Production Note
Cornell University Library produced this
volume to replace the irreparably
deteriorated original. It was scanned using
Xerox software and equipment at 600 dots per
inch resolution and compressed prior to
storage using CCITT Group 4 compression. The
digital data were used to create Cornell's
replacement volume on paper that meets the
ANSI Standard Z39.48-1984. The production of
this volume was supported in part by the New
York State Program for the Conservation and
Preservation of Library Research Materials
and the Xerox Corporation. Digital file
copyright by Cornell University Library
1994.AN ADDRESS,
DELIVERED AT THE
INAUGURATION OFa THE AUTHOR
Ifinimnr nf CJjristiim. Clplogt);
IN THE
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT AUBURN,
JUNE 15, 1853.
BY REV. CLEMENT LONG, D. D.
AUBURN:
J. C, IVISON, PUBLISHER.
1858.XNAPP * PEOK, PBINTEBfl,
ATTBUBN, S, T.ADDRESS.
Christian Theology, as opposed to Natural Theology, ex-
hibits in a systematic form the doctrines of Christ and his
apostles. They are contained in the inspired word of God.
The instructor in this department of sacred learning is. an ex-
pounder of the principles set forth in the scriptures of the Old
and New Testaments. It is his office to classify and arrange
revealed truths, rather than to exhibit his own views.
And the duty of the Christian Theologian is not confined to
systematic exposition : he will inculcate on his pupils the be-
lief of scripture doctrines on the grouud of divine authority.
Never man spake like Jesus Christ: the apostles were mirac-
ulously qualified to teach in his name. The theology which
is fairly deducible from their instructions is no mere matter of
historic interest, but it is binding on our consciences. The
student should embrace it, not because it is coincident with
his reason, but because it emanated from such a source.
The recognition and belief of certain supernatural facts is
therefore implied in Christian Theology. It presupposes the
credibility of the statements made in the scriptures to the
effect that God has interposed in an extraordinary manner for
our . spiritual good, and has given miraculous proof of such in-
terposition.
But we are met with an objection to this view of Christianity
as a system resting its claims on divine authority. It is some- *
times affirmed, and oftener tacitly assumed, that it is unreason-4
able to believe in a supernatural revelation, or any other su-
pernatural fact.
Avowed infidels do not hesitate to declare that miracles are
incredible simply because they are deviations from the course
of nature, and not for the reason, which indeed they allege,
that miracles are not necessary for our moral welfare.
Many who are unwilling to incur the odium that attaches
to the name infidel, and who profess themselves believers in
Christianity “ as they understand it,” do yet deny the super-
natural facts of the New Testament as being repugnant to rea-
son. They pretend that they hold the essentials of our faith,
while refusing to believe that Christ was more than man, and
even that he was a man divinely sent, and, as will be seen
hereafter, while advocating an opinion which is subversive of
ad religion.
And it is to be feared that scepticism on this subject exists
among many who do not venture to take an attitude of posi-
tive disbelief. Is not the feeling too generally prevalent, that
facts are sufficiently explained when they are referred to the
established course of nature, and that the course of nature
itself requires no explanation, but stands and produces effects
by its own power ? But if the continuance of the things that
are made does not depend every moment on the good plea-
sure of God, but their various properties and relations exist
without him, it must be a question whether the order of events
is at all under his control. He who does not believe that na-
ture itself is a miracle, can hardly think that any individual
miraculous event is possible.
The course of argument usually pursued with these unbe-
lievers and rational Christians, is to accumulate from every
source the proof of the supernatural facts of the gospel, and also
to show that no satisfactory account can be given of the man-
ner in which Christianity has obtained a footing in the world,
if it be supposed a deception or an illusion. The truth, and
the God of truth, it has been said, could overcome the preju-
dices against the gospel from pre-occupation of the mind with5
other beliefs and from the depravity of the human heart. But
it is to the last degree improbable, that the sacred writers
should have been able to impose on the credulity of Jew and
Gentile a fable, which was alike repugnant to the feelings of
both. This should be a consideration of overwhelming weight
with those who are willing to be determined in this case, as
in others, by the force of evidence. But the unbelievers of
whom I am speaking are not prepared to listen to an argument
of this kind, because they do not admit that a supernatural
fact is possible. They are, therefore, compelled to accept the
alternative, beset as it is with difficulties, that the sacred wri-
ters were either self-deceived or conscious impostors. If they
would abandon their rationalistic objection, they would feel
that they must, in candor, receive the natural explanation of
the spread and power of the gospel, that it truly describes the
person and life of our Lord.
Is it not the duty of the believers in a revealed theology to
endeavor to dislodge them from their present position ? If
this could be. accomplished, but little further argument would
seem to be necessary in support of the credibility and divine
authority of the scriptures. Perhaps I might go further, and
say that little more is wanting to the defence of what is com-
monly designated as orthodoxy. For, according to the latest
phase of infidelity, there is no question of interpretation be-
tween the unbeliever and the evangelical Christian. The un-
believer admits that the Bible is an orthodox book. But he
holds that the sacred writers were themselves deceived; for
he denies that there can be any infallible divine guidance in
religion, or that a miracle can ever have been performed.
Could he believe it possible that the evangelical history is
true, he would be in a position to feel the force of the Chris-
tian evidences, and then also to embrace the faith of evangeli-
cal Christians, that Jesus is the Son of God and Savior of
the world.
The defenders of the gospel have urged against this class of
unbelievers the probability of a miraculous interposition for6
the moral welfare of mankind. They have said that this is
needful, and that a benevolent God who loves our happiness,
and a righteous God who desires our holiness, may be expect-
ed to do for us what our spiritual necessities require. But
this argument supposes, what the rationalistic unbeliever de-
nies, the possibility of a deviation from the established course
of nature. Evangelical Christianity is unreasonable, as he
pretends, not because it professes to do for us that which is
not needed, but because it is inconsistent with the nature of
things and absurd. It is on this ground that Strauss, the au-
thor of the amended ^ rational” Life of Jesus, which is circu-
lating among us in an English translation, and which presents
us with the latest form of infidelity, has undertaken the im-
practicable task of showing how the narrative of the evangel-
ists, though false, could have been believed to be true by them-
selves and the Christian world.
Infidelity now offers to the defenders of a revealed theology
this issue, that the supernatural facts of the Bible are incon-
sistent with the laws of nature; and we should not fear to ac-
cept the issue. Is it unsuitable to the occasion which calls us
together, that I should ask your attention to some remarks on
the relation of the laws of nature to Christian Theology ? A
teacher in this department of instruction may be expected, if
occasion seems to require it of any one, to defend the ground
on which he stands, and maintain his right to live and labor
in the vocation to which he has been called.
I shall speak first, and more at large, of the possibility of
supernatural events, and then refer, briefly, to some undeniable
facts of our moral nature which should lead us to believe in
those recorded in the Kew Testament.
I. Are the facts of Christian Theology, then, inconsistent
with the laws of nature ? Is it absurd to believe that a phe-
nomenon which has occurred in numberless instances only un-
der certain circumstances, can in any other instance have hap-
pened under a different set of circumstances ? For example,7
the million anticipate the future solely through their knowl-
edge of the past; is it absurd to suppose that a few individuals,
have been able, by other means, to predict coming events ?
According to the uniform course of nature, dead bodies return
to the dust. Are we at liberty to believe, upon any evidence
whatever, that one man, after' lying in the grave three days^
rose from the dead ?
In answer to these inquiries, I remark, first, that the advo-.
cate of naturalism cannot pretend to see in these facts any
necessity that they should occur in the usual mode. He knows
not wherefore corruption is a natural consequence of the ex-
tinction of life, and can give us no reason why, in every in-
stance, men should not rise from the dead after three days. He
knows the general fact, and that is all. Should he profess that
he was able to determine why certain phenomena appear un-
der certain conditions, as a dissolution of the body in connec-
tion with the loss of life, he would class himself with that school
in philosophy, not now in the highest repute, that flourished
before the time of Bacon, who occupied themselves with the
inquiry, how the world ought to be constructed according to
their ideas, instead of attempting to discover the actual relar
tion s of things by observation. The speculations of this school,
though not by any means worthy of our contempt, were not
so eminently conducive to the advancement of knowledge, as
to evince the correctness of their method. The principle of
the great reformer in philosophy, that “ man, the servant and
interpreter of nature, understands and reduces to practice just
so much as he has actually experienced of nature’s laws:
more he can neither know nor achieve,” now so generally re-
ceived, is undeniably true. The wisest philosopher, if asked
why a stone falls when left unsupported, can only say that
other bodies fall in like circumstances. If further inquired of,
why other bodies fall, he has to confess his ignorance. The
wisest philosopher would not know beforehand that a lump of
sugar would dissolve in his tea. And now he can anticipate
such a result only because he has already observed its like*8
He is now just as ignorant of the reason why he should have
had such an experience, as he was before that it was to be ex-
pected.
The rationalist can therefore, see nothing in the nature of
any given miracle which must forbid its occurrence. He can-
not know that the miraculous power of predicting the future
otherwise than by means of the existing causes, out of which
the future will be developed, is impossible in itself. He has
no such acquaintance with the conditions of human knowl-
edge, as to be able to affirm that all mankind, if God had so
pleased* could not have been informed of the future after the
manner of the prophets, so that a fact which is now a wonder
should have been a common event. He is incompetent to de-
clare from any information he possesses, that the bodies of all
the dead, after having slumbered three days in the grave, could
not be raised immortal, and ascend to some other world, there
to commence their eternal existence.
It appears, thus, that the rationalist must believe, on some
other ground than any insight he has, or can pretend to, into
the objects of our knowledge—-the minds and material sub-
stances whose phenomena we observe—that there cannot be
any deviation from the laws of nature. If he has that pro-
found knowledge of possibilities, which he alleges, it is not
from his penetrating glance into the essences of the things
which compose the natural world. He does not know that
mind from its nature as mind, or matter in general, or any
kind of matter, must, from its very constitution, always act
and be acted on in precisely the same manner as now, or in
any other uniform manner. So far as it regards the matter of
the facts which fall under the laws of nature, his information
is confined within very narrow limits. He knows what phe-
nomena this matter has exhibited, but not that it could not
have been made to exhibit different phenomena.
I therefore remark, secondly, that the rationalist, if he is
indeed so deeply read in the mysteries of nature, as his denial
of the possibility of a miracle supposes, must perceive that nat-9
ural law, as such, irrespective of the matter in which it is ex-
emplified, is immutable and eternal. For this is the only alter-
native. He must see that an unvarying uniformity is an attri-
bute of natural law in itself. ' He must hold that no violation or
suspension of a law of nature, or deviation from it, is credible,
for the sole reason that immutability enters into its idea. To
recur to a former illustration, he must think that a return to
life of a single individual, after having been three days dead, is
impossible, not because this could not have been the natural
order of sequence, but because not being the natural order, ex-
ceptions are not to be admitted. The reason, it must be main-
tained, can tolerate no singularities ; it must require that the
rules of action in the physical world be not merely general, with
occasional deviations, but absolutely universal. If a dead man
was to be restored to life in a single instance, the whole con-
stitution of nature must have been different.
Before such a view as this is entertained, a reflecting man,
such as the rationalistic infidel would be thought, should pon-
der well the consequences which it involves. . If the laws of
nature are absolutely universal, there can be no phenomenon
which was not preceded by a natural cause, and no creation is
possible. The first plant of any kind, being like others of its
class, must have been produced like them from a seed; and
the seed must, as a natural product, have been the fruit of a
previous plant. Thus no beginning of nature will be allowa-
able. And again, as every cause in nature has a certain effect,
the causes existing in the most remote future must be followed
by their consequents, and the system of nature can never
come to an end. Nature must therefore be eternal, and if
eternal, then also self-existent, and absolutely independent,
and consequently God. For there can be no other God but
the self-existent and absolutely independent Being. We are
parts of nature, and thus parts of God, on this supposition ;
and we are also free from all moral responsibility, unless we
can be said to be accountable to ourselves. But, in truth, nei-
ther we, the human developments of Deity, nor the universe10
taken as a whole, could have a moral character, since all things
would come to pass by a fatal necessity. So incompatible is
the rationalistic assertion of an absolute uniformity of events
with any religion.
And yet there are some professedly Christian teachers in
this country, and more abroad, who deny the possibility of
the supernatural, with a clear apprehension of the legitimate
consequences of their unbelief. With them Christianity has
come to be.synonymous with the rejection of all possible
grounds of religious faith. They have rectified the gospel, and
obtained from it the quintesceuce of spiritualism, which is that
the world is God. These Christians, if they ever overcome
the world, place their God beneath their feet.
But let us examine this position, that laws of nature must
be absolutely invariable, if they are to retain the character of
laws, and learn whether it be impregnable. Is it as certain
that nature is without beginning, interruption, or end, as that
there are any physical laws ? If it is a general fact that the
sun shines, must it be admitted that the sun shines from ever-
lasting to everlasting ? Is pantheistic infidelity as undeniable,
at least, if it be not so clear as the shining of the sun ?
The remarks that we have already made will help us to an
answer. Our philosophy does not inform us why any given
phenomenon should occur—why, for example, there should be
a sun to shine, or why the emission of light should be a prop-
erty of that luminary. We simply know the fact. But the
rationalist contends that the fact being once established, were
it precisely the reverse of what we observe it to be, as that
the sun were a dark body, it must be an everlasting fact. If
the sun ever shines it must shine on without end. The par-
ticular phenomenon is contingent; reason would not be out-
raged if we should suppose its non-existence. And yet the
law as the rationalist affirms, is necessary: it could not cease
to be.
What now are we to understand by the necessity of law, it
being granted that the matter submitted to its control is con-11
tingent? What, for instance, can be meant when it is said
that there might be, so far as we conceive, no bodies to fall,
yet the law of gravitation is necessary and eternal ? In what
sense is it true that the laws of mind and matter are unchange-
able, while at the same time the facts of both could differ from
what they are at present, or matter and finite mind could be
non-existent ? To the apprehension of the speaker it seems so
far from a dictate of reason to believe in the necessity of laws,
the contingency of facts being granted, as to be selficontradic-
tory and absurd. Actually operative laws without phenome-
na subject to their regulation, gravitation without bodies, and
emission of light without luminous matter, seem to us quite
as inconceivable as vallies without contiguous hills, or triangles
without sides.
But is there not something which gives plausibility to this
dictum of pantheistic infidelity, it may be asked. There is.
The uniformity of nature is a well known principle of science.
So far as there is a system of nature, its laws are invariable.
In a natural order of things phenomena are subject to fixed
rules. But this statement is by no means equivalent to the
principle of the rationalist, that there is nothing actual or pos-
sible besides an order of nature—no supernatural fact—no Be-
ing who controls all things according to his own pleasure, and
who is able for wise reasons, of which he is the judge, to de-
viate from, his uniform course in the physical world. Our
reason enables us to form an idea of some of the most general
conditions of a nature of things. One of these is, that the re-
lations which are established are uniform. Season tells us
that this is necessary, if \ and so far asy there is a system of
nature. The necessity affirmed by reason does not pertain to
nature itself, but to the attributes which serve to define it.
Certain conditions are necessary to it, just as certain condi-
tions must be fulfilled in the construction of a watch. One
, could not be understood to assert that the mechanism of a
watch must actually exist, when he described the principles
which enter into it, much less that there could be nothing in12
the wide universe but mechanism. So likewise the dictate of
our reason that in nature uniformity of action is necessary,
should not be interpreted to declare that there can be no phe-
nomena out of nature.
The baseless assumption of the pantheistic infidel, that a
supernatural fact is impossible, also derives plausibility from
another consideration. It is, that uniformity of action is a
necessary condition of our knowledge of the physical world.
Our experience is a guide to our future conduct under the
laws of nature,, only so far as that which we have observed of
the properties and relations of things shall hold true in time
to come. An absolute uniformity of nature would be neces-
sary to an absolute knowledge of it. And the rationalist mis-
interprets this necessary condition of knowledge, as if it were
a condition of existence. He affirms that a principle which is
essential to our reasonings concerning the future, is essential
to the future itself. We reason from the existing relations of
things on the supposition that they will continue. A consid-
erable fall in the mercury of the barometer indicates a storm
to our reason, only on the presumption that the circumstances
on which that event depends remain unchanged. Reason can
not pronounce with certainty on the conclusion that there will
be a storm in the case supposed, unless the premiss be grant-
ed, that the established order of sequence will not be changed.
And in general, our experience cannot be valid for all the fu-
turevun!ess it is certainly known that there will be no inter-
ruption of the existing relations of things. This is a postulate
or necessary assumption in reasoning. But it is quite a con-
siderable blunder to suppose that a premiss is true, because
it is necessary to a conclusion we wish to prove. This, how-
ever, is just the mistake of the pantheistic infidel, who would
cenvert the indispensable condition of our inferences concern-
ing facts, into an absolute truth. He asserts, that the merely
logical relation of premiss to conclusion, is a real relation ol'
an eternal law to a fact, when he insists that the uniformity
which we presume as a basis for reasoning can not but exist,—13
when, for example, he says that the laws of the weather must
ever be the same as they have been, and ean not change, be-
cause they must be the same, if the barometer is to fulfill its
end.
But not to delay for the purpose of accounting for any show
of reason the denial of the possibility of supernatural facts
may have, it may be observed, thirdly, in further confutation
of this species of infidelity, that the rationalist would convert
his own ideas into eternal verities. For, as I have said before,
he does not pretend to see any necessity for the actual course
of nature. Men could as well have been born to crawl upon
their hands and feet as to walk erect; brutes could have been
endowed with powers of reason and discourse, regard being
had only to that which is possible and not to that which is
wisest and best. The assumed impossibility of a change in
the order of nature, can not be discovered in the existing con-
stitution of the world, and hence if it be found any where, it
must be in the ideas of the unbeliever. Because it is contra-
ry to his ideas that there should be any change in the estab-
lished course of events, he must insist that it is contrary to fact.
The necessity of a fixed and unchangeable order of nature,
not being in objects, can be no where else but in ideas. And
if these are the grounds of a reality so substantial as an endless
series of facts, they must themselves be eternal realities, and
not merely the mind’s view of the properties and relations of
things.
This will be better understood, and will be acknowledged
to be no misrepresentation, if we will'consider what we mean
by a law of nature. A law of nature, then, as we conceive, is
not some force that acts upon objects, but it is a uniform mode of
action. If we say that it is by a law of nature that the acorn
produces an oak, we do not mean that any thing else besides
the acorn, namely, a mysterious law, is the cause of the effect.
The law is but the uniform mode of action ©f this cause. If
there were no acorn, there could be no oak, the law continu-
ing : for this product, by the established order of sequence,u
springs from that germ, and from nothing else. The cause of
action, the acorn, being absent, there is no action, no mode of
action, and therefore no law. Law, in that case, becomes but
an idea of the mode in which action might occur. Apart
from the particular facts in which it is illustrated, it is but a
conceivable form of action.
The objector against the possibility of supernatural events
on the ground that nature is unchangeable and eternal, must
therefore regard our general view or idea of the mode of physi-
cal action as having a necessary existence. He grants that all
the observed matter of fact in which a law is illustrated is con-
tingent. Whether any individual acorn shall produce an oak is
problematical. The necessity which he predicates of nature
will thus pertain to its mere forms of action, which are nothing
but ideas, separated from the contingent matter in which they
are realized. The objector converts ideas into eternal verities.
He must first ascribe objective reality to his own abstractions,
before he can deny creation, and miracles, and the being of
a personal God not the most oubstantial foundation, it must
be confessed, on which to build up a system of infidelity!
One could retort upon the infidel his own objection. Are
the laws of nature absolutely invariable, and can no miracle
be performed ? Then no finite mind can conclude, from its
own ideas, without light from abroad, what the course of things
must have been in the eternal past, and what they will be in
the everlasting future. We have good historical evidence
that miracles were wrought by our Lord and his apostles.
The pantheistic rationalist opposes to this evidence the light
of his far-seeing ideas. He rebuts the historical testimony in
favor of miracles, by setting up the miracle of a supernatural
knowledge of the course of nature against our natural means
of information. Having been driven from all other positions,
infidelity now takes its stand here. In order to show the im-
possibility of a miracle, it alleges its own exemption from the
necessity of acquiring information by natural means. It even
refuses its confidence to the best testimony, (our only method15
of possessing ourselves of the distant in time and place, under -
the established laws of nature,) for the reason that it has mi-
raculous evidence that no miracle was ever wrought. The
infidel has entrenched himself, at last, behind the rampart of
omniscient ideas. The weight of the argument is "confessedly
on the side of the believer, when he urges the importance of a
divine interposition for our moral welfare, the great prepon-
derance of the historical and internal evidence in its favor, the
impossibility of explaining satisfactorily the prevalence of
Christianity supposing it to be a fable, and even the correct-
ness of the orthodox interpretation. In all these respects an
unobstructed way is open to faith. She meets with only one
obstacle—the belief of miracles is inconsistent with the mirac-
ulous ideas of the unbeliever.
Would it be uncharitable, if we suspected that, in this age
of the world, when it is not judged to be the most philosoph-
ical mode of procedure to construct and explode facts by dint
of pure metaphysics, there must be some moral bias, inclining
the unbeliever to deny that the facts of nature are under the
control of a personal G-od ? True, the infidel does not believe
in a moral bias. His system will no more allow him to grant
the possibility of moral, than of miraculous facts. But not to
turn aside here to break a lance, I may express my fear that
it is a moral dislike to the truth which inclines the unbeliever
to this abuse of metaphysics.
The mode of argument he has adopted is the more incon-
sistent with the method of philosophizing now approved, in
that it would establish facts by the use of metaphysics in that
department of inquiry, the natural world, where this proceed-
ing has been the most pointedly condemned.
An inquiry concerning the ideas which belong to the con-
stitution of nature, is certainly not unphilosophical. Some
immaterial principles must be supposed inherent in all bodies, ♦
as, for example, that of cohesion. Nature cannot be conceived
to exist without them. The attempt to determine what and
how many they are, is not to be rebuked. But the error of16
which I complain is that of giving unlimited extension to na-
ture on the ground of these ideas. A reference to one or two
of them will explain my meaning.
One of these ideas is that of cause and effect. We con-
ceive the facts of nature to be so united in this relation, that a
fact of a given class is in like circumstances always followed
by another fact of a certain kind. The support of a body be-
ing removed, it always falls; the soul having taken its depar-
ture from its present abode, the decay of the unoccupied
dwelling is always the consequence. We do not suppose the
succession of facts to be accidental, but to be fixed for all time,
so that when an event appears we can predict the event which
will follow it, and determine, without sight, the event which
must have preceded. This is one of the ideas we have of a
natural order of things. We do not conceive that facts must
occur in a natural order, but if they are thus to occur, we con-
ceive that they will sustain to one another an invariable rela-
tion of causation. A system of nature is not necessary in the
view of reason, but if there is to be such a system, reason re-
quires, as one of its conditions, a uniform succession of phe-
nomena.
But the objector to a supernatural fact, as a thing impossi-
ble, presumes to give unlimited extension to nature in the
past and the future on the ground of this idea of cause and
effect. The recorded experience of mankind embraces but a
few short years. The divine testimony carries us back only
sixty centuries. But the idea of the rationalist, being regard-
ed not merely as an idea in the light of which the physical
world may be comprehended, a mode in which its phenome-
na may be viewed when they present themselves—but as a
real and necessary existence, reveals to him an eternity past
and to come! He not only knows what would be true in an
endless duration, provided the existing relations of thing
should continue, which would be a harmless position, but he
knows that they will continue, and that there is no power
above nature that can bring it to an end. All this he knows18
case produced the injury, but as that which always will pro-
duce it. It therefore knows how to take care of itself ever af-
terwards. And it acquires this knowledge without a long
and bitter experience, because the principle assumed is true,
namely, that every effect may be traced to a natural cause.
All our reasonings concerning nature, and all our science, it
is further urged, proceed on the same assumption. We are
no more certain that a stone thrown into the air will return
again to the earth, than we are that every cause is connected
with a. certain effect, and every fact may be traced to a natu-
ral cause. We can absolutely know nothing respecting na-
ture, except that which we or others have witnessed, unless
we can know that its laws are invariable, and that every fact
is the consequent of a natural antecedent. If there may have
been a single exception at the time of the asserted beginning
of the world, or in the progress of its events, our science of
nature is uncertain. The absolute certainty of any event, as
that the sun will rise to-morrow, or, if it rises, that it will give
light, must depend upon the invariability of the natural
laws.
How I should have no difficulty in admitting that we have
no absolute certainty that the sun will give light another hour,
or that any natural event which we anticipate with the great-
est confidence will occur, as that we shall all die before we
are two hundred years old, or that we shall not all die before
we leave this house. The certainty of natural science regards
not the duration of the system, but the principles on which it
is constructed. Science teaches us what belongs to the idea
of a thing, and it loses none of its certainty if the thing is sup-
posed non-existent. The principles of the watch would not be
altered if all watches should go wrong or be destroyed. So
likewise the laws of this divine piece of mechanism, the world,
are certain, albeit the facts should not all accord with the
laws in consequence of some interference, or the maker should
choose to reconstruct the machine or commit it to the flames.
When we assert the general facts, that man must die and seeIT
from his idea. Like the philosophers of the dark ages, he
founds conclusions concerning matters of fact on his ideas.
It cannot be maintained that the idea of cause and effect is
without significance, unless it is conceived applicable to an
endless succession of events in nature. It cannot be affirmed
that it either means this or it means nothing, and is so much
useless lumber in our minds. We do not necessarily intend
by the word cause, if we understand ourselves, that which pro-
duces a certain effect through unnumbered ages. We can des-
ignate by the term as well that which, according to the course
of nature, and so long as the course of nature continues, is
followed by a given result. It is a name under which all facts
that precede and bring in other facts uniformly, may be classed;
but it does not determine the number of facts which it covers,
anymore than the common name man comprehends an infinite
number of actual men. It is as absurd to say that we must mean
by the word cause a fact which has from eternity been produ-
cing a certain effect, as to contend that by man we must mean
an infinite number of individuals. Every general term is by
its nature capable of embracing an infinite number of particu-
lars. The word steamboat, in its idea, designates as many ob»
jects as cause; for it denotes an unlimited number of individual
things. And it would be as perverse reasoning to infer, from
the comprehensiveness of the word cause in its idea, that there
is no end to the number of actual natural causes, as to conclude
from the extent of the word steamboat that the world is filled
with this kind of craft. It would be a crowded universe, if
there were as many real objects as the boundless capacity of
our ideas would comprehend.
But reason, the objector insists, requires us to believe that
all facts are the effects of natural causes, and therefore that no
creation, and no miracle, can be acknowledged. When the
child burns its finger, it immediately searches for the cause of
the injury, without having been taught to do so by previous
experience, from the dictate of its reason. And having ascer-
tained the cause, it kno AS it, not as that which in the given
219
corruption, that he must use certain means for the supply of
, his earthly wants, that his prosperity depends on his observance
of certain rules of conduct, we state that which is certain and
necessary according to the course of nature, but not that which
is absolutely necessary. And we do not therefore contradict
the statement of the scriptures that Enoch walked with God,
and was not, for God took him, and that Elijah was fed by
ravens, and the barrel of meal and the cruise of oil from which
he was nourished did not waste. For the scriptures do not
speak of these facts as happening according to nature.
Noah Webster tells us that the clock is “ a machine so con-
structed that, by a uniform vibration of a pendulum, it meas-
ures time, and its divisions, hours, minutes and seconds, with
great exactness.” Must error be imputed to[the lexicographer,
if many of the Connecticut clocks should be found not to be
the most accurate time-keepers ? And why should such devi-
ations from the course of nature as are recorded in the scrip-
tures, be regarded as inconsistent with the science of nature ?
The absolute certainty which pertains to the idea of a system
is not incompatible with uncertainty in respect to the actual
working of the system. If the natural cause of a fact is not
.discovered, so long as there is a single event in nature of the
same kind that cannot be referred to the supposed cause; it
does not follow that there can be no event out of nature.
There are no natural exceptions to natural laws, certainly, for
exceptions declare natural laws to be as yet undiscovered;
there may be supernatural exceptions.
The infidel presumes that our knowledge of the facts which ac-
tually occur in the history of the world is demonstrably certain,
and not merely probable—that our conclusions in regard to
actual events are as necessary as our mathematical conclusions.
He reasons as one might reason concerning the performance of
a machine from his idea. The connection between the idea of
the machine and his conclusion would be demonstrably cer-
tain, and he might have a right to maintain it against all the
world. But now, if he should insist that his idea must be per-20
fectly realized, and that because it is his idea, and not from
his knowledge of the skillful construction of the machine, and
that his expectations can not fail to be fulfilled, however blun-
dering the artist may have been, or whatever variation he
may have been pleased to introduce from the original plan,
a commission of lunacy might properly issue to place him un-
der keepers till he should return to his sober senses. Tet the
infidel reasons precisely in this way concerning the facts which
occur in the world’s history. Every event in the natural
course of things is connected with a certain cause, he insists
very truly, and he therefore concludes it to be as certain as
Euclid’s forty-seventh, that it can be produced by no other
cause, and hence that there can be no Creator and no deviation
from the established laws of nature. I beg leave to say that
there is a yawning hiatus between the conclusion and the
premiss.	v
The position in which the rationalistic opponent of a super-
natural revelation has entrenched himself behind an abstrac-
tion, does not then appear to be impregnable. Reason does
not require that we should believe the natural world to be
eternal, and to exclude supernatural agency. That which fol-
lows by logical deduction from the idea of nature, the •con-
nection of each particular event with a certain antecedent in
time, may not be true in fact, because the idea of nature may
not have been realized through an unlimited duration and in
every case. A logical consequence from an abstraction can,
itself, be nothing but an abstraction.
If these principles are sound, they will justify me in some
criticisms which 1 shall offer on the manner in which this
species of infidelity is sometimes treated.
The supposition of some of the friends of religion that a
miracle may be but a part of the natural order of things,
seems to concede to the rationalist his principle, that all events
must be subject to laws of nature. It is sometimes said that
an apparent interference with the uniform course of things in
nature, may have been provided for by the system of nature21
itself. This seems to be an admission, on the part of the
friends of religion, that there would be force in the rationalis-
tic objection to the supernatural, if it could not be resolved
into the natural. Is this a wise concession? Does it not
yield the whole matter in dispute, and that too without the
shadow of a reason ? If God cannot act otherwise than by
natural laws—if, for example, he can produce no effect other-
wise than by a natural cause, he cannot create. For to speak
of creating by a natural cause is absurd, since it supposes
nature, his instrument in creation, already in existence and
therefore uncreated and independent of Him. So also is
it absurd to refer a miracle to a natural cause, because this
cause must either be directly dependent on the will of God,
(in which case you only place the immediate agency of God a
step further back, and you might as well connect it with the
miracle itself,) or the natural cause of the miracle must be
independent of him, and self-existent, and God will perform
no wonder, but we shall merely see a new natural cause come
into play. What do we gain, when we get an acknowledge-
ment of the possibility of miracles from the infidel by so de-
fining the meaning of the word miracle as to exclude from its
idea that which distinguishes it from a natural event ? Con-
versions to Christianity effected by means of such a device
very much resemble the conversions from heathenism achieved
by Popery, in which the former idolatries are retained under
new names. The real change is from Christianity to infi-
delity.
The friends of religion also yield more than an amiable can-
dor requires, when they admit that every natural appearance
which the world exhibits must have resulted from the agency
of a natural cause. When the system of nature was created,
it may have had the same natural appearance as it would have
attained in hundreds, or thousands, or hundreds of thousands
of years, under the operation of nature’s laws. Indeed, the
world must have appeared to have been previously in exist-
ence at the very beginning. When the work of creation was22
just completed, the effects of the word that spoke it into exist-
ence must have resembled exactly the effects of second causes.
It must have been, at the start, under just such laws, and ex-
hibited just such natural appearances, as after it waxed older.
A Humboldt placed among the scenes then presented by na-
ture, and conjecturing, as such a mind would conjecture, by
the aid of natural indications, the origin of its phenomena,
would have traced them back to other phenomena in the past.
There was the sun in the heavens, just as if it had been there
always. The philosopher would have made it rise and set on
the day before creation just as it did afterwards. The moon
would have seemed to know her appointed course as well in
those first months as now. The heavenly bodies discoursed
as harmonious music then as at the present. The philoso-
pher, if supposed acquainted with astronomy, would have
calculated eclipses backwards into non-entity, taking for the
basis of his computation the existing relations of the sun, moon,'
and earth. By counting the rings formed by the annual ad-
ditions to the trees, he would have determined how long they
nust have been growing before God said, “ let the earth bring
forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding
fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth.”
The plants which first grew would not, of themselves, have
indicated that they did not spring from seeds, like those after-
wards propagated from these. Our philosopher, if supposed
to be the first man, could not have known by his philosophy
that he was the son of God, but must rather have denied it,
if the philosophy of nature was to be his sole guide. And if
the soil was then first formed by the word of God, it would
have been judged to be the result of depositions made through
long periods of time, by one acquainted with the process em-
ployed by nature for this purpose. The world must have had
the appearance of being an old work when it was first made.
It must have looked as if it was the effect of the natural agen-
cies operating in times past.
And if it must be admitted that God could create an old23
looking world, it is immaterial how old it might seem to have
been in the beginning. We could receive.a “ thus saith the
Lord,” in regard to the time of creation, if it should oblige us
to believe that the world, at the time when it came from the
forming hand of Deity, exhibited the appearance of having
been millions of years in existence. Philosophy could not
contradict the teachings of revelation, if they were of this pur-
port. For philosophy can inform us only of that which is
agreeable to the course of nature, but cannot tell us how long
the course of nature must have continued. And if you take
her as your guide in this last inquiry, you will have to con-
clude that nature had no beginning. For the world must ever
have indicated a connection with the past, if you will judge
of its duration by natural appearances. Whatever beginning
of natural phenomena you assume, the philosophy of nature
will refer them to previous natural causes. Insist on taking
a point for a beginning where philosophy would find one, and
you must deny a beginning, and hold the account of a crea-
tion given by Moses to be fabulous. But if you are not pre-
pared for this, and will assume the possibility of a beginning,
all natural appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, you
can as easily take your stand at one point as another, so far
as it regards any supposed conflict with philosophy. If philos-
ophy would account for natural phenomena by the supposition
of a duration of the world through endless ages, the same ob-
jection will lie against a beginning wherever revelation may
place it, namely, that at that time the world must have ap*
peared to be an old world. The objection is in fact altogeth-
er groundless. For it is the business of philosophy to tell us
what the laws of nature are, not how long they have been in
operation. Philosophy cannot observe and testify, it can only
explain. Philosophy cannot see the facts in an endless past
or an endless future, it can only account for the facts which
the senses have brought within its cognizance. Philosophy
can furnish principles for facts, but it cannot furnish facts.
I do not by any means affirm that the scriptures, when fairly2 I
interpreted, oblige us to believe that the earth was made only
six thousand years ago, with the appearance of having stood for
ages. But I maintain that if they did, they would not con-
tradict the laws of science. For science can only teach us
how phenomena must occur under the established order of na-
ture, but cannot deny that the same phenomena may be
brought into existence otherwise than by the fixed course of
nature. Science is out of its place when it tells us how God
must work, and ventures to affirm that he cannot deviate from
a uniform course. It can show us what must happen accord-
ing to his constitution of things, but cannot prescribe a law to
him. And this is not a restriction of the boundaries of science
by the speaker. It is generally admitted, at the present day,
that man is only nature’s interpreter. He can determine the
order of events in nature. But he cannot take his stand out
of nature, in a past eternity, and thence speculate upon the
beginning of nature. For he then leaves the facts which it is
his province to observe and explain, in order to imagine how
these facts could begin to exist. He ceases to be an interpreter
of the language of nature, humbly applying his understanding
to the truths which she declares, in order to dogmatise con-
cerning a subject respecting which nature gives him not the
slightest information. All that he affirms about the beginning
of the world is the merest conjecture. He can see in the
facts exposed to his observation how the system of nature
works, but not how it was introduced. It is the province of
religion to discover to us the state of things when the world be-
gan. Does Moses dechre that the world had its beginning at
the time when man was made ? Unbelievers affirm that he
does, and that he is plainly inconsistent with known facts.
Both assertions, in our view, may be false. The unbeliever
does not know them to be true. He may be in error regard-
ing the true interpretation of Moses ; he may also be in error
concerning the alleged inconsistency of his own interpretation
of Moses with facts. For he presumes that there could have
been no appearance of age in the globe at the very moment25
of its creation. The known facts with which, as he asserts,
the sacred writer is at variance, are that the world must have
had the appearance six thousand years ago of having been
long extant. We can admit it, and yet believe that it was
then created. For whenever created, it must have had, at the
very first moment, the appearance of age. It had no more
the marks of a supernatural fact then than it has now. Natu-
rally it must have seemed at that very moment, to a finite
intelligence which comprehended the relation of cause and
effect, if there was any such, to have had a past. But the
consideration that effects do not now come to pass without
second causes, is not at all to the purpose as urged against the
creation of an old looking world. For the real question is:
whether the supposed time of creation was not the time when
the order of nature commenced, and whether the apparently
natural phenomena of that' time, (such phenomena as must
have existed wherever you fix the date of creation,) were not
produced by a supernatural cause. I do not say or believe
that this is the assertion of the Author of the Pentateuch.
Fair interpretation must decide. But if it is, and if, as I be-
lieve, Moses wrote by divine inspiration, then that authority
which alone is competent to inform us respecting the creation
of the world has spoken, and natural science, which treats of
the relations among physical facts since the creation, but not
of the relation of the world with all its phenomena to the Crea-
tor, can interpose no conclusive objection. When we cleave
to the word of God as our guide in regard to the origin of all
things, we do not set ourselves in opposition to the teachings
of science. We would by no means forbid investigation of
the laws of science, lest the knowledge of God’s works should
beget a profane contempt of God’s word. We would not
cherish a superstitious regard for the oracles of God at the
expense of human intelligence. We can believe the testimony
of the scriptures, at the same time that we acquaint ourselves
with the principles.of science, and avail ourselves practically
of their benefits. Mankind need not become more ungodly26
in proportion as their knowledge increases of those works in
which the glory of God is displayed.
Is it insisted that reason must be employed in scientific in-
vestigation, and that it is the province of reason to conclude,
from that which we now behold, what the phenomena of the
world must have been in past time, and what they will be in
future. Is it argued that science runs through all time, and
that its conclusions are universal, embracing all the phenome-
na that have existed and can exist ? I cheerfully grant that
the conclusions of reason from observed facts extend to all the
system of nature. But I deny that reason can give unlimited
extent to nature itself, that it can not only comprehend the
whole system of nature, but that it can also enlarge that sys-
tem infinitely, in the direction of the past and the future. All
our knowledge of reality founded on reason has conditioned,
not absolute certainty: it supposes, what may not in fact be
true, that the laws of nature were, or, if our knowledge re-
gards the future, will be unchanged. It is not reason, but
mere will and imagination, that ascribes an endless duration
to the system of nature. There is doubtless a true metaphys-
ics of nature. But it is valid for nothing but nature ; and na-
ture is not eternal.
Paley illustrates the design of the Creator by the supposi-
tion that a watch was so constructed as to produce another
watch, as well as to keep time, and also to add to the second
watch, the machinery for producing-a third, so that watches
should have the power of perpetuating themselves. And he
argues, very justly, that our admiration of the inventor would
be greatly increased by the circumstance that each watch, after
the first, was capable of producing another. The attempt to
defraud the author of the contrivance of the consideration
which was his due by the suggestion that the first watch may
have been produced, like all the rest, by & preceding watch,
would be .simply ridiculous. The knowledge of the principles
of the machinery would not authorize one to determine in how
many watches those principles must have been realized, much27
less that the number of watches must haye been infinite. Yet
this absurd mode of reasoning is adopted by infidels in oppo-
sition to the scripture account of creation. The first natural
products being like their successors, it is insisted that they
must have been produced in the same manner, that is, that
the scriptures were erroneous in asserting that there was a first.
And this mode of reasoning is not regarded as altogether un-
sound by many Christians. They allow its validity to so
great an extent as to be inconsistent with themselves in not
carrying it all lengths with the infidel. They grant that if the
objects of nature had the appearance at any supposed time of
creation of having come, into their existing state by natural
causes, the work of creation must have been performed before
that time. Now all the plants, (to speak of one class of crea-
ted objects,) which God spake into existence at the beginning,
must have been like their successors, and must have had the.
appearance, like them, of having sprung from other plants.
It must therefore be denied that God created plants. And,
again, the seeds of plants are the end as well as the germ of
growth. We could not believe that God created seeds, if we
should hold it unreasonable to think that he would create such
objects as had the appearance of having been produced by a
natural process. Thus, if it be supposed that we must find a
time for creation when nothing should begin to be by the fiat
of the Almighty, that might seem to have been developed by
a natural process, it must be denied that the vegetable world
is a part of his works. And this principle is assumed to be
trr.e by many defenders of the scripture account of creation.
They are very far from intending to deny its credibility. But
the circumstances in which, as they admit, the power of the
Creator must have been exerted, are such as could never exist.
He could not create the natural world without giving it the
appearance of having been developed out of a previous state
of nature. And this is the condition of creation that is insist-
ed on. Geological writers, who are by no mean enemies of
Christianity, affirm the necessity of going back for a time of28
creation, to where there shall be no appearance of a connec-
tion with a past. They demand an impossible condition ; and.
therefore, with the pantheistic infidel, virtually deny the pos-
sibility of creation.
If we will reason concerning possibilities on natural princi-
ples, we must concede that the pantheistic rationalist has the
best of the argument. Nature in its idea is a chain that hm
no end. The seed springs from the plant, and the plant again
from the seed ; 'neither the one nor the other is a first link.
Every son has a father, and every father is also a son. Every
compound is the result of a previous combination; and every
elementary substance which has entered into a compound,
was previously separated from its connection with some other
compound. Neither a state of isolation, nor a state of combi-
nation, can be said to have existed at first; but the one must
be explained by a previous dissolution, and the other by a
previous union. Is it unreasonable to think that God would
create any thing which should bear the marks of age and de-
cay ? But what is decay, but a preparatory step to renova-
tion ? The decay of this year precedes naturally the germina-
tion of the next. Do you say that God could reasonably be
expected to create only first things ? But decay precedes as
well as follows growth, and by this rule, he could as well cre-
ate things in their dissolving as their springing time. In a
natural order of sequence, you are as near the beginning of
things at one point as another. Assume that the metaphysics
of nature should be our guide in determining when creation
should begin, and you will in effect declare the impossibility
of creation.
We might consider the world itself as an object in nature,
and attempt to trace its development from the beginning to
the present time, as we do the progress of the plant from the
germ. But if we regard it as having been produced thus by
a law of development, we must suppose it to be one of a series
of worlds. The germ or seed of a world would, in this way
of viewing the subject, have been the produce of another129
world now gone to decay. A natural development is not one
which occurs only in a single instance. One example of de-
velopment of a bird from an egg, or of an egg from formless
matter, would be a miracle, and not a natural phenomenon.
The frequent repetition of a fact in the same manner is neces-
sary to-constitute it a natural phenomenon. We can regard
this world as having sprung from a germ by a natural develop-
ment, provided it can be shown by an induction of particular
instances, that worlds do commonly spring from germs, as ■
given plants grow from certain seeds, and particular species
of birds from eggs of a determinate kind. But then, if the re-
lation of worlds to their elementary principles or germs is a
uniform relation, the germs or seeds of worlds will themselves
be natural products, and will have been developed by natural
means. Following analogies, we may suppose that the seed, \
or, if you please, the egg out of which this world has sprung, j
was produced by a previous world. We are no nearer to the |
creation of the world, when we have referred it to such an \
origin, than we were before. If we will insist on going back }
thus to the beginning of all things by the light of our reason, X
where it will be necessary to find a God as a first cause, we |
may go back without end.
The eminent naturalist, Guyot, (by no means inclined to infi-
delity,) in his “ Earth and Man,” represents the process of
world-development to be essentially the same as that which
occurs in incubation. He first describes the changes which
take place in the egg, and then proceeds: “ We have recog-
nized,' in the life of all that develops itself, three successive
states, three grand phases, three evolutions, identically repeat-
ed in every order of existence ; a chaos where all is confound-
ed together, a development where all is separating, a unity
where all is binding itself together and organizing. We have
observed that here is the law of phenomenal life, the formula
of development, whether in inorganic nature, or in organized
nature.” And he adds : “ If such is the law of all beings, it
ought equally to be the law of life in our entire globe, collec-30
tively considered as an individual.” According to this state-
ment, the globe as a whole sprang out of chaos as naturally as
the objects, mineral, vegetable, and animal, which this globe
sustains. It bears, to the formless matter from which it was
developed, the same relation essentially as the bird to the cha-
otic mass from which the egg and the bird were produced.
And if this is so, then it is just as necessary to. find a natural
origin for the germ of the world as for the world itself. The
little chaos from which the egg is formed is as much a natural
product as the egg. So likewise the larger chaos at the begin-
ning of the world must be conceived to have resulted from a
pre-existing state of things. We are no nearer to the end of
the chain at this point than at the following link.
If it be an objection of any weight to the creation of an ap-
parently old world, that it cannot be thought God would
make a world in which there was already decay and death, it
is still more weighty as against the creation of a chaos. For
this is the natural result of a complete dissolution and disor-
ganization of all things. If infinite Wisdom would not begin
his work in the middle, as it is contended, much less would he
begin it at the end. We are incompetent to determine, on
purely rational grounds, where he must begin. The rule which
we would prescribe to Deity, that the world as it came from
his forming hand should seem to sustain no relation to the past,
is unreasonable and absurd.
The question here, it will be noticed, is not when the course
of nature commenced according to the Scriptures, but it re-
gards the competency of reason to correct the teachings of the
word of God. Let it be believed that our globe was in exist-
ence hundreds of thousands or millions of years before man
was created, if there is nothing in the word of God, fairly in-
terpreted, to contradict the supposition. But let not interpre-
tation force upon the Scriptures a meaning which they can-
not bear, in order to accommodate them to the reasonings of
naturalists concerning the age of the world. For then the in-
terpreter would assume with the naturalist, that such natural31
phenomena as the world has at any time exhibited, must, per-
force, be referred to previously existing second causes, and
cannot be ascribed to the immediate agency,of the Most
High. And this assumption would evidently allow no place
any where in the endless chain of nature for the work of crea-
tion, and would deny the existence of the Creator, and of a
revelation, and brand with folly our sacred regard for the
Scriptures, and our anxious endeavors to render it consistent
with nature by forced interpretation. The teachings of nature
and of the Word of God must agree, it is said, and in this it
is presumed that we can judge, solely by natural indications,
how long the matter of this globe must have been in existence,
and that the Bible must authenticate the record thus made of
the age of the world. If this is true, then as ro time can be
found in the chain of events where there will not be indica-
tions of a past, the Bible must be made to harmonize with the
teachings of science by being interpreted so as to declare that
this globe was never created, but is the result of a process of
eternal development.
Here are two different regions in which wholly diverse phe-
nomena prevail. In one of them are exhibited the phenome-
na of freedom, the direct agency of God and of man : in the
other, are seen the phenomena of nature, the effects of physical
causes. In the first, the pleasure of the mind determines each
particular phenomenon, unfettered by the principle of unifor-
mity ; in the second, all the phenomena are governed by an
invariable rule. The two regions may be compared to two
countries, in one of which the dress, the manners, the civil re-
lations—all the actions of the people, should be governed by
nothing but a sense of propriety; while in the other every
thing was regulated by habit, custom, precedent, and legisla-
tive enactment. How it would be the duty of a philosopher,
residing in the country last described, and studying its various
prescribed modes of action, to state only what he there obser-
ved and knew to be true. Should he allow himself to presume
that what was true in that region must be true every where,32
and that action must be regulated by the same laws in tbe
land of freedom, he would do just what those natural philoso-
phers do, who impose the laws of nature on the God of nature
and his responsible creatures—he would found his conclusions
on prejudice, rather than on observation, experience, and well
accredited testimony. Travelers sometimes form their judg-
ments concerning that which is reasonable and proper, from
the characteristics with which they have always been familiar
at home. They imagine that such modes of address as they
have not been accustomed to are rude or even ridiculous, that
any style of apparel but ihat of their own country is uncouth,
that any institutions but those under which they were born
must make the people unhappy. Of the same nature, pre-
cisely, is that prejudice of the naturalist, which will not suffer
him to believe that there can be a region of freedom, where the
natural laws here established have no control. For how does
he know that the phenomena he sees in the natural world
must always have been produced by second causes? What
reason can he give for this opinion, but that it is so in the nat-
ural world ? Like the prejudiced traveler, he will admit the
reasonableness of nothing but that to which he has been ac-
customed. As the inhabitant of a country where law regulates
every thing, is struck with horror at the thought of freedom of
speech and action, so he supposes that every thing must be in
a state of wild confusion, if natural law does not control all
events. Even God himself becomes, in his view, but another
name for natural law.
I have spoken of the error committed by such of the friends
of Christianity as concede that the world must have stood long
enough for all its phenomena to have been produced by second
causes. I will observe, further, that the friendly attempt to
prove the existence of a First Cause from the natural relation
of an effect to its cause, is to be discouraged. If God stands
related to this universe as particular effects to their causes, so
that we may properly reason from the one to the other, and
say that, as each effect must have had its cause so all the ef-S3
fects in the universe taken, as a whole, must have had their
cause, and this is God, then God must have produced the uni-
verse by a fatal necessity; in like circumstances he must pro-
duce the universe again; and he must produce exactly such a
universe a thousand times, if he should be so often in a situa-
tion to act as a cause, for natural causes produce invariably the
same effects. Furthermore, natural causes produce no new
matter, they do not create. Nor, finally, do natural causes op-
erate self-moved ; they act only when they are acted on.
Tne friendly attempt to defend the truth, that there is a su-
pernatural cause, by means of an idea of causation taken from
the metaphysics of nature, is just as injurious, as the unfriend-
ly attempt to disprove it in the same manner. And we are
sometimes called to witness the sad spectacle of the friends and
enemies of religion leagued together unconsciously to under-
mine its foundations by the use of the same instrument. The
pantheistic infidel carries out the principle of natural cause
and effect beyond its true province, that he may prove the non-
existence of a first cause ; the believer, that he may prove his
existence; but both with the same result. The principles of
our reasoning are stubborn things ; they will not lend them-
selves to the establishment of every conclusion that may be
agreeable to our wishes. The infidel and his fellow-laborer,
the mistaken friend of religion, must be met by denying the
right of both to reason concerning free agents as we reason about
the phenomena of nature. The metaphysics of nature are not
valid beyond her domains. Reasoning from the uniform rela-
tion of cause and effect we are able to defend ourselves against
accidents from fire and flood. We can properly extend our
experience among facts of this description to all times and
places. A disaster by fire is an effect, according to the meaning
of that word, when we reason from the relation of cause and
effect, and we may conclude that if we would escape such a dis-
aster we must shun the previously ascertained cause. But a
work of creative power, is not) in that sense, an effect; and to
argue from it to a First Cause, is to found a conclusion on an
334
ambiguous use of a term. One might as logically argue that a
thief in a garret is an honest man because he is aJbove stealing\
The argument against the existence of a God, who is a free
personal Being, from the idea of the relation of cause and ef"
feet, is equally fallacious, inasmuch as it extends to phenomena
of one kind, those of freedom, a principle of reasoning which
is only valid for those of another kind, namely the phenomena
of the natural world. There is nothing to be said in favor of
this application of the metaphysics of nature. Our reason is
furnished with the idea of causation in order that we may em-
brace under it all physical facts, and may thus extend the
boundaries of our knowledge of the physical world. This is
all its significance and use. It is the merest presumption to
contend that there can be no fact or being to which the idea
does not apply.
I have dwelt the longer on this principle of causation, be-
cause it is one with which we are all familiar. It is another
principle of the metaphysics of nature, that no absolutely new
substance can be formed by natural means, and none can be
destroyed. Should a substance new to science be discovered,
the chemist would not suppose that it was in fact more recent
than any other substance, but only that now, for the first time,
it had become known. So far as substances are made to as-
sume a new appearance by any means, whether chemical or
mechanical, the naturalist does not believe that they lose their
identity or become extinct. He holds the indestructibility of
substance, however, as a naturalist. The science of nature
cannot carry one out of nature. An end of nature can never
be found on natural principles; but every state of the world
must lead on to a succeeding state, if some supernatural pow-
er does not intervene; which science, founded as it is on uni-
form relations, cannot at all anticipate. So, also, an absolute
beginning of a new substance would be a new creation, and
not a natural effect; and therefore not cognizable by science.
For a naturalist, as such, the world has neither beginning nor
end. But he does not assert the impossibility of the creation35
or destruction of matter by the power of God. On that sub-
ject he, as a naturalist, has not a word to say. The laws of
nature, which it his office to discover and explain, declare
nothing respecting the supernatural one way or the other. If,
therefore, the theologian testifies that he has good reason to
believe the world was made by the power of God, and
that the same power has occasionally changed the nature of
substances, he does not and cannot join issue with the natural,
ist. Their statements relate to different subjects. One speaks
of the course of nature, the other of the power of the God of
nature.
The conception of substance is a part of the metaphysics of
nature. It must be formed to render nature intelligible. All
our assertions, all our thoughts even, respecting any physical
fact, as of the fluidity of water, presuppose this metaphysical
idea. For by the fluidity of water I mean a property which
always has been, and always will be connected with that sub-
stance. I should have no knowledge of substances, if my as-
sertions concerning them were limited to a single moment.
That which is not for one moment true of nature is never true.
Truth and science suppose continuance. Without it, nature
would be non-existent. And there is only so much of a nature
of things as there is a duration. It is not necessary that there
should be a nature of finite things. But if there is to be, per-
manence must enter into its idea. This is what is meant by
the necessity of substance. The duration of the matter of ob-
jects is not absolutely necessary, but it is necessary provided
there is to be an established order of things. But if it be the
pleasure of Deity that there shall be wo established order of
nature, this abstraction of substance cannot oppose his will.
The pantheistic infidel, who holds that because there is a
physical world with its indispensable conditions, therefore there
is nothing but a physical universe, no Creator and Moral Go-
vernor, no responsible creature, no divine revelation—is as
inconclusive in his reasoning as would be a naturalist in |any
one department who should insist that his department covered36
all nature and all existence, for example, the botanist, who
should aver that all mineral substances, all animals, and men,
and angels, and even the Great First Cause, if there could be
any, were plants ; as inconclusive, as the bigoted American,
who should insist, that since men shake hands in this country
by way of salutation, there can be no people so absurd as to
press their noses together in token of friendly greeting.
Other ideas pertaining to physics, might be mentioned, be-
sides those of cause and substance, from which it has been il-
logically argued that a supernatural fact is impossible. Every
attack of this kind may be repelled, by showing that our ideas
of the physical world enable us to comprehend the facts of na-
ture, when, by other means, besides our ideas, namely by the
observation of the senses, they are known to exist; but that
ideas- cannot of themselves give us assurance of the existence
of an actual world. Our idea of a cause does not inform us
that there is any actual cause agreeing with it. How then
can this same idea prove to us the eternal existence of the or-
der of nature ? Our ideas do not discover facts: they merely
aid us in interpreting them.
And if there is no conflict between our ideas of the course of
nature and supernatural events, it is not unreasonable to be-
lieve in such events when they are well authenticated. For
the unreasonableness of a belief in creation, miracles and in-
spiration can be alleged, as I have endeavored to show, only
on the ground that the ideas of the unbeliever are incompati-
ble with it. He cannot pretend to see in the matter of any
essential facts of this description a repugnance to reason. It
is not these peculiar facts,—the formation of this globe, the
healing of the sick and raising of the dead, the giving to men
of instruction regarding a future state—it is not these facts,
from some peculiarity in them, which reason insists must be
produced in a natural way, according to the unbeliever. It is
not the nature of objects as discovered by observation, but the
nature of things as conceived in his mind, nature according to
his ideas, that embraces all actual and possible facts. When37
Hume said that miracles were contrary to experience, he may
have meant wbat infidelity of a later type explicitly declares,
that miracles were contrary to his notions of experience. The
asserted unreasonableness of faith in a supernatural revelation
appears thus to be equivalent to the inconsistency of any thing
miraculous with our ideas. If there is clearly no contradic-
tion between these and the supernatural facts of the Scriptures,
the Christian faith is not irrational. If the whole use and sig-
nificance of our ideas of nature can be acknowledged without
denying the possibility of a miracle, as I have endeavored to
show, reason can admit the credibility of well-authenticated
testimony to the effect that miracles have been performed.
And if nature is not necessarily eternal and omnipresent, but
will suffer the infidel to believe that there can be found a place
for a personal Almighty Being to create facts by the word of
his power, then, as I have intimated already, the way is open
to bring home to his mind with effect the Christian evidences,
as they have been often exhibited, in the most convincing man-
ner, by the friends of the gospel. These evidences are of suf-
ficient weight to command the assent of every unprejudiced
mind. If objections can be still raised against them, particu-
larly from the difficulty of harmonizing all the statements of
facts in the evangelical narratives, yet the objections are far
more serious to the supposition that the accounts of the New
Testament writers are fabulous. The infidel cannot explain
how a religion which started in weakness and contempt, and
excited against itself, both in the mind of Jew and Gentile,
natural, national, and religious prejudices, overcame all oppo-
sition, and in the course of three centuries became the religion
of the Roman Empire, if it was either an imposture or a delu-
sion. The hypothesis that it was a conscious imposture is now
generally abandoned. But that which is now patronized by infi-
delity is equally untenable, that our Lord was a mere man, but
a man of so great wisdom and virtue, that his disciples were be-
trayed by their excited imaginations into the belief that he was
more than man and performed supernatural works. For it is un-38
accountable, in the first place, that the disciples should have been
so greatly deceived as to think they verily saw the wonderful
facts they have recorded, or that their earthly minds could
have been so wrought upon as to create a character so unlike
themselves, and so elevated above themselves, both as Jews and
as men—a character so admirable and so consistent—as that
of our Lord. And if this difficulty could be gqt over, it is
unaccountable, in the second place, that such statements as
these writings contain of miracles publicly performedand gen-
erally known, should have so imposed on the imaginations of
the people where they are alleged to have been done, that they
could have really believed the events passed before their eyes;
and that the world of that day, not being predisposed, as we
know, to faith in such a divine personage as is here set forth, but
rather very decidedly prejudiced against him, should yet have
been persuaded that this fabulous narrative was true. This
hypothesis, therefore, after all the effort that has been made to
bolster it up, seems likely to fall to the ground. And what other
supposition can be made by the unbeliever, but the one which
is now abandoned, namely, that our holy religion was a con-
scious imposture ? Why then should not unbelief itself be re-
nounced ? Why should any other explanation be given of the
reception of Christianity as a heaven-descended faith, but that
the truth is mighty and will prevail ? Laying out of view the
corruption of man’s heart, which it may be suspected lies at
the foundation of the disposition to reject the gospel, the cause
of this resort to so very improbable a conjecture regarding the
origin of our religion, is the baseless assumption which I have
been considering, that an extraordinary divine interposition
for our spiritual good is impossible. The author of the able
article in the Edinburg Eeview on Eeason and Faith, lately
republished, repeats the declaration of Strauss, the inventor of
the hypothesis just now examined, that if he could believe a
miracle possible, he would not attempt to discredit the history
of the evangelists. Yet the Ee viewer does not show the falla-
cy of the assumption of Strauss, but satisfies himself with39
pointing out the difficulties connected with his hypothesis.
Now the infidel admits and feels these difficulties, but he pre-
tends that he is under the necessity of encountering them, be-
cause it is absurd to suppose a miracle ever happened. It
would have been a good service rendered to our faith, and one
which the Keviewer could have performed in the most satis-
factory manner, to expose the groundlessness of this infidel
dogma. When it is seen that the belief in supernatural events
is not irrational, it will have to be granted that the evangeli-
cal history is credible. So far as faith depends-on the force of
argument, there will be no more unbelief, when our opponents
have been driven from this, their last position.
The confutation of this error is important, also, in reference
to the Mosaic account of the creation. For this account is
disputed on the same ground. The principles of nature are
invariable, facts always existing, within her province, accord*
' ing to uniform laws, and therefore it is concluded, very illogi-
cally, that there can be no supernatural facts. And unbe-
lievers are, for this reason ever looking to find some discrep-
ancy between the declarations of the word and the works of
God. They take it for granted, unconsciously, perhaps, in
many instances, that the necessary condition of an order of
nature, is a necessary condition of all reality. No inconsis-
tency has yet been discovered between physics and divine rev-
elation, but the unbeliever fancies that he already perceives
an inconsistency in reason, and after every disappointment he
applies his mind with new diligence to find it realized.
He frames his theory of development, according to the pre-
tended demand of his reason that all things should originate
in a natural way. There is a constant tendency in nature, he
surmises, to more perfect modes of existence. For the higher
orders of creatures began to exist after the lower. These must
therefore have been the germs out of which those were pro-
duced. And, according to this law, we must believe that
there will be creatures on the globe hereafter of a superior or-
der to man, to be followed by other nobler races ; for the law40
which has been found to prevail, will, from its idea as a law,
never cease to be operative. All the individuals of our kind
will be dissolved in the dust, or hereafter constitute a fossil
race, and this will be their end ; but human nature will enter
into some nobler animal and there live again, just as the na-
ture of fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals, is reproduced in
man, and in this manner and no other shall man become im-
mortal.
This theory of development meets with facts which it can-
not explain, and therefore breaks down. It is not true that
the tendency in any given race is to improvement. A con-
trary tendency, to deterioration, has been observed. In the
tribes of fishes and reptiles, the most perfect specimens were
formed first, and degradation afterwards occurred. Analogy
seems to sustain the revealed fact that man was by the fall de-
graded from the physical condition in which he was created.
Facts do not lend their support to the assumption, that each
inferior class of animals was, by a law of nature, elevated into
the one above it. And furthermore, no creature has ever yet
been discovered in the transition state. If we turn to look at
the moral nature of man, which is as truly a fact as his phys-
ical nature, and should no sooner be left out of view by a
philosopher, we see reason to believe that the individuals compo-
sing our race are not destined to perish forever when they die,
but will exist in a future and eternal state of being to bear the
responsibilities of this day of trial. Can we then suppose that
this accountable creature is but a link between the herd and a
superior tribe of animals? It seems therefore to be agreed
among naturalists themselves, that the theory of development
is already one of the things that were. But the presumption
that the different classes of animals cannot have been succes-
sively introduced by a creative act of the Most High, still
holds its place in many minds as an unquestionable truth, and
induces the expectation that some discovery will yet be made
to bring science into irreconcilable" conflict with the word of
God.41
A thorough exposure and confutation of this ground princi-
ple of infidelity is obviously most desirable. For even if the
reality of the supernatural should be considered as one of the
things of the Spirit, which must be foolishness to unspiritual
men, it will still be a great advantage to Christianity to have
it proved that reason does not authorize the denial of the su-
pernatural, and that the difficulty of the unbeliever can be
nowhere but in the will.
II. The second topic to which, in the outset, I proposed, for
a few moments, to ask your attention, was, as you will remem-
ber, that certain facts cognizable by all, should prepare the
way, in the minds of the reflecting, of whatever character for
spirituality, for the reception of a revelation from God.
One of these is, that the law of duty differs radically from,
a law of science. The latter is a mode of action. If the class
of facts which fall under it should fail, the law would end with
them; or if they should suffer modification, the law would
undergo a corresponding change. Could a single fact be
found which was clearly not in accordance with thedaw of
gravitation, we must conclude that the law itself is not satis-
factorily established, unless, indeed, we saw reason to think
that the exception was the consequence of a divine interposition.
But there are innumerable instances of human action that do
not agree with the law of right, and yet the law holds. If the
whole race were perverse, and not an action of mankind were
in accordance with moral law, this would not annul or change
the principles of morality. Moral law is not then a mode of
action. When the moral philosopher lays it down in a scien-
tific form, he does not state what men are actually found to
do in their various relations, but he declares what they are
bound to do. ITe does not conform his rules to the facts, but
he requires that the facts should be conformed to his rules.
A writer on natural science who should pursue a like method
would be simply ridiculous. He accommodates his ideas to
facts; but the moral philosopher must not yield a tittle of42
right to make his laws more agreeable to the facts of human
character and conduct.
Natural laws have their whole significance as principles of
classification. They are the distinguishing mark by which
classes of facts may be recognized. They enter into each indi-
vidual fact to constitute it such a general fact as it is, and to
determine where it belongs. They have no reality, except ^
they are realized in the individual facts which they govern.
Apart from these they are empty abstractions. But moral
law has not its whole force and meaning as an explanation of
that which actually happens. It is not the form under which
individual facts present themselves. It stands and has au-
thority where it is not carried into effect. It is more than a
principle of classification, and of knowledge and science. It
is the true principle of action when it is not a principle of
knowledge by which human conduct can be explained. Like
a law of the state, it speaks to command, and we are its sub-
jects. It implies a Sovereign Legislator. We did not place
ourselves under its authority; but we found ourselves there
when we first recognized our personality. If we had bound
our own consciences, we could grant ourselves a release; but
we feel and know that this is impossible. The commandment
in the law is independent of us and over us, supreme, immu-
table, and eternal. What else can we believe, but that it is
imposed on us by a Higher Power, that it is the law of the su-
preme, immutable, and eternal God ?
The unbeliever has nothing to object against his own felt
certainty that he is under a moral law and a Supreme Legis-
lator and Judge, but his mere ideas of nature, his empty ab-
stractions.
Another fact, cognizible by all men, is that the world is in
a bad moral condition. The universal conscience would de-
clare, if it were allowed to speak, that there is not a just man
upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not. For the law,
as it utters itself through the conscience* requires of us per-
fect and perpetual obedience. It cannot mitigate its claimsto adapt them to human imperfection, but if we have ever
turned aside from the wayofduty,or if we have not advanced in
that way as rapidly and as far as we were able, the law speaks
only to condemn. And it forbids us to look on any offence
as venial. It pronounces that wrong-doing can never be jus-
tified—not even if we could suppose it possible to gain
eternal happiness by transgression. Such is the strictness of
moral requirement. Who that knows himself can lay his
hand upon his heartland say that he is not an offender ?
And, furthermore, it is involved in submission to any moral
rule, that we obey from regard to the authority that imposes
the rule, and not from any consideration of personal pleasure
or advantage. There is certainly no obedience in the pursuit
of self-interest, even when self-interest and duty coincide. He
who is moved by the desire of personal gratification, will be
found wanting when duties come upon him which are cross-
ing to his natural inclinations. He will make exceptions in
favor of the pleasant duties. But the truly virtuous man will
do every duty ; because he will feel a sacred regard to duty itself.
He will be influenced less by the pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness of a duty than by the consideration that it is command-
ed. He will obey, not only when and because it pleases him
to obey, but when and because it pleases the Sovereign to com-
mand. He will do every duty with such a renunciation of his
own will and preference of the will of God, as will imply uni-
versal obedience.
Who now, of all the children of men, can lay his hand upon
his heart, and honestly say, he has done every duty with a
a supreme regard for the will of God ? Who can declare, as
a perfectly virtuous man would be able to declare, that it was
never the particular matter of the requirement that pleased
him most, whatever it may have been, but always the will of
the Sovereign by whom it was imposed ? The character of
the best of men, tested by these principles, must be found alto-
gether deficient. How hateful, in the sight of infinite purity,
must the great majority of mankind appear! And yet theu
worst of men differ less from the best of those whose natural
character is unchanged, than the best, from the ideal of a pure
and holy man. The best of men, without repentance, will
ultimately arrive, and that before long, where the worst now
are, and will go on to inconceivably greater lengths in sin.
The exceeding greatness of some men’s sins is a most deplora-
ble fact. But it is a fact still more deplorable, that the race is
apostate, and the difference between unregenerate men is only
a difference in degree, and that the most virtuous among them
cannot consistently reprove sin as sin, because all are alike
committed to it.
To the truth of these statements, which is sustained by the
experience of the pantheistic infidel, he has nothing to oppose
but the metaphysics of nature, most illogically assumed to be
the metaphysics of all being, and therefore incompatible with
sinful character.
But further still: it is no more certain that we are trans-
gressors of the law of God, than that we deserve to-suffer for
our sins. We ought to receive from a just Moral Governor
a reward suited to our character. If God is the righteous Be-
ing he declares himself to be, in placing us under a law of un-
compromising severity, if he is inflexibly holy, we must anti-
cipate that he will be inflexibly just Not to treat sin accord-
ing to its hateful nature, would be to declare himself not per-
fectly and irreconcilably opposed to it. Our Great Moral Le-
gislator, who shows himself so severe in his requirements, we
cannot suppose will recede from the rigor of his demands in
his executive character. We must expect to find him as just
as he is holy, and must anticipate that he will deal with our
sins as they deserve.
But we see not now the righteous relation established be-
tween sin and misery. For we cannot suppose that the natu-
ral connection between vice and suffering is all the penalty
that justice requires and that God will inflict. Some who
never did a vicious action, and who will wholly escape this
species of retribution, are yet opposed in spirit to the law of45
God and deserve punishment. And the feeling of opposition
against God common to the race, the outwardly virtuous as
well as the vicious, is an uncomparably more serious offence
than the occasional disregard of natural laws. In truth it is
this feeling, alone, whether exhibited or hidden under the garb
of a reputable deportment, that renders us obnoxious to pun-
ishment. “ Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned, and in
thy sight done evil,” should every transgressor confess. Sins
against man can be so named, only because they are also
offences against God. Who now suffers that, animadversion
against sin as sin, which he ought to suffer? Is the distinc-
tion between moral good and evil as broadly marked at pres-
ent as we must expect to find it under the government of a
righteous God ? Those who are entirely opposed to God, as
all are without repentance, ought in justice to receive no favor
from him, but rather to feel convincing and positive evidence
of his displeasure. Rebellion against the divine government
ought to experience the treatment every where proper to re-
bellion against righteous authority. There is, evidently, not
such a relation between sin and suffering in this life as there
ought to be in a state of retribution.
What then must be our conclusion, but that there will be a
future state in which God will do what justice requires ? If
there is not to be, after this life, a new order of dispensations,
in which happiness and misery will be exactly meted out ac-
cording to character, and each person shall suffer what he de-
serves, both in kind and degree, then that which our conscien-
ces require will never be done, there will be no proper respon-
sibility for moral action, and God will fail to show himself the
holy and just being that he declares himself to be in his law.
Thus the light of nature must lead us to anticipate that there
will be a day of judgment. We must expect it with as much
confidence as we believe that God is just. The pantheistic
infidel has nothing to oppose to this expectation, but his erro-
* neous metaphysics.
If, then, there are undeniable facts in our moral constitution46
which point ns to a personal God, who is our Moral Governor,
and who will hereafter reward us according to our deserts, the
rationalist must feel that it is highly desirable he should break
the order of nature, for the purpose of revealing to us more
clearly his purposes concerning us, and in particular, of
informing us whether a remedy for the moral disorders of the
world is possible, and if so, what remedy his wisdom has pro-
vided,—especially if the use of the remedy is to depend at all
on our free-agency. A supernatural revelation, authenticated
by signs and wonders, as it must be, would thus appear not in
the least incredible, reasoning from principles and feelings
existing in the minds of all reflecting men, the unbeliever him-
self not excepted, who pretends to know that there can be no
supernatural event. If this presumption of his must be aban-
doned, as altogether untenable, it must be concluded that rea-
son is not against the supernatural, but rather that it is most
rational to anticipate that a divine revelation would be made.
Faith in a miraculous interposition for our spiritual good should
not appear to be foolishness to the natural man. If there were
some among the speculating Athenians who mocked when
Paul preached unto them Jesus and the Resurrection, as the
natural man is ever prone to do, yet others doubted, as they
well might, and said to him, we will hear thee again of this
matter. A solemn rehearing of the question, whether Jesus
and the Resurrection are possibilities, must appear, even to
rationalizing infidels themselves, both desirable and obliga-
tory. Their eternal system of nature is but a metaphysical
abstraction, and they are cognizant of facts which point to
future retributions, and prove that never man was more ra-
tional than the then recently heathen contemner of Christ’s
apostles, when he “ sprang in, and came trembling, and fell
down before Paul and Silas, and said: Sirs, what must I do
to be saved ?”
Nor should a reconsideration be given to this subject by a
few speculative infidels alone. An unhesitating conviction,
that there is a Power above us, who, as a Sovereign, governs47
all things according to the counsel of his own will, is one of
the moral wants of this time. Why, otherwise, should it seem
at all incredible, as to many it does, that man would have been
immortal in body, if sin had not entered the world; that man
should have been subjected to temptation in manner and form
as related in Genesis ; that even in our age, and in all ages,
the enemy who is permitted to sow tares among the wheat is
a personal being ; that the word should have become flesh,
and the person thus constituted by a human body, a human
soul, and the eternal Son of God, should have suffered, and
died, and risen again and gone into heaven; that all who are
in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man and come
forth, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life,
and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation;
and that these and other truths have been recorded by men
who wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, so that
their word, though freely committed to writing in the use of
their natural faculties, and exhibiting their characteristics, is
still the word of God ? Why should we have difficulty with
these or any other statements of the scriptures from their won-
derful character, if we do not presume that the supernatural
facts of our religion are to be explained on natural principles ?
Why should it ever be thought necessary to do the smallest
violence to the text of the Bible, in order to bring it inta
agreement with our views, if we do not presume that our sci-
ence is a rule for the divine operations ?
The too general prevalence of a tendency to try the statements
of the word of God by the ideas of the Speculative Reason, must
be acknowledged. Rationalism on the one side, and Formal-
ism on the other, are the two great enemies with which Evan-
gelical Christianity is called to contend. And Rationalism is
in conflict with the gospel just at the point which I have indi-
cated. Those who pretend that reason is opposed to revela-
tion, most unreasonably enlarge the province of that power, as
it is employed in generalizing the phenomena of nature, so as
to include all possible facts. The rationalizing tendency of48
the age, which is so much to be lamented, manifests itself ex-
actly here, in this gratuitous assumption, that the metaphys-
ics of nature are the metaphysics of all being. Let this error
be abandoned, and the pretended conflict between reason and
faith would disappear. The interest in the present subject
should therefore be as widely extended, as that which has been
felt in the opposition experienced by Christianity on the side
of rationalism. It should not be limited to a few speculators,
but should be as wide spread as the rationalizing spirit of the
age. It should go into our churches; and, in particular, it
should be a matter of inquiry with those who advocate scrip-
ture truths on principles which are subversive of all religion.
They should have u great reasoning among themselves,” be-
fore they attempt to commend the gospel to the natural man
by suggesting that possibly the supernatural may yet be found
subject to some hitherto undiscovered natural law, and thus,
in effect, concede to the infidel the unreasonableness of a faith
in the miracles of the Bible. A revived faith in a God who
is absolutely free from all control but that which his own wis-
dom imposes, is also important to the piety of Christians gen-
erally. The best Christian will ascribe the most absolute con-
trol over creatures to Infinite Wisdom, and Holiness, and Love.
And we are bound to include in our creed whatever is clearly
necessary as a basis for religious character. We know that
nothing is so good, nothing so true and substantial, as that
which is the foundation of our piety. We may place ourselves
upon it without fear. “ Blessed is the man that walketh not
in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sin-
ners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful, but whose delight
is in the law of the Lord and who meditates in his law day
and night.” And we may add: Blessed is the man who cher-
ishes such a faith in the voluntary, free control of “ the only
wise God,” that he will have no disposition to walk in the
counsel of the ungodly, or stand in the way of sinners, or sit
in the seat of the scornful.
It will be the pleasure as it is the duty, of the teacher in49
the department of Christian Theology in our Seminary, to as-
sert and defend the peculiar doctrine of Galvanism, now advo-
cated in opposition to naturalism, that the pleasure of God is
limited by nothing but his own moral perfections, and that
He can and will do all that belongs to Power, under the gui-
dance of boundless Intelligence and Goodness, to effect. He
will strive to produce the conviction, that there can be no
Christian submission to the evils, natural and moral, which
prevail in the world, if they are not believed to be absolutely
subject to the will of a righteous and benevolent God, exist-
ing not in despite of his purpose, but according to his purpose,
and subordinated to the wisest and holiest ends; that every
right minded person on earth should unite his voice with that
of the great multitude around the throne in heaven, saying:
Hallelujah, for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth; that every
soundly reasoning man will think it by no means necessary to
the welfare of creatures that our will should limit or turn aside
from its true course the will of Infinite Wisdom and Goodness,
and will rather judge that submission to the sovereign control
of these attributes must be the way to happiness—that if the
absolute sway of Supreme Excellence over all that is finite and
imperfect, ourselves included, would neither be absurd in it-
self, nor incompatible with a power of faith in us, we should
have, under it, all th § freedom and ability we want—that we
do not need the liberty to counteract and to thwart, but only
the liberty to believe—that if pleasure in the divine suprema-
cy is possible, it cannot do us harm since this very acquies-
cence in it is our safety.
It is a source of satisfaction to know that these views have
been inculcated by my able predecessor, and by him of pre-
cious memory who, more than any other person, may be
regarded as the founder of our Seminary. Instructors come
and depart with the changes of time, but the substantial iden-
tity of the instruction and of the institution continues. May
450
it ever be devoted to the maintenance of the same great prin-
ciples, and may it have unnumbered voices to publish them
from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same.CHARGE
BY KEY. W. C. WISNER, D. D., OF LOCKPORT.
My Dear Brother:
It is a matter of no small gratification to us, that, on the
present occasion, we are permitted to greet you as the Profes-
sor of Didactic Theology in this long cherished and revered
school of the prophets. This Professorship, since its founda-
tion, has had but two incumbents—the beloved and lamented
Richards, who filled it for many years with eminent success,
until called from the faithful and acceptable discharge of its
duties to his home in heaven; and one of whose ability as a
theological teacher we refrain from speaking, because he yet
lives, but whose departure to another field of labor we have
sadly felt, and deeply regretted. But, blessed be God! he
who has taken away, has also bestowed, and we trust that our
loss will be fully compensated by the securing of yourself as a
successor. You have just been inducted, by the usual forms
and services, into the Professorship, and it becomes my duty,
on behalf of the Boards of Commissioners and Trustees, who
are the legally constituted guardians of this institution, to
charge you, in few words, in regard to the duties and respon-
sibilities of your office. Of the vast importance of the Profes-
sorship you are to occupy to the Churches in this region, and,
through them, to the Church universal, you cannot be less sen-
sible than myself. The Churches of our denomination, in
Middle and Western New-York have long looked to our Semi-52
nary for a supply of under shepherds to lead them into the green
pastures, and beside the still waters of the gospel of Christ.
Nor are the streams of influence, which emanate from this
sacred fountain, confined within narrow geographical limits.
Our Seminary has supplied pastors to every part of our land,
and has furnished its full proportion of missionaries to a foreign
field. Her sons are among the most gifted, influential and
useful of our ministers; and we trust that what has been will
continue to be, only upon a larger, and more extended scale.
We need, we must have a ministry, learned in all those branch-
es, which contribute thoroughly to furnish the ambassador of
Christ; and among the most important of these is a sound,
scriptural, systematic, and complete theology. Such a theolo-
gy as will tend to lay deep the foundations upon the word of
Eternal Truth, and rear the superstructure amid the covenants,
and promises, and doctrines of the New Dispensation. Such
a theology as will fit pastors, so to instruct the Churches, over
which they preside, as to fill them with intelligent, strong-
minded, symmetrical and abiding Christians, who shall honor
the cause of their Redeemer, and exert a judicious, effective,
and extensive influence for the upbuilding ot his kingdom.
It should ever be borne in mind, that theological seminaries
are founded, and supported, not for the professors, nor for the
pupils mainly, but for the Churches. Their object is to give
to our LZion a ministry, whose labors will tend to promote
just such a Christianity as the world needs, and as will be well
pleasing in the sight of God. Such a Christianity can only be
produced under the faithful and symmetrical preaching of all
the doctrines of Christ. It is a sad reality, my brother, that
much of the preaching, at the present day, has come to re-
semble lay exhortation, instead of consisting of well arranged,
and. well digested doctrinal discussions, which are calculated
to enlighten the understanding, to feast the soul, and to affect
the heart. As a legitimate consequence many Churches, who
should be capable of instructing in the doctrines of Christ,
have need to be taught the very first principles of the oracles53
of (jfod. If there was ever a time calling for plain, discrimi-
nating, doctrinal preaching, the present is that time. Many
professed Christians, who are adults in age, remain babes in
doctrinal knowledge. They are literally famishing to be taken
from the milk, (and even that largely diluted with another el-
ement,) and put upon the meat of the gospel. Nor is this
difficulty circumscribed by geographical boundaries, or limited
to either division of our Church. Both branches of our be-
loved Zion have felt its sad results. The disease has become
too deep-rooted, and extended, to be remedied by a resort to
ecclesiastical surgery, however skillfully applied* The anti-
dote must be taken inwardly, and must be of such a nature,
that its restorative influences will pervade the whole system.
Much of the preaching in both divisions of our Church is either
purely hortatory, or else one class of doctrines are taken, and
used as a hobby, and driven to extremes, until thinking men
have become disgusted, and start back at their very names—
and thepchureh has been filled with feuds, and contentions, and
strifes among brethren. These evils must be remedied, and
we know not where so hopefully, to look for the remedy, as to
our theological institutions; and especially, to the chair of
theology. From it proceed those doctrinal lessons, which are
to qualify young ministers, in their turn, to become the theo-
logical instructors of the people: and it is generally true, that
as they are taught and trained, so will they instruct. The
Bible is our only text book; and, while nature, and art, the
sciences, and history, may serve to illustrate, and enforce the
truths it contains, the lessons of theology are to be drawn from
no other source* Each doctrine of this sacred volume has its
appropriate place; and all its doctrines combined, form a most
beautiful and harmonious system, as they revolve around their
common center* the cross of Christ: and no part of this sys-
tem can be left out, nor can a lesser doctrine be magnified
above a greater, without marring its beauty, and paralyzing
the arm of its power. The theological professor, by untiring
application, and thorough investigation, is, as far as possible,54
to make himself master of the philosophy of these doctrines.
He must not only know what they are, but understand the
bearing of each upon the entire system of truth. He is to
arrange and systematize them, and to ascertain their true po-
sition and relative importance. He is to establish them be-
yond a reasonable doubt; to illustrate, and enforce them by
every means in his power. He is to defend them against the
assaults of their adversaries, and to answer unanswerably the
objections they urge. He is to carry the war into the enemies
camp, and satisfactorily refute those false doctrines, which, like
Satan clothed as an angel of light, that they may the more
easily deceive and ruin, are arrayed in much of the livery of
the true.. Nor is this all. The most important and difficult
part of his work is yet to be stated. He is not only to do all
this himself, but he is also to teach his pupils how to do the
same. He is so to instruct them that they will not be subject
to disappointment and failure, from the cause assigned by the
renowned Witherspoon to one of his pupils, that he neglected
to lighten before he thundered. And this is especially the
work to which he is set apart by his brethren. Ifo matter
how thoroughly read an individual may be in the doctrines
of the Bible, and in theological lore, if he is not to teach, and
cannot so instruct as to enable his pupils correctly and suc-
cessfully to instruct others, he had better occupy any other
place in the Church than that of a theological professor. To
succeed in this object of paramount importance, he must take
the position of an elder brother, or a father, to the young men
under his care. By treating them with a dignified familiarity,
and manifesting the deepest interest in their welfare, as well
as by the richness of his instructions, and the powers of his in-
tellect, he must exert such an influence over them as to se-
cure their esteem, and confidence, and love. He will find
among his pupils a great variety of character, temperament,
and capacity, and, as far as possible, he must adapt his course
to the peculiarities of each. He must encourage the fearful
nd desponding; kindly admonish the too confident; incite55
to greater diligence the indolent; and throw the safeguard of
religion about the path of the ambitious. His lectures should
be prepared and delivered in the very best possible manner to
be thoroughly digested and retained by his pupils—and they
should be encouraged to transfer to their note books a full sy-
nopsis of the instructions they contain : and if any of the stu-
dents should desire to retain a more full transcript than they
can possibly secure in the class room, as far as is consistent he
should cheerfully loan his manuscripts for such a purpose. He
should so conduct his recitations as to incite the members of his
class to think for themselves. They should be encouraged to
suggest thoughts and arguments of their own, and to interpose
objections to what has been presented, which should be
thoroughly weighed, and carefully answered. In fine, by eve-
ry laudable means, he should endeavor to throw his pupils upon
their own resources, and so to train and discipline their minds
as to enable them to grapple with the most knotty and difficult
points in theology. It will be seen at once that the successful
professor must possess, in no small degree, the facility of adapt-
ation. He should unite blandness of deportment with great
energy of character. He should blend the wisdom oi the ser-
pent with the harmlessness of the dove. He should cultivate
habits of industry, and of severe application. As a student he
should be untiring, and bring forth to his class, from his intel-
lectual treasure-house, things new as well as old. He should
not be satisfied with his course of lectures as first prepared and
delivered, but should frequently rewrite them, and be constant-
ly amending and improving them. Hot that the great doc-
trines of the Bible can be altered or improved. They are un-
changing as the throne of God, and infinite in their excellence.
But we, the creatures of yesterday, with our minds darkened
by sin, may by a diligent search of the Scriptures, and the aid
of the Spirit, constantly improve in our understanding of
these doctrines,' and in our modes of stating, illustrating, and
enforcing them—and we should be continually making such
advances. There are in our land a few professors, who virtu-56
ally convert their professorships into sinecures, and seem to
be experimenting to ascertain with how little labor they can
secure a support. Like some circuit riders and stationed
preachers of another denomination, they make the meager
preparations of their first few years answer for a whole life time
of service. They read to successive classes their stale lectures
from manuscripts so old that if, like wine, they improved by
age, they would be pronounced the very best in the country
—for they have not been rewritten, or materially altered, for
at least a score of years.* Such a course is unpardonable in
any professional chair—in that of Christian theology it would
be insufferable. We, my dear brother, are too thoroughly ac-
quainted with your well-earned reputation in another institu-
tion, to suppose for a moment that this will ever be your course.
But we have felt constrained from other considerations to im-
prove the present occasion plainly to express our views upon
this subject.
We will here briefly notice a duty which we believe the
professors in our theological seminaries owe to their brethren
in the ministry, and to the church universal, and which we
fear has not been sufficiently considered. We refer to their
obligation to make frequent contributions to our biblical and
theological literature. Their professional labors naturally lead
them into fields of research and investigation from whence
they may glean and prepare such contributions without a large
additional draught upon their energies and time : and usually
these preparations may be used by them in the lecture room
with great advantage to their pupils. We know it may be
said that they are constantly perfecting lectures and essays in
* From the first of their induction into office, these professors have related the same anec-
dotes, and have repeated them so often that the young men have committed them verbatim—
and the members of one class rehearse them to those of the next succeeding one, so that they
may know what to expect when they come to enjoy “ the same blessing.” The very wit and
point of these anecdotes have become stale to the professors themselves, and the laugh with
which they accompany them has been so often indulged, that it has degenerated into some-
thing purely mechanical, and seems to be produced by some external force far more than by
that which is heartfelt and internal.57
this department of which the church may avail herself after
they have gone to take possession of their heavenly inheritance
—and we have no doubt that this will be the destiny of the
larger portion of their writings. But we are unwilling to
wait for the death of our professors before reaping any benefit
from their productions. We are their cotemporaries, and may
possibly die before them, or soon follow after them. And
even if this should not be the case, we are willing to leave it
to you, sir, and to your reverend associates, if we should not
be permitted, as a sort of antepart of what is to come, frequently
to feast upon the rich clusters of grapes before entering the
promised land over the newly made grave of the professor.
It should also be considered that such contributions give char-
acter, reputation, and influence to the institutions in which
their authors preside. Princeton, Andover, Union, and other
seminaries have been greatly benefited by the published wri-
tings of their professors. Nor has our own seminary been en-
tirely wanting in this respect. A few able articles and pub-
lications have been given to the world by its professors, which
have tended to elevate its standing and increase its renown.
We earnestly desire to see their number so far increased as
will be consistent with home duties, and the ability and com-
manding character of the productions themselves. We are
sure that this suggestion will be kindly received by those for
whom it is intended, and we will leave it without further ex-
pansion.
Finally, we charge you, my brother, to cultivate a prayer-
ful spirit, and deep, heart-felt, pervading piety. This is neces-
sary both for yourself, and for those over whom you are to
exert a moulding power. The church must have a goodly
ministry, and our theological seminaries should be nurseries
of religion, as well as schools for intellectual development.
A theological student, while pursuing his course of studies,
should be fitting for his work in heart, as well as in intellect.
He should leave the seminary not only a much wiser, but a
much better man than when he entered it. To secure this58
result, the professors must live near to God, and reflect upon
the path of their pupils his blessed image. They must drink
deep at the spiritual fountain, and so walk with their Lord and
Master as to exert a holy, transforming, sanctifying influence.
They should frequently converse with their students on the
subject of personal religion, and should do all they are able to
prepare them, in heart and life, for the sacred office. The dan-
ger is that both professors and students will pursue their work
with a paramount reference to its professional aspect, and will
neglect its appropriate bearing upon the inner man. We
would warn you against this danger; and remind you of the
fact, that the greater the intellectual furniture of an ungodly
minister the greater his power to curse the church of God—
but let that power be sanctified, and he may become a giant
in the cause of his Divine Master.
Besides, you, my brother, are entirely dependent upon God
for success. If you forget him, he will forsake you, and will
scatter blight and mildew in your path. If you seek his face
and favor, and walk in the light of his countenance, he will
bless you, and build you up—he will establish your feet in a
large place, and give you influence, and make you useful.
“ Them that honor me I will honor, and they that despise me
shall be lightly esteemed.” “ Except the Lord build the
house, they labor in vain that build it.” “ I have planted,
Apollos watered : but God gave the increase.” “ Not by
might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of
hosts.”
In conclusion : we welcome you to this Western New York,
and to our beloved Seminary. We welcome you to our hearts,
to our homes, to our pulpits. We shall delight to introduce
you to our people, and have you become familiarly acquainted
with those whom we love. We trust that, as God shall give
you opportunity, you will greatly enlarge the sphere of your
influence by such associations. We are perfectly aware that
your position among us, while it is one an angel might covet,
is exceedingly arduous and responsible. We pledge you our59
sympathy, our co-operation, and our prayers. May the Lord
bless you, my brother. May he, through his grace, give you
eminent success in your labors of love. And, when he has
Served himself with you on earth, may he bestow upon you a
crown of glory, rendered a thousand fold more radiant by the
gems of souls converted through your immediate agency not
only, but also through the agency of those pastors whom you,
and your venerated compeers, are to give to our churches.