The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992 Tim Kell Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjectThe Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992 Tim Kell (Publication no. 74) Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1995© 1995 Cornell Modem Indonesia Project ISBN 0-87763-040-2 Price: $10.00 Typeset by Roberta H. LudgateFor my father, Richard, and my late mother, MurielContents Acknowledgements ........................................................ vi Note on Spelling, Usage, and Translations.............................. vii Glossary and Abbreviations ............................................. viii Map of Aceh................................................................ x Introduction............................................................... 1 Part One: Historical Background............................................ 3 Part Two: Aceh Under The New Order..................................... 13 The Economy .......................................................... 13 Aceh's Contribution to the National Economy....................... 14 The Impact of Industrial Growth in Aceh........................ 16 Impasse in the Acehnese economy................................... 21 Summary........................................................... 28 Government, Politics, and Society..................................... 28 The Emergence of the Technocrats.................................. 29 Centralized Power and the Absence of Autonomy..................... 31 Governors and Bupati: The Center's Choice....................... 32 Finance and Development: The Center's Preserve.................... 40 Electoral Politics.............................................. 41 Army and Technocrats.............................................. 43 Social T ransforma tions.......................................... 45 The Eclipse of the Ulama.......................................... 47 The Majelis Ulama Indonesia....................................... 50 The Roots of Rebellion................................................ 52 Part Three: The Rebellion................................................. 61 Hasan Di Tiro and the Free Aceh Movement.............................. 61 Insurgency........................................................... 66 Counterinsurgency..................................................... 74 Nonmilitary Responses: The Ulama and the Civil Government............. 77 Part Four: Conclusion..................................................... 83 Bibliography.............................................................. 87 Name Index................................................................ 93 vAcknowledgements My interest in Indonesia began when I worked in that country for over three years in the mid-1980s. I subsequently studied for an M.A. in South-East Asian Studies at the University of Hull in 1990-91. This monograph began life as my M.A. thesis, which I submitted in October 1992.1 wish to thank Clive Christie and Tim Huxley of Hull's Centre for South-East Asian Studies for their supervision, guidance, and encouragement. I owe a special debt of gratitude to John A. MacDougall of Indonesia Publica- tions (7538 Newberry Lane, Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland 20706, USA), who gave me the benefit of his hospitality during the summer of 1991 and allowed me full use of his library and technological resources for research purposes. It was John who had first stimulated my interest in Aceh with a translation assignment for Indonesia News Service in 1990, and he who subsequently passed a copy of the completed thesis to the Cornell Modem Indonesia Project. I am also indebted to Sidney Jones of Human Rights Watch/Asia (New York) for her generosity in helping me carry out research; to Geoffrey Robinson and his colleagues on the Indonesia research team at Amnesty International for their invaluable assistance with information; and to Carmel Budiardjo of Tapol for providing a quantity of Indonesian-language news material. Special thanks are, of course, due to my editor at Cornell, Audrey R. Kahin, for her guidance, encouragement, and patience. In addition, I am grateful to the staff of New Consumer, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, for the use of their computer equipment and accompanying brain-power. Last but not least, loving thanks to Mandy for her patience and support. viNote on Spelling, Usage, and Translations The name Aceh also appears in this study as "Atjeh," its spelling under the old Indonesian orthography. A further variant is "Acheh," which is used by the Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front and in some historical works. The new Indonesian system of spelling is also applied to names such as "Suharto" and "Sukarno," unless these are quoted from sources which use the old spellings "Soeharto" and "Soekamo." In the case of Acehnese place names which are commonly presented in the form of two words instead of one, the conflated form is used, unless quoted from a source which uses the two-word convention. Thus, for example, "Lhokseumawe" also appears as "Lhok Seumawe." Italicized Indonesian nouns, such as ulama, uleebalang, kabupaten, and pesantren, are used in the same form for both the singular and the plural. However, they some- times appear with an "s" to denote the plural when quoted thus from other sources. All translations of material from Indonesian-language sources are the responsi- bility of the author, unless otherwise stated. viiGlossary and Abbreviations ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces ASNLF Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front Bapedal Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan, Environmental Impact Control Agency Bappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional Development Planning Agency bupati Daerah Istimewa district head (head of a kabupaten) Special Region Darul Islam See "DI/TII" dayah Acehnese name for pesantren, or traditional Islamic boarding school. DI Daerah Istimewa, Special Region DI/TII Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army, armed movement active in various regions of Indonesia from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, seeking the establishment of an Islamic state. DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional Representative Assembly, used to denote both provincial and kabupaten/ municipality-level assemblies (DPRD I and DPRD II respectively). In this study, the abbreviation is used only for the former. fatwa GAM Ruling issued by leaders of the Islamic community. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement Golkar Golongan Karya, the New Order government's "Functional Groups" electoral organization. GPK Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, Gang of Security Disturbers, generic term used by the Indonesian government for armed political organizations which oppose it. IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Institute, government- controlled Islamic university. imam mosque leader viiiIr Insinyur, Engineer, title of someone with a degree in engineering. kabupaten district (also referred to as "regency"). The province of Aceh is divided into eight districts. Each district is further divided into subdistricts, or kecamatan. kiai Islamic scholar, teacher, and leader (as ulama). Kopassus LNG Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command liquefied natural gas madrasah Modem Islamic primary school. Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indo- nesian Muslims, modernist Islamic political party banned in 1960. MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Ulama NLFAS National Liberation Front of Acheh-Sumatra (now ASNLF) Pancasila The five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia's state ideology). PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party Pemuda PUSA PUSA Youth (see "PUSA") Pertamina Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Nasioml, Indonesia's state- owned oil and gas company. pesantren PKI Traditional Islamic boarding school. Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party PUSA Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, All-Aceh Ulama Association Tengku Teungku Title of a Malay aristocrat. Title of an ulama. (Also used generally as a respectful term of address for Acehnese men.) TP2WI Tim Pengendalian dan Pembangunan Wilayah Industri, Industrial Zone Development and Control Team Tuanku Title of members of the sultan dynasty in Aceh. ulama Islamic scholar or teacher (simultaneously leader of the Muslim community). uleebalang Unsyiah YLBHI Acehnese territorial chiefs/traditional elite. Universitas Syiah Kuala, Syiah Kuala University Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation ZILS Zona Industri Lhok Seumawe, Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone IXWEH ACEH [Sabang o L km 1C0Introduction When armed insurgents began to attack government soldiers in the Indo- nesian province of Aceh with increasing frequency in the middle of 1989, it was apparent that this distinctive part of the far-flung republic was adding yet another period of turmoil, rebellion, and blood-letting to those that had marked its history over the previous hundred years. Famous for their long war against the Dutch in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Acehnese were equally well-known for their willingness to resort to arms to defend their identity and interests against the encroachments of postindependence Indone- sian governments. As early as 1953 a rebellion had broken out against the central government, and in the latter part of the 1970s another attempt had been made to foment revolt. This study seeks to explain the reasons for the most recent uprising in Aceh. Part One sketches the region's history up to the mid-1960s. Part Two examines the eco- nomic, political, and social changes that have occurred in Aceh over the past quarter of a century, under the New Order regime: the roots of rebellion in the province. This analysis goes beyond the period defined in the title of the study: the end of rebellion does not mean that its root causes have been resolved. Part Three looks at the rebel- lion itself, and at the complexion of political power in Aceh in the early 1990s. Part Four summarizes the principal arguments of the monograph. The main thesis of this study is that exploitation of Aceh's resources for the bene- fit of the central government; economic stagnation in the province itself; govern- mental and political overcentralization which has served to disenfranchise the people of the region; and social changes which have led to the mass of Acehnese losing their traditional social and political leaders, have combined to open the way for an armed separatist movement to foment rebellion in the province. 1Part One Historical Background Acehnese political leaders in the late twentieth century, whether at home or in exile, whether proponents of union with Indonesia or of independence, all hark back to the time when Aceh was a formidable and influential political and religious power. However, though once an important power in the Malay archipelago, Aceh was never a cohesive nation-state of the kind we would recognize today. Nor did it ever sit easily as part of the Netherlands East Indies, the foundation for the new postwar state of Indonesia. Before the sixteenth century the state of Aceh, confined to the far northwest of Sumatra, "was of little consequence."1 However, the port-kingdom of Samudra (subsequently Pasai), centered on present-day Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, was of such significance as a center of commerce and Islamic scholarship in the fourteenth century that the whole of the island was named after it.2 It was in the 1520s that Aceh grew in significance, and first began to appear as the entity it is today. When the Portuguese captured the great trading city of Malacca on the Malay Peninsula in 1511, Aceh was a vassal of its neighbor on the north Sumatran coast, the port-state of Pidie. Pidie and Pasai, both lucrative sources of pepper, in turn came under the influence of the Portuguese.3 The "intolerable inter- vention" of this European power4 drew a response from Ali Mughayat Shah, sultan of Aceh from 1514. He declared Aceh independent, and, with an eye to the economic riches to be gained,5 in the first half of the 1520s "rallied all the anti-Portuguese forces to expel the newcomers from their footholds" on the north coast. This was a "popular and permanent" conquest: Pidie and Pasai were united with the Aceh river valley (Aceh Besar), and their people became acculturated as Acehnese.6 Daya, a 1 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 29. 2 Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858-1898 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press/University of Malaya Press, 1969), p. 1. 3 J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control over West Sumatra up to the Treaty of Painin, 1663," Journal of Southeast Asian History 10,3 (December 1969): 455. 4 Anthony Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. Three Stages: c.1550-1700," in Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia: The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Bali-Lombok, South Celebes, ed. Anthony Reid and Lance Castles (Council of the Malaysian Branch of The Royal Asiatic Society, October 1975), p. 46. 5 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," p. 455. 6 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 2. 34 Roots of Acehnese Rebellion neighboring pepper port on the west coast, was also occupied by Ali Mughayat's forces.7 Aceh subsequently entered into a "triangular struggle" with Johore and the Portuguese for commercial and imperial dominance over Sumatra and Malaya,8 while an "aggressive royal monopoly"9 in trade was maintained from the port-capi- tal of Banda Aceh. Control was extended down both coasts of Sumatra: Ala'ad-din Riayat Shah al-Kahar, "the second of [Aceh's] great sultans,"10 conquered Aru (on the present-day border between East Aceh and North Sumatra) in 1539, and on the west coast took control of Pariaman, formerly part of the Minangkabau kingdom.* 11 Under a succeeding sultan, Acehnese rule was established further down this coast, in Inderapura (which, like Pariaman, is in today's province of West Sumatra). However, a subsequent decline in Aceh's fortunes meant that by about 1613 its authority on the west coast was only effective as far south as Barus (just inside present-day North Sumatra).12 Acehnese power reached its zenith during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda from 1607 to 1636. By means of a highly successful "absolutist strategy"13 and an ambitious and spectacular policy of expansionism,14 Iskandar made Aceh the most powerful state in the region. On the west coast of Sumatra, where the prize once again was the area's pepper and gold exports, control was re-established as far as Inderapura,15 and on the east coast "all the important ports ... as far south as Asa- han [now in North Sumatra]" came under Acehnese authority.16 By 1620 Iskandar controlled Pahang, Kedah, and Perak on the Malay Peninsula,17 and he even had designs on Java.18 Aceh itself was a major center of Islamic scholarship, and "the tra- dition of Atjeh as an Islamic state" began.19 7 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control/' p. 455; C. R. Boxer, "A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600," Journal of Southeast Asian History 10,3 (December 1969): 416. 8 D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1981), pp. 368,367. 9 Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 4. 10 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 367. Various dates are given for the period of al-Kahar's reign: Hall suggests 1530-68; Kathirithamby-Wells, 1537-68 ("Achehnese Control," p. 455); Reid both 1539-71 ('Trade and the Problem of Royal Power," p. 46) and 1537-71 (Contest for North Sumatra, p. 3); and Boxer, 1537-71 ("Portuguese Reactions," p. 416). 11 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 455, 457, 453; Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power," p. 46. 12 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," p. 458. 13 Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power," p. 49. 14 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 369. 15 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 459-60. 16 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 3. 17 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 369. 18 Osman Raliby, "Aceh, Sejarah dan Kebudayaannya," in Bunga Rampai Tentang Aceh, ed. Ismail Suny (Jakarta: Penerbit Bhratara Karya Aksara, 1980), p. 34. Raliby says that at the time of the Acehnese navy's crushing defeat at the hands of the combined forces of Portuguese Malacca, Johore, and Patani in 1629, Iskandar had been preparing to attack Java. 19 James T. Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 37.Historical Background 5 Aceh's "golden age" under Iskandar did not last long, however. The sultan's conquests had "stirred up a deep hatred of the Achinese yoke,"20 and in 1629 his navy was roundly defeated by Aceh's regional rivals. In Sumatra, the foundations of his empire were shaky: despite links going back many years, no more than "an artifi- cial connection" existed between Aceh and its dominions on the west coast. Aceh- nese governors and officials were placed in these coastal centers to control trade and taxation. Once that had been achieved, "there was no attempt at administrative unification" and little "interference with the fabric of indigenous government." As a result, the people of the subject areas "justifiably regarded [Aceh] as an alien power." Resentment against Acehnese rule led to attempts by the indigenous chiefs of Paria- man and Inderapura in 1619 to forge alliances with the Dutch, whose commercial intrusion Iskandar was intent on limiting.21 Against this background, it was the years of decline following Iskandar's demise "which really set the political pattern for Atjeh."22 The erosion of its commercial and political power, including the loss of its acquisitions on the Malay Peninsula, was hastened by the Dutch take-over of Malacca in 1641. On the west coast of Sumatra, representations to the Dutch by Minangkabau leaders seeking an end to Acehnese suzerainty led to the Painan Treaty of 1663,23 under which the Dutch East India Company was to afford protection against the Acehnese in return for "an absolute monopoly over the pepper trade" and exemption from tolls.24 These developments were resisted by the Acehnese, but Dutch military expeditions in 1666-67 finally "put an end to [their] influence throughout the whole region."25 The west coast from Barns southward once again became part of a united Minangkabau kingdom, such as had existed until around the end of the fifteenth century (though without its sove- reignty compromised by European intrusion).26 Thus "the permanent dissolution of the Atjehnese empire" was assured, and Aceh was subsequently limited to roughly those areas which it covers today 27 Within those areas, the "promising movement towards institutionalised govern- ment" that had begun under Iskandar Muda came to a halt.28 The "Sultanate became a weak symbolic institution,"29 largely "without influence in the internal affairs of 20 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 369. 21 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 454, 460-64, 479, 469. Even the occupying authorities were not immune to such feelings of resentment: the local chief in Pariaman was joined in his plot against Iskandar by the Acehnese governor of neighboring Tiku (p. 469). 22 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 4. 23 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 469-76. 24 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 372; Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," p. 476. 25 Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 345; Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 476- 77. 26 Kathirithamby-Wells, "Achehnese Control," pp. 477-78. 27 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 5. Reid states that following the Iskandar Muda era, "Atjeh was limited to those areas which had already been effectively acculturated by 1641— basically the northern coastal strip and the scattered ports of the West Coast as far south as Barus." However, he also describes Tamiang, which is in the easternmost extremity of today's East Aceh district, as "the border state of Atjeh," even though the coastal area between there and Lhokseumawe was not fully settled until the mid-nineteenth century. (See below, page six.) 28 Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power," pp. 55, 49-51. 29 Ricklefs, History of Modem Indonesia, p. 33.6 Roots of Acehnese Rebellion Atjeh"30 and with "effective control" only of Banda Aceh and its port.31 The "new nobility" brought into being by Iskandar, the uleebalang, were glad of the opportunity to free themselves of their creator's "centralised tyranny" and "draconian rule."32 Though still theoretically "officers of the sultanate," the uleebalang became politically independent territorial chiefs, deriving their power from the control of trade in their respective domains and ideological legitimacy from their link with the sultanate.33 From the late eighteenth century the political fragmentation of Aceh was under- scored by the desire of European and North American merchants to trade freely with the individual territories, bypassing the royal capital. By the 1820s over half the world's pepper came from Aceh, and on the north and east coasts uleebalang estab- lished strong trading links with the British entrepot of Penang on the Malay Penin- sula.34 It was only during the reign of Tuanku Ibrahim from 1838 to 1870 that the Acehnese sultanate regained a semblance of the authority it had had in the early 1600s. Ibrahim exploited the rivalries of the new pepper-rich uleebalang, and by "a system of judicious alliances" was able to extend his authority 35 He was helped in his maneuverings by the fact that although Aceh was not a coherent entity in politi- cal terms, it was clearly definable in cultural terms. Anthony Reid points to "the influence of a common language, culture, and 400-year history on the Atjehnese, and the fact that most of the dependencies [of the central state in Banda Aceh] were more properly 'colonies' of cultivators usually bom in Atjeh Besar and retaining strong connexions there."36 This was clearly illustrated by the development of the coastal strip between Lhokseumawe and Tamiang (in the easternmost extremity of today's East Aceh district), which was "very sparsely inhabited" and "virtually unculti- vated" until it started to prosper as a center of pepper production in the 1850s.37 Not only were plenty of men "to be found in Atjeh Besar and Pidie ready to try their hand as seasonal workers or permanent settlers" in the new areas, but the "leading pioneers" were "often of the uleebalang class in Atjeh Besar." Despite establishing themselves "as virtually autonomous rulers" in their new fiefdoms, "all recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan . . . and endeavoured to obtain authorization from him."38 Ibrahim also sought to regain some of the imperial authority Aceh had once exercised over the rest of Sumatra: on the east coast, Acehnese suzerainty was 30 Siegel, Rope of God, p. 40. 31 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 4. 32 Ricklefs, History of Modem Indonesia, p. 32. 33 Siegel, Rope of God, pp. 9-10,44-47; Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 4. 34 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, pp. 6-7; idem, Blood of the People, p. 4; Ricklefs, History of Modem Indonesia, p. 135. 35 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, pp. 16, 79. 36 Ibid., p. 109. Reid refers to Aceh's "400-year history" in the context of war with the Dutch in the 1870s. A lower figure might be more accurate given that Aceh first came to prominence with its "popular and permanent" conquests of Pidie and Pasai in the 1520s, which united Aceh Besar with the "rich plain of the north coast." Before then, Aceh had been an "unimportant state at the extreme north-west of [Sumatra]," its greatness predated by that of Pasai (pp. 1-2). 37 Ibid., pp. 16 n. 4,79,15. 38 Ibid., p. 15.Historical Background 7 imposed on Langkat, Deli, and Serdang in 1854, and the sultan also claimed author- ity as far south as Bila and Panai. (These areas cover the entire east coast of present- day North Sumatra.)39 The sultan of Siak (in today's Riau province) also claimed these areas as dependencies, but neither his nor his Acehnese counterpart's claim was conclusive and rule by both was resented in the territories concerned. Indeed, the three states over which Aceh had established suzerainty all "welcomed the idea of Dutch protection."40 This was afforded to them in the early 1860s as a result of the 1858 Siak Treaty, which gave the Dutch sovereignty over Siak and which counted as that state's "dependencies" territories as far north as Tamiang, "the border state of Atjeh."41 Indeed, Banda Aceh's authority over Tamiang, where "the bulk of the population" was Acehnese by "sentiment as well as race," was usurped by the Dutch in 1865, and, "obliged to accept his powerlessness, the Sultan of Atjeh attempted no further contact with the East Coast."42 Antagonism between "these two imperial powers"43 did not stop there. Not only were the Dutch piqued by Penang's domination of trade with Aceh,44 but increasing imperial competition among the Western powers further excited their concern over the continuing independence of Aceh. The British shared their worries over the pos- sible intervention of other powers, and, preferring continued domination of Sumatra by Holland, signed the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra, part of "one of the greatest trade offs of the imperialist age." Giving the Netherlands "an entirely free hand in Sumatra"45 (while guaranteeing the British complete freedom of trade with the island, as already existed),46 this agreement "was Aceh's death warrant as an independent polity,"47 and also meant the abrogation of the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London, which had defined Sumatra as a Dutch sphere of influence but had secured the independence of Aceh 48 It was "a public pronouncement that the Dutch intended to take Aceh,"49 and they began their attempt to do so in 1873. 39 On the west coast, authority was claimed over states as far south as Barus (see above n. 27). In fact, Barus and neighboring Singkil, to the west, had been annexed by the Dutch in 183