Iberia. common means of control in Carthage and which he and his family possessed in superabundance, Hamiloar gained from the Carthaginian senate permission to undertake the expedi- tion ; or at least his enterprise, if not authorized, was not forbidden. Carthage had not been able to rebuild a fleet since the destruction of its last one in the First Punic War. The city, in its present condition of weakness, dared not under- take openly to build a navy, lest the jealousy of Rome should be again provoked to attack her before she was prepared. There was no means of shipping an army to Spain. But 146 HAMILCAR IN SPAIN. Hamilcar, nothing daunted, found it possible, by careful and systematic measures, to undertake a march along the north- ern shore of Africa to the Pillars of Hercules, accompanied by such few transports as he could command to carry bread ; for, though there were many colonies along the coast, there •were stretches which could not be safely crossed without ra- tions always at hand. From the Pillars, Hamilcar was able to cross to Gades in B. C. 236. This bold and intelligent un- dertaking showed how well Hannibal came by his own daring genius for dealing with the impossible. Once on Iberian soil, Hamilcar conducted a series of cam- paigns, basing on Gades and moving eastward, and in these doughty blows were so admirably seasoned with generous conduct and far-sighted diplomacy that in nine years he had conquered the greater part of the southern extremity of the peninsula, and placed the power of Carthage on a firm foun- dation. Cato, a generation later, exclaimed that no king was worthy to be named beside Hamilcar Barca. And when we read the history of the wars which have been carried on in Spain from Hamilcar's era to Napoleon's, and look at the difficult nature of the country, and the bold resistance always offered by its people, this praise seems no whit too high. In B. c. 228 Hamilcar was killed in a campaign against tribes somewhere between the Tagus and the Durius (Dou- ro) ; but so strongly had the Carthaginians impressed them- selves upon their Spanish allies that the chief command of all the troops, Carthaginian and Iberian, was at once, by unanimous consent, conferred on his son-in-law, Hasdrubal. The position was an important one, for the joint forces amounted to sixty thousand foot, eight thousand horse and two hundred elephants. Hasdrubal — a common Carthaginian name, there being in Carthaginian history no less than eight generals thus SAGUNTUM. 147 named, and this one was dubbed Hasdrubal the Handsome — went on with the policy of Hamilcar in a thoroughly work- manlike manner. He was noted for great personal strength and beauty, justice, courtesy and intelligence. His admin- istration increased the Carthaginian authority and territory. It was he who founded Cartagena (New or Spanish Car- thage), and he so firmly established the Carthaginian influ- ence in the peninsula that most towns as far north as the Iberus (Ebro) paid tribute to his native city. This was by no means brought about without the usual bitter antagonism of the conservatives at home ; but success, military and finan- cial, in Spain reconciled the Carthaginians to Hasdrubal's doings, and forbade the opposition party under Hanno to interfere. There were many rich and thriving Greek colonies along the east coast, of which Saguntum, in the centre, was the most flourishing. These colonists had grown rich in their dealings with the Spaniards, and viewed with alarm the threatening growth of Carthaginian influence. In the fear that they might all eventually fall under the dominion of the new power, and the mother country being unequal to the task of helping them, the inhabitants of Saguntum unwisely turned to Rome for protection. Rome was only too happy to embrace this opportunity of again weakening her ancient foe, whose growth in the Span- ish peninsula she had long been suspiciously watching. She took Saguntum under her protection, sent a garrison to the city, and gave notice to Hasdrubal that the Iberus must be the boundary of bis advance. Rome clearly had no idea then of an overland invasion being contemplated ; but Sagun- tum was an excellent base for her own operations in Spain, should the successes of Carthage there make such a proceed- ing desirable. For Hasdrubal meant war when Carthage 148 HANNIBAL IN COMMAND. should be strong enough, and Eome foresaw war. But Eome did not go at the matter on so broad and intelligent a scale, and the Gallic problem on the Po was difficult enough to rivet attention to northern Italy. " The policy of the Eo- mans was always more remarkable for tenacity, cunning and consistency, than for grandeur of conception or power of rapid organization," says Mommsen. Hasdrubal, not deeming Carthage strong enough to precip- itate a war with the great city, was fain to agree to the terms so haughtily formulated. Shortly after this treaty, in B. C. 221, Hasdrubal was as- sassinated, and again the Iberians showed their confidence in the Carthaginian policy, and in its leading family, by elect- ing Hannibal, eldest son of Hamiloar Barca, then twenty- eight years old, to the command in chief ; and, despite the vote of Hanno's party, the home government confirmed the election. The army still consisted of the same elements, namely, Carthaginians, Liby-Phoenioians, Spaniards and Gauls, to- gether vrith heavy and Numidian cavalry. But the army was in every sense an army, reflecting its noble leaders in all its characteristics. The power of Carthage had been transferred from its fleet to its land forces, and all there was of these which had a marked value lay in Spain, and under the com- mand of the Barcas. Hannibal (" Favorite of Baal," the chief Phoenician deity) was born B. c. 249. He had been a mere stripling when he first accompanied his father to Spain in 236 B. c. He had always shown clear-cut powers of intellect, and had received the best of educations, under the careful scrutiny of Hamil- car, who was equally fond of the lad and proud of his evi- dent capacity. Hannibal and his brothers, Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hanno, — the lion's brood, — were all born and trained HANNIBAL'S EDUCATION. 149 to arms, and all nobly fulfilled their mission. Three died on the field ; the greatest lived to aid his country in her dire extremity. "We do not know much about the character of Hannibal's education. We do not even know what the Punic language was, except that it was allied to the Egyptian and Hebrew. That it had a literature of its own we are told by the Roman historians ; and Mago's book on agriculture, an exhaustive treatise in twenty-eight volumes, and the only work of which we are informed, was translated into Latin, and was the chief text-book in Italy. We cannot fail to recognize the ability of the Carthaginians ; we know that they came of the stock to which we owe our letters ; but Carthage was so utterly de- stroyed that not a vestige remains to tell us the literary status of the " London of Antiquity." Prophetic, indeed, had been the exclamation of Cato, " Delenda est Carthago ! " We know that Carthage had borrowed much of the Greeks, and no doubt this was true in a literary as it had been in a military sense, though indeed the Greeks and Car- thaginians were jealous of one another in a commercial way. Dion Cassius states that Hannibal had studied all that the Greeks could teach ; and while the Carthaginians as a nation were chiefly distinguished for their ability to turn all they handled to gold, the Barca family had aspirations far above mere filthy lucre. There can be no question whatever, from the uniform leaning of the little testimony we have upon the subject, that Hannibal's vast intellect was supplemented by a mind stored with all that was then known to the world as great and beautiful. And " his character has descended to us throughout the ages, pure beyond the power of his enemies to stain." Love of his native land and intense hatred of Eome had been Hannibal's hourly lesson since he could first speak, and 150 LIVY'S PORTRAIT OF HANNIBAL. while his education was of the most liberal character, it was chiefly directed to the department of war. Hannibal re- mained in his father's camp nine years. During this period he was constantly in the field, and was near his father when he fell in battle. He was then sent back to Carthage, some say at an earlier date, the better to continue his education. At all events, he went home upon his father's death. But he returned to Spain in B. C. 224, at the age of twenty-five, called thither by Hasdrubal, and in the next three years re- ceived his maturer military training in the field, as command- ant of Hasdrubal's cavalry. Titus Livius, who harbored a solid Roman hatred of Han- nibal, and has in the same breath abundant ill to say of him, gives us this photograph of the young chief : " No sooner had he arrived, than Hannibal drew the whole army towards him. The old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth given back to them ; the same bright look, the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. But soon he proved that to be his father's son was not his highest recommendation. Never was one and the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey or to com- mand. It was hard to decide whether he was more dear to the chief or to the army. Neither did Hasdrubal more readily place any one at the head when courage or activity were required, nor were the soldiers under any other leader so full of confidence and daring. He entered danger with the greatest mettle, he comported himself in danger with the greatest unconcern. By no difficulties could his body be tired, his ardor damped. Heat and cold he suffered with equal endurance ; the amount of his food and drink was gauged by natural needs and not by pleasure. The time of waking and sleeping depended not on the distinction of day and night. What time was left from business he devoted to HANNIBAL'S EARLY PLANS. 151 rest, and this was not brought on by either a soft couch or by quiet. Many have often seen him, covered by a short field cloak, lying on the groiind betwixt the outposts and sen- tinels of the soldiers. His clothing in no wise distinguished him from his fellows ; his weapons and horses attracted every one's eye. He was by long odds the best rider, the best marcher. He went into battle the first, he came out of it the last. . . . He served three years under Hasdrubal's su- preme command, and left nothing unobserved which he who desires to become a great captain ought to see and to do." Thus equipped, it was by no means strange that Hannibal should succeed to the command. The manner in which he used his power forms one of the greatest pages in history. Hannibal early declared that he would complete the con- quest of all Spain, and it was a family secret that such a con- quest was but the first step towards carrying the war into Italy. But he was wise enough to keep his own coimsel on the latter point, and to follow up the excellent plans of his father and Hasdrubal towards making his position on the peninsula impregnable. The plan which this young chieftain carried in his head was no doubt the original conception of Hamilcar, and had by him been impressed upon his son-in-law and son. But the crude conception had long been seething in the soul of Hannibal, and it was his brain which truly gave the project birth, as it was his hand which carried it through to the close. The colossal nature of the plan, its magnificent daring, its boundless self-confidence, its contempt of danger, no less than the extraordinary manner of its execution in the succeeding years, are equaled only by Alexander's setting forth — also but a youth — to conquer the illimitable posses- sions of the Great King. But Hannibal was far from being a mere dreamer. He well knew that he could not invade Italy without exceptional 152 NO HELP FROM CARTHAGE. material resources in addition to the motive power furnished by his well-equipped head and self-reliant ■ heart. He recog- nized that he had the Pyrenees and the Alps to cross, in addition to many mighty rivers, and that these, difficult in- deed for small bodies of troops going from one friendly land to another, even at an auspicious season, might be all but insurmountable for an army of invasion, — particularly his, which must be accompanied by long and heavy trains as well as a number of elephants. Nor were these natural obstacles any worse than the possible opposition of the warlike Gauls, through whose land he must pass upon his way. He was wise enough to contemplate no actual movement imtil all his preparations were made, his army perfectly equipped, his base reliable, and his projected advance reconnoitred. Hannibal, owing to the political combinations, could not rely on help from Carthage. The peace party was again in the ascendant and would not allow him to declare war. He was a mere servant of the senate, with his hands tied, and liable at any moment to be recalled, though the wealth and influence of the Barcas, and the restdts accomplished, had long left them in control of Spain. AU his force in men and means must come from the peninsula. The mother-country was still weak from her struggle with Rome, and looked to him for aid rather than was able or willing to yield it. Without the revenues of the Iberian mines, in fact, the Bar- cine hold on command would have probably long before been severed. But Carthage needed the money which came from them and favored the generals who made war remunerative instead of costly. Hannibal did not conceal from himself the fact that the peace party in Carthage would oppose his scheme in every manner. What he did was done with his eyes wide open and with a full calcidation of means and con- sequences. But the main factor in the proposition was that IBERIAN CONQUESTS. 153 burning genius which made his heart bold to undertake any difficulty to avenge the wrongs of his down-trodden country, that lambent flame of the divine which — among soldiers — few indeed have ever shown in such effulgence. In no wise bhnded to the herculean nature of his task, Hannibal spent the first two years of his command (b. c. 221-220) in consolidating his Spanish possessions, which the death of Hasdrubal had again in some parts threatened to Iberian Conquests of Hannibal. compromise. He reduced the town of Carteia, near the Pil- lars of Hercules, by a vigorous siege, overcame the tribes along the Tagus and made them tributary to his scheme, and then retired to Cartagena to winter. The next year he added the tribes of the Durius region to his standard, captur- ing both Arbocala, or Albucella, and Salmantica (Salamanca). His liberality to his soldiers, both from the public purse and still more from his private fortune, was a means of keeping them devoted to his person no less than that pride which, of all subordinates, the soldier most truly feels for his successful chief. He was sure of his army wherever he went, and his 154 SOME TRIBES REBEL. generous policy to the tribes he overcame promised to avoid trouble when his back should be turned, and he distant from the scene. These conquests on the Tagus and the Durius were not made without many a hard struggle. One may weU be in- stanced. While Hannibal was besieging Arbocala, certain "iVEB TACU3 Battle of the Tagus. of the tribes between the two rivers joined forces to the num- ber of one hundred thousand men, and on his return stood awaiting him near modern Toledo, hoping to fall on his rear when he shoidd cross the river, incumbered as he was with immense trains of booty. They undervalued the capacity of the young chieftain. The bed of the Tagus is difficult to ford, and the conditions offered the barbarians a fine oppor- tunity of revenge. They occupied the right bank at one of the main fords. AN ABLE MANCEUVRE. 155 Hannibal was suddenly called upon to show liis qualities as a general ; and lie himself took advantage of the difficul- ties of the country on which the enemy chiefly relied. De- clining to cross the Tagus with so large a force in his vicin- ity, he contented himself, when attacked, with holding his own, and at nightfall took up a strong position on the right bank of the river, fortifying it in such a manner as to lead the enemy to believe that he intended to act on the defensive in that position. Meanwhile, he sent out scouts to reconnoi- tre the rivsr, who found up the stream, and not far off, a practicable ford. While the barbarians were debating how best to deliver an attack on the morrow, Hannibal, shortly after the fall of night, keeping his camp-fires bright and leaving a rear-guard to simulate the presence of the army, stole a march upon them, crossed the Tagus and took up a new and similar position on the left or farther bank, oppo- site the ford held by the barbarians, purposing to punish their temerity, as he must not fail to do if he was to quiet the land. He had escaped the chief danger by acting on a common theory of barbarians, that no army will undertake an impor- tant march at night, of which Alexander so often, and he himself later in the Alps so ably, took advantage. He could now direct events himself. Like all barbarians, these tribes ascribed Hannibal's retire- ment to fear. Early in the morning they followed him up and began fording the river in detached parties, expecting to make him an easy prey. Anticipating exactly this, Han- nibal had made his plans. The main ford lay at a bend in the river, of which the convexity was nearest Hannibal's new position. Along the banks he had distributed his elephants as a curtain to his infantry. In the centre, opposite the ford, he placed his cavalry. No sooner had the enemy begun to 156 VICTORY AND MASSACRE. throng the ford than the Carthaginian horse advanced and met them in midstream, where, riding them down by mere weight, the force of the current swept them off their feet and towards the banks. Here the elephants crushed them or the infantry cut them down. Foot had no chance what- ever in the torrent against mounted men. Meanwhile, the light troops from between the elephants showered arrows and darts upon the barbarians in the water or entering the fords. Though without artillery, or long-range arms, Han- nibal showed a clear idea of the value of the bend in the river which indented his own position. New masses constantly appeared on the other bank, crowd- ing out of all organization to gain the front. Hannibal saw that the day was his. He recalled his horse. This, retiring, unmasked the heavy infantry, which Hannibal called in from either flank and sent with a vigorous elan in close column across the ford against the ill-arrayed barbarians, followed by the cavalry, which had formed again in its rear. Noth- ing could resist the charge. The barbarian masses meltfd into a demoralized mob. A bitter defeat and merciless slaughter of these tribes taught the whole of Spain not to undervalue the new commander for his youth. The entire operation reads like one of Alexander's battles in Asia; and shows that in dealing with similar enemies Hannibal possessed the same tremendous force. It was when pitted against the three quarters of a million of men which Rome could muster that Hannibal was called on to exercise caution and self-control, — virtues Alexander never possessed. By this last victory Hannibal was enabled to make his con- quests secure. Having, by the addition of the territory he had subdued, the whole peninsula south of the Iberus under control, he again returned to Cartagena for the winter. XI. SAGUNTUM. SPRING TO FALL, 219 B. C. HAXKiBAii was ready for his expedition against Home. He controlled all Spain as far as the Ebro, save only the city of Saguntuiu. This he now attacked. The Romans, who had promised Saguntum their protection, did nothing but send an embassy to protest against the act. Saguntum lay on a. high and naked rock, affording a besieger no facilities for the erection of works. The inhabitants were brave and skillfid, and for eight months, during a part of which time he was called away to put down a rebellion on the Tagus, bid defiance to all Hannibal's efforts. Finally the city was taken ; but the brave Saguntines buried themselves and their treasures in one vast conflagration. Nothing was left of the city but a heap of stones. Kome sent a second em- bassy to demand Hannibal's surrender. On the refusal of the demand, the sen- ate declared war. In b. c. 219 Hannibal considered himself able to under- take his great expedition against Rome. Except Catalonia and the single city of Sagnntum on the east coast, all Iberia was his. His army was of the best, and devoted to his cause ; the chiefs of Spain promised men and means. His route he had already reconnoitred by envoys to the Gauls living on both slopes of the Alps, which envoys had returned with Gallic chiefs bearing many promises of good-will and as- sistance. He was ready and eager to provoke a quarrel with the great republic. Saguntum, still under Roman protection, was yet without much defense. Under a pretense that the Saguntines were attacking the Torboletes, subjects of Car- thage, Hannibal advanced against the city and laid siege to it, — while the Eoman senate, instead of flying to the assistance of its ward, contented itself, as it had done the year before, with sending protesting embassies both to Hannibal and to 158 POSITION OF SAGUNTUM. Carthage. Hoping to force a declaration of war out of Eome, flannibal treated the ambassadors, when they reached him, with marked discourtesy. The siege of Saguntum, in 219 B. c, was no child's play. This city was then situated about a mile from the sea. It is SagTintum. now nearer three. On a long and naked rock, three hundred to four hundred feet above the plain, commanding the entire country, it was scarcely to be approached. On the west the slope of the rock was least steep. Its defenses were thor- oughly constructed, and it had a large population of cour- ageous and well prepared inhabitants, jjlenty of stores and the prospect of the help of its Roman allies. Hannibal planted his main body at the western end, for though here the walls were thickest and a great tower faced the assailant, here also the more moderate slope of the ground alone af- forded him a possible chance to work. He had an abundance of men, stated by Livy at one hundred and fifty thousand, and by Eutropius at one hundred and seventy thousand men, but probably much less than either figure. The garrison was not large, — " insufficient," says Livy. But it was not a A DIFFICULT SIEGE. 169 question of numbers. Only so many men could be put to work on the walls. The rest were mere blockaders. Hanni- bal hoped for a prompt surrender, but he was doomed to dis- appointment. He set to work to besiege the place, throwing up the usual lines of circumvaUation, surrounded by numer- ous towers. For a number of weeks he could make no impression what- ever upon the city. Owing to the entire lack of earth upon the rock of Sagxmtum, the usual works could not be thrown up, and the common siege devices were un suited to the ground. Resort had to be had to a novel kind of movable towers and engines. The besieged showed the greatest deter- mination, and met Hannibal's siege arrangements with many daring sorties, in which both parties appear to have equally suffered. On one of these occasions Hannibal, exposing him- self at the head of his troops, was so seriously wounded in the thigh that for some time he could not personally superintend the siege, which for lack of the master's hand degenerated into simple blockade. On his recovery he set to work with renewed vigor. He had as good siege material as was then known. We remember how expert the Tyrians were in their defense against Alexander a hundred years before ; their daughter, Carthage, was presumably not behind her in inven- tiveness. But sieges were by no means Hannibal's strong point. His excellence lay in broader conceptions and more cunning manoeuvres than are called out by the details of a siege. No whit disheartened by the stubborn nature of his task, Hannibal advanced his vineae or covered ways, erected towers with battering-rams of great size, and was finally success- ful in throwing down a portion of the wall and three of the towers of the town. He now ordered an assault, but though the breach was wide and the fighting was forced in heavy 160 A SECOND WOUND. columns, so that the Carthaginians were able to penetrate even beyond the ruins of the wall, the besieged met him with such bitter determination that, coupled with the novel use of the f alerica, — a sort of burning lance or dart, — they drove him back with great loss, and speedily repaired the walls ; and this, though Hannibal headed the assault in person. In the melee he was aU but crushed by a heavy stone. It is a curious fact that the entire experience of Han- nibal in this siege was repeated in 1811 by the French. Ajinoyed beyond measure at this unexpected resistance, Hannibal now erected a wooden terrace and a huge movable tower, armed with a goodly force of men and missile-throw- ers on every story, moved it up to the ditch, drove the be- sieged away from the wall and undermined it. This latter was a work which could be done with pickaxes, because the stones were not laid in cement, but clay. Thus a further breach was opened. A fresh assault met with no greater re- sult, for the troops found a demi-lune built behind the breach. But Hannibal held what he had got, and though constantly opposed by newly erected walls behind each breach he man- aged to operate, he made a slow but certain progress ; for with each point gained he had a proportionately better chance for the next assault, lacking not men. Meanwhile, the siege was interrupted by an uprising of the Tagus barbarians, which was of so dangerous a nature that Hannibal deemed it essential to go to the scene of action in person. He left Maharbal, son of Himilco, in command. This officer made some progress upon the defenses during his chieftain's absence, while hunger and sickness had begun to produce sad havoc within the walls. A new breach was soon assaulted, and on this occasion the Saguntines were driven into the citadel. Hannibal, when he had returned, offered terms to the brave city, — hard, to be sure, but stil] SAGUNTUM REFUSES TERMS. 161 terms. But the inhabitants, with true Grecian pluck, refused any terms whatever. Death was to be preferred to what to them was slavery. The entire public treasure and all private wealth were collected in a huge pile, set on fire, and the most noble of the inhabitants destroyed themselves in the flames. At the same time the great tower of the burg, which had been gradually undermined, fell to the earth. Into the breach poured the Carthaginians, furious at the long de- fense, and spared no living soul. In the general horror of the sack, most of the inhabitants set fire to their houses -and perished in the universal conflagration. There was but a pile of stones left of the once splendid city. This siege does equal honor to the bravery and skill of both attack and defense, but little indeed to the Romans, who thus, for a period of eight months, allowed the city which they had taken under their protection to be besieged, and finally to suffer an appalling fate. Hannibal sent back to Carthage a vast amount of booty for distribution, which, being accepted, committed even the peace party to the war. This siege shows Hannibal to have been familiar with, and able to use to good advantage, all the arts then known for besieging strong places. A fuller description of these arts is to be found in the volume on Alexander. It has been often said that the Carthaginian was not good at a siege, and he was certainly not the equal of Alexander and Csesar in this respect. He was greater in other branches of the art. But we must not forget that in Spain he took Carteia, Arbocala and Salmantioa, in addition to Saguntum ; and that in Italy he captured Turin in two days, and a number of other cities as well, though unprovided with siege devices. Still Tyre and Alesia rank far beyond Saguntum. Hannibal returned to Cartagena for the winter of 219-218 B. C, and furloughed all his Spanish troops till spring. 162 ROME DECLARES WAR. Rome contented herself with alleging a violation of the treaty made with her by Hasdrubal, and sent messengers, first to Hannibal and then to Carthage, the latter to demand the surrender of Hannibal and his principal officers. This de- mand being treated with the contempt it deserved, war was immediately declared. This war is known as the Second Punic War, or the War with Hannibal. It is in many re- spects the most wonderful struggle the world has ever seeiu Roman Helmet. XII. HANNIBAL STARTS FOR ITALY. MAY, 218 B. C. Hannibal undertook his expedition against Rome with his eyes wide open. He carefully made his preparations for the security of Carthage and Spain and for the equipment of the Army of Italy. He had sent embassies to the Gauls on both sides of the Alps, and from them received assurances of alliance and aid in the passage of the Alps and when he should debouch upon the valley of the Po. This secured him a base. Having no fleet to hold head against tlie Roman supremacy at sea, he could not operate directly from either Spain or Carthage. Southern Italy was, for this very reason, unavailable, as a single naval disaster would ruin his scheme, and the cities of lower Italy could not be relied upon to join him. Once on the Po, he would have allies, a base, and hope of aid from Macedon, with which country Rome had quarreled. The plan of an overland march to Italy was Hamilcar's ; its details were all Hanni- bal's. It is intellectually the most gigantic plan of campaign known in mili- tary annals. Rome, unconscious of her danger, put seventy thousand men into the field, namely, twenty-six thousand under Sempronius in Sicily, for an ex- pedition against Carthage ; twenty-four thousand under Sclpio for one to Spain ; twenty thousand in Gaul. She was too slow to cope with Hannibal. She should have sooner sent out both her expeditions ; but before either Sempronius or Scipio had got ready, Hannibal was well upon his road, and Sicily was kept busy by some naval raids cleverly pushed by the small Carthaginian fleet. With three quarters of a million men to call upon, Rome was opposing but forty-six thousand to the Army of Italy, which numbered ninety thousand. Hannibal Lad not acted blindly in forcing a contest with Home. He knew that sooner or later war must come, and he was prepared to carry it to her very gates. In this extraordinary undertaking Hannibal was perhaps justified, when a weaker man would have been to blame. A bold attack is always the surest defense ; and aware that war must be mainly waged on land, — for Carthage had no fleet to cope with Home, — Hannibal saw that to carry it into 164 HANNIBAL'S PLAN. Italy would do much to keep it away from Carthage, as well as put the waste of maintaining the struggle on the enemy's soil. Nothing exalts higher both this great man's military judgment and self-reliance than this step, taken, as it was, not blindly, but with all the facts considered. For there is more evidence of careful preparation by Hannibal for his invasion of Italy than by Alexander for the campaign in Asia. But it was a step which required no less a captain than Hanni- bal to dare and carry through. Hannibal was anxious to make his descent on Italy before the Romans had got through with the Gallic and lUyrian wars. He had made many preparations to this end, not only in men and material, but in reconnoitring the to him un- known route. He had, as above stated, made friends of the tribes of Gaul so far as he was able to do with repeated em- bassies, and had, early in 220 b. c, sent across the Alps to offer to the Padane Gauls money and his cooperation against Rome. By thus securing their friendship he aimed to have an available base of operations when he should debouch from the mountain barrier of the Alps. He received flattering answers from many of these tribes, especially the Insubres on the upper Po, and the Boii farther down ; but at the same time he heard from his envoys, among whom were perhaps some of his topographical engineers, by no means reassuring accounts of the difficulties to be encountered in crossing the Alps. These reports in no wise daunted Hannibal. He felt confidence in his ability to deal with the peoples through whose territories he should have to pass ; he knew how to arouse their hatred of Rome as well as their love of adven- ture and plunder ; and he believed that he could with equal readiness surmount any natural obstacles, however great. It was evident to Hannibal that he must have a base nearer Rome than either Spain or Carthage. To operate HIS PROBABLE ALLIES. 165 solely from Spain or Carthage was mere hazard, — for Rome had too strong a fleet to rely on communications kept up alone by sea, and he could not protect so long a line by land. In fact, Hannibal could have, properly speaking, no commu- nications such as Alexander had with Macedonia, or such as are essential to-day ; reinforcements from Spain or Carthage must come to him in armies rather than in detachments ; if in small bodies, always at the risk of capture. He practically cut himself off from any base, except such as he himself should make. Lower Italy was not available. The Koman allies in the south of the peninsula were too much committed to Rome to be relied on at the outset. Pyrrhus had found no permanent aid from them ; how could he ? No base pre- sented itseK which was in any respect as promising as cis- alpine Gaul, in other words, the line of the Po. The insur- rectionary tribes of the Gauls had but just been conquered, and their feelings were supremely bitter; many of their cousins, the Spanish Celts, were in Hannibal's ranks ; the In- subres and the Boii had promised their own immediate aid on his arrival, had assured him reliable guides across the Alps, the aid of the transalpine tribes in the passage, and abundant supplies on his arrival. Thus the Po would be an effective base among allies who would look on him as their deliverer from the yoke of hated Rome. Macedon and Rome had come to a rupture, and perhaps aid might be persuaded to come through lUyria — though it was a long circuit — to meet him on the Po. With a good base on that river, with a supply of troops coming from Spain on his right, and with an allied army from Macedon to sustain him on his left, he would be firmly planted for a decisive struggle with his en- emy. This was the hopeful side. The plan was not altogether new ; it had been canvassed again and again in the Barca family. The ground had, in 166 PROS AND CONS. fact, been already reconnoitred by Hamilcar; the Romans found a party of Carthaginians in Liguria in 230 B. C. J3ut the scheme was none the less Hannibal's. If Carthage had been mistress of the seas, southern Italy would have afforded a markedly better base than the Po. For Macedon might then readily have sustained the Cartha^ ginian right, and reinforcements could come from home or Spain with much less time and risk. But southern Italy was full of fortified cities committed to the Eoman cause ; a foothold was not so easy to acquire there ; and Carthage had no fleet which could compete with Eome. Next came the question whether Hannibal should seek to reach the Po by land or by sea. Though the sea was com- manded by the Roman fleet, a descent at Genoa was possible. But a single naval disaster would ruin the Carthaginian cause beyond redemption ; by the overland route conflict would be avoided until the Gallic allies had been reached. Hannibal's knowledge of the topography of northern Italy was as yet meagre. He knew that from Genoa there was stiU a moun- tain range to cross to reach the Po ; how much less an one than the Alps he was not advised. The Alps had already been crossed by many roving bands of large size ; indeed, Gallic armies had accomplished the feat; why might not as much be done by a Carthaginian army? Moreover, in the plan to cross the Alps, there was the element of doing that which your enemy least expects, and Hannibal understood and had weighed this well. Hannibal, says Polybius, " conducted his enterprise with' consummate judgment ; for he had accurately ascertained the excellent nature of the country in which he was to arrive, and the hostile disposition of its inhabitants towards the Romans ; and he had for guides and conductors through the difficult passes which lay in the way natives of the country, PREPARATIONS OF ROME. 167 men who were to partake of the same hopes with him- self." Rome had acted in a vacillating manner in sustaining her allies and in declaring war. She now committed other equal mistakes in preparing for war. Nothing was farther from her thoughts than that an attack could come overland from Spain. She would have scouted the idea of the possibility of such a thing. The armies put into the field by Rome in B. C. 218 were as follows : Tiberius Sempronius Longus, the consul destined for Sicily, had two Roman legions, each of four thousand foot and three hundred hor.se ; sixteen thousand allied foot and eighteen hundred horse: total twenty-six thousand four hundred men, and one hundred and sixty quinquiremes and twelve galleys. With this force Sempronius was to go to Sicily, en route to Africa, on which he was to make a descent like Agathocles and Regulus. The other consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was to go to Spain with two Roman legions, eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, and fourteen thousand allied foot and sixteen hundred horse : total twenty- four thousand two hundred men, and sixty quinquiremes. The praetor Lucius Manlius was to march to Padane Gaul with eighteen thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse, partly with a view to plant colonies, partly as a military measure. According to the table of Polybius above given, Rome was capable at this time of putting on foot something like three quarters of a million men. The senate must indeed have de- spised its adversary to send but a tenth of this force against the Carthaginians, and to have divided this force into three parts at that. Their eyes were opened when Hannibal placed foot upon the soil of Italy. The Romans had long been acting in a penny-wise, pound- foolish manner. They had given Carthage twenty years to 168 DELAYS OF ROME. recover her strength, when at any time a descent on Africa might have crushed her. They could not see the danger of a Punic occupation of Iberia. They could not believe that the Phosnieians would again wage an offensive war. They had unnecessarily quarreled with Macedonia. They had failed to finish the work of conquering the Celts and seizing the avenues of the Alps. They had delayed any systematic action on the mere notion that the next Punic war must be waged in Africa, until the enemy himself had decided on the theatre of war. The manifest Roman plan was to land in Africa while holding the Carthaginians in Spain by a stout diversion there. This they had failed to do with energy or speed. If they had been half as active as Hannibal, they could, with their fleet, have easily placed an army on the Ebro before Hannibal could reach it. As it was, Hanni- bal found none but natives on the Ebro ; the consul Scipio had been detained on the Po by a threatened insurrection, which Hannibal's emissaries had been the means of raising. Had the Romans made a stout contest for Spain, Hannibal could not have left it. The fortunes of Carthage were too much bound up in the peninsula, as Hannibal later found to his sorrow. Had the Romans even delayed his advance a month more, snow would have closed the Alps, and they could have fallen on Africa unopposed. But Rome could scarcely conceive boldness such as Hannibal's. Time seemed ample to do things in her own way. Hannibal was thirty-one years old when at the end of May, B. C. 218, he left New Carthage on his great expedition. The Spanish army was distributed in a very sensible fashion to meet the wants of Carthage, Spain and the " Army of It- aly." It was altogether a fine body of men. It had no merce- naries, except a few Ligurians. The bulk of the forces were Carthaginian subjects, Libyans and Spaniards. Two thirds of SPAIN AND CARTHAGE PROTECTED. 169 the army were Africans, and all were hardened troops, com- mitted to their chief by both discipline and affection. Following was the distribution, as given by Polybius from Hannibal's copper tablet at Lacinium. The Army of Italy had eighty-two thousand infantry and twelve thousand cav- alry, in addition to thirty-seven elephants, — the latter more for effect on the Gauls than for use against the Romans. Hannibal was too able a soldier to rely to too great an extent on these creatures, though he knew their value in their place. He had sent to West Africa about fourteen thousand troops from Spain, among them some deserters and disaffected men who would do well enough out of Spain, but could scarcely be relied on in the peninsula during his absence ; and for the protection of Carthage had transferred four thousand West African troops to the capital. He had brought some African troops to Spain for a similar reason. He had left his brother Hasdrubal in command in the Spanish colonies with twelve thousand six hundred and fifty foot and two thousand five hundred and fifty horse, largely East Africans, twenty -one elephants and fifty-seven men-of-war, mostly quinquiremes, of which thirty-seven were equipped. The communications between Spain and Carthage were secured with as much care as the smallness of the fleet would allow, and, as a diversion, twenty quinquiremes, with one thousand soldiers aboard, were sent out to pillage the west coast of Italy ; while twenty-five were dispatched to Lilybseum to essay its capture out of hand. More than this the fleet could not venture to do. The plan was well devised and executed in all its details, and the main feature in it was, that while the Romans were sending their smallest army to cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal was ready to invade Italy through that province with a force more than twice their own. 170 LAST PREPARATIONS. Recent news from Carthage inspired Hannital with more confidence in the support of his fellow-citizens than he had lately had. His army was wedded to him, as every army is to the man who exhibits the qualities of the great soldier. Hannibal laid his plans before them, told them the demand of the Eomans, that he and all the principal officers of the army should be delivered up, explained the fertility of Italy to them, and the hearty allies they would there meet, and found the warmest support from one and all. As a last act of self-denial, Hannibal sent his Spanish bride, Imilcea, and their infant son to Carthage. He did not dare expose them to the dangers he was himself about to encounter. He must do his work alone. Sixteen long years elapsed before he again embraced them. Surely no man ever undertook a great work to his own sorrow, from more purely patriotic instincts, than this same Carthaginian. Roman Helmet. XIII. CATALONIA. JULY AND AUGUST, 218 B. C. The Army of Italy left Cartagena about the end of May. In July it crossed the Iberus in three columns, "which, traversing Catalonia from south to north, by clever mountain tactics, heavy fighting and set purpose, succeeded in sub- duing the land. The several columns then crossed the Pyrenees and reunited at Uliberis, near modern Perpignan. The loss had been thirteen thousand men. Here Hannibal left Hanno with eleven thousand men ; and here too he dis- charged an equal number of disaffected soldiers. He crossed the Pyrenees with less than sixty thousand men. From Cartagena, where the army wintered after the cap- ture of Saguntum, to the Ebro was twenty-six hundred stadia, three hundred and twenty-five Roman miles. Hannibal is thought to have left Cartagena about the end of May. He reached the Ebro the middle of July, having, no doubt, many things to do upon the way. This river lies in front of the Pyrenees, like a huge ditch, is the most prominent river in Iberia, and originally gave its name to the peninsula. After crossing the Ebro, Hannibal was in Catalonia, a territory over which Rome pretended to exercise sway, — one which, at all events, had as yet been beyond Carthaginian assaults. In order to leave no danger in his rear, and to rob his enemy of a base for an invasion of the Spanish colonies of Carthage, Hannibal must first of all conquer and garri- son the land. Catalonia is bounded by the eastern Pyrenees, the sea, the Ebro and the Sicoris. It is a mass of moun- tains, valleys, passes, precipices. It has, in history, the rep- utation of resisting invasion with the greatest desperation and success. Through this difficult country Hannibal made 172 THREE COLUMNS. a sharp, quick and costly campaign, of whicli unfortunately there are sparse records, as there always are of Alexander's mountain campaigns. The one thing which the old author- ities invariably skip is mountain-campaigning. 100 MILES Catalonia. Hannibal divided his array into three columns of not far from thirty thousand men each. The right column, to judge by the topography and the operations of later generals, and probably with baggage and impedimenta, crossed at Adeba (Amposta), and, aided by the fleet which skirted the coast, overran Lower Catalonia. The second passed at modern Mora, pushed up the valleys of the mountain range, and at- tacked the country at the heart. The third crossed near the A COSTLY CAMPAIGN. 173 mouth of the Sicoris (Segre) and marched up the valley of that river. The duty of the first column must have been to take pos- session of the coast cities, then as now many and thriving, as far as Emporise ; that of the left column would be to follow the line of the Sicoris as far as its source in the main range of the Pyrenees. The centre would move by way of the val- leys of the central range of Catalonia. Along the Eubri- catus (Llobregat) was a road by which the columns could at need reunite midway, or assist each other in their opera- tions. Hannibal, no doubt, was with the right column, which had with it both treasure-chest and cavalry, and may be called the column of direction. Owing to the uncertainty of the Roman movements, he did not dare absent himself from the coast. The campaign covered two months and was very costly. The losses of the three columns footed up some thir- teen thousand men. The Catalonians have always resisted invasion nobly. That the country could be subdued in so short a space speaks highly for Hannibal's lieutenants and the training they had received. Having reduced Catalonia, he placed this territory under command of Hanno, and left with him ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, with headquarters probably at Barcino (Barcelona). Here too some of the Iberian regiments are said to have shown signs of disaffection, and three thousand to have deserted. But this is doubtful. At all events, Han- nibal deemed it wise to state that he had given them leave to go, and also to let off eight thousand more. This act added to the devotion of the rest. He did not lose his moral power over his army. He is alleged to have had the additional motive of thus showing his confidence to accomplish what he had set out to do with limited numbers, and those only 174 TEMPER OF THE ARMY. of such as were willing to east in their lot with him for good or ill. He had so far set forth his object to his army as to inspire it with confidence, and his explanation to the Carthaginians of the alternative they had of victory or slav- ery raised the ambition of all to the pitch of following their venturesome young leader to the very end. Catalonia thus reduced the Army of Italy by more than a third. It was with only fifty thousand foot and nine thou- sand horse that Hannibal crossed the Pyrenees. Hannibal had waited at Emporiae for the other columns to be ready to cross the mountain-range, and then, himself probably making his way by the pass nearest the sea, the centre and the left columns crossed at points farther west. The whole army reunited at Illiberis (Elne, near Perpignan), about the middle of September. We know that Hannibal crossed the Iberus in three col- umns, and it is to be supposed that these were intended each to subdue a given part of Catalonia. The route of the col- umns is to a certain extent prescribed by the topographical features of the country. We know that Catalonia was sub- dued, and remained so until the Romans later came to its rescue. We assume, then, that the several columns traversed the country as indicated ; but all we are told is of the points of departure and rendezvous, and of the result. Hannibal had been the first man who ever frayed a pas- sage for a regular army through the Pyrenees. What Hannibal now had left were the best of his troops. They had been hardened by nearly twenty years of cam- paigning against warlike tribes in a difficult country, had been uniformly victorious, had captured many cities, includ- ing the strong fortress of Saguntum, and were well aware of their ability, hearty and self-confident. Hannibal was sol- dier enough to know that numbers are of less importance HANNIBAL'S INFLUENCE. 175 than homogeneity, and was willing to carry with him no sol- dier whose fidelity was not unquestioned. And yet it is probable that nothing less than the wonderful personal influ- ence of this young general — an influence shown but seldom in history — would have been able to weld these diverse ele- ments into a mass capable of such unity of action as the Army of Italy showed. Tula Player. XIV. FROM THE RHONE TO THE ALPS. FALL, 218 B. C. From the Pyrenees to the Rhone, Hannibal's route was inland, on a line towards Roquemaure. Scipio, meanwhile, at Genoa, had embarked his legions ior Spain, and when Hannibal reached the Rhone was at Massilia. Hearing with surprise of the presence of the Carthaginians on the Rhone, Seipio sent a scouting party up the river to discover their whereabouts. He should have marched his entire army upstream to prevent a crossing, or at least to bring Hannibal to battle before he could reach the Alps. Hannibal forced a passage at Roquemaure, and at once advanced up the river. Seipio, on receiving a re- port from his scouting-party, marched up to meet him ; but he reached Roque- maure three days after the Carthaginian rear had left. He had lost a week's time. He then returned to Massilia, sent the bulk of his army into Spain, un- der his brother Cnaeus, to attack the Carthaginians at their base, — a wise and long-headed policy, — and personally returned to Italy, to hold head against Hannibal when he should debouch from the Alps, with the army of the prse- tors, which was still upon the Po. His general scheme was good. It was weak in underrating his foe. Hannibal was cheered upon his way by an embassy from the Padane Gauls, which met him at the Rhone. From the Pyrenees to the Rhone, Hannibal's progress was easy. Much interesting discussion has been made over the probable details of the route. These are more significant to the French, over whose territory it lay, than to us. The point of crossing the Rhone is more important. The popu- lations along the road were, some friendly, some antagonistic, but Hannibal's sensible policy was an open sesame. He had a way of propitiating the native tribes which made his march safe and expeditious. Where honeyed words had no effect, gold was used. The Roman road later made, prob- ably along the route Hannibal took (for Roman roads were not unapt to follow ancient paths, which themselves were die- ROUTE FROM PYRENEES. 177 tated, by the topographical requirements), crossed the Pyr- enees at Bellegarde, and went by way of Ehie, Perpignan, Narbonne, Beziers, somewhat to the north of Montpellier, Pont d'Ambroise, Nimes. From here Hannibal steered di- rect for Roquemaure, on the Ehone. It was the end of Sep- tember. He reached the vicinity of this river, which flowed ,IV0N i^ >v>5^^^?==^ VIINNtJ 'r—""""'^^^^^ ^N^-. . \ •1 Nmrs/y inofwinnuRt 1* ^'-^^ •"NWtLitJ -^i ^^ ^^j-rifchBEiU-t '^'?<"nuforni accuracy connnends these distancH's to our undoiibting aecejitation. The most important distances are, " fi-om the Khone, for those who are traveling along the river in the direction of its source," to the ascent of the Alps, fourteen hundred stadia; the Alps themselves, twelve hundred stadia. In ad- dition to tills, Polybius tells us that from Cartagena to the Ebro are twenty-six hundrt^d stadia ; and from the Ebro to EmporiiB, sixteen hundred Ht.adia ; and from thence to the passage of the Rhone, sixteen hundred stadia ; so that we have Hannibal's entire march ma))pcd out. For though the Roman road was built after Hannibal's day, such roads wore apt to follow tlio old country routes which may have been in use for many centuries previous ; and especially is this so in the Alps, whore the watercourses or mountain-gaps mark out the natural roadways. Thus wo begin first by narrowing ourselves down to the ohoif(> of Polybius as our guide, on account of his universally accejjtcd accuracy and of his being the only contemporary writer who gives us details, and whom we have at first-hand ; and, secondly, by taking him without omission or alteration, supplementing by other authors wjion they do not disagree with him. Let us see how well this works. 19? PLACE OF CROSSING RHONE. Hannibal reached the Ehone at Eoquemaure, and actually crossed the river a league above. This seems to be well proven by the description of the river and by its distance, as given by Polybius, from Emporise, the Insula AUobrogum (or Delta made by the Ehone, Isere and Mt. du Chat), and the sea. The distance from Emporise is given as sixteen hun- dred stadia, two hundred miles ; and it is actually two hun- dred and four from Emporite to Eoquemaure. The whole distance from crossing the Ehone to the foot of the Alps being given as fourteen hundred stadia, one hundred and sev- enty-five Eoman miles, Polybius says that from the Insula to tlie Alps was eight hundred stadia, one hundred miles, leaving seventy-five miles from the crossing to the Insula. Eoqviemaure is just about seventy-five miles from the conflu- ence of the Ehone and Isere, that is, the Insula. It is also sixty miles from the ancient seashore line, at say Foz ; and Polybius states the sea to be about four days' march from the place of crossing, which, at fifteen miles a day, is accurate enough. Moreover, the Ehone here " flows in a single stream," which does not often occur, as the Ehone is gen- erally full of islands ; and it is improbable that Hannibal crossed below the river Durance (where there is a similar stretch without islands), as he would in that event have had that stream to cross as well. The island where Hanno passed the river is just above Pont St. Esprit, opposite La Palud. The proof of our assumption that Hannibal crossed the Little St. Bernard lies largely in the accurate tally of days and distances from the crossing of the Ehone. These must be carefully computed, even at the risk of being somewhat tiresome. As already narrated, the army was got over, excepting the elephants, on the fifth day after the arrival at the Ehone. On the sixth day, the five hundred Numidian horse was sent AN INACCURACY. 199 out towards Massilia, and came back with the Eomans at their heels ; and the array held the meeting at which the chiefs of the allies on the Po were presented. On the sev- enth day the infantry set off up the Rhone, and on this and the eighth day the elephants were got across. On the ninth, Hannibal, with the cavalry and the elephants, followed tho column as rear-guard. Three days after, Publius Scipio reached Roquemaure. This gave six days for his scouting-detachment to rejoin him and for him to march to Roquemaure. It being eight days' march (four down and four up), he evidently made it, as Polybius says, " with all possible haste." Polybius describes the Rhone as flowing towards the setting sun of winter, that is, about from northeast to south- west. Here is clearly an inaccuracy, though, indeed, the Rhone, in a general line from its source to its mouth, does so run. But it first flows west and then south, making an angle at Lyons. In this, as in other matters, Polybius, writ- ing for the Greeks, who knew nothing of this part of the world, no doubt meant to describe the general direction of the river and of Hannibal's march ; and no doubt his own ideas of the direction were as limited as those of all ancients in respect to geography. He had no instruments, and spoke solely by the sun and stars. After crossing, Hannibal reached the Insula in four days' march ; but the infantry, — with baggage, presumably, — which formed the head and bulk of the column, had two days' start, and thus marched the seventy-five miles in six days, twelve and one half miles a day. As they had several rivers to cross on the route, bridging some of which would eat up time, this rate of speed was good. The rear-guard — elephants and cavalry — easily made the same distance in four days, nineteen miles a day, for it was unincumbered with baggage, and had the road prepared for it. 200 THE INSULA. The Insula is well described by Polybius by likening it to the Delta of the Nile, but having rugged mountains on one side instead of the sea. It can be nothing but the triangu- lar region between the Rhone and Isere, closed on the east by the Mt. du Chat. The description tallies with Polybius' statement that the course of the Ehone is southwest. That his geography was no better than that of the day is small Polybius' Idea of the Insula. wonder. He likens the mountains on the third side to the position of the sea in the Nile Delta, and no doubt had in his mind something like the accompanying chart. The fact that this triangular territory is level and very abundantly watered adds to the accuracy of the description. It is universally accepted as the Insula of Polybius. At the Insula, Hannibal found two brothers contending for their kingdom, — probably a tribe of the AUobroges, though perhaps a larger sovereignty. Embracing the cause of the eldest, Brancus, who was also the one favored by the majority of the tribe, Hannibal made a strong ally, from whom he received much subsequent assistance in munitions, corn, clothing, arms and shoes, the latter of greatest value on the mountain roads, and in protection from the rest of the AUobroges as far as the foot of the Alps. THE ISkRE ROUTE. 201 Some moi3ern authorities, relying on the difficulty of cross- ing the Isere at its confluence with the Rhone, of which Po- lybius does not speak, make Hannibal march up the left bank of the Isere as far as the Drac or the Arc, and thence turn towards the mountains up one or other of these streams. But Polybius rarely mentions difficulty in crossing rivers ; Hannibal's men were expert pontonniers. The Allobroges lived in the Insula, and, to aid Brancus, Hannibal must have crossed the Isere in any event, having done which there was no reason for him to recross it. Again, the left bank of The Real Insula. the Isere was in places almost impassable to an army, es- pecially one with cavalry and elephants. Near Grenoble the defiles were too narrow for troops to file through, and the streams to be crossed were rapid torrents. The mod- ern road is largely blasted in the rock. And as Polybius 202 A VOTIVE OFFERING r says that Hannibal moved fourteen hundred stadia up " the river," meaning no doubt the Ehone, and not the Ehone and the Isere, and expressly states that Hannibal " crossed (the Alps) in the part where they touch upon the Rhone," it would seem that the Isere route, which makes him cross the range so far away from the Rhone, is inadmissible. The only places where the Rhone touches the Alps at a practicable gap are Martigny, near the Great St. Bernard, — then an un- known pass, and therefore not to be considered, ■ — or St. Genix, where is the entrance to the Mt. du Chat, one of the foothills of the Alps. This latter is therefore clearly indi- cated, and it is the route we are now to follow him over. There is but one difficulty in the distance 'of fourteen hun- dred stadia "along the river" from the crossing of the Rhone to the foot of the Alps. It obliges Hannibal to leave " the river " — that is, the Rhone — at some point, and move across country to another point, "on the river." But it is quite natural that his GaUic guide should have told him how many miles he could thus save, and equally natural that Polybius should not mention the cutting off of the angle at Lyons, for " along the river " would naturally cover such a deviation, if Hannibal regained " the river " at the end of his shortcut, while to leave the Rhone for the Isere would not. Hannibal probably left the Rhone at Vienne and rejoined it at St. Genix, marching along the then usual route via Bourgoin, afterwards made into a Roman road. There are some lesser indications that Hannibal came this way, upon which, however, it will not do to lean too heavily. In 1714, a silver shield, with the common Carthaginian de- vice of a lion and palm, and engraved in a manner unlike Roman work but much like Carthaginian medals, was found at the village of Passage, which lies on a hiU where, on this route, you first get a view of the main chain of the Alps. BRANCUS LEAVES HANNIBAL. 203 This shield, now in the Louvre, may have been, it is thought, a votive offering made by Ilanuibal on his approach to the greatest mountain chain of Europe, which he was about to cross. And indeed the name Passage is by an ancient tra- dition of the place said to come from the fact tliat Hanni- bal marched that way. Still, such traditions are unreliable. The Alps are full of them, and the modern are with diffi- culty to be distinguished from the ancient. Near modern Aouste, Brancus, the chief of the AUobroges, Exits to Insula. left Hannibal. Here the flat country ends, and Polybiua states that the chief " secured them from all attack tiU they 204 PASSES OUT OF INSULA. drew near the foot of the Alps." From the confluence of the Ehone and Isere to Chevelu, at the foot of the Mt. du Chat, is, by our route, just about one hundred miles, the eight hundred stadia of Polybius. From St. Genix the Rhone cannot be followed far upstream, owing to its precipitous banks from La Balme to Yenne, and around the head of the Mt. du Chat, where the present road has been blasted a con- siderable part of the way. Hannibal probably struck from St. Genix over the hills by Chevelu, with only the guides from his Padane allies as a compass. There are now several passes from "the Island " over the foothills of the Alps. The most southerly one, by Moirans to Voreppe and Grenoble, can scarcely have been the one selected by Hannibal ; for he would not have come so far up the Rhone, merely to go back on his steps. He would rather have kept along the Isere to begin with, and we have shown the difficulty of this route. The next northerly one is Les Echelles, which was not opened until the seventeenth cen- tury, and up to that time had at many places stairs cut in the rocks to aid in the ascent. To Hannibal's elephants and cav- alry, not to mention pack-mules, this route was an impossibil- ity. Hannibal probably did not even know of it. Next come two routes to Chambery, on either side of the lake of Aigue- beUette, but they are only practicable for mules. The last is the Mt. du Chat, the Chevelu Pass, so called from the vil- lage at its western outlet ; and this alone fulfills the table of distances, which are best taken from the later established Augustan Itinerary, or which may be roughly reckoned from the course of the roads to-day. This alone is " where the Alps touch upon the Rhone." ^Moreover, it is vastly easier than the others, and Polybius says that Hannibal reached the Alps at a place " through which alone the army coidd pass." This leads us to suppose that the others were GSULS HOLD PASS. 205 as yet unknown, and at his time it is altogether probable that only this one was practicable. All things considered, the Chevelu Pass comes nearest the description of Polybius ; and even to-day the people tell you that there is no road (by which they mean none over which they care to take you) across this range between the Chevelu Pass and the Grande Chartreuse, that is, the first one above cited. When Hannibal reached the foot of the mountain he found that the Allobroges from beyond the Mt. du Chat, notified perhaps by those in the Insula who had sided against Bran- cus, had occupied the pass he intended to use. He camped, and sent out his Grallic guides as spies, to ascertain the exact mm&'^fi, c*'-*" mk"•'•'!/'. IS MILCS Chambery to S^ez. wide and fertile, and the slopes are not only cultivated up- wards for mUes, but there are levels at the tops of the abut- ting hills which sustain large parishes. The entire valley is in marked contrast to any other route suggested ; and it is 210 THE ARMY CHEERFUL. certainly of all of them the one which was surely productive, and was apt to have a population of sufficient size to build roads, at the time of Hannibal's passage. To construct a road up the Isere from the Chambery plain is nowhere of extreme difficulty; any of the other passes are in places impracti- cable, except for the modern military road built at an enor- mous cost. With the slender means at the command of the barbarians, therefore, the Isere route was apt to have by far the best road for an army to take. Hannibal camped for one day at the captured village, no doubt to collect rations and forage, as well as to give his men a short rest after their perilovis work, and to explain to them their further route. Like all great generals, he was apt to keep touch with the mood of his men ; and often convoked them in assembly, which stood in lieu of a stirring order of the day. The army appreciated its perilous undertaking. On either hand were high knife-blade or saw-tooth ridges, at the north the lake of Bourget, on the south the white-topped outlying spurs of the Alps, on the summits of which fresh snow had already fallen. This outlook on the mountains they had yet to cross must have had a repellent effect on the Carthaginians. The Alps at times look remorseless. But Hannibal seems to have found no difficulty in cheering up his men. He had a persuasive tongue. Assuming that as far as the Mt. du Chat our route has been correct, — and the distances, it wiU be observed, agree as closely as the necessary slight changes of route will allow, — there remained to be made, according to Polybius, from the " entrance to the Alps " to the " foot of the Alps " at the Italian plains a march, in fifteen days, of twelve hundred stadia, or one hundred and fifty Eoman miles. The first day was the one taken up by fighting through the defile just passed, and the army lay encamped at its close on the TREACHEROUS ALLIES. 211 plains of Chambery, where they spent the second day in rest and making ready for the dangerous march before them. Polybius tells us that on the fourth day after resuming the march (the sixth from the "entrance to the Alps"), the march being now along the Isere, envoys from the inhab- itants (Centrones, into whose land he was just entering, at modern Albert ville) came out to meet the Carthaginians with boughs and garlands, offering hostages and supplying cattle to its troops, " desirous," they said, " of neither doing nor suffering any injury." Hannibal was shrewdly suspicious of their intentions, but deemed it wise to conceal his mood. He saw that to openly antagonize them would place him in a bad predicament. He " pretended to enter into an alliance of amity with them," took some of their number as guides, in addition to those he had received from his Insubrian allies, and marched on two days farther, which brought him to " the foot of the highest ridge of the Alps." It is nowhere suggested that the army lost its way, and indeed the Little St. Bernard is so plain a gap in the range that guides were almost unnecessary, except to point out the details of the route. This can scarcely be said of any other pass. Having reached this spot on the eighth day from Chevelu, Hannibal found his suspicions confirmed ; the de- file leading from the valley to the pass was occupied by the barbarians, who attacked the head of his column at its en- trance, which was " difficult of access and precipitous." This was no doubt near Seez, at the foot of the Little St. Ber- nard. There are grave objections to the proposition advocated by many, in this following Napoleon, that Hannibal turned from modern Montmeillan up the Arc and crossed the Mt. Cenis, though indeed this might now be the better route for an army to take. First and foremost, the route is not men- 212 NAPOLEON'S ERROR. tioned by Polybius as known to him, as it certainly would have been if Hannibal had passed over it. Nor does Strabo mention it. Again, the valley of the Arc is narrow and rocky and far from rich. It would be unable, indeed, to sustain an army at the present day. It could not feed a sufficient population to equip an army capable of holding head against Hannibal, as was done in the passage of the main ridge. The Mt. Cenis road would lead him into the land of the unfriendly Taurini. Even the authority of Na^ poleon cannot overcome these objections. Napoleon attacks this question with his usual assertiveness, in a way to bear down aU controversy. And in so doing he argues, unconsciously of course, from misstatements. He says that Polybius and Livy both allege that Hannibal first entered Italy in the land of the Taurini. But Polybius ex- pressly says that Hannibal entered Italy in the land of the Insubrians ; it is Strabo who says that Polybius states that he debouched into the Taurinian territory, — in other words second-hand evidence, and probably spurious at that ; and were it not so, Polybius is surely more credible in his own words than by the hearsay of even Strabo. Were not Strabo expressly contradicted by Polybius, he would be en- tirely credible, but in this instance we cannot pay heed to what he says. Putting aside the fact that only four passes are mentioned by Strabo, it is clear that Napoleon argues like a soldier of this century ; not as Hannibal must have done in crossing the greatest of mountain ranges quite unknown to him, and with an equally unknown but gigantic problem beyond. It seems evident that Hannibal would make every possible sacri- fice of distance, ease and even safety, in order to descend from the Alps among friends. Moreover, the Mt. Cenis valley is barely three fourths of a mile wide in any place, and narrows HANNIBAL'S KNOWLEDGE. 213 down to a few hundred yards. It is a desolate, poverty- stricken valley now, — what must it have been in Hannibal's era ? How could he have fed his men along this route ? Napoleon was apt to speak as well as to act from his in- tuitions. But even Napoleon's intuitions are not history, t"hough, indeed, they were so wonderful as often to make it. And, curiously, in this matter of crossing the Alps, Napo- leon did not seem to be positive about the Mt. Cenis route. For one day on the passage of Monte Cervo, he is said to have remarked : " II [Annibal] n'a pu prendre qu'un des cols du revers septentrionale du Viso," which leaves a con- siderable choice of passes. And, after all said, the question is not what a military man would do or ought to do, but what does Polybius say Hannibal did ? It will not do to assume that Hannibal knew very much about the Alps. This is where Napoleon errs. What he knew he had learned from his allies, the Insubres, and from his own officers who had been, not all through the Alps, but only through such passes as would lead to the ter- ritory of the Insubres. It is scarcely probable that the In- subres knew much about any of the Alpine passes except the one at their very doors ; and it is still less probable that they would have directed Hannibal or Hannibal's offi- cers to a pass or passes which would lead him into the domain of the Taurini, their enemies. The question for Hannibal's topographical engineers, if any were with the embassy which visited the Padane Gauls, to answer was, not which was the easiest of the passes of the Alps, but was the passage which would lead the army to the territory of their allies a practicable one ? StiU, had they been called on to answer the first question, they must have pointed out the Little St. Bernard. For this is not only the easiest in the 214 THE DAYS' MARCHES. Alps for an army, but it and the Mt. du Chat are those which are the most readily followed, even without guides. Now, if Hannibal did really cross the Mt. du Chat and head up the Isere towards the Little St. Bernard, the dis- tances of Polybius should agree with the miles to be covered along this route. And we find that they do very closely agree. The army would naturally foUow the river, for this was the only practicable way, and along its banks was subse- quently built the Roma,n road. In three days from Bourget or Chamb^ry, four from the western foot of the Mt. du Chat, the army would reach the Arly, at modern Conflans or AlbertviUe, where they would be met by the envoys of the Centrones, above mentioned, whose boundary this river was. Almost to modern Moutiers on the sixth, and to modern Ayme on the seventh, would be fair marches, and the middle of the eighth would find the army at modern Bourg St. Maurice or Seez. The march so far would be easy and along a valley where the barbarians would not be apt to attack, for it is several miles wide near Chambery, and from one up- wards near Albertville, which would enable Hannibal to fore- stall any attack with ease ; and that there was no fighting is what Polybius tells us. From Bourget to Seez is seventy- five miles. To make this in six days is twelve and a half miles a day, — a fair rate of speed for a long column, espe- cially while gathering rations. So far, Polybius' account coincides as well with this route as it is possible to expect. XVI. THE SUMMIT OF THE ALPS. OCTOBER, 218 B. C. Hannibal's suspicions were confirmed. At the defile at the foot of the Lit- tle St. Bernard, his pretended allies made an attack on his marching column ; and it was with extreme difficulty that he beat them off and saved his army, and this with heavy loss. The mention of "a certain white rook," by Poly- bius, enables us to locate the battle-field. During; the battle, the train was pushed on ahead up towards the summit of the pass, and when the army reached the spot it rested two days. Polybius describes a plain at the top of the pass crossed by Hannibal, which corresponds with that at the top of the Little St. Bernard. Here Hannibal cheered his army by showing them that they were on the watershed and that their course would now be downward, towards fertile Italy. Snow had fallen, there was no vegetation, and the loss of part of the train in the late battle made the prospect serious. On the way down, the men had difficulty in keeping to the road, or in maintaining their footing. Many slid down the precipices and were killed. Not far down they found the road carried away by a landslide. Starvation stared them in the face ; but Hannibal managed to get the road repaired and thence descended to pastm-age. The elephants were all but dead before they got forage. In three days from the break in the road they reached the level country and were among friends. Taking all these facts into consideration, there remains small doubt that it was the Little St. Bernard by which the Carthaginians crossed the Alps. The one fact suffices that they were led by Insubrian guides, and this pass alone, among those then known, would take them into friendly territory. Moreover, on this route, the days and distances accord better with those given by Polybius than they can be made to do over any other pass. The ground at Seez admirably coincides with what Poly- bius tells us of the attack made at the foot of the highest pass by the barbarians on the Carthaginian column. It was the end of October. Following is substantially his account. Though Hannibal had seen fit to receive the advances of the barbarians who met him at the Arly, he had yet, with 216 A SERIOUS ATTACK. commendable prudence, taken his measures to be ready for a possible attack. He placed the baggage, elephants and cav- alry in front, while with the heavy-armed troops he held the Valley at S^ez. rear. When the Carthaginians, in this order, " were passing through a ravine very difficult of access, and closed in by steep and rugged heights, . . . the barbarians, having, mean- while, assembled together in great numbers, made a sudden attack." The column had apparently made some progress through the defile, but the barbarians, who had secretly lined the heights bordering upon it, " advancing along the sides of the mountain " as fast as the Carthaginians through the de- file, rolled rocks and hurled stones upon them, and spread such confusion and disorder in the ranks as to cause the loss of a vast number of men, beasts of burden and horses. Though but few, and these the most active of the barbarians, could clamber up the steep sides of the ravine, it was difficult to cope with this attack ; but, as the bulk of the barbarians had apparently fallen on the rear-guard as it was moving up the Seez slope, they were more easily held in check. Hanni- bal saw at once that if he was able to hold the mouth of the NIGHT MARCH AND FIGHT. 217 defile, he could fend off pursuit, and by suitable flanking par- ties hold back the attacks on the column filing through. He, therefore, with half the army, occupied " a certain white rock, strong from its position," which commanded the approaches to the defile, and, making his bivouac close to it for the night, was able to drive off the enemy, and get his entire column through by morning. For the enemy had difficulty in mak- ing his way along the precipices bordering the defile during the day, and after nightfall could scarcely do so at all. The train and cavalry and elephants had been kept in mo- tion all night, and were well on ahead (" now separated from him "), with part of the infantry column following on. These suffered next day only from isolated attacks by smaller de- tachments, which may perhaps have advanced along the easier slope above St. Germain, so as to head off the Carthaginian army. The exhibition of the elephants, which the barbarians had never seen, and upon which they looked as something supernatural, always checked their advance. On the follow- ing, the ninth day, Hannibal made his way to the head of column and reached the summit of the pass. Here he halted to reorganize his column, and camped two days, during which time many stragglers and animals came in, contrary to all ex- pectation. The pack-animals had, however, mostly lost their loads. This fight, and that at the Mt. du Chat, must have been very severe, as much of the total loss is to be ascribed to them. So far Polybius, interspersed with explanations. Now let us look at our terrain. Just below Seez, the val- ley of the Isere, which here is wide and level, and to-day un- der fine cultivation, narrows, and makes a sharp bend to the southeast ; and it is here joined from the northeast by the Eeclus, a stream having its rise in the Little St. Bernard, and fed by numberless brooks from the mountains on either hand. The ground from the river slopes up, and finally, after a 218 THE WHITE ROCK. rise of about six hundred feet in a slope of over a mile, nar- rows to a gorge. This slope has on either hand high moun- tains, and forms an excellent defensive battle-field for any one backing up against the defile. Battle at the Wtite Rock. Up a ravine on the left bank of the Reclus, probably went the old Roman road. It is also probable that whatever road the barbarians had then made ran up this bank. That they had made a road through the pass we are not only informed by the authorities, but we know that the pass is utterly im- practicable without a road of some kind. The population on this route was quite equal to making fair roads for foot and packs, which the necessarily sparse population of the Mt. Cenis would not be apt to have done. Dominating this road, as well as the Reclus, between which it stands boldly out, is a high white rook of gypsum, whose face is naked, and which is here universally known as La Roche Blanche. To-day it is mined, and the rock ground into fine plaster. With refer- ence to this rock, a tradition exists in the place that a great THE ARMY GETS THROUGH. 219 battle was fought at its foot. Huge bones are said to have been dug out of the river-bed ; and we know that fully half the elephants perished on the passage. Too much faith must not be placed on such notions, however, as the Alps are full of traditions, many of them of deliberate fabrication. The Carthaginian advance was probably up the ravine road. The barbarians, anticipating this, had sent a detach- ment up the heights on either side, had occupied the defile some way from the entrance, and had waited in the woods for the column to get well engaged in the defile before they at- tacked it. The bulk of their force was on the plain in Hanni- bal's rear. Hannibal's task, then, was to defeat the attack on the marching column, as well as to prevent the main body of the barbarians from pursuing. For this latter purpose, he backed up against the Roche Blanche, in which position he could with a handful oppose a host. Possibly a column of light troops may have made its way up the rocky bed of the river, which corresponds well with the words used by Poly- bius, and have joined the main column nearer the source of Eeclus. The Eoche Blanche is perhaps three hundred feet high and commands the whole vicinity, though we must not forget the short carriage of the arms of Hannibal. It is probable that Hannibal only backed up against the rock and did not use the top of it, though indeed he may have placed archers and slingers at the top to advantage. What he did was to form his line in front of the mouth of the defile, and there hold the enemy in check. The road all the way up is very narrow and difficult, and the army could well spend all night getting through the defile ; but as we ascend towards the source of the Eeclus the valley widens, and here Hannibal could make his way to the head of column, so as to " lead it to the summit," as Polybius says he did. 220 ROADS UP LITTLE ST. BERNARD. Within the present generation there has been built through the Little St. Bernard a military road which, by many and long windings along the left bank and far above the Reclus, reaches the summit. The old road on the right bank is now Ko£uls up the Little St Bernard. practicable only for mules. The Eoman road, as well as the Gallic road, probably ran nearer the stream, — in places climbing up the slope to avoid a particularly Vjad spot. Thus the army reached the summit of the pass, and here it rested two days. There is here what Polybius calls, and what may, in the midst of the rugged splendor of the higher Alps, properly be called, a plain, perhaps a couple of miles long, well sheltered by the surrounding heights, and having not far from its cen- tre a small lake, from which rises the Doria. This exactly THE PLAIN AT THE SUMMIT. 221 corresponds to Polybius' description of the summit of the pass by which Hannibal crossed. The summit is full of rocky hills and vales, and gradually slopes towards the northeast. So good a camping - place for an army of thirty thousand men, at the very top of an Alpine gap, it would be hard to find elsewhere. And though the fact has no particular value, it may be mentioned that near by is a large inclosure of stones, somewhat similar to Druidioal temples, universally known as Hannibal's circle, where he is supposed to have held a councU. Were this so, however, it must be assumed Plain at top of Little St. Bernard. that he did not find time to stop to build a memorial of the event. These traditions go for nothing. When we come to reckon distances, it is to be noted that from Chevelu to this plain is a trifle more than eighty miles. One might vary the distance by ten per cent., for mountain roads are long or short according to the grade sought to be 222 THE SIGHT OF ITALY. kept. The distance tallies closely enough. The army had been eight days, not counting the rest-day, on the way. This is as well as mountain marches can be made. The battle did not seriously delay the column, which was kept in as rapid motion as possible. But Hannibal's anticipation of battle had obliged the van to wait until the trains, which usually marched in the rear, could gain the head of column. We now approach what to some has appeared to be a diffi- culty. " There was already snow collected on the summit of the mountains, as it was now near the setting of the Pleiades " (end of October). " Wherefore, seeing his troops in a state of great dejection from the hardships they had suffered and those that still awaited them, Hannibal sought, by drawing them together, to raise tbeir drooping spirits. The sight of Italy was the readiest expedient he had for this purpose, for it is so close beneath the mountains that, when viewed to- gether, the Alps appear as a citadel of Italy. Pointing out, therefore, to his soldiers the plains adjacent to the Po, and reminding them of the friendly disposition of their inhabit- ants, the Gauls, towards them, and showing them the place where Eorae itself was situated, he in some degree renewed their courage. On the morrow they decamped and began the descent." So far we have always taken Polybius literally ; but if the above passage is to be so understood, the Little St. Bernard route must be abandoned, or Polybius classed with the romancers. And the advocates of other passes have laid great stress upon this paragraph. No actual view of the plains of the Po can be had from the summit of the Little St. Bernard Pass. Some claim that Polybius was speaking literally of the plains of the Po, as he was of course figura- tively of the site of Eome, which is four hundred miles dis- EARLY SNOWS. 223 tant as the crow flies, and maintain that a view can be had of the plains of the Po from heights flanking some other passes. But there is less difficulty to be encountered in tak- ing Polybius to mean that Hannibal pointed out the down- ward slope of the mountain and the downward flow of the watercourses, which begin right here, and told his men that at the foot of the heights where they then stood lay the lands of the friendly Gauls, and beyond it Rome, than there is in making the rest of Polybius agree with any route near which the plains below can actually be seen. There is no special Tiolence done to Polybius in reading this whole passage fig- uratively; and though there are one or two crests from which, under very favorable conditions, a dim view of the plains below may be had, there is not a single pass in the Alps from which any one pretends that the Po can be seen. From the only other pass known to Polybius which comes at all near to fitting his relation, Mt. Genevre, no view of the Padane valley can be had. The romantic account of Livy of itself fully proves the author's ignorance of the Alps. In- deed, Livy makes no pretense to have written his history any- where except in his study ; and while its value in other re- spects is undoubted, in military matters, it is, when in conflict with Polybius, certainly to be placed far below the latter, who spoke of things he had seen, if not been a part of. It was close upon November. Hannibal had been a month too late in his crossing. The early snows had fallen, ths surface of which, on the southerly exposures, thawed dur- ing the day and froze at night. The climate of the Alps was probably more severe two thousand years ago than to- day. These southern peoples in their half-naked condition must have suffered beyond telling. Nothing shows the won- derful power of this man, Hannibal, over men better than the patient endurance of their danger and toil by his soldiers. 224 A DANGEROUS ROAD. The savages offered no more opposition to his advance, but the steeper and more rugged descent on the Italian side made the progress of the army difficult and slow. The mountain paths — they could have been no more — were hidden, by the From top of Pass to La ThuUe. snows. Whoever missed his footing slid hopelessly down the precipices. Thousands were thus lost. But the men were hardened to losses, looked forward to what awaited them at the foot of the mountains, and kept up their courage. They needed it sorely. Early on the first day of descent, the eleventh in the Alps, we are told that the army reached a place where the road had been carried away by a landslide for a stadium and a half, — about three hundred yards. Such slides were usual in this place, but the present one was more extensive. The men all but lost heart. Hannibal tried to avoid the place A LANDSLIDE. 225 by a circuit, but a fresh fall of snow lying upon a body of the last year's fall, yet unmelted, rendered the footing abso- lutely treacherous and prevented the men from making any headway. The fresh snow on the sharp slope slipped upon the old, or, being trodden through, the men and horses slipped on the glassy surface underneath; the loaded mules once down could not be got on their feet ; many slid down the sharp declivities ; many were engulfed in the old drifts. Hannibal abandoned the attempt as impracticable. The army went into camp, and the men, sick and well, in relays, were set at clearing, propping up and rebuilding the road, a task of great risk and difficulty. Hannibal was everywhere with cheering word and active help. During the twelfth day of the passage, so many were the hands and so willing the hearts, enough progress was made to get the horses and pack- animals through, and these were at once sent down to the pastures below the snow-line. It required much effort dur- ing the coming three days, on the part of the Numidians, whom Hannibal put at the task, to repair the road suffi- ciently to get the elephants past the broken part. These poor beasts were nearly famished, for they were yet above the line of vegetation. Thus Polybius. Now let us see how well our route chimes in with our author. The old last century road down from the summit of the Little St. Bernard runs from the lake through a valley of slight width, beside the Doria, some six miles to the first place which can be called a level. As the crow flies, it is but three miles ; by the modern military road, which zigzags down at a fair grade, it is nine. The nature of the ground corresponds well with Polybius' description of precipices down which the men slid and fell, for the first part of the way is rugged, and the last part exceedingly steep and difficult ; there is little beside a succession of precipices, and 226 THE BROKEN ROAD. with snow upon the ground there would be only the most treacherous footing. From the lower end of the summit plain one may see far below, at the foot of the sharply de- scending mountain side, the village of La Thuile (ancient Artolica), in a small but fertile valley, where the Baltea, from the glacier of Mt. Euitor, on the right, joins the Do- ria, and makes g, stream of goodly vol- ume, which rushes down at a sharp in- cline in a torrent of great power. Just below this valley, the Doria-Baltea, as it is now called, enters a ravine where it has cut its bed deep into the solid rock for a distance of some miles. On the right, the rocks rise from the river-bank perpendicularly to a height of many hundred feet to the mountain side behind. On the left, the hills are slightly farther back and equally high, but they are of a very friable sort of schist, the detritus of which has slid down from time to time, and formed, for a height of over one thousand feet, a mountain slope of sharp descent. On this left bank, as you enter the gorge, is a place where for just about three hundred yards the slides are at the worst ; and the old road used to be so constantly covered by avalanches and landslides as to be eventually abandoned for the right bank, where it has The Break in the Koad (section). ATTEMPT TO AVOID IT. 227 now been hewn in the rook. These slides and avalanches come down a funnel-shaped ravine which discharges itself iu a narrow cleft, and from the rotten structure of the heights near by, these slides, as well as the avalanches, must have been usual from remote antiquity. So much snow comes down at times, so narrow is the river-gorge, and so overhang- ing are the rocks which shelter its bed from the sun, that in exceptional years the snow remains in huge banks throughout ATTtnP Hannibal's Circuit. the summer, and sometimes even makes a natural bridge over the torrent for a long distance. Such a thing occurs nowhere else on this route, and it is quite unusual anywhere. Now the La Thuile valley, by the ancient path, was less than six miles from the summit, and Hannibal reached the broken place in the road on his first day's march down early enough to try to turn the place by a circuit before camping. This distance would agree very well with what Polybius tells us. In attempting the circuit, Hannibal may have tried to cross the river on the snow, which would account for a part 228 THE BREAK REPAIRED. of his losses. Or these, indeed, may have ocenrred in fol- lowing the road as far as the break, and in the first attempt to cross it. Or, more jsrobably, he may have tried to pass the river above, at La Thuile, intending to skirt or march back of the heights on the right of the river, where there is a possible though difficult passage, very likely not then known to his guides, and at this season highly unpromising. The attempt, whatever it was, failed of success. The camp at the entrance to the broken road was probably in the La Thuile plain, and was pitched at the end of the first day. The next day was taken the road, and on the morrow pack-train were got through and sent to pasturage down the mountain. To-day, vege- tation ceases about two -,< miles from the summit of V~ up in repairing the horses and the pass. In Han- appears to have on this plain. It mention, cer- j fute, Livy's ''•- nibal's day there been none in October is scarcely necessary to tainly not worth while to con- story about softening the ^ rocks with vinegar. It may stand as a pleasant bit of fiction. At the end of the gorge wherein was the broken way is another steep mountain side, and at its foot, in a lovely vaUey, modern Pre St. Didier, under the frowning glory of Mt. Blanc. Here the valley bends to the southeast on its way to Aosta below. In Hannibal's era, the valley was inhabited by the Salassi, clients of the Insu- bres. The lighter animals must have been sent down oLATHU"-' La Thuile to Pr^ St. Didier. A SMALL ARMY LEFT. 229 below St. Didier, because there is not enough pasturage at this point for so many animals for any length of time. And Hannibal must have wished to keep the nearest forage for the elephants, soon to foUow. Here, in October, with fresh snow in the La Thuile valley, would be the highest pas- turage. Well out of this difficulty, says Polybius, Hannibal re- joined that part of the army which had gone down to pas- turage, and in three days from the broken way "descended boldly into the plains which are near the Po and the ter- ritory of the Insubrians." He had left Cartagena five months before with ninety-two thousand men. He had crossed the Ehone with thirty-eight thousand foot and over eight thou- sand horse. He had now under the colors but twelve thou- sand African and eight thousand Spanish infantry, and six thousand horse ; and these were so worn out with toil and suffering, with lack of provision and extremity of weather, that " both in appearance and condition they were brought to a state more resembling that of wild beasts than human beings." Hannibal must have been singularly careful of his cavalry to have brought it through with so small a proportionate loss. This no doubt was the result of his having saved it as much as he could. He as well knew what its value would be to him on the plains of the Po as Alexander knew the value of his Companions ; and he had done his best to keep it intact. But the condition of the army was pitiable. How many of the nine or ten thousand pack-animals which must have accompanied the army were left is not told. " Hannibal's whole care was therefore directed to the best means of reviving the spirits of his troops and restoring the men and horses to their former vigor and condition." Apart from Polybius' positive statement, the fact that Han- 230 THE PLAIN REACHED. nibal divided Ms army in the manner described, and spread his animals over the country at pasture, goes a long way to prove that he was in the land of friends, — the Insubrians, and not among the inimical Taurini. It is not improbable that the horses and pack-animals were headed by the infantry on the way down the mountain. To judge from Polybius' words, as well as military sense, they were under command of Hannibal, who would certainly be apt to be with the van, whether marching to meet friends or foes ; and Polybius says the Numidians were ordered to pro- ceed with the repairs of the road, which, after three days, they made practicable for the elephants. In three days from leaving the broken road Hannibal reached the plain, where he " encamped at the foot of the Alps " at a point which was one hundred and fifty miles (twelve hundred stadia) from where he entered them. This point is clearly near modern Ivrea. Now the distance from Chevelu to Ivrea is just about one hundred and fifty miles by the Augustan Itinerary, made but two hundred years later than Hannibal's era, and it is less than one hundred and seventy miles, measured by the much longer modern road. This is near enough to an agreement, for mountain roads are long or short, according to the grade they seek to make along the steeper parts, and the extent of the zigzags they cover upon the hillsides. To compare the old with the modern road over the Little St. Bernard, though tliis is an extreme in- stance, illustrates this point. Indeed, it is not quite certain to what part of the column Polybius might refer when he says that the army reached a certain point on a certain day. A column of thirty thousand men and baggage in these mountains would be twenty miles long, at least. Dates and distances are wont to be measured by headquarters. Exact accuracy cannot be expected, as headquarters may one day "ENTRANCE" AND "FOOT" OF ALPS. 231 be with the van, and another day with the rear. But in this case it was probably with the van. One is apt to find discussion in most works on the Passage of the Alps by Hannibal as to just what is the " entrance to the Alps," and what the " foot of the Alps," to which Poly- bius refers. Any one familiar with this mountain-range, who remembers the plain of the Po, from which the gigantic bar- rier rises, as it were a wall, directly from the plain, wiU have no difficulty in agreeing that, by the Little St. Bernard, the " foot of the Alps " is reached near Ivrea, which is but seven hundred and eighty feet above the sea, and where one imme- diately, and without the succession of minor heights usual in our mountains, sets foot on the alluvial levels of the great North Italian plain. The same thing applies in almost equal degree to Chevelu, for the Mt. du Chat rises sharply up from the rolling country on its west, and is the first barrier which does so rise. It is the first mountain which has to be crossed in the route from the Rhone to the Little St. Bernard, and it is in reality a mountain, rising to the height of two thou- sand feet or more from a merely rolling country. That Chevelu and Ivrea are the " entrance " and the " foot " of the Alps along this route seems certain. Now as to the days. The army broke up from the summit on the eleventh day, having reached it early on the ninth, and camped there two days, the ninth and tenth. The broken road was reached early on the day of starting, the eleventh. The road was repaired on the twelfth, and " the beasts of bur- den and the horses were immediately led down to the plains." If Hannibal headed the van, leaving the Numidians to get the elephants through, as is altogether probable, he spent the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth days in reaching " the foot of the Alps " with the van-guard. This is the number of days given by Polybius. If Hannibal stayed with the ele- 232 THE ITINERARY. phants, we should have to reckon from the van-guard, or else count three days more, or assume that Polybius meant that it was fifteen days to the point where the chief obsta^ cles of the Alps were overcome, which was fairly the case at Pre St. Didier. For though there are several awkward defiles from St. Didier to Ivrea, especially one halfway to Aosta, and one at Fort du Bard, there are none to be com- j ^ ^ ■! ,.,.^^ ^-.J^''^'"! .^- \ Pr^ St. Didier to Ivrea. pared to the one below La Thuile, where the snow added its list of complications to the treachery of the ground. It seems more plausible to assume that Hannibal was with the van when it reached Ivrea. The distances and days come curiously close to Polybius' estimate, who at the time had not the Augustan Itinerary to go by. They are as follows : — ITINEEAET THROUGH THE ALPS. 1st day, passage of the Mt. dn Chat and to Bourget. 2d day, halt on Chamb^ry Plain. 3d day, to near Montmeillan. 4th day, to Frtterive. TRADITIONS. 233 5th day, to Albertville. 6th day, to a point near Moutier. 7th day, to Ayme. 8th day, to Seez, and the fight at the Roche Blanche. The cohimn marched all night, so that it reached the summit next morning. 9th day, at the summit, which was reached so early that this was really a day of rest. 10th day, rest. 11th day, start down the mountain, to the break in the road, and at- tempted circuit. 12th day, work on road, and horses got through. 13th day, Numidians work on road, and van marching down to foot of Alps. 14th day, Numidians work on road, and van marching down to foot of Alps. 15th day, Numidians work on road, and van reached Ivrea, at foot of Alps. At close of day the elephants were got through break in road. One more tradition may perhaps be mentioned bearing upon the Little St. Bernard being the route pursued by Han- nibal. At Donnaz, just above St. Martin, and oijposite the Fort du Bard, the road is chiseled out of the rook, which comes down to the very edge of the river. Tradition assigns this work to Hannibal, and for many centuries this pass has been known as that of the Carthaginian army. It is not probable that Hannibal had anything to do with this work ; but the tradition is interesting, if not reliable. Appian is sometimes quoted as an authority on the War against Hannibal. But he is quite unsatisfactory. A fair sample of his work is his description of the passage of the Alps, which is as follows : " When Hannibal came to the Al- pine range, he found not even a road which led upwards, let alone one which led across, for it is extraordinarily steep. Notwithstanding this, with great boldness he ascended the mountain, under all manner of difficulties. For as it was full of snow and ice he was forced to cut down the woods and 234 TABLE OF DATES. to burn them, and then subdue the heat with water and vine- gar, and break up the softened rock with iron hammers, and thus make himself a path, which is yet accessible, and is known as the pass of Hannibal." This, for a historian who wrote in the reign of Trajan, is rather lacking in equipoise. To resume our narrative. " When, therefore," says Poly- bius, " Hannibal's troops were sufficiently recovered from their fatigues, he first of all invited the Taurini, who dwell at the foot of the Alps, to enter into an alliance with him, they being then at war with the Insubrians, and but ill-affected towards the Carthaginians. Upon their refusal, he surrounded their chief city, and took it after a siege of three days, putting to the sword all who had opposed him." This passage follows immediately after the paragraph re- citing the care Hannibal gave to reviving his army's spirits and restoring its vigor. It seems clearly to show, in addition to Polybius' explicit statement, that Hannibal emerged from the Alps among the Insubrians, his allies, and that after he had rested there, he attacked the Taurini. Apart from the absolute statement of Polybius, we cannot suppose that the Taurini, inimical to Hannibal, would neglect the chance of attacking him as he emerged, weary and demoralized, from his long passage of the mountains. In fact, one of the best reasons why Hannibal should steer for the Insubres, and not for the Taurini, was that he was by no means certain that the Romans might not be at the outlets of the Taurinian passes, waiting, in connection with their Gallic allies, to fall upon him in the naturally exhausted condition in which he must emerge from his arduous march. The following table of dates, as given in the first column, has been compiled by Lavalette. They are as nearly accurate as ingenuity can make them. Some critics make the dates two months earlier, in which case they would be as in the TERRIBLE LOSSES. 235 second column. But Lavalette's dates accord with Polybius' reference to the setting of the Pleiades, as the others do not. Left Cartagena May 30. March 30. Crossed Ebro July 15. May 15. At Elne September 15. July 15. Crossed Rhone September 27. July 27. At Vienne October 12. August 12. At entrance of Alps October 17. August 17. At summit of Alps October 26. August 26. At foot of Alps November 1. September 1. A month earlier, Hannibal would have had a much more easy time. Little snow was apt to be found late in Septem- ber or early in October, and plenty of forage was on hand for the beasts, up to a considerable elevation. That, at the late season of his march, Hannibal's commissaries could have managed to get together provisions for thirty thousand men and eight thousand horses, without counting the sumpter- animals, which must have amounted to nearly ten thousand more, reflects great credit upon these officers. And that they did so tends to prove that the march was over the route indi- cated, the fertility of which is vastly greater than that of any other. Nothing better shows the fearful exposures of this wonder- ful march than the fact that from the Rhone to the Po Han- nibal had lost twenty thousand out of forty-six thousand men. The distance covered in these five months was nearly twelve hundred Roman (say eleven hundred English) miles, but this period counted all the delays from the enemy in Catalonia, at the Rhone, and through the mountains. The loss had been slight from the Rhone to the first mountain pass, heavy from thence to the summit, almost as much so from the summit down. The truth of this numerical record is vouched for by the inscription cut upon a column, later erected by Hannibal 236 PROSPECTS OF THE ARMY. near the promontory of Lacinium, in Calabria, before re- ferred to. Hannibal had reached his goal. He had with him a force of twenty-six thousand men, exhausted physically and morally from their extraordinary toils and danger. What he had gained is well put by Napoleon : " Get Annibal . . . qui ne descend en Italic qu'en payant de la moitie de son armee la seule acquisition de son champ de bataille, le seul droit de se combattre." Extraordinary man ; wonderful army ! Noth- ing but the tireless nerve tension of their ever-confident chief prevented this small force from melting away lilie the snows they had crossed when springtide brings its heat. And here they were, with naught to help them but the promised alliance of a few Gallic barbarians, while they had the present enmity of at least an equal number to overcome. It may be doubted whether Hannibal himself, at this moment, could consider his military programme as successfully inaugurated. What was the purpose of this reckless army ? To attack on its own soil a people capable of raising three quarters of a million of men ; a people which, in the last conflict, but a generation since, had utterly overthrown — all but extermi- nated — the Carthaginian power and nationality. Truly, in any other than ^an army led by such a man, an undertaking- like this would have been the wildest frenzy. It was like Alexander setting forth with his handful of Macedonians to overturn an empire whose armies were numbered by the millions. But we cannot doubt that Hannibal had taken even such a situation as this into his calculations ; and rely- ing on his own good arm and brain, had resolved to face it, — to dare this and any other danger for the chance of bringing to his feet the cruel, rapacious power of Rome, which had in- flicted such injustice and degradation on his beloved country. And in a Hannibal this was not frenzy. The man whose FACING THE IMPOSSIBLE. 237 courage cannot be daunted, whose mind and body are in- capable of fatigue, whose soul burns with the divine spark of genius, may always confront the impossible. And Hannibal had faced all this with a fuU knowledge of what he was about to do. To him there was no impossible. To him, with his honest cause and imconquerable purpose, there must be a way. It is, indeed, when such a hero looks the all but im- possible in the face that he is at his greatest. It is here that he shines forth, clad in all his virtue. Be it that the palm of the victor awaits him, be it that he is destined to sink beneath the weight of his herculean task, at such a time he is no longer man. He is a demigod ! Cornu Player. XVII. THE ARMY OF ITALY ON THE PO. NOVEMBER, 218 B. C. The valley of the Po was very rich. It was inhabited by the Gauls, a fine people living on the luxuriance of the land. The Po is the main obstacle to the invasion of Italy, and its main line of defense. It and its affluents form a barrier difficult to be overcome. The Komans were at Placentia, a city which can be attacked only by forcing a passage of the Po from the north side, or by the deiile of Stradella on the south bank. The Army of Italy was ready for its work. It was admirably organized, and despite its losses a short rest put it in good heart. Hannibal learned with surprise that Scipio had come back to con- front him on the Po, and was now at the head of the praetorian army which had been defeated by his allies, the Boians. He was preparing to move upon Placentia, when he heard that the consul had moved across the Po and was about to advance towards him. This simplified a difficult problem to the dimensions of an open-country battle. Hannibal, of course, was strategically bound by the topography of the Padane country, but not in the same way Na- poleon was. He moved straight towards Scipio by crossing the Ticinus at its upper fords and marcliing down its eastern bank. Here, at the head of his cavalry, he ran across Scipio, who was out on a reconnoissance with his horse and light foot. A combat ensued, in which the Romans were defeated and Scipio badly wounded. The consular army retired across the Po. Hannibal had won the first innings. That the peninsula of Italy was peopled by diverse nation- alities was a fact in Hannibal's favor. In the northern zone, filling the vaUey of the Po, lived the Gauls ; the Italian tribes occupied the centre ; the Greek colonies monopolized the southern zone. As we have seen, Hannibal had based his calculations primarily upon the alliance of the Gauls ; a second factor was possible aid from Macedon ; a third, and the most important one, was the disaffection towards Eome which he might breed among her colonies and allies south of THE VALLEY OF THE PO. 239 the Apennines by the victories he felt confident he could win. Hannibal was looking down from the foothills of the great range he had crossed upon the valley of the Po, which, like a vast garden, waUed in by the Alps and Apennines, lay smiling at his feet. Then, as now, it was wonderfully fertile, though more wooded in those days. Every species of grain and fruit, flax, wine and oil, was yielded to an easy culture. Herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and droves of pigs found abundant pasturage. Horses were bred in the Venetian country. All authors bear testimony to the fruitfulness of the region at that day ; and Polybius tells us that a genera- tion later the traveler was generously entertained at hostelries for one quarter of an obole, or about one cent, a day. The Gauls who inhabited this region were a tall, straight, handsome race, living simply on the luxuriance of the land. Flocks, vines, and a few ingots of gold, easily hid or carried away, were their sole riches ; raids across the Apennines were their recreation, from which they were wont to return with their carts laden down with booty. There were still many cities which, under the Etruscans, had been great and beauti- ful, and the Gauls themselves had made some slight progress in the arts. Cutting this level valley from west to east ran the Po, taking its rise in Monte Viso, and, increased by many afflu- ents, making its way through a course of three hundred miles to the Adriatic. The Po is but a dozen feet deep on the average, except in floods which cause its overflow, when it may be fifty. At Turin it is one hundred and seventy yards wide ; at the confluence of the Ticinus five hundred ; at Cre- mona one thousand. Its fall is moderate ; on the plains it is a sluggish river. The Po and its affluents form an obstacle which cannot be 240 ITS DEFENSIVE FEATURES. avoided by whoso would invade Italy from the north. In the west, the Po is itself small, but its affluents are impor- tant ; in the east the river itself .is a boundary. On descend- ing the Alps, one is met by the affluents of the left bank, which make respectable lines of defense. Behind these is The Po and its Affluents. the splendid line of the Ticino-Po-Trebia. The key of this line is at the defile of StradeUa, at whose mouth then lay the fortress of Clastidium, modern Casteggio. To an army descending from the Alps, the Po is the first object of attack. To an army seeking to forestall an attack from the Alpine region, the Po is the line of defense. The Maritime Alps sweep down in a semicircle from the Cottian, to join the Apennines on the Gidf of Genoa. The Apennines throw out an immense bulwark towards the Po, which, at StradeUa, forms the defile above mentioned. This defile is the key of the country, the cross-roads, so to speak, of the entire section. The strategic value of "the knot Pa via - StradeUa - Pia- cenza " was fully recognized by Napoleon. It did not exist for Hannibal. But Hannibal was governed by the general DEFILE OF STRADELLA. 241 topography as much as the First Consul. The Eomans, in their contests with the Gauls before the Second Punic War, had in their way ascertained the relative importance of the various towns. Piacenza is nowadays the pivot of operations of the central Po. It cannot be escaped. "Un bon fort au defile de la StradeUa couvrirait I'ltalie du cote de la France," said Napoleon. Placentia in Hannibal's time possessed the same importance. The Eomans had held Placentia for some time, and had made it strong. Their allies, the Ananes, could hold the de- file of Stradella. Several of the new colonies had been for- tified. Clastidium was an oppidum. The Romans thus held the Po at the knot. Farther down they held Ariminum and the passes of the Apennines. If Hannibal moved down the right bank of the Po, he would be stopped by the defile. If down the left bank, the Ticinus was a first barrier. In regard to the military value of the Padane country as a whole, Napoleon once said : " Lorsqu'on tient I'ltalie septen- trionale, le reste de la peninsule tombe comme un fruit mur." This was true a century ago, but it was not true in the days of Hannibal. His work lay beyond the Apennines. But he had as much to do on the Po as the great Corsican. The Carthaginian army has been already described. Let us add a word about the Army of Italy. We know little about Hannibal's officers, except that they were presumably all Carthaginian aristocrats, and that they had been through a long and arduous training. Unlike Alexander's, few are ever mentioned by name. There were Mago, his brother, young, full of vigor and elan, who commanded the Carthaginian legion, and was fre- quently sent on detached duty ; Hanno, son of Bomilcar, a distinguished infantry general ; Maharbal, son of Imilco, commanding the entire body of cavalry ; Adherbal, chief of 242 TBE ARMY OF ITALY. engineers; Hasdrubal, a cavalry general, peculiarly distin- guished at Cann» ; Carthalo, commanding the light cavalry ; Bostar, Bomilcar, Gisgo, aides. Numbers of young Cartha- ginians accompanied the army, and to them later was con- fided the command of allied contingents. The subsistence department is clearly defined by Polybius. There were special officers who went out with the foraging parties and gathered corn and beef and wine, and had charge of the depots of victuals. We hear that in Italy the soldiers had regular issues of beef, grain and wine, with cheese, hams, vinegar to cut the water, oil for rubbing their bodies, and, curiously enough, perfumery for the hair. And the quartermaster's department must have been equally well organized. The elephants and horses never seemed to want for forage. Medical service we learn nothing about, but we hear of a celebrated African surgeon, Synhalus, who was with the army. Veterinary care is once or twice hinted at in the authorities. Paymasters were kept regularly at work, and Hannibal's own private wealth, as well as his share of the booty, was wont to flow into their coffers. There were no doubt topographical engineers. Polybius, Livy, Silius Italicus, speak of some kind of maps. The Ko- mans of this day had " itineraries," which were either written (annotata) or sketched (picta), and the Carthaginians were far in advance of the Romans in clever devices. However he may have used these officers, Hannibal always finished by making his own reconnoissances. The ancients were clever at signaling, and if a signal-corps was not attached to the Army of Italy, we yet see repeated instances of the use of signals by smoke and flags. It was while resting in Piedmont that Bostar, Hannibal's aide-de-camp, who had been dispatched to the temple of Jupi- ter Ammon in the Libyan desert, returned with a cheering CAPTURE OF TURIN. 243 oracle. This Hannibal used to advantage in encouraging his men. . It is not probable that he had asked of the deity the foolish question Alexander is said to have put. Priestcraft was not so rampant in his camp as in the Komans'. Livy makes this a reproach, in fact. To return to our narrative. We know practically nothing about the siege of Turin. The passage of Polybius above given, supplemented slightly by some of the other authorities, Livy, Nepos and Silius, is all there is. It is evident that Hannibal tried all reasonable means to persuade the Taurini to join his cause ; but being unable to do so was compelled to take harsh measures against them. By making a sudden dash and unexpected assault, he captured this chief city of the tribe, later Augusta Taurinorum, and, deeming an example necessary to his own safety, he sacked it and put the inhab- itants to the sword. This act so effectually spread terror among the Ligurians and Celts of the Upper Po, that they chose at once to join his alliance. Such a motive may not have won him very warm aid, but it was better than open opposition, and Hannibal knew just how to use his tools. He placed none too much reliance on them. With this vigorous measure he secured his rear from interference when he should advance, and no doubt Hannibal intended at the out- set to show that he could be very generous to allies, very cruel to enemies. Hannibal had learned through the Gauls and his own spies, whom he kept actively at work in every direction, — he even had spies in Rome for years, — that the senate was greatly disturbed by the news of his presence in Italy ; but that, instead of rising to the occasion, they had remained of divided counsels. He learned, also, with the utmost surprise, that Scipio had returned from Massilia to confront him. This news must have largely modified his plans. Neither he nor Scipio had expected the other so soon. 244 THE TWO ROMAN ARMIES. To recapitulate. There were two principal Roman armies this year ; one destined for Spain, and already there, while its commander, Scipio, as we have seen, had hurried back to the Po : one destined for Africa, which, under Tiberius Sem- pronius, had been wasting its time in Sicily, in pursuit of the Carthaginian fleet sent to ravage the Italian coast. The second Carthaginian raiding-fleet had been wrecked in a storm. Of the two consuls, Publius Scipio had just landed at Pisa, while Tiberius Sempronius, who of course still deemed Hannibal at Saguntum or somewhere south of the Pyrenees, was dividing his efforts between the Carthaginian fleet and preparations to cross over to Carthage,, and thus — should he ever get there — oblige that city to call back Hannibal for its defense. These several contingencies had been foreseen and ably provided for by Hannibal. Before leaving Spain, as we remember, he had brought over Carthaginian troops and placed them under his brother Hasdrubal ; and had sent Spanish troops to Carthage. Thus the armies in each place were not apt to fail in their duty on account of any political upheaval. Their interests were merely mercenary, and they were wont blindly to follow their chief, who in each place was wedded to the Barca cause. Moreover, the Spanish troops sent to Carthage were personally devoted to Hannibal, and could be counted on to join willingly in any scheme which would prevent those of his fellow-citizens who were headed by Hanno and opposed to himself from overturning the present regime. The only force to oppose the advance of Hannibal was the prsetorian army under Manlius, amounting to twenty thou- sand men ; and a further force at the recently planted colo- nies of Placentia and Cremona. This latter force was numer- ically considerable. Some twelve thousand colonists had come SCIPIO ON THE PO. 245 thither to oust the aborigines ; but most of them were old and unfitted for war. The Boians and Insubrians were already in active revolt, the former vexed beyond endurance by the founding of Mu- tina and Placentia and Cremona as Roman colonies, and the distribution of their lands to Roman citizens, and both encouraged by the news of Hannibal's approach. Manlius, while marching from Ariminum to relieve Mutina, which the Boians had attacked, had been cleverly ambushed and badly beaten by these Gauls as he was filing through a forest road. The relics of the Roman army and colonists, much more demoralized than their actual loss would warrant, had taken refuge on a hiU, where the barbarians had held them in a state of blockade until reinforcements to the amount of a legion, under Atilius, had been sent to repair this disaster, when the Romans recovered their spirits and ground, and retired to Mutina. Scipio found, on reaching the scene, which he did on the day Turin was taken, a force of from twenty to twenty-five thousand men again in possession of Mutina, Cre- mona and Placentia. He assumed command of all. His intention had been to attack Hannibal as he emerged from his perilous passage of the Alps, if indeed he ever got through, before he should have time to recover from its exhaustion. Had the Romans had a consular army at Turin, when Hannibal emerged from the Alps, it might have gone hard with the Punic captain. But the insurrection of the Gauls prevented Scipio's doing as he designed ; and it was imperative to rest his troops after their late defeat, and find his own bearings in cisalpine Gaul. He must have been the more astonished of the two to hear that Hannibal had al- ready established himself among good allies, captured Turin, and stood ready to try conclusions. Scipio would have been wise to remain on the right bank 246 HANNIBAL'S STRATEGY. of the Padus, and dispute its passage at Stradella and Pla- centia, until he could be reinforced ; for Hannibal had as yet shown no disposition to cross the river at its upper fords. In- stead, however, of doing this, and doubtless fearing a general rising of the Gauls in favor of Hannibal, he crossed the river somewhere between the Ticinus and the colony of Pla^ centia, thinking to impose upon the natives, — the same idea as later in making his new camp on the Trebia, — and took up a position near the mouth of the Ticinus. Here the ground was level and in the highest degree unfavorable to him, for Scipio had but two thousand horse, while Hannibal had thrice the number, not to count the Gauls ; and the plains about the vicinity were as if made for the evolutions of cavalry. Moreover, the Ticinus, while a good line of de- fense, must be held in its entire length to be held at all ; for it can be crossed at many points. Scipio's advance savored more of courage than discretion. He went into camp and set to work to bring his men into good heart and discipline. He had by no means gauged the opponent who was about to move against him. There is a tendency among some of the modern historians of Hannibal to make this general manoeuvre on the line of the Po much as Napoleon, with a more perfect art, with the history of centuries of warfare in this region before him, and with a close knowledge of its minutest topographical details, would be apt to have done. This does not appear to be war- ranted by the facts of the case. Hannibal was unquestion- ably one of the world's greatest soldiers. His strategic intui- tions had as yet been equaled by no one but Alexander. It was he who taught Eome the art of war, and this so crisply that his teachings were perpetuated, and not, like Alexan- der's, lost to the world of that day. He knew and showed the Romans that mere fighting is not all there is of war. He ITS LIMITATIONS. 247 may with propriety be called the father of strategy. And there can be little doubt that Hannibal had fully studied all the features of the country he was about to invade, and made himself familiar with its geographical and topographical out- lines, so far as he was able to learn them. But strategy, which is still nothing but the highest military expression of the art of deceit, was in that day, as a rule, mere stratagem, and we can scarcely assume that the Carthaginian general was called on to look as closely into the strategic mapping of the country as Bonaparte was both compelled and able to do; nor indeed that his topographical engineers had found time to reduce the country to a map so detailed. Some of the cleverest of military critics seem to work on the theory that such and such a course was the proper one for a good strategist to take, and that therefore Hannibal did so, for- Placentia and Hannibal's Manceuvre. getting that there was no strategy in Hannibal's era, except that which came from his own intellectual conceptions, and that what we call strategy to-day is the science which Alex- ander and he were, to be sure, the first to put into prac- tice, but which has since been developed by such giants as Csesar, Gustavus, Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Frederick and Napoleon ; and forgetting also — and this is the main 248 PLACE OF FIRST BATTLE. point — that the old authorities give us facts which we may not overlook. No doubt Hannibal was largely governed by the salient features of the valley of the Po in the course he followed; but we must not assume more than this. Our true rule should be, first and always, to glean our facts clearly and crisply from the original sources ; when statements con- flict, to select the most reliable, or most probable, to base upon ; and then from these to divine what may have been Hannibal's intuitive reasoning upon the conditions presented to him, which resulted in his taking the action history teUs us of. Now there is a dispute as to the movements of Hannibal and Scipio at this moment. Let us apply our theory. The two earliest of our authorities, Polybius and Cornelius Nepos, state the battle of the Ticinus to have been fought upon the banks of the Ticinus itself. Silius Italicus places it on the Eridanus, another name for the Po, — but as he is a poet we will not rely too much on him. Floras places it between the Po and Ticinus, that is, in one of their angles of confluence, which may be said to agree with Polybius and Nepos. Livy states that it took place five miles from Victumviae, west of the Ticinus, after Scipio had crossed not only the Po, but the Ticinus as well. He does not say why in this he does not follow Polybius, whom he copies so continually. Polybius gives not only the clearest but the earliest ac- count of this first battle between the Romans and Carthagin- ians, as well as the one which appears to accord best with the probabilities. " Publius," he says, " had already advanced across the Po, and in order to pass the Ticinus had ordered that a bridge should be built over it. While waiting its completion," he assembled and harangued his soldiers. " On the morrow the two armies advanced, the one against the other, along the Ticinus, on the side which looks out upon SCIPIO ADVANCES HALF-WAY. 249 the Alps, the Romans having the river on their left, the Car- thaginians on their right. The second day, the foragers of each party having given notice that the enemy was near, each one camped in the place where he stood. On the third, Pub- lius with his cavalry, sustained by some light-armed troops, and Hannibal with his cavalry only, marched each from his side into the plain to reconnoitre the forces of the other. When they saw, from the dust, that they were not far apart, they put themselves into battle order." This is a perfectly clean statement, such as Polybius always makes, and Polybius had been on the ground when many who saw the battle were still alive, — the only historian who had this advantage. What he says places the battle-field on the left or east bank of the Ticinus, the Romans facing sub- stantially north, and the Carthaginians substantially south. How does this accord with what Hannibal would be likely to do ? The Carthaginian general had just completed the capture of the capital of the Taurini, and had probably re- turned to the Insubrians, where he was patching up fresh alliances with the Gauls, and making ready to advance, when news was brought in by some of the numerous scouting-par- ties which he had sent out in all directions, both Gauls and Numidians, that Scipio had already crossed the Po. Here was an unexpected piece of good luck. Though well aware of the Roman habit of forcing the fighting, Hannibal had apprehended that Scipio would hold himself at Placentia, and seek to defend the line of the Po there and at the defile of Stradella. In order to attack him in the open field, which was what he desired to do, Hannibal would have had to lure him out of Placentia. This he might have accomplished either by threatening Cremona, which was on the north bank of the Po, or by a turning movement around Scipio's left across the upper Po, and thence down the right bank, which would lead 250 HANNIBAL MEETS HIM. him through the Stradella defile, and leave Soipio the advan- tage of choosing ground less good for the Carthaginian cav- aby than the plains on the left bank. Under the circum- stances Hannibal was probably on the point of trying the fu-st plan, relying on the impetuosity of the Roman character and the national habit, when the welcome news reached him that Scipio was about to meet him haK-way. Hannibal calculated that Scipio would not cross the Ti- cinus, but would back up against Placentia, with Cremona on his right, and await developments. He therefore marched towards and passed the Tioinus, from which he was not far distant ; and no doubt did so for greater certainty at one of the upper fords near Lake Maggiore, thence advancing south along the river. Scipio, on the contrary, had already crossed the Po, and was making ready to cross the Ticinus and to advance towards the Vercellae region, which he supjsosed Hannibal would be most apt to aim for after capturing Turin, when he heard that Hannibal had crossed the Ticinus ; and instead of using his bridge, which was in all probability near the Po, moved at once up the Ticinus. On the second day of liis march, — perhaps twenty-five miles from the Po up the east bank, — the two armies met. It was mid-November, 218 B. c. It does not seem as if Scipio could have marched as far north as Somma, near the lake, where the scene of the battle has been placed by some historians, nor does the situation accord with the authorities. This simple deduction from the facts stated by the earliest of our ancient authors, the one whom all agree in acknow- ledging as uniformly reliable, and who in this case is amply sustained by others, seems to be preferable to an argument founded on the strategic values as they are understood to-day. AN OBJECT LESSON. 251 These, however useful to Napoleon, were probably never ap- preciated by the Carthaginian. Hannibal, meanwhile, had strongly impressed on his own ,troops the evident fact that they had but the single choice of conquering or being destroyed to a man. He felt convinced and assured them that success would at once bring all these Gallic peoples under his standard, and the army marched cheerfully to meet the Roman legions, which were at the same time advancing rapidly towards them, but, to credit Livy, in by no means as good morale. A curious story is related as to the means Hannibal em- ployed to impress this alternative of victory or slavery upon his soldiers. He had with the army a number of the hostile Gauls whom he had captured in the Alps. He had kept the young warriors in chains, had illy fed them, and had punished them with cruel stripes. He now brought these youths before the army, and exhibiting to them such weapons as Gallic kings are wont to use for single combat, and richly capari- soned steeds, he asked which of them would be willing to fight to the death with a comrade in order to earn freedom and such arms. One and all eagerly demanded the privilege of the duel, for victory would be liberty, and death a deliv- erance from their present evil state. Lots were drawn, and several pairs of combatants fought in the presence of the army. Those to whom the lucky numbers did not fall, and who must still languish in slavery, equally felicitated the liv- ing victor and the vanquished dead. This object-lesson had a marked effect upon the Carthaginian army. The two detachments were approaching each other. Scipio had his two thousand Roman and allied cavalry, some Gallic cavalry, and his light troops ; Hannibal had his body of six thousand horse. Inasmuch as Hannibal so greatly outnumbered the Roman general in cavalry, his line also 252 THE FIRST ENCOUNTER. extended far beyond the flanks of Hs opponent. The Eo- mans advanced slowly, with the velites and Gallic horse in the first, and the Eoman and allied cavalry in the second r- .-' Battle of the Ticinus. lines. Hannibal, on the contrary, had but one line, with the Numidians on the flanks and the Spanish and Carthaginian heavy horse in the centre. The velites, who, we remember, were young soldiers, opened the action, but, speedily demoralized by the appearance of their new foe, after throwing a few darts, fled through the cavalry intervals, and allowed Hannibal to charge down upon the Roman line. The Eoman opposition was stanch, and the battle wavered for a while, many Eomans dismounting and fighting on foot ; but the Carthaginian horse proved greatly superior, as they had years before in SicUy. They not only exceeded the Romans in numbers, but in activity and discipline, and were already on the point of breaking the Eoman front, when the Numidians, who had ridden around both of Scipio's exposed flanks, fell smartly upon his rear, and, dispersing the velites who had there taken refuge, fell to sabring the disconnected Eoman horse right and left with- A FIRST VICTORY. 253 out mercy. The entire Roman formation was quickly broken up, only a small body remaining firm around the person of wounded Scipio, and retired in much confusion to the camp. The Carthaginian loss was heavier than the Eoman, says Polybius, but does not give the figures. This defeat was perhaps partly due to a severe wound received by Scipio early in the action. He was with diffi- culty rescued and borne from the fight by his seventeen-year- old son Scipio, — later so distinguished as Africanus, the victor of Zama. Hannibal deemed it wise not to follow up the Eoman force, which he supposed would retire upon the infantry and to the protection of its camp. He expected nothing less than a general engagement on the morrow. He had now the moral effect of a first success upon his side, — a distinct and solid gain. He more clearly than ever grasped the idea of his superiority in horse, and saw what should be the selection of his future battle-fields whenever available. The loss of this first combat — it scarcely rose to the dimen- sions of a battle — should not militate against the Eoman general. The encounter of his own with Hannibal's cavalry on the Ehone had naturally misled him, and to his grievous loss. But Scipio was a good soldier ; it was his feeling of Eoman invincibility which had led him into rashly measuring arms with an older soldier. He too late recognized his error in meeting Hannibal without the support of his foot, and under such conditions that he must almost certainly leave the victory to his enemy. The Eomans, on the succeeding night, retired from their camp straight on the bridge they had built over the Po. On arrival at the river, Scipio decided to recross to the south side, which he did, skillfully and well, destroying behind him the bridge, which was of rafts, says Livy, and again took post at a camp near Placentia. XVIII. MANCEUVRING. NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 218 B. C. Hamnieal did not follow up Scipio, but marched two days up the Po, crossed it, moved unopposed throug-h the defile of Stradella, camped below Plaeentia, and offered Scipio battle. The -wounded consul could not accept the g"age. The Roman senate, appalled at this first defeat, ordered the consul Sempronius from Sicily to reinforce Scipio. Hannibal was in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia and Ariminum, by which Sempronius would have to march. Scipio was awkwardly placed, and was threatened by a general insurrection of the neig-hboring- Gauls. He moved out of his Placentia camp, across and up the Trebia, and built a stationary camp on the bordei-s of the river. His object is not very clear, as his manoeuvre did not cut Hannibal's communications with the upper Po. For, having- moved his camp nearer Scipio's, the Carthaginian general was able to capture Clastidium, beyond the Stradella Pass, and from it draw large supplies of rations. But this gain was coupled ^vith a loss. Sempronius in some manner avoided Hannibal's watchful- ness, slipped round his flank, and joined his colleague in his camp on the Trebia. Hannibal had now no alternative but to fight both consuls, and set about luring Sempronius, whose rashness he well knew, into a pitched battle on unequal terms, before Scipio should recover from his wound. Hannibal, one of whose marked characteristics was to look coolly and prudently at a success accomplished, was wise enough not to follow too far the retreat of the Roman army, and perhaps have to force a passage across the Padus, in their teeth. He sent a force in pursuit, which captured the Roman garrison of six hundred men at the bridgehead at the Padus ; or, as we may infer from some of the authorities, the force holding the bridgehead at the Ticinus. The bridge on the Po had been broken down on Scipio's retreat. Coelius Antipater relates that Mago, with the cav- alry and the Spanish infantry, at once swam the Po, while HANNIBAL CROSSES THE PO. 255 Hannibal sought fords farther up the river. But Coelius ro- mances occasionally. Those who know the Po will hesitate before crediting the story, as indeed Livy does not. It was not now worth Hannibal's while to remain on the north of the Po, in the vicinity of Placentia. He had accom- plished a primary gain and won much credit among his new allies. He could scarcely force the river near Placentia with- out unnecessary loss, for Cremona was on his flank. More- over, this route towards central Italy was not a promising one, for the Romans held the outlet of the lower Padane country by the possession of the road from Ariminum via Mutina to Pla- centia. And the Po became harder to cross the farther down he marched. He preferred to effect a passage of this great river without opposition or great effort, if he could. Still, if he wished to attack Scipio at Placentia, the most important thing for him to do was to cross speedily to the south of the Po, and seize the intervening pass of StradeUa. He therefore filed his column to the right, crossed Scipio's bridge over the Placentia and the Apennines. Ticinus, and marched two days upstream to a point in aU probability not far from modem Cambio, here crossed the Padus with his van, on a bridge of boats of temporary con- 256 FAITHFUL GAULS. struotion, and went into camp to give time for building a stronger bridge so as to get bis foot and trains across with more safety. He at once sent his brother Mago out with a sufficiency of horse to scour the country and make sure of Scipio's whereabouts. To his camp here — as there had to other camps — came embassies from many of the Gallic tribes of the north bank, hitherto allied to Rome, who offered him their aid with men and victuals. The Gauls were as good as their word. In addition to much in the way of breadstuffs, no less than sixty thousand men of foot, LilybEDum to Plaoentia. and four thousand horse, at one time or other joined the Punic standard. The Romans held Clastidium, at the mouth of the defile of Stradella, but this oppidum apparently offered no opposition to his free use of the pass, for, when he continued his advance, HANNIBAL OFFERS BATTLE. '257 on the second day after putting his van across the Po, Han- nibal, with a march of about fifty miles, reauhed the vicinity of Placentia, and in front of the town on the third he offered battle to Scipio. This being declined, — for Scipio was con- fined with his wound, — he camped some six miles from the city. Scipio had no choice but to hold himself where he was, until he could be reinforced by the other consul, Sempronius ; for he could not intrust the safety of his legions to a lieu- tenant. The presence of his colleague was imperative. The Roman senate was both astounded and alarmed at the sudden appearance of Hannibal on the Padus, and the more so when news of the battle of the Ticinus was received. The consul Tiberius Sempronius was ordered speedily to reinforce Scipio. Sempronius was at the farther end of Sicily, at Lily- ba;um, but got under way as soon as possible. He left the prietor M. iEmilius in Sicily, with the fleet of fifty ships, sent Sextus Pomponius to the territory of Vibo in Bruttium, and, himself proceeding by sea, marched his army via Rome to Ariminum. This was done in forty days, being about sixteen miles a day ; from Ariminum they came by forced marches to Scipio's aid. Livy says the entire army came by sea, but there are indications in other authors which seem to make him wrong in this particular. The exact place near Placentia where Hannibal camped cannot be given, but it is thought to have been southeast of Placentia, on the Nura. lie apparently had two objects in view ; one, to prevent the junction of the two consuls, and the other, to accept the friendly overtures of the Boii, who dwelt in the northern foothills of the Apennines, were wavering in the balance, and needed his presence by way of encour- agement. By this manoeuvre he severed the communications of Scipio with Sempronius, and should have been able to 258 A HANDSOME MANCEUVRE. prevent their junction, and beat Sempronius while on the inarch to join his colleague. His own communications, by this change of position, were laid open to attack by Scipio, and would have been seriously compromised were it not that he was in the land of friends, and had a vast superiority in horse. He ran the invariable risk of such a mancEuvre. That CtNOHANI Manoeuvres near Placentia. he still kept his communications open, by what exact means we do not know, is well attested by the fact that, while en- camped at this place, he was able to gain possession, by treachery, of the post of Clastidium. Now here is one of the earliest and best instances of the taking up of a central position between two armies of the enemy. It was like Napoleon's manoeuvre of 1796, and Na^ poleon himself recognized the fact. " J'etais," he says, " dans una situation plus favorable qu'Annibal. Les deux consuls avaient un interet commun : couvrir Rome ; les deux gen- eraux que j'attaquais avaient chacun un interet particulier qui les dominait : Beaidieu celui de couvrir le Milanais ; Colli celui de couvrir le Piemont." There is no such crisp and masterly manoeuvre in early history as this, and it shows, by his own unfeigned acknowledgment, whence Napoleon SCIPIO CHANGES HIS CAMP. 259 drew Ha inspiration for some of his masterly strokes of genius. Scipio was awkwardly placed. The path to Genoa, by which he had personally come to Placentia, was In the hands of Hannibal's allies ; Hannibal, astride the direct road from Ariminum, could stop Sempronius from joining him other than by a circuit. He was isolated. Moreover, he was troubled by a defection among the auxiliary Gauls in his own camp, of whom two thousand foot and two hundred horse deserted one night, after tumultuously killing a number of the Roman men on guard. This, Scipio feared, was the signal of a more general outbreak, and he wished to keep his hold on the Ananes, near by, which was nearly the only tribe of the vicinity which had remained faithful to Rome. This he thought he could do by camping in their midst. Only through the aid of his allies could he hope to regain and hold the pass of Stradella. Scipio was an active soldier, whom even wounds could not quell. He determined to try on Hannibal a diversion which might make him quit his prey. He left in Placentia a suit- able garrison, and moved out of his camp near the place with the bulk of his force, straight west and across the Trebia ; whence, moving south, he took up and fortified a stationary camp on the left bank, in a position somewhat on a line with Hannibal's camp on the Nura. On the march he was inter- rupted by an attack of the Numidians, who were always on the alert ; but his rear-guard alone suffered any loss, for these cavalrymen turned aside to pillage his abandoned camp near Placentia, and afforded him time to get the bulk of his forces across the Trebia. They were sometimes unreliable. Scipio did not go far enough in his manoeuvre. While to all appearances he had placed Hannibal where he must retire, and by means of a battle at that, he did not assure himself of 260 SCIPIO'S NEW CAMP. the pass of Stradella, but left tlie Carthaginian line open, presumably by a circuit around his left to the mouth of the defile. Indeed, Hannibal's light cavalry, of which he had so great an excess over the Romans, seems to have been equal to holding all the surrounding country and of cooping Scipio up in his camp. Battle was what Hannibal wanted, and Scipio desired for the moment to avoid. Scipio's manoeu- vre was good ; his morale was not equal to it. He had not gone far enough. He was bound to wait for Sempronius. Scipio had wisely established his new camp on ground which was rolling upland, not far from the foothills of the Apennines, and broken enough to be less fitted for cavalry than near Placentia. In a stationary camp he was safe enough from assault. Placentia, on which and up the Padus he expected to rely for rations, as well as on Clastidium, were neither far distant. He was apparently in a position from which he might retrieve the disaster at the Ticinus. The Cenomani, on the north of the river, had remained faith- ful, and threatened the Insubres, Hannibal's chief supporters. Properly used, unless he should prove to have too little cavalry, his army could cut Hannibal off from the iipper Po and his allies there. The strength of the Roman camp pre- vented his isolation from being a substantial danger; but while his move had been a handsome one for the purpose of compelling battle, it does not appear in what its advantages lay as a position in which to wait for Sempronius, or even compromise the Carthaginians. For he had secured neither the pass of Stradella, nor the road which might enable the reinforcements under Sempronius to reach him from Arimi- num, which lay through a country largely in revolt, and actually in Hannibal's hands. To secure the fidelity of the Ananes may, after all, have been his main object. Hannibal paid no heed to Scipio's manoeuvre, except to HANNIBAL BETWEEN THE CONSULS. 261 assure himself that his communications could he kept open at need. Scipio, safe in his stationary camp, did not pretend to control the road to Placentia, as he could ration himself from Clastidium if he so wished. Probably the light horse of both parties scoured the whole country. This was the usual habit, and common means of foraging. Hannibal had ascertained at an early date that Sempro- nius was ordered to northern Italy, and it seems at first blush rather strange that he did not seek to engage Scipio's army before he should be thus reinforced. But battle could not be forced in those days of walled cities and intrenched camps; and Scipio was warily biding his time. He could not be attacked to advantage, and Hannibal always liked to see the chances on his own side. He had as marked a mixture of the bold and discreet in his composition as Gus- tavus Adolphus. The delay is further explainable by Han- nibal's having so much to do to secure his footing among his new allies that he was unable to push forward. Just so much time had to be spent in councils and negotiations. It was wiser for him not to undertake the offensive until the entire territory of cisalpine Gaul was either in alliance with or in subjection to him. Hannibal had manoeuvred superbly in thus interposing between the two consuls. But he lost his game for all that. In some way Sempronius gave him the slip and joined his colleague. By what route or how, history does not tell us. It is not even made a matter of boast by Livy, and yet it must have been a very clever march. Colonel Hennebert, in his very learned work, suggests that he marched via Faesulse and Luca, and thus twice crossed the Apennines. But even if the Arnus marshes were dry at this season, it scarcely seems a probable thing for him to do. It is more likely that he moved south of the Carthaginians through the 262 SEMPRONIUS EVADES HANNIBAL. forest roads of the northern foothills, even though this was Boian territory, aUied to Hannibal. It is possible that it was while Hannibal was engaged in his early efforts on Clasti- dium that Sempronius slipped through. But Clastidium was small game ; Sempronius was big. It seems as if Hannibal should himself have Watched Sempronius. We must lay a lapse at the door of even this captain. Whatever the means, Sempronius did escape Hannibal and did effectuate his junction with Scipio. Both consuls were now encamped on the Trebia. They were in a posi- tion to make the Carthaginian fight for his communications. But battle was just what Hannibal wanted, provided always that he could choose the occasion and the field. Hannibal had established a new camp on the right of a small affluent of the Padus, somewhat less than five miles east of the Trebia, probably what is to-day called the Trebiola. Here he also received proposals from the Ligurians to join his forces and furnish him provisions. There were plenty of Roman haters in northern Italy, when it was safe to play that role. Hannibal saw that he must not rely too much on his new allies for food. He needed a large magazine of supplies. He turned to Clastidium, where the Romans had large quantities of breadstuffs. That even the two consuls had not severed his communications with the upper Po is evident, for while they were discussing the situation with a view to active operations, Hannibal had been at work on this town. What measures he took to force the place we do not know, except that he prepared to assault it ; but the gov- ernor was more open to the show of gold than to threats, and surrendered the place. It proved an excellent capture, of which Hannibal made good use and fully rationed his army, much to the disgust of the Roman consuls. And, as Livy says, " it served as a granary for the Carthaginians while A SMALL ROMAN SUCCESS. 263 they lay at the Trebia," a further proof that Scipio's ma- noeuvre had failed to cut Hannibal off from the upper Po. The Ananian Gauls, among whom the Roman army lay, were afraid or unwilling to join the new coalition, or else they were waiting to see whether the Romans or Carthagin- ians would win in the battle soon to come. Making this a pretext, but really because he desired to taunt Sempronius to action before the recovery of Scipio from his wound, — for Hannibal knew Sempronius to be hot-headed and lacking in the discretion of his colleague, — the Carthaginian gen- eral sent out a force of two thousand foot and one thousand horse, Numidians and Gauls, to ravage the Ananian territory so as to prevent the Romans from procuring forage and corn. The Ananes of course turned to the consuls for help. Scipio, as yet unable to leave his quarters, strongly advised against giving up the excellent position they held, preferring a policy of caution. Sempronius was for battle. The consuls went to the extent of indulging in all but acrimonious discussion as to what it was wise to do. Sempronius would by no means hearken to Scipio's advice. He sent out the bulk of his horse and some thousand bowmen to drive the Car- thaginians from their work of destruction. This force crossed the Trebia, and won a cheap victory over a small Car- thaginian detachment which was retiring to camp laden with booty ; and which, reinforced in its turn, faced about and drove in the Romans. Sempronius now moved out with a still larger force, consisting of all his cavalry and light troops, and beat off the reinforced Carthaginian column. Hannibal, having accomplished his purpose, and not desiring a general engagement under the existing conditions, contented himself with steadying his troops and left the Romans to retire. Han- nibal had whetted Sempronius' appetite for a pitched battle. Livy, who, like a good ward-politician, is in the habit of 264 BOTH EAGER FOR BATTLE. "claiming ererytliing," in this instance calls the affair a draw. Proud of his success, and desirous of coming to blows with Hannibal before Scipio could recover and assume command, — and particularly as the time for the election of new con- suls was drawing nigh, — Sempronius took measures looking towards a general engagement, heedless of Scipio's caution to beware of the wily foe. Hannibal was equally eager to engage, but proposed to get the chances in his favor ; for the Roman army was now some forty thousand strong, and not counting barbarian allies on either side, considerably outnumbered his own. The Gauls also were noted for their inconstancy, and Han- nibal desired to give them an opportunity to profit by the defeat of their enemy, rather than wear out his own wel- come. To lie stiU doing nothing was the most dangerous policy, especially as winter was coming on, and to delay meant to weary his allies by taking up winter-quarters among them, which he did not want to do without some very marked success to retire upon. The new Roman levies had as j'et had no hardening in war ; his own troops were quite restored in strength, and their morale was of the highest ; his oppo- nent was a rash soldier ; Hannibal well knew the situation of the Roman army ; everything looked favorable. There are not a few who read the authorities to mean that Hannibal had all this while remained on the west bank of the Trebia, while the Romans held the east, — in other words, that Hannibal had made no effort to cut Sempronius off from Scipio. But not only was it natural that Hannibal should move among his allies, the Boians, but the balance of evi- dence goes to support the statements above given. Polybius, Livy, Nepos, all state that Scipio on leaving Plaoentia crossed the Trebia to encamp, and moreover it was to quiet his allies. THE BATTLE-FIELD. 265 tlie Ananes, ttat he moved among them. If Hannibal had remained west of the Trebia, he would have been among the Ananes, and there would have been no special reason for Scipio's moving ftom Placentia. But when Hannibal cut Soipio off from his colleague, there was a definite reason for the consul's change of camp, particularly so if, as is possible, he so placed himself as to afford Sempronius a better chance of joining him. These facts, coupled to the positions of the armies in the coming battle, which are not disputed, appear to decide the matter to be as stated. No field can be established with absolute certainty for the battle of the Trebia, but the following account and plan ac- cord well with the authorities and with the topography they describe. The locality given is in fact the only one in the vicinity which will do so with accuracy. We have seen that shortly after Scipio had gone into his camp on the Trebia, Hannibal had moved his Nura camp to the Trebiola, much nearer to the enemy. Here he had been ever since, facing the Komans on the other side of the Trebia. Boman Helmet. XIX. THE BATTLE OF THE TREBIA. DECEMBER, 218 B. C. To the left of Hannibal's camp was an overgrown ravine, a, branch of the Trebiola. Here he hid a party of two thousand choice troops under Mag-o, and before daylight next morning sent his Numidians, who had eaten their morning meal earlier than usual, across the Trehia to attack the Roman camp, and by re- treating induce the Romans to foUow them back. This was well done. Sem- pronius ordered his entire army into line, and though his men had not broken fast, he pushed them across the river. The day was raw ; snow was falling ; by the time the legions had crossed the Trebia fords the men were chilled through. The Carthaginians had, on the contrary, eaten and rubbed themselves with oil before their camp-fires. Sempronius was already half beaten. The two lines formed, and despite their bad condition, the Romans fought stanchly. The Roman horse was, however, soon beaten by the Carthaginian, which then turned in on the flanl^ of the Roman infantry, and at the same time Mago emerged from ambush and fell on the Roman rear. The elephants had demoralized the Gallic allies in the consular army, and the whole Roman force was surrounded by the Carthaginians. Ten thousand of the centre legionaries, under Sempro- nius, cut their way through Hannibars centre and marched to Placentia ; the balance were either killed, or trodden down by the elephants, or drowned in the Trebia. Scipio decamped under cover of a storm on the succeeding night and made his way to Placentia. Sempronius went to Rome. Hannibal held the entire country. Both armies sought winter-quarters, after some further slight exchanges, Hannibal in Liguria, Scipio at Ariminum, Sempronius at Luca. Hannibal's base on the Po was secure. But in Spain, Cornelius Scipio had practically recovered Catalonia. Hannibal was a master of stratagem. Having ascer- tained by the use of numerous Gallic spies — and they were good ones, Laving affiliations in both camps — all the facts relating to the enemy which he deemed essential to his pur- pose, he carefully scrutinized the ground between the two armies and east of the Trebia. It was an open plain, well HANNIBAL'S STRATAGEM. 267 suited for tlie evolutions of cavalry, and on its southerly limit lay an overgrown waterway — a branch of the TreLi- ola, in fact — whose high banks, covered with underbrush, were capable of concealing a considerable force. In this re- treat he placed in ambush his brother Mago, with a chosen body of one thousand horse and an equal number of the best of the light troops, all men of known resolution ; and on the following morning, the Carthaginian army having been or- dered to take hearty nourishment before daylight, he sent the Numidian horse beyond the Trebia to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, lure him from his camp and across the river before the hour of the morning meal. The whole Carthagin- ian army he ordered to make itself ready for battle. This was not far from the end of the year B. c. 218. The Trebia is, in its upper course, no more than a moun- tain torrent. On the plain near the Po it is at times full to overflowing ; at times low and shallow — a mass of sand- banks. At this season it was full. It is the barrier which covers the eastern debouch of the defile of Stradella, and by its valley, moreover, lies the straight road from Placentia to Genoa. It is an important stream. History has lined its banks with blood. No sooner had the Numidians shown up in the vicinity of the Roman camp, than Sempronius sent out his cavalry to drive them off, sustaining it with six thousand velites ; and himself, in impatience to seize what was to him apparently an excellent opening, at the head of the entire army moved out as to battle. It is a constant rule of war to get all the chances, or as many as you can, on your own side ; Sempro- nius was preparing to get them all, on this occasion, on Han- nibal's. The Numidians had their orders. They skirmished with the cavalry for a while, then, feigning defeat, which these 268 SEMPRONIUS' FOOLHARDINESS. nomads could do with astonishing cleverness, recrossed the river. Sempronius could not restrain his ardor. He had beaten these wretches a few days since ; why not again to-day ? ..^^J^^ (1/ .StdPMN>l)3 ' C/U1P Battle of the Trebia. The day was raw ; snow was falling ; the troops had not yet eaten their morning meal ; yet, though they had been under arms for several hours, he pushed them across the fords of the Trebia, with the water breast-high and icy-cold. Arrived BAD ROMAN POSITION. 269 on the farther side, the Roman soldiers were so chilled that they could scarcely hold their weapons. Hannibal was ready to receive them. His men had eaten, rubbed themselves with oil before their camp-fires, and pre- pared their weapons. He might have attacked the Eoman army when half of it was across, with even greater chances of success. But when he saw his ruse succeeding, he bethought him that he could produce a vastly greater moral effect on the new Gallic allies, as well as win a more decisive victory, by engaging the whole army on his own terms. Sempronius was in the worst possible position. He had a river — fordable in places, to be sure, but still a serious ob- stacle — at his back, and an army to command, which was not only not in the best of heart, but physically weakened by lack of food and the morning's exposure. But he did not recognize this weakness ; he only considered how he had, as it seemed to him, driven the Numidians back across the river. He cheerfully moved forward into line of battle, calling in his horse. He had sixteen thousand Roman and twenty thousand allied infantry, and four thousand Roman and allied cavalry. He drew up this army in the usual three lines, throwing out the velites to the front, and placing the cavalry on the flanks. The Gallic auxiliaries were on the left of the legions. He then advanced to the attack. Hannibal opened the action by sending out eight thousand light troops and his one thousand Balaorean slingers as a skirmishing first line, to sustain the Numidian horse in its re- treat. His main line of twenty thousand infantry, including Gauls, he disposed a mile in front of his camp, in phalangial order, the Gauls in the centre, the Africans on either side of them, the war-hardened Spaniards on the flanks. His cavalry was now, with the Gallic auxiliaries, fully ten thousand strong. This he posted opposite the cavalry on the Roman flanks, but 270 THE BATTLE. as the Roman front was longer, there was left an interval on each flank between his foot and horse. This interval he filled with his elephants. The Carthaginian skirmishers, much fresher and older at the business, soon drove in the Eoman velites. Hannibal then called, them back, and sent them to support the ele- phants, in the intervals spoken of. The velites fell back, and rallied behind the triarii, and the line advanced, the prin- cipes checkerwise behind the intervals of the hastati, and the triarii in reserve, with sure Eoman steadiness. So soon as the two lines met, for in those days of short- carriage weapons, lines did meet, the Eoman centre forced the fighting, but the Eoman wings of infantry, which met the elephants and light troops, were unable to make any head- way, though, to the surprise of all, the Eomans did not take alarm at the appearance or tactics of the elephants. Hannibal now ordered forward his cavalry of both wings, and after a sharp charge and tussle they broke the Eoman horse, and drove it from the field. A part of the Carthaginian horse followed up this retreat, while another part, assisted by the light troops and the Balacreans, who did astonishing execu- tion, turned inward upon the flanks of the Eoman infantry. The elephants had been driven back by the legionaries, but Hannibal dispatched them to oppose the Gauls on the ex- treme Eoman left, where they did the best of work. Meanwhile, Sempronius' centre, composed of the Eoman legions, with that wonderful tenacity of which even their green troops were capable, despite the wrecking of their horse and the fearful danger to the infantry wings, had pushed in the Carthaginian centre, where fought the Gauls and Afri- cans ; and, elated with its success, and no doubt imagining that it was on the eve of victory, had advanced so far that it had become separated from its wings. The Numidian and BUT A FEW ESCAPE. 271 Carthaginian cavalry were now making fearful havoc among these wings, which contained the allied foot, and shortly sur- rounded and quite cut them off from the successful centre. At this moment, too, Mago emerged from hiding, rode around the Roman right, and, falling upon their rear, completed the destruction. The bulk of the line was cut to pieces on the spot. A hardy portion fought its way through to the river, but the men were here mostly either killed or drowned. What the horse did not cut down, the elephants trampled under foot, or the Trebia swaUowed up. Very few were able to cross to camp. The front of the centre, ten thousand strong, probably the principes and hastati of the Roman legions, which were not immediately reached by the attack of Mago, resolutely held together, formed circle in close order, and made their way to Placentia, under Sempronius, who, if not a discreet general, showed himself a doughty fighter. Hannibal was too busy destroying the wings to be able to prevent this escape of Sem- pronius with the central body. A few stragglers also made their way to Placentia. Scipio at once broke camp, and, crossing the Trebia by night, under cover of the cold and storm, which, added to the toils of the day, kept the Cartha- ginian army closely housed, marched in haste to the same place, with the few troops which had been left in the camps. In Placentia, Scipio took command. Sempronius returned to Rome, sending a courier ahead to announce that he had fought a battle, and that, except for the bad weather, he would have won it. A part of the troops were sent to Cre- mona, so as to divide the Roman force for winter-quarters. This battle is the only one during Hannibal's Italian cam- paigns in which the phalanx encountered the legion, and again the balance was not even. But that the legion possessed manifest advantages over the phalanx is in nothing so power- 272 SCIPIO SHUT UP IN PLACENTIA. fully shown as in the fact that before Cannaj Hannibal largely armed his phalangites Roman fashion ; and though he did not adopt the manipular organization, we are led to believe that he made changes in his phalanx which altered its one-shock disposition to one in which there was mobility more nearly approaching the Roman line of cohorts. In Spain, legion and phalanx frequently met, with mixed success in the early years, but eventual superiority for the legion — or for Roman discipline — towards the end. Hannibal did not follow beyond the Trebia. He had fought a masterly battle and won a decisive victory. But his losses had also been serious. They are, unfortunately, not given. The Gauls in the centre had especially suffered. He had lost nearly all his elephants, many by the cold. His brilliant success was more than compensation for any loss, and he now felt that he had a base perfectly secure in the alliance of the Gallic tribes. For these looked upon him as their savior from Roman tyranny. Had he not beaten the invincible Roman infantry man to man? No doubt remained with whom rested the credit of this first campaign. He followed up his success by numerous raids around Placentia and near- by Roman strongholds, thus keeping the legions in a state of constant uneasiness. The Roman army was shut up in Placentia, with its com- munications cut with Ariminum and Etruria. Scipio made no show whatever of leaving the place, and Hannibal knew his cautious habit and did not attempt to lure him out to battle. He also knew that a fresh army would in early spring be sent to Scipio's relief ; and recognized that though he was superior to the Roman general in horse, he was far behind him in foot, and might not have so easy a task as with Sempronius. Hannibal saw that he must be active in order to keep his advantage and to satisfy the demands of his Gallic CAPTURE OF VICTUMVI^. 273 allies. The Tery security of his position depended upon this fickle people remaining friendly, and he made every effort to satisfy them and procure additional allies. Hannibal held the entire country. The Numidians or Gauls scouted undisturbed over the whole of it. The means Scipio had of getting food was by ships up the Po, for Hannibal ate out and laid waste all the contributory territory which Scipio might have used, — sparing of course his own allies. A strongly fortified though small town, Em- porium, on the right bank, aided in keeping navigation open. Hannibal made up his mind to surprise the place, and did in- deed move against it one night with his cavalry. But by a system of preconcerted signals, or by the tumult, or by cou- riers, Scipio was called to its rescue. He came up with his cavalry at a rapid pace, followed by his legions in close order. A slight wound received by Hannibal in the cavalry action which followed was the cause of the defeat of his horse. This obliged the Carthaginians to retire. But Hannibal shortly repaired this disaster by the capture of Victumvise, a citadel which might interrupt his communications with Ligu- ria. The inhabitants of the vicinity, who had taken refuge in Victumvise, made a gallant show of opposition, marching out to the number, says Livy, of thirty-five thousand men, to meet him in front of the town, but he gave them so summary a beating that the town decided to surrender. In order to terrify the garrisons of other towns, Hannibal, according to Livy, decided to put the Eoman soldiers found here to the sword, and gave the place to his men to plunder. The winter weather now detained him some time in quar- ters ; but in February (b. C. 217) a milder period set in, and Hannibal undertook a campaign up the Trebia into the Apennines, thinking to make an irruption into Etruria, and there create a diversion in his favor, and if possible detach 274 SEMPRONIUS AGAIN BEATEN. the province from Rome. But he was met in the mountains with so severe a spell of weather that, after camping two days, he was fain to retire, losing a large number of men, ani- mals and seven of his precious elephants. He went again into camp not far from Placentia. Livy's description of the storm reads like the one so graphically sketched by Curtius, in which Alexander's army suffered so severely in the Para- pamisus. Sempronius' defeat at the Trebia had not served to dis- courage or teach this officer caution. He had now returned from Rome. With his fiery impetuosity, for which to a certain degree he deserves credit, he determined, before retiring from Hannibal's front, again to cross swords with the Carthaginian. The opportunity was soon afforded him. Hannibal, after his mountain adventure, had returned to within ten miles of Placentia. One day, apparently while intent on making a reconnoissance in force, with twelve thou- sand foot and five thousand horse, Sempronius sallied forth to meet him, and to accept Livy's relation (Polybius does not mention the engagement), the consul's attack on Hannibal's line was so sharp that he forced him back to camp, and even went so far as to attack the camp intrenchments. Then, sat- isfied with the seeming advantage, he began to withdraw. This was Hannibal's ojsportunity. He debouched from camp with the bulk of his force, the foot from the front-gate, and the cavalry from the side-gates with instructions to fall on the Roman flanks. A hotly contested combat was the result, which only night arrested. Sempronius withdrew from the field with a loss of six hundred foot and three hundred horse, including five Roman war-tribunes, three allied prsefects and many other officers. Hannibal's loss was about equal. Livy calls this a drawn battle, but the advantage had remained with Hannibal. WINTER-QUARTERS. 275 The Eoman generals had determined to retire from Pla^ eentia before going into winter-quarters. They had become convinced that they could not longer hold the line of the Padus to advantage. Leaving garrisons in Placentia and Cremona, Scipio retired on Ariminum ; Sempronius retired on Luca, across the Apennines into Etruria. By this divi- sion of forces, the two consular armies protected the two lines of operation from cisalpine Gaul to Rome, — the one east, the other west of the main range of the Apennines. At this pei'iod the danger of a division of forces never seemed to be understood. Hannibal was alone aware of its weakness ; but he was not always able to take advantage of this error on the part of his opponents. The method of the day of intrenching camps placed even a small army in comparative security, provided it did not accept battle when offered. Forcing battle, as it can now be done, was not then possible. But, by parity of reasoning, an army did not protect any given line as well as when it is at all times ready to fight for its object. The consuls deemed the presence of at least one army in cisalpine Gaul imperative. Either of the consular armies could be speedily reinforced up to the strength of Hannibal's. And as winter -quarters were by both parties deemed a sine qua non, — as they always had been, indeed, by every one but Alexander, — both contestants subsided into quiet until spring should bring forage for their animals on the march. The question has been suggested why Hannibal should have allowed the Romans to retire from Placentia unopposed, or indeed to divide and retreat eccentrically, without falling upon and destroying one or the other of the consular armies. Perhaps his absence from the scene and his wound are the best explanation, though such operations were not so easy in the days of daily intrenched camps as they are now. Much 276 CISALPINE GAUL SECURE. time was moreover consumed in negotiations with the Ligu- rians. The relation of all the historians is more or less ob- scure. We constantly find gaps which can be filled only by guess-work. Such gaps, in the case of a master like Hanni- bal, are the more to be regretted, as we often have to pass over some incident or lapse without a proper understanding of the conditions, and thereby lose half the benefit of our study. The reason why Hannibal did not endeavor to take Placen- tia and Cremona, so as to deprive the Romans of their last foothold in cisalpine Gaul, is probably that he had no mate- rial wherewith to conduct a siege. In fact, he appears to have had none during his entire campaign in Italy. Men- tion of such is nowhere made. Moreover, Hannibal seemed always to feel, and it was probably true, as of Frederick, that his proper strength was on the battle-field, or in strategic combinations, and not in sieges. He had no time to sit down before strong places. The only siege in which his ability was ever brought strongly to the fore was that of Saguntum. And the holding by the Eomans of these places in no wise militated against his general scheme. He did his work with as much liberty as if they had been in his own possession. They were effectually masked by his aUianees with the neigh- boring Gauls, and each contained but a small garrison. They were in fact soon evacuated. The whole of cisalpine Gaul thus fell into the hands of Hannibal. He was now very eager to disembarrass his hosts, the Gauls, from the burden of his army, and to make them yet warmer allies by giving them a chance at the riches of Italy. But the severity of the season prevented his carrying out the expedition he had planned into Etruria, and forced him to winter in Gaul. He took up his quarters in Liguria. The Apennines separated him from Sempronius at Luca. CNMUS SCIPIO IN SPAIN. 277 The Ligurians definitely joined Hannibal's standard, and furnished him as hostages a number of Roman officers, two quaestors (C. Fulvius and L. Lucretius), two military trib- unes and five knights, most of them the sons of Roman senators. Meanwhile in Spain, Cnseus Cornelius Scipio, who had sailed from Massilia, as above narrated, had won some suc- cess against the Carthaginians. He had landed near Em- poriae, had by clever management gained the coast-land be- tween the Pyrenees and the Iberus, and after defeating and capturing Hanno, in a battle near Soissis, had got possession of a considerable part of the interior. His policy was pacific, and his occupation promised success. But Hasdrubal marched across the Iberus and surprised the crews of the Roman fleet, which had landed near by and carelessly dispersed, and killed a number of them. After these latter unimportant exchanges, Hasdrubal went into winter-quarters at New Carthage, Cnaeus Scipio near Tarragona, where he divided much booty among his soldiers. Hannibal's carefully prepared base in Spain had already received a damaging blow. Soldier's Cloak. XX. THE AKNUS MAKSHES. SPKING, 217 B. C. The Padane country was lost. The new coiisuls, Servilius and Flaminius, proposed to hold the approaches to Rome on the two main roads, at Arretium and Arimiuum. Flaminius was a hot-headed man, though not lacking ability. He had the bulk of the consular forces at Arretium. What the consuls should have done was to join their armies and fight Hannibal ; but they could not see the risk of divided forces. The Carthaginian determined to invade Etruria. He did not wish to move by the main Roman road, via Placentia and Mutina, because the consuls expected him that way. His only other route was across the mountains to Genoa, along the coast to the Arnue, and up the river. This led him through a section of land overflowed in spring, and peculiarly marshy this year. The obstacle was a dangerous one ; but it was because he could debouch on Flaminius unexpectedly that he chose it. He broke up from, winter-quarters, and after a difficult and costly march reached Fsesulae, much to the surprise of the consuls. In central Italy, Hannibal expected not only to win victories, but to be able to seduce some of the Roman confederates from their allegiance. In doing this lay, in fact, his only hope. Alone, he could accomplish nothii^, even with victories, and he knew it well. Rome was too strong in material resources. But if he could break up the Italian Confederacy, he could dictate a peace at the gates of Rome. The consuls elected for the ensuing year — B. c. 217 — were Cnaeus Servilius and Caius Flaminius. It was intended that the former should protect against the approach of Han- nibal the line of the Via Flaminia through Umbria to Arimi- num, while the latter should cover the road which was later the Via Cassia, leading through Etruria via Arretium, riorentia and Luca. These roads were not yet the great highways of a later age, but they were good of their hind. No unusual preparations were made by Rome. The four legions were reinforced up to their normal strength, and the FLAMINWS. 279 cavalry was somewhat increased. Rome had no idea that she would be called on for undue exertions. The forces from Pla- centia and other fortresses on the Po were drawn in to rein- force the consular armies. They could readily drop down the Rome to the Po. Po and along the coast to Ariminum. The two consuls ex- pected later to concentrate north of the Apennines and again rescue the line of the Po. Flaminius was of an aristocratic family, but though he had espoused the cause of the people, his quarrelsome character lost him many friends and clients. The nobility hated him, and he is generally represented as a demagogue. He was really a man of progress, with an honest and vigorous nature, but had made more foes than friends by proposing an agra- rian law when he was tribune. He was of an impetuous, over-confident nature, but had shown some years before. 280 SERVILIUS. against the Gauls, that he did not entirely lack military ca- pacity, as he certainly possessed some civic virtues. But these were overclouded by his peculiarities. He now began in his usual wrong-headed way, and quarreled even with the senate before leaving Rome for the north, which fact enables Livy to explain the coming disasters by portents and omens. Flaminius had reason to fear that he might be again recalled by this sometimes arrogant body before he could join the army, as it had formerly tried to recall him from Gaul by appealing to the superstition of the people. Taking at Ari- minum the two legions which properly belonged to Servilius, in addition to the two he had got by lot from Sempronius, who, we remember, had retired on Luca before winter, he concentrated at Arretium. Here he purposed to wait quietly until the roads became passable, when he supposed it would be time enough to block them against Hannibal. But he found that the Phoenician did not wait for practicable roads. Servilius remained in Rome to raise additional forces and to make arrangements for victualing both armies. In March he moved to Ariminum with two new legions, to hold head against the Gauls, who with coming spring would be apt to move. Scipio was ordered to Spain, his province of last year, with two legions ; and there were, besides, one in Sicily, one in Sardinia and one at Tarentum. The six le- gions ran the force of the consuls up to over fifty thousand men. Servilius would have been better with Flaminius. There was no immediate peril from the Gauls. Alone, the Gauls were not dangerous. Under Hannibal they were much to be feared ; but once beat Hannibal, and they would leave him without delay. Hannibal was the enemy whom it was essen- tial to crush. This could only be done by numbers, if at all. But the consuls did not yet know their man. THE ITALIAN CONFEDERACY. 281 Hannibal had no idea of wasting his time defending the valley of the Po against Roman assaults. His work lay among the confederates in southern and central Italy. His scheme was a constant offensive, and we shall see that so long as he had strength to do so, he kept even the Romans, the very essence of whose policy was push, strictly to a defensive r81e. He well knew that should he defeat one consular army after another, this would not be defeating Rome. He must weaken the Italian Confederacy in order to strike at the root of her power. Victory was necessary, but it was only a first step. Unless victory affected in his favor the Roman allies, it could do him no eventual good. Hannibal was too old a soldier not to know that the Roman military organization was better in the long run than his own, even if the legion was not at this time better than his own phalanx. He saw that Rome could prolong the contest indefinitely, and would keep on improving, while he could not expect to do so. He by no means underrated his foe. His plan must be unremitting activity by which he could undermine the morale of the Ro- man senate, and a succession of victories which should incline to his cause the Roman allies. Rome had absolute material preponderance. All Hannibal had to oppose to this was his burning genius. And in his greatest successes he never for- got this limitation to his power ; nor did his divine fury ever mislead him. Hannibal made strenuous efforts, even at this time, to in- duce some of the allied cities to come over to his standard. He gave them to understand that his attitude towards Rome tended directly to their benefit, and that they could all gain their independence if he succeeded. The allied prisoners whom he had captured he treated generously and sent back without ransom. That he massacred the Roman prisoners is altogether doubtful, but he probably he drew a crisp distinc- 282 HANNIBAL'S DISGUISES. tion between them and their confederate brothers in adver- sity. He managed to produce a good impression, but it was as yet too dangerous a thing for any of the socii to break openly with Kome. On the other hand, the Gallic allies of Hannibal were getting restless, from having to sustain the war on their territory instead of gathering plunder on the enemy's. Hannibal was often put to severe straits to allay this feeling, which is described as being at times so strong that his assassination was planned. And it is related by Po- lybius that Hannibal was obliged to resort to all manner of subterfuges and personal disguises of costume to escape this constantly threatening danger ; especially so, as he was al- ways active in personaDy reconnoitring the country, and in judging what he ought to do with his own eyes. Flaminius had an army of four legions ; at the normal strength with allies about thirty-six thousand men. Servi- CLkBTIOl"" °7P%^ The Arnu3 Marshes. lius had half the number. While the senate had not waked up to the full danger of the situation, Eome had this year over one hundred thousand men in the field. She needed more before the year was out. ROADS TO ETRURIA. 283 When spring opened, Hannibal determined to move to Etruria as a first step towards an invasion of central Italy. There were two directions from Liguria by which he might do this. The main route, over which the Romans marched their army to the Padane country, was excellent. From Li- guria, however, it ran by a long circuit through Clastidium, Placentia, Mutina and Bononia, to Ariminum, before it crossed the mountains, though there were several gaps in the Apennines, with country roads turning southerly off this route — later the Via Emilia. The only other road then practicable was one which the Ligurians had not infrequently used in their raids into Etruria, but which was little known to the Romans. It lay across the mountains to Genoa, and then along the coast to the mouth of the Arnus, whence a march up the right bank would bring Hannibal to the left of the Roman position at Arretium, on the southern foothills of the Apennines. If Hannibal attempted the highway or any of the roads leading off it, the consul Flaminius could make his progress all but impossible by besetting the mountain passes, and the country was such that he would be unable to make valid use of his cavalry. Moreover, the other consul, Servilius, would soon reach Ariminum with two legions, — as Hannibal well knew, for these things were reported to him by spies whom he never neglected to keep in motion, — and could readily harass his rear should he attempt to force the mountain passes. On the other road, the territory at the mouth of the Arnus was at this season one huge marsh, which took days to traverse, and happened this year to be deeper overflowed than usual, a state of things which would last many weeks, and might subject him to as much toil as the passage of the Alps. This seemed to the bold Carthaginian, however, the lesser evil, and he chose it. The route he knew to be fuU of difficulties, but as it was the 284 THE APENNINES. surest and quickest to the heart of Italy, as it turned the Roman position, and as it was the one on which he would not be looked for, it was the road which best suited his ideas. Obstacles he knew not, when they lay between him and Rome. The Romans gauged Hannibal's manceuvres in the light of their own. They had always dictated the method of war, and could look at it only thus. So far, Hannibal had sought battle, and they supposed he would stUl do so by the simple means of moving directly up to their position. They were watching the valley of the Padus and the passes of the Apennines leading upwards from the lower part of the river. Hannibal had been camping in a level country of vast ex- tent. He was now to enter upon the mountain country, near whose foothills he had won his first pitched battle. Most generals excel either in upland or lowland war ; Hannibal had been trained, and was equally at home in both. The backbone of the Apennines runs down the length of the peninsula of Italy, at times rising to an altitude of ten thousand feet, at times merely a rolling country with occa- sional mountains accentuating the range. Throughout their length the Apennines are now cut by numerous excellent roads ; the population is large, and the cultivation abundant. In Hannibal's time, many communities lived in these hilly fastnesses ; and the valleys smiled with grain and oil and wine. But the roads, excepting those which alwa)fs followed hard upon Roman occupation, were probably mostly such as peoples can produce whose transportation is done by pack-animals alone. The Gauls of the Po had carts, but they lived in the plain ; the mountaineers of Italy used no vehicles at that day ; they own few now. At intervals, rather rare, in this mountain chain, there were alluvial plains, and frequently the shore extended well out to THE ROADS OF ITALY. 285 sea from the foothills. But the general character of the whole peninsula was upland, and there were in central and southern Italy but three plains of marked extent ; those along the Arnus, the happy fields of Campania, and the prairies of The Plains of Italy. Apulia on the opposite coast. Still, almost all portions of central Italy, on either side of the chain, made good cam- paigning ground, and the mountains could at intervals be readily crossed. We do not know as much about the roads as we could wish. But where the great turnpikes with which the Romans invariably followed up their conquests did not yet exist, there were no doubt excellent substitutes in the country roads, either native or Roman. The neighbors of Rome were all but as active in internal improvements as herself. Neither the consuls nor Hannibal appear usually to have been ham- pered by lack of practicable roads, though in such a country 286 THE ARNUS MARSHES. certain positions and gaps have a constant and peculiar stra- tegic value, and are used by preference. The Roman roads were so apt to follow the paths indicated by the roads of the populations which preceded their occupation, that we may fairly consider that intercommunication between all parts of Italy was excellent, certainly better than that we Americans were fain to content ourselves with in our Civil War. Han- nibal had only infantry, cavalry and pack-trains ; he could practically go anywhere where there were mountain-gaps. Hannibal broke up in early spring, probably March, 217 B. C. He had wintered in the vicinity of modern Alexandria. The first part of the march towards Etruria was not over- burdened with difficulties. The range from the Ligurian country to Genoa is rugged ; but his troops had campaigned in Spain, and the Gauls knew the land tolerably well. From Genoa to modern Spezzia, he kept along the cliff -roads. Nearing the Luca country, he also neared the Arnus marshes. Just what the extent of this submerged section was, we only know from the ancient authors. It does not now exist. It is called a marsh. It probably was alluvial land covered by the usual spring overflow, this year exces- sive. At first blush, especially to judge from the fact that Luca was a Roman colony, one would suppose that there must have been a practicable road around the north of the flat land of the Arnus. But that there was none must not only be as- sumed from the authorities, but is evident from the structure of these foothills. Roads in plenty there may have been, up into the valleys of this southern slope of the Apennines, and some across the range ; but to attempt to march along the length of the slope would have been to encounter a never- ending succession of precipices and torrents, as well as a zig- zag path as long in miles as the entire peninsula. Hannibal was obliged to essay the passage of the marsh. Through this A FEARFUL MARCH. 287 there was a road, fairly good during the dry weather, but at this time considered impassable. But the Carthaginian knew not the meaning of the word. There was no road he could not utilize. He set out confi- dently on his perilous march. In the van he sent the Spanish and African troops, with the most necessary and valuable of the baggage, so that these, his best troops, should not suffer, and that the treasure and essentials should be got across the marsh before the road was too much trodden down by the column. It is not probable that a large quantity of baggage was taken. Hannibal was well aware that if he lost the game, he would need none ; if he won, he would have food and treas- ure in superabundance. He probably kept his treasure in small bulk. Next came the Gallic allies — the least reliable of his army — followed by Mago with the horse, whose duty it was to persuade these troops to diligence, if possible ; but, if necessary, to push them on by the use of force. The van with the baggage got through without all too great loss. They were old and hardened troops, and found the road, such as it was, still unbroken by recent travel. But the Gallic column, unused to and impatient under such expos- ure, lost heavily from fatigue and deprivation. The whole army was four days and three nights marching through water, where only the dead horses, dead beasts of burden or aban- doned packs afforded any chance to rest. Many horses and mules cast their hoofs. Hannibal personally made the march on the last remaining elephant, — the rest having all perished at the Trebia or in the Apennines, — and during this season of exposure lost an eye from an inflammation which he was unable to attend to, and which was seriously aggravated by overwork. Cornelius Nepos states that he had to be carried in a litter from this time until after the battle of Trasimene. The army finally reached firm land and went into camp, on 288 ITS SUCCESS. the north bank of the Arnus, on the heights of Fsesulae (Fie- sole), overlooking the plains of modern Florence, where it found store of good provisions, the province being one of the most fertile in Italy. Unlike Alexander, Hannibal did not do brUliant things for their own sake ; but that he was always ready to face the most perilous and harassing undertakings in order to place himseK nearer the accomplishment of his object, this march proves almost as well as the passage of the Alps. He had completely turned his adversary's position and had again won his choice of a theatre of operations. Homan Corselet. XXI. A FLANKING- MANCEUVRE. SPRING, 217 B. C. Arrived in Etraria, Hannibal be^an manoeuvring to lure Flaminius out to battle. Tbia he did largely by devastating under liis very eyes the country the consul had come to protect. Finally, unable to draw Flaminius out of his camp at Arretium, Hannibal moved around his left flank and cut him off from Rome ; and this without losing his own line of operations. The ma- nceuvre was as neat as any of Napoleon's. Still Flaminius remained in camp, and Hannibal determined to move towards Apulia, where he could better negotiate with the confederates, and whither he felt sure the consuls would follow him ; which, if they did, would afford him a chance of draw- ing them into ii pitched battle. As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he came to a place very suitable for an ambuscade ; and hearing that Flaminius had broken camp and was following him up, he stopped and camped on the road to Perusia. Hannibal found that the Etrurians were well inclined to rise against Eome, and needed but the encouragement of suc- cess to determine them. He made careful study of the whole region, as well as the condition of the Roman army, which lay southeast of his at Arretium. " The plans and temper of the consul, the situation of the country, the roads, the sources from which provisions might be obtained, and whatever else it was useful to know ; all these things he ascertained by the most diligent inquiry," says Livy. This well illustrates Han- nibal's constant habit. Etruria was rich in victuals and could furnish the Cartha- ginians material assistance, and the Eoman general was, thought Hannibal, hot-headed enough to be betrayed into a battle on as disadvantageous terms as had been Sempronius. Having studied out his problem, — and particularly the methods of Flaminius, for " it is to be ignorant and blind in 290 FLAMINIUS SURPRISED. the science of commandiDg armies to think that a general has anything more important to do than to apply himseK to learn- ing the inclinations and character of his opponent," aptly says Polybius, — Hannibal crossed the Arnus to the south bank. Flaminius lay intrenched in a stationary camp at Arre- tium. His intention, very likely, was to move forward to Luca, when the conditions of the road should allow, in order to close up the passes debouching at that point, while his col- league should move from Ariminum to replace him where he now stood. The two consuls would thus close up the avenues of the Apennines. Padane Gaul was lost to them. Flaminius had a certain repute, acquired partly in the field, more largely in the forum, but he was in no sense fitted to cope witli Hannibal. So sure was he of victory that his camp is said to have been thronged with non-combatants who had assembled for spoil. But this has been the case in the camps of better soldiers, — Pompey's at Pharsalus, as an instance. Arretium lies at the northern outlet of a long and level valley, some ten miles wide, of which Lake Trasimene forms the southern boundary, and in a species of gap, which de- bouches into the valley of the Arnus. The entire surround- ing country is hilly, but fertile and accessible. Flaminius was as much astonished at Hannibal's sudden appearance on his left, as Scipio must have been to find that Hannibal had crossed the Alps. He at once sent word to Servilius of Han- nibal's near presence. Hannibal's march from the Arnus was deliberate, at every step seeking for indications of the consul's purpose. He was living on the coimtry, but in addition to what he took for victual, he thoroughly plundered the land, partly to gather booty, by the distribution of which he hoped to gain new ad- herents to his cause, but mainly to work Flaminius up to a proper pitch of fury. For seeing the land he had come to BRILLIANT MANCEUVRE. 291 protect reduced to a desert under his very eyes, the consid was the more apt to lose his head. But though the smoke of burning villages and the outcries of pillaged inhabitants rose Arretium to Trasimene. like a spectre to appaU the consul, he showed no sign of mov- ing from his stationary camp at Arretium. He was held there by the advice of his colleague and lieutenants. It was then that Hannibal conceived another of his brilliant manoeuvres. We are told nothing about it by the ancient authors, whose knowledge of war confined them solely to the description of battles. But it is apparent enough to us. He was still in the Aquileia region, north and west of Arretium. Marking his progress with fire and sword, he headed south- erly, and marching boldly around the consul's left flank, he 292 CUT, OFF FROM ROME. made for the Clavis above Clusium. By this handsome march Hannibal cut Flaminius off from Rome. It is proba^ ble that he sent his heavy train by way of Saena (modern Siena), and made his march in order of battle, as he was apt to move by the flank past the Roman camp, the more bitterly to taunt the Roman general. The operation did not, however, partake of the danger which would beset it to-day. Here again is shown — as by Alexander on two several oc- casions — the clear conception of the enemy's strategic flank, with all its advantages, having, of course, reference to the difference of arms and war-methods. Nor by his manoeuvre had Hannibal recklessly cut himself loose from his base, though he was living on the country and independent of it, as it were ; the fact is, that the complete integrity of his hne of communications with the Luca country, and beyond to Li- guria, was preserved by the valley of the modern Elsa, near whose sources lay the town of Sseua, which was a rotite much shorter than that of the consul from Arretium. WhUe this line of retreat was unquestionably difficult, it was far less so than Napoleon's, after he had entered Italy by the Great St. Bernard. Every week tended to reduce the overflow of the Arnus. A more perfect case of cutting the enemy from his communications can scarcely be conceived. It goes without saying, that the consequences of losing their line of communications was not fraught with the danger for the ancients which it is to-day. Flaminius had no long trains of food and ammunition to be cut off and captured. He did not depend for his daily bread, nor for his ability to fight a battle, on what could reach him from Rome. But he was none the less cut off from the capital. If he fought, it must be under morally and materially worse conditions than if his line was open ; and the effect on his men of having the enemy between them and Rome, as well as of their being held back FLAMINIUS DOES NOT MOVE. 5i93 from a battle, could not but be disastrous. WMle Hannibal's manoeuvre could not accomplish the result against Flaminius which Napoleon's did against Melas or Mack, it was none the less the work of a master-hand, and affords the intelligent soldier a lesson in strategy, if it cannot be used as an illustra- tion to the young student of the modern art of war. Hannibal continued to tempt Flaminius to battle by all the arts he knew how to practice. He relied upon the consul's well-known vehemence for this result, and doubted not that it yet would come. It was in fact only the joint entreaties of all Flaminius' lieutenants which had constrained him so Jong to hold the defensive role. It would seem as if Flaminius, when he found that Hanni- bal had got between him and Rome, would have sent for Ser- vilius to come immediately to his assistance. Nothing but concentration and action could overcome the Carthaginian general. Flaminius could well have prevented the success of Hannibal's mancBuvre by a timely occupation in force of Clusium, or some point near it. But to learn to play such a strategic game was no part of a Roman's military education. Up to this time, strategy had been a closed book to the Ro- mans. They understood how to fight. Manceuvring was an unknown art. Perhaps the two consuls could not act ami- cably together in one body ; and Servilius was deemed to be necessary in Ariminum to hold the Gauls in check. It is altogether likely that it never entered Flaminius' head that Hannibal could by any possibility reach his rear. Hannibal continued to waste the country after collecting what material he needed, and finally, when he saw that Fla- minius showed no inclination to accept his gage of battle, he moved down the Clavis to Clusium, devastating as he went, thence across the river due east to Lake Trasimene, and around its north side to the road leading by that bank to Perusia. 294 HANNIBAL LETS GO HIS BASE. Hannibal has been criticised for thus moving so that a force of thirty thousand men should be on his rear. But Hannibal at this moment may be said to have had no rear. He was living on the country in every sense, and all his actions were based on what he had ascertained about the character, position and force of his antagonist, and what h'e felt sure he would do ; and Hannibal was rarely deceived in such matters. No doubt the most essential factor in calcu- lating a campaign is the weight of the opposing commander. This Hannibal had surely gauged. He had moreover re- tained his line of operations until he saw that he must run a further risk, and under the circumstances he was wise to run it. He was seeking for the proper field of battle, and felt sure that Flaminius would by and by follow him to it. It must be remembered that Hannibal did not look upon these strategic manoeuvres of his in the same light that he would have done had he hved and fought to-day. Then, as now, battle was the purpose of all manoeuvres, but then more than, now. The consuls were safe in their camp. Rome was safe within its walls. The moral or political effect which Hanni- bal could produce by marching even up to the walls of Rome was not what to-day would be produced by such an act. Nothing would suit Hannibal's purpose or extend his influ- ence in Italy except to beat the Romans in battle ; and in his march around Flaminius' left, he was aiming first and fore- most at battle on a suitable battle-field, and in a secondary sense at a change of base. He had tried his best to bring 'Flaminius out to fight, and this was a new resort to accom- plish the same end. As Flaminius was not disastrously affected by Hannibal's cutting him off from Rome, so Han- nibal did nothing unwarranted in cutting himself loose from his own communications. The other and perhaps stronger consideration for Hanni- FLAM I NWS FINALLY MOVES. 295 bal's march was the fact that it had been from the inception a part of his programme at the proper time to throw up his base on the Padus, and make a new one for himself in central or southern Italy, where he could readily communicate with Carthage by sea, as well as be closer to his prospective allies, those cities of the Roman confederacy which he might succeed in detaching from their allegiance. It was doubtless at this moment that he determined to give up his old line of opera- tions, and acted accordingly. His march accomplished both his aims. Flaminius was wrought up to a high pitch of wrath by this march and devastation of Hannibal's. He again called a council of war, though he had determined in any event on his own responsibility to follow and chastise the insolent invader. The council advised caution, to wait for Servilius and merely to send out his horse to hamper Hannibal's move- ments and prevent his laying waste any more of the country. But vexed still more at being crossed, Flaminius at once ordered the troops under arms and moved on Cortona, a strongly situated town on a high hill jutting from the eastern range of the valley south of Arretium, and half-way on the road to Trasimenus. According to Livy there were many signs and portents of approaching disaster. The keener- witted officers shook their heads, but the army was of the mood of its commander. The march was made without any particular order or precaution, — a fact weU known to the Carthaginian general. Flaminius is taken to task by both Polybius and Livy, as well as by many modern writers, for thus moving on Han- nibal. They appear to judge him solely by the event, and by his naturally quarrelsome disposition. This criticism does not seem to be well earned. It would have been less than soldierly, with Hannibal moving around him with daily 296 HANNIBAL'S SKILL. taunts, ravaging with fire and sword the land of tie people he was supposed to defend, and having actually got between him and Rome, to do less than seek to attack him. Fla^ minius is blamable for not having forestalled Hannibal in reaching the road to Eome, and is blamable in the highest degree, in the presence of a captain who within a few months had in two encounters shown the Eomans the necessity of the greatest caution, for not moving with such precaution as to prevent his being surprised, even though such was not the habit of Eoman marches ; or, if you like, blamable for not waiting for the other consul, on the ground that you cannot do better than get together your very utmost force on the eve of battle ; but clearly he was not wrong in fol- lowing up, with a view to attack, or at least with a view to harass, the enemy which his chief duty as consul it was to destroy. He was not wrong in moving out to face Hannibal. He was blamable for his methods only. He might readily, while waiting for ServiUus, have taken up a position to ob- serve his enemy and seek to place him at a disadvantage before bringing him to battle. He could have seriously ham- pered the Carthaginians without risking his own safety. Ho was not bound to plunge into an open snare. It was in the manoeuvring that one general showed his skill, and the other his want of it. Flaminius could in no wise cope with Hannibal, who had from the instant he appeared in Italy shown the highest conceptions of the art of war. His operations had been bold as weU as wise. His battles had been skiHfidly conducted ; his march into Etruria had been stolen on Flaminius and made by a path the latter had never conceived that an army could tread, — like Alexander's march around Mt. Ossa in Thessaly, or his march by the Pamphylian Ladders, and with similar results. He had crossed, without a battle, the Apennines, the obstacle at HANNIBAL'S POLICY. 297 wMch the consuls had felt sure they could arrest his pro- gress. He had skillfully gauged the ability of each of his opponents, and had acted accordingly. He now stood ready for the final arbitrament of battle, so soon as it could be had on even terms, and was doing all that in him lay to force the consular army into it. And it must be added that Hanni- bal's political good sense was equal to his military skiU. No captain has ever succeeded whose policy did not march abreast with his manoeuvres. That Hannibal eventually failed was not from lack of intelligent policy, but because he had no aid from home, and because the Latin confederacy had been builded with a cement altogether too strong. Legionary with Scale Armor. xxn. THE BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE. APRIL, 217 B. C. On the east bank of the lake, Hannihal pnt his whole army in ambush to trap the Roman consul. The locality is south of modern Passignano, where the mountains come down to the lake and make a narrow plain, closed in at both ends by a defile. Through this plain and defile ran the road. On the heights bordering the plain, Hannibal placed his light troops; at the end of the plain, near the entrance defile, the Gauls and Numidiana ; at the south end his heavy troops. Flaminius was intent on following np and chastising the invader. He left Cortona, marched to the lake and camped. Next morning, at daylight, he entered the defile, at the end of which he could see Hannibal's camp on the hill over which ran the road to Perusia. A morning mist aided to conceal the ambushed Carthaginians. So soon as the entire Roman army had entered the plain, the defile was closed by the Numidians. Flaminius was advancing with- out order or care, when suddenly his van was attacked by Hannibal's heavy troops, and the signal was given for a general attack. The entire Carthaginian force fell on one flank of the Romans, who were in order of march, and had the lake on the other flank. There arose at once a sauve qui pent, and in a brief space the whole army, except six thousand men, who cut their way through to Perusia, were killed or captured. The six thousand were taken next day. Flaminius did not outlive his shame. Within a day or two, Maharbal defeated a reinforcement of four thousand Roman horse, killing half and capturing the rest. This was the worst of Roman defeats. After the battle, though the road to Rome was open, Hannibal was wise enough not to try to march on the capital. He saw the impossibility of the undertaking, and moved down to Apulia instead, from whence he could communicate with Carthage. Rome showed her wonderful capacity for resisting disaster as never before. Fabius Maximus was chosen dictator, and he made Minucius his master of the horse. Just how far away from the consuls Hannibal might have marched, or what was his original motive in moving towards Perusia, can only be guessed, though it is evident he first of all desired battle. But wliile on the march he took notice of the topography of Lake Trasimene, and its singular fitness THE LOCALITY. 299 for an ambuscade. If Us plans were at once to move farther south, he altered them at this place. He no doubt studied bis scheme with care. He may have remembered his father's able trapping of the Libyan rebels in the Tunisian defile. He learned at the moment that Flaminius had left Cortona to follow him up. Diviuing from the impetuosity of his character that his pursuit would be conducted in a headlong manner, Hannibal, instead of keeping on towards Perusia, bethought him again to attempt an ambuscade, not with a small force, but with his entire army, in these same defiles of the Lake of Trasimene. The idea was no sooner conceived than acted on. It is the only instance in history of lying in ambush with the whole of a large army. The exact location of the battle is not stated by Polybius or Livy, but on carefully comparing these authors with the locality itself, it appears altogether probable that it took place between the defile at modern Passignano and the hill over which the road ascends on the way to modern Perugia. The topography here not only admirably fits the statements of these authors, but is exactly the place Hannibal would have chosen for the work in hand. This is not the spot selected by all modern critics, many of whom make the local- ity of the battle between Borghetto and Passignano. The plain at whose apex lay Arretium (Arezzo), and on the eastern flank of which Cortona juts boldly out on a mighty hillside commanding the valley, ends at Lake Trasi- mene, the ranges on either hand spreading out and continu- ing on around the lake. On the northeast shore, at modern Borghetto, the range descends to the water side in a gently sloping hill ; then recedes so as to form a wide plain between hills and lake ; and again, at modern Passignano, it impinges on the lake in a huge, bold headland, terminating in a preci- pice of sheer rock, which overhangs the water. From the 300 THE DEFILE. hills across the plain, which is entirely a flat, alluvial deposit, run a number of small brooks of no size or volume, except in spring. The lake has a depth of thirty or forty feet ; the mountains to the east rise gradually to an average height of fifteen hundred feet above its surface ; the plain is about five miles long, and at its ,widest some mile and a half. Southeast of the exit of this first plain, at modern Pas- signano, is another and less wide plain, some four miles long, which is terminated at Torricella by the hills again impinging on the lake, and over these hills the road now runs, some three hundred feet up and down, by way of Maggione to Perugia. It appears probable that this is the scene of the battle. In Livy's day, tradition would have still been reliable. Poly- bius could certainly identify the spot. From both of their de- scriptions of ground and ambush, the author inclines to the belief that the battle was not fought on the first plain reached by Flaminius, though this is the one now pointed out to tour- ists as the battle-field. There is no difficulty in understand- ing the battle, after visiting the locality itself. The changes in the lake during the last two thousand years have not altered the features named by both Polybius and Livy, namely, a narrow entrance-defile, a narrow plain, which, indeed, Livy also calls a defile, and a hill closing the farther exit. And the second plain was much better fitted for am- buscade, as the mountains at places came down close to the shore, and at no place is the plain, even to-day, more than half a mile in width. In Hannibal's day it was probably narrower yet. Small brooks also cross this plain. On the hill at the southern exit of the plain he had chosen, Hannibal camped where he was in full view of any one enter- ing at the northern defile, and spent the night in placing his troops. Below the camp, he posted his heavy infantry — Spanish and African — upon a slight elevation, from which DISPOSITION OF TROOPS. 301 they could rush down with effect upon the Roman head of cohimn when it should reach the position. His heavy cavalry was on the right of this infantry force, where it had ample charging ground, prepared to take the Eoman head of column I 5 C "? >^B^-J Battle of Lake Trasimene. on the left flank. For an army passing this way had but a narrow path to follow. His light troops, bowmen and sling- ers, were posted at intervals aU along the heights overlooking the plain, with orders to keep well hidden in the woods, and to debouch sharply when the order for attack should be given ; his Numidian and Gallic cavalry and the Gallic infantry was hidden in the hiUs well back in the depths of a wooded valley at that end of the defile which the Romans would first enter. 302 FLAMINIUS MARCHES BLINDLY. but so placed that the cavalry could quickly sally out and close the entrance when the game was trapped. It was April. Flaminius, marching from Cortona, camped at sunset at a place conveniently situated on the road before it reaches the ominous defile, not unlikely on the hillside of modern Borghetto. He was so overcome with indignation at his predecessors, and at the circumstances which had enabled Hannibal to ravage one of the most fruitful regions of Italy, that he was incapable of harboring any idea except determi- nation summarily and severely to chastise the barbarian. For, much as Hannibal exceeded, in all that was intellectual and cultured, any Koman general .of the day, he still re- mained, as we to the followers of Confucius, an outer bar- barian. Flaminius easily ascribed the defeat on the Ticinus and at the Trebia to causes other than lack of caution. The invariable victories of the past had made every Koman feel himself invincible. With his enthusiastic and angry legions the consul might well feel able to overthrow any foe. Little he thought that he was to be one of those who, for Rome's eventual good, was by succumbing to Hannibal's abler method to teach a lesson in the art of war. For Rome, in order to make complete her splendid equipment, system and discipline, needed to learn that war is an intellectual game and not merely a contest of giants. In the usual Roman fashion, Flaminius made no attempt to reconnoitre the ground in his advance, or to send out par- ties who should ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Hannibal, we must believe, took every precaution against his ambuscades being made known to Flaminius. The best dis- posed of the inhabitants of this section were but half-inclined to favor Hannibal's presence, and there must have been many arch-Eomans among them, who, unless such precautions had been taken with exceptional skiU, would be apt voluntarily THE ROMANS TRAPPED. 303 to report to the Roman general the situation of the Cartha- ginian army. It is surprising indeed that Hannibal's plan succeeded. Flaminius was eager to come up with Hannibal. He broke camp very early the next morning, — considerably be- fore daylight, — and began his march in the midst of a morning fog, common in the vicinity of any large sheet of water, and which on this day lasted well into the forenoon. He hoped soon to reach the rear of his enemy, whom he no doubt imagined to be evading him for the purpose of contin- uing his ravages unmolested. To these the consul determined to put a stop. One must call his imagination into play for the horrors of this memorable battle. A general description and the result alone are given in history. The Roman army, in slender column, skirted the precipice which formed the entrance to the fatal plain. As the head of column reached the open ground, the army spread itself out for convenience of march- ing. From the entrance, and above the fog which covered the surface to no great height, Flaminius had seen, on the hills at the southern end of the plain, the tents of Hannibal's camp, some four miles off. He imagined the Carthaginian army to be collected at that spot. Eager to come to blows with his enemy, he pushed rapidly on, and hurried up the column in the rear. The entire Roman army passed into the open space without discovering any sign of an ambush. The morning fog was all in Hannibal's favor. As the head of column reached the vicinity of the south- erly exit, and began to halt to close up ranks, for they were now near where Flaminius had seen the Carthaginian camp, the Roman right was suddenly saluted with a loud blare of trumpets, — the signal for a general attack by aU parts of the ambushed Carthaginian line, — which signal 304 AN UTTER SURPRISE. they again heard repeated and repeated along the hillside on their front and towards their left as far as the gap they had just filed through ; and immediately thereupon they saw, ad- vancing upon them through the rolling clouds of mist, the ser- ried ranks of the Carthaginian phalanx. To add to the con- sternation of the moment, the thundering tread of charging horse, and the terrible shout of horsemen galloping to certain victory, came rushing down upon the head of column from the left. The first idea of the Roman officers was that they had merely thrust their van into an ambuscade, and must at once withdraw it. The head of column was compromised. But they were soon undeceived. As far down the marching line as they could hear, for see they could not, the enemy's light troops on the heights, with exulting shouts, debouched from hiding, and rushing down the hiUs to wards the care lessly spread -out Roman column, discharged their hail of leaden bullets and fired their darts and arrows upon the Romans, who were utterly unprepared for resistance and in nothing resembling order of battle ; while from several of the heights, which in this plain came down close to the water, fell a con- stant rain of arrows and sling stones. Nor could the sur- prise and terror of the head of column exceed that of the rear, when, rushing from their wooded screen in the upper valley, the Numidians and Gallic horse and foot fell furiously upon the disordered troops. It must be remembered that there was at that day no reg- ular order of march in a Roman army, and Flaminius' eager- ness to get up with Hannibal had probably made speed rather than care the order of the day. There was no front, no flank, no rear. There was no way of retreat. On one side was the lake ; on the other the hills from which de- bouched bodies of unseen but active foes ; on right and left AWFUL BUTCHERY. 305 tlie attack of well-prepared and carefully arrayed battalions, instinct with the ardor of victory already won. Never was army worse compromised, never was army more certain of destruction. The Gauls had as yet had no chance to wreak their ill-will for many acts of cruelty done upon them by their Roman conquerors, and they now glutted their ven- geance to the full. The Carthaginians saw that to-day they might wipe out the defeat and shame of the war in which their fathers had been so terribly punished, so deeply humil- iated. The butchery was savage. The Roman soldier, unconquerable when fighting within the lines of disciplined combat, appeared here to be no better than a brute beast led to the shambles. In the brief space of three hours, before the morning mists had lifted, there was no semblance of an army left, and still the butchery went on. Legions, cohorts, velites, triarii, all were mixed in one confused mass. Even the small bodies which hung to- gether to defend themselves seemed incapable of wielding their arms ; thousands threw themselves into the lake to seek a fate to them less cruel ; other thousands put an end to their own existence. Livy states that so horrible was the tumult that neither party was aware of the occurrence of an earth- quake, which at the very moment of the battle " overthrew large portions of many of the cities of Italy, turned rivers from their rapid course, carried the tides up into the rivers, and leveled mountains with an awful crash." A body of six thousand men cut its way through towards Perusia, no doubt under cover of the fog. Not exceeding ten thousand men all told escaped this fatal day. Of the remaining thirty thou- sand, half were killed in their tracks, half captured. Han- nibal's loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men, mostly Gauls. Hannibal at once sent Maharbal with the Spanish foot, 306 THE ROMAN SOLDIER. some archers and the heavy cavalry in pursuit of the body which had escaped through the lines to Perusia. They were surrounded next day on a hiU they had occupied, and obliged to surrender to save their bare lives. On their surrendering, the Romans were made prisoners of war, the allied soldiers were all sent home without ransom. " I come not," said Han- nibal, " to place a yoke on Italy, but to free her from the yoke of Eome." Some authorities have stated that of the whole force but six hundred cut their way through ; that but nine hundred were captured ; and that the rest, including Ma- minius, were cut to pieces. Flaminius indeed fell with the rest. Well for him that he did ! The first quoted figures are probably more nearly correct than the latter, which seem to go beyond probability. Certainly, however, Eome had never as yet seen so sad a day. Plutarch relates that Hannibal sought long for the body of Flaminius, to give it burial, but was unable to find it. The Roman soldier must not be underrated. The ten thousand legionaries of the centre at the Trebia cut their way through the Carthaginian army in good order, despite the utter demoralization of the rest of the army. The six thou- sand leading troops at Trasimene did the like. The Cartha- ginian was an older, not a better soldier. In material and basis of organization, and in the natural discipline and charac- ter of the race, the Romans were by far the stronger. The advantage of the Carthaginian soldier was the training which comes of long service and a strong leader ; and the whole body profited by the expertness of its cavalry ; but any superiority of the Carthaginians as an army lay solely in Hannibal's genius. The Roman army here showed a decided capacity for panic. No wonder, perhaps, for the column was not in hand. But the instinct for panic has always existed among troops in CAPACITY FOR PANIC. 307 greater or less degree. No soldier has ever, on the whole, been so free from it as the American volunteer, — or, rather, no soldier has ever so quickly recovered from the effect of panic and returned to duty. Lines were driven back during our civil war in apparent great confusion ; but a few hundred yards to the rear these same lines would of their own motion rally, apparently ashamed of having broken, and advance to renew the fight with no semblance of panic left. Tacitus tells us that the Romans were accustomed to demand their rights of their enemies with weapons in hand, and not dumbly and by stratagem, and ^lian says that it was a virtue peculiar to the Romans to employ neither ruse nor artifice to overcome their enemies. Livy and Valerius Max- imus cry out against Hannibal's ruses as instances of deceit. But the Romans were not so free from stratagems as they pretend ; the difference between theirs and Hannibal's was but in the degree of ability displayed. And war cannot be conducted on a basis of frankness. It is strictly a game of wits, of deceit. Rob the able general of all which comes within the ken of stratagem and you paralyze his right arm. After the battle Hannibal went into camp to give his men their well-earned rest. But hearing that a force of four thousand horse had been sent, under the pro-prsetor Cnaeus Centenius, from the consular army of Sempronius at Arimi- num, to reinforce Flaminius, and to give the latter a some- what nearer mounted equality to the Carthaginians, Hannibal sent Maharbal out to meet it with a part of his own cavalry and some light troops. In a battle shortly fought, Maharbal defeated Centenius with a loss of half his number. The rest took refuge on an adjoining hiU, where, next day, Maharbal made the balance prisoners. Again humiliation to the proud Roman name. The road to Rome was open to Hannibal, and he has been 308 ROME UNASSAILABLE. often criticised, as after Cannae, for not at once marcning upon it. But Hannibal was more far-sighted than Pyrrhus. He knew it would be impossible to take the city by a coup de main. It was over a hundred miles distant. It was always well garrisoned and in two days could raise a large force. He knew the Koman character for stanchness all too well. So long as the Latin confederacy remained without a breach, there were still many times as many men to defend Eome as he himself could put in front of the capital ; and to attack the capital might, until some of the allies were clearly weaned from their allegiance, be but the cause of a new birth of good- will towards Kome. The allies as yet knew Hannibal and his intentions little. He was still to them a barbarian invader, and despite his victories an unknown quantity, and Hannibal recognized the fact that these allies could only be detached from the Eoman alliance by a continued series of victories, added to a much longer diplomatic suasion than he had yet found time to use. It was evident to Hannibal that he could make no progress without appealing to the interest of the allies. This indeed was his universal rule. He had thus won the Gauls to his side, and he must thus influence the Italians. By a system of generosity backed by victories on the one hand, and by liv- ing on their land and occasional devastation on the other, he thought he might eventually rely on self-interest to bring about their defection from Rome. Success alone would not do. His three victories had, while strictly due to his own able generalship, been won under circumstances which might not again occur. And he would have shown a weakness which was no part of his character had he failed to appre- ciate the fact that Rome had within its walls many men abler than those he had yet encountered. He was strong in the field, owing largely to his cavalry ; but of what use was his ALEXANDER. HANNIBAL. CjESAR. 309 cavalry when coping witli walled cities ? He had no siege- machinery ; he knew that Rome was heavily fortified, and he was not insane enough to expect the senate to open her gates to him as the servile satraps of Babylon and Susa had done to Alexander. Perhaps as good a proof of Hannibal's remark- able generalship as any during his whole life is his refraining from marching on Kome at this moment and after Cannae. No one has ever doubted this man's remarkable courage or exceptional spirit of enterprise, — has he not abundantly proved them ? But greater than these was that wonderful balance of judgment which always overrode every other quality, and was perhaps never wrong. It has been sometimes said that Alexander captured cities in his campaigns as well as won battles ; that Caesar did the like ; why, then, if he was an equal soldier, should not Han- nibal have marched on and captured Eome ? But it must be remembered that Alexander and Caesar commanded each the very best army of his day, an army drilled, disciplined, armed and equipped in a manner so far beyond that of any he encountered, that the odds were entirely on his side so far as actual fighting or any feat of engineering was con- cerned. Alexander and Caesar had siege - material which was the best of its day, and, with few exceptions, the cities they captured had much cruder means of defense, excepting walls. And each had under his command a trained corps of engineer o£B.cers, the most expert of their day. Despite which, we have seen how Alexander, when he matched him- self against the science and strength of Tyre, came as near faUure as he ever did ; and we shall see Caesar recoil from the walls of Gergovia. In Hannibal's case the circumstances were exactly re- versed. He had no siege-enginery in Italy, or at least the authorities so lead us to infer from their silence on the sub- 310 NOT EQUIPPED FOR SIEGES. jeot, and, if any, but a small equipment of missile-throwers. The art of using engines had perhaps degenerated since the days of Alexander. Those famous field and mountain bat- teries of his had been forgotten. Nor, indeed, had Hannibal anticipated their use. He had expected to win pitched bat- tles to weaken Eome, and use diplomacy to detach her allies. A plan which contemplated long sieges of the numberless strong places of Italy would have been from its inception doomed. We shall see what a mistake of this kind Hasdru- bal made when later he followed his brother to Italy. Siege- material was not an essential in a campaign in Italy. Cities could be won by bargaining better than by force. Cavalry was the arm of most importance. And while Hannibal's army was veteran, so far as work and the hardiness of the field was concerned, it never had come near the wonderful nat- ural subordination inherent in the Eoman and allied legions. His recent allies, the Gauls, furnished him only a wUd and unreliable contingent ; and the numerical strength of his stanch troops was pitifvdly small compared to the enormous forces of men, trained to arms from their youth up, which Eome could within a few days — almost hours — oppose to him at the gates of her capital. And to the Eoman soldier " actual war was but a bloody repetition of his daily drUl, as his daily drill was but a bloodless campaign." The balance in the matter of army ran decidedly against Hannibal instead of in his favor. Nothing, perhaps, shows how well Hannibal recognized the better arms and equipment of the Eoman le- gion than the fact that he shortly reorganized his Libyan foot on a Eoman basis. Just what the details of the changes may have been we are not informed, but he armed them with the Eoman weapons taken at Trasimene, and Livy ob- serves that one could at a distance scarcely tell the differ- ence between Carthaginians and Eomans. MARCH AFTER TRASIMENE. 311 Again, tlie walls of Kome were strong and defended by skillful officers and large bodies of good, if new, troops, who would be fighting for their homes and precious Rome, their gods and household fires. And in a few days after Hannibal had sat down before Rome, an army of relief vastly larger than his own would have come to besiege himself. Imagine Alexander before Tyre, with an enormous Persian army in his rear to shut him in, and without a fleet ; what would have been his chances ? Imagine Csesar opposed at Alesia with an army of relief of disciplined legions. Hannibal would have been in still worse case. With yet only a few of the confed- erates wavering in their allegiance to Rome, and barely look- ing upon Hannibal as a possible recourse in case of future unquestioned success, he would have been wanting indeed in good judgment had he undertaken such an operation. And as to marching on Rome for the mere sake of so doing, and without a definite object, this was not Hannibal's understand- ing of the art of war. We shall recur to this subject after the battle of Cannse. Turning, then, from a "prize he saw he could not yet win, he ravaged the fertile plains of Umbria, attacked the fortress Spoletum, but was repulsed from before its walls, — clearly from lack of siege -material, — marched eastward across the range to Ancona, thence south along the Adriatic, and, spreading devastation right and left upon his road, levied contributions all over Picenum, which was covered with Ro- man farms. His men could not be kept from retaliating even upon innocent yeomen the horrors suffered by their fathers in the First Punic War. In the southern part of this province he gave his troops a few days' rest among its plethoric gran- aries, weU earned by a year's hard campaigning, and sadly needed. Por the men were in bad condition, suffering from scurvy and other camp diseases caused by deprivations, and 312 COMMUNICATION WITH CARTHAGE. the horses were much reduced. The men are said to have bathed the horses in old wine to cure them of an irruptive disease. Hannibal then proceeded towards the south, appar- ently marching along the eastern foothills of the Apennines, 50 rtiKS Prom Trasimene to Luceria. so as to cross the streams at their narrowest, through the land of the Pretutii, Hadria, the Marsi, the Marucini and Peligni, and stopped in Apulia, in the neighborhood of Arpi and Lu- ceria. He hoped to open communication by sea with Car- thage, and thus make for himself a new base of operations in this province. From here he sent dispatches home by sea to announce his successes to the Carthaginian senate, and we may readily imagine the rejoicing caused by the welcome news. Luceria was one of those locations which have always been selected by able generals to command the adjoining country. THE ROMANS STANCH. 313 The place has long been known as the key of Apulia. The town lies on lofty but level ground, sloping easily to south and east, but sharply to north and west. On the west the plateau projeets into a site now crowned by the ruins of a medisBval castle. Here stood the arx of the Romans, who had held it from 314 b. c. Hannibal made this place a coign of vantage from which to dominate Apulia. The stanchness of the Roman character, that supreme virtue which deserved to conquer the world, as it did, was never more fully shown than now. The gathering rumors of disaster, so new to Roman ears, and which grew the more the news came in, the cumulative effect of a third and infinitely worse defeat — slaughter — than those of the Ticinus and Trebia, were all but paralyzing. The common people were instinct with terror ; even the senate was dismayed beyond immediate power to act. But what made Rome great was the presence of men — of a class, indeed — which was always able to rise superior to disaster. And it was so now. This class took the matter into its own hand, and the plebs fol- 314 FABIUS ELECTED DICTATOR. lowed its lead. No word of peace was heard; no idea of aught but stubborn defense of the Eoman soil. There was but one thing to do. A dictator must be appointed. Under the law of the land the dictator must be nominated by the consuls, — and one was dead, the other distant. The neces- sity was pressing, but the love of law reigned supreme. The senate allowed the people to elect, not a dictator but a pro- dictator. The choice fell upon Q. Fabius Maximus, and he, as was the rule, chose as master of the horse — his mjst im- portant lieutenant — M. Miuucius Euf us. Carthaginian Coin. XXIII. FABIUS CUNCTATOR. SUMMER, 217 B. C. Rome was put in a state of defense, and Fabius Mazimus, who had been made dictator, at once went to work to repair the disaster. Servilius had transferred his army to Rome, and Fabius, after raising- some fresh troops, marched out to meet Hannibal, who, when he reached Luceria, found the dicta- tor's array at JS>cie. The Romans were well supplied ; Hannibal had to forage. Fabius was cautious in all his moTements ; kept in the hills where the enemy's cavalry could not attack him, and harassed the Carthaginians with small-war. This was just what gave Hannibal the greatest trouble. It deprived him of the possibility of winning victories. There was a great deal of opposition to Fa- bius' policy, but he in no wise altered it. Finally, Hannibal was driven from Apulia by sheer lack of an enemy to fight, and made his way to Campania, one of the richest parts of Italy, hoping that dread lest he should devastate the province would bring Fabius to battle. The dictator slowly followed, still keep- ing on the defensive. Minucius and the army were anxious for battle; but despite Hannibal's devastation Fabius refused to undertake the offensive. FABnJS was a scion of one of the old aristocratic families. He himself was of a moderate, wise and reasonahle charac- ter, and had already rendered excellent service in Roman wars. His intelligence was broad. He is said to have con- formed to all the religious and formal rites of the state, less because he believed in the Roman gods than because he deemed religiotis faith a necessary anchor of good govern- ment. And knowing how powerfully superstition rules the masses, he did not leave Rome until the Sibylline Books had been consulted. He was then ready to set out to face the great Carthaginian. Rome was quickly put in a state of defense, and sundry weak places in the walls were repaired. Minucius, master of 316 PREPARATIONS- OF FABIUS. the horse, was instructed to raise two additional legions, which was speedily done. Orders had already been given to forestall the expected march of Hannibal on Eome (so soon as it should be known that he was advancing) by devastating the country, burning the crops and houses, removing the breadstuffs, destroying the bridges and retiring the popula- tion into the towns and strong places, so that nothing should be left for Hannibal to subsist upon. If he marched on Home, it should be through a howling waste. As matters turned, these orders were not carried out. Meanwhile, Fabius took command of the army of Ser- vilius, which this general, after a few slight exchanges with the Gauls, had promptly and sensibly transferred from the valley of the Po to Ocriculum, near Rome, so soon as news had reached him of the defeat at Lake Trasimene, and which, increased by the two supplemental legions, amounted to an Via Appia. effective of fifty thousand men. To Servilius was given the duty of raising a fleet to protect the coast of Italy from prob- able Carthaginian invasions, for the Carthaginians had just intercepted a Roman fleet sailing from Ostia for Spain with provisions. Though the allies showed no sign of defection, but each FORAGING FOR THE ARMY. 317 city in turn closed its gates on Hannibal, Rome did not deem it wise to allow Hannibal in their midst without the presence of a Eoman army as counterweight. Fabius took this matter in hand, and, advancing along the Via Appia, which led him towards and through Campania and thence through the mountains of Samnium, via Beneventum, into northern Apulia, he advanced to ^cse, within half a dozen miles of his adversary, intending to prevent his ravages, but not pro- posing to accept battle on disadvantageous terms. When Hannibal passed Luceria toward Arpi, he found the dictator on his flank at JEca&. The Eomans exceeded the Carthaginians in number, but were weaker in cavalry. They were well provisioned, and so placed that they could constantly receive supplies by way of the Beneventum country, and needed to forage but little for their rations. This was a manifest advantage, as the cam- paigns of all ages have shown ; for to supply an army in an enemy's country, and sometimes in a friendly one, always means large detachments of troops and a great tax on the in- telligence and time of the commander. Napoleon has said that the general who cannot provide for his troops is ignorant of his business. This is doubtless true, but it does not make the difficulties any the less. And in that age, half or two thirds of an army was habitually obliged to be absent on foraging duty, — a vast danger. Fabius, who had no doubt been selected in a spirit of re- vulsion at the military demagoguism of Flaminius, acted on this knowledge. He moved with the utmost caution, and with his troops well in hand. He kept at a safe distance and in the hilly country bordering the vast Apulian plain, where cavalry could not so easily operate. He harassed Hannibal by picking up his foraging parties, which had grown overbold and reckless, and making a small-war wherever he could. He 318 CARE OF FABIVS. never lost Hannibal from sight. He never got so near him as to give him an advantage. He insisted on the strictest performance of all their duties by the soldiers, protected his few foragers by proper detachments of cavalry, kept the men Luceria and Vicinity. close in camp, permitted no straggling, and when he marched, it was in so cautious a manner and with such van- and rear- guards and flankers, that none of Hannibal's manoeuvres, marches or countermarches, none of his offers of battle, none of his wiles, were of any avail. Hannibal tried every strata- gem, every taunt, to impress Fabius with a willingness to HANNIBAL'S SPIES. 319 fight. He sHfted camp constantly, moving round the Romans from place to place and ravaging under their very eyes. He disappeared for a day or two, and again came back to the vicinity of Fabius. He marched away, and laid ambushes, into which he hoped Fabius, by following, might fall. But aU proved useless. Fabius was of a different mould from his predecessors in command. He kept either close to camp, or moved with a caution proof to all that Hannibal could do. There was little in Rome or in the Roman camp which was concealed to the Carthaginian. His activity in procuring in- formation was abnormal. Even the secrets of the capital or of the headquarters of the consular armies were delivered to him. And though he was in the enemy's country, the Romans knew nothing of his. To organize and use such a service well is a wonderful proof of ability, and throughout his entire career, Hannibal showed that he was equal master of the grand oper- ations, and of the minutiae of war. This singular change of policy from the universal rule of the Romans — which was summary, unquestioning attack under all circumstances, relying solely on the fighting quality of the legions — has excited the admiration of all historians and soldiers. Fabius' troops were excellent, but new ; Han- nibal's less good in material, but old and experienced. The Romans could reinforce their army ; Hannibal could look for little help. Fabius had not much cavalry ; in this Hannibal was rich. Every motive pointed to just this policy ; and yet it was, as it were, an absolutely new invention of this level- headed soldier, a positive departure from Roman precedent. He was teaching himself and the Romans a new system of war. And it was exactly what Hannibal the least desired, — the one thing he saw that he could not long stand up against. Still, wise as this policy was, — it was in fact the only one which was not under the circumstances fatally weak, — Minucius 320 HANNIBAL LEAVES APULIA. was much dissatisfied with it, and, like Sempronius and Fla^ minius, he also desired a battle. But the proof of Fabius' wisdom lay in the fact that Hannibal was of like mind with Minucius. Eventually this clever manoeuvring worried the Cartha^ ginian into leaving Apulia, where he had not met with the hoped-for support of the population, and into marching through the land of the Hirpini across the Apennines and into Samnium, which he did by moving around Fabius' flank and through the same vaUeys by which the latter had ad- vanced. This must have been an operation of great delicacy and beautifully conducted. We have no details of it. Hannibars Koute to Campania. At this point the Apennines are not high. A few of the peaks rise to an altitude of from three thousand to four thou- sand five hundred feet ; but between the ranges, which branch out in every direction, are valleys and plains of more or less extent, and much beautiful rolling upland, susceptible of ex- cellent cultivation. The streams are not large in summer; CAMPANIA FELIX. 321 in spring they are torrents. Some of tlie hillsides are of naked limestone, and at the highest part of the range the sur- face is stony and sterile, and there are now few trees. The country was presumably well wooded in those days. At Beneventum, which lay strongly fortified on the Via Appia, on an eminence high on north and east, but sloping down on south and west, in the midst of a pleasant, rolling, fertile country, whose hills vary from one hundred to five hundred feet above the valleys, he found the gates closed and the town unassailable. He ravaged the vicinity, and proceed- ing down the Calor, captured Telesia, where a vast store of booty rewarded his efforts. It had been made a depot for the grain raised in the fertile valleys near at hand. Hannibal now heard from spies in Capua that he might expect to capture that wealthy city. It was the most im- portant of the cities dependent on Rome, and felt itself grievously oppressed by the arrogant capital. Hannibal had formed connections there and hoped for its alliance ; and turning from Telesia, he kept on through the mountains between Samnium and Campania, crossed the Vulturnus, near Allifae, headed through the passes in Mons Eribanus, and, descending by way of Cales into the Falernian plain, selected a camp on the north of the river, near Casilinum, and strongly fortified it. He then sent out Maharbal to ravage the vicinity, which was done with his accustomed thoroughness as far as Sinuessa. This plain, Campania Felix (even to-day called Campania Felice), consisting of the Falernian to the north of the Vul- turnus, and the Campanian to the south of it, was perhaps the most beautiful and fruitful part of Italy, fed by nature, as well as by the commerce of the adjoining sea^towns. Its fertility was wonderful. Then as now the land was capable of raising two crops of grain and one of hay each year, not 322 FABIUS STILL CAREFUL. to speak of vines and olive-orchards and abundant cattle. No land except tlie Nile-washed fields of Egypt rivaled its productiveness. In no place could Hannibal have more seri- ously attacked the dignity or the sentiment or the welfare of Eome. Livy states that Hannibal blundered into it by an error of his guide, who mistook Casinum, whither Hannibal desired to go, for Casilinum. But this scarcely seems probar ble. We know too much of Hannibal's careful topographical studies to believe that he had any other plan than to move into Campania Felix. Hannibal had hoped that fear lest he should ravage this most fruitful region of Italy, where im- mense booty could be gathered, would compel Fabius to come to battle ; or, in the event he did not do so, that some of the towns of Campania — particularly Capua — would join the Carthaginian standard in order to save their property, in case the Romans should be unable to protect them from the invader. For to allow Hannibal to destroy the crops of these lovely plains would be to acknowledge that they dared not dispute with him the posses.sion of the open country. Fabius followed at an interval of one or two days, won- dering greatly at the daring of Hannibal, but content to observe him from a safe distance by marching along the foot- hills, and never descending to the plain where he might be forced to accept a battle. The Numidian cavalry continued to scout the country, leaving the mark of the torch on every acre, while the Roman legionaries gazed on this destruction with gnashing of teeth from helpless wrath, and a growing desire to finish the campaign by one desperate and instant blow. From this, however, Fabius resolutely refrained. Of the soldiers' opinion Minucius warmly partook ; he could not understand Fabius' policy, and it was not long before a considerable faction arose in the camp against the dilatory management — the sloth and cowardice, as they called it — CABAL AGAINST FABIUS. 323 of the dictator in command. Nor were the Roman people and senate far from joining the cabal. But all this had no manner of effect on the constant mind of Fabius, who, while listening to his colleague, pursued his own plans, un- ruffled by opposition nor disheartened by the present humilia^ tion. He now camped athwart the roads to Kome on the The Falernian Plain. foothills of Mt. Massicus, at a place near Falernus Ager, where he could not be successfully assaulted, and from where he could extend his lines to hold the pass by which Hannibal had entered Campania. We cannot but wonder why Hannibal, who was so anxious to gain over the allies, and whose policy had been one of generosity towards them, should have resorted to devastating their lands, thereby not only irritating them, but destroying his own means of foraging. Upon many of these questions 324 GENEROSITY AND CRUELTY. we have barely the stated fact, with no explanation given by the contemporary historian, and are left to draw our own con- clusions. We must not lose sight of the fact that the histo- rians of Hannibal were for the most part his bitter enemies ; and that even their facts must sometimes be taken with a grain of allowance. Hannibal accumulated an immense quantity of victuals and booty, which he destined for the approaching winter, — but this was only one motive. Perhaps he despaired of attaining any success with the Roman allies in Campania, and concluded that he might as well make them an example for the purpose of being able to approach the others with both a record for abundant generosity and relentless cruelty. With regard to the latter quality, we can say nothing except that war has always been cruel ; that two thousand years ago it was worse than cruel ; and reflect that, until within a few generations, civilization has been unable to rob war of its ele- ment of utter savagery. Nor was Hannibal in any respect worse than the Romans. Be it as it may, Fabius certainly understood that his enemy was in his every act sapping the possibility of success for his cause, and all the more clung to his cunotatory policy. The pertinacity with which Fabius stuck to this manifestly proper line of conduct, against the most grievous opposition, redounds vastly to his reputation for strength of character, despite the fact that one of his cog- nomens was Ovicula, or the Lamb. The comparison between Fabius and Washington, however old, clings constantly to one's mind. XXIV. A CURIOUS STRATAGEM. FALL, 217 B. C. Though Fabius would not fight, he made an excellent plan for trapping Han- nibal in the Falernian plain. He closed the southern exit at Casilinum on the Vulturnus, held the Via Appia and Via Latina in force, and put a corps in the defile by which Hannibal had entered. The Romans were abundantly sup- plied ; the Carthaginians had only the small valley to depend on. Fabius' plan was to wait until Hannibal sought to escape, and then to attack him in flank or rear. Hannibal was really in bad case. But he hit on a happy stratagem. Having fruitlessly offered battle to Fabius, he took two thousand beeves, and tying torches to their horns, drove them at night up the slopes of the moun- tains inclosing the defile he had come in and proposed to leave by. The Ro- man force holding the defile, imagining the Carthaginians to be escaping through the woods, left the defile to attack them ; Hannibal promptly occupied it, and his column and trains speedily made their way through. After this stratagem he made a raid towards Rome, and finally went to Geronium to winter. Fabius merely followed him up, with his old caution. All parties now began to lose faith in Fabius and his policy. Though cautious, Fabius lacked not alertness. He de- vised a plan for surrounding Hannibal, and took his measures accordingly. The northern half of the plain, — the Faler- nian, — where the Carthaginian army had been committing its ravages, had the unfordable Vulturnus on the south, with but a single bridge, at Casilinum, held by the Roman garri- son at that town ; it had on the east a line of difficult hills whose only debouch was the pass by which Hannibal had entered, for the main road to Beneventum was south of the river ; on the west was the sea ; on the north Fabius and the Latin colony at Teanum blocked the road and closed the Latin Way. The Appian Way, also leading northward, had several fortified places along its course, and passed 326 FABIUS TRAPS HANNIBAL. through the defile of Terracina as well. Thus the exits of the Falernian plain were aU closed. Polybius says that the mountains on the north and east of the plain had but three outlets. By this he unquestionably means the Via Appia or main road via Beneventum, the more difBoult pass near AUifas, by which Hannibal had entered, and the Via Latina through Teanum. The plan thus organized by Fabius was excellent. Hannibal had finished his work, but without meeting with the political success he had anticipated ; he now proposed to gather together his booty and march to the other coast or to southern Italy, where he could spend the winter in gi-eater comfort and security. Fabius had foreseen all this and acted accordingly. He had sent Minucius to put in a state of de- fense the defile of Terracina, where the mountains come down to the sea, so as to hold the Appian Way to Rome ; another force of four thousand men he had sent to hold the pass of Mons Eribanus (or CaUicula), as the defile to AUifae was named ; he had strengthened the garrison of Casilinum, and with the main Eoman army now moved from Mt. Massicus eastward, along the hiUs towards the road which Hannibal must use, to a point where he could readily observe the Car- thaginian movements. Fabius proposed to wait till Hanni- bal, after destroying or consuming the provisions of the val- ley, should try to make his way out. He would then have him at an utter disadvantage. In his rear Fabius had aU Latium and Samnium to victual his main army ; his force at Casilinum had the Campanian plain for supplies ; Minu- cius was on the Via Appia, and his four thousand men in the defile could depend on Beneventum. The dictator was in a position to wait for battle on his own terms. Hannibal fully understood the difficulties of his situation, and having carefully gathered his booty, sought to study the BY WHICH PASS? 327 means of leaving the valley. It was early fall. It was es- sential that he should pass the next winter in some region not yet devastated by the war. His immense train of booty was a very serious factor in his calculations. And it may be weU here to point out that in weighing the operations of Hannibal, such factors must not be lost sight of. Nearly always in Eo- man or allied territory, he was forced to move with large trains, which the Romans, having victual on every hand, could dispense with. What Hannibal accomplished was with every element in favor of his enemies, and scarcely a single tactical or strategic value on his own side. It is probable that at this time Hannibal had a very large train of wagons, which he had taken from the farmers of the Falernian plains. As a rule, his trains consisted only of sumpter-animals. He had to pay his men, and give them much booty ; he desired to provide for the winter ; he must keep on hand treasure for the subvention of towns he hoped to induce to join his cause. For the moment, he was unusually loaded with trains. Hannibal could not debouch by either the Appian Way or the Latin Way leading to Rome, as these roads were not only held in force, but a movement along them would bring Fabius at once down on his flank while he was cutting his way out. It was, moreover, not the direction he desired to take. He could not well cross the Vulturnus, because Fabius could fall upon his rear during the serious operation of forcing the river. The mountain pass on the east by which he had en- tered was held by Fabius' detachment of four thousand men, and Hannibal reckoned that this was the direction from which he would be for that very reason least expected, espe- cially as he had acquired the reputation of not pursuing the same road twice, and it was by no means an easy pass. This exit was the one Hannibal chose for his passage. But it was 328 A CAVALRY COMBAT. an operation of some delicacy, for if his way was stoutly dis- puted, it was altogether likely that he would be attacked by Fabius from the rear during his movement. Having chosen his route, as a first step, he must drive the Eomans out of the pass by force or stratagem, and he set about it in a curious manner. He had come in that way, and he knew the lay of the land very accurately. Operations were opened by a cavalry demonstration on Minucius,to divert Fabius from the idea that he would seek to leave the valley in which he was — a very trap to any but a Hannibal — by way of the mountains. Minucius sent Hostilius Mancinus out to meet the Numidians, and this officer drove them back to camp. Following them up too hastily, Hostilius was met by Carthalo with the whole body of horse, badly cut up, and himself slain. The relics of the Roman cavalry took refuge in Fabius' camp. Hither, too, Minucius had returned, after securing the defile of Terracina. Even this defeat in no wise changed the Roman ardor for a general battle, though it showed Fabius that he was right in clinging to his own scheme of defense. Next day Hannibal drew up in battle order in the plain below Fabius' camjs, and endeavored to bring him out to fight. He would have been glad to measure swords in earnest with Fabius, and did his best to bring about this end. Fabius also drew up his army in front of his camp, but re- fused to move down to the plain, contenting himself with beating back a skirmishing attack of horse, which must have been severe, as Livy acknowledges a Roman loss of two hun- dred men killed, and with his very natural habit of exaggerat- ing the enemy's, states the Carthaginian loss at eight hundred. Finding this last resort to engage battle on at least even terms a failure, Hannibal was driven to ruse. Fabius had made up his mind not to fight till Hannibal tried to escape, when he would take him in flank or rear. STRANGE TORCHES. 329 The Carthaginians had collected several thousand beef- cattle. Hasdrubal at this time had charge of the engineer- ing detail of the army, and to him Hannibal gave his orders. Selecting two thousand of the most vigorous of these crea- tures, pitch-pine or other dry branches tied in fagots were kv-urkt tASJ LI '^^'t^XP^^'-'- The Oxen Stratagem. fastened to their horns, and towards the middle of the night, — in the third watch, — having lighted these strange torches, Hasdrubal's pioneers, aided by the light infantry, drove the cattle up the slopes inclosing the defile of Mons Eribanus, which was held by the enemy. Maddened with fear and pain, the bullocks rushed in all directions up the hill and into the woods, giving to the Romans the impression that the Car- 330 HANNIBAL ESCAPES. thaginian army was trying to escalade the heights with torches. The defenders of the defile imagined from the noises on the heights that Hannibal's troops were escaping through the woods over the mountains, thus turning the defile they felt unable to force, and, leaving their position, at once set out to oppose them or cut off their retreat. When they reached the heights they were equally puzzled and dismayed by meeting an array of mad bulls in lieu of Carthaginian phalangites, and not only made no pretense to fight, but for- got all about the defile they had been ordered to hold. The beeves rushing hither and yon prevented any serious engage- ment on the heights. Having aided the pioneers to drive the beeves as far as necessary, the light infantry attacked the defile through which Hannibal proposed to march. They found it almost unprotected, and at once possessed them- selves of it. Fabius, fearing to faU into some new ambuscade of Hannibal's, remained close to his camp, though he drew up his army in order of battle. Having thus opened the defile, Hannibal lost no time in setting out on the march, for which his entire column stood in readiness. The African infantry was in the van. The cavalry followed. The baggage-train and booty came next. The Spaniards and then the Gauls closed the column. From this defile his head of column soon emerged upon the valley of the upper Vulturnus near Allifse, whence his road was clear. For by hurrying a detachment down the Vulturnus to the junction of the Calor to hold this point, the road via Beneventum was open to him and closed to Fabius. The marching was forced, and before morning the whole army and baggage-train had passed beyond the reach of Roman inter- ference. As the morning mists were dissipated, Fabius discovered his four thousand men who had been stationed to hold the FEINT ON ROME. 331 defile and the heiglits, still skirmishing all along the line with the Carthaginian light infantry, who were now sustained by the Spanish and Gallic rear-guard of Hannibal's column. Under cover of this combat, the Carthaginian column had been enabled to retire in perfect safety, after throwing the Eomans back into the valley they had just left, with a loss of not far from one thousand men. Hannibal now went into camp at Allifse, well satisfied with the success of his very remarkable and ingenious stratagem. Before thinking of winter-quarters, however, he determined to impose still further on Fabius by leading him to believe Campania to Geronium. that he would move to the vicinity of Rome, through eastern Latium. He could continue his ravages and collect booty for 332 CAPTURE OF GERONIUM. a wMle longer, owing to iis enemy's utter discomfiture at Lis escape. He marched up tlie valley of the Vulturnus to Venaf rum ; but instead of making towards Rome, he kept within Samnium, crossed the Apennines and descended by Sulmo to the plains of the Peligni, where he gathered addi- tional rich stores. To read the ancient historians' account of Hannibal's method of foraging with his Numidian cavalry, calls vividly to mind the forays of Sherman's bummers. Barring the cruelties practiced by the barbarian horse, one might imagine one's self to be reading of Georgia instead of Italy. Fabius followed up Hannibal's march along the hiUs, show- ing no little skill, and keeping always between him and Rome. Hannibal had found his diversion a failure ; he could not lure Fabius to battle. Learning that in Geronium, near Lari- num, there was abundance of booty and much wheat, he soon altered his course towards the land of the Frentani. Un- able to seduce the inhabitants of Geronium by promises or threats, Hannibal attacked and took the place by storm, razed it to the ground, leaving the walls and a few buildings for magazines, and put the inhabitants to the sword. He then strongly fortified a camp near by, and began amassing victual for the winter, sending each day two thirds of his force out foraging, each party being charged to bring in a given quan- tity of wheat, and deliver the same to the commissaries. Hav- ing secured none of the Italian allies, he must take up winter- quarters alfresco. Fabius slowly followed the Carthaginians, and finally went into an equally strong camp at the foot of Mt. Calene in the territory of Larinum.