“White Book” on the 1992 General Election in Indonesia Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election (BPHPR) Translated with an Introduction by Dwight Y. King Cornell Modern Indonesia Project"White Book” on the 1992 General Election in Indonesia Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election (BPHPR) Translated with an Introduction by Dwight Y. King (Publication no. 73) Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1994© 1994 Cornell Modern Indonesia Project ISBN 0-87763-039-9 Price: $10.00 Typeset by Donna AmorosoCONTENTS Introduction by Dwight Y. King .......................................... 1 1. The 1992 Indonesian General Election ................................. 11 2. Election Protest (Golput) in the 1992 Election........................ 41 3. Conclusions About Political Practices in the 1992 Election ........... 53 Appendix 1: Public Statement of the BPHPR................................ 61 Appendix 2: Declaration of the Founding of BPHPR......................... 63 Glossary................................................................. 69Introduction* On November 18, 1992, a delegation representing Badan Perlindungan Hak-Hak Politik Rakyat dalam Menghadapi Pemilihan Umum 1992 (BPHPR) [Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election], presented a "White Book" on the election to the People's Representative Assembly (MPR). The delegation members were received by Prof. Dr. Achmad Amiruddin, the Deputy Chairman of the MPR, who was quoted as "valuing their opinion," but who refused to be engaged in dialogue on the issues raised in the White Book.* 1 As far as is known, nothing more became of that document until now. Most of it is presented here in translation. The White Book contains not only a detailed accounting of infractions and fraud that occurred during the campaign and election process, but also a fundamental cri- tique of the system of popular representation under the New Order, of which general elections are only a part. This critique arises, in the first instance, from the discrep- ancy between New Order laws, regulations, and rhetoric on the one hand, and actual practices on the other. But it also arises from a deeper—some would say idealistic— vision of popular democracy in Indonesia, including the role of political parties, elections, and the rule of law. In this vision, some basic human rights, including the political right to abstain in elections, are inviolate. From the dates mentioned in the White Book, the BPHPR apparently came into existence formally in late April, 1992, a few weeks before the start of the official cam- paign period and about one and a half months before the General Election on June 9th. The appendices contain a copy of a letter to the police chief of Semarang on behalf of four detained students signed by "H.J.C. Princen, BPHPR." A report about a visit to the General Election Institute (LPU) in Jakarta, included in Appendix 2, indicates that BPHPR "was represented by H.J.C. Princen, Berar Fathia, Agus Edy Santoso, M. Tito, Taufan, and Santoso." The press report on the presentation of the White Book to the MPR mentions that the BPHPR delegation consisted of nine per- sons led by Princen, who was the only one named. Haji J.C. Princen is a well known human rights activist. Born in The Hague, Princen was called up to fight in the Dutch army following the Second World War. After disembarking in Java, he became sympathetic with the cause of Indonesian independence, deserted, and joined the liberation forces fighting against the Dutch colonial state. After Independence and following his conversion to Islam, Princen 4 Full Indonesian titles of the organizations and agencies mentioned in the introduction and translation may be found in the Glossary. 1 Kompas, November 19,1992. However, there is no mention of the content of the White Book, what the MPR leadership did with it, or what reaction it elicited.2 acquired Indonesian nationality and obtained a position with the Immigration Ser- vice. He was elected to Parliament in 1956 and built a reputation as a journalist and lawyer concerned with electoral democracy and the defense of individual civil and political rights. His rights advocacy and criticism of government actions under both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes have led to him spending a total of eight years in Indonesian prisons. In 1966 he founded the Institute for the Defense of Human Rights based in Jakarta. Whatever the exact character of the BRHPR, the White Book merits attention for its content. Chapter 1 provides a great deal of detailed, empirical evidence on illegal and questionable campaign and election practices, usually presented in an objective, factual manner. Many of the items have been gleaned from the mass media, and attribution is often given to the source. These are supplemented by reports from the authors' own monitoring and private information network. The attention throughout to specifics and details—dates, places, names, sequence, exact quantitites—lends credence to these accounts and facilitates understanding exactly how deviations occurred. Since restrictions by New Order authorities on the media and foreign observers tighten during elections, the White Book is an important addition to the information available on the 1992 election. It also provides the most extensive information on the conduct of a New Order election since Nishihara's and Ward's studies of the 1971 election.^ Virtually every study on the three elections since—1977, 1982, and 1987—concentrates on analysis and interpretation of outcomes (voting turnout, direction, and implications for the regime). The reasons for the relative neglect of implementation or conduct probably include the restrictions mentioned above, the successes of New Order public rela- tions efforts toward international monitors, and the analytical potential of the numerical results in the eyes of scholars. Chapter 2 concerns Golput or golongan putih (lit. white group), a uniquely Indonesian phenomenon.2 3 In a behavioral sense, it refers to active and passive non- cooperation in the electoral process as defined by the authorities. The term is also rich in connotation. "White" symbolizes pure-minded and also blank ballots. Golput also has historical significance, reviving a movement started by Arief Budiman at the time of the first New Order election in 1971. Thirdly, it functions as political humor, since Golput mirrors Golkar (Golongan Karya, lit. functional groups), the party clos- est to the government. Because of these multiple meanings, Golput has been retained untranslated in the translation of the White Book. As in the original text, Golput can refer to a person, group, movement, attitude, action, or behavior. This chapter com- bines factual reporting, quantitative analysis, some dubious inferences, and logical/political justification and argumentation for the legality of Golput under existing Indonesian laws. In their zeal to legitimate Golput, the authors contend that Golput reached 10 million in the 1987 election and exceeded 15 million in 1992. But these empirical inferences were based on the questionable assumptions that qualified (registered) voters who failed to vote and voters casting invalid (i.e., blank, incorrectly marked, 2 Masashi Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, No. 56, 1972); Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974). 3 For a comprehensive collection of articles, see Arbi Sanit, Golput (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992).3 or damaged) ballots were all expressing their non-cooperation. But if we assume, alternatively, that only those who stayed away from the voting places (tidak meng- gunakan hak pilihnya) were Golput, the numbers drop to 3.6 million in 1987 and 10.3 million in 1992.4 Neither alternative allows for dropout due to illness, unanticipated travel, or death. It is likely that the highest concentration of Golput was among the youth in large urban areas.5 6 7 In Chapter 3, the conclusion, the authors make little effort to summarize the foregoing material, preferring to draw out what they believe are the implications for democracy in Indonesia of the political practices surrounding the election. The arguments here, such as one about "structural betrayal," will challenge anyone who argues that elections under the New Order have become more meaningful over time. THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION The analysis and complaints of the White Book often presuppose some background knowledge about the current political system. As in other states, Indonesian political life is structured formally by a hierarchy of policy decisions and legal authority. The 1945 Constitution and the decisions of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) have the highest authority in providing general rules and policy direction. The 1992 election was governed by a statute (undang-undang) passed by the People's Represen- tative Council (DPR) in 1969 and amended in 1975, 1980, and 1985.° This law was subsequently interpreted in a series of governmental regulations (peraturan pemerin- tah, instruksi menteri)? These regulations, promulgated by the central bureaucracy, were open to further specification and interpretation by the semi-autonomous heads of regional governments (gubernur, bupati). Although the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) has since 1985 had the power to review ministerial decrees and regulations, the Court has not yet used this power to arbitrate apparent conflicts or inconsis- tencies among the laws and regulations at various levels. The writers of the White Book identify what they believe are important conflicts and inconsistencies. They contend that the latest statute (UU 1/1985), enacted by a DPR in which the New Order executive directly controlled about 80 percent of the votes (Golkar and military [ABRI] factions), contradicts Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution and two decisions of the MPR, all of which have higher authority. They also describe numerous instances where local practice, perhaps even guided by for- mal decisions of local authorities, deviated from statutes and (central) government regulations. Another complaint found frequently throughout the White Book is that the elec- tion was under the complete control of the New Order executive, rather than some more neutral authority. To understand the basis of this charge, a brief description of election organization is needed. At the central level, the General Election Institute 4 Miriam Budiardjo's estimate of Golput in the 1971,1977,1982, and 1987 elections is based on this assumption. See "Sistem Pemilu dan Pembangunan Politik," Jurnal Ilmu Politik 11 (1992): 3-16. The 1992 figure is calculated from preliminary data reported in Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25,1992. 5 Riswandha Imawan's 1991 survey of 613 voters ages 17-39 drawn from Medan, Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Denpasar found that about 25 percent intended to choose Golput in the 1992 election. The findings are reported in Editor, April 13,1991. 6 UU 15/1969, UU 4/1975, UU 2/1980, and UU 1/1985. 7 The most important are PP 35/1985, PP 43/1985, and PP 37/1990.4 (LPU) has been established in Jakarta as a permanent (executive) agency, headed by the Minister of Home Affairs and a leadership council composed of seven other ministers and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and staffed by civil ser- vants from the Department of Home Affairs. As a symbolic nod toward neutrality, the LPU includes a fourteen-member Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan) headed by a minister and containing three representatives from each of the four offi- cial political factions—Golkar, PDI, PPP, and ABRI. Among the LPU's major duties are planning and preparing for elections; leading (memimpin) and supervising (mengawasi) all temporary election-related committees at all levels; and collecting, processing, and announcing election results. To assist the LPU with the administration of a particular election, such as the 1992 election, temporary committees are established at five levels, paralleling and utilizing the vertical lines of Indonesia's local government organization under the Department of Home Affairs. Central level: Indonesia Election Committee (PPI) Central Implementation Supervisory Committee (PANWASLAKPUS) Provincial level (each of twenty-seven provinces): Regional Election Committee (PPD-I) Regional Implementation Supervisory Committee (PANWASLAK-I) District/municipality level (each of approximately 296 districts and municipalities): Regional Election Committee (PPD-II) Regional Implementation Supervisory Committee (PANWASLAK-II) Subdistrict level (each of approximately 3,625 subdistricts): Voting Committee (PPS) Subdistrict Implementation Supervisory Committee (PANWASLAKCAM) Village level (each of approximately 67,000 villages): Voter Registration Committee (PANTARLIH) Voting Implementation Group (KPPS) This committee structure was highly centralized under the New Order executive authorities. For example, committees at the central level were appointed by and responsible to the President. Committees at the provincial and district/municipality level were appointed by and responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs (concurrently head of LPU), despite the fact that regulations permitted the Minister to delegate authority over committees at the district level and below to the provincial governors. Each committee in this vast structure was under the leadership of execu- tive/ administrative officials, although members included representatives from each of the four political factions. Hence, on every committee, the two "opposition" politi- cal factions or the ones lacking representatives in the executive apparatus (PPP and PDI) were clearly outnumbered. As an earlier assessment noted, "while it ensured administrative efficiency, this structure no less certainly guaranteed effective gov- ernmental intervention and control... In effect, the General Election Institute5 assumed the character of a military command with local chief executives as local commanders and election committees as their staffs."8 Of particular interest are the Implementation Supervisory Committees (PANWASLAK) because of their monitoring and supervisory role. At the central level, the Committee was chaired by the Attorney General, and at each of the two regional levels by the Chief Public Prosecutor—all part of the New Order adminis- tration who served at the pleasure of the President or the Minister of Home Affairs. In addition to the chair, one vice-chair on each committee was drawn from the administrative apparatus, giving the New Order administration and its factions (Golkar and ABRI) even greater predominance than on other election committees. The rules governing the work and procedures of the Committees were stipulated in a decision of the Minister of Home Affairs. According to the law, the three contestants (Golkar, PPP, and PDI) had the same status, rights, and duties (mempunyai kedudukan, hak dan kewajiban yang sama). In fact, the playing field was not level, but tilted sharply in favor of Golkar. The examples given in the White Book are legion. They include heavier losses by PPP and PDI of their legislative nominees in the mandatory screening process; New Order officials campaigning for Golkar under the guise of official duties; Golkar's much greater access to government facilities, including the territorial administrative organization (whereas PPP and PDI had to create their own organizations and were prohibited from organizing at the grass roots/village level); and disproportionately more media coverage of Golkar's campaign activities. The White Book charges that regulations were violated in the treatment of wit- nesses and that fraud occurred in the vote counting. To understand these charges, a brief description of the regulations pertaining to witnesses and to the Voting Imple- mentation Groups (KPPS) is useful. The KPPS had the critical roles of overseeing each polling place and counting the votes, yet the composition of this committee was the least specified. The regulations stipulated only that each should consist of seven members, who serve at the pleasure of the District Chief/Mayor, and that the mem- bers include witnesses. The head of the KPPS, a village or sub-district official, had authority over the members and they reported only to him. If a witness did not show up on election day, or the head of a KPPS felt that a witness was improperly certified, the head could draft a regular voter to serve as a (non-partisan) substitute for the (partisan) witness. The requirements for certification of witnesses were complex and presupposed a considerable degree of party organization and planning. Witnesses had to be resident in the village or neighborhood in which the polling place was located. Witnesses rep- resented a particular party, so they had to be party members and nominated by a party at least twenty days prior to the election. They had to have been approved and certified in writing prior to election day by the District Chief/Mayor. In the event a party was unable to find a resident witness, someone in another, contiguous village/neighborhood in the same district/municipality could be nominated. The White Book describes instances in which one of the minority parties was unable to obtain a witness, often due to partisan homogeneity at the village level. In another 8 Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971, p. 13. The structure was even more centralized than Nishihara may have realized. Although he correctly described the Minister of Home Affairs as "ex officio" chairman of the LPU and local government chief executives as "ex officio" chairmen of local election committees, he failed to point out that these chief executives were chairmen who doubled as voting members (ketua merangkap anggota).6 instance, a party-designated witness was disallowed because one or more of the requirements had not been met. Moreover, the legal basis of these requirements and all those pertaining to the KPPS, whose appointed head had administrative authority over the witnesses, was found not in the election law (undang-undang or UU) enacted by the DPR, but in the less authoritative regulations issued by the executive branch (peraturan pemerintah or PP). The KPPS had the duty of distributing to every registered voter, at least three days in advance of the election, a summons (Model C) informing them of the time and place of voting. The White Book indicates that this distribution process was sometimes unreliable for a variety of reasons. Voters who planned to be away from the place where they were registered on election day could obtain a form (Model AB) which permitted them to vote elsewhere. The White Book monitors found irregulari- ties in this procedure as well. Sometimes voters were found with both forms (Model C and Model AB), allowing them to vote twice. And groups of transmigrants were disenfranchised because they were not given the proper form (Model AB).9 According to the regulations, once the polls closed on election day, the KPPS were immediately to tally the ballots. Witnesses had the responsibility of calling irregularities to the attention of the head of the KPPS, who had full authority to han- dle and decide on them. However, the regulations explicitly specified that the absence of witnesses "does not influence the implementation and validity of the vote counting." Once the tally had been completed, the results announced and certified with the signatures of the KPPS members, and witnesses given a written recapitu- lation of the compilation (Model CA1), the ballots were to be returned to sealed boxes and sent to the sub-district office. The White Book reports instances of viola- tion of these procedures, such as ballots being taken away to the sub-district office for counting out of sight of witnesses, and witnesses not being given a recap of the compilations. THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Some historical perspective on the conduct of elections under the New Order is needed in order to evaluate properly the evidence and arguments of the White Book. Considering all five general elections (1971,1977,1982,1987, and 1992) conducted by the New Order administration, what changes have occurred in the regulations and actual practices? As mentioned above (footnotes 6 and 7), the laws and regulations have been amended three times. In 1975, the Election Law was amended to reflect the changes engineered by the New Order in the organization of the political parties after the 1971 election. A simplification of the party system had taken place in 1973 in which nine of the organizations that had contested the 1971 election were forced to fuse into two: the Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), 9 My own computation of voter turnout (the total number of valid votes cast as a percentage of registered voters), using data on the 1977 Election published by LPU on all 281 dis- tricts/municipalities as the unit of aggregation and analysis, shows that voter turnout varied from 75 to 120 percent with a mean of 91 percent and a standard variation of .06. How much of this variation was caused by actual voter mobility across district/municipality boundaries, as compared to other possible causes (like fraud) is unknown. (These indicators are not yet avail- able for the 1992 Election because the disaggregated data needed to calculate them had not yet been obtained at the time of writing.)7 comprising the four Muslim parties; and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI), containing three nationalist and two Christian parties. These changes had been formalized (UU 3/1975) just prior to the consideration by the DPR of proposed changes to the Election Law.10 Hence, the Election Law needed amending to recognize explicitly three and only three, specific election contestants— Golkar, PPP, and PDI. Also, the blanket disenfranchisement of former members of banned organizations was eased, giving the government discretion over the voting rights of those suspected of the least serious crimes (Golongan C). The explanation (penjelasan) attached to the 1975 amendments contained several items of interest.11 First, it noted that, for legal or regulatory purposes, a general election encompasses twelve types of activities.12 Second, in Irian Jaya, an election would be conducted under special regulations based on developments in the region and the provisions of the law. "Developments in the region" can be interpreted as a reference to the peculiar settlement patterns, communication difficulties, and security problems (OPM insurgency) of Irian Jaya. Thus, with this clause, the administrative authorities were claiming more than usual discretion in carrying out an election in a region where central government authority was being questioned—a precendent for managing elections in East Timor, as will be noted shortly. Third, the explanation stipulated that the Voting Implementation Groups (KPPS) consist of government functionaries. Although the next sentence referred to party and Golkar witnesses, who would supervise vote counting and approve the results, they were by implication separate from the KPPS. In sum, the 1975 amendments to the Election Law extended the broad discretionary powers of New Order authorities over the conduct of elections. Having reached some compromises with the PPP and the PDI in the preceding parties bill, the authorities apparently decided to hold the line against the parties' attempts to put more guarantees of fair treatment into the election bill.13 The 1980 amendments sought to involve the parties in the administration of elections, to formalize campaign restrictions, to give the government more than usual discretion in conducting elections in East Timor, which had been formally annexed in 1976, and to modify the organization of elections to help remedy some weaknesses felt during the 1977 election. Specifically, representatives (unsur) of political parties were added as regular members to the committees at all levels, including the Imple- mentation Supervisory Committees (PANWASLAK) which were added to the implementing organizational apparatus. However, as mentioned above, every 10 Gary E. Hansen, "Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and Continuity of the New Order Struggle," Asian Survey 26, 2 (February 1976): 148-51. While not included in the main statute, making their legal status unclear, these understand- ings and stipulations were subsequently reiterated and reflected in governmental regulations (peraturan pemerintah or PP) and ministerial instructions (instruksi menteri). 12 The twelve were voter registration, determination of number of representatives to be chosen in each electoral district (based on results of population registration), submission (for approval) of organizational names and symbols, submission of candidate nominations, screen- ing of nominated candidates, determination of candidates/formulation of candidate lists, announcement of candidate lists, election campaign, voting, counting of votes, determination of election results (including number of seats won by each party, elected candidates), and administering the oath of office/installation. 13 R. William Liddle, 'The 1977 Indonesian Election and New Order Legitimacy," Southeast Asian Affairs 1978.8 committee was led by government personnel, who together with committee mem- bers from Golkar and the Armed Forces, composed a commanding majority on every committee. The establishment of the Implementation Supervisory Committees was a response to the accusations by PPP and PDI of widespread deviations and fraud dur- ing the 1977 election. But the fact that the subdistrict level supervisory committee (PANWASLAKCAM) was specifically assigned to oversee voter registration and the distribution of summons to vote (surat panggilan) suggests that another impetus for the supervisory committees was the government's concern over rising apathy and election boycotting (Golput).14 Another modification, in response to complaints by the parties, was intended to strengthen the role of witnesses at voting places. They were attached "organically" (secara organik masuk) to the KPPS and their responsibilities were specified to begin with the preparation of the voting place and to end with sending the counted ballots to the subdistrict voting committee (PPS). A nod was made in the direction of more equal treatment of the parties by statements contained in the explanation attached to the amendment: "every social-political force is given the same position, freedom, opportunity, treatment and service in carrying out their campaign together with the same obligation to obey current laws and regulations." The "theme" required of every organization during its campaigning was the organization's program for national development. Raising questions about the offi- cial Pancasila ideology or the 1945 Constitution was expressly prohibited. And, "civil servants who are members of parties or Golkar and who have been nominated... can engage in campaigning." In 1985, the most important amendment to the law was the requirement of ideo- logical monism, or that all social-political forces adhere to the Pancasila as their "one and only principle." Having thus required the election contestants to be philosophi- cally indistinguishable, the amendment decreed that Golkar, PPP, and PDI have the same "position, rights and duties." Not until after the 1985 amendments were made to the (statutory) Election Law did the New Order issue comprehensive implementing regulations in PP 35/1985 (and PP 43/1985 pertaining exclusively to East Timor). This document provided detailed regulations on eleven of the twelve types of election activities, and covered about 100 printed pages. Following the 1987 election, some changes were made in the implementing regu- lations (PP 37/1990), several of which are noteworthy. In order to increase community involvement in the election, the official list of registered voters was to be announced publicly by being posted in the village office for twenty days. Mofre restrictions were placed on campaign activity. For example, every type of campaign activity in public required advance permission of the Chairman of the Election Committee (i.e., chief administrator of the region) and notification of the police a minimum of seven days in advance, and was subject to rescheduling and relocation if the authorities determined that "security could not be well guaranteed." The pro- hibition on campaigning by "members" (anggota) of the Armed Forces was changed to "soldiers" (prajurit), presumably to clarify that only members on active duty must refrain from partisan political activity (including voting and running for elected 14 Since the supervisory committees were placed administratively under the election commit- tees at every level, rather than to some more autonomous body, they probably had little effect on deviations and fraud that were implicitly or explicitly sanctioned by government officials.9 refrain from partisan political activity (including voting and running for elected office). The subdistrict chief (camat) was given authority to determine the number of polling places (TPS), based on the restrictions that no voter be forced to stay away from home overnight due to distance from a polling place, and that no TPS be located in a school or government building. Requirements for witnesses were clari- fied as 1) member of the party represented, 2) resident of the subdistrict in which the polling place was located, and 3) registered voter. On the basis of this brief review of major changes in the Election Law and regu- lations from 1969 to 1990, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the administration of general elections has remained highly centralized under the control of New Order executive authorities, despite the fact that the elections are held in part to elect repre- sentatives for regional assemblies at two subnational levels (DPRD-I, DPRD-II). The particular conditions and problems encountered in conducting elections in two provinces, Irian Jaya and East Timor, were handled by exemptions and the issuance of regulations specific to each province. Second, each one of the twelve delineated types of election activity has been increasingly regulated, especially with the pro- mulgation of implementing regulations in 1985 (PP 35/1985). In other words, whereas authorities have always exercised broad discretionary powers in the matter of elections, since the mid-1980s they have made a concerted effort to codify and institutionalize these powers. But this effort has been a two-edged sword. If it has ensured a controlled and orderly election process, it has also specified and clarified the rules of the game by which actual practice can be measured and found deviating—as well illustrated in the White Book. Third, as the political landscape has undergone restructuring through such methods as enforced simplification of political organizations and ideological monism, the political parties have been granted a greater role in the administration of elections. Helping to expand their role as well was the perpetual struggle of the PPP and PDI for equal treatment, since the bureau- cracy has always heavily favored Golkar. Turning now to changes in actual practices or behavior over time, the discussion will focus on a few aspects of the election process. One of the most repugnant tasks assumed by the New Order authorities has been the screening and endorsement of candidates nominated by the three electoral contenders. As the White Book points out, elimination of candidates by the security apparatus is anti-democratic because it deprives the parties and ultimately the people of the right to choose their representa- tives and there is no way to appeal the results. It is difficult to gauge changes in screening from one election to the next for a variety of reasons, but available evi- dence suggests that it has become more comprehensive and stringent. About 20 percent of the nominated candidates were eliminated through the screening process in 1971.15 The fallout may have been somewhat less in 1977, in light of one report that, at the national level, the PDI lost 19 percent of its candidates, the PPP 16 percent, and Golkar 5 percent.16 As a result of a Presidential Decision in 1990 (KEPPRES 16/1990), a much more comprehensive special investigation (litsus) process was applied to candidates nominated for the 1992 election. The screening process for previous elections—as required by the Election Law and regulations— had involved submission of written answers to specific questions of fact, followed by verification by the police, in order to prove that the nominated candidate had no 15 Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971, pp. 24-28, Tables II, III, and IV. 16 Liddle, 'The 1977 Indonesian Election."10 previous involvement in leftist organizations banned after 1965. The new litsus pro- cess required, in addition, written answers to open-ended and subjective (political) questions and an interview with security personnel. In late 1991, the litsus process triggered nation-wide political controversy. * 7 Restrictions on campaigning have tightened and increased over time. The 1985 implementing regulations discussed above require advance permits and give local security authorities wide discretion over virtually all campaign activities. The official campaign period has been shortened from sixty days in 1971 and 1977, to forty-five days in 1982, and finally and permanently to twenty-five days in 1987 and 1992. Beginning in 1982, the campaign periods have been divided into rounds with each of the three contestants taking their turn for one day on a rotating basis. Violations of election laws and regulations seem to have continued unabated, with very few prosecutions. The General Election Institute (LPU) registered an increase in violations and election crimes from 607 in 1982 to 6,094 in 1987, of which only twenty-eight were prosecuted.*8 Since similar statistics for 1992 were unavail- able for this analysis, it is impossible to judge the extent to which this tenfold increase between 1982 and 1987 was real or the result of more vigilant reporting and clearer standards emerging from the detailed implementing regulations of 1985 (PP 35/1985). Still, as the White Book argues, there can be no debate about lax prosecu- tion of violators, especially when they were government officials or members of Golkar. Overt election-related violence declined in 1987 and 1992 compared to 1977 and 1982.19 The White Book, while presenting a fundamental critique of general elections in the New Order political system, also documents numerous infractions that occurred in the conduct or actual practice of the 1992 election. This in itself must have been a difficult task. Still remaining is a comparison of 1992 against the conduct of previous elections. The question intrigues serious students of Indonesian politics: overall, how did the conduct of the 1992 election measure up against previous New Order elec- tions? It seems fair to conclude that in 1992 there was less overt intervention by the Armed Forces in favor of Golkar than in previous elections, and that the 1992 election was implemented in a more neutral fashion at both the upper or central and the provincial levels.20 But there was little change at the lower levels, where numerous violations and manipulations occurred in such aspects as the distribution of sum- monses needed to vote, the presence of party witnesses at polling places, attention paid to witnesses' complaints, meaningful participation of party representatives in committees (PPS and KPPS), and the initial compilation of the votes. 17 See the feature articles in Editor, September 14,1991. 18 See the feature articles in Forum Keadilan, May 28,1992. 19 Ibid. 20 For a similar assessment, see Ramlan Surbakti, "Pemilihan Pada Pemilu 1992: Antara Kendala dan Peluang" [The Election in the 1992 General Election: Between Obstacle and Opportunity]. Paper delivered at the Seminar Nasional IX Asosiasi Ilmu Politik Indonesia, Surabaya, August 6-8, 1992. Gordon Hein's judgment that "it was the most trouble-free election in the country's history" seems premature in light of his lack of substantiation and this White Book. See his "Indonesia in 1992," Asian Survey 33, 2 (February 1993): 209.1 The 1992 Indonesian General Election [A. Voter Registration, Identification, and Polling Hours] UNREGISTERED AS VOTERS IN 1992 Out of all the citizens of town administrative unit (RW) 10, which consists of six neighborhood associations (RT) in the community of Gondosari, village of Tamansari, subdistrict Wuluhan, district of Jember, province of East Java, not one was able to exercise his/her voting rights because they were not registered by the local committee. How was it possible that not a single person was registered? Sampun, a citizen of RW 10, said that they were never visited by the Voter Registra- tion Committee (PANTARLIH). "Not one official came to our community to register us as voters," said Sampun. They realized they had been omitted only when their neighbors in another RT received C cards. Committee officials, Trimo and Sali, con- firmed that they never visited RW 10. This incident indicates irresponsibility by Soelarso, Governor of East Java, Priyanto Wibowo, Chief of Jember district, Lieu- tenant Colonel Soedjadi, Head of the Social and Political Affairs Office, along with the local subdistrict and village heads. TRANSMIGRANTS LOST RIGHT TO VOTE Tens of thousands of transmigrants who were registered at their place of origin could not exercise their "right to vote" because they did not possess an AB card. These transmigrants are scattered over the provinces of Riau, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya in their new residences at Transmigration Project loca- tions. This was admitted by Minister of Home Affairs, Rudini, and Minister of Transmigration, Sugiarto, two days before election day. It came to the forefront in newspapers which cited statements by Rudini and Sugiarto that this problem would be solved immediately by sending AB cards to the locations where the transmigrants are now residing. Were shipments possible in such a short time? MANY CITIZENS OF THE MENTENG AREA OF CENTRAL JAKARTA NOT REGISTERED TO VOTE This was acknowledged by the daily executive in the Menteng office, Drs. Dachwan. "I was very disappointed with what happened," said a citizen living on Banyumas Street. "It doesn't matter if I choose not to vote (golput), but I truly wanted to exer- cise my right to vote. There were four of us here who did not vote. I don't know where the fault lies," he added. "On Banyumas Street only two houses were regis-12 tered, the house of Pak Wiyogo and another house. Yet there are twenty-one residences here/' he said. If every house contained five voters, it meant that nineteen multiplied by five or ninety-five persons lost their right to vote. Another blatant case was that of Drs. Kwik Gian Gie, the Head of Development and Research in the PDI Central Executive. Drs. Kwik was never registered so that he failed in his candidacy as a PDI legislator for Jakarta. His house was never visited by Registration Committee offi- cials, although an occupant was always present in the house. If matters like these are considered trivial in the capital city Jakarta, how about in the middle of the jungle or in isolated villages? It may be added that the village head responsible for voter reg- istration was transferred in order that the problem could not be traced. Drs. Dachwan assumed his current duties only in March 1992 [about eight months after voter registration]. ALEX ASMASUBRATA SEES RUDINI The Chairman of the PDI Jakarta Region Executive, Alex Asmasubrata, met with Minister of Home Affairs and head of PPI/LPU on June 13, 1992 at the Minister's office. After the meeting, Alex Asmasubrata, who was intercepted by reporters, said that he had conveyed a folder containing reports of election implementation viola- tions. When pressed by reporters about the types of violations which had been found by the PDI, Alex was not specific. He said that the map contained "odd" aspects in the implementation of the election on June 9. "It is up to Pak Rudini whether action will be taken on the violations or court proceedings initiated," said Alex. "We are obliged to report deviations which we encountered in the field during the voting on June 9, 1992," he concluded. Meanwhile, according to information obtained from other sources, PDI witnesses discovered improprieties, such as numerous AB cards being held by people who had C-l cards, voters who voted more than once, and additional voting places which were not listed with the PPD II. (Pos Kota Minggu, June 14, 1992.) PREMATURE VOTING The election was conducted a day early on June 8,1992 in West Kalimantan. Voting was carried out from seven o'clock in the evening until midnight, Western Indonesia Time. This nighttime punching of the ballots was ordered by a certain official of the Bontang subdistrict and the Golkar leadership. It occurred in the communities (idusun) of Begigong and Ganis, village of Majel, communities of Tanjan and Emkodis, which are all located in the subdistrict of Bonti, district of Sanggau, province of West Kalimantan. FRAUD DURING THE ISLAMIC PILGRIMAGE Participants in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca were supposed to cast ballots on June 9, but apparently they were told to vote earlier on May 25,1992. On May 27, Media Indonesia reported as follows: "The casting of ballots by Indonesian pilgrims will be adapted to existing regulations and conducted by the Overseas Voting Committee in Jeddah this coming June 9." Yet, from Jeddah, Media Indonesia reporter Muchlis Hasjim reported yesterday that several pilgrims from East Java had cast their ballots. On Monday (May 25, 1992), those gathered in air charter group eleven, consisting of 480 pilgrims, received two envelopes which contained ballots. Marked ballots were then returned to functionaries of the Voting Committee, said Dafri Abdullah, one of13 the pilgrims who stayed in the Falah Mess Hall. They also related their doubts about the secrecy of the balloting, because voters could interact. "After all, the voting wasn't in a private booth," another pilgrim added. Of course, voting such as this is not legally valid, because it violates the election laws and clearly is not direct, gen- eral, free and secret (LUBER), and the guarantee of its security can be doubted. A SMALL PORTION OF THE REPORTS OF FRAUD DURING THE 1992 ELECTION IN BEKASI In the village of Santiaji, subdistrict of Bekasi Timur: • Voting Implementation Group (KPPS) Margahayu, Bapak Lieut. Col. Siahaan, Military District Commander, proposed that the KPPS commit fraud (under his protection). • KPPS was forced to validate votes that were declared invalid by PDI and PPP witnesses. • It was recommended that the Chairman of KPPS file his fingernails. • Many Form C ballots from Jakarta were utilized at voting place VII Margahayu. • Many ballots were declared invalid, especially ballots of PDI and PPP. • Sudden registration of people who were given Form C ballots which were imme- diately punched. • Chairman of KPPS at voting place XXII put three ballots in the box on two occa- sions (six ballots). • Computation of votes tended to be done hurriedly so that the witnesses could not pay close attention. • Many members of the community did not get a summons to get Form C. In the village of Bintara, subdistrict of Bekasi Barat: • The village head issued blank AB Forms which had already been signed and stamped by him and conveyed to the neighborhood (RW) office 04. • At voting places VI, XXX, XXI and III, the vote counting was closed to the PDI witness, Ms. Romiyana. • At voting place VII, Medan Satria, there were many counterfeit AB Forms lacking registration numbers. • At Ujung Menteng there was a Form AB from Kali Baru, voting place XVII. • Two counterfeit AB Forms without registration numbers in the name of Darmadi. • In the voting place in the Bakrie and Brothers factory complex, namely voting places XX and XXI, the election utilized Form Cs from all over the district (Tambun, Babelan, and Kaliabang). This matter was witnessed by PDI witnesses, Djanuri Santo and Tonny Bener Ambarita, from the Regional Implementation Supervisory Committee. • Examples of names which utilized AB Forms and the voting places which issued them: Riswanto, Rohayati, Nyai Herawati, Marzuki A, Syfrul Jamal, Bambang14 Mulyono, Bambang Suryadi, Suhata, Endang Suhgiarti, Aris Wiyono, Marsaid, Rismiyati, Haryono, Harisman, Sriyanto, Supaidi, Mrs. Supaidi, Suhardi, Rustam Hadisaputro, and Musa Jani (reported by a PDI witness). [B. Treatment of Witnesses at the Voting Places] REJECTION OF PPP AND PDI WITNESSES PPP and PDI witnesses were turned away in the subdistricts of Tayun Hilir, Nanga Mahap, Nanga Taman, Belitang Hulu, and Belitang Hilir—all located in the district of Sangau, West Kalimantan. All these infractions were reported by the regional leaders of PPP and PDI (Drs. Syarifuddin and Drs. Massardi Kaphat), who concur- rently protested strongly to the District Chief, who heads the District Election Committee (PPD II), and to the Governor, who heads the Provincial Election Com- mittee (PPD I). These party leaders rejected the election results as legally flawed and urged that the balloting be repeated. (Kompas, June 15,1992.) THE PROBLEM OF WITNESSES Ismail Hasan Meutareum, General Chairman of the PPP Central Executive, and his counterpart in the PDI made a big issue of this at every opportunity during the cam- paign. Both appealed to every activist in the PPP and PDI to be prepared and willing to serve as witnesses in every voting place throughout Indonesia. Political party wit- nesses should not be intimidated. The presence of political party witnesses at every voting place is very important to guarantee that the election is implemented directly, generally, voluntarily, secretly [in casting ballots] and justly. Every witness must be given a recapitulation record of the vote computation of each contestant, in accor- dance with the laws and regulations. If every witness receives a recapitulation record, then checking and rechecking of votes obtained can be done exactly. Efforts to manipulate the vote can be avoided, and suspicions will disappear, as hoped by the Government, including the LPU. But what happened in the conduct of the 1992 election? The attendance of both PPP and PDI witnesses was inhibited everywhere throughout Indonesia, even though they had obtained letters of appointment from the district chiefs or mayors. Party witnesses were intimidated and conspired against with dirty methods. If they did not succeed with those methods, village and subdis- trict officials openly and roughly expelled them from the voting places. Here are several examples of this phenomenon: • PDI General Chairman Soeryadi said that 5,000 PDI witnesses were unable to function in East Nusa Tenggara based on the excuse that they were not registered in the village and subdistrict. "This was a trumped up excuse. There is no regula- tion such as this. This requirement of registration was unnecessary," added Soeryadi. • In the district of Bojonegoro, only 500 out of about 1000 PDI witnesses were authorized. In Madiun district, only 144 witnesses out of 4,000 proposed by PDI were authorized. In Mojokerto district, out of 1,400 proposed PDI witnesses, only 400 were authorized. • In West Kalimantan, Sanggau district, subdistricts Tayun Hilir, Nanga Mahap, Nanga Taman, Belitang Hulu, and Belitang Hilir, the presence of every PPP and PDI witness was rejected at every polling place.15 • The presence of witnesses representing each contestant in the 1992 election democracy festival is required according to the election regulations. Why did [Minister] Rudini as head of the PPI/LPU not take action which would have facilitated the presence of political party witnesses, comparable with Golkar wit- nesses or bureaucrats who served as Golkar witnesses? In the matter of witnesses, had Rudini along with the entire Department of Home Affairs apparatus chosen a favorite contestant? BEATING OF PDI WITNESSES The Wonogiri, Central Java, PDI Branch Leadership Council reported a case of cruel treatment of Randim Karsorejo (56) by Htn., the head of the Tiangu community, vil- lage of Balepanjang, subdistrict of Jatipurno. This case was reported to the Wonogiri police on June 9,1992 after voting was completed. Randim, a PDI witness at voting station VI, asked the head of Tiangu why Randim's friend Rakimin, who had been appointed a PDI witness, was not present to carry out his duty as a PDI witness. That question was posed because the absence of Rakimin was orchestrated by Tiangu head, Htn. The answer received by Randim was that Rakimin had been beaten by Htn. According to the testimony of the victim, he was struck repeatedly until he became ill and fell to the stone studded street. (Kompas, June 17,1992.) INSULTING POLITICAL PARTIES While this case was being handled by the Wonogiri police, the PDI Branch Leader- ship Council received a complaint on Tuesday, June 16,1992 from five citizens who were PDI witnesses in the Ngasri neighborhood, village of Giriwamo, subdistrict of Giriwamo. The village head insulted PDI with the statement, "PDI is the same as the forbidden PKI." The insult was made when PDI witnesses, Mugino, Saino, Karno, and Paino came to the village office to request a letter identifying them as PDI wit- nesses. [C. Intimidation and Violence Against Political Organizations] TANGERANG WEST JAVA The closing of PDI Tangerang's campaign occurred on June 2, 1992 at the Cimone soccer field. This last rally of the PDI was attended by General Chairman Soeryadi and an entourage from Jakarta. About 25,000 supporters of the Wild Bull [symbol of the PDI] were in attendance. Upon completion of the program, the rally continued with a pafade through the city of Tangerang. Later the parade was disbanded in an open field and the entourage returned to their respective homes. Meanwhile, a group of PDI supporters who remained resting at the soccer field were attacked by a group of youth of unknown identity. The latter, using machetes, short knives, and sickles attacked the small group of PDI supporters. Fleeing to save themselves, the PDI sup- porters left behind their red shirts and campaign materials. There were several casualities in this incident. ARSON AND TORTURING OF PDI ACTIVISTS Election violations in North Sulawesi were more noticeable than in other regions throughout Indonesia. Considerable property was lost when eleven houses of16 members and leaders of the PDI were burned by operatives of unknown identity. In addition, four PDI activists were tortured in rough and inhumane ways. In Manado, North Sulawesi, forty PDI activists were tortured so that they became black and blue. Drs. Yance, Head of the DPD, PDI, reported all these viola- tions to the PDI General Chairman in a leadership meeting in Jakarta, June 14-15, 1992. ELECTION PROTESTERS HIT WITH CRIMINAL CHARGES Six persons including the Assistant-Ill to the Rector of Diponegoro University were interrogated by Semarang Police in connection with the Golkar campaign at the Faculty of Literature during a rally commemorating National Awakening Day (Media Indonesia, May 27, 1992). Legal experts rejected the accusation of subversion which was mentioned in this case. On the other hand, the plan of the Semarang Police to utilize Article 154 of the Penal Code was also inappropriate, because election protest is not a statement of hatred. Rather it is a political attitude that is protected by the Constitution, namely the section on human rights. POLICE OVERREACTING Suara Pembaruan, May 22, reported that Dr. Mochtar Naim commented, "A lot of fun, but, and there is a but... It is like a race, we often experience interference so that sometimes we fail to reach the finish line... Our competition is not Golkar or PDI, but the government apparatus such as village heads and the police." They have used all kinds of methods to wreck the campaigning of this former lecturer at Andalas University, Padang, and other campaigners of national stature such as Rusydi Hamka. "I myself failed once in Tanah Datar and twice in Pesisir Selatan. In my own neighborhood in the district of Agam, I almost was unable to appear because the people who determine who makes campaign appearances are not the PPP Branch Leadership Council (DPC), but the local police. Apparently the PPP, DPC did not have courage to protest it," he added. The question is, what is the validity of Pan- casila democracy and the consensus of the political organizations? Is this phenomenon guided democracy or bureaucrat democracy? FIRED BECAUSE HE JOINED THE PDI Hendro Sukarno (37), employee of public corporation Angkasa Pura II, was fired by his superior because he wanted to join PDI. This case proves again that freedom in elections is a fiction. Civil servants or workers in state-owned enterprises are forced in various ways to support Golkar. They may not make another choice. Hendro had been employed at Angkasa Pura for ten years. On May 20,1991, he told his superior that he wanted to join PDI. But on October 28, 1991 he got a "gift" consisting of termination without severance pay. Now Hendro is suing that public enterprise for damages in the amount of Rp. 100 million. HOUSES OF PDI ACTIVISTS BURNED Four houses of PDI activists in the subdistrict of Seririt, district of Buleleng, Bali were damaged and burned. I Gusti Kuat (28), aide to the Seririt PDI commissioner, was startled when suddenly stones came raining down upon his house. "One stone nearly hit my child," said Gusti. This damaging of PDI activists' houses is a form, more or less, of intimidation. But, we should remember that slum houses and markets are even more often burned.17 PPP CAMPAIGNERS REPRESSED The PPP West Sumatra Region Executive Council canceled campaign plans because its spokespersons could not obtain permits. According to H. Yahya, head of the Council, spokespersons in all areas except the municipality of Padang had difficulty obtaining campaign permits. They have protested, but no response has yet been received. 'This reflects the failure of Pancasila democracy," said Hasyim Idrus, the Chair- man of PPP Central Lampung Branch Executive Council. He complained that just because of this prohibition, PPP supporters became afraid to approach campaign locations, and only fifty people had the courage to come. 201 PEOPLE ARRESTED IN JAKARTA Jakarta metropolitan police arrested at least 201 during the first ten days of the cam- paign, and 820 drivers were ticketed. The reasons for the ticketing and arrests involved mainly no driver's license, transporting campaign supporters, and the accu- sation of motorized parades. The government outlawed motorized parades in this election campaign. And foolishly, none of the political organizations protested. The problem subsequently was, how could campaign participants gather all in one place if they were not allowed to crowd into trucks? Were they supposed to walk or was it assumed they all had cars? This prohibition was clearly intended to prevent mass gatherings. It is 180 degrees from the election freedom we're always being told about. SRI BINTANG SLAPPED WITH RED CARD* This legislative candidate from the PPP was presented with a red card while cam- paigning in South Sumatra. According to the election committee, Sri Bintang's campaign material discredited the government. But it turns out that what was evalu- ated as being derogatory towards development in the speech was only figures about poverty and injustice, evidence of which is easily found in everyday life. Prejudice against Sri Bintang appears to have begun when he announced openly that he was not afraid to join PPP, even though he is a civil servant. Apparently the government is worried about the prospect of increasing defections from Golkar among civil servants. AZWAR ANAS INSULTS THE POLITICAL PARTIES Golkar spokesperson, Azwar Anas, urged the people not to trust the political parties because they can only make empty promises. According to Azwar, who is also Min- ister of Communications, parties were given leadership in the period 1945 to 1967, but they only quarreled among themselves. So they need not be trusted. This attitude of Azwar Anas is clearly in contradiction to the Constitution which recognizes parties, and also violates Government Regulation No. 35,1985. According to the latter, campaigners are forbidden to slander and insult official organizations. So it would be appropriate if Azwar were hit with a red card. * Red card refers to a ticket or summons issued by the authorities for violation of regulations governing the campaign.18 ALI SADIKIN PROTESTS ABOUT KENTOT HARSENO Ali Sadikin wrote a letter, which was printed in Suara Karya, April 24, 1992, to the Commander of the Armed Forces, Army General Try Sutrisno, protesting the state- ment of Metro Jakarta Regional Commander, Major-General Kentot Harseno, about the security situation during the 1992 election. Kentot was quoted as saying: "Whoever he is, don't try anything here in Jakarta. I will destroy him. I am afraid of no one. So don't be influenced to ruin stability. I will shoot." He also said: "Another extreme group is the Group of 50, which is a coordinating organization for disap- pointed generals. They are supported by several NGOs, former members of the Indonesian Socialist Party, and persons previously involved in the Malari incident. Also, the Petition of 50 often provides leadership for movements and draws sympa- thy on campus, among the young generation, by utilizing the guise of religion to attract sympathy." Ali Sadikin thinks that: • This statement by the Jakarta commander damages the honor of the Army's senior officer corps, which should be upheld. • This statement, which contains intimidation, will cause increasing general fear in society, on the one hand, and may also cause general hatred of the military, on the other hand. • The group, Petition of 50, for twelve years has been conveying criticism and ideas about the renewal of national and state life in accordance with the proclamation contained in the Pancasila and the Constitution. Accordingly, the statement by the Jakarta Commander about the Petition of 50 group is slanderous. What is done by the Petition of 50 is essentially only devout service. Moreover, the statement of the Jakarta Commander against the Petition of 50 will increase its support and sympathy in the community, especially among the youth, because support and sympathy are usually given to "groups which are considered weak." TWO VILLAGE HEADS ACCUSE PDI=PKI The heads of villages Tanjung Beringin and Lebong Utara in Bengkulu charged: Join- ing PDI is like joining the [outlawed] PKI." Crazy! Efforts to scare the people never end. Village heads cannot differentiate D from K. GURUH STOPS HIS SPEECH, PLATFORM COLLAPSES The fate of the Proclaimer's [ref. Sukarno] son is sad, too. When he was campaigning before 10,000 PDI supporters in Cilacap, suddenly the platform collapsed, and he was forced to stop his speech. There were no casualties in this incident, only Guruh was rather pale. Yet he has been nominated for president. Was this sabotage? ALEX SELLS HOUSE FOR PDI CAMPAIGN Alex Asmasubrata, 41, is a champion car racer. This number one PDI candidate for the DPR from West Java acknowledged that he was forced to sell his house in order to pay his campaign costs. It is understandable, since PDI had to mobilize voluntary contributions in the amount of Rp. 12.5 billion just for campaigning in Jakarta. We pray that much good fortune will come to Pak Alex if he gets into the DPR so that he can purchase a house again and get his capital back.19 3000 PDI SUPPORTERS INVADE THE BOGOR OFFICE OF THE MILITARY POLICE It started with three PDI persons being arrested while campaigning. They were arrested by the Military Police without a reason, giving rise to spontaneous solidarity from their friends. Supporters of PDI gathered, surrounding the Military Police office on Tuesday, June 2nd. They demanded that their friends be freed. This crowd pressure succeeded, and the three PDI members were let go. But ramifications continued. Guerrilla warfare between PDI supporters and others broke out. In front of the Internusa Mall, three police were attacked by the crowd. On the other hand, Golkar supporters threw objects at the houses of PDI members. A boardinghouse of student activists was stoned. Hostile, uninvited guests entered the office of the Ampera Legal Aid Institute. In fact, a typewriter and a cam- era disappeared from this office. Provocations against PDI members continued all during the campaign. Thus is the face of New Order Democracy. SUDOMO TALKS IN HIS SLEEP AGAIN Coordinating Minister Sudomo warned that there are certain persons who want to ruin the results of the election by spreading the issue that it was fraudulent and full of intimidation. He also warned the political organizations who are unwilling to approve the results of the election. According to him, such refusal can be regarded as an effort to spoil the election and could be punished with five years [in jail]. His statement invited wide reaction, and was judged the statement of someone sleeping in broad daylight. Even Sudomo's own friend, H.J. Naro, the Deputy Chairman of the DPR, said he regretted the statement of the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. According to Naro, Sudomo's accusation had absolutely no basis, because Naro judged the election to have improved in quality. "So, whether or not the accusation is true, we come back to the current laws. We must now uphold the law (why not earlier, Pak?—editor), meaning that if there was fraud, don't just be forgiving, legal proceedings must be initiated. This means that political organizations may file legal suit outside the Implementation Supervisory Committee," he contin- ued. But the reaction to Sudomo's statement was actually not only about this matter. Sudomo took actions out of proportion in the form of threating the press. He threat- ened the mass media so that they would not publish a statement by one political organization which complained about fraud and the cancellation of the election. Moreover, Sudomo said quite seriously that if the mass media published this state- ment^ they could be accused of provocation. In response, the leadership of the PDI said that Sudomo's statement was excessive. THE ELECTION IN EAST TIMOR The region of East Timor, which passed through battle in 1975, has become Indo- nesia's twenty-seventh province, but it is not yet free from coercion. It's not very long since East Timor society experienced a huge disaster which we know as the "Dili Incident," in which hundreds of East Timorese people were killed. East Timor, whose integration into the Indonesian state is not yet recognized by the United Nations because it was "integrated" by an invasion, can be said to have been "electioned" into the 1992 festival of democracy. As is well known, the election in East Timor was colored by instances of coercion by the local authorities.20 Information from some of our sources shows that the implementation of the elec- tion in East Timor was very coercive. According to information we received on the eve of the election, the youth in the districts of Ermera, Liquisa, and Manattuto were closely watched by security people, because in the last election the number of votes obtained by PDI had soared. And it turned out after the election that several sadden- ing incidents happened in places where PDI won. For example in Quelicai-Baucau, several persons became victims of the Armed Forces (ABRI) because they voted for PDI. These persons were tortured/beaten near death by the Armed Forces; they included 1) Felix da Costa, 2) Antonio Cabral, and 3) Pedro Pinto. Although the implementation of the 1992 election was generally accompanied by tightened security by the Armed Forces, it still resulted in pursuits and arrests of the native people. Houses of people under suspicion were broken into (inspected) in the middle of the night by security people. Intelligence people swarmed about in various places in order to watch all forms of the people's activities. Many military men in full combat dress and with weapons were encountered on public streets. They boarded public transportation, even sat down without paying. Consequently, drivers com- plained about paying the rental fee for the vehicles. The tightened security also was applied toward high school/university students who studied outside the region and were visiting family in their home villages. They were watched continuously, and the people were scared to have any relationship with them. No exceptions were made for priests and nuns, who were also under tight surveillance while engaging in pastoral activities. Some even got the opportunity to be called for periodic interro- gation, including Pastor Dominggos Soares and Pastor Ricardo da Silva. [D. Handling and Compilation of the Ballots] BALLOT BOX SNATCHED AWAY TO THE SUBDISTRICT OFFICE According to the regulations, a ballot box containing ballots must be opened and counted at the official place of voting. Boxes containing votes were snatched away to the office of Subdistrict Nagarawi, district of Sintang, West Kalimantan. There the boxes were opened and the ballots counted without being witnessed by represen- tatives of the PPP and PDI. RUDINI APOLOGIZES TO THE PDI Minister of Home Affairs Rudini, better known as the head of the PPI/LPU, apolo- gized to the DPP, PDI for the misprint in the announcement of votes obtained by PDI in East Nusa Tenggara. On June 10-11, 1992, the PPI/LPU announced that the PDI had obtained 210,003 votes in East Nusa Tenggara. But on June 12 the total changed to 126,677 votes. This drastic change raised a big question for each election contes- tant, especially the PDI. It needs to be noted that PDI witnesses did not function throughout East Nusa Tenggara. The head of the DPD, PDI for East Nusa Tenggara said that the violations and fraud in the casting of ballots were reported to the DPP, PDI in Jakarta in the all-Indonesia DPD, PDI leadership meeting, June 14 and 15, 1992. Simon Hayon, head of DPD, PDI in East Nusa Tenggara, protested to the provincial Implementation Supervisory Committee. "We are not responsible for all the fraud and violations which happened throughout East Nusa Tenggara. Therefore we hope the PDI Central Executive with its entire organization can clarify the prob- lem at the central level," he said.21 Rudini's apology was sent through Adi Pranoto and Bambang Haryanto SH, who represent the PDI Central Executive and serve as deputy heads of the Central Implementation Supervisory Committee, to be passed on to the General Chairman of the PDI. It should be noted also that no one is allowed to enter the vote computation/computer room of the LPU except functionaries appointed by Rudini. PPP LEADERS IN SAMPANG, MADURA REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE ELECTION RESULTS The head of the PPP Branch Leadership Council (DPC) in Sampang District, Madura, East Java refused to sign the form acknowledging the 1992 election results because of the large number of deviations and violations harmful to the PPP. The members of the PPP leadership council agreed that the results of the vote counting which were sent to district, provincial, and central election committees were illegal and they requested a repeat vote. K.H. Nasib Siradj, the head of DPC, PPP Sampang, also said, "the DPC, PPP Sampang together with 1128 witnesses is prepared to defend its posi- tion because it is our duty and we must speak the truth." According to Muzalki, another of the PPP leaders, "our decision is final. Whether or not it is acceptable to the provincial and central party leaders, the decision of the DPC, PPP Sampang will not be changed." Violations in the implementation of the election occurred in the subdistricts of Jremi and Banyuadem. None of the PPP witnesses in the two subdis- tricts was given copies of the CA 1 form (recapitulation of vote computation). Yet every witness should be entitled to a copy. According to PPP witnesses in Jengrik, PPP obtained 8,000 votes and Golkar 5,000. Yet these figures changed by the time the votes arrived in the subdistrict office; PPP had 3,000 votes and Golkar more than 11,000. This case is one of the most interesting of all instances of violation and fraud in the 1992 election. ELECTION VIOLATIONS IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA In the municipality of Padang, subdistrict Padang Barat, on Purus Lima Street, a group of youths succeeded in foiling the attempt of certain operatives to exchange the ballot box at voting place No. 5, containing the results of the voting on June 9, with another ballot box which had been prepared in advance. This happened just as the vote counting was about to begin. A tense atmosphere could not be avoided, because the youths succeeded in a struggle for the ballot box containing [legal] votes which had just been opened. This box was taken to the provincial police office not far from voting place No. 5. The youths explained that it was about to be exchanged by several operatives with another box when they foiled the attempt. Yet in the resulting dispute, they were the ones that were accused of stealing a ballot box. This effort to exchange the ballot box in Padang was the first report of violations received by PPP Central Executive. According to General Chairman Ismail Hasan Metareum, the case will be immediately reported to the PPI/LPU and the Central Implementation Supervisory Committee in Jakarta. (Kompas, June 10,1992.) [E. Inconsistencies and Bias of Authorities] THE PRESIDENT VIOLATES HIS OWN INSTRUCTION The President instructed that, during the month-long campaign, government officials were forbidden to engage in official visits and formalities at project sites. But the22 President himself officiated at projects in West Java, Aceh, West Kalimantan, and other places. These hundreds of projects were not new projects, rather they were only additions of warehouses, laboratories, rest rooms, and bathrooms. Did not the President violate his own instructions and, moreover, create the impression that the President has insufficient work? In connection with this prohibition, there is evidence that a number of ministers violated it as well, including Minister Rudini who opened/dedicated Pasar Baru in Malang and other projects. GOVERNMENT VEHICLES FOR CAMPAIGNING A number of government vehicles (red license plates) were used in campaign activi- ties, but the numbers on their plates were covered with plastic, such as when Golkar units pasted the Golkar emblem over the plates (Media Indonesia, May 27,1992). This clearly violated the rules about using government facilities. MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICE FACILITIES The Department of Industry misused government office facilities by turning its office into a campaign place for Department workers, which was called Solidarity Day. The activity, involving about 8,000 Department of Industry workers, took place on Saturday, May 30, 1992, in the back courtyard of the Department of Industry office. The gate, which was usually opened, on this day was closed, and only visitors with a yellow invitation were allowed to enter. "Today office activities have been cancelled," said a Department worker. Office facilities, such as telephone and air conditioner, were intentionally turned off so that workers were uncomfortable stay- ing inside the office. However, according to Presidential Instruction No. 8/92 on the implementation of the campaign, campaigning may not be carried out in government offices, hospi- tals, school buildings, and their yards. This stipulation is found in Chapter IV, article 22, paragraph 1. Although these activities of the Department of Industry were given the name Solidarity Day, in reality it is difficult to separate them from campaign activities. The speakers who appeared often cried out "Long live Golkar" and invited listeners to greet the call "Golkar" with the response, "Victory." Among the speakers appearing on the program of this Solidarity Day were the Junior Minister of Industry, Tunky Ariwibowo, and the Minister of Industry, Hartarto Sastrosoenarto. In attendance were all Directors General of the Department of Industry in addition to about 8,000 Department staff. Junior Minister Tunky Ariwibowo on this occasion said that there are at least three themes in the campaign: democracy, renewal, and justice. According to him, Golkar is concerned and struggles continuously for these themes. "Golkar activists must be able to grasp the issues appropriately," said Tunky Ariwibowo. He did not forget to invite the participants in this Solidarity Day to vote for Golkar in the elec- tion on June 9. He said that a Golkar win could guarantee the continuation of national development. Also, Tunky Ariwibowo explained that during twenty-five years, the New Order government has succeeded in changing the structure of the economy from a condition in which the agricultural sector predominates to one in which a balance between agriculture and industry has been achieved. In 1991, the industrial sector contributed 20 percent of the Gross Domestic Prod- uct or the same as the contribution of the agricultural sector. This balance occurred for the first time, because previously agriculture always contributed more than23 industry to the composition of the GDP. "If the structure is in balance, it means that the country has entered the era of industrialization," said the Minister of Industry, Hartarto Sastrosoenarto, quoting a report of the UNDP—the United Nations Agency for Development. GOLKAR NOT SATISFIED WITH UTILIZING THE BUREAUCRACY The bureaucracy is supposed to serve society. It is salaried with the people's money, so that in almost all states bureaucrats are called civil servants. Only in Indonesia are civil servants called servants of the state. The state and society are clearly different. The New Order state is directly connected with Golkar. But the society consists of members of Golkar, PDI, PPP, and also Golput. In every election, Golkar utilizes the bureaucracy for its own purposes. Golkar uses the facilities of the bureaucracy and forces civil servants to participate in parades. On the other hand, civil servants who prefer another party can be fired. President Suharto said that ministers may not engage in official travel during the campaign. Yet he himself officially opened factories in Cilegon and Aceh. If the Pres- ident violates his own talk, it is no wonder that thirty-seven ministers do likewise. Rudini officiated at a market in Malang, Sugiarto manipulated 45,000 transmigrants in Central Sulawesi, Hartarto was busy managing industry in Central Java, Tunky was in Lampung, and Hasrul Harahap used a government jeep while campaigning in Bengkulu. All imitated Suharto, competing to be the cleverest at utilizing govern- ment facilities for the Golkar campaign. On the last day of the Golkar campaign in Jakarta, Saturday (May 30,1992), the clearest scene of fraud occurred. All [government] departments took a holiday. Min- isters gave speeches in office courtyards. All air conditioners and telephones were turned off so that employees would exit their offices and listen to the ministers cam- paigning. Nor was this sufficient. Roll call was taken, so that no employees could get away. Using departmental facilities in this way violates Presidential Instruction No. 8/92 about campaign regulations. After they gathered in the courtyard, departments gave transportation money in the amount of Rp. 2000 per employee to attend the campaign rally in Senayan. The story of Golkar utilizing the bureaucracy is possibly nothing new. We only wish to stress again that the state is not the property of Golkar. Equipment, build- ings, employee salaries—all are supported by the people's taxes. So Golkar ought to come to its senses. Do not continuously attach yourselves to or utilize office facilities. We* call on the other political organizations to try continuously to separate Golkar from the bureaucracy. Do not talk about it only during the campaign. If PDI and PPP are unable to stop this fraud, they had best stop being parties. Change their names and become associations of comedians or rotating credit associations. Because how can a party struggle to improve the people's lives if it is unable even to defend itself? GOLKAR DOES NOT OWN TVRI The national [public] television is funded from the people's fees. Thus it should treat the people's aspirations justly. But actually, its affection in campaign news was one- sided. Every evening, six to ten minutes were allocated to coverage of Golkar activi- ties and scenes were shown from several places around the entire country. In contrast, the PDI and the PPP were [each] allocated only one or two minutes and scenes from only one or two places were shown. This clearly contradicted the joint24 agreement on campaign news broadcasts. If this continues, let us just change its name to TVG: Television Golkar. VEILED CAMPAIGNING Every day and night the state television (TVRI) broadcasts New Order development progress, for example, tenfold increases in exports, hundredfold increases in road construction. This is done as a veiled campaign for the success of the Golkar gov- ernment. What is unjust is that the news did not disclose the real truth, for example, the extent of embezzlement of state funds [under the New Order] compared to the Old Order, rising prices, deteriorating roads, unemployment, poverty, and a several hundredfold increase in foreign debt, crime, etc. Questions certainly can be asked about all these things. POLICE INJUSTICE Police actions appeared unbalanced in taking action against campaigners, for exam- ple, when they took action against PDI supporters on the pretext of them causing traffic jams, not wearing helmets, riding three persons on one motorcycle, having many passengers in open-roof cars, driving open trucks, or sitting on top of car roofs. The police normally never take action against behavior such as this. Actually, even without a campaign the traffic in Jakarta jams constantly. Other contestants, such as Golkar, engaged in these violations as well, so why were 5,000 supporters of PDI escorted to the Regional Police Command? Similarly in Yogyakarta, only when PDFs turn at campaigning arrived did the Governor issue an order prohibiting motorized parades. This contributed to the subsequent situation in which the flags of all politi- cal organizations were lowered and replaced by white flags. TRAFFIC VIOLATION One of the vehicles of some Golkar campaign participants was stopped. But within several minutes, Asmori Lody, the driver of the Suzuki Carry, was freed, despite the fact that his driver's license expired seven years ago. "Of course, the regional police chief has said that police officers do not discriminate among the three contestants' campaigns," said a reporter who witnessed the incident (Sinar Pagi, May 25,1992). So why did the police discriminate in this case? FUNDS AND GIFTS Greater Jakarta Military Commander, K. Harseno, donated fifteen million rupiah, five automobiles, and dozens of motorcycles to each of the three election contestants. It needs to be asked, were these personal gifts of Major-General Harseno, or gifts in his capacity as regional military commander, and where did the money and so many vehicles come from, since his salary as military commander is insufficient even to support his family? Was this money an item in the Armed Forces budget or the central government budget, or was it an extension of a fat cat's hand? If a foreign contribution, was it registered with a government agency? Did these gifts not have a political implication, since the Commander's wife herself traveled around during the campaign as a Golkar spokesperson? Was this consistent with the Commander's statement that the Armed Forces did not favor any one group?25 PSEUDO MILITARY In providing for campaign and election security, the National Stabilization Consoli- dation Assistance Coordinating Agency (BAKORSTANAS) prohibited the general community from using Armed Forces uniforms, or ones resembling them. Yet on May 27, 1992, the daily newspaper Media Indonesia contained a photograph of a Golkar security team dressed in camouflage-khaki uniforms and hats resembling those of the Armed Forces. Was this a violation, or was the Golkar team an extension of the hand of the Armed Forces, a kind of fifth column? PPP AND PDI PROTEST MANIPULATION OF BALLOTS PPP and PDI protested the manipulation of paper ballots, which benefits Golkar, to the regional offices of the General Election Institute. These two socio-political organi- zations found sample ballots which contained only the Golkar symbol. Such election materials certainly damage PPP and PDI. For example, these sample ballots were used in voting training in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta. Consequently, the village masses got the impression that Golkar was the only choice. Such training can be called psychological intimidation or an effort to deceive so that the people will vote for Golkar. PROHIBITION ON PARADES WITH SUKARNO'S PORTRAIT UNFAIR—ARIEF BUDIMAN In the opinion of this lecturer from Satya Wacana University, Bung Kamo's charisma consitutes one of PDFs assets. So the prohibition against processions displaying the portrait of the Proclaimer [of Independence] is unfair, since Golkar is allowed to mobilize the bureaucracy to win votes. Bung Arief is correct. Moreover, what is fair about the current system of election? Rief, when will you don a white shirt with a pentagonal symbol again? Weren't you the pioneer of Golput? SUKARNO MENTIONED The Sinar Pagi daily, May 12, 1992, reported that a Golkar rally in Jakarta was attended by Suprapto, Sudomo, Suhardiman, Azwar Anas, and others. According to Azwar Anas, "Bung Karno [former President Sukarno] requested burial under a banyan tree, so cast your ballot for the banyan [symbol of Golkar]." It is appropriate to ask, was not this statement a violation of election campaign rules that prohibit using the name and picture of Bung Karno? And why was it Golkar campaigners who utilized Sukarno? Why did the police not take decisive action? MONOPOLY OF FACILITIES On the pretext that the campaign was increasingly brutal and endangering security, Golkar shifted to a dialogue form of campaigning in Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and other places (Media Indonesia, May 27, 1992). Because campuses are mostly controlled by rectors affiliated with Golkar, making it easy in practice for Golkar to obtain permits from university authorities, facilities for dialogue on cam- pus were monopolized by Golkar. Certainly this was contradictory to freedom of speech and the ethical prohibition against any one political organization claiming ownership over an area.26 HUNDREDS OFIPB STUDENTS PROTEST, THEIR CAMPUS BECOMES CAMPAIGN ARENA The rainy city [Bogor] is no longer chilly. The spirit of blue-jacketed youth warms the morning and offers hope. They have awakened and stand up to express their opin- ion. "Don't sully our campus," thus more or less is the feeling of hundreds of IPB students. Demonstrations spread out in Satari park, Baranangsiang, since nine o'clock a.m. The protests, which were organized by the Student Senate, originated from Golkar intervention in the Blue Campus. Several irritating Golkar actions included the pasting of banyan tree pictures on the Darmaga Campus, the education and training of Golkar activists in the IPB Alumni building, and Rachmat Witoelar's holding a dialogue in the Binarum building. IPB students could not accept their alma mater being dirtied. "Campus serenity has been sullied by Golkar symbols," said one student. The chairman of the IPB Student Senate, Farid, stated that Golkar should apolo- gize for its impudence in besmirching IPB. He demanded that the apology be made in the mass media and in an official letter addressed to the IPB academic community. Farid's opinion was supported by the Rector of IPB, Sitanala Arsyad, who stated that the election campaign should not enter the campus. We send warm greetings to the bravery of the blue jackets. Don't forget that the apology by Golkar has not yet showed up in the newspapers. UNRAM STUDENT PROTESTS SPREAD AGAINST COERCION TO VOTE GOLKAR The Mataram University Student Senate organized a protest at the University on Wednesday, May 27,1992, at ten o'clock. Lecturers, staff, student recipients of Super- semar scholarships, and recipients of Pertamina scholarships were protesting against being forced to check the banyan symbol in voting training. This was the implemen- tation of the Rector's letter No. 4348/PT21.H/07.01.07/1992, dated May 22, 1992, which required that recipients of Supersemar and Pertamina scholarships participate in voting training. The program "open platform" was attended by thousands of students, all regret- ting the actions of the Rector and his apparatus. The protesting students hung a banner on which was written, "VOTING TRAINING IS A FORM OF POLITICAL SWINDLE (pembodohan—lit. making people stupid)," and several other posters deco- rated the open platform atmosphere. They judged this training to be a duping tactic which tended toward emascula- tion and obfuscation of the meaning of democracy, making it "forced" democracy. In addition, they displayed evidence that this voting training was conducted with only one symbol, the Golkar emblem, which was posted at the training place. Students stressed: "This is coercive action to vote for Golkar." "This training is actually not needed, ever since the last election in my village there was never voting training such as this," added another student. Usually, the Rector accuses students of engaging in practical politics in an effort to dampen critical activities of students, but this time the Rector played "dirty poli- tics" or "peanut politics." Also, this training was evaluated by students as lowering the prestige of the University's academic community, and making it look stupid, or in their words, "being treated like a village chicken which needs to be trained." In practice, the training consisted of intimidation which resulted in coercion to choose only a certain election symbol. "Students do not accept it, UNRAM has become a27 political propaganda tool of private interests and tyrannical power," stressed a stu- dent activist from the Law Faculty, Bambang Mei. [F. Mobilization of Society] COMPULSORY PATROLS: GENERAL ELECTION = WAR EMERGENCY? In connection with election security, a circular distributed in all town administrative units (RW) and neighborhood associations (RT) announced compulsory patrols by the people at government instruction (from May 17 through June 19, 1992). Anyone not participating would be fined. So people already finding it difficult to make a liv- ing are burdened with staying up and talking all night, disturbing their primary occupation. Thus, we ask: if stability is firmly established [as the New Order claims], why does just holding an election require such incessant mobilization of the neighbor- hood security system? Is the election equal to a war emergency, requiring a general mobilization? It also needs to be asked, what are the duties and responsibilities of the professional military units at the village level, the police, the civilian defense units, and the noncommissioned law enforcement officers for guaranteeing security? Moreover, they are salaried by the people and the state for this duty and responsi- bility. PUBLIC ORDER FFOR THE SAKE OF THE ELECTION Besides compulsory patrols by the people, there were other repugnant events due to the election. (Suara Pembaruan, May 27,1992.) For example, the temporary stopping of the main night train between Semarang and Jakarta, the crackdown on hawkers in Yogya, and the strict stopping and inspecting of cars. The community worried there could be a patient who was held up and died prematurely on account of election security, as was experienced by Dr. Rahman Suryomiharjo. ARBITRARY POLICE The action of the Jakarta Region police chief in summoning the chairman of the PDI Regional Executive to assume responsibility for the behavior of campaign partici- pants has no basis in law. This can be done only if the behavior is the result of direct provocation by a campaign spokesperson. The matter of public security at campaign activities is really the responsibility of the police who have the authority to issue permits for the activities. As a comparable example, if a person gives a ceremonial feast (wedding, circumcision, etc.) where the police also come to provide public secu- rity, and subsequently a guest or spectator suffers a picked pocket, a fight, and so forth, it is not the host who is held responsible. Rather, the police have the duty of guarding security and giving a permit for that ceremony. MOBILIZATION OF TRANSMIGRANTS About 8,000 of 45,000 transmigrants in Central Sulawesi were mobilized to attend the campaign rally of Minister Soegiarto as a Golkar functionary (Suara Pembaruan, May 27,1992.) The transmigrants are a state asset, not owned by Golkar, even if the Minis- ter of Transmigration is a Golkar spokesperson. Furthermore, Soegiarto in that campaign appearance said that in the United States, only 60 percent of the popula- tion exercise their right to vote. But in Indonesia, 90 percent participate in the28 election. This, he said, is evidence of good political education. These facts are inaccu- rate, because in Indonesia more than 10 percent of votes are Golput. Moreover, this statistic matches the statistic found in a Golkar book publication under development. PERMITS FOR CAMPAIGN SPOKESPERSONS H. Adenan, SH, Chairman of the Aceh Election Implementation Supervisory Com- mittee, said, "There were thirty-three election violations by political organizations, including use of campaign spokespersons lacking permits from the authorities, as revealed after the end of the campaign." (Sinar Pagi, May 27, 1992.) This statement needs to be questioned, because there is no regulation requiring that political organi- zations obtain permits for their spokespersons. Designation of spokespersons is a prerogative and internal matter of political organizations, so that limitations by the government are overacting. CAMPAIGN SPOKESPERSON PENALIZED A political party spokesperson was taken off the platform and interrogated by offi- cials for more than twenty-four hours, because he was discussing material which was considered to be a wide digression and unethical. (Suara Pembaruan, May 20,1992.) An interrogation lasting even one to two hours means that one is effectively taken hostage and indirectly detained. This was clearly in conflict with the Penal Code. FOUR YOUTHS ARRESTED FOR DAMAGING A POLITICAL PARTY'S SYMBOL Four youths were interrogated intensively by Metro Jakarta police, accused of dam- aging a party symbol. They were arrested on Kemanggisan Raya street, at the Post Office for Kebayoran Baru and Cipinang Besar. The very diligent police must now interrogate them but the police have not yet discovered a motive. If this pattern con- tinues, let us hope that the police office is not filled with people who have been arrested. ATTORNEY GENERAL SCAPEGOATS THE CAMPAIGN Attorney General Singgih, head of the Central Implementation Supervisory Commit- tee, evaluated this 1992 election campaign as brutal, especially in Jakarta. He also threatened that officials will begin taking more decisive action, because the limits of toleration have been exceeded. What was categorized as brutal by Singgih? They included: theft of singlets bear- ing symbols of political organizations and of water along major roads, young kids boarding the buses without paying, and all kinds of other trivial deeds. When will Pak Singgih also take issue with the unjust election system, emascu- lated political parties, or MPR members who are appointed arbitrarily as the authorities please? Perhaps these things which appear proper are actually far more brutal. B ASOFI (POPULAR CROONER) CHARGES: A CERTAIN GROUP WANTS THE ELECTION TO FAIL Basofi Sudirman, the popular crooner, who also serves as Deputy Governor of Jakarta, charged that there were groups who wanted to disturb the '92 election. He said that these efforts to disturb began with brutal campaigning and the likelihood of protest about the validity of election results.29 Nowadays, perhaps the Indonesian people are fed up with being accused of this and that by the authorities themselves. So, they are not too surprised. Here we want to stress so that our singer—Basofi Sudirman—has no doubts. Who really has the power to disturb the New Order's plan at this time? We believe that the election will go smoothly and Golkar will win 75 percent again. And Pak Basofi can continue his singing career. Settled, isn't it? SRIWIJAYA POST SILENCED On Tuesday, May 26,1992, the editors of the Sriwijaya Post had an uninvited guest. Incredibly, the guest felt he had the right to control what the paper would print. He even entered the paste-up room and affixed his signature on news which passed cen- sorship. "I have been ordered by the Chief of Bureau, South Sumatra Public Relations Office, to inspect your paper, how else can it be known if there is a misprint?" said Leonardus Effendi to the Deputy Head Editor of the Sriwijaya Post, Bob Hutabarat. This action by Effendi conflicts with Law No. 11/1966 on Basic Press Regulations. Various reactions have emerged faulting this action by an instrument of the regional government. But actually, censorship of the press in Indonesia is nothing new. Only the way Effendi did it happened to be too blatant, so he was reprimanded by his superiors. More sophisticated control of the press can be done using the tele- phone, threatening to cancel publishing permits, and lobbying for a particular slant on the news. It has been long recognized that the Pancasila press indeed is no differ- ent than government public relations. [G. Campaign Style and Tactics] AGITATION DURING THE ELECTION Campaign speeches, marked by high rhetorical style and intermixed with thunder- ous yells, were generally more directed to touching the emotions than the rational, objective reasoning of the listeners. In this way, what occurred was not political edu- cation, but tended toward political agitation. (Editorial, Suara Pembaruan, May 27, 1992.) Indeed, political education cannot be nurtured in a month-long campaign, because there is the floating mass. This fault certainly lies with the system! BRUTALITY SAY EXPERTS Brutality occurred in the campaign as a result of the existing political culture and system, in the opinion of Dr. Eka Darmaputra, Dr. Alex Paat, and Dr. Dadang Hawaii Idris. (Suara Pembaruan, May 27,1992.) Political organizations and their sym- pathizers are given freedom only once every five years to speak freely, although nurturing responsibility is something that should be done continuously. Violations occurred as an expression of oppressed feelings and social frustration. An unhealthy climate does not support discipline and national loyalty. According to Deward Depari, University of Indonesia lecturer, campaign rallies have become a political ritual in various styles but are empty of substance. (Editorial, Journal Pemilu, May 27, 1992.) Certainly the responsibility for the current system of politics lies with the gov- ernment and its laws, regulations, and limitations on political activities and the freedom of the people, including its actions during the campaign.30 PORNOGRAPHY IN CAMPAIGN MATERIALS Speaking at the eastern parking lot of Senayan, Nico Daryanto, Secretary General of the PDI, said, "Ask your girlfriends to punch a hole for the PDI. Girlfriends, don't just get poked, once in a while ask your boyfriend to poke [the ballot]." (Sinar Pagi, May 25,1992.) Besides being lewd, this statement did not help educate about politics. Why did the police not warn him or straightaway issue him a red card? VARIOUS LIES 1. Minister Supardjo Rustam, Golkar functionary, appeared only a few minutes in Banyumas and said, "All of you are constant supporters of Golkar, because Golkar never lies. There are all kinds of concrete proof from the success of development." (Suara Pembaruan, May 27, 1992.) Similar statements were made by Sudomo, Moerdiono, Harmoko, and others. However, their lie is evident because they have never informed the people that development comes from the 800 billion foreign debt plus interest which later will become the people's burden. Moreover, since the end of the Old Order, prices have increased many tenfolds, yet one of the People's Three Demands (Tritura) was "lower the prices." Self-sufficiency in rice also turns out to be empty talk, because we still import rice from Vietnam, India, China, and other places. Meanwhile, the Food Stabilization Agency (BULOG) was involved in the Duta Bank scandal with all its manipulations. The whereabouts of the proceeds of the lottery (SDSB) are also a mystery. Many lies by Golkar and the government are known to the masses. 2. The headline of Sinar Pagi, May 27, quoted Sudomo: "Golkar will battle condemna- tion [of property for public use], corruption, illegal tolls and monopolies, irregularities, patronage, and unemployment." Subsequently he said, "If someone gives you a beautiful promise, don't believe it, because carrying it out is impossi- ble. .. it is all lies... if it is just a question of making promises, even an old woman can do it." This statement of Sudomo was pure nonsense, because Golkar has never decreased condemnation and unemployment. 3. Minister Habibie in Ujung Pandang said, "The great achievement of Suharto's leadership is that it has succeeded in lowering the level of poverty from 49 percent in 1969 to 15.2 percent in 1992, and it will be lowered to 1.5 percent in the future." (‘Terbit, May 26, 1992.) This Professor did not explain the sources and criteria for those figures. Hopefully he is not yet absentminded and can see the reality that the number of poor people far exceeds his professorial computations. 4. The Minister of Information has claimed, "Civil servants are not forced to vote for Golkar." (Suara Pembaruan, May 24, 1992.) Speaking as a Golkar functionary, his statement remains defective, because civil servants have been taken hostage. Aside from being told how to vote, they have to do it at their offices, and not on a day when they're off duty. This way it is easy to know who did not vote for Golkar because ballots are coded. The claim of the Minister would be valid only if balloting was direct, general, free, and secret (LUBER), as well as honest and just (JURDIL) and implemented outside the office environment. 5. In Yogyakarta, the Minister for the Efficient Use of the State Apparatus (MENPAN), Sarwono, held a meeting with students from various institutions of31 higher education and activists of youth organizations. While discussing the need to have a strong economic base, he said that the embryo for a national economy has already emerged and developed through the presence of conglomerates in Indo- nesia's economic system. It is strange, then, that conglomerates are often disparaged. (Suara Pembaruan, May 24, 1992.) Possibly Sarwono does not notice that conglomer- ates cause social imbalances. Those conglomerates have also parked their funds abroad, the amount of which is equal to Indonesia's foreign debt. 6. In Medan, Golkar functionary and Minister of Youth Akbar Tanjung said, "The success of Pak Harto in leading the Indonesian nation must be upheld and contin- ued. .. Golkar recognizes neither liberal democracy nor guided democracy; what Golkar recognizes is Pancasila democracy." (Suara Pembaruan, May 24,1992.) It needs to be asked, has the government under Golkar not pursued economic policies of lib- eralism and monopolies? Is the exercise of power nowadays not more liberal than it was under Dutch colonialism and the Old Order? The general opinion at the present time is that Pancasila democracy is only a brand name or lip service, because in prac- tice it is guided democracy or, more exactly, totalitarian democracy. Those who feel this, of course, are not well established Golkar functionaries, but rather the poor people who have been evicted from their property and hit with illegal tolls, taxes, bullets, and so on. 7. In Ciawi, Azwar Anas said, "During the first twenty-three years of the Old Order, the Indonesian nation was unable to unite. Everywhere there was division and our economy was in difficulty. Sometimes the people ate, sometimes not. Then we ate bulgur (cracked wheat). Pancasila democracy became communist democracy... Then was bom the young 1966 generation who, together with the Armed Forces and soci- ety, gradually carried out development in all fields.. . Since then neither wild democracy nor liberal democracy are any longer implemented." (Suara Pembaruan, May 22, 1992.) His statement denies the reality that since Indonesian independence in 1945, the broad area stretching from Sabang to Merauke, and from Sangihe Talaud to Rote, was not the achievement of the New Order. He forgets that the movements for Free Aceh, Free Papua, Free East Timor, and the demands for decentralization throughout Indonesia exist because of the exploitative actions of the authorities. In addition, there is the reality of how hard it is to make a living and how high the prices are now compared to the period of the Old Order. Indonesia's foreign debt, which must be shouldered by the people, rises continuously. Famines in various regions (Indramayu, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, Gunung Kidul, Lampung, Irian Jaya, and Central Kalimantan) have been covered up by the euphemism "food disturbed" (rawan pangan). The amount of rice that must be imported in the context of "self-sufficiency" has also increased drastically. Indo- nesia's GNP is the lowest among ASEAN countries, and ranks 77th after Bangladesh among 88 countries worldwide. HARMOKO DECEIVES PEDICAB DRIVERS Campaigning in Ujung Pandang, Minister of Information Harmoko pretended to drive a pedicab, as if pedicabs get helpful attention from the New Order government. Such was his attempt to attract the sympathy of the masses for Golkar. Actually, pedicab drivers are beaten. In Jakarta they have been chased away so that more than 10,000 pedicabs have been sunk in the sea.32 The way Harmoko campaigned in Ujung Pandang, removing his shirt and undershirt, naked to the waist, was vulgar and clearly not an element of political education. Apparently Harmoko has courage only to bare his body, but not to bare the dilapidation and suffering of the people everywhere. Is this the characteristic of nonsense democracy? Rather than swallow new lies, it is preferable that the people be sensitized to the reality they experience, however bitter. SUDOMO LIES The Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs said, "Golkar will fight evictions, corruption, illicit fees, monopoly, violations, clout (beking-bekingan), and unemployment." This beautiful promise was uttered during the campaign. But the people are satiated with eating promises. They can no longer be deceived. They know who is the pioneer of Future Full of Hopes, who arrests hawkers. They know who frequently frightens and threatens them, who condemns and confiscates the people's land, and who are the champion monopolists. Moreover, the people know exactly that unemployment is widening so fast. SUDOMO REMOVES HIS MASK: GOLKAR NOMINATES SUHARTO Actually, this is not news. But for the record, Suharto is Golkar's candidate for Presi- dent next term. Perhaps a special gift will be bestowed on Sudomo if Suharto gets a sixth term. GOVERNOR'S WIFE DECEIVES THE PEOPLE Sri Mulyati Poedjono Pranyoto, the wife of the Governor of Lampung, tricked 10,000 people in Kalianda, district of South Lampung. She said that if on June 9 [election day], there are those who do not choose Golkar, Mount Rajabasa will erupt. Possibly she was teasing, but to people in an agrarian environment, a volcanic eruption is a natural phenomenon which always haunts them. Connecting the general election with volcanic eruption is psychological intimi- dation. Mrs. Governor should have gotten a red card; her campaigning did not educate. B ASOFI: FROM LAND EVICTOR TO POPULAR MUSIC CROONER Tired of his infamy as evictor of residents of Jakarta, Basofi changed his profession to popular music (dangdut) crooner. His cassette, titled "Not All Men," is quite well known among popular music fans. Thus, at every election campaign, Golkar sup- porters never forget to request that Basofi sing songs. His singing is an effective method of campaigning. The audience is not urged to think about problems of the state, rather they are just lulled to sleep with songs. Perhaps a Presidential Decision needs to be made stipulating that candidate campaign spokespersons must be able to sing, so that platforms are livelier and cam- paign audiences do not need to get in an uproar or conflict while debating ideas. As a consequence, the DPR/MPR could be expected to be full of artists, and their play- acting would become more professional. GOLKAR PROUD OF ITS SERVICE TO EAST TIMOR VICTIMS Salvador Jauario Soares, No. 2 Golkar candidate from East Timor, praised Golkar's performance in the development of that province. He said that the people of East33 Timor have experienced the fruits of New Order development, thanks to the pioneer- ing of Golkar. We suggest that Salvador should mention this to the East Timor mothers who have lost their children. Were the lives of one-third of the population of East Timor and thousands of Indonesian soldiers worth the results of that develop- ment? ELECTION AND THE SENTENCING OF FIVE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS In the face of the 1992 election, the scheduling of the sentencing of the five students was accelerated. The trial which began in March ended with the following sentences: • Ten years in jail for Joao Freitas Da Camara (May 26, 1992), who was accused of subversive actions against the Indonesian government by struggling for East Timor's independence. • Nine years in jail for Fernando De Araujo (May 25, 1992), who was accused of subversive actions. • Two years and five months, less time in detention, for Virgilio Da Silva Guteres. He was accused and convicted of expressing in public feelings of hostility and of insulting the government of the Republic of Indonesia by demonstrating on November 19,1991 to protest the shootings in Dili. • Ten months in jail, less time in detention, for Agapito Cardoso (May 21,1992). He was accused of demonstrating against the integration of East Timor. • Six months in jail, less time in detention, for Dominggus Bareto (May 12, 1992), who was accused of participating in a protest demonstration at the office of the United Nations in Jakarta. The court process by which the five East Timorese students were sentenced con- veyed the impression of being very hurried. According to several defense attorneys, this lightening trial was pushed by the election schedule. The judges wanted to deny the [protesters'] charge that this state is not based on law. Is this the result of the development in East Timor which is lauded by the Golkar spokesman, Salvador Januaro Soares? PPP AND PDI UNITED, GOLKAR SCARED PDI had the idea of campaigning together with PPP and Golkar in Jakarta. The pro- gram in a closed room was attended by about 500 people. But only representatives of PDI and PPP showed up, whereas Sarwono who had been invited to represent Golkar did not have the courage to appear. So several participants asked, wasn't it Pak Sarwono who threw up the idea of "dialogue campaigning?" On this occasion, Kwik Kian Gie spoke on behalf of PDI and Yusuf Syakir on behalf of PPP. They made a joint statement that democracy in Indonesia is still sick. Both parties concurred that Golkar must be separated from the government and bureaucracy. Strange that Sarwono, Minister for the Efficient Utilization of the State Appara- tus and Golkar functionary, lacked the courage to come to this joint campaign meeting. "Golkar does not permit its members to campaign jointly with competi- tors," said Sarwono, giving his reason. What, Pancasila Democracy has opposition? Usually, we speak [only] about family-type relationships!34 ATTACK BY GOLKAR CROWD In the room of the Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Emergency (PPPK) Unit, were Ahmad W.K., Djuni P., and Suzzana E. In the UGM Student Outdoor Club were Cecep, Tri, Supoyo, and Balunk. Djuni and Cecep saw that suddenly a boy ran into the Student Center from the north gate. He was followed by a Golkar crowd chasing after him. Djuni and Ahmad went out of the Center to see what was happening. Apparently they [the crowd] did not catch their prey, which made them increasingly angry. Meanwhile, the Golkar crowd was growing rapidly in front of the north gate of the Student Center and the Golkar marshals came. At the moment Djuni and Ahmad prepared to leave, the sound of breaking glass was heard. After the crowd hunted but did not find [the boy], they began throwing rocks at the the glass door and windows of the Polyclinic so that much glass was broken. At that moment the marshals did little to calm the anger of the Golkar crowd. In front of the north gate of the Center, an argument ensued between Djuni and Ahmad on one side, and the Golkar crowd on the other. Ahmad was almost carried away as a hostage, because they said he was suspected of being a friend of the boy whom they were hunting. Fortunately it did not happen, because Ahmad resisted. Then, little by little, the Golkar crowd disbanded in order to return to Kaliurang Street to continue their campaign rally. One of the aforementioned witnesses saw a motorcycle which was used by the Golkar crowd, namely a small, black, Astrea motorcycle with license plate number Pol B 3505... (insufficient opportunity to note the letters behind it). Thus was the sequence of events which befell the north gate of the UGM Student Center. The result of this "afternoon attack" can be seen for oneself at the place it happened. (Reported by Ahmad W.K. and Djuni Pristiyanto.) THE COURSE OF THE INCIDENT: DAMAGE TO THE STUDENT CENTER BY GOLKAR PARADE PARTICIPANTS This incident happened about 15:55 Western Indonesia Time, June 3, 1992. It hap- pened in the street on the north part of the Child Care building owned by the UGM Dharma Wanita; in front of the office of UGM Student Cooperative Telecommunica- tions (Wartel KOPMA) office; in front of the UGM Student Senate secretariat; and the rear door of the UGM Student Center. (All of them are within the UGM Campus.) The course of the event in detail began with a procession of the Golkar crowd. A parade of Golkar supporters proceeded through C. Simanjutak and Kaliurang streets in the vicinity of the UGM campus. Drivers of vehicles of parade participants held up two fingers and forced spectators on the side of the road to respond similarly. Some of them [the parading Golkar crowd] carried sticks, beams, and iron bars. Included among them were those on top of a red Toyota hardtop. Salman, who happened to be watching the parade, sat on his motorcycle under the sign reading UGM Student Cooperative Telecommunications and responded with a smile. From the top of the aforementioned red Toyota hardtop, parade participants swung sticks and beat Salman. Salman stood up automatically. Other parade partici- pants considered Salman to be resisting and spontaneously mobbed Salman. Due to the large parade crowd chasing him, Salman fled in the direction of the UGM Student Senate Secretariat, but then turned toward the back door of the UGM Student Center (on the north side of the UGM Student Senate Secretariat). Parade participants gave chase and entered the campus vacinity. Then they tried to enter the Student Center. But they were obstructed by several UGM students who happened35 to be around the Student Center. One student was even grabbed by his shirt collar and hoisted by one of the parade participants. The Golkar marshals did not even attempt to control the anarchic actions of their crowd; rather they ordered the stu- dents who had attempted to prevent [the anarchy] to get out of the way. Because they did not catch the person they were seeking, parade participants who were hunting Salman engaged in destruction by throwing rocks and swinging the clubs which they carried. The glass door in the back part of the Student Center (north side), the glass window of the PPPK room, and the glass window of the Cam- pus Polyclinic, all of them located on the back side of the Student Center, were destroyed. While the Student Center was being damaged, the motorcycle which was aban- doned by Salman at the side of the road was damaged by other parade participants. Several marshals even participated in flinging the cycle against the masonry wall of the UGM Dharma Wanita Child Care building and piercing its engine with a crow- bar. Firman, whose motorcycle was used by Salman, attempted to stop the damaging of his cycle, and explained that it was not owned by the person they were chasing. But he in turn became a victim of beating by other parade participants. [H. The New Order Political System] SUHARTO AVERSE TO STEPPING DOWN Suharto's ambition is to sit again in the presidential chair for the period 1993-1998. Thus he had to discourage immediately the proposal about term limits on the presi- dency. He cut down that idea using the pretext of the 1945 Constitution, claiming that term limits are not needed because the Constitution already stipulates that the president serve for five years after which he can be chosen again. "That [term limits] is an emasculating attitude toward the 1945 Constitution," said Suharto before the central leaders of Kosgoro. One question has to be raised with the President: Article 28 of the 1945 Constitu- tion guarantees the right of citizens to form associations. Why does the New Order make laws which limit the number of social-political organizations to only three, no more and no less? Strange, the President did not mention this as emasculating the Constitution. The Constitution was formulated by the fathers of the nation with good inten- tions and a spirit of service. Not all matters could be dealt with explicitly, so the Constitution is open to interpretation and adaptation to the changing times. There is only one criterion: everything is dedicated to the good of the country. If the idea for a two-term limit indeed fulfills the [changing] needs of the nation, why not? Laws can be formulated to translate the spirit of the 1945 Constitution. A system with a maximum of two terms is good because it lessens personal interest which can emerge if an incumbent settles too long into the presidency. Thus, was not the President's rejection connected to his plans for a sixth term as president? NICO DARYANTO BEHIND THE TIMES The Secretary General of the PDI, Nico Daryanto, said that the floating mass system makes democracy sterile. This system, which prohibits political party activities at the village level, is unfair because Golkar retains access to the grass roots through the36 village administration and the civil servants' organization (KORPRI). Nico's opinion is nothing new. We just wonder why he recognizes Golkar's advantage only now, after his party experienced defections for two decades. Apparently Pak Nico is behind the times. Rather than promise various things to assist the people, the PDI should first help itself. There has never been a handcuffed party which can free the people's shackles. WAR OF STONES IN MATRAMAN NOT CITIZEN BRUTALITY On Wednesday, May 27, 1992, Matraman became a stone throwing arena. Two groups of youths, one from Berlan and the other from Tegalan Street, engaged in an uprising (intifadah) for almost three hours. Several persons were injured, and it is said that some died. Property losses consisted of a burnt automobile and damage to three buildings. The incident aroused curses from the government. They charged that the citizenry has become brutal at the time of the campaign. Is it true that the people are brutal? This question we easily answer: "NO." Fur- thermore, we often hear foreigners recognizing that Indonesians are characteristically friendly, polite, and smile easily. So what causes a friendly people to become so furious? We must search for the root of the problem in everyday life. The Indonesian people during the New Order have been shackled in a very repressive political economic system. Making a livelihood is increasingly difficult for a majority of the people, while a small group have become affluent. Conglomerates rise on top of the miserable carcasses of the people. In the political sphere, the people do not have a healthy channel of communication. They may not do this, they may not do that. Stability has become the new religion, which is defended to the death by the New Order. If necessary, it will crush all dissent with military power. Repressed people can be compared to a stick of dynamite. It can explode at any time, whenever the safety mechanism has been opened. Any type of opportunity becomes momen- tum for a social explosion. On the way home from watching soccer, the station is stoned (the Persebaya case), ridicule ends in war among gangs (student fighting case), a haphazard questionnaire becomes a trigger for mass anger (Monitor case). There is no limit to such illustrations. The war of stones in Matraman was only one form of expression of the people's frustrations. The PDI was cursed by the government because it was considered unable to control its supporters. But actually this stunted political organization was simply a victim of the circumstances.1 So Yapto, Chairman of Pancasila Youth [PP], proposes a still stupider solution. He wants members of the PP to assist in controlling party supporters. If this cowboy-style solution were followed, it is certain that brutality would increase. In summary, brutality is located not in the evil characteristics of the people, but in a lousy system of social relations, which is the root of the problem. Who is responsible for the creation of this system of social relations? The finger should be pointed, not at the people, but at the government. The New Order, which flies the flag of stability and growth, must realize that it is responsible for the fact that the people's suppressed condition is always ready to explode. The message indicated for every authority is, "Do not blame the people if they rebel. Rather, ask yourself, does 1 The writer(s) are referring to the forced merger in 1973 of five parties to form the PDI. There has been considerable turmoil ever since in the new, amalgamated party.37 not the system of social relations which I have helped create facilitate the emergence of rebellion?" SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS REFUSES SUHARTO NOMINATION Sri Bintang comes from the Party of the Star. He voices aspirations which differ with those of his party. If PPP clearly nominates Suharto again for the 1993-1998 period, Sri Bintang does not. This campaign spokesman for the PPP, who was hit with a red card, says it is possible that the PPP will nominate someone else for President. "The presidential candidate from PPP is still undetermined, " said Sri Bintang before one million PPP supporters. Supposing Sri Bintang7s proposal is true, he must first oppose the head of his party, Ismail Hasan M., who for a long time has been stroking Suharto. This being the case, support for someone other than Suharto has increased fur- ther. Previously, Yahya Nasution explicitly nominated Rudini. But the official opinion of PDI is still unclear. How about Yahya, Sri Bintang and other like-minded persons declaring ABS [asal bukan Suharto, lit. provided not Suharto].* ABS could become a good unifier and there are already many who would support it. GOLKAR'S UNEQUIVOCAL WIN AND "FRAUD" The results of vote counting have been finalized, only the legalization is awaited on June 28,1992. That Golkar emerged as "number one" is a result that was anticipated. Supported by a large amount of funds and bureaucratic facilities all the way down to the village level, it was natural for Golkar to win unequivocally. The results of BPHPR monitoring in several villages (not sub-district administrative centers) showed that Golkar won an absolute majority in almost all voting places. This was made possible by the prohibition against political parties engaging in political activ- ity at the village level, including campaigning. We know that this prohibition represents a part of the "floating mass" concept, in which political parties are permitted to engage in political activities only down to the sub-district level. During the last campaign, activities of either PPP or PDI were almost not found in villages, whereas Golkar was unimpeded in campaigning in the villages where 80 percent of the voters are. So, even without fraud, Golkar was assured of emerging as the winner in this election. What surprised many was Golkar's vote-getting in Jakarta, where it led unequivocally. Golkar's vote was considered surprising in light of the enthusiastic atmosphere of the PDI and PPP campaign rallies, which were attended by millions of supporters. A foreign reporter not yet well acquainted with Indonesia said he was amazed at the voting outcome in Jakarta and, even though his Indonesian reporter friends explained, "This is how elections go in Indonesia, anything can happen," he remained greatly surprised. From the results of BPHPR monitoring, which followed continuously the cam- paign activities of the three political organizations through the vote collection, and in light of the election regulations, it should not be surprising if Golkar emerged as the winner in all provinces. If we study the political system which undergirds the elec- tion system and its regulations, it is indeed possible for Golkar to obtain a majority of votes, because: * This is word play, as ABS usually means asal bapak senang [as long as the boss is happy].38 • In the villages, there were no representatives of two political organizations (PDI and PPP) who could witness the vote collection. This made it possible for other things to happen during vote collection. Based on monitoring in the field on the day votes were cast in the subdistrict of Ujung Berung, an area on the outskirts of Bandung, a case of deception was discovered. Although subdistrict office sources claimed witnesses representing PDI and PPP were posted, on election day it turned out that they were missing at almost all voting places in subdistrict Ujung Berung, Bandung. Finally, witnesses were obtained from voters who suddenly held up their hands. At one voting place an argument occurred, almost becoming a fist fight. • Form AB, which makes it possible to vote at another voting place, provides oppor- tunity for ample fraud, because a person can vote more than once. Who can guarantee that a voter will vote only once? • The prohibition against political parties witnessing the process of vote tabulation at the General Election Institute (LPU) gives rise to suspicion from many quarters. Everyone knows that the LPU is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and his apparatus is tied tightly to the bureaucracy. For that reason, the bureaucrats are loyal Golkar supporters, in order to protect their jobs. Compiling a list of votes from about 290,000 voting places throughout Indonesia is not a difficult task, so it ought to be announced widely to the community as soon as possible. Based on data obtained about fraud, both in the 1992 election and the previous election, BPHPR divides the fraud into two categories: real fraud and inherent fraud. Real fraud is fraud which occurs in the implementation of the election, such a prohi- bition on a campaign rally or manipulation in the counting of votes. Thousands of instances of real fraud have been recorded. In the 1987 election alone, 5,200 cases were recorded. Hundreds of notes on 1992 election infraction accusations are piled up just on the desk of BPHPR. Inherent fraud is fraud found in the political system itself, or fraud which attaches to the political system. This matter is very much involved with the quality of democracy. As was explained previously, party activists are prohibited from enter- ing villages, a large number of the people's representatives are appointed, and so forth. Inherent fraud is seldom questioned by many people or even by political parties, because making it an issue can become a boomerang for the party itself. Participating in the political festival means indirectly agreeing with the political system and all its inherent fraud and deceptions. The statements of election protesters (Golput) indi- cate that inherent fraud is the foundation of their protest; that is, they have no faith in the political system as a whole. The presence of election protesters in the election constitutes a reality which cannot be denied. PROTEST OF ELECTION VIOLATIONS UNNECESSARY—RUDINI Rudini stated that violations by the three election contestants balanced out. "So there is no need for protest, because violations did not concern only one political organiza- tion," he said in answer to reporters questions in Watampone, South Sulawesi. If protest is not permitted, will the violations by the three political organizations just be passed over? So, what is the meaning of a state based on law? Are people who clearly do wrong left alone, just because all do wrong? Rudini's statement is very39 ironic, because it means that law is worthless in the Indonesian state. So, what law do we use? Must we use the law of the jungle? DPP-PPP ACCEPTS THE ELECTION RESULTS, PDI NOT YET The PPP Central Executive finally accepted the election results issued by the General Election Institute. The PPP position emerged through a difficult process in a leader- ship meeting on June 17, 1992. Of course this opinion was not in line with the opinion of the Branch Leadership Councils, who directly confronted fraud in the regions. Take, for example, what was faced by the Party of the Star in Sampang- Madura. The Central Executive's position clearly is a consequence of the position it took long before the election, namely to nominate Suharto as President no matter what happened. The PPP, which has been afflicted with fragmentation recently, apparently wants to function as a "safety player" in the 1992 election. Indeed, the PPP did not again face defections as in the previous election. Although in several regions the PPP experienced increases in seats, the PPP was still the party most unable to anticipate the 1992 election, which was no longer colored by military threat. Consequently, the PPP has now become a party ardently desired by the gov- ernment, a "friend-of-govemment party." Just the opposite, PDI until now has not yet issued a statement accepting or rejecting the election results. A leadership meeting indeed signaled its inclination to reject the results. But this was only a momentary opinion, because based on the exist- ing political system and the constellation of real power, it is difficult for a party to take a position like that. It is feared that a confrontational attitude toward the gov- ernment will give birth to a "third party" which will meddle in the internal succession of each party, as was experienced in previous years. The reality is that the efforts of PDI to appear as the "opposition party" were not welcomed by the PPP. Moreover, the balance of power, at least in recognizing the election results, is Golkar and PPP on one side, and PDI on the other. Seeing the bal- ance of power like this, clearly PDI will return to its traditional position, that is, taking a mainstream (majority) position. This means that the PDI will be forced to accept the results of the 1992 election. For that reason, we "can only await" PDFs statement to accept the election results. PDFs attitude to extend repeatedly the time for issuing a statement accepting the election results will certainly annoy the author- ities, especially President Suharto personally. It is also sure that PDI will convey its acceptance of the election results accompanied by a maneuver "supporting" Suharto's leadership. This is the one and only political maneuver which will have to be chosen by PDI at the last stage before the coming general session of the MPR/DPR. Finally, what was said by an editorial in the Merdeka daily was true indeed, that the several elections during the New Order era point toward the possibility of form- ing only one party. Golkar, PPP, and PDI could show some differences on issues and programs, but they were unable to show meaningful differences in vision and ideol- ogy. Secondly, all three political forces minus Golkar are unable to change the political system in a fundamental way, because the current system does not make it possible for them to win votes. Thirdly, our politics is fully colored by the support of the floating mass (60-70 percent of the voters), who are completely controlled by Golkar. Having one party is more logical than continuing to playact.Election Protest (Golput) in the 1992 Election1 GOLPUT OFFICIAL FOURTH PARTY BPHPR gave special coverage to the atmosphere of Golput in Yogyakarta and Semarang, Central Java. An interesting phenomenon happened when PDI and PPP supporters themselves took down their election materials and attached white sym- bols. They chose Golput after searching all over for justice in the implementation of the election and feeling certain that the election would not change one bit. Golput is passive opposition which cannot be ignored. The bravery of the young people, in breaking through the rigidity, was not with- out casualties. At least forty-eight persons were arrested in Yogya and two in Semarang after they courageously stated their intention to [engage in] Golput. Their arrest again proves how law and democracy are still expensive goods in Indonesia. The attitude of the military, who arrogantly cocked their guns in front of the Golput demonstrators, shows that they do not understand themselves. If people just differ in opinion, they can be arrested. Let us hope that not all Indonesians are jailed. YOUTH CHOOSE GOLPUT, BUT NATSIR DESERTS Documentation about the 1992 election that causes rejoicing is the speed of the Golput movement. Without any organization. Without financial support. Golput emerged everywhere as an attitude of mistrust toward the election. Most of those engaging in Golput were youths who are critical [of the election]. They have reached the conclusion that this election is in vain. So why participate? They, in a responsible manner, use their citizen's right to not vote. As intellectuals they choose Golput, cer- tainly with logical, political reasoning. Thus, not as revenge. Or possibly because they think participating in an election that fools the people is a great sin. In the 1987 election, the number of qualified voters who did not exercise their right reached ten million. This figure is more than the total votes obtained by the PDI. Hopefully the number of Golput will be even greater this election. When the time comes that Golput reaches 30 percent of the qualified voters, perhaps this can become an indicator of how the rules of politics formulated by the New Order have been abandoned by the people. Supporters of Golput spontaneously emerged from among those victimized by development and from young intellectuals. Among the former group we include 1 Golput is retained throughout because of the multiple connotations of the term. See the discussion in the Introduction.42 residents of Ombo Dam, Cimacan, Plumpang, pedicab drivers, and others. Among the latter group are students, the campus community, and the urban middle class whose only source of livelihood is their salary and who, perhaps, support Golput silently. "I get my living from Golkar, but I'll Golput later during the election," said a reporter for Suara Karya. The most coordinated Golput movement apparently emerged from students. In Yogya, they united with the PDI and PPP masses, then 3,000 people lowered red and green flags. On May 22, Yogya was only colored with two flags: yellow and white. In Bandung, Golput went to the DPR. Bogor students spread out a banner, because they felt ashamed their campus had been sullied by Golkar. In Ujung Pandang, there was action involving 300 persons. In Semarang, two students are still under arrest because they spread Golput actions. The campus is the primary place where the New Order has lost trust. So, without official organization, funds, or any facilities, Golput has developed rapidly. What is the reason? Briefly it can be said that the New Order political system is anti-democratic. The three existing parties are only playacting. "So the community chooses Golput as a opportunity for change to appear, not because they do not understand the importance of elections," said Laode Armansyah, the pioneer of Golput in Ujung Pandang. Armansyah added, "In this way Golput becomes an alter- native because the three political organizations cannot voice the people's aspira- tions." Moreover, this election chooses only 400 of the 1,000 members of the MPR. Six hundred people are appointed by Suharto. Whatever the result of the 1992 election, Suharto will become president again. Politics, economics, the military approach, growth slogans, nothing will change. This election only strengthens the status quo and creates the image that the New Order is democratic. With capital of one trillion Rupiah for the election, Suharto seeks the favors of foreign financial institutions. So he can add to our debts. Very strange and mysterious. When the Golput movement began to take shape, the youth supported it enthusiastically. Natsir did just the opposite. This Islamic leader, who once chose Golput in an election and was a member of the Petition 50 Group known for its Golput, now recommends that his religious community choose PPP—the party which early on cried out that they want Suharto for President again. We hope that Pak Natsir becomes conscious and returns to the true path. WHAT PEOPLE SAY ABOUT GOLPUT Nico Daryanto: "Golput people are frustrated. They are irresponsible citizens." Ismail Metareum: "They lose twice. First they do not utilize their right, second their votes are replaced by others with a registered AB card." Akbar Tanjung: "They appear pessimistic in view of existing political forces. They have no hope, because they judge the three contestants to be only extensions of the government's hand." Rachmat Witoelar: "Golput is worrisome because it's related to political apathy. Golput can mean an unwillingness to develop the nation." All people within the system evaluate Golput negatively. Or at best neutrally. But conversely, Golput people think that participating in the election at this time is43 irresponsible. Casting a ballot in an undemocratic system is plunging the nation to its fate. The most important cause of Golput is the huge number of appointed members of the MPR. The President appoints 600 and the people elect only 400. This ratio is a violation of the Constitution, so that the MPR no longer reflects the people's sovereignty. It has become a mirror of the president's sovereignty. So what is the purpose of participating in the election? The selection of those 400 is still colored with fraud and coercion. Rather than throw away 190 billion Rupiah to fund the election, better to distribute it. Every per- son would get one million Rupiah. Whatever the disdain of the authorities, Golput will continue to exist and cannot be ignored. At the University of Hasanuddin, students held a Golput rally. A delega- tion of Bandung students and youth came to the DPR wearing white headbands. "Among Red [PDI], Yellow [Golkar], and Green [PPP], White [Golput] is my purity," read one banner they unfurled. These students were just the visible ones. There were certainly more who were Golput in their hearts. "SLIPS-OF-THE-TONGUE" (PLESETAN) A.R. FAKHRUDDIN STYLE Understand that because this singular leader is from Yogyakarta, the city where slip- of-the-tongue grows and develops with fertility, we at first did not take too seriously Pak A.R.'s recent statement that Golput is a sin, especially for the PPP community which, according to him, is Muslim. But it turns out that his statement was made officially through an Open Letter which was announced in the daily Kedaulatan Rakyat, Yogyakarta; thus the problem became different. Moreover, it became related to a matter which is under the authority of God: Sin. As we all know, students and youth in Yogyakarta and Semarang can be said to be pioneers who affirm their stance and political right to choose Golput openly with all the risks, which they accept. Thus, several weeks ago, we heard about the "Yogya Incident," which was so phenomenal and impressive. And who knows why Pak A.R. became so irritated that he felt the need to issue an instruction (fatwa), "they sin who engage in Golput," without prior investigation of the reasons and background of it all. There were several arguments which were put forward by Pak A.R. First, he quoted a saying of the Imam Syafii, "if something cannot be obtained entirely, that does not mean it should be thrown away entirely." Second, according to him again, "if what exists at the present is not yet truly good, let us improve it together and not abandon it completely." Third, he continued, "the disadvantages of Golput are greater than the benefits." We can suggest immediately several questions: First, is PPP indeed, according to its constitution, an Islamic party? Actually, the basis of PPP is Pancasila, not Islam. Second, for the ordinary people who feel opressed by several development policies and have attempted to struggle against them without success, do they not have the right to reject those who oppress them, whereas only God will fulfill the prayers of his servants who truly understand? A story is told of Caliph Umar Bin Khattab free- ing a slave who had stolen bread from his master, because the master did not give him sufficient food. Is it not more just and wise to merely note that those who engage in Golput are limited to the context of the election event? Why in the world sentence them as sinners? Moreover, we have not yet spoken about the problem of the laws and the violation of the law in the implementation of the General Election.44 IAIN CAMPUS IN YOGYA STONED BY GOLKAR SUPPORTERS Three days before an election protest on the campus of the State Islamic Religious Institute (IAIN), Wednesday May 20,1992, about 5:10 p.m., a group of young Golkar supporters, who were returning from a Golkar rally on motorized vehicles, threw stones in the direction of several buildings of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga on Timoho Street, Yogyakarta. Windows of four buildings in the campus area were smashed to pieces. The buildings which suffered damage from the dirty hands of these democracy destroyers were: • The Students' Cooperative (KOPMA): glass broken in three windows, each one measuring 64 X145 cm. and 5 mm. thick. • The Headquarters of the Student Regiment (MENWA): glass broken in a window measuring 125 X 75 cm. and 5 mm. thick. • The Syariah Faculty: glass broken in two windows, each one measuring 85 X 95 cm. and 5 mm. thick. • The House of a lecturer, Drs. Yahya Harun, also did not escape the thrown rocks, which perforated the asbestos [shingles]. A small black motorcycle of the Astrea make with license number AB 3627 D, owned by a rock thrower, was noted by an IAIN student. YOGYA PIONEERS WHITE FLAG-WAVING DEMOCRACY Once again, Yogya advances to the forefront, pioneering the democracy movement. Three thousand youths took down red and green flags. They replaced those colors of the PDI and the PPP with white flags symbolizing Golput. Thus, Golput is no longer a choice which attracts supporters silently. Rather, it has become an open and orga- nized choice. The streets in Yogya registered the four-finger movement as a protest against emasculated democracy. On May 22, 1992, Yogya was completely decorated with white flags. "They took down the flags themselves, we could not prevent it," said Sutarjo Suryoguritno, Chairman of the Yogya PDI, with resignation. Apparently he is realis- tic. The PDI was powerless when the Governor of Yogya, Paku Alam VII, issued letter of decision No. 042.L/KPTS/PPDI/1992, which outlawed motorized campaign rallies. A party which cannot articulate the aspirations of its members really should be abandoned. It began on May 21, 1992, when 7,000 Air Force Special Forces put on a show of force. They tightened the campaign regulations which prohibited motorized vehicle parades. The military's attitude of force was based on a foolish campaign regulation. "How can it be that just parading is outlawed? What is a campaign about?" asked the irked youths. "This is not permitted, that is not permitted. Never mind, the election is useless," is about how they feel. The election no longer creates democracy. The youth courageously establish this stance. They choose to stand outside this festival of lies. Rather than bear the sin of the election, they loudly cry out, "Long live Golput." The Golput parade bagan at four o'clock on May 22. Beginning from in front of the Sunan Kalijaga Islamic Study Institute on Urip Sumoharjo street, it moved to Gadjah Mada University, traversing two kilometers. The parade was accompanied by a coffin, symbolizing the death of democracy in Indonesia. Armed Forces Commander Try Sutrisno's beard immedi-45 ately caught fire. He threatened to take stern action against campaigners who deviated from the rules of the game. According to him, people have the right to vote or not to vote. "But don't influence others to Golput," he said furiously. The Armed Forces Commander's logic is super strange. He said, "voting or not voting, both are sanctioned by the Constitution." But while the government unceasingly recommends that people vote, we may not recommend that people not vote. Why is the govern- ment more [believable] than the people? Are we not the same before the Constitution? FORTY-THREE PEOPLE ARRESTED IN YOGYA, ORDERED TO EAT PLYWOOD After the brave young people pointed toward democracy with the flag of Golput on May 21-23, 1992, they resolutely accepted the risks of their action and life choice. Forty-three persons were arrested without due process and were accused of mas- terminding the action involving a bier [symbolizing the death of democracy] and the hoisting of a white flag. These young people were, of course, released the following day. But they never regretted their actions, which they viewed as important for democracy. Although they suffered indescribable humiliation, these youths view the future with shining eyes. They do not tremble with fear, even though cruel authorities humiliated them by forcing them to eat plywood while in jail. PROTEST ACTIONS IN YOGYA TRULY BRIGHT IDEAS—ROMO MANGUN This famous cultural critic strongly sympathized with the protest actions of the peo- ple in Yogya. The movement to lower one's own flag (May 21) he considered a non- violent action having extraordinary effect. This event reminded the authorities that the people can still remain silent as the last alternative for expressing disagreement. The people showed that they are not clay to be shaped at another's whim. Furthermore, Father Mangun stressed that the voice of suffering people often reflects the voice of God. That voice is laden with messages of conscience which should be heard by the authorities. He is of the opinion that the injustices which have occurred in the everyday life of the community, as well during the campaign, can no longer be tolerated by the people, so they have chosen silence. ARREST OF ELECTION PROTESTERS An inquiry is needed into the detention of forty-three election protesters in Yogyakarta (Sinar Pagi, May 27,1992) who were accused of inciting the community to abstain from voting, although the right to abstain is included in the Constitution and represents a basic human right. Thus, action should not be taken against voting protesters. The Head of the National Police Information Agency, Drs. Sumarsono, said that refusing to vote is still within the limits of acceptability. Why then does the President, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs call it brutal? CHRONOLOGY OF THE ARREST OF TWO STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN SEMARANG On May 20, 1992, in the courtyard of the Literature Faculty, Diponegoro University, Semarang, about thirty Semarang students, who were grouped in the Semarang Stu- dent Forum, held a "National Awakening Preparedness Rally" with the theme, "The 1992 Election Phenomenon." This program was intended to commemorate National Awakening Day.46 In the program, which was packaged in the form of a comedy theater perfor- mance, the students attempted to criticize the mechanism and quality of elections in Indonesia. And they tended to choose Golput. According to their statement, elections are a vehicle (wahana) for popular control over the holders of power, and at the same time the most strategic means for making a change in decision-making in various aspects of life. Yet, the mechanism for mak- ing decisions until now is still unbalanced because the executive is stronger than the legislature. The implementation of the General Election is still unhealthy, still far from the hopes of the people. Democracy has not yet appeared in the implementation of the general elections in Indonesia. The special screening system for legislative candidates is inappropriate, because it causes homogenization and sterilization of the people's representatives. Thus, the General Election is only a temporary game, because after the election is over, all ele- ments of the political parties change and become of one kind. No matter the results of the election, the winner is already clear—the executive, which is controlled by a certain group and which appoints 60 percent of the members of the MPR. Only 40 percent of the members of the MPR are chosen by the people through the elections. Because of this, the Semarang students take the following position: 1. The General Election is useless, because it has no political educative function; rather it is political "dictation." This Festival of Lies wastes energy and funds, in the amount of one trillion Rupiah, in the midst of the tumult of development. 2. If indeed general elections continue to be held, first revoke the laws which regulate the appointment of the members of the DPR/MPR. 3. Make the students a neutral group, in accordance with the regulations that stu- dents may not engage in practical politics, and give them authority to supervise the implementation of the election. As a non-partisan, non-voting group, the stu- dents could function as a fair referee and jury in the implementation of elections. The program began about 10:00 and ended at 11:30 (Western Indonesian Time) with tight surveillance by the security forces (military and police), which were directly led by the Commander of the Semarang Military District 0733, Lieut. Col. Sudibyo, and Metropolitan Semarang Police Chief, Col. Drs. Gunawan. Before all of the crowd disbanded, the security forces, dressed in civilian attire, reacted. Without showing an arrest warrant or identifying themselves, they forcefully arrested four students who were suspected of being the "brain" of the aforementioned program. The four students were directly taken away by military truck, who knows to where. Several minutes later, it became known which four students were arrested, namely Poltak Ike Wibowo (Law Faculty, Sultan Agung Islamic University), Lukas Luwarso, Hari Sutanto, and Dwi Sugiyanto (Literature Faculty, Diponegoro Univer- sity). They were detained at the Semarang Police Headquarters. No one who attempted to visit those four students was permitted to meet them. On May 21, 1992, about 13:00, two students, Hari Sutanto and Dwi Sugiyono, were freed but required to report [to the police] twice weekly. On the second day, still no one was allowed to meet Poltak and Lukas, including their parents. About 14:30, the Semarang Police issued an arrest warrant for Lukas Luwarso (No. Pol. SPRIN/126/V/1992/SERSE) and Poltak Ike Wibowo (No. Pol. SPRIN/127/V/1992/SERSE), charging them with subversive activities.47 On May 22,1992, the Metropolitan Police issued a detention order for Lukas and Poltak, charging them with criminal action under article 154 of the Criminal Code (KUHP), which reads, "making statements of opposition, hate, or insult against the government of Indonesia." This detention order was valid for twenty days, from May 21 until June 10,1992, in the Semarang Police jail. Up until June 22, Lukas and Poltak had not yet been visited by anyone. (Reported by the Independent Student Communication Forum.) A democracy movement can grow only if every violation of the people's rights is felt by every person individually. The case of Poltak and Lukas is also our case. For this reason, the solidarity of all friends is eagerly awaited. 100 INDONESIAN STUDENTS PROTEST: FREE IKE AND LUKAS About 100 students comprising the "Democracy Lovers Group" demonstrated at the Central Java Governor's office, Monday (June 1). They demanded the liberation of two of their friends, Poltak Ike Wibowo and Lukas Luwarso, who were arrested after a Golput demonstration at Diponegoro University, Semarang. Students who originate from tertiary-level schools in several cities, such as Salatiga, Bandung, Yogya, and Bogor, stated their solidarity with two of their friends who were arrested without due process. Until now, the two Diponegoro University students are still in police detention and it is possible that they will be tried on charges of subversion. The Governor of Central Java, Ismail, is like a man whose beard is on fire. He was confronted with demonstrations supporting Golput not only by students, but also by farmers from the Ombo Dam. Apparently the inherited sins of the Ombo Dam are not forgotten by the people, so they are averse to voting. But the Governor did not engage in introspection. Rather he barked, "take firm action against the mas- termind of the Golput demonstrations." Wow, when will he come to his-senses? Poltak and Lukas were detained May 20 after they led a Golput demonstration. The demonstration involved thirty people and took the theme, "The 1992 Election Phenomenon." They were of the opinion that this election is futile, because only 40 percent of the members of the MPR are elected (400 people), whereas the other 60 percent (600 people) are appointed by Suharto. So these youth believe that the elec- tion deception which consumes one trillion Rupiah is best just postponed. Red roses for Semarang. May the solidarity of all of you spread to other cities. STUDENTS EXTEND ACTIONS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL, URGE RELEASE OF POLTAK AND LUKAS A group of students from several institutions of higher education on the Island of Java, who have named themselves the Free Student Communication Forum (FKMM), visited Attorney General Singgih on Thursday, June 18 to demand the release of their two friends who were arrested in Semarang. The students unfurled a banner and pasted up many posters, among which read: • The Cases of Poltak and Lukas Prove Democracy is Dead • Liberate Our Friends, Poltak and Lukas • Only One Word, "Free" • Golput is Beautiful • Article 154 Very Funny48 • Revoke Articles Which Are Products of Colonialism Which Emasculate Singgih only received ten students as representatives of the 100 demonstrators. They demanded freedom for their two friends being held in Mlatan Prison in Semarang. The students questioned the validity of article 154 of the Criminal Code, namely the criminal charge of insulting the government, which was brought against Poltak and Lukas. The students' dialogue with Singgih was difficult. Singgih left the impression of being very careful to evade the questions of the delegation of ten stu- dents. What was not understood by Singgih was that the illegal arrest of Poltak and Lukas was done by persons in civilian attire. Singgih promised that he would check it out with the Semarang State Attorney. "If the charge is true, the Attorney General will take them to trial. And if indeed they are not in the wrong, the Attorney General promises to release these two students," according to the Attorney General's office. Meanwhile, the students who awaited their representatives outside the building attached posters to the fence of the Attorney General Building and cried out "Release Poltak and Lukas." After the ten students finished their dialogue with Singgih, they went home in an orderly manner. GOLPUT DEMONSTRATION About 1,000 students from several institutions of higher education in Yogyakarta demonstrated in the courtyard of the the State Islamic Religious Institute (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, from 9:30 in the morning until 14:00 in the afternoon. This demonstration, which was intended to criticize directly the General Election 1992 laws and regulations, also emphasized the students' existence as Golput, which they considered a political right that must be valued. In the demonstration, which they named "Concerned Student Course for a Democratic Nation," several demands were submitted for changes in the laws and implementation of the General Election. The basis of these demands was the stu- dents' view that the floating mass policy must be abolished. They also believed that for the people as a whole, the General Election is not a "Festival of Democracy," as is often touted. It is more appropriately called a mobilization (not participation) pro- cess, the results of which quickly appeared in the campaign, such as social rioting which harms the community. They also said that the power of the people's political and social control was silenced and emasculated. The government becomes stronger like a giant, while the people become weaker and weaker. For this reason, they shouted loudly, "We who fly the flag of Golput and consider its legal existence as a moral movement for the creation of political democracy and true national democracy, today, Saturday, May 23, 1992, put forth several demands to the DPR, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and in part also to the Minister of Home Affairs: • Postpone the General Election until the party system is truly just and democratic. • Protect the right of the community to choose Golput and to disseminate it in the campaign. • Give broader rights to the community to participate actively in politics. • Destroy the system for selecting the people's representatives which has strength- ened/ enlarged the dominance of the executive. • Change the proportional electoral system to a district one.49 • Change the existing recall system in order to give the people's representatives more freedom to express their views and control the executive in an open and free manner. This demonstration, which was organized by the Pro-Democracy Student Fam- ily, intended at 11:30 to parade by foot to the building of the Chief Public Prosecutor and then in the direction the UGM campus. But the parade was totally obstructed at the front gate of the IAIN by a unit of anti-riot police and a unit of troops armed with automatic weapons from the Military Resort Command. Next, the crowd turned around and attempted to go out the rear door of the campus, but waiting there also was a unit of troops armed with automatic weapons. Seeing that the situation was heating up, the crowd finally agreed to come back within the campus and gather in the front yard of the IAIN Sunan Kalijaga. The demonstration ended at 14:00 in the afternoon. RESIDENTS OF TANAH MERAH SUPPORT GOLPUT Golput is not happening only in Yogya, Semarang, and Bandung. Residents of Tanah Merah, Plumpang, are vicitims of Pertamina land evictions in Jakarta. At every one of their actions, they mention Golput. They have given up, because they complained to the DPR and have never received an answer. Complaining to the government, they are accused on trumped-up charges. Finally, they are resigned to their fate. The campaign slogans of the three political organization contestants, which they say will assist in the resolution of community land cases, can be answered cynically, "Try and prove it!" This opinion of the victims of land condemnation can be found not only in Plumpang. At least twenty-nine locations in Jakarta have been hit with condemnations, and the victims are ready to choose Golput in the election. It's the same with the farmers in Cibodas, Ombo Dam, and Blangguan, and with other vic- tims of land condemnation. Golput develops without a campaign. KIKUK: THIS-NO-THAT-NO GROUP In Jakarta, This-No-That-No Group has been formed, abbreviated KIKUK [lit. clumsy]. The name is appropriate and funny. This group was initiated by the Pi jar Foundation, which sent out thousands of postcards on which was written KIKUK. BPHPR had the opportunity to dialogue with the group. As a result, said KIKUK, the Pijar Foundation has several times been raided by persons who think muscle matters more than law. BPHPR expresses greetings at the formation of KIKUK. Let us together implant the pillars of democracy in this country. Struggle on! STUDENTS VISIT DPR: GOLPUT OR STOP THE ELECTION The Golput movement continues to roll. Now seventy-two students have paid a visit to the Central DPR with the demand: "Golput or Stop the Election." The student demonstration also severely criticized the presence of PDI and PPP, who have merely become victims of the New Order political system. The students were received by the Deputy Chairman of the DPR/MPR, Suprapto. The banners which they unfurled included the following messages: • Golput or Stop the 1992 Election • The People's Poverty Is Marketed for Contesting Seats in the DPR/ MPR • PPP and PDI Are Enslaved by the New Order Political System50 • Semarang Students Are the Victims of Pseudo-Democracy • Don't Sacrifice Youth to Development "Let the people discuss their own fate, because until now the political organiza- tions and the DPR only peddle promises," said Ferry Juliantono, one of the demonstrators. This action involved students from several cities, such as Bandung, Semarang, Salatiga, Sukabumi, Tasikmalaya, Bogor, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. They also involved laborers and farmers who had become victims of development. Demonstrators held out in the DPR building, Senayan, until yesterday afternoon (June 4,1992). They sang struggle songs and yelled Golput slogans. They also invited PDI and PPP supporters to become Golput, because the voice of these two inconse- quential parties, even if combined, will never be able to win. "Participating does not make whole, abstaining does not make abnormal," says a Javanese proverb about being opportunistic partisans like PDI and PPP.* Golput is criticized by many officials. Sarwono says: "Golput damages the PDI and PPP." Afan Gaffar says: "Golput people merely seek notoriety (popularitas)." But the reality proves that the Golput movement rolls on continuously and gets the peo- ple's support. Bravo Golput! RESULTS OF MONITORING GOLPUT AND OUTSKIRT VOTES At the time voting was underway, BPHPR engaged in monitoring at several places on the outskirts of Jakarta. The reason why the outskirt areas were taken as the sam- ple was because BPHPR wanted to understand the voting profile of communities which experienced many incidents. The outlying areas, especially of large cities, usu- ally receive many economic pressures from the dynamics of the city. Physically, the outskirts are often hit with condemnation of land [for government use]. But in the economic sense, the outskirts are the most affected by the process of marginalization. An example of this process is the eviction of traditional markets by large super- markets, such as the Hero, Hembo, and Tomang Tol supermarkets. In addition, the outskirts are the most exploited by the center, especially in areas where agricultural land is scarce and there are no alternative sources of primary livelihood. The outly- ing areas have been proven to be the largest contributor to the funds in the national lottery (SDSB), which is a method of exploitation of the suburban and rural areas. The population's livelihood in the isolated areas is laboring in industry and the informal sector. As is known, the lives of these laborers have been victimized by unjust labor laws. On the average, their pay is below the minimum wage. And in the informal sector, the population on the outskirts is always pressured by illegal taxes and cleanliness-orderliness-security (TIBUM) regulations. The informal sector is always shadowed by powerful authorities who are prepared to evict people from their place of livelihood. For example, it can be seen how motorized and non-motor- ized pedicab drivers have been evicted by taxis owned by officials and conglomerates. Yet these communities on the outskirts, on average, have middle class mentali- ties, because usually they are touched by the government's education programs. Because of this, the communities on the outskirts possesses high political conscious- ness when compared to village communities. Preliminary figures from the results of • Masuk nggak bikin genap, keluar nggak bikin ganjil.51 voting in outlying areas obtained by BPHPR indicate a balance of strength between Golkar and PPP plus PDI. In the outskirts, Golkar only obtained 43.40 percent of the votes (compared to 67.96 percent nationally), whereas PDI got 30.10 percent of the votes and PPP got 21.21 percent. The higher figure of PDI compared to PPP indicates that incidents in the outskirts usually represent secular problems or class conflict, such as eviction and marginalization. During the campaign, PDI also successfully politicized these cases. Yet for [metropolitan] Jakarta as a whole, PPP actually obtained 24 percent, PDI only 23 percent, and Golkar 53 percent. Votes Obtained Randomly at Voting Places on the Outskirts of Jakarta No. Place PPP Golkar PDI Golput 01 Rawa Badak 4 388 3 13 02 Sunter I 152 184 202 7 03 Semper I 72 89 111 14 04 Tugu Selatan 146 121 84 26 05 Komp. Airud 4 200 4 4 06 Pulo Asem 82 135 150 12 07 Kelapa Gading 24 326 118 11 08 Semper II* 71 20 19 4 09 Penjaringan** 1584 3013 2159 564 10 Rawa Lumbu 80 235 140 27 11 Serdang*** 2203 4274 2232 412 TOTAL 4378 8985 6222 1094 Information: * Compiled when process underway. ** Voting places monitored were Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5,17,64,66, 67, 70,71, 74, and 78. *** Voting places monitored were Nos. 7, 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,16,17, 29,30, 31, 32, and 33. In addition to the strength of PDI and PPP, whose combined total in the outskirt areas was 52.31 percent (to Golkar's 43.40 percent), Golput obtained 5.29 percent. The existence of Golput not only indicates the strength of outlying communities' political consciousness, but also their critical thinking toward the existing political system. While they are conscious that their choice not to vote cannot possibly change the existing political system, they know that their choice is ideologically correct. Golput, that is, to punch all three symbols, not to punch any of them, or to damage the ballot invalidating the vote, was done by those who feel that their voice need not be chan- neled into existing political forces which now are monolithic. Accordingly, this reality will prove that in the Indonesian political system there are only two political forces in conflict, government parties and Golput. If this figure for Golput of 4 percent [sic] is projected nation-wide, the number of Golput reaches 4 percent of ninety-seven million (total voters) or 3.88 million. If this category of Golput is widened to include those who did not show up at the voting places, ten million have to be added. They received a ballot, but did not come to the voting place. This absence certainly indicates their low motivation or apathy toward the election. In light of Indonesian cultural [characteristics], which are "shy and afraid," the figure for Golput who did not come to the voting place could exceed the Golput who came to vote. If both types of Golput are combined, it means52 3.88 plus 10 million or 13.88 million people. One seat in this election was contested by 267,000 votes. Thus, obtaining 13.88 million Golput at this moment and dividing by 267,500 equals fifty-two seats. This means that the number of Golput seats was only four less than than the number (fifty-six) obtained by PDI through the election. The above data indicates that Golput can be called the fourth political force, in addition to Golkar, PPP, and PDI.3 Conclusions About Political Practices in the 1992 Election L IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATION A. This could not be trusted because the Direct Implementer and the Regional Implementation Supervisory Committees (PANWASLAK) consisted of bureaucrats and government officials who served concurrently as Golkar functionaries, so their neutrality and integrity were doubtful. B. The Armed Forces with all their apparatus, which at the beginning professed neu- trality, tended over time out to favor a certain group and treat other groups as stepchildren during security actions (i.e., the Berlan-Matraman case, the escorting of 5,000 PDI sympathizers to the National Police headquarters, the "Yogya Mourns" case, Semarang Golput, etc.). C. The occurrence of obstacles from the side of the bureaucracy: • Many people did not receive ballots, even though the time to punch them was near (including hundreds of thousands of transmigrants, residents in villages, etc.). • Witnesses were rejected; permits for witnesses failed to be approved and issued. • There were delays and deficiencies in the provision of forms for witnesses. D. Fraud in the sending of data from certain regions. The General Election Institute made changes only after the fraud was exposed by others. This fraud included vote totals which expanded by hundreds of thousands of votes (the PDI case in several areas). E. Structural treason by the Election Implementers. Although the working principle was deliberation until consensus, in practice, the contestants did not play a role in any determinations, except in periodic, ceremonial programs (Source: Nico Daryanto, Secretary General, PDI). F. All implementation officials, from the President down to the voting place officials, made statements that everything was well done, safe, peaceful, orderly, and fair. Examples include: "All is fair and there is nothing that raises suspicion."54 "[This election is] taking place in an orderly, safe manner, and without disturbance." "If there was fraud, mistakes, or disturbances, it was an ordinary matter." "This and that incident had [someone] fanning or masterminding them." "No one can be blamed, we all were responsible." "This becomes a lesson for all of us that it not happen again." "This election was better and more orderly." "Violations? Later we will look into them and consider them." All the officials in the election had the attitude of washing their hands, because they feared loss of face and position (as safety-players). II. THE CAMPAIGN A. Too much bombast and selling of promises. B. Violations which besmirched mass/political organizations. Azwar Anas, for example, accused political parties of being incompetent to develop [the country] during the Old Order, whereas he himself fully enjoyed development under the Old Order, becoming an engineer and obtaining a cushy position. C. The misuse of Bung Sukarno's name by Golkar functionaries who said that he wanted to be buried beneath a luxuriant banyan tree. Yet the election regulations prohibited the use of Bung Kamo's name and picture in the campaign. D. Deceptions, clear falsehoods, or at least hypocritical persuasion without fore- thought. This was done by Sudomo when he said: "Golkar will fight evictions, corruption, illegal taxes, monopoly, deviations, clout (beking-bekingan), unemploy- ment, [and for] freedom from fear and freedom from danger." Yet, it is precisely all these things that have been committed by the Golkar government, which has never succeeded in eliminating them up to this moment. E. Only programs can be debated. This limitation benefits Golkar, because only Golkar monopolizes the government and is capable of running programs, whereas the political parties are not part of the executive. F. The limitation to programmatic matters is accompanied by a prohibition on men- tioning program failure or criticizing the government. Yet the government has experienced many failures since the beginning of the New Order, such as in lowering prices, surmounting real inflation, decreasing foreign debt, eliminating corruption and monopoly, increasing the standard of living of civil servants and the welfare of the people (who find it difficult to find work and income), nurturing cooperatives, increasing the quality of education, increasing the weight of the DPR/MPR (despite the screening their members undergo), upholding law and justice, carrying out regional autonomy broadly, preventing the exploitation of natural resource profits by opportunistic commercial groups, putting social justice into effect as a state duty in accordance with the 1945 Constitution, overcoming unemployment and layoffs,55 and maintaining buildings, streets, and infrastructure that have been built with state funds. G. The rotation, time and, technique of campaigning were not conducted in accor- dance with mutual agreement and existing general election regulations. The campaign has been emasculated and its character changed to become a dialogue in a closed room. Moreover, the time for open campaigning was abruptly stopped on the last rotation.1 H. The campaign was not a medium for political education. In addition to the con- tinuation of the floating mass system, the open campaign period of three weeks was full of various limitations. And not only was the campaign not democratic, but it was also merely the "show business of democracy," fulfilling pro forma requirements of democracy without the principles and essence of democracy itself. I. The military and government mass media (RRI and TVRI), which were expected to be neutral, actually displayed actions which were unjust and not equitable toward all contestants. J. There was much veiled campaigning, both in the pre-campaign period and in the week of calm, especially by Golkar functionaries who control state facilities. For example, the President and ministers officiated at projects in various regions; the college admission test (UMPTN) in Senayan was administered by Basofi Sudirman; a political prayer was sent to the heavens by H. Alamsyah Prawiranegara; the TVRI music studio shone with yellow clothes, jokes, various other commentaries which featured the successes of Golkar and songs of flattery to Suharto. K. The timing of the campaign hurt the PDI. On June 16, the PDI could not celebrate the birthday of Bung Kamo because it fell in the week of calm. Yet one day before the election, on June 2, Suharto had a birthday and got TVRI and mass media coverage which popularized him. L. Many Golkar functionaries who concurrently serve as government officials uti- lized state facilities in the campaign (pay without working, vehicles, hotels, equipment, campaign materials, etc.). M. Security duties were too much imposed on the people, especially during the cam- paign and the General Election. This can be seen in the formation of mandatory General Election nighttime neighborhood patrols in every RW/RT, the establishing of General Election marshals from the mass and political organizations, New Order upholder guards, etc. So it needs to be asked, what is the real extent of the duties and responsibilities of the Armed Forces, including the Police, as the stabilizer of security. 1 Rotation refers to the requirement, beginning in 1982, whereby the campaign period is divided into rounds with each of the three contestants taking its turn for one day on a rotating basis. For example, if a day has been designated as a Golkar day, neither the PPP nor the PDI would be allowed to hold activities in public on that day. The main reason given by the authorities for the requirement was that prohibiting simultaneous campaigning would help to minimize campaign violence.56 N. The campaign saw much negative excess. The emotions of the people, who have lived until now in a "Genghis Khan" democratic environment, just overflowed. This could be seen in youth circles with the emergence of protest movements. III. VOTING A. Voting conducted by the government for the pilgrims to Mecca from May 25 to June 21 was clearly in conflict with the general election laws, which state that the election must be conducted simultaneously by everyone. Shipping [ballots] through the mail compromised their authenticity. B. Voting which was forced on the Baduy population constitutes a violation of the Constitution, customs, convictions, and certain religions. Voting apparently was "guided" by government officials because the Baduy "do not yet know the way," and because it was "their first time." Freedom to choose did not exist, and also [the Baduy] tended to be herded. C. In certain areas, many government functionaries conducted a political census by filling out forms for the residents, followed by training in [ballot] punching; this represented refined pressure and intimidation. Besides this, authentic general elec- tion forms were circulating in the community prior to the voting (in Yogya and other places). D. Voting in the environs of schools, offices, barracks, and official places of work constitutes taking hostage a person's freedom to choose, a freedom which is guaran- teed in the Constitution and law. At the same time, this constitutes pressure and a threat, direct or indirect, to [political] education. IV. COUNTING OF VOTES A. The counting of votes raised questions, because many figures were suspicious, some resulting from intentional fraud, i.e., the announcement of PDI votes in four provinces was changed the following day with very striking differences; Jakarta and the north coast of Java were a sea of red and the PDI should have won, but as it turned out did not. This constituted an impropriety, according to the opinion of Sucipto Wirosarjono—Kompas. B. A great many voting places were not fully staffed with witnesses (who were already proposed by the contestants, but not given permission by the local govern- ment for reasons which were fabricated) and substitutes were appointed at the voting place. Witnesses who refused to sign the official record were declared to be absent. (This was clearly contradictory to the principles of honesty and justice, as well as with realistic, positive law.) C. It is true that the counting of votes utilized sophisticated equipment, but fraud could still occur because: • Those who pressed the buttons of the sophisticated equipment were human (the man behind the gun).57 • With sophisticated equipment, fraud also could be committed with greater sophistication, as was explained by Suryadi. • The counting was handled by the implementaters (government officials who dou- bled as Golkar functionaries), not by the contestants, so [the contestants] had no right to examine or to check directly the correctness of the computations by the equipment. D. Because the local government was the implementer, and the boxes containing votes were moved around from village to subdistrict, from subdistrict to district, it was difficult to guarantee fully that manipulation did not occur enroute or during storage. Representatives of the contestants were not permitted to accompany or to sleep over while awaiting the ballot box. In Riau, South Sumatra, Irian Jaya, and other places, a ballot box containing authentic votes was exchanged for a box of iden- tical color and construction which contained engineered [vote] punches. Then the authentic boxes and their ballots were thrown into the river or burnt to ashes. E. The counting also aroused suspicion because it was not done by an institution or agency which was neutral and separated from the executive and judiciary. The implementer, a player, can not simultaneously serve as the referee. Consequently, the correctness of the result is very much in doubt. The counting of votes in elections abroad is frequently done by neutral agencies and witnessed by foreigners invited to witness the integrity and validity of the figures. Counting which is pure and neutral not only strengthens honesty and justice, but also abolishes negative prejudice and reassures the people. V. GOLPUT A. The existence of Golput is a reality which cannot be denied. It is proven by: • Data which are included in Golkar's own development book (total Golput number about ten million). • The difference between 107 million registered voters and only ninety-seven mil- lion who actually cast valid votes. This means that there were ten million Golput. • The reality, as reported in Kompas, that among registered voters who voted, there were ballots which were damaged or cancelled. There were three million such bal- lots in East Java, and two million in Central Java. Similarly in other places, there were very many ballots which indicated Golput. • Based on the reality of the three points above, we can conclude that the total number of Golput exceeded fifteen million, an amount greater than the total vote for PDI and similar to the vote for PPP. Golput should properly become a new party separate from the others. B. The existence of Golput illustrates the protest attitude of the society toward the system of government. The society considers general elections to be futile, having no use and wasting billions of Rupiah for a show of democracy without raising the peo- ple's standard of living, a waste of time and energy. Thus the election in itself had absolutely no meaning, because it was nothing more than a means of defending the status quo of authorities who always torment the people.58 C. Suharto gave a speech one night before the voting and said that the election is not only a right but also a duty, so those who do not participate would lose. Yet the peo- ple are already conscious of political reality and are not deceived by a hypocritical recommendation. They maintain their steadfastness not to participate in the voting. Or if they come to vote, they give vent to their protest and criticism by damaging the ballot, causing it to be cancelled. D. The emergence of Golput actions, such as "Yogyakarta Mourns" and the move- ment in Semarang, was caused by unjust actions of the authorities which killed the aspirations of pro-democracy people. E. The Golput movement actually cannot be prosecuted, because there is no law pro- hibiting it. It constitutes the manifestation of a high level of political consciousness developing outside the system. It has arisen because power and the mechanisms of the system are often in conflict with the Constitution, Pancasila, and current laws. Democracy, human rights, and justice are defeated by the authorities. The Golput attitude is only a reaction against a system and a mechanism of power which is insensitive and inconsiderate toward the people. VI. EPILOGUE A. The election indeed ran smoothly, securely, and in an orderly manner, but it was too much colored by pressure, intimidation, intervention, instructions, obstructions, manipulation, restrictions, and fraud in forms ranging from coarse to refined and sophisticated. B. Considering both legal aspects and the honesty and justice of election implementa- tion, it is difficult to pronounce the result valid because: • The juridical foundation was unconstitutional. • The [election] laws and regulations deviate [from the Constitution] and are manipulative. • Togetherness and consensus were only ceremonial and pro forma, because in the implementation, the contestants went unheeded, whether in matters of policy, administration, or realization. Suspicion of fraud cannot be avoided, because: • Implementation was handled absolutely by the executive authorities. • The implementing and supervising agency was not independent, because it was composed of state functionaries who doubled as members of Golkar. • Voting results often changed on the pretext of technical error. • Numerical results differed greatly from the aspirations alive in the local commu- nities.59 • There were about fifteen million Golput (ten million people did not vote and five million blank votes were declared invalid), so the election was delegitimized. In any case, results were engineered by the authorities. • Security of ballot boxes, counting, and witnesses was not guaranteed. Transporta- tion, transfer, and storage of ballot boxes were not escorted by representatives of the contestants, only by functionaries of the authorities. • Printing and distribution of voter forms, witness [forms], and ballots were all done by the authorities, so it was difficult to control for manipulation and falsifi- cation of forms and ballots before and during the election. • The authorities were afraid to establish an election judicial agency (as proposed by Suryadi), because it could have exposed all kinds of fraud and cancelled the results of the election. C. The extent of voter turnout registered only the success of the authorities in coer- cion and the system of herding citizens to the ballot box with threats to their livelihood. Those herded were: • Civil servants, military families, laborers, high school students, etc. • Some 500,000 repatriates who returned to their original neighborhoods, and who could have registered and voted in the places where they work. • Islamic pilgrims and the Baduy ethnic population of West Java. D. There was a veiled campaign, which took various forms: officiation at projects, accompanied by the mobilization of a crowd to witness [government projects] and hear instructions; entertainment shows; activities in the villages and neighborhoods disguised as voluntary labor; the Armed Forces-enter-the-village-and-unite-with-the- people program; and broadcasts of Golkar development successes on RRI and TVRI, which hid Golkar failures. E. Due to the large amount of pressure, manipulation, and fraud, this election should be declared invalid and cancelled for the sake of the law, because its constitutional and juridical foundation was invalid. F. The General Election was a waste, because • The people's aspirations in pluralism were not respected. • There were a large number of deviant and fraudulent actions. • The political party contestants were considered insignificant, so they had to sub- mit to the majority and the authorities; accordingly, the election implementors were not honest, just, or impartial, and did not operate on the basis of mutual deliberation to reach consensus. • The entire result consists of dubious numbers. • Due to the large number of obstructions and restrictions, it is no longer appropri- ate to speak of a "Festival of Democracy."60 G. The errors and fraud in the election cannot be settled by actions or apologies of the officials responsible, because the election is not an informal activity; rather it is a manifestation of the Constitution in which human rights are protected by law. Thus the fraud cannot be gotten rid of simply by the apology of a Minister or official responsible. It must be dealt with by a formal juridical process. H. The defects of justice as a result of the election must be rectified completely in all regions, because this matter will contribute to continued excesses and resentment among the people. (For example, a member of the PDI burnt a Golkar flag in Surabaya, a member of Golkar threw rocks at the PDI central office, and eleven houses of PDI people were burned in East Nusa Tenggara.) This rectification should adhere to the truths that our state is a state of law and that all people have the same status in public [before the law]. I. The authorities' actions against the political manifestation of Golput were unjust, because silencing the protest and voice of society is unconstitutional, contradicting Article 28 and Paragraph II of Chapter 1,1945 Constitution. J. The general elections during the New Order are considered a variable which is no longer important in the democratic process, because the result can be surmised beforehand, and the conditions of the highest institutions later undergo little change. K. The existence of a target by which government officials measure success makes the election lose its neutral, honest, and just meaning. Government officials clearly mobilize the people to benefit one of the contestants. L. Many campaign spokespersons were not legislative candidates (vote-getters only). Not only were their promises empty talk, but they were also unrepresentative of the people because they did not sit in the DPR. Not being responsible to the people, it is not possible for them to struggle to defend the people. M. The decline in Golkar seats, while not very large, is an indication that the people have begun to lose faith in Golkar and want change on this Indonesian soil. N. The safest change comes through general elections, but if these elections are manipulated, defrauded, beaten, and raped, then the overflowing of the people's aspirations can explode through channels outside the system. A situation like this becomes more dangerous, as happened in Thailand, Myanmar, Taiwan, Korea, and other places. O. Although this election took place in a quite secure, orderly, and peaceful manner, the result should be deplored because there was pressure and herding. The election did not fulfill the requirements of the law and the principle of togetherness, and it deviated from its true objective. For these reasons, it must be cancelled for the sake of the law.APPENDIX 1 Public Statement of the BPHPR We, a portion of the Indonesian people, declare that: 1. The implementation of Law No. 1,1985, on the General Election of Members of the People's Consultative/People's Representative Bodies, along with Law No. 3,1985, together with deviations in the implementation of Law No. 8,1985, on Mass Organi- zations, clearly truly deviate from Articles 27 and 28 of the 1945 Constitution and from Decision III of the MPR, 1988, and Decision VII of the MPR, 1978. 2. The 1992 General Election indicates only the appearance of democracy, evidenced by the screening of all candidates by the state apparatus under Presidential Decision 16, 1990, and by the appointment of more members of the MPR than are elected, resulting in a dominant, majority social force exerting greater influence on legislation than the smaller social forces. The dominance of the executive over the legislative is very strong in the New Order. It is reflected in the strong support for legislation pro- posed by the government, whereas an anti-monopoly bill initiated by a small social force was refused. 3. Many regulations and laws deviate from higher regulations and laws, and gov- ernment regulations subordinate to [DPR ratified-] laws often damage the interests of the people, neglect the constitutional rights of the people, and increasingly strengthen a culture of feudalism which deviates from the Broad Outlines of the State's Direction (GBHN) and the 1945 Constitution. Examples [of damage and neglect] are the protests of farmers, laborers, fishermen, pedicab drivers, factory laborers, and hawkers to the DPR. 4. The regulations on the conduct of the DPR weaken the position of the people's representatives. Law No. 19,1964, was superseded by law No. 14,1970, [allowing] in practice, intervention by the executive into judicial institutions. Decision VI of the MPR, 1988, Article 2, brought about an expansion in the power of the executive, compared to the powers of judicial and legislative institutions, which causes [the executive] to exceed the bounds of the 1945 Constitution. These regulations only reinforce the status quo, prevent any substantial change in connection with the absence of the institution of judicial review, and become an obstacle to moving toward Pancasila Democracy and social justice.62 5. It must be considered that the group who did not vote (election protesters) in vari- ous ways and for various reasons exercised a conscious and responsible choice, constituting a form or shape of protest toward the system of affairs of state put into effect by the authorities. 6. Due to the above reasons, it is very clear that an election implemented according to laws that deviate from the 1945 Constitution compels us to declare: a. Cancel the election for the sake of the law. b. The logical consequence is for the Head of State/President to account for his per- formance and authority to the MPR which appointed/elected him for the 1987-92 period. The DPR should immediately urge the MPR to conduct a special public session, and the MPR must request accountability in a constitutional way for the sake of the unity of the Nation. c. Immediately establish a national committee for the purpose of reviewing the valid- ity of regulations and laws (i.e., judicial review) which are issued by both the legislative and executive bodies. The committee should consist of independent legal experts who serve as supervisors and referees. Jakarta, June 8,1992APPENDIX 2 Declaration of the Founding Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights facing the 1992 General Election (BPHPR Pemilu 1992) A. Assumptions The proclamation of Independence of the Indonesian People, August 17, 1945, intended to form a unitary state, the Republic of Indonesia, in which the people exercised sovereignty in order to bring about well-being and social justice for the entire Indonesian people. In light of that statement, a state policy is sorely needed which guarantees the people's sovereignty and which is conducted entirely by the MPR as the highest institution of state. As is known, a general election must be conducted every five years to select members of the MPR and to provide a means of implementing the principle of the people's sovereignty. The General Election is regulated by election laws and will involve not less than 60 percent of the 160 million people of Indonesia. Stipulations in the General Election law which are most important are that the election be conducted in accordance with Pancasila Democracy and that voting occur in a manner that is Direct, General [universal], Free, and Secret (LUBER). But the manner of implementing the election or voting, while often said to be general and direct, is not yet able to guarantee "free and secret." This manner of voting is contradictory to how a real, free general election is con- ducted, because the implementing apparatus is composed of officials and employees of the government. Accordingly, the honesty and neutrality of the election imple- mented has to be questioned. B. Problems General elections, whether as a means of actually uniting the sovereignty of the people or a means for an authoritarian regime to obtain legitimacy, have been accepted as a representative system by every modem nation-state, including Indo- nesia. Because there are voters in the election who could fall victims to manipulation,64 especially if the election supervisory committee itself is not neutral (i.e., the govern- ment sitting as chair), the position of voters is very weak. In fact, the degree of objectivity in Indonesian elections is very low, as can be seen from several problems below: 1. The election will not make possible any substantial political changes, because fewer members of the MPR are elected than are appointed by the authorities. Even if voting were put into effect, and PPP, PDI, and Golkar were united, it would still be impossible for them to win facing those who are appointed, mean- ing that the majority dominates in politics. Also, many mass organizations whose independence is uncertain (KORPRI, FKPPI, AMPI, Dharma Wanita, etc.) are appointed as a portion of those supporting the majority group. 2. The previous elections and the one which will be held in the month of June, 1992, have not been conducted in a situation of political consciousness of the people, because the concept of floating mass is still in effect, and the reality is that the people choose not candidates, but [party] symbols. With this current election sys- tem, it is not yet possible to create a legislature which is really representative of the people's aspirations. Accordingly, the executive (President) and MPR/DPR who are chosen will [not] have quality. 3. When the coming election is implemented, the dual function of the Armed Forces, in practice, makes impossible the creation of a just balance of power and real civil political rights. In fact, in addition to being represented by the Armed Forces fac- tion [in the DPR], members of the Armed Forces are also appointed to the Armed Forces functional group [in the MPR]. 4. The coming election will also be conducted in a situation of unclear separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Moreover, the MPR leadership still doubles as the leadership of the DPR, a lower institution. And, again, this election will be conducted at a moment in which there is still in the community an extra- constitutional body possessing unlimited powers, the National Stabilization Con- solidation Assistance Coordinating Agency (BAKORSTANAS). 5. This election only involves the interests of a small portion of the citizens, due to regulations which limit the people's participation in conducting mass campaigns and to administrative requirements put into effect by the authorities. 6. In Indonesia at the present time, the Subversion Law is still in effect, which is con- tradictory to the spirit of democracy and Basic Human Rights, because it can become a means of pressure by absolutist authorities. Under this law, persons suspected by the authorities of [not] holding to the official ideology are not per- mitted to participate in the election, even though in practice they would later support the official parties. 7. The political parties and Golkar are at present the result of a fusion which was engineered, so they can never reflect all the people's political aspirations. For this reason, the election as a means of democracy should include the participation of voters who wish to channel their political rights in a different way, such as Golput, which has grown to more than 8,000,000 citizens since 1987.65 8. The history of the implementation of the 1971,1977,1982, and 1987 elections indi- cates that moral/ethical and juridical violations occurred which damaged the people in channeling their political rights. 9. By Law No. 1, 1985, it was decided to establish an Election Implementation Supervisory Committee led by a government official. Can a supervisory body such as this be objective? 10. The formation of a 1992 Election Task Force (saigas) in the greater Jakarta area (JABOTABEK) and the formation of a New Order Upholder Guard in every mili- tary command area throughout Indonesia have indeed become instruments for coercing voters. It is feared that the 1992 Election Task Force, consisting of mem- bers of political organizations who underwent military training, will become identical with a Fifth Force. The existence of task forces such as these raises ques- tions about the authority of the Police. C. Reason for the Founding of BPHPR Considering that the 1992 election, which chooses members of the MPR/DPR, will eventually determine whom the MPR will entrust with the Presidential mandate for 1993-1998, an independent body needs to be established to supervise the implemen- tation of the people's political rights. Most of the work of the body will be carried out by those who do not have a personal interest as a member of a political party organi- zation and who work to uphold the legitimacy, morality, ethics, and legality of the election. This body works on the basis of constitutional and legal principles. D. Objective for the 1992 Election BPHPR will educate every citizen to have the courage to channel her/his political rights, so as not to be trapped into participating in an election system which is a tool of legitimation to maintain the regime in power. BPHPR for the 1992 Election will also protect the people's rights, both those actively and those inactively participating in the election, through monitoring, supervision, protection, and activities which in essence struggle for democracy in Indonesia. E. Activities The organization which is given the name Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 Election (BPHPR Pemilu 1992) will monitor, oversee, and become a private, neutral referee in the implementation of the people's political rights facing the 1992 election; it will denounce morally, ethically, and juridically, every violation of the people's political rights, and will carry out other activities to struggle for democracy in Indonesia. F. Program 1. Establishment of an information network: This information network is very impor- tant for monitoring the implementation of the elections and all incidents which occur in the field. In addition, this information network can be utilized to dissem- inate news and technical needs of protection/defense. 2. Establishment of monitoring posts: Monitoring posts will be erected in several regions which are considered to be regions marked by "cases" or violations.66 Places with monitoring posts will include: Aceh, South Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Bali, Madura, and East Timor. 3. Establishment of monitor/supervisor, complaint, and legal defense divisions: These divisions constitute the executive and handle technical work. What type of work will consist of (a) monitoring/supervision and (b) protection [i.e. defense]? Complaint means complaints direct from the community. Defense by BPHPR means defense in litigation and non-litigation processes. 4. Publication of the journal General Election 1992: This journal will contain cases which occurred during the 1992 election as bases for protection of BPHPR, and it will also announce the compilation of votes continuously. 5. Organization of guidance: Limited guidance will be given to community leaders to instill consciousness about the people's political rights. It is hoped that these community leaders will become agents who can guide their communities in implementing their political rights. 6. Publication of a manual for citizens: This manual will take the form of a small book containing information about what citizens must do at the time they face the 1992 election, and what to do if repressive activities and violations of the law and basic human rights occur. BPHPR PROTESTS INTIMIDATION TOWARD BPHPR Only three weeks after BPHPR was founded, several uninvited operatives (oknum) began to intimidate one of the members. These operatives, some of whom had been met before, monitor student actions and are often seen at the office of BAKO- RSTANASDA Jakarta. On May 15, 1992, at about 10:30 Western Indonesia Time, no less than six opera- tives in civilian clothes raided the office of one of the functionaries of BPHPR located in Rawamangun. They suddenly entered the office without the permission of the workers therein. Men of sturdy build, they directly entered the working room of the BPHPR functionary and asked the whereabouts of Indro Tjahjono. After finding that he was not there, one of the operatives in civilian clothes, without permission, exam- ined the dossiers on top of the table. The operatives also threatened to raid the working rooms. After they were given an explanation, they abandoned their plan. But they still took the opportunity of becoming the receptionist at the above mentioned office for a while by answering, without permission, every incoming phone call. The goal of the raid apparently was to get information about the BPHPR plan to come to the DPR, which was prepared for May 18,1992. After failing in their search, the operatives left the place. Yet at 15:00, they undertook a second surprise attack. On this occasion, they also failed to find the functionary they sought and left the office leaving behind a letter. At the occurrence of this action, which smells of intimidation, we the functionar- ies of BPHPR declare deep concern that the implementation of democracy and human rights in Indonesia still faces sharp gravel. We also hope that all sides will keep the implementation of the election from being sullied by actions of the govern- ment, military, or whomever. No matter what the level of violence, it will never be able to solve the political and social problems of our nation.67 BPHPR MEETS WITH DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF MPR, R. SUPRAPTO Our concerns range from the problems of the system, to limitation on Presidential terms, and to Golput. In essence, there were several matters which were suggested by BPHPR to the Deputy Chairman. First, we explained the founding declaration of the BPHPR, including its goals and programs, and we stressed the issue of election protest as a political right which must be valued. Second, we reported the results of monitoring election violations during the first week of the campaign. Third, concern- ing the problem of succession and limitation on the number of Presidential terms, we proposed emphatically a maximum of two terms. Fourth, we reported about our protest of the intimidation which was assumed to have been carried out by opera- tives from BAKORSTANASDA, Jakarta, against one of our functionaries in our office (see above). Responding to these four issues, Suprapto, as we had assumed in advance, said in essence that whatever the proposals for change, one should utilize the existing system. He said that if we do not use the existing system, history will put us aside. He gave the example of former Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, saying: "Brother Ali is a person of quality, but he doesn't understand politics, and did not use the existing system. Thus he was isolated." Concerning election protesters, Suprapto stressed that election protest is indeed the right of every person and is guaranteed by the Constitution. But, he continued, if there is a person or group who urges people to become election protesters, as was done by FPKR, it becomes a different matter. Action can be taken against them. Concerning intimidation toward BPHPR by certain operatives, he said that whatever we make of this matter, we come back to the human factor. He meant that although the legal system exists and is recognized, human beings cannot escape from error. He continued, saying that if BPHPR wants, it should go ahead and initiate a legal proceeding (suit). A sharp debate ensued, in which, in essence, we demanded that changes be made in the laws and implementation of the election for the sake of guaranteeing democracy and the people's political rights. After this, the meeting ended. Suprapto's commentary was difficult to shift from "use the system," and "please use the system." In response, a BPHPR activist asked if there had been any meaningful system change to guarantee the people's political rights since the beginning of the New Order. BPHPR VISITS THE GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) On May 21, 1992, at 11:00, we visited the LPU on Iman Bonjol Street [in Jakarta]. BPHPR was represented by H.J.C. Princen, Berar Fathia, Agus Edy Santoso, M. Tito, Taufan, and Santoso, and was accompanied by a resident of Majalengka. Our visit was received by Pak Sutomo, Head of 1992 Election Security Bureau. We had wanted to meet directly with the Head of the LPU [Minister Rudini]. At this meeting, the BPHPR side conveyed our Declaration on the 1992 General Election, protested the violations that had occurred in the campaign, and expressed the hope that we would be able to meet with the Head of the LPU. [We were told that] all proposals and protests of the BPHPR about the afore- mentioned violations in the 1992 General Election would be conveyed to the Head of the LPU, Rudini. Finally, we reiterated that we still wanted to meet with the Head of the LPU.68 BPHPR VISITS PDI, PPP, AND ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS BPHPR conveyed the results of monitoring the final rotation of the campaign to the PDI, PPP, and Head of the Social-Political Staff of the Armed Forces in Cilangkap. First, about 10:00 (May 4, 1992 [sic]), our group arrived at the office of PDI on Iman Bonjol Street in Jakarta, which is next door to the office of PPP. At the PDI office, we were received by Suko Waluyo who was in the process of giving guidance. Princen, representing BPHPR, presented the results of our monitoring, then immedi- ately left in order to make the same presentation at the office of the PPP. At the PPP office, none of the functionaries was present, so we only entrusted [a copy of the report] with a posted guard and PPP member. Our entourage continued its trip to the Head of the Social-Political Staff of the Armed Forces in Cilangkap. Unfortunately, our entourage was unable to meet the Head, because he along with important staff was on a field trip to the regions in con- nection with the 1992 election. Finally, we conveyed a copy of the results of our monitoring to one of the guard staff named Jubingan.Glossary ABRI—Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [Indonesian Armed Forces] AMPI—Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia [Indonesia Renewal Younger Generation] BAKORSTANAS—Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional [National Stabilization Consolidation Assistance Coordinating Agency] BAKORSTANASDA—Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional Daerah [Regional Office of the National Stabilization Consolidation Assistance Coordinating Agency] BPHPR—Badan Perlindungan Hak-Hak Politik Rakyat dalam Menghadapi Pilihan Umum 1992 [Body for the Protection of the People's Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election] BULOG—Badan Urusan Logistik [Food Stabilization Agency] DPC—Dewan Pengurus Cabang [Branch Leadership Council] DPD—Dewan Pengurus Daerah [Regional Leadership Council] DPP—Dewan Pengurus Pusat [Central Leadership Council] DPRD—Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah [Regional People's Representative Council] DPR—Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [People's Representative Council] FKMM—Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Merdeka [Free Student Communication Forum] FKPPI—Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia [Sons and Daughters of Retired Armed Services Officers Communication Forum] GBHN—Garis Besar Haluan Negara [Broad Outlines of the State's Direction] Golkar—Golongan Karya [Functional Groups] Golput—golongan putih [white group] IAIN—Institut Agama Islam Negeri [State Islamic Religious Institute] IPB—Institut Pertanian Bogor [Bogor Institute of Agriculture] JABOTABEK—Jakarta Bogor Tangerang Bekasi [Greater Jakarta Area] JURDIL—jujur dan adil [honest and just] KEPPRES—Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decision] KIKUK—lit, clumsy, awkward [This-No-That-No Group] KORPRI—Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia [Indonesian Civil Servants Corps] KPPS—Kelompok Pelaksana Pemungutan Suara [Voting Implementation Group] KUHP—Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana [Criminal Code] LPU—Lembaga Pemilihan Umum [General Election Institute] LUBER—langsung umum bebas rahasia [direct, general, free, and secret] MENPAN—Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara [Minister for the Efficient Use of the State Apparatus]70 MPR—Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [People's Representative Assembly] OPM—Organisasi Papua Merdeka [Free Papua Organization] PANTARLIH—Panitia Pendaftaran Pemilih [Voter Registration Committee] PANWASLAK (I and II)—Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilihan Umum [Regional Implementation Supervisory Committee (provincial and district)] PANWASLAKCAM—Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilihan Umum Kecamatan [Subdistrict Implementation Supervisory Committee] PANWASLAKPUS—Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilihan Umum Pusat [Central Implementation Supervisory Committee] PDI—Partai Demokrasi Indonesia [Indonesia Democratic Party] PPD (I and II)—Panitia Pemilihan Daerah [Regional Election Committee (provincial and district)] PPI—Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia [Indonesia Election Committee] PPP—Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [Development Unity Party] PPS—Panitia Pemungutan Suara [Voting Committee] PP—Pemuda Pancasila [Pancasila Youth] PP—peraturan pemerintah [regulations issued by the executive branch] RRI—Radio Republik Indonesia [Indonesian State Radio] RT—rukun tetangga [neighborhood association] RW—rukun warga [town administrative unit] SDSB—Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah [National Lottery] TIBUM—ketertiban umum [public order] TPS—Tempat Pemungutan Suara [polling place] TVRI—Televisi Republik Indonesia [Indonesian State Television] UGM—Universitas Gadjah Mada [Gadjah Mada University] UMPTN—Ujian Masuk Perguruan Tinggi Negeri [State Higher Education Entrance Exam] UNRAM—Universitas Mataram [Mataram University] UU—undang-undang [law enacted by the DPR]