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Corporation. Digital file copy-
right by Cornell University
Library 1992.THE QUAKREL
BETWEEN
THE EARL OF MANCHESTER
AND
OLIVER CROMWELL:
AN EPISODE OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR.
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS RELATING THERETO,
COLLECTED BY THE LATE JOHN BRUCE, F.S.A., &c.;
WITH FRAGMENTS OF
A HISTORICAL PREFACE BY MR. BRUCE,
ANNOTATED AND COMPLETED BY DAVID MASSON.
PRINTED FOR THE OAMDEN SOCIETY.
M.DCCC.LXXV.WESTMINSTER :
PRINTED BY NICHOLS AND SONS,
25, PARLIAMENT STREET.
[NEW SERIES XII.]COÜNCIL OF THE CAMDEN SOCIETY
FOR THE YEAR 1874-75.
President,
THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF VEttULAM, F.R.G.S.
WILLIAM CHAPPELL, ESQ. F.S.A., Treasurer.
WILLIAM DURRANT COOPER, ESQ. F.S.A.
HENRY CHARLES COOTE, ESQ. F.S.A.
FREDERICK WILLIAM COSENS, ESQ.
JAMES GAIRDNER. ESQ.
SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, ESQ., Director.
ALFRED KINGSTON, ESQ., Secretary.
SIR JOHN MACLEAN, F.S.A.
FREDERIC OUYRY, ESQ. Y.P. S.A.
JAMES ORCHARD PHILLIPPS, ESQ. F.R.S. F.S.A.
EDWARD RIMBAULT, LL.D.
REY. W. SPARROW SIMPSON, D.D. F.S.A.
JAMES SPEDDING, ESQ.
WILLIAM JOHN THOMS, ESQ. F.S.A.
J. R. DANIEL-TYSSEN, ESQ.lhe Council of the Camden Society desire it to be understood
that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations that
may appear in the Society’s publications ; the Editors of the several
Works being alone responsible for the same.INTKODUCTORY NOTE.
At the death of Mr. Bruce, in October 1869, there was found
among his papers a quantity of manuscript relating to the quarrel
between the Earl of Manchester and Cromwell in the year 1644,
and showing that he had been minutely studying that incident
in the History of the English Civil War, and meant to make it the
subject of some publication. The MSS. consisted of (1) Copies of
previously unpublished documents recovered by Mr. Bruce’s research ;
(2) Fragments of a ïïistorical Préfacé, in which Mr. Bruce meant
to tell the whole story at some considérable length, by weaving the
information from these documents into that otherwise accessible;
and (3) Miscellaneous jottings towards the completion of this Pré-
facé, chiefly in the form of extracts from the Lords and Commons
Journals, but with notes of dates and stray facts besides.
The documentary matter, as left by Mr. Bruce, and as put to
press by the Council of the Camden Society for this volume, is
partly from the Public Record Office, partly from the Manchester
Family Papers at Kimbolton. From the Letter-Books of the Derby
House Committee or Committee of Both Kingdoms, preserved in
the Record Office, are the copies of the correspondence between
that Committee and the Earl of Manchester from July to November
1644, occupying pp. 1-58 of the présent volume; and from the
Domestic State Papers in the Record Office is the document entitled
Cromwell98 Narrative (pp. 78-95). The remaining three documents,
entitled Narrative of the Earl of Manchester’s Campaign (pp. 59-70),
Statement by an Opponent of Cromwell (pp. 71-77), and Notes of
Evidence, &c. (pp. 96-99), are from the Kimbolton Papers. The
footnotes to the documents are by Mr. Bruce, except those signed
“ G. C.,” which are by Colonel Colomb.
The Council of the Camden Society having sent me the docu-
ments in their présent printed form, together with the MS. fragments
of Mr. Bruce’s intended Historical Préfacé and the miscellaneous
b
CAMD. SOC.11
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
MS. jottings he had left besides, I hâve had much pleasure, both
from respect to Mr. Bruce’s memory and from interest in the
subject, in complying with their request that I would do what
might be necessary or possible towards completing the Préfacé.
The resuit has been as follows :—Every word of Mr. Bruce’s Préfacé,
so far as it had been written, has been religiously kept ; and the
completion has been endeavoured in the three forms of Notes,
Insertions, and Continuation. The Notes (initialed where they are
not Mr. Bruce’s own) are few. The Insertions, always given within
brackets, are either attempts to fill up gaps left in Mr. Bruce’s
manuscript, and which he meant to fill up at his leisure, or they
are additions necessary for the cohérence of the story at points
where I could perceive that Mr. Bruce would almost certainly hâve
made some such additions in revising what he had written. The
Continuation was a more troublesome affair. Mr. Bruce had,
unfortunately, broken off just as he was approaching the heart of
his subject, and when hc had begun a more minute style of narra-
tive in préparation for what was coming. To hâve huddled up
the sequel in a mere casual paragraph or two would hâve been to
leave Mr. Bruce’s design unintelligible. It would hâve done no
manner of justice either to the documents he had collected or to the
perception that had actuated him in collecting them and in writing
his Préfacé so far—the perception, namely, of the significance of the
quarrel between Manchester and Cromwell, and its involution with
ail that was most important in a whole important year of English
history. I tried, therefore, to put myself in Mr. Bruce’s place, and
to finish his Préfacé on his own plan, by combining the material
supplied by the documents with that to be found in Bushworth,
Baillie, the Journals of the Lords and Commons, and other standard
authorities. The extracts he had himself made from the Journals,
with such hints as I could gather from his other MS. jottings, hâve
been of use both in the Continuation and in the Insertions ; and
I hâve thought it right carefully to note every instance of help thus
received from his own dead hand.
David Masson.
Edinburgh: February 1875.CONTENTS.
PAGE
Historical Préfacé	v
Documents : —
I.	CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE EARL OF MANCHESTER
AND THE COMMITTEE OF BoTH KlNGDOMS	.	•	1
II.	Narrative of the Earl of Manchester’s Campaign 59
III. Statement b y an Opponent of Cromwell .	.	71
IV.	Cromwell’s Narrative	.	.	•	.78
V. Notes of Evidence against the Earl of Manchester 96HISTORICAL PREFACE.
It is a mere truism in the history of révolutions to assert that
tliey are seldom brought to a close by the persons or political parties
with whom they originate. Men whose existence was perhaps
scarcely known to the world at large when the onward movement
took its origin rise in succession to the surface, acquire the govern-
ment, and carry forward the work to lengths and heights which
their predecessors never contemplated. It is in tracing this sequence
of political parties, the graduai growth of what was looked upon in
the first instance as a contemptible and almost senseless faction, its
struggles for the mastery, the arts (too often unworthy) by which
it acquired the ascendancy, its acts whilst in a condition of
dominancy, and finally the errors by which it forfeited power and
made way for the next in turn, that much of the interest of historical
narrative is found.
It is to an incident in a movement of this nature which took
place in the course of our great national révolution in the reign of
Charles I. that I hâve now to direct attention.
The Quarrel between Oliver Cromwell and the Earl of Manchester,
at the close of the campaign of 1644, is a great leading incident in
the history of our Civil War. It brought to the surface and into
direct antagonism principles of the very deepest significance in
référence to the management of the war, and the triumph of the
movement party on that occasion led directly to the ruin of the
royal cause.
Our information respecting this important incident is singularly
incomplète. Brief entries which refer to it occur on the Journalsvi	HiSTORICAL PREFACE.
of the two Houses of Parliainent; some papers and notes of speeches
relating to it are publishèd in Rushworth and Nalson ; and Clarendon
and the memoir-writers hâve told us with more or less inaceuraey
what they could rècollect, mostly after the lapse of many years.R
From such weak and incomplète authorities historical writers hâve
inferred the particulars of what occurred, and the degree in which
their statements are mere guesswork may be gathered from the fact
that in none of the authorities to which we hâve alluded is there
any definite statement of the facts which Cromwell alleged in the
House of Commons against the Earl of Manchester in the way of
charge, nor of those which the Earl adduced against Cromwell in
the House of Lords in the way of answer and récrimination.1*
In the course of the operations which are in progress among the
State Papers under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, some
documents hâve lately been found which establish upon the most
certain of ail authorities, that of Cromwell himself, what were the
assertions on one side of this momentous controversy. These are
the papers to which attention is now solicited ; but in order to make
their meaning and importance palpable we must préfacé them with
some notice of the events out of which they arose.
The Earl of Manchester, whose conduct forms the spécial point
of this inquiry [i.e. Edward Montagu, second Earl of Manchester],
is principally known in our history by the circumstance that, when
a Mr. Braçe’s references here are to Rushworth, y. 732-736 ; Clarendon, 514 et
seq. (ed. 1843) ; and, perhaps, under the name of “ Memoir-writers,” to Baillie, ii.
229-30, 234-5, 244-7 ; Whitlôcke, i. 343 et seq. (ed. 1853) ; Walker’s History of
Indépendency, part i.; and Holles’s Mémoire, 18-28. Baillie’s jottings on the
subject are, however, strictly contemporary.—D.M.
b Among modem accounts of the quarrel between Cromwell and Manchester are
Godwin’s in his History of the Commonwealth (i. 878-413) and Mr. Carlyle’s in
his Letters and Speeches of Cromwell (i. 146-150, and 159-163, ed. 1857). Godwin
does fonnd only on the authorities mentioned by Mr. Bruce ; but Mr. Carlyle had
before him other documents, communicated to him by the Duke of Manchester from
the family papers at ‘Kimbolton, including that printed in the présent volume under
the title “ Narrative of the Earl of Manchester’s Campaign.”—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Vil
Lord Kimbolton, by which title he was calléd üp to the House of
Peers during the lifetime of his father, he was joined in the charge
of high-treason with Pym, Hampden, Strode, Holles, and Haselrig,
whom Charles I. went to the House of Commous to ârrest. This
circumstance, and the conjunction in which Clarendon places him
with the Earl of Bedford and Lord Saye, as the three “great con-
trivers and designers ” in the House of Peers,a sufficiently mark his
political opinions, Dedications to him of religious bocks by clergymen
of the school then termed puritanical indicate that he belonged to
that large class of persons who, under the influence of dissatisfaction
with the conduct of the bishops and the State of the Church and
the clergy, thought it necessaryfor the préservation of Protestantism
that there should be large alterations in the framework of the
established Church. In his individual character, every one attests
that he was oné of the most amiable and most liberal of mén. If
Clarendon is to be believed, he was indeed too liberal by far. He
did not wait to play the part of the lavish heir with the estate
which his father had accumulated, by means which “ exposed him
to some inconvenience and many reproaches,”b but during. his
father’s lifetime, for the mere advantage of his party, as Clarendon
assures us, he lived far beyond. “ the narrow exhibition allowed
him by his wary father,” and thus involved himself in <‘a great
debt,”c which drove him into séclusion for many years. Still,
whether in the country or at the Court, the Royalist historian is
ôbliged to admit that, “ by his natural civility, good manners, and
good nature, which flowed towards ail men, he was univérsally
acceptable and beloved.”d
[From several loose sheets containing notes and references
in Mr. Bruce’s hand, and in that of a correspondent of his, it
seems as if he had intended to involve in this Préfacé, or to
append to it, a somewhat detailed memoir of the Earl of Man-
a Clarendon, Hist. Rebell. p. 73, ed. 1843.
b Ibid. p. 22.	c Ibid. p. 73.
d Ibid. p. 74.
/HISTORICAL PREFACE.
viii
chejter. The following may here suffice for that part of the
Earl’s life which précédés the point at which Mr. Bruce’s narra-
tive begins:—He was born in 1602, the eldest son of the law-
yer Sir Henry Montagu, who, after various intermediate pro-
motions, became in 1625-26 the first Earl of Manchester, and con-
tinued to be one of the councillors and ministers of Charles I.
He was educated at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, which he
entered in January 1617-18, just after Cromwell, who was three years
his senior, had left the same college. Having returned to Court,
he attended Prince Charles to Spain ; and the intimacy thus
established between him and Charles lasted for some time after
Charles came to the throne. After having sat in the Commons as
knight for Huntingdonshire in Charles’s first and second Parlia-
ments, he was raised to the Upper House in 1626 by the title of
Baron Montagu of Kimbolton ; and for the next sixteen years some
confusion is caused by the fact that he is heard of both by his proper
peer’s title as Lord Kimbolton and also by his higher courtesy-
title of Viscount Mandeville, son and heir-apparent of the Earl of
Manchester. His first wife, who was a relative of the Duke of
Buckingham, having died without issue, he had married, for his
second, the Lady Anne Rich, daughter of the Earl of Warwick;
and to this connection Clarendon ascribes, in great measure, his
detachment from the Court-party, and his identification of himself
with the Puritans, Certain it is that, through what is called the
Reign of Thorough, the fact that Lord Kimbolton, the son of one of
Charles’s chief ministers, had abandoned his Court prospects and
joined the ranks of the then suppressed Puritans, was much com-
mented on, and that, in 1640, when the Scottish troubles compelled
Charles again to summon an English Parliament, and the hopes of
the Puritan party were thus revived, Kimbolton stepped forth as
one of their chiefs. His activity and importance on the popular
side in the first year of the struggle between the Long Parliament
and the King were signally attested in January 1641-2, when he
alone of the peers was conjoined by Charles, as Mr. Bruce mentions,IlISTORICAL PREFACE.
IX
with the five leadîng Commoners whose arrest Charles attempted
in his famous and fatal coup d'état. Seven months afterwards,
when the actual Civil Warbegan (August 1642), it was natural that
a nobleman already so distinguished should be one of the sraall
body of about thirty peers who stood by Parliament at ail risks,
while the rest of their order, to the number of about one hundred,
went with the King. He was tlien still only Lord Kimbolton *or
Yiscount Mandeville; and he did not become Earl of Manchester
till his father’s death, November 7, 1642.—D.M.]
When King and Parliament adjourned the decision of the war of
addresses and messages from Westminster to the tented field, Lord
Manchester [still only Lord Kimbolton] took the command of a
régiment of foot in the army of the Earl of Essex, and was présent
at the Battle of Edgehill.a He had not had any previous military
expérience ; but, like other noblemen on both sides, he came forward
at the commencement of the war as a leader in the field of the party
which he espoused. [In a pamphlet, dated September 14, 1642,
and entitled “ The List of the Army raised under the Command of
his Excellency, Robert Earl of Essex ” one of the twenty régiments
of Foot of the Parliamentarian army at that date, each calculated
at 1,200 men, is styled u Lord Mandeville^ Régiment,” Mandeville
or Kimbolton himself taking. rank as colonel of the régiment,
with John Parkinson for his lieutenant-colonel, John Drake for his
major, seven captains of companies under these, and Simeon Ashe as
thé regimental chaplain. Among the other colonels of Essex’s foot
régiments, eàch with his subordinate lieutenant-colonel, major, and
captains, were the Earl of Stamford, Yiscount Saye and Sele, Lord
Wharton, Lord Brooke, and Lord Roberts, from the House of Lords,
and Hampden and Denzil Holles from the House of Commons. The
same list gives the Horse of Essex’s army as divided into seventy-
a Fought on Snnday, October 23, 1642, near Keinton in South Warwickshire, the
first important battle of the Civil War. The Parliament had, on the whole, the
vie tory, though not a very decided one. Among the slain was Robert Bertie, Earl
of Lindsey, commander-in-chief of the King’s army.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.
CX
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
five troops of sixty men each. Of one of these troops, numbered the
67th, Oliver Cromwell, M.P. for Cambridge, was captain ; and
among the captains of other troops were several of the Parlia-
mentarian peers and several of CromwelPs colleagues of the Lower
Ilouse. But, superior to the mere captains of individual horse-troops,
were six of their number, taking rank as colonels of horse: viz.,
the Earl of Bedford, Sir William Balfour, Lord Fielding, Lord
Willoughby of Parham, Sir William Waller, and Edwin Sandys ;
besides whom there was a colonel of Dragoons in the person of
John Brôwne, M.P. for Dorsetshire, commanding five troops of
dragoons, each of 100 men, and each with its sépara te captain.—The
relative military positions of the peer Lord Kimbolton and the com-
moner Oliver Cromwell in Essex’s main Parliamentary army at the
beginning of the Civil War may thus be easily conceived. Under
Essex himself, as commander-in-chief, there were five chief officers
ranking as générais (the Earl of Bedford and Sir William Balfour
two of them) ; under these were 27 colonels, with about as many
lieutenant-colonels and majors ; and under these again were about
210 captains of foot, horse, and dragoons. Lord Kimbolton was
one of the 27 colonels, commanding a foot régiment of 1200 men;
Cromwell was one of the 210 captains, commanding a horse troop
of 60 men. The captaincy of a troop of horse, however, was a
somewhat higher thing in réputation than the captaincy of a
company of foot.—Farther, it has to be noted that the above State
of the army was little more than its State on paper at the outset,
and that the first shocks and exigencies of the war greatly deranged
the paper scheme. Officers that figure on the first paper list dis-
appear, or even desert; others flash into note at once, and are
promoted rapidly. It was not Essex alone that regulated the pro-
motions ; the Parliament was watching, and selected those that seemed
fittest. Indeed, very soon there were other masses in the field in
various parts of England, with the style of armies for the Parliament,
besides Essex’s main or original army. although Essex continued
nominally the commander-in-chief.—D.M.]HISTORICAL FREFACE.
XI
When subsequently, in the year 1643, County Associations
were formed, primarily for local defence, tlie Earl was put at the
head of that one which comprised the Eastern Counties. In that
capacity he came into direct military communication with Oliver
Cromwell, whose régiment of Ironsides was principally raised and
recruited in the county of Huntingdon, in which the Earl had
great property and influence, and where he must hâve known
Oliver Cromwell for many years.
[Mr. Bruce has here rapidly skipped the period of about fifteen
months intervening between the Battle of Edgehill and the opening
of the year 1644; but it seems necessary, for the understanding of
what follows, that the reader should hâve some notice of the course
of events during that interval, and especially of the steps by which
Colonel Lord Kimbolton and Captain Oliver Cromwell had risen
above their first ranks in the Parliamentary service.
After the Battle of Edgehill, the King, foiled in an attempted
march upon London, had retired to Oxford, which became thence-
forward his head-quarters; and through the winter of 1642-3, and
the early summer of 1643, the war resolved itself into what may be
called district-struggles, in which the Royalists and the Pailia-
mentarians ascertained eacli other’s strengtli by fights and sieges in
the varkms parts of England, and, when any district had manifestly
declared for the one side or the other, tried to keep it fast to that
side by suppressing hostile risings within it, or repelling inroads
from other districts. Rupert in the Midlands, Lord Herbert on the
South-Welsh border, the Marquis of Hertford and Sir Ralph Hop ton
in the South-Western counties, and the Marquis of Newcastle in the
North, were the Royalist chiefs most heard of; on the side of Par-
liament, Essex was still generalissimo, but with Sir William Waller
as his most active lieutenant in the South, Earl Stamford and others
in command in the South-West, and Lord Ferdinando Fairfax and
his son Sir Thomas Fairfax doing their best in the North. On the
whole, the military hero of the Parliament through those first few
months of the war was Sir William Waller. His brillinnt succesees.XÜ	HISTORICAL PREFACE.
first in the South-East and then in the West, contrasted favourably
with Essex’s heavy sti’ategy, and suggested to some the idea that
he might be the better commander-in-chief. For the rest ail was
dubious; nay, surveying the map of England, and observing that
the King had a strong hold of the Midlands, with Wales behind
him as one unbroken magazine of Koyalism, the South-West eounties
as far as Cornwall almost wholly his, and the North tending to be
his, one might hâve pronounced the chances to be greatly in his
favour.
The strength of Parliament was mainly in the Eastern and South-
Eastern eounties, nearest London ; and within that région the six
eastern eounties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Cambridge, Herts, and
Hunts, had acquired especial distinction. Although, as Mr. Bruce
mentions, the association of neighbouring eounties into groups ail
over the map was part of the policy of the Parliament, and five or
six such associations had sprung up in the winter of 1642-3 or early
in 1643, the six eounties named (five only at first, but Hunts was
added) had corne to be known as “ The Associated Counties ” par
excellence. This was owing in a great measure to the energy and
activity of Cromwell. As a native of the district, and as repré-
sentative in Parliament of one of its chief towns, he had naturally
begun his soldiering there, and proved there first, at the âge of forty-
three, his inborn military genius. From the very first, in raising the
single Cambridgeshire horse-troop of which he was captain,hehad pro-
ceeded instinctively on his famous principle of selecting “ men with
a spirit for the business,” men like-minded religiously with himself;
and gradually, after having himself learnt his drill, and drilled his
first troop, he had applied the same principle with greater and
greater confidence in recuiting that troop, and in raising others.
Accordingly, in March, 1643, he was no longer 44 Captain Crom-
well,” but “ Colonel Cromwell,” at the head of a whole régiment of
the sort of men that were afterwards known as CromwelPs Iron-
sides. The nominal head of the Eastern Counties Association was
then Lord Grey of Wark; but the soûl of the Association was ColonelHISTORICAL PREFACE.
Xlll
Cromwell. The particulars of liis soldiering and miscellaneous
activity from Mardi to August, 1643—mostly at Cambridge or else-
where within the Association, but with some important excursions
beyond it, and especially one into Linçolnshire for the rescue of that
county from risings of its native Royalist éléments, aided by “ in-
falls ” of Royalists from the north—will be gathered best from Mr.
Carlyle’s narrative (Letters and Speeches of Cromwell, i. 103-132,
ed. 1857).
Meanwhile in other parts of England the cause of Parliament
had met with aiarming disasters. The Fairfaxes had lost an im-
portant battle in the north; Sir William Waller, despatched into
the south-western counties as the likeliest man to retrieve former
failures there, had been twice beaten; the city of Bristol, in-
sufficiently defended, had surrendered to Rupert. Under the pres-
sure of these misfortunes the Parliament had resolved on what they
had for some time contemplated, and had sent envoys to Edinburgh
to solicit the armed aid of the Scots. Yarious changes of command
were at the same time made within England itself, and among them
one affecting the Eastern Counties. Lord Kimbolton, Earl of Man-
chester since November, 1642, had not ceased to be a star of the
first magnitude among the few Parliamentarian peers; and he had
been honoured as such in various ways, e.g., in being nominated as
one of the ten peers who were to sit as lay-members in the famous
Assembly of Divines, convened at Westminster, July lst, 1643,
to advise the Parliament in ecclesiastical matters. His first great
military command, however, dates from August, 1643. Lord Grey
of Wark having, it appears, hardly satisfied either Cromwell or the
Parliament in the discharge of his duty as head of the Associated
Eastern Counties, the Earl of Manchester, whose connections with
that district were in any case numerous and close, had been pitched
upon as his successor in the post. “ Ordered, that my Lord General
(Essex) be desired to grant a commission to the Earl of Manchester
to be Serjeant Major General of ail the Forces of the Six Associated
Counties,” is the entry in the Commons Journals, under dateXIV
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
August 9, 1643; followed by tins entry on thesame day, “ Resolved,
that the Six Associated Counties shall raise 10,000 foot and
dragoons to withstand the enemy.’’a
Cromwell and the Earl of Manchester hàd, of course, known each
other well before this time; but their co-operation in the military
service of the Parliament now first properly began.b The Earl was
the commander-in-chief of the Associated Counties ; Cromwell was
one of four colonels under the Earl, with the governorship of the
city of Ely just added to his colonelcy. But, whoever were the
other three colonels, the foremost in council and in action was
always Cromwell. This appears amply in the records that remain
of the transactions from August, 1643, to January, 1643-4, in that
section of the Civil War which included the Associated Counties
a The two extracts from the Commons Journals are not directly on my part from
the Journals themselves, but from those sheets of miscellaneous MS. jottings, left by
Mr. Bruce in connection-with his unfinished Préfacé, which seem to me to prove that
he meant, in completing his Préfacé, to make some such insertions and additions as
hâve now to be made for him.—D.M.
b A story told by Clarendon in his Life (p. 936, ed. 1843) is worth noting here.
Shortly after the meeting of the Long Parliament, and when Cromwell was a com-
paratively unknown man in it, a question of private grievance came before the
House of Commons, relating to an inclosure of waste lands in the Eastem Counties.
As the lands had been acquired by the old Earl of Manchester, Lord Privy Seal, it
was his interest and that of his son, then Yiscount Mandeville or Lord Kimbolton,
to maintain the inclosure : the complainants, on the other hand, were tenant f armers
in the district. Some of them had corne up to town as witnesses ; and in a private
committee of the House on the subject Cromwell distinguished himself by mar-
shalling the witnesses, seconding their statements, and seeing them get fair play.
He was so “ tempestuous ” in his behaviour on the occasion that Mr. Hyde, who
was chairman (i.e. Clarendon himself), had to call him to order and threaten to
report him to the House. In especial he was “ rude ” to Lord Mandeville. “ When,
upon any matter of fact or the proceeding before and at the inclosure, the Lord
Mandeville desired to be heard, and with great modesty related what had been done
or explained what had been said, Mr. Cromwell did answer and reply upon him with
so much indecency and rudeness, and in language so contrary and offensive, that
every man would hâve thought that, às their natures and their manners were as
opposite as it is possible, so their interest could never hâve been the same.” Man-
deville himself, now Earl of Manchester, does not seem to hâve remembered this
encounter with Mr. Cromwell half so bitterly as Mr. Hyde did for him.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XV
(see Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 132-146, ed. 1857). Much of the work
consisted in urging on the levies of the new forces that had been
ordered ; but the feat of greatest mark was the complété recovery of
Lincolnshire. That county had continued to be the debateable
land between the Parliamentarians of the Eastern Counties and the
Royalists of the North under the Marquis of Newcastle; and the
question was whether Newcastle, who had driven the Fairfaxes into
the very south of Yorkshire and was besieging Lord Fairfax in
Hull, should be able to cross the Humber, annex ail Lincolnshire to
the Royalist area, and so break in upon the Eastern Counties, or
whether Manchester, with Cromwell under him, and with the aid
of Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had brought his horse across the
Humber for the purpose, should be able to make Lincolnshire good
and so repel the invasion. It was virtually decided by the Fight of
Winceby, October 11, 1643, in which, mainly by CromwelPs exer-
tions, the Lincolnshire Royalists, and the Northern Royalists who
had broken in to assist them, were utterly beaten. The county
was then cleared of the intruders; and, the Marquis of Newcastle
having raised the siégé of Hull and withdrawn farther back into
Yorkshire, it was plain that he had been foiled in his hope of
carrying the stress of the war into the Eastern Counties and would
hâve to abide it in his own North.
Of what importance tliis resuit appeared to the Parliament may
be inferred from this entry in the Gommons Journals, Nov. 6,1643:
“ Ordered, that Sir Peter Wentworth and Sir Anthony Irby do
présent unto the Earl of Manchester the thanks of this House in
acknowledgement of the great services done by him to the Common-
wealth.”a Thenceforward, in fact, Manchester, though still in
terms of his commission only serjeant-major-general for the Asso-
ciated Counties by députation from Essex, was regarded as an inde-
pendent general-in-chief at the head of one of the sectional armies
of the Parliament, while for Cromwell the conséquence was that he
a I find this extract from the Commons Journals in Mr. Bruce’s miscellaneous
jottings, and I copy it from them.—D.M.XVI
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
ceased to be merely Colonel Cromwell (though that name is found
occasionally attached to him for some time longer in contemporary
documents) and became Manchester’s second, or lieutenant-general,
in the same sectional army.— D.M.]
In January 1643-4 Oliver Cromwell gave clear evidence that
up to that time he had acted in harmony with Lord Manchester.
Himself ever active and fearless in the public service, he was the
plain-spoken exposer of the incompetency of others. Lord Wil-
loughby [of Parham] was the commander (serjeant-major-general
. was the official title) of the troops raised by the county of Lincoln
for the Association of the Eastern Counties. He *	*	*	*
[There is a gap here in Mr. Bruce’s manuscript ; but it is not
difficult to judge how he would hâve filled it up.
The Parliamentarian Lord-Lieutenant for the county of Lincoln
since the beginning of the war had been Francis, Lord Willoughby
of Parham, already mentioned as one of the six colonels of horse
in Essex’s original army.a To strengthen his hands, he had, as
Mr. Bruce has just said, been also commissioned by Essex as
General of the Lincolnshire forces. Hence in the struggle, just
described, between the Northern Royalists and the Parliamentarians
of the Eastern Counties for the possession of Lincolnshire, Lord
Willoughby had been a man of some significance, and Manchester,
Cromwell, and Sir Thomas Fairfax had been brought into relations
with him.b Cromwell, in particular, had found reason for thinking
him a very incompetent person for his post; and, accordingly, when
the immédiate business was over, and Cromwell had leisure to run
up to London and appear transiently in his place in Parliament, he
is found “ complaining much of my Lord Willoughby, as of a
backward general, with strangely dissolu te people about him, a
great sorrow to Lincolnshire, and craving that my Lord Manchester
miglit be appointed there instead.Vc This was on the 22nd of
* See Rushworth, v. 108-109, and p. x. ante.—D.M.
b Rnshworth, y. 280.—D.M.
c Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 146, ed. 1857.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XVII
January, 1643-4 ; and on that very day, it appears from the Com-
mons Journals, it was ordered by the Commons “that the Lord
General (Essex) be desired to grant the Earl of Manchester a
commission to be Major General of co. Lincoln.” a In other words,
Lord Willoughby was deprived of the military command of Lin-
colnshire, and, by the addition of that county to the six Asso-
ciated Eastern Counties, the Association over which Manchester
presided, and in which Cromwell was his Lieutenant-General, was
extended over seven counties. Willoughby fiercely resented his
disgrâce, and even sent a challenge to Manchester. Yarious entries
in the Lords and Commons Journals, in February 1643-4, show
that the two Houses interfered to compose matters, and that Crom-
well was regarded as the mainspring of the affair.b Altogether,
Mr. Bruce is quite justified in citing the affair as a distinct proof
that in January, 1643-4, there was a thoroughly cordial under-
standing between Manchester and Cromwell. There are other proofs
to the same effect. In fact, Cromwell had hitherto found Man-
chester a chief with whom he could get on} because, in ail essentials,
he could manage him.
Farther to supply the missing links at this point of Mr. Bruce’s
narrative, we must extend the view alittle:—Essex, as generalis-
simo for Parliament, had remained characteristically sluggish
throughout the year 1643. The siégé and capture of Reading in
April, and a successful march westwards in August and September
for the relief of Gloucester, followed by something like a victory
over the King’s main army in the first Battle of Newbury
(Sept. 20), had been the sum of his exploits in that year. Discon-
tente d with such barren strategy, though full of respect for Essex,
a This quotation from the Commons Journals is from Mr. Bruce’s own jottings.—
D.M.
b In Mr. Bruce’s miscellaneous jottings I find se ver al extracts from the Lords
Journals relating to Willoughby’s dispute with Manchester. They need not be
reproduced here ; but they show Mr. Bruce’s care in collecting materials for the
perfection of his Préfacé.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.
dXV111
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
it had become the policy of Parliament more and more to distribute
the responsibility among the leaders of sectional armies, nominally
deriving their commissions from Essex, but really with inde-
pendent powers and chances. About the time when the Earl of
Manchester had been set up in his serjeant-major-generalship or
command-in-chief in the Eastern Counties (Aug. 1643), Essex had
been persuaded, though not without some difficulty and show of
offended dignity, to grant a similar major-generalship, in the fcrm
of the command-in-chief of a new army to be raised by the Lon-
doners, to his rival Sir William Waller.a Thus at the close of
1643 and beginning of 1644 one may say that there were four
Parliamentary armies in England, besides garrisons and local forces
—Essex’s own main army ; Waller’s, raised or to be raised, also for
action chiefly in the south and west ; Manchester’s, of the seven
Associated Eastern Counties; and the army of the Fairfaxes in the
north. But by the end of January 1643-4, lo ! a fifth army avail-
able. It was no other than that auxiliary army of Scots which had
been applied for in the preceding August. Ail arrangements
having been made with the Scottish Government, and the two
nations having sworn a strict alliance on the basis of the Solemn
League and Covenant, binding them to mutual defence and the
endeavour after a uniformity of religion and Church government,
this army had at last entered England, wading through the snow,
21,000 strong, with the Earl of Leven for its chief, and Lieutenant-
General William Baillie and Major-General David Leslie next in
command.
With the advent of the Scottish army came, almost necessarily,
a This incident also had been noted by Mr. Bruce, probably for use in his Préfacé
had he perfected it. I find among his jottings several extracts from the Commons
Joumals, from July to Sept. 1643 inclusively, relating to the proposition of a
separate command for Sir William Waller and to Essex *s réluctance in the matter
from personal pride or from jealousy of Waller. At length, it isreported (Sept. 28),
Essex is pacified, and handsomely assures the House that he “ will begin upon a new
score, and give Waller the best encouragement he can.”—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XIX
a new modification of the System of the war, trenching farther on
the powers of Essex. Two independent nations being now con-
joined in a common enterprise, it was thought fitting that there
should be a central body consisting of représentatives of botli, to
direct the générais and correspond with them ; and this was provided
by the institution (Feb. 16, 1643-4) of what was called the Com-
mittee of both Kingdoms. It consisted, for the English Parlia-
ment, of seven selected Peers and fourteen selected Commoners, and,
for the Scottish Government, of four Commissioners that had
accompanied the Scottish army. Essex, Manchester, Sir William
Waller, and Cromwell were of the English part of this Committee,
and the same compliment was paid to others in military posts ; but,
as effectively the Committee was to hâve its habitat in London
and to issue its directions tlience, the working core of it was to be
a small quorum, chiefly of civilians (six from the two English
Houses, but always with two Scots présent), who could be résident
in London and in daily communication with Parliament. As Derby
House, in Cannon Row, Westminster, became the meeting-place of
this Committee, it received the name of the Committee at
Derby House; and under this name, as well as under the other,
it was, with renewals and modifications from time to time, to be a
very important executive body in England, in the guise of a war-
office, for several years to corne. Essex by no means liked the new
institution, but he had to acquiesce.
The particular army with which we hâve meanwhile to do is
Manchester’s army of the Seven Associated Eastern Counties. It
consisted of about 14,000 foot, horse, and dragoons;a it had already
acquired great réputation ; and much was expected from it. At its
head was the Earl of Manchester, a popular Puritan nobleman,
forty-one years of âge at the opening of 1644; his lieutenant-
general was Oliver Cromwell, three years older.—D.M.J
Such were the persons with whom we hâve to deal, and such
their relative positions. Manchester was the commander-in-chief,
a Rushworth, v. 621.—D.M.XX
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Cromwell the second in command : Manchester, described by Bishop
Burnet, in words which singularly confirm and illustrate those of
Clarendon, as “ of a soft and obliging temper, of no great deptli,
but universally beloved, being both a virtuous and a generous man;”a
Cromwell, a soldier such as the world was then beginning to know
him, ail fîre and intensity ; never allowing an enemy near him to be
at rest, and carrying on his troops from success to success until they
partook of his own enthusiasm ; believing himself to be fighting the
Lord^s battles, and doing so at the head of men who held the same
faith and felt the same scorn of danger as himself—
Ail that the contest calls for,—spirit, strength,
The scorn of danger, and united hearts,—
The surest présagé of the good they seek.
Cowper. Task, y. 366-68.
In the affairs of thÎ3 world it has not yet become possible for the
lion and the lamb to lie down together. It is even less wonderful
that the combination was out of the question in the case of Cromwell
and the Earl of Manchester, inasmuch as the Earl’s major-general,
the next officer to Cromwell in command, “ helped ” his two
superiors, in the language of Mr. Carlyle, “ to quarrel.” Crawford,
the major-general, was a Scotchman of good descènt, and was full of
his country’s warm attachment to Presbyterianism and the Covenant.
Cromwell had little affection either for Scotland or its institutions.
[Some additional information seems here désirable, and would
probably hâve been given by Mr. Bruce.
N otwithstanding the great accession of strength which the
Parliament had received by the coming in of Leven’s auxiliary
army of Scots, there was a decided lull of military activity in the
early months of 1644. That army had duly quartered itself in the
north in aid of that of the Fairfaxes ; and there were minor move-
a Hist. of Own Time, i. 167, ed. 1823. Baillie ternis the Earl “ a sweet, meek
man.”—Letters, ii. 229.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXI
ments and detached pièces of service of the other armies, including
an expédition of Cromwell westward as far as Gloucester ; but there
were no great operations. The cause may hâve been that the King,
whom the advent of the Scots had alarmed, was then holding an
Anti-Parliament or Royalist Parliament in Oxford (January 22,
1643-4—April 16, 1644), and there was talk of a possible peace.
At ail events, Manchester had leisure for a while for other duties than
those of bis generalship: e.g., for some actual attendances in his place
in the Westminster Assembly, and then for that great business of the
visitation and reformation of the University of Cambridge which
Parliament had assigned to him by spécial ordinance as a work of
suprême importance within the territories he administered. From
February, through March and April, 1644, he and his chaplains,
Messrs. Ashe and Goode, were at Cambridge, busy in this work, Le.,
summoning heads and fellows of colleges before them, examining the
States of the colleges, ejecting men of the wrong sort from their
masterships or fellowships, and putting into their places Puritan
ministers and scholars recommended by the Westminster Assembly.
As Cromwell for part of this time was also at Cambridge, he and
Manchester must hâve been often together, Cromwell looking sym-
pathetically upon Manchester’s doings in the University, but in
the main occupying himself with the duties of his lieutenant-
generalship, and getting the army of the Associated Counties ready
for further service in the war when Manchester should résumé
command.
By this time, however, there was a third person of influence in
that army, somewhat disturbing the relations that had hitherto
subsisted between Manchester and Cromwell. Since the coming-in
of the Scottish auxiliary army, stray Scots, willing to be employed
in one or other of the English armies proper, had been even more
plentiful than before ; and one of these Scots had been picked up
by Manchester, or had been recommended to him, as a fit man
to be his major-general. He was the “Crawford” of whom Mr.
Bruce speaks: Laurence Crawford, of the family of the CrawfordsXXII
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
of Jordan Hill, Kenfrewshire.a He had seen service both abroad
and in Scotland, and it may hâve been thought that his trained
professional ability would be a useful importation into Manchester’s
array, led otherwise only by an English nobleman and an English
gentleman-farmer who had turned soldiers for the nonce. But
from the moment of this importation peace was gone, and the
management of Manchester’s army became a very difficult case of
the problem of three bodies. This was largely owing to the peculiar
tempérament of Crawford, who “ paints himself to us,” says
Mr. Carlyle, “ as a headlong audacious fighter, of loose loud tongue,
much of a pédant and braggart, somewhat given to sycophancy
too;”b but, as Mr. Bruce has hinted, and as Mr. Carlyle also has
occasion to show, the différence between Crawford and Cromwell
involved questions of theology and ecclesiastical polity then much
agitating the mind of England. Cromwell was a fervid English
Puritan of the largest-hearted type, whose very principle in selecting
his Ironsides was that they should be religious men, having what
he thought “ the root of the matter in them,” but who, when he
was sure of that, cared little for formai différences, and even valued
liberty of différence. Crawford was a man of the most narrow and
pragmatic type of the Scottish Puritanism of that day, a rigid
believer in strict Scottish Presbytery as the one and only true
religious discipline in the world: by no means a stalwart Dalgetty,
placidly adjusting himself to any medium* but an irascible martinet
for orthodoxy.
Care must be taken, however, not to misapprehend, in connection
with this contrast, Mr. Bruce’s phrases “ Presbyterianism and the
Covenant,” and “ Scotland or its institutions.” Scotland had then
a Douglas’s Baronage of Scotland, i. 430. From Crawford himself we leara that
he joined Manchester’s army in February 1643-4: see his narrative among the
documents in this volume, p. 69. Care must be taken not to confound this “ Major-
General Laurence Crawford ” with another Scottish “ Crawford,” who will appear
in the course of the story.—D.M.
b Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 150, ed. 1857.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XX111
two Covenants, distinct in their aims and in their wording—the
National Scottish Covenant of 1638, under the banner of which she
had fought her own quarrel with Charles I., and succeeded in re-
Presbyterianizing herself; and the Solemn League and Covenant of
1643, which, though it was of Scottish origin, was not a peculiarly
Scottish institution, inasmuch as it had been adopted enthusiastically
by the English Parliament as the fîttest bond of union between the
two nations, and signed universally by the English Parliamentarians
on the one hand as well as by the Scots on the other. In respect
of the latter, Cromwell, as one of the myriads of Englishmen who
had signed that covenant, was no less a “ Covenanter 99 than Craw-
ford was; nor had any sign appeared yet on Cromwell’s part, or
among those he represented, of a desire to disown or repudiate that
covenant. Yery digtinctly, however, had signs by this time
appeared of a différence in the interprétation of the document.
The Scots viewed it as implying that strict Presbytery, with no
toleration of anything else, was to be set up in England ; they had
sent their auxiliary army into England as an agency to that
end ; and, as the Londoners and the majority of the English
Parliamentarians everywhere had caught the passion for Presby-
terianism, they were in prospect of success. An unascertained
minority of the Parliamentarians, however, had by no means made
up their minds that Scottish Presbytery would be the best form of
established Church government for England, and had very decidedly
made up their minds that, if such an establishment should be set
up, there should be at least a toleration of dissent and liberty for
varieties of worship under it. True, there were phrases in the
Solemn League and Covenant pledging its subscribers to “ endeavour
to bring the Churches of God in the three kingdoms to the nearest
conjunction and uniformity in religion,” andalso to u endeavour the
extirpation ofpopery, prelacy, superstition, heresy, schism, and profane-
ness;” but were Englishmen to be tied downalready to that Scottish
interprétation of these phrases which would dictate the acceptance
of Scottish Presbytery in ail its details as the only “ conjunctionXXIV
IIISTORICAL PREFACE.
and uniformity ” possible, and would propose civil pains and penalties
on ail tliat the Scots called “ heretics ” or “ schismatics ” as the only
way of extirpating real “heresy” and real “schism”? Already,
in the beginning of 1644, this différence as to the interprétation of
the Covenant was a growing one; and, when Crawford entered
Manchester’s army, he imported into it not only his own peevish
temper but also the Scottish construction of the obligations of the
Covenant. B y that construction it was the duty of ail in high
command in any of the Parliamentary armies to see that heresy did
not break out in the ranks, and especially that the officers were
orthodox. Hardly, in fact, had Crawford become major-general
in the army of the Eastern Counties, when, as Mr. Bruce goes on
to relate, an instance in point occurred.—D.M.]
The lieutenant-colonel of Crawford’s régiment [a Lieutenant-
Colonel Packer.—D.M.] having given him offence [near Bedford,
Manchester and Cromwell being then both at Cambridge.—D. M.]
was placed by him under arrest [and then sent back to Cambridge,
as a suspended officer, until Manchester should be at leisure
to investigate the case.—D.M.]	The culprit, whose general cha-
racter was good, appealed to Cromwell, who interceded by letter
to Crawford on his behalf. [The letter, written at Cambridge and
dated lOth March 1643-4, was carried by Packer himself to
Crawford, then in Buckinghamshire.—D.M.]	To his spécial
offence the lieutenant-colonel added that of being an Anabaptist.
“ Admit he be/’ remarked Cromwell, “ shall that render him
incapable to serve the public ? . . . . Sir, the State, in choosing men
to serve it, takes no notice of their opinions: if they be willing
faithfully to serve it, that satisfies. I advised you formerly to bear
with men of different minds from yourself. . . . Take heed of being
sharp, or too easily sharpened by others, against those to whom you
can object little but that they square not with you in every opinion
concerning matters of religion.” a
Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 201, ecl. 1846 [i. 147-148, ed. 1857.]HISTORICÀL PREFACE.
XXV
It took nearly two centuries to make such opinions as these
of Cromwell to be generally admitted. In hia time politicians
denounced them as highly dangerous, and divines as peculiarly
wicked.a Manchester, stirred .up by Crawford, who had “ a great
hand with him,” b was strong against them ; and hence a source of
strife between Cromwell and his commander-in-chief.c
Nor was the strife upon this subject simply theoretical, or one
which in practice affected only a particular person, like this
Lieutenant-Colonel, here and there. At that time the question of
the rights of sectàries was really vital. It determined the whole
course of public policy.
At the commencement of the war between King and Parliament*
the people prepared for it as for a mere démonstration of strength,
a Somewhat too strongly stated. There was a considérable number of persons in
England in 1644, inclnding some politicians and some divines, wbo had conceived
as wide and just ideas of toleration as any that hâve been generally admitted since ;
and Cromwell was but the most conspicuous public head of these, and their most
emphatic spokesman.—D.M.
b Baillie’s Letters, ii. 229.
c Mr. Bruce seems here to anticipate a little. At the date at which we now are
(March 1644), it cannot be said that the strife between Cromwell and Manchester
had begun, but only that an influence leading to strife had been introduced between
them in the person of Crawford. In that letter of Cromwell’s from which Bruce
has quoted (see the whole of it in Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 147-8, ed. 1857) there is no
sign of any idea on the part of Cromwell that Manchester would hâve differed from
him, or sided with Crawford, in the case of Packer. Manchester was then too busy,
he says, with the University Visitation to hear what Packer had to say in self-
defence ; but it seems to be implied that Cromwell, in writing the letter, could
assume that he and Manchester would be of one mind on the “ Anabaptist ”
objection. Not till afterwards, when gradually Crawford had acquired his “ great
hand” with Manchester, is there any reason for characterising Manchester as
“ strong against ” those Toleration opinions of Cromwell which, till Crawford’s
advent, he seems to hâve abetted, or at least allowed to Cromwell in the
recruiting and officering of the Ironsides. Possibly, however, his recent sittings
in the Westminster Assembly, and his communications with that body in the
business of new appointments in the University, may hâve given him a tum
already towards Presbyterian strictness, and so prepared the way for Crawford’s
insinuations against Cromwell.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.
eXXVI
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
or at most as for a contest in the arena. So badly had the King’s
friends managed their cause, so little show had they made of their
real strength, that it was a common opinion that one battle would
end the struggle, that a victory clearly pronounced on either side
would bring the long-continued strife of words to an end. This
opinion was soon shown to be fallacious. The new course entered
upon when the King raised his standard [Aug. 1642] turned out
to be, not a battle, but a war. Still there were many persons on the
side of the Parliament, including the anti-royal leaders of the
highest social position, who went on dreaming that ail that was
needed was a war of résistance. If they could but make such a
stand against the King as would convince him that he could no
more overpower them by arms than by the measures to which *he
had previously had recourse, they imagined that he would submit
to the curtailments of his prérogative and the other alterations in
Church and State which they had determined to effect.
Such persons neither understood the character of the King nor
the necessary course of such a war. Party bitterness grew with
what it fed upon. It was strengthened by every victory and every
defeat, by every loss and every sacrifice. The relative positions of
the parties also gradually changed. The Parliament, with a view
to the maintenance of their own position, was compelled to assume,
within the portion of the kingdom which was under its control,
first one and then another of the functions of the executive. At
the end of two years (which is the period with which we are now
dealing) they had appointed lord-lieutenants and sheriffs, they had
made arrangements for the administration of justice, they had im-
pressed soldiers, had levied taxes, had held direct communications
with foreign governments, had made a separate treaty with the Scots,
and had called them into England to their military assistance. The
contest was no longer between two co-ordinate powers in one
System of government; it had become a war between two bodies
each of whom exercised an independent and sovereign jurisdiction,
a war which could only be what the King had ail along designedHISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXVll
it to be, not merely one of defence, nor of résistance, but simply
and absolutely a war of conquest.
This was a lesson which tbe original Parliamentary leaders were
slow to learn. From tbe meeting of tbe Long Parliament they
bad consistently pursued certain definite aims, settled probably, in
general terms, among themselves before the Parliament assembled.
They bad determined I. To punisb the evil counsellors who had
advised and assisted the King in his course of arbitrary govem-
ment ; II. To secure frequent meetings of Parliament ; III. To
reform the Courts of Law, which had been perverted to purposes of
oppression; IV. To effect such a reform in the Church as should
prèvent a fresh intrusion of Laudism. Whilst they were pursuing
these objects in a parliamentary way, the conduct of the King
compelled them for their own safety sake to add a Vth object to
their programme, namely, To secure a temporary parliamentary
control over the militia ; and the war added a VIth, To exclude
from future power and influence those who had been the King’s
principal military supporters.
The first three of these objects were accomplished and the fourth
and flfth were under discussion when the standard was raised. The
sixth could only receive its détermination at the close of the war.
The fourth touched the conscience of the King, and the flfth his pride.
But he had yielded to the Scots [in their struggle with him for the
re-establishment of Presbytery in Scotland, 1638-1640.—D.M.]; he
had yielded [in England] in the case of triennial parliaments, and
in that of Strafford [1641] ; and there was ground for hope that he
might be induced to do so in other things. The case of the Militia
seemed peculiarly susceptible of diplomatie arrangement. Com-
bination of authority and limitation of time were bases upon which
arbitrators might work. Even the Church question did not seem
entirely insoluble. The consent of the King to the removal of the
Bishops from the House of Lords [Feb. 1641-2] was a great con-
cession to popular opinion, but it was made too late. In the first
instance that and some other modifications of the hierarchicalXXV111
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
government would hâve sufficed. Even to a late period, if the
King had stood his ground, and the powerful friends of Episcopacy
had honestly contested the matter in parliament, a peaceful settle-
ment might hâve been corne to. The war put an end ta the possi-
bility of arrangement. Thenceforward the changes eflected by
Parliament were in most instances the results of the necessities of
their political position. Presbyterianism was substituted in the
place of Episcopacy as a sacrifice to the league with Scotland.
There was indeed a large and influential party in England that
desired Presbyterianism in lieu of Episcopacy. The existence of
such a party is a necessary reaction against Laudism ; but that party
would hâve consented to a modified Episcopacy, and it was simply
the general anxiety to secure the military assistance of the Scots
which drove the Parliament into the adoption of this great organic
change.
[Some correction of Mr. Bruce’s language is here necessary :—
The “ great organic change ” of which he speaks, viz., the substitu-
tion of Presbyterianism for Episcopacy in the National Church of
England, had not been accomplished at the date he has reached in
his narrative. The exclusion of bishops from the House of Lords
and from other places of secular authority and jurisdiction had been
carried, and assented to by the King, in Feb. 1641-2, six months
before the beginning of the Civil War ; various other acts and reso-
lutions relating to the Church had since then been passed by the two
Houses, amounting in the gross to an utter abolition of the Episcopal
form of Church government, root and branch ; and this fact had
been put on record in the ordinance of the two Houses, June 12,
1643, convoking the Westminster Assembly of Divines.
Whereas it has been declared and resolved by the Lords and Com-
mons assembled in Parliament that the présent Church government by
Archbishops, Bishops, their Chancellors, Commissaries, Deans, Deans
and Chapters, Archdeacons, and other ecclesiastical officers depending on
the hierarchy, is evil, and greatly offensive and burdensome to the king-
dom, and a great impediment to reformation and gfowth of religion, andXXIX
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
very préjudiciai to the State and Government of this kingdom, and that
therefore they are resolved that the same shall be taken away, and that
such a governinent shall be settled in the Church as may be agreeable
to God’s Holy Word, and most apt to procure and preserye the peace of
the Church at home, and nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland,
and other Keformed Church es abroad :—
Such is part of the preamble of this ordinance, and the ordinance
itself goes on to entrust to about 150 persons named, divines and’
others, the business of deliberating such questions as to the future
constitution and standards of the Church as may be expressly referred
to them by Parliament, and of advising Parliament in the same.
When the Westminster Assembly did meet (July 1, 1643) it was
pretty clear that the drift of opinion among the active majority of the
members was towards Presbyterianism, and indeed it was afterwards
maintained that the members had been selected by the two Houses
beforehand with a view to that resuit; but not till after the Solemn
League and Covenant had been made with the Scots, and some Scottish
divines and laymen had been added to the Assembly as assessors to
the English members, was the Assembly empowered to begin the
considération of the form of Church govemment to be substituted
for Episcopacy (Oct. 1643). Then, partly in conséquence of the
enthusiasm over the new compact with the Scots, and of the pré-
sence of Henderson and other Scottish divines in the Assembly, the
prépondérance of Presbyterian opinion in that body was overwhelm-
ing—only five English divines, called “the Dissenting Brethren,”
questioning the Presbyterian theory of a Church, and putting in
arguments in favour of the rival theory known as Congregationalism
or Independency. Always outvoted in the debates, these five
Dissenters at length changed their tactics. Knowing Presbytery
to be predetermined on in the Assembly, and that a décisive recom-
mendation in favour of that form of Church govemment would go
from the Assembly to Parliament, they started a side-question, and
openly appealed on this question both to Parliament and to the
general public (Jan. 1643-4). This was the question of Toleration.XXX
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
If Presbytery were to be set up in England, as seemed now certain,
was it to be an absolute Presbytery, compulsory on every man,
woman, and child ; or would some allowance be made for tender
consciences that could not reconcile themselves to ail tbe details of
the Established Church, and would ministers like themselves be per-
mitted to preach in a peaceful non-Presbyterian way to such con-
grégations as might voluntarily gather round them ? Such was still
the State of the controversy at the point Mr. Bruce has reached in
his narrative, viz., March or April 1644. The establishment of
Presbytery had not yet been actually voted in England, nor did the
formai votes to that effect pass Parliament till the following year ;
it was only as good as votedy or certain to be voted.
In view of this, however, there was an enormous agitation of the
whole mind of the country. The very air was full of new questions
and new phrases. Now first did most Englishmen hear of the
dispute between Presbytery and Independency, and learn
what it was ail about. Presbyterian divines, both English and
Scottish, put forth pamphlets upon pamphlets, explaining the Pres-
byterian System, i. e.9 that System in which, while each parish or
congrégation has its own Church Court, consisting of the minister
and lay elders, yet, for the purposes of control and unity, there must
be a regular gradation of superior judicatories, called the Presbytery
or Classis (the District Court, supervising a group of congrégations),
the Provincial Synod (the periodical court of a whole shire or of
several shires, supervising ail the Presbyteries within its bounds),
and the General Assembly (the annual or occasional meeting of
représentative ministers and lay elders for the whole nation). They
demonstrated the divine origin of this System, and its adaptation to
human society; and they pointed to Scotland as an example of its
admirable working. The five Dissenting Brethren and their allies,
on the other hand, put forth pamphlets maintaining the divine
origin and the superior freedom of Congrégationalisme the main
principle of which is the “ independency ” of individual congréga-
tions, though it admits the utility of correspondence between differentHISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXXI
congrégations and occasional meetings for consultation. With the
main question as between the two Systems, however, was blended
that side question of Toleration winch the Dissenting Brethren had
started. Would the Presbyterians, while establishing their System,
concédé some amount of toleration under it? One cannot now per-
ceive any necessary or logical reason, inhérent in the nature of the
Presbyterian System of Church government, why they should not
hâve agreed to do so ; and it might be a curious spéculation what
would hâve happened if they had so agreed. Had the English and
Scottish Presbyterians in 1644 consented to set up Presbytery with
a toleration, how the future course of English history might hâve
been changed ! In fact, they would hear of nothing of the kind.
Absolute, universal, strict, compulsory Presbytery was their sole
idea of Presbytery ; toleration or liberty of conscience, name or
thing, much or little, was their bugbear, their horror, the condensa-
tion in one phrase of ail that was hideous, abominable, and to be
resisted. In other words, anti-toleration was proclaimed as a neces-
sary tenet of true Presbyterianism. Ail the more naturally the
doctrine of liberty of conscience became precious to the small minority
of English parliamentarian divines who had adopted the theory of
Congregationalism or Independency, and to the scattered thousands
of persons throughout England who, for the same or for other
reasons, looked forward with dread to the substitution of absolute
Presbytery for the Prelacy that had been abolished. Nay, the
interprétation of the phrase “ liberty of conscience ” grew bolder
and bolder.—D.M.]
When it [i. e. the virtual adoption of Presbytery in lieu of the
abolished Episcopacy, though with the question of Toleration in
reserve.—D.M.] was accomplished, the old leaders of the move-
ment party had finished their contemplated work of rational
reformation. They were not blind, we may feel well assured, to
the inconveniences and irregularities attendant upon their hasty
législation. But, satisfied with what they esteemed to be their clear
gain in having got rid of an intolérant hierarchy based upon PopishXXX11
HISTOR1CAL PREFACE.
principles, fondly attached to Popish ceremonies, and animated b y
a Popish spirit, they trusted to time and to subséquent limitations
and qualifications to accommodate the change to the customs and
notions of the English people.
Such feelings brought them necessarily into strong harmony with
the popular desire for peace. The miseries of the war which had
desolated the country for a couple of years had excited in the
minds of the timid and the restless an ardent longing for the close
of the unnatural strife. These feelings were forced upon the
attention of the Parliament by the représentations of excited
multitudes; and, although such men as Essex, Northumberland, and
Manchester in the one house, and [Holles, Stapleton, and Whit-
locke] in the other, neither partook in the despondency nor the
mutability of the populace, they might well feel that, having revised
ail the great establishments of the kingdom and accomplished such
legislative changes as indicated that England of the F uture which they
desired, and having secured such military assistance as gave them a
clear superiority in the field, the time had corne for an earnest and ur-
gent endeavour to put an end to the pending anarchy by an arrange-
ment with their unwilling sovereign. Nor was there absent from
their minds another feeling which urged them still more strongly
to desire a peace. What evils might resuit from such a decided
superiority of either party as would enable it to dictate terms of
submission tp its conquered adversaries ! Such an ascendancy, on
whichever side it occurred, would be followed by forfeitures and
proscription, and would probably al ter ail the institutions of the
country. Considérations like these led them to favour a military
policy of exhaustion rather than of conquest. Such a policy was
exemplified in the heavy inactivity of Essex. It discouraged
àudacity and enterprise. It opposed the recklessness of Rupert by
steadiness, fortitude, and discrétion. By such a policy it was hoped
that the resources of the King would be exhausted, and he would
be compelled to yield to England that freedom in relation to eccle-
siastical afiairs which had already been extorted from him by the Scots.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXX1U
In the meantime a party was growing up which took a totally
different view of the position of affairs, both political and religious.
When they found victory followed by sluggishness and consequently
yielding small or no results, when the destruction of one royalist
army was succeeded by a period of inactivity which enabled the
King to form another, these men began to exclaim, “ Shall the
sword devour for ever?” They chimed in with those whose
anxiety was for peace, but they sought ifc, not by outcry, nor by
vainer endeavours to corne to terms with an opponent who refused
to admit the constitutional status of those with whom he treated,
but by directing ail the national energies to obtain a victorious
close of the war. They accepted the issue offered by the King and
threw upon him the responsibility of the resuit. As means to their
end they advocated discipline and intelligence among the troops,
unity in command, activity in operations, and improvement to the
very utmost of ail opportunités. In these views they had many
supporters, but the leading advocates of these opinions were men
who went much farther. They had no desire that the King should
close with the terms that were now offered to him, which comprised
the substitution of Presbyterianism for Episcopacy. Both these
schemes of ecclesiastical government claimed a foundation jure
divino. This party denied the foundation, and found no shelter
against past grievances in the substitution of the one scheme for
the other. They aimed at procuring what was then termed freedom
of conscience, a modified toleration of sectaries within a certain pale—
the first ray of the fuller light that has since risen upon ourselves ;a
* Mr. Bruce is not absolutely right in describing the doctrine of Toleration that
had appeared in English society in 1644 as merely " the first ray of the fuller light
that has since risen upon ourselves.,, There were very varions grades of the
doctrine even then; and, though most of the respectable people who advocated
Toleration did only mean “ a modified toleration of sectaries within a certain pale,”
there were some thinkers whose notions of Toleration were as wide and exceptionless
as any that hâve since been known. Indeed Voluntaryism in its utmost extreme, as
denying the right of the civil power to establish, endow, patronise, or in any way
favour any form of religious belief, or interfère with any mis-belief or no-belief, was
then a proclaimed spéculation.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.
/XXXIV
HISTOUICAL PREFACE.
and în that particular they were most unpopular. But the
point in which the popular voice went with them helped them on
in spite of its union with that which was disliked, and so it was
that they made way, and were shielded from the obloquy which, had
they stood only upon the latter point, might possibly hâve over-
whelmed them. Among their leaders it is scarcely necessary to
remark that Oliver Cromwell was pre-eminent.
They who would picture to themselves Oliver Cromwell, at the
period in which we hâve here to deal with him, must regard him
not merely as ' a man whose actions were controlled by a strong,
determined will, nor merely as a soldier strict in discipline, distin-
guished at ail times by steady energy, in decision prompt, in execu-
tion unwavering. Ail these unquestionably he was, and probably those
who did not know him the most intimately described him over and
âbove as cold, reserved, unfeeling; but these things would scarcely
hâve constituted a différence between Cromwell and multitudes ot
other resolute and peremptory men. He was much more. In him
tliere was not merely a pre-determined judgment upon the points in
dispute, but one which he believed to be infallible, because communi-
cated to his mind by the Spirit of God. Call it enthusiasm, cant,
fanaticism, hypocrisy, or what you will. He saw God’s Church defiled
by hirelings. He witnessed how they strove to bring back within the
sacred precincts the soul-destroying trumpery of rejected super-
stitions. They who profaned God’s Church could not be otherwise
than enemies of the Lord of Hosts. To oppose them was the cause
of God. It was in this cause, uniting the hero with the prpphet, that
he drew his sword ; and, whenever his efforts were triumphant, he
devoutly believed the success to be a token of God’s approval—the
flashing of his sword to be the liglitning of God’s vengeance.
* * * * *
These were the principles which he inculcated upon his Ironsides,
and they in their turn, as much by their good conduct as by their
achievements, made disciples and prosélytes wherever they went,
and that in spite of the angry opposition of Scots, of Presbyterians,HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXXV
of ail who desired a royal restoration upon any terms, and of those
who were alarmed at the multitude of enthusiastic sectaries who
sprang up upon the removal of the over-stringent restraints of the
Established Church. The sudden withdrawal of a rigorous religious
system is always foliowed by an outburst of irregular enthusiasm.
So it was at the Reformation, so on the occasion with which we are
now dealing, and so it always will bè. In the présent instance the
effects must hâve been greatly heightened by the unwise conduct of
the Parliament in abolishing the Episcopal Government without
substituting anything in its place for a considérable time. The
Cavaliers commented as if with satisfaction upon those wild explo-
sions of religious passion. They had no cause to do so, Persons
thus affected kept the Ironsides at their full complément, and
wherever they were found were the deadliest enemies of the royal
cause.
[He would be a rash person that should try to complété an un*
finislied character of Cromwell by any one else, whether for 1644 or
for any other epoch of Cromwell’s life ; and so Mr. Bruce’s remarks
on Cromwell hâve been left with his asterisks after them to dénoté
their incompleteness. There is evidence, however, in the peculiarly
fragmentary State of the manuscript at this point, that Mr. Bruce
proposed additions in the way of fact that should farther illustrate
the division into two parties that had appeared among the Par-
liamentarians in 1644, and CromwelPs*pre-eminence in one of the
parties. What is déficient may perhaps be supplied as foliows:—
As Mr. Bruce has pointed out, there had even from the first been
virtually two parties among the Parliamentarians, a more modéra te
and a more thoroughgoing. Whether one belonged to the one or
to the other was partly an affair of natural tempérament, partly of
social rank and circumstances, partly of the intensity of acquired
conviction beforehand on the political and religious questions at
issue in the war. Most of the stately Parliamentarian lords, many
of the members of the House of Commons, and a large foliowing ofXXXVI
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
the people, wanted to beat the King sufficiently, but not to beat
him too much; they wanted to make such terms with him as would
permit English society to résumé its course, with royalty under due
Parliamentary check, and the Church reformed and popularized,
but other institutions disturbed as little as possible. Some of the
more energetic spirits of both Houses, however, such as Yiscount
Saye and Sele and Lord Brooke in the Lords, and Hampden,
Cromwell, Haselrig, the younger Sir Henry Yane, and Henry
Marten, in the Commons, had no faith in any method of bringing
the King to terms short of his crushing defeat in the field, and did
not shrink from the chance that deeper changes, some of them even
démocratie, might resuit from the conflict; and to these leading
spirits there adhered throughout the community those Puritans and
others whose sufferings or whose reasonings during the late Reign of
Thorough and of Laud had carried them in advance of the rest in
political theory. So it had been from the beginning of the war;
but in 1644, ns Mr. Bruce also points out, not only had this natural
distribution of the Parliamentarians into the moderate or cautious
party and the party of energy and movement become more obvious,
but it had identified itself in great measure with that ecclesiastical
division of the Parliamentarians into Presb yteri an s and In-
dependents which had meanwhile occurred. The party of
modération and peace was now in the main the Presbyterian party,
satisfied with that solution of the Church-question which was pro-
vided by the strict Presbyterian seulement recommended by the
Westminster Assembly and as good as adopted by Parliament, and
chiefly anxious now that the King should be brought to terms
including the acceptance of that settlement. The party of move*
ment, on the other hand, was now the Independent party, dis-
satisfied with the proposed settlement in itself, but, above ail,
resolute, since such a seulement appeared inévitable, that it should
be accompanied by a sufficient toleration enaetment, or guarantees
for liberty of conscience, in behalf of non-Presbyterians. This
question of liberty of conscience, indeed, had become practically theHISTORICAL PREFACE.
XXXV11
all-important one within the Parliamentarian ranks. For now, in
addition to the Presbyterians and the Independents proper,
one heard much of the Sects, Le. of a vast miscellany of persons
diffused through English society, who, though most of them were
Independents too in the sense of holding by the principle of the
“ independency99 of particular congrégations of Christians, were
yet distinguishable from the milder Independents of the Westminster
Assembly by the fact that they had branched off into varieties and
irregularities of religious belief which those divines did not profess
to countenance. These sects were, as Mr. Bruce says, partly the
product of the immédiate ferment of the time, foliowing on the
break-up of Laud’s rule and the abolition of Episcopacy; but they
were partly also re-appearances of sects native in England since the
Reformation, and which, though apparently suppressed by the rigour
against Separatists through the reigns of Elizabeth, James, and
Charles, had left remnants and seeds.	Brownists, Anabaptiste,
Antinomians, Seekers, Socinians, &c., &c., were the names in ail
men’s mouths, descriptive of the different classes of this religious
medley, attached to the Independents. The existence of such sec-
taries, their rapid multiplication, and their growing boldness in
venting their “heresiesand blasphemies,” were pointed to by the
Presbyterians as proofs of the dangerous tendency of the principle
of Church-independency ; and the more orthodox Independents were
tauntingly asked whether they were not ashamed of such a rag-tail
of adhérents, and whether they would extend the benefits of liberty
of conscience to them.	The Independents, on the whole, were
obliged to say they would, though some of them did so reluctantly,
and most of them still with the admission that, when religious error
went beyond certain limits, it might lawfully be checked. More
and more, therefore, “ Presbytery and No Toleration ” became the
watchword of that great majority of the Parliamentarians which
formed the moderate party, while the more extreme or révolu-
tionary Puritanism, which wanted to throw iribreased energy into
the war, took to itself more and more the name of Independency,
and even passed beyond ordinary Independency into Anabaptism,XXXV111
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Antinomianism, Brownism, and other forms of sectarian opinion.—
D.M.]
Such opinions made easy way in the Army, especially in that
part of it which was under the command of Cromwell, who pos-
sessed the faculty of imbuing other persons with his own opinions.
His scheme of military reform was based upon the employment as
soldiers of men in whom dévotion to the public cause should act as
a counterpoise to feelings of chivalry and loyalty. Such men were
necessarily persons of intelligence, and, when Cromwell had the
power of sélection, men of religion, already imbued with the leading
opinions and ready to put faith in the judgment of their commander.
But, with the exception of the incident with Major-General
Crawford, we hâve no information upon the subject, nor any
indication of différence of opinion between Cromwell and the Earl
of Manchester, until after the Battle of Marston Moor, from which
time our narrative must become more minute.
[Mr. Bruce’s manuscript now passes at once to the Battle of
Marston Moor, skipping three months. It is vital to the story,
however, that there should be some farther mention of the phe-
nomenon upon which he has been touching, viz.'the spread of
Independency and Sectarianism in the Parliamentarian army, and
especially in Cromwell’s part of it, and also that some of the
incidents of those three months should be noted.
Independency and Sectarianism had acquired gradually such
strength in the various armies of Parliament that at Jength the
Presbyterians of the two Houses and the Westminster Assembly
had taken alarm. On the 2nd of April, 1644, the Scottish Baillie,
then in London as a Commissioner to the Assembly, expressly
noting the fact that the Army contained many Independents, adds
that “ sundry officers and soldiers ” of that way of thinking had
gone beyond it into “ Antinomianism and Anabaptism.”a On the
26th of the same month he again writes, “ The Independents hâve
so managed their affairs that of the officers and sojours in Man-
a Baillie, ii. 146.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE»	XXXÎX
ch ester’s army, certainly also in the GeneraTs (Essex’s), and, as I
hear, in Waller’s likewise, more than the two parts (two-thirds) are
for them, and these of the far most resolute and confident men for
the Parliament party.”* This, as Baillie soon came to know, was a
great exaggeration at that time as regards Essex’s and Waller’s
armies; but it was substantially true as regards Manchester’s. One
guesses, indeed, that Baillie had in his mind the recent affair of the
Anabaptist Colonel Packer, in which his countryman, Major-
General Crawford, had corne so memorably into collision with
Cromwell. At ail events, Baillie and ail the Presbyterians had
their eyes fastened by this time on Manchester’s army of the
Associated Eastern Counties, as that most impregnated with
Independency and other dangerous forms of opinion, and had
learnt to associate the fact with CromwelPs hitherto all-powerful
influence in that army. “ Colonel Cromwell, the great Indepen-
dent,” is already Baillie’s name for him. It was perfectly true in
évery sense. Although Cromwell, like other English Puritans, had
sympathised with the Scots in their national struggle for Pres-
byterianism, although he had even inquired into the principles of
Scottish Presbytery with a view to judge of its fitness for England,
although he had signed the Solemn League and Covenant—pledg-
ing England and Scotland to a union in Church Beform—his
reasonings had led him to a decided preference for the views of the
Congregationalists. With them, he would hâve avoided, if possible,
the importation of the exact Scottish Church-system into England;
and, with them, he was resolute that, if it should be imported, it
should be tempered to English ideas with a large, if not an un-
bounded, liberty of dissent. In his management of Manchester^
army, and especially in his sélection of officers under him, he had
acted according to his own nature, his main principle being to choose
men that “ feared God and had a spirit for the business.” Presbyterians
were by no means to be rejected, if otherwise suitable; but
naturally Independents were his favourites, aud other such men as,
a Baillie, ii. 170.—D.M.xl
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
agreeing in. essentials, would be easy and tolérant with each other
in smaller différences. Neither now nor at any future time in
Cromwell’s life could observera assign him certainly to any one sect
in particular, though tbe fervid sects, such as Anabaptists, Anti-
nomians, and Seekers, seemed more congenial to him than the
cooler and. more sceptical sects that had also begun to be heard of:
he was simply “ the great Independent,” looked up to by ail the
sects, and uniting them ail on the common ground of liberty of
conscience. Quietly and gradually, Manchester having let him
hâve his own way, he had “ packed ” Manchester^ army, it was
now said, with religionists of his own type or of types as question-
able ; and that this was true to some extent appears from the fact
that among the offieers of that army at our présent date one can
count Pickering, Whalley, the two Lilbumes, Fleetwood, Montague,
Hammond, Rainsborough, Harrison, and others, some of them very
young men, ail ardent disciples of Cromwell already, and to be
known as more or less faithful to him in coming years. It was
into this u happy family ” that the precisian and Presbyterian
Major-General Crawford had stepped; and we hâve seen the first
conséquence.
The différence between Lieutenant-General Cromwell and Major-
General Crawford over the affair of the Anabaptist colonel was still
a matter of rankling in Manchester’s army when, late in April 1644,
active militaryoperations recommenced. Again Essex made objections
to the encroachments on his authority caused by the existence of so
many armies under separate commands, and by the régulation of ail
by the Derby House Committee of both Kingdoms ; but again he was
overruled and pacified.a The Derby House Committee was renewed ;
and there were still, as before, to be five sectional armies for the
* I find among Mr. Brnce’s papers of jottings extracts from the Lords and
Commons Jonmals of April and Maj 1644 referring more particularly to Essex’s
remonstrances about the independent power given to the Earl of Manchester. This
is one more proof of Mr Bruce’s industry in collecting materials for enlarging and
completing his Préfacé.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
xli
Parliament—Essex’s own and Waller’s of 10,000 men each for the
midlands and south, that of the Fairfaxes and the auxiliary army of
the Scots for the north, and Manchester’s for the eastern counties.
For this last army, through the whole of May, there was a good
deal of renewed spécial work in Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire,
including the siégé and capture of Lincoln itself ;a and there is
proof that even during that month Crawford found additional reason
for rancour against Cromwell.b But another and more extra-
ordinary piece of service for Manchester’s army was at hand. The
army of the Fairfaxes and the Scottish auxiliary army had brought
matters to such a pass in the north that the siégé of York was now
the great enterprise in that région; and, Manchester’s army having
crossed the Humber to assist in this enterprise, the three armies, or
rather portions of them, to the number of about 25,000 men in ail,
beleaguered York ail through June, skirmishing and pushing on the
attacks. Here again, according to Crawford’s account (Narrative,
p. 60), he had ample opportunity of knowing that Cromwell was
taking the entire control of Manchester’s army, and especially of
the Horse, into his own hands, and using his Lieutenant-General-
ship, with the help of his “ créatures,” for the discrédit of Man-
chester and the furtherance of the sectarian interest. Crawford
himself, we hâve to infer, was doing his best to counteract this
Cromwellian influence, and was gathering round him those Presby-
terian officers whom Cromwell had aggrieved or who longed to
escape from his domination. Unfortunately, a feat of Crawford’s at
the siégé of York, of which we do not hear from himself, was not
of a nature to enhance his réputation in rivalry with Cromwell even
among his fellow-Presbyterians. On the 16th of June, “ hoping to
a Rushworth, y. 620-622.—D.M.
b See Crawford’s own ex parte “ narrative ” in the Documents in this volume
(pp. 59-60); and connect therewith this passage in Baillie of date May 19th, 1644:
“ We are advertised that much more than the most part of my Lord Manchester’s
army are reduced to Independency, and very many of them hâve added either Ana-
baptism or Antinomianism, or both.”—Baillie, ii. 185.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.	gxlii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
take the city himself,” he sprang a mine witnout orders and dashed
in through the breach so made, with the resuit of a repuise and
the loss of 300 men.a Crawford’s “ foolish rashness 99 and “great
vanity ” in this business were confessed even by his countryman
Baillie in London,b and he seems to hâve collapsed for the rest of
the siégé. On the lst of July, however, when the Marquis of
Newcastle could defend York no longer, and was on the point of
giving it up, the approach of Rupert for his relief, after a north-
ward march distinguished by various successes, obliged the besiegers
to desist, and try the issue in a great pitched battle in the vicinity.
Thus came about the Battle of Marston Moor, the first
supremely momentous battle of the Civil War.—D.M.]
That great battle was fought on Tuesday the 2nd July, 1644,
almost under the walls of York. It was won by the division of the
Parliamentary army under the command of the Earl of Manchester
and Cromwell, in combination with the forces of Yorkshire under
Lord Fairfax and his son Sir Thomas, and those of the Scots
under the Earl of Leven and Générais [Baillie and] Leslie. The
bloody contest continued from seven o’clock in the evening until
ten o’clock, in the moon-lit twilight of a mid-summer night. It
was fought amidst much confusion, and the contemporary accounts
which hâve descended to us partake of the doubts and inexactness
of the original writers.e Even now historians are not agreed as to
the number or the disposition of the forces engaged on either side.
But no one doubts as to the results. Rupert gathered up the frag-
ments of his broken army and hurried off through Lancashire into
Shropshire to recruit. The Marquis of Newcastle and General
King forsook their men and their cause, and made their way to
*	Rushworth, y. 631.—D.M.
b See letter of Baillie of date June 1644, ii. 195.—D.M.
*	The best account we hâve is that of Mr. Sandford in his Studies and Illus-
trations ofthe Great Rébellion, 8vo. 1858, a most valuable book. [See a later paper
on the subject, entitled “A Yisit to Marston Moor,” by the late Mr. Herman
Merivale, in Macmillan9s Magazine for July 1862.—D.M.]HISTORICAL PREFACE.
xliii
Scarborough and thence into Holland [with a large following of
Royalists of rank]. York surrendered on the 20th July.
[Mixed up with the rejoicings among the Parliamentarians ail
through England, and especially in London, over the grand victory of
Marston Moor, was the question which part of the combined army
and which of the générais concerned were chiefly entitled to the
crédit. What was substantially the truth seems to hâve reached
London at once, viz., that none of the three générais in-chief could
claim any of the merit, ail three having been somehow carried off
the field in flight, and that the battle had been won by Cromwell at
the head of Manchester’s horse, ably seconded by Major-General
David Leslie at the head of a few Scottish troops. But for some
time there were fluctuations of rumour on the subject, caused by the
réluctance of the Presbyterians to admit that the lionours of the day
had been won by “ the great Independent ” and his sectarian Iron-
sides, and especially by the anger of the Scots at the small allowance
of praise accorded in the London journals to the Scottish auxiliary
army. This is curiously illustrated in Baillie^s letters. “ The
Independents sent up one quickly to assure that ail the glory of
that night was theirs, that they and their General Cromwell had
done it ail their alone,” he writes on the 12th of July, adding that
Captain Stuart, a Scot, had since arrived to “ show the vanity and
falsehood of their disgraceful relation,” and to tell that David Leslie
had really begun the victory, and how much of the burden of the
battle besides had been borne by the Scottish Foot under Lieutenant-
General Baillie.a Again, on the 16th, writing to his friend Robert
Blair, then one of the chaplains in the Scottish auxiliary army, he
says : —
We were both grieved and angry that your Independents there should
hâve sent up Major Harrison to trumpet over ail the city their own
praises to our préjudice, making ail believe that Cromwell alone, with
his unspeakably valorous régiments, had done ail that service—that the
a Baillie, ii. 203-204. —D.M.xliv
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
most of us [the Scots] fled, and who stayed they fought so and so as it
miglit be. We were mucb yexed with these reports, against wbicb y ou
were not pleased, any of y ou, to instruct us with any answer till Lind-
say’s letters came at last and Captain Stuart with his colours. Then we
sent abroad our printed relations, and could lift up our face. But within
three days Mr. Ashe’s relation was also printed, who gives-ws many good
words, but giyes much more to Cromwell than we are informed is his due.
Let good Mr. Ashe [Manchester’s army-chaplain and a Presbyterian]
know what is the use that generally here is made of his relations, much,
I know, beside his intention : even this in plain terms, The Independents
hâve done so brave service, yea they are so strong and considérable a
party, that they must not only be tolerate, but in nothing grieved.®
Again, on the 23rd, to another correspondent,
Our Independents [of the Westminster Assembly] continues and
increases in their obstinacy. Much is added to their pride and hopes by
their service at the Battle of York, albeit much of their valour is grounded
on very false lies, préjudiciai to God, the author, and to us [Scots], the
true instrument of that day’s honour.b
Finally, as late as August 10, speaking of the Independents generally,
Baillie writes:—
The men are exceeding active in their own way ; they strive to advance
Cromwell for their head. They ascribe to him the victory of York,
but most unjustly; for Humbie [Sir Adam Hepburn, Laird of Humbie,
Commissary-General of the Scottish auxiliary army] assures us that
Prince Rupert’s fîrst charge falling on him did humble him so that, if
David Leslie had not supported them, he had fled. Sheldon Crawford,
who had a régiment of dragoons in that wing, upon his oath assured me
that at the beginning of the fight Cromwell got a little wound in the
craig [neck], which made him retire, so that he was not so much as
présent at the service, but his troopers were led on by David Leslie.0
a Baillie, ii. 208-209.—D.M.
b Ibid. 211.—D.M.
c Ibid. 218.—D.M.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XIV
The u Sheldon Crawford99 here mentioned is not the Major-
Gêneral Crawford of Manchester’s army, with whom we hâve chiefly
to do, but William Crawford, of Nether Sheldon in Ayrshire, a
lieutenant-colonel of dragoons in the Scottish auxiliary army. He,
too, had the Scottish and Presbyterian antipathy to Cromwell ;
and, having run up to London after Marston Moor, he had talked
of Cromwell very much as his namesake the major-general would
hâve done.a In spite of ail, Cromwell emerged more and more
clearly in public opinion as the true hero of Marston Moor; and
Baillie and the Scots had to console themselves as well as they
eould with the hypothesis that this was owing to the systematic
puffing of him by the Independents and their command of the
London press for the purpose. Meanwhile, York having been taken,
the necessary combination of the three Parliamentary armies which
had led to such important résulta had been judged no longer necessary
or convenient, and they were about to part company. Mr. Bruce
proceeds to describe the circumstances of the séparation, and to
follow Manchester’s army on its particular route southwards again.
—D.M.]
The fall of the northern capital and the flight of Prince Rupert
to the southward substantially brought the whole of the kingdom
beyond the Humber under the dominion of the Parliament. There
rèmained indeed a few fortified places, principally houses scattered
about Yorkshire, but they were comparatively unimportant ; Scar-
borough and Newcastle, the latter a great centre of commerce and
communication, were the chief towns on the eastern coast over
which the royal standard still waved.
The destruction of the Marquis of Newcastle’s army and the
réduction of Yorkshire, the objects which had brought the armies
* Rnshworth, y. 605, and note by Mr. David Laing to Baillie, ii. 218. See note
in this Préfacé, ante, p. xxii. It is very natnral to confound this “ Sheldon
Crawford ” with “ Major-General Crawford,” the rather as the major-general after-
wards made accusations against Cromwell like those in the text, or worse. Godwin
and other writers haye made the mistake.—D.Mxlvi
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
of Manchester, Fairfax, and the Scots together, having been accom-
plished, it rested with the central authority—the Committee of
Both Kingdoms—to direct their subséquent movements by fresh
instructions. Manchester did not wait long for them. No en-
deavour had been made to pursue Prince Rupert, although the
Committee had urged that. course in letters addressed to the three
générais on the 9th and 19th July ;a but, two days after the surrender
ofYork, Manchester apprised the Committee that the great neces-
sities of his army, and those of the Scots, had induced them to
separate. He wrote from Ferry bridge, on his way to Doncaster;
the Scots were at Leeds and Wakefield; whilst Fairfax had taken
possession of York. Manchester described his men as falling sick
daily “through want of clothes and other necessaries ;” he prayed
they might be preserved from pestilence. At Doncaster he should
await the commands of the Committee.b
On the 27th July he announced that, having summoned Tickhill
Castle, [in Yorksliire, but on the very border of Nottinghamshire]
and sent into the town 300 dragoons, the garrison had surrendered.
“ I hâve taken” he remarked, u some 120 arms, some 80 horse, and
hâve given liberty to the gentlemen to go unto. their several dwell-
ings, because they referred themselves very much to my disposai ”c
In the meantime the Committee had received from Sir Adam
Hepburn and Mr. Hatcher, messengers despatched from the armies
of the Scots and Manchester, more précisé information of their
condition. They had also learnt that Prince Rupert, “ with the
assistance of the Earl of Derby,” who was “ very active and of great
power,” was [busily] recruiting “ in Lancashire.” Having possession
of Liverpool, it was anticipated that succours would corne to him
out of Ireland, and that in a short time he would be in condition
to make another of his dashing forays, the direction of which it was
difficult to foresee, and perhaps even to fight another battle of
* Letter Book of the Committee of Both Kingdoms under those dates.
b Letters received by the Committee 22nd July, 1644.
c Ibid. 27th July, 1644.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
xlvii
Marston Moor. The Committee, having “ taken these things into
serious debate, at which Sir Adam Hepburn and Mr. Hatcher were
présent,” reiterated their desire that the three lords would make some
endeavour to avert such a calamity. They allowed that there might
be difficultés in the march of the whole army; they agreed that the
enemy could not “ be pursued through difficult passages, nor with
speed, by a great body with artillery and carriages,”a and that
u the following a light, flying enemy ” would harass out and break
an army, whereof there “ had been too muoh expérience;” but they
still urged co-operation with the forces of Lancashire and those
parts, and the despatch of such a body of auxiliaries as, in conjunc-
tion with the local forces, “ might be able to go up to the Prince
and fight with him.” “ What ways to march, what number, and
with what forces,” the Committee concluded, u you who are upon
the place can best judge, to whom we leave it.”b
Manchester’s answer, which is dated from Blyth [in Nottingham-
shire, a few miles south of Tickhill] on the Ist August, 1644,
announced that the générais and other chief officers of the three
armies had held a consultation “ what was fittest to be done
upon the letter of the Committee.” They found that the informa-
tion concerning Prince RuperPs being in Lancashire could not be
relied upon, for that he and ail his best horse had passed over into
Cheshire at Haleford, and that his “ dragooners” c and such remainder
of foot as he had were çt daily boated over from Liverpool.” “ The
rest of his horse under the command of Goring, together with some
foot under Colonel Clavering and the Earl of Montrose, are marched
towards Cumberland and Westmoreland, so as Lancashire haveonly
some petty garrisons left, which the forces in the county, if well
employed, may easily master.” Upon this State of things, as if
Lancashire, and not Rupert, had been the object of solicitude with
a i.e. with baggage or things to be carried; the same sense in which the word is
used in the anthorised translation of Acts [xxi. 15].
b Letter Book of the. Committee under the date.
c Dragoons.xlviii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
the Committee, the Consulting ofBcers had determined “ thus ” to
divide their forces: “ that I,” remarks the Earl, “ should march
southward, and that the Scots . . . should march for the security
of those northern counties, and to intend the taking in of New-
castle.” In pursuance of this resolution Manchester announced his
intention to be at Lincoln by Saturday night, the 4th August,
when he should devote himself to recruiting and refreshing his
troops, and would attend the commands of the Committee which
way they would have.him to march and what they would hâve him
to do. He concludes with some remarks upon his difficultés in
recruiting, and upon a rumour that his troops were “ really and
fully paid,” which of course was not at ail true ; but in spite of every
obstacle he protested his readiness, with that force he had, and
which yet he hoped might do the Committee some service, to obey
their orders.a In a postscript the amiable Earl added : “ Since my
coming to Blyth I hear there is two régiments of horse corne to
Newark from Prince Eupert, with the assurance that the Prince
will send some foot thither with ail speed, but I hope neither his
horse or foot shall do any hurt to that county. I shall make the
more haste into it.”
The postscript illustrâtes not only the comparative activity of the
Prince and the Earl, but confirms the Earl’s letter in exhibiting his
affection for ‘J county” considérations in the management of the
war. Newark was one of the most important places in that part of
England. It belonged territorially to the Queen, and the inhabitants
were full of loyalty to the sovereign lady of the manor. Besides
which, it locally commanded the communications between Lincoln-
shire, and consequently between the eastern counties, and York. It
had been strongly garrisoned by the Marquis of Newcastle, and, at
the beginning of this year, had been besieged by the Parliamentarians
under Sir John Meldrum. It was reduced to the greatest straits,
but Eupert by a masterly march from Shrewsbury came, just in
tiihe, to their relief. He took the besiegers by surprise. Without
* Letter Book of Letters received by the Committee under date.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
xlix
waiting for his foot, he dashed in upon the besiegers with his
cavalry. They took refuge in a place oalled the Spittle, which they
had fortified. Besieged in their turn, and without provisions, they
soon surrendered upon easy terms, but their losses in the field were
heavy, and they relinquished ail their artillery, their arms, and
ammunition. The Earl, it will be observed, did not'contemplate
resuming the siégé, but, in the interest of the country, expressed in
ajaunty way his kind-hearted desire and intention to restrain the
loyalist foragers.
Pursuing his career of easy but by no means unprofitable victories,
the Earl advanced from Tickhill and Blyth to Lincoln, paying a
triumphant and of course a courteous visit on his way to Welbeck,
the magnificent seat of his vanquished opponent, the Marquis of
Newcastle, In his haste to avoid the sneers of Oxford on his defeat
at Marston, the Marquis had left his family in the séclusion of that
stately home, still rich with the recollections of the vain-glorious
cérémonials which had distinguished it on past visits of the Marquises
royal mas ter .a The story of the EarPs courteous réception by the
deserted inmates and his own polite returns had best be told in his
own words [from Lincoln, Aug. 6] :—
In my march from York towards Lincoln I was earnestly intreated by
divers in those parts of Yorkshire about Sheffield, that I would consider
of the great spoil that the garrison in Sheffield did unto the places near
adjoining, and likewise of the conséquence of the place in regard of the
great commodity of iron-wares that were vented there. I was further
moved by the Committees and gentlemen of Nottingham for the reducing
of the garrison in Welbeck to the obedience of Parliament, because it
was a great annoyance to those parts ; whereupon I resolved to go my-
self with a great part of my forces to Welbeck, and to send General-
Major Crawford with the rest unto Sheffield. Upon my coming near
a Perhaps the most famous of these was Charles^ visit to Welbeck on his way to
Scotland in the summer of 1633 for his coronation there. Part of the entertainment
consisted in the performance of Love3s Welcome, a masque by Ben Jonson, written
for the occasion.—D.M.
CAMD. SOC.
h1
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Welbeck, I sent in a summons to the place, and they, with great civility,
sent to parley with me. And the next day, being Friday, they rendered
the House unto me upon composition. I was willing to give them the
larger terms, because I was not in a condition to besiege a place so well
fortified as that was, and therefore I gave the officers and soldiers liberty
to march with ail their arms, colours flying, and other pnnctilios of war.
But, when I came to take possession of the house, most of ail the soldiers
came unto me to lay down their arms, and would not carry them, but
desired tickets of me to go to their own homes, the which I granted
them ; so as I had 350 muskets in the house, fifty horse arms, eleven
pièces of cannon great and small, whereof one the Govemor had liberty
to carry away-, I had likewise twenty barrels of powder and a ton of
match. The house I preserved entire, and hâve put a garrison into it of
Nottinghamshire men, until I know your Lordships’ resolution whether
you will hâve it slighted or not. The place is very regularly fortified,
and the Marquis of Newcastle’s daughters, and the rest of his children
and family, are in it, unto whom I hâve engaged myself for their quiet
abode there, and to intercède to the Parliament for a complété mainte-
nance for them. In the which I shall beseech your Lordships that they
may hâve your favour and furtherance. I am now myself corne to Lin-
coln, and those forces that were with me I hâve quartered about Gains-
borough and those places, that I may give them some refreshing after
the great hardship they hâve endured.
He concludes with some comments upon a recent ordinance of
Parliamenta for putting the Associated Counties, of which he was
the military head, “ into a posture of defence,” by raising fresh
forces of horse and foot, and giving the persons listed upon that
service the power to propound and nominate their own colonels and
other officers, subject to the approval of the lord-lieutenants.b The
Earl suspected, or felt inclined to believe, that these new arrange-
ments were inconsistent with his authority, and desired to know
wliat were the intentions of the Committee :—
Dated 3rd July, 1644.
b Husband, 516.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
li
If your Lordships please to hâve me to deliver over the remainder of
this force I now hâve into the hands of those colonels and captains that
are to be chosen to give a supply to that army that is now to be raised,
I shall very readily obey your order; if your Lordships’ intentions be to
dispose of these forces otherwise, I shall with ail care observe your
commands.a
In ail these arrangements of the Earl there was no doubt much
that was agreeable to the Committee. Tickhill and Welbeck were
thoms in the sides of the people dwelling within the Parliamentary
line. Their garrisons lived by the plunder of their Roundhead
neighbours ; or, if kept in order by forces stationed in neighbouring
towns, such forces could hâve been far better employed elsewhere,
besides that such fortified places hindered ail free communication
across the country. But ail these minor victories of the heroes of
Marston Moor were dimmed in the appréciation of the Committee
by the cloud which hung over the movements of Prince Rupert.
The suddenness and violence of his onslaughts had taught them the
necessity of continuai watchfulness and preparedness. For the third
time, writing to the Earl on the date of his letter to them, they
reiterate their directions in unmistakeable language :—
We hâve taken into considération the necessity of hindering the recruits
of Prince Rupert, and wholly to break his army, if it be possible. And
to that end we desire you to gather what force you can get together forth-
with. And with them (together with the forces of Nottinghamshire,
Derbyshire, and Lancashire, as also those of Sir William Brereton and
Sir Thomas Middleton, to ail of which we hâve written to that purpose,
and to receive your orders) to march toward Prince Rupert and attend
his motions, and follow him which way soever he shall go, and to take ail
advantages against him that shall be offered.
They add that they hâve taken measures to procure his soldiers
their pay, which shall be sent to him wherever he may be, and that,
* Boofcof Letters received by the Committee, under date of 6th August, .1644.
[See Documents, pp. 5, 7.]lii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
as for the New Ordinance on which he had commented, it would
be rather to his advantage than the contrary in procuring recruits.*
By subséquent letters of the 7th and the 9th they intimate to him
that the House of Commons had ordered that 1800 foot of the
troops levied under the New Ordinance should be sent to him as
recruits, but that in selecting that number he was to take no more
than necessity required out of Essex, because an entire formed
régiment of 1000 men was to be raised by that county.
Orders so peremptory came most unseasonably upon the kind and
considerate Earl. They overturned ail his own schemes for refresh-
ing his victorious Marston men. To attend Prince Rupert’s motions
and folio w him which way soever he should go was u so large a
commission, and work so difficult, considering the weak condition
of his forces with their indispositions and infections,” that he called
together such of his chief officers as were with him at the time to
consult what he was to do. The resuit was a paper of “ considéra-
tions,” or rather objections, which he transmitted from Lincoln on the
lOth of August. It does not appear who were the objectors.
Their objections were the merest common-place excuses of un-
willingness. It could not be éxpected that they should force Prince
Rupert to a second engagement that summer, nor, considering his
defensible position at Chester, was it likely that they could force him
to “ go away.” If he did and they were to follow him through
Wales, or wherever they went, it would ruin their own army.
Besieging Chester was out of the question ; it would be as great
a work as that which they had just accomplished at York. Ail
they could do would be to lie near Chester and hinder the Prince
from receiving any accession of force, which would necessarily keep
them there ail the winter. Then, how were they to secure their
supplies and recruits, and the back pay they were to receive, which
would hâve to pass under the walls of Belvoir, Newark, Bolsover,
and Tidbury and other garrisons of the enemies ? Those four fortified
places ought first to be taken or blocked up, and the Earl’s forces were
a Book of Letters sent under date of 6th August, 1644. [Documents, pp. 4-5.]HISTORICAL PREFACE.
liii
insufficient for any thing of the kind, his foot, “ sick and Sound,’* not
amounting to more than 6,000 men. Finally, it was urged that the
Association of the Eastem Counties, by which Lord Manchester’s
forces were raised and should be paid, had been already much dis-
contented at their withdrawal into the north, [and] would, if they
were now to draw off so far westward, hâve just cause to withdraw
from their recruiting or maintenance, and seek some other body and
head to protect them.a
A représentation which trenched so close upon insubordination
must hâve tried the temper of the Committee ; but it was their eue,
in the confused and precarious condition of public affairs, not to try
conclusions with anyone. They complimented the Earl on his
successes at Welbeck, and afterwards at Sheffield, where Major-
General Crawford was successful ; they alleged that the State of
Prince Rupert’s army being other than they conceived, many of his
forces having marched northward, and a considération of the reasons
which the Earl had inclosed to them, had caused them to alter their
resolutions. They now desired him merely to send such a party as
he should think fit to join with the forces to be sent from Notting-
hamshire, Derbyshire, ....
******
CONTINUATION.
[At this point, August 14, 1644, Mr. Bruce’s fragments of his
Préfacé abruptly stop. It was evidently his purpose to narrate the
history of Manchester’s campaign, in the same style, partly by
continued abstract of the correspondence between Manchester and
the Derby House Committee, but with light from other sources, on
to the second battle of Newbury, October 27,1644, when the long-
smouldering quarrel between Manchester and Cromwell publicly
exploded into flame, and then to trace the quarrel itself through
the two Houses in the subséquent months, till, in the beginning of
* [Documents of Manchester’s Correspondence, pp. 8-12.]liv
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
1645, it was hushed up in a total recast of the whole army-system of
the Parliaraent, devised or approved by Cromwell, and rendering the
further prosecution of his quarrel with Manchester quite unnecessary.
The following may pass as a substitute for what might hâve corne
from Mr. Bruce’s pen.-—D.M.]
The inactivity of Manchester, his évasion of work recommended
to him or even enjoined upon him, his indisposition to leave his
own district of the Associated Counties, continue obvious in the
correspondence between him and the Derby House Committee.
He had arrived at Lincoln on the 4th of August, and he was still
there and idle on the 4th of September, having in the first place
managed to décliné the expédition into Cheshire in pursuit of
Eupert by pleading that Newark and other garrisons of the enemy
near Lincoln ought first to be dealt with, and having in the next
place avoided ail effort about those garrisons. One can see, even
through the polite phraseology of the letters of the Derby House
Committee, that there was considérable dissatisfaction at head-
quarters with this State of matters, the Presbyterian members of that
Committee, sucli as the Scottish Lord Maitland, evidently now
agreeing with the Independent members, such as Viscount Saye
and Sele, in the opinion that the great success of Marston Moor
ought to hâve been more vigorously followed up.
But what of Manchester’s own army, and especially of those
Ironsides in it, Cromwell’s horse, who were the heroes of Marston
Moor ? That Manchester^ policy of idleness had the sanction of a
considérable number of his officers is to be inferred from the fact
that he had been able to send from Lincoln to the Derby House
Committee on the lOth of August a paper of reasons against the
Cheshire expédition, purporting to be the resuit of a consultation
with such of his chief officers as were then about him ; but that
Cromwell and his adhérents were dissatisfied there is abundant proof.
They were more than dissatisfied; they were vehemently roused.HISTORICAlrf PREFACE.
lv
Among CromwelPs preserved letters as published by Mr. Carlyle
there are but two belonging to this period, one dated from Lincoln,
Sept. 1, the other from Sleaford, somewhat south of Lincoln,
Sept. 5 or 6. The latter, winch is addressed to his brother-in-law
Colonel Yalentine Walton, then in London, contains this passage:—•
We haye some amongst us much slow in action; if we could ail intend
our own ends less and our ease too, our business in this army would go
on wheels for expédition. But, because some of us are enemies to rapine
and other wickednesses, we are said to be “ factious,” to “ seek to main-
tain our opinions in religion by force,”—which we detest and abhor. I pro-
fess I could never satisfy myself of the justness of this War, but from
the authority of the Parliament to maintain itself in its rights; and in
this Cause I hope to approve myself an honest man and single-hearted.
Pardon me that I am thus troublesome. I write but seldom : it gives
me a little ease' to pour my mind, in the midst of calumnies, into the
bosom of a friend.a
These words, vague in their mournfulness, receive adéquate
illustration for the first time in the two documents published in the
présent volume under the titles Cromwell's Narrative and Narrative
of the Earl of Manchester*s Campaign, which last is in fact Craw-
ford's Narrative. From Cromwell himself we now learn, in the
first of these documents, the exact causes of that mood of sorrow
which he communicated to Colonel Walton. From Marston Moor
to the date at which he wrote, the whole conduct of Manchester’s
army had been, in his opinion, a tissue of mismanagement. Newark
might hâve been taken or blockaded; there might hâve been the
march after Eupert; at the very least a body of horse might hâve
been sent for service in Cheshire ; even within the range to which
the Earl had confined himself hundreds of useful things might hâve
been done, besides the taking of Tickhill Castle and Welbeck
House—which petty exploits themselves had actually been forced
on the Earl and done against his will ! The army had been quar-
* Carlyle’s Cromwell, i. 157, ed. 1857.lvi
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
tered upon the friends of Parliament precisely in those parts of the
eastern région where there was nothing to do, leaving other parts
free for the enemy to range in ! Only one Council of War had
been called by the Earl since he left York ! Considering ail this,
Cromwell had corne reluctantly in his own mind to one conclusion
—to wit, that the Earl’s fault was not improvidence only, but an
incorrigible “ backwardness to ail action,” caused by “ some prin-
ciple of unwillingness ” to see the King brought u too low.”
Now, though Cromwell had not publicly expressed his opinion in
this degree of strength at the date we hâve reached, he had certainly
expressed the substance of it in such ways that the Earl could not
remain ignorant of the fact that he had lost the confidence of his
Lieutenant-General. One infers also that Cromwell had taken means
to convey his impressions to the Derby House Committee and other
authorities in London; and it is worth noting, in this connection,
that Cromwell’s disciple, young Fleetwood, had been in London in
August, and was the bearer of some of the Committee’s letters of
that month back to the Earl at Lincoln. Clearly the relations
between the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army and his
lieutenant-general were now those of schism,—Cromwell speaking
out his mind frankly whenever he could; and the Earl resenting his
advices, and treating him with as much coolness as was permissible
towards a man of such antécédents, who could make himself so
terrible when he chose. Even convenient to the Earl might now
be those Presbyterian alarms about Cromwell’s Independency, and
his sympathies with Anabaptism and other heresies, which in the
earlier days of their co-operation had counted for so little. Cries
about Cromwell’s sectarian factiousness, and his forcing of his own
religious opinions into the army by ejecting orthodox men from
posts and putting sectarians into them, were doubtless now en-
couraged among the Earl’s partisans, and seem to hâve been the
u calumnies ” of which Cromwell speaks in his letter to his brother-
în-law. No mention is made in Cromwell’s narrative of Major-
General Crawford’s doings at this time, because, when the narrativeHISTORICAL PREFACE.
lvii
was written, it was unnecessary to revert to him ; but tbat Crawford
had a conspicuous part in the schism is only what might hâve been
expected, and is expressly vouched by himself. Crawford, it is true,
had been out of Lincolnshire during the greater part of Auguste
employed, with 1,200 foot and a régiment of horse, in that spécial
service of the taking of Sheffield Castle for which he had been
detached, and to which he had added the capture of Bolsover
Castle and one or two other houses in Derbyshire.a But, both
during his absence and after his return to the main army in
Lincolnshire in the end of August, he gives us to understand,
Cromwell had been at his old tricks, “ taking ail the praise to himself
of other men’s actions ” (at Marston Moor and elsewhere), promoting
actual “ mutiny,” screening and protecting men of his own “ godly ”
sort in any delinquency, and labouring, with his “ juncto,” to bring
good officêrs into discrédit. Especially had Crawford been the
object of his enmity. “ Ail this tirae,” he says, in his peculiarly
clotted grammar, “ the said Cromwell endeavoured to work Major-
General’s Crawford’s ruin by dissuading the Earl of Manchester’s
army not to obey him, and, giving his charge away to others,
making them to do the duty, did in the most notorious manner
traduce and calumniate the said Crawford, to make him odious to
the army and to discontent him, that so he the said Cromwell the
better might advance his wicked ends, uttering many speeches
highly to his disadvantage and utter ruin, and for drawing of
factions in the army, which. highly distracted the public good in
Lincoln/’ The régiments of Colonels Pickering and Montague are
mentioned as chief among those that, on Cromwell’s instigation,
u absolutely refused orders from Major-General Crawford.” The
correct interprétation of ail this is not difficult. Cromwell did
regard the introduction of Crawford into Manchester’s army as the
original cause of the mischief, and he was willing for the time to
direct his full fury against him rather than against the Earl, in the
a Rushworth, y. 642-645.
i
CAMD. SOC.lviii
HISTORICAL* PREFACE.
hope perhaps that, if Crawford were removed, the Earl might résumé
his better mind, and be induced to a more active strategy.a
At last, willingly or unwillingly, the Earl was on the move.
On the 5th of September, the day of Cromwell’s letter to Walton
from Sleaford in Lincolnshire, the Earl was at Bourne, still farther
south in the same county, haviïig left Lincoln on the previous day;
and tlience he advanced to Huntingdon, where he was on the 8th.
He was still within his favourite région of the Association, but that
he was in motion at ail portended something. In fact he had
yielded at last so far to repeated missives from Derby House, in-
forming him that the services of his army were urgently required in
the west, and appointing Abingdon on the borders of Berks and
Oxfordshire as his rendezvous.
The reasons were most serious. Since Marston Moor had secured
the north for the Parliament, the main stress of the war had been
in the Midlands and south-west, where Essex and Waller were the
two Parliamentary générais. After co-operating for some time
against the King in the Midlands, these two générais had separated
in June 1644, Essex persisting in undertaking that expédition
against Prince Maurice and his Royalists in the south-west which
the Parliament had designed for Waller, and Waller remaining in
the Midlands. A kind of defeat sustained by Waller, on the
Oxfordshire border, on the 29th of June (three daysbefore Marston
Moor), had enabled the King to follow Essex into the south-west,
with the intention of joining Prince Maurice, and so crushing Essex
by superior force. Essex, instead of turning back to fight the King,
had been persuaded to push into Cornwall; in which extremely
Royalist county, the King and Maurice having joined their armies,
he found himself cooped up in the month of August in a most
precarious condition. To send Waller for his relief with a newly
equipped army was then the strenuous effort of the Parliament;
a The passages of Cromwell’s narrative and of Crawford’s more particularly
founded on in this paragraph will be found at pp. 78-83 and pp. 60-62 of the appended
Documents.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
1ÎX
and, as Rupert was sure to move south wards to complicate matters,
it was also a necessary part of their plan that Manchester^ army
should corne out of its quarters in the Eastern Counties and follow
Waller’s route westward, or at least take his place in the Midlands.
Hence the urgent missives to Manchester in Lincoln, and hence his
march thence south wards, and his presence in Huntingdon on the
8th of September. By that time, however, Essex’s fate in Cornwall
had been decided. Before relief could reach him he had been
obliged to make his own escape by sea to Plymouth on his way to
London, leaving his horse under Sir William Balfour to eut their
way eastward as they could, and his foot under Skippon to negotiate
terms of surrender (Sept. 1). This news muet hâve reached Man-
chester in Huntingdon; whence on the 8th of September he writes
to the Derby House Committee, expressing his condolence over the
sad event. “ The Lord’s arm,” he adds, “ is not shortened, though
we be much weakened. I trust he will give us a happy recovery-
I shall, with ail the speed I can, march in observance of your former
orders.” Two notes to him from the Committee, dated Sept. 9 and
Sept. 11, show that in their opinion their former orders were still
to be obeyed. The King would now be on his retum from
Cornwall to Oxford, and the forces formerly destined for Essex’s
relief would now hâve to oppose the King in his return march.
Let Manchester, therefore, still make westward for Abingdon with
ail possible expédition, and let him send the Committee advertise-
ment of his marches as he proceeds !
From Sept. 11, the date of the Committee’s last note,to Sept. 22,
there is a gap in the correspondence between them and Manchester.
The information as to what happened in this interval must be sought
elsewhere.
The feud in Manchester^ army and similar feuds in others had
béen greatly distressing Parliament and the Derby House Committee.
“ Concerning those différences which your Lordships take notice
to be amongst some of this army,” Manchester had written to the
Committee in his letter from Huntingdon, “ I hope your Lordshipslx
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
shall find that I shall take such care as, by the blessing of God,
nothing of the public service shall be retarded.*’ But the Committee
were not content with private references to this subject. On the
lOth of September they addressed a formai letter, signed by Yiscount
Saye and Sele and the Scottish Chancellor Lord Loudoun, to ail
“ the principal commandera of the armies, commenting on their
jealousies, and imploring them to lay these aside and act cordially
together for the common cause.a Within three days after that letter
was written, Manchester, Cromwell, and Major-General Crawford,
were ail three in London on the business of the schism which had
so long been distracting their particular army. The story is told
most graphically by Baillie, and nothing more is necessary than to
quote his account :—
The most of the officers in the General’s [Essex’s] and Waller’s army,
[writes Baillie on the 16th of September] has open and known quarrels.
Manchester’s army is more pitifully divided : it is like to divide us ail
incontinent. Manchester himself, a sweet meek man, permitted his
Lieutenant-General Cromwell to guide ail the army at his pleasure : the
man is a very wise and active head, universally well beloved, as religions
and stout; being a known Independent, the most of the sojours who
loved new ways put themselves under his command. Our countryman
Crawford was made General-Major of that army. This man, proving
very stout and successful, got a great hand with Manchester, and with ail
the army that were not for sects. The other party, finding ail their
designs marred by him, set themselves by ail means to hâve him out of
the way, that, he being removed, they might frame the whole army to
their dévotion, and draw Manchester himself to them by persuasion, or
else to weary him out of his charge, that Cromwell might be general.
This has been the Independents’ great plot by this army, to counter-
balance us [the Scots], to overawe the Assembly and Parliament both to
their ends. At this nick of time, while their service is necessary to
oppose the King, they give in a challenge against Crawford : they require
a Committee of War to remove him. Both the parties writes up here to
.* See the Letter, Rushworth, v. 719, 720.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxi
theîr friends the case: at last Manchester, Cromwell, and Crawford, corne
up themselves. Our labour to reconcile them was vain : Cromwell was
peremptor; notwithstandiDg the kingdom’s évident hazard, and the
évident displeasure of our nation, yet, if Crawford were not cashiered,
his Colonels would lay down their commissions. Ail of us, by my Lord
Manchester’s own testimony and the testimony of the ministers in
the army, finds Crawford a very honest and valorous man, in nothing
considérable guilty, only persecuted to make way to their designs on
that army, and by it on the Parliament and kingdom; therefore ail
here of our friends résolves to see him get as little wrong as we may.
What the end of this may be God knows.a
Baillie then notes another incident of Cromwell’s visit to town as
of surpassing importance :—
While Cromwell is, here the House of Commons, without the least
advertisement to any of us [the Scottish Commissioners in London],
or of the Assembly, passes an order that the Grand Committee of both
Houses, Assembly, and us, shall consider of the means to unité us
[the Presbyterians] and the Independents ; or, if that be found im-
possible, to see how they may be tolerate. This has much affected us.b
The gap in Manchester’s Correspondence is now sufficiently
accounted for. The Earl, his Lieutenant-General, and his Major-
General, had hurriedly corne to London, there to argue out their
différences in person, before the Committee of the Two Kingdoms,
or Committees of the Houses; and Cromwell had been so vehement
against Crawford, and had so many Independents and others on his
side, that the Scots and their Presbyterian friends had to exert
themselves to the utmost in Crawford’s behalf. But* Cromwell had
turned his brief visit to even larger account. Appearing in his
place in the House of Commons, and advising with some of his
friends there, he had suddenly, and without previous warning, got
the House to pass what came to be called “ The Accommodation
* Baillie, ii. 229-230.
b Ibid. 230.lxii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Order,” i.e. an order to a great Committee of the Lords and Com-
mons, then in regular conférence with the Scottish Commissioners
and a Committee of the Westminster Assembly, to try to compose
the différences between the Presbyterians and the Independents
in the Assembly, and, if they failed in that, to devise some
means for a moderate toleration of dissent under the Church
System that might be established. The date of this order was
Sept. 13. Cromwell himself was the real mover, though St. John
and Yane carried it through the House, and St. John was responsible
for the very cautious wording. “ The great shot of Cromwell and
Yane/’ says Baillie, “ is to hâve a liberty for ail religions, without
any exceptions but St. John had thought it judicious not to frame
the order so as to alarm the House by that implication. As it was,
the order was a most disagreeable surprise to the Presbyterians.
The Presbyterian System had not yet been carried completely
through the Assembly itself, much less brought into Parliament;
and here virtually was a Toleration Clause inserted by anticipation
into the Bill for establishing Presbytery when it should corne to be
passed. Altogether, Cromweirs hasty visit to London in Sept. 1644
was to be a very mémorable matter.
Manchester, Cromwell, and Crawford (not dismissed, after ail),
were again away at their posts in the army. On the 22nd of
September the Earl was at Watford; and on the 27th he was still
no farther west than Harefield on the borders of Bucks and
Middlesex, but with Cromwell détached in advance of him. It is
only necessary to read the letters that passed in this week between
him and the Derby House Committee (Correspondence, pp. 27-31)
to see that his visit to London had not increased his zeal for the
service in which he was to take part That service had now assumed
a definite form. Essex, whose late disaster in Cornwall had been hand-
somely condoned in the general respect for him, was again to be in
command of an army, and Waller and Manchester were to co-operate
with him in such a way as to meet and oppose the King returning
eastwards to Oxford, and frustra te at the same time any movementHI8T0RICAL PREFACE.
lxiii
of Eupert’s. In reality, Essex, sick at heart, was to leave the
conduct of this war to his co-generals, Waller and Manchester.
To march west, therefore, was still the injunction to Manchester from
the Derby House Committee. “ Your Lordship was présent at
our debates and do know the necessity of this service,” they Write
to him September 24. Manchester’s reply from Harefield on the
25th is characteristic. The bridge at Maidenhead, by which he
meant to pass the Thames, was broken; “ this also being the Fast-
day, I thought it my duty to seek God ; ” but—
Your Lordships may be assured that I shall march as soon as with
any conveniency I can, and therefore I shall desire that favour from
your Lordships that my former observances to your commands may
somewhat prevail in lessening the opinions of my backwardness to obey
your commands. I was présent at some of the debates which your
Lordships mention, and your Lordships know what my humble opinion
was. I am still of the same mind—that, if the King be upon his
march, in that condition that I see those armies in, you expose us to
scorn, if not to ruin; but, my Lords, when my sense is delivered, I
shall obey as far as in me lies.
On the 29th of September he is at Eeading, Cromweirs horse-
detachment then to the north of him about Oxford ; and from
Eeading he does not budge for more than a fortnight. Again his
correspondent with the Committee (pp. 31-46) is worth study.
One sees his heart back in his own Eastern Association, the hardships
of the various counties of which by the removal of the army beyond
their bounds he represents most carefully ; and, though he is still
profuse in expressions of obedience, he fînds excuse after excuse for
not marching farther west. Once (October 2) the Committee are
irritated to this reply :—
Having taken into considération how préjudiciai delays hâve always
proved to the public service, and how necessary it is that your Lordship
should advance speedily westward, we hâve thought fit again to renewlxiv
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
our desires to your Lordship ta send your horse and foot according to
our former orders ; winch we hope you will do with that expédition that
we shall not need to iterate it again to your Lordship.
Notwithstanding this and more to the same effect,a Manchester,
on the 14th of October, was still at Reading. On the 19th, however,
in conséquence of consultation with Waller, and in order to a con-
junction with Essex’s army, he was at Basingstoke in Hants, where
a Although the Committee of the two Kingdoms at Derby House was really the
authorised organ of Parliament in war matters and its missives were in effect orders
from Parliament, it is worth noting that the House of Commons itself took notice of
Manchester’s dilatoriness at this time. Among Mr. Bruce’s jottings of material for
the continuation of his Préfacé I find two extracts from the Commons Joumals
illustrating this fact. On the 8th of October, à propos of a pétition from the Com-
mittee of the county of Norfolk representing the danger to which that county and
others of the Eastem Association were liable “ from the moving of the Associated
Forces so far westward,” the House ordered “ That the Earl of Manchester do march
with his forces forthwith into the West, for the safety of the public, and conse-
quently of each particular county, according to the direction of the Committee of
both Kingdoms ; and that this House will take care of the safety of the county of
Norfolk and the other Associated Counties in like manner as they will of the rest of
the kingdom : And it is referred to the Committee of both Kingdoms to take care
herein, and to send this order to the Earl of Manchester.” It was duly sent the same
day (see No. 46 of the Correspondence) ; and Manchester, in his reply to the Com-
mittee next day (No. 47), notices the fact rather tetchily, thus: “I hâve often
received orders from the House of Commons for my marching westward ; but they
never designed any place to which I should march.” This must hâve been com-
municated to the House; for, on the lOth of October, there was a report there on
the whole subject of the correspondence between the Earl and the Committee, with
a significant note that the first letter to him asking him to expedite his march into
the West had been as far back as August 27th, and the House then renewed its order
that he should advance and join with the Lord General’s and Sir William Waller’s
forces, referring it to the Derby House Committee to appoint the places of rendezvous.
The Committee did not fix the place themselves, but instructed Manchester to com-
municate with the Lord General on the subject (Nos. 48 and 49); and it came at
last to be Basingstoke. In contrast with the entries in the Commons «Tournais at
this date relating to Manchester are those relating to Cromwell. They are about
a supply of “ pistols and holsters,” with “ heads,” “ backs,” and “ breasts,” which
Cromwell w&nted for his own régiment, and about the mode of raising money for
the same. It is rather interesting to note that the person charged with seeing them
sent down to Cromwell is Colonel Walton.HISTORICÀL PREFACE.
lxv
the siégé of Basing House was in progress. The Committee of
Derby House had by this time sent two of their number, the Scottish
Sir Archibald Johnston of Warriston and the English Mr. John
Crewe, to attend the movements of the générais and stimulate them ;
and these two civilians, we find (No. 56), met Manchester at Basing-
stoke. In fact, we are now within sight of the Second Battle
of Newbury.
This battle, so called from Newbury in Berks, where there had
been a battle about a year before, was fought on Sunday the 27th
of October, 1644. The King’s army, commanded by himself and
Prince Maurice (Rupert not having corne up), was not nearly so
numeroùs as the combined armies of the Parliament, commanded,
in Essex’s absence, by Manchester and Waller, with Skippon, Sir
William Balfour, Lieutenant-General Middleton, Lieutenant-General
Cromwell, and Major-General Crawford, among the chief officers
under them. The battle lasted three hours, and ended, in the
moonlight, in what was thought a victory for the Parliament, but
of such a kind that the King marched away easily enough to
Wallingford, and thence to Oxford, having previously deposited his
cannon and baggage in Donnington Castle, a strong place holding
out for him close to Newbury. Nothing was done in the'way of
pursuit ; Donnington Castle remained untaken ; nay, twelve days
afterwards, when his Majesty returned in full force, Rupert now
with him, to relieve and revictual Donnington Castle and recover
his ordnance and baggage, he was permitted to do so (November 8).
The Parliamentary générais declined also another pitched battle to
which he subsequently dared them on the old Newbury ground,
and let him return to Oxford in leisurely triumph. The war was
then over for the year, the armies on both sides preparing to go into
winter quarters.a
The disappointment in Parliament, and in London generally, was
extreme. On the 29th of October the Parliament had ordered
days of commémoration and thanksgiving in the churches for the
a Rushworth, y. 721-730, and Nos. 59-68 of Manchester's Correspondence.
CAMD. SOC.	klxvi
HISTOIIICAL PREFACE.
“ great and good success ” at Newbury, and for another recent success
in the capture of Newcastle by the Scottish auxiliary army (Octo-
ber 19) ; but the subséquent news, and especially that of the King’s
triumph in the Donnington Castle affair, had changed their mood.
My Lord and Gentlemen,
We hâve received your letters conceming th>e relief of Donnington
Castle by the enemy, and are very sorry that they met not with that
opposition that was expected from an army that God had blessed lately
with so happy a victory against them :
these opening words of a letter addressed, November 12, by the
Derby House Committee^to the Earl of Manchester and his fellow-
commanders (No. 69 of Correspondence), are the prologue to a
great impeachment, in which it is Manchester that is the chief
défendant, and it is Cromwell that steps out to take him by the
throat. The essence of the story as far as to the 25th of November
lies in the following extracts from the Commons Journals, which I
find among Mr. Bruce’s miscellaneous jottings, carefully written out,
partly in his own hand, partly in another:—
Nov. .13. Ordered, That the Members of this House that are of the
Committee of both Kingdoms do to-morrow give an account to this
House concerning the carriage of the business at the relieving of Don-
nington Castle near Newbury by the King’s forces.
Nov. 14. Sir Arthur Hasilriga related unlo the House the passages of
the whole business conceming the relieving of Donnington Castle by the
King’s forces.—Mr. Solicitor [St. John] was ready, for the Committee of
both Kingdoms, to give an account to the House of relieving Donnington
Castle, according to an order yesterday made : But, the House having
formerly received a relation made by Sir Arthur Hasilrig of that business,
Mr. Solicitor proceeded not to his Report.
* He was a member of the Committee of both Kingdoms, had been présent at the
Battle of Newbury, and had just been sent to town by Manchester, Waller, and
Sir William Balfour, as joint commanders, to give the Committee “ a rigbt under-
standing ” of the Donnington Castle business, (See No. 68 of Correspondence.)HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Ixvii
Nov. 19. Resolved, &c., That it be referred to the Committee of both
Kingdoms to consider the state and condition of ail the armies and forces
under the command of the Parliament, and to put them into such a
posture as may make them most useful and advantageous to the
Kingdom.
Nov. 22. Ordered, That the Members of this House that are of the
Committee of both Kingdoms do to-morrow give an account to this
House of the whole carriage and motions of the armies, both near
Donnington Castle, Newbury, Basinghouse, and of the présent posture
of them.
Nov. 23. Ordered, That it be referred to the Committee of both King-
doms forthwith to put the armies into such a posture as may keep the line
as large as may be, and may oppose the advtfnce of the King’s forces,
and preveni the enlarging of his quarters : And likewise, upon the con-
sidération of the présent state and condition of the armies, as now disposed
and commanded, to consider of a Frame or Model of the whole Militia,
and présent it to the House, as may put the forces inlo such posture as
may be most advantageous for the service of the public. This to be done
notwithstanding any former Ordinance of Parliament.
Same Day. Ordered, and the House doth enjoin, That Sir William
Waller and Lieutenant-General Cromwell do on Monday moming next
déclaré unto the House their whole knowledge and informations of the
particular proceedings of the armies since their conjunction.
On Monday, the 25th of November, accordingly, both Waller
and Cromwell did, in their places in the House, make the required
statements. What was the nature of Waller’s statement is hardly
known; ail the interest was centred in Cromwell-s. It was a bold
outbreak, at last, of ail that he had been thinking about Manchester
for months, and nothing less than a sustained and deliberate im-
peachment of that Earl. The sole accessible record of it hitherto,
however, in the form of a report of Cromwell’s speech, has been the
summary given in Rushworth, as foliows:—
That the said Earl hath always been indisposed and backward to
engagements, and against ending of the war with the sword, and forlxviii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
such a peace to which a victory would be a disadyantage ; and hath
declared tbis by principles express to that purpose, and a continued sériés
of carriage and actions answerable. That, since the taking of York, as
if the Parliament had now adyantage full enough, he hath declined what-
eyer tended to further advantage upon the enemy; neglected and
studiously shifted off opportunities to that purpose, as if he thought the
King too low and the Parliament too high,—especially at Donnington
Castle. That he hath drawn the army into, and detained them in, such
a posture as to giye the enemy great advantages ; and this before his
conjunction with the other armies [î.e., with Essex’s and Waller’s just
before Newbury], by his own absolute will, against or without his Council
of War, against many commands from the Committee of both Kingdoms,
and with contempt and yilifying of those commands ; and since the con-
junction, sometimes against the Councils of War, and sometimes per-
suading and deluding the Council to neglect one opportunity with pretence
of another, and that again of a third, and at last by persuading that it
was not fit to fight at all.a
Through Mr. Bruce’s diligence, the entire charge of which this is
an abstract has now been recovered and is printed for the first time
in this volume (pp. 78-95). It is entitled “An Accompt of the effect
and substance of my Narrative made to this House for soe much
ihereof as concerned the Earl of Manchesterand is doubtless the
réduction to writing immediately by Cromwell himself, in consulta-
tion with his friends, of those parts of his speech which the House
required to hâve in that shape for further proceedings.b The
reader will turn to it with no ordinary interest, and will find it to
be a continuous and scathing criticism, paragraph after paragraph,
a Rushworth, y. 732.
b I cannot agréé with the opinion expressed in the last footnote to CromwelVs
Narrative (p. 95), that the “ terseness and perspicuity ” of the document are
qualities that must hâve been imparted to it by those who assisted him in drawing
it up. In any document in the préparation of which Cromwell took part I should
say that the tersest and most emphatic parts, and essentially the most perspicuous,
were always his. Substantially and throughout, this Narrative appears to me to be
Cromwell’s own, with suggestions from Haselrig, and perhaps from Waller.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
ixix
of Manchester’s military conduct, from his parting with thé armies
of Fairfax and the Scots in Yorkshire after Marston Moor (July
1644) to his conjunction with the armies of Essex and Waller in
the South for the second battle of Newbury, and the abortive issue of
that conjunction in the affair of Donnington Castle (Nov. 1644).
We hâve already given the purport of the document as far as to the
beginning of that slow and reluctant movement of the Earl out of
his comfortable dormancy in the Eastern Counties which did bring
him at last into conjunction with Essex and Waller. Cromwell,
however, devotes more space to Manchester’s delinquencies in the
sequel. Why had the Earl, after his long and obdurate stay at
Keading in October, marched southwards to Basingstoke, as if that
were the place for a proper conjunction, instead of directly west-
wards, where Sir William Waller was anxiously expecting him, and
whither the orders of the Houses and of the Derby House Com-
mittee had so pressingly pointed him? Had he thus marched
westward, the conjunction of the three armies might easily hâve
been at Salisbury ; in which case the issue of the campaign would
hâve been different—the King still to the west of Salisbury river,
without a foot of ground on the other side of it, except two or three
Koyalist towns and castles, hard beset by the Parliament ! Then
the neglects and delays between the conjunction at Basingstoke and
the Battle of Newbury, including one actual proposai of retreat, from
the disgrâce of which, Manchester now acting as Commander-in-
Chief, the armies were saved only by the remonstrances of Waller
and Sir Arthur Hasilrig ! Then at the Battle of Newbury itself
what blunders of the Earl, what avoiding of the part he had
expressly undertaken in the battle, so that the battle was rendered
less effective than it might hâve been ; and, above ail, when the
battle had been won, what dogged opposition to the earnest requests
of Waller, Hasilrig, and Cromwell himself, that the whole army
should be marched Oxford-ways in pursuit of the King, or at least
that Manchester would lend some foot to assist the horse in pursuit !
Neither would be granted, his Lordship expressing extreme un-lxx
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
willingness thereto, making excuses and delays, speaking for his
return into his Association, and much for peace.” For the next
twelve days it had been the same, the Earl either refusing to move,
or always making little moveinents the wrong way, thus positively
playing into the hands of the King, and making his return and his
relief of Donnington Castle not only possible but easy ! And at
the last moment, when, after the relief of Donnington Castle, there
was the chance of relieving ail by another great battle with the
King, how had the Earl acted ?
His Lordship, haying now no further évasion left to shift it off under
another name, plainly declared himself against fighting, and, having
spent much time in viewing the enemy while they drew off, and pre-
paratory discourses, a council being called, he made it the question
whether ’twere prudent to fight. With ail eamestness and solicitousness
he urged ail discouragements against it, opposed ail that was said for it.
And, amongst other things, it being urged that, if we now let the King
go off with such honour, it would give him réputation both at home and
abroad . . . but if we beat him now it would lose him everywhere . . .
his Lordship, replying, told the council he would assure them there was
no such thing, adding (with vehemence) this principle against fighting:
that, if we beat the King ninety-nine times, he would be King still, and
his posterity, and we subjects still ; but, if he beat us but once, we should
be hanged and our posterity be undone. Thus it was concluded not to
fight.
On the whole Cromwell could corne to no other conclusion than
that which he had expressed at the outset of his narrative: viz., that
the Earl of Manchester was the man in England most blameable
for recent mishaps, and that his “ backwardness to ail action ” had
proceeded not so much from dullness of mind as from a rooted
u principle of unwillingness ” to see the Parliament too successful.
Whitlocke’s recollection of CromweH’s narrative is that it “ gave
great satisfaction to the Commons,” and that, in the matter of
Donnington Castle, it “ seemed, but cautiously enough, to lay more
blâme on the Lord-General’s army [Essex’s] than upon any other.”HISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxi
The second statement may refer to portions of CromwelTs speech in
the House apart from that charge against Manchester which alone
it was necessary to reduce to writing; and the first statement seems
quite authentic. The Commons Journals for Nov. 25, 1644, show
what occurred immediately after Waller and Cromwell had addressed
the House. The whole business was referred for inquiry and report
to a Committee of the House, previously appointed for army matters,
of which Mr. Zouch Tate, one of the members for Northampton,
was chairman; and this Committee was empowered to examine
witnesses and send for ail necessary papers, including letters des-
patched or received by the Committee of both Kingdoms.
The Earl of Manchester must hâve known pretty exactly that
same day ail that had happened in the Commons. His place for
replying was, of course, in the House of Lords—not now, it is to
be remembered, that unbroken body of 150 peers, temporal and
spiritual, which had existed before the Civil War, but the mere
Parliamentarian fragment of it, consisting of about thirty peers in
ail, of whom seldom more than fifteen were présent. Here, for the
first time since his return from his campaign, Manchester appeared
on the 26th of November, the day after CromwelPs impeachment of
him in the other House ; and the Lords Journals of that and the few
following day s show the steps taken by him and his brother peers:—
Tuesday, Nov. 26.—The Earl of Manchester signified to this House
“ That, since he attended this House last, he hath had the honour to be
in employment in some of the armies of Parliament, and some actions of
the army where his lordship was hath not given satisfaction to some ; an
account whereof he will be ready to give to this House when he shall be
appointed.” And this House appointed Thursday next for his Lordship
to give this House an account thereof.
Thursday, Nov. 28.—The Earl of Manchester made to this House a
large narrative of the carriage of the affairs of the army at Newbury, and
of some speeches spoken by Lieutenant-Colonel [sec] Cromwell, which
concerns much the honour of this House and the Peers of England, and
the good and interest between the two kingdoms of England and Scotland.lxxii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Hereupon the House noininated these Lords Committees following, to
consider what is fit to be done upon that which tbe Earl of Manchester
delivered this day to this House :—Lord General [the Earl of Essex],
Lord Admirai [the Earl of Warwick], the Earl of Northumberland, the
Earl of Pembroke, the Earl of Salisbury, Lord North. Any three to
meet this afternoon, at three of the clock, in the Lord Keeper’s lodgings.
Monday, Dec. 2.—The Earl of Manchester acquainted the House,
“ That he having made a Narrative to their Lordships concerning the
business of the affairs of the army at Newbury and other affairs, and by
their Lordships commanded to put it down in writing, which he has
accordingly done, and is ready to présent it to the House:” Which the
House received, and caused it to be read (Here enter them.)—the narra-
tive being of two parts, one concerning the business touching the affairs
of the army at Donnington Castle, the other concerning Lieutenant-
General Cromwell.
The House being satisfied with the Earl of Manches ter’s Narrative
concerning the affairs of the army at Donnington Castle, there being
nothing appearing to the contrary, it is Ordered, To communicate the
same to the House of Commons. And that narrative concerning
Lieutenant-Colonel [s/c] Cromwell, in regard he is a member of the
House of Commons, the House resolved, To communicate the narrative
to them at a Conférence; and the Lord Wharton and the Lord North are
appointed to read the papers at the Conférence.
A message was sent to the House of Commons by Mr. Serjeant
Whitfield and Mr. Sergeant Fynch, to desire a Conférence, so soon as it
may stand with their conveniency, in the Painted Chamber, [1.] Touch-
ing a Narrative concerning the affairs of the army at Donnington Castle ;
2. Concerning a Narrative wherein a member of their House is concemed.
Ordered [while tbe two sergeants are away to the Commons requesting
a Conférence of the two Houses], That these Lords following are appointed
to join with a proportionable number of the House of Commons to
examine the business of the army at Donnington Castle and the proceed-
ings thereof :—Lord General, Lord Admirai, Earl of Northumberland,
Earl of Pembroke, Earl of Salisbury, Earl of Denbigh, Lord North : any
three. The Speaker [of the Lords] was to let them [the Commons]
know at the Conférence “ that their Lordships hâve appointed seven lordsHISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxiii
to examine the business of the army at Donnington Castle, and tbe pro-
ceedings tbereof, and to desire that tbe House of Commons would appoint
a proportion able number of their House to join with them in tbe said
examination. For tbe latter part, in regard it concerned a member of
tbeir House, tbeir Lordsbips hâve forbome to proceed in the business, as
being of a bigh nature, until their Lordships bad communicated the
business to them [the Commons].a
Both the Lords Journals and those of the Commons show that
the conférence of the two Houses so requested was held that same
day (Dec. 2), and that consequently the Commons were then put
in possession of the two distinct documents which Manchester had
presented to the Lords as embodying what he had already delivered
to them orally: viz. (1) His counter-narrative o'f recent military
events, in exculpation of himself from the charges of Cromwell and
others; and (2) A serious charge against Cromwell personally on
account of speeches said to hâve been uttered by him, at various
times, derogatory to the House of Lords and the whole order of the
Peerage, and tending also to offend the Scots and disturb the good
understanding between the two nations.
The first of these Papers has been preserved, and is given in
Rushworth, where it fills four folio pages (v. 733-736). Godwin
finds reason for thinking that it was penned by Denzil Holles; but
it is, at ail events, in a studiously calm and dignified style, quite
befitting the character of the Earl himself. He begins with the
Battle of Newbury and the subséquent affair of Donnington Castle,
as the transactions in which he had been most distinctly blamed.
His defence, in general, is in these words :—
From the time I came to join with my Lord General’s army I never
did anytbing witbout joint consent of those that were the best experienced
» These extracts from the Lords Journals I take from Mr. Bruce’s MS. collection
of materials for his préfacé; and I hâve not thought it necessary, with his careful
copies before me, to refer to the originals. I adhéré to the copies even where they keep
the faulty grammar of the original, only translating the usual Cornes of the Journals
into “ Earl,” or the like.
CAMD. SOC.
Ilxxiv
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
and chiefest commandera in ail the armies; and herein I shall appeal to
those who were sent down from the Committee of both Kingdoms whether
upon ail debates my expressions were not these, 44 I cannot prétend to
hâve any expérience in this way ; therefore what you shall résolve I shall
observe and I am confident that both they and ail the commandera of
the Army will jnstify my practice made good my professions.
In the particulars of his version of the facts, however, there is a
continuai pointing to Cromwell as one who had thwarted com-
mands and failed in duty. Thus, at Newbury Battle, the Earl
himself had done ail he had undertaken, and other parts of the army
had behaved in such a way as to contribute to the success; 44 but
where those horses were that Lieutenant-General Cromwell com-
manded I hâve as' yet had no certain account.” Then, afterwards,
on the news of the King’s retum from Oxford for the relief of
Donnington Castle, when the Earl, after Consulting with Skippon,
thought a rendezvous of ail the dispersed horse necessary, and had
sent orders to that effect to Sir William Balfour and Cromwell,
what had Cromwell done?
He came unto me, and in a discontented manner expressed himself,
asking me whether I intended to flay my horse ; for, if I called them to a
rendezvous [after so much hard work recently], I might hâve their skins,
but no service from them. I told him my opinion was that it was abso-
lutely necessary, for, if it were not done, I doubted if we should hâve
them présent when we had most use of them ; yet, he persisting in his
dislike of it, I told him he might do as he pleased.
Again, when the King had relieved Donnington Castle and
threatened battle, why had the army been obliged to remain on the
défensive and confine itself to repelling with its foot the charge of
the enemy? Because, thougli 44 some of my Lord General’s horse
and some of Sir William WallerV* were on the side of the river
where the action was, 44 Lieutenant-General Cromwell had not
brought over any horse, notwithstanding I had desired him that ail
of them might be drawn over on that side of the river.” The EarlHISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxv
then touches on the capital charge of his allowing the King after
ail to retreat undisturbed instead of compelling him to a battle.
That had been done, he déclarés, by the unanimous consent of ail
the commanders assembled in council, on the ground that a defeat
of the Parliamentary army at that time, with the Scottish auxiliaries
and other forces so far away in the north, might be fatal; and, in
taking that view himself, he had only agreed with others, and
especially with Sir Arthur Hasilrig. Here he reverts to his general
defence of having always acted by ad vice; after which, in two brief
closing paragraphs, he goes back to topics of older date than his
conjunction with Essex’s army and Waller’s. He had been blamed
for dilatoriness at Lincoln and neglect of the orders of the Com-
mittee of both Kingdoms to hasten southward and westward in
order to that conjunction. Lieutenant-General Cromwell himself
could be an efficient witness in answer to that charge, if he would
recollect certain particulars. Finally, about certain “ discontents”
which “ brake forth ” in his army of the Associated Counties and
were really “ the cause of retarding that service,” the Earl does not
think it necessary to speak until desired to do so.
The contemporary and more secret paper, containing Manchester’s
report of highly inflammatory sayings in which Cromwell had for
some time been indulging, has not corne down in the Journals of
either House, or in any of the collections; nor, unfortunately, has
Mr. Bruce’s research recovered it. We hâve the means of guessing,
however, what was the nature of those utterances of Cromwell here
and there in his wrath which were now remembered against him
and gathered into one mass by Manchester to be hurled at his head.
With others of the Independents and forward spirits he had
observed that the shred of a House of Lords nominally adhering to
Parliament, and still acting as an Upper House with ail the pomp
and forms that had belonged to that House in its complété State,
was really a clog on the energies of the other House, impeding
what was prôposed there, and causing languour and half-heartedness
in the war. How was it possible for men of large estâtes and greatlxxvi
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
family interests to avoid making the safety of those estâtes and
interests a prime considération in ail their debates and methods,
and so looking forward anxiously to any réconciliation with the
King that would restore the status quo ante, with only the few
changes deemed indispensable? Perceiving this, Cromwell had
begun to doubt whether the war would ever be finished until the
fragment of the House of Peers had been swept out of the way;
and he had, perhaps, pushed his spéculation farther, and begun to
question the desirableness of any peerege whatever, or at least any
peerage of the existing sort, in the future constitution of England.
Never afraid of bold speaking, and indeed liable, on occasion, to
sudden gusts and phrenzies of expression, he had talked in this strain
among his friends, and perhaps sometimes in more miscellaneous
company. At least once, it appears, whether in passionate earaest-
ness or in a moment of semi-humorous confidence, he had surprised
Manchester himself with some outbreak of the kind.
General Cromwell declared to the Earl of Manchester his hatred of
the Nobility and House of Peers, wishing there was ne ver a lord in
England, and saying he loved such and such because they loved not lords,
and that it would not be well till he [Edward Montagu, Earl of Man-
chester] was but Mr, Montagu.
Such is the record, long afterwards, in Holles’s memoirs,a repeat-
ing, perhaps, one of the anecdotes of Cromwell that figured in
Manchester^ présent paper. But we hâve a more exact and com-
plété description of the contents of the paper, written at the very
moment by one who was at the centre of information and in ail
the secrets of the Presbyterian party—the Scottish Commissioner
Baillie. “ Always, my Lord Manchester,” writes Baillie, December
1, to Scotland, “ has cleared himself abundantly. to the House of
Lords, and there has recriminate Cromwell as one who has avowed
his desire to abolish the Nobility of England ; who has spoken con-
tumeliously of the Scots’ intention of coming to England to establish
ft P. 18, as quoted in Pari. Hist. iii. 349.HISTORICAL PREFACE,
lxxvii
their Church government (in which Cromwell said he would draw
his sword .against them)—also against the Assembly of Divines ;
and has threatened to make a party of Sectaries, to extort by force,
both from King and Parliament, what conditions they tbought
meet.”a The Scots, therefore, with their pertinacious pushing of
their Presbyterian System in ail its strictness upon England, and
their loan of their vaunted auxiliary army solely for that end, had
become, equally with the English Nobility, a subject of Cromwell’s
comments; and, despite his union with them in the Solemn League
and Covenant, his comments on them, and on the Westminster
Assembly as virtually their organ, had been growing more and
more disrespectful. In bringing this out in his paper, Manchester
had done a most politic thing in his own interest. The little
phalanx of Scots then in London, as members of the Committee of
both Kingdoms, lay Commissioners for other purposes, or Divines
in the Westminster Assembly, were a very powerful body, not to
be insulted with impunity. They had long looked askance on
Cromwell as the champion of Independency, and now was their
time for action. “ It’s like, for the interest of our nation,” proceeds
Baillie in the same letter, “ we must crave reason of that Darling
of the Sectaries, and in obtaining his removal from the army (which
himself by his over-rashness has procured) to break the power of
that potent faction. This is our présent difficile exercise : we had
need of your prayers.” To understand what was really meant by
this, we must turn to Whitlocke.
In the lull in military operations caused by the retirement of the
several armies into winter quarters, propositions for peace had again
been revived. Commissioners from the two Houses, with some of
the Scottish Commissioners, had gone from London (Nov* 20) with
overtures to the King at Oxford ; they had had interviews with
him, and had brought back answers ; and matters were thus in train
for that great Treaty of Uxbridge which occupies so much
space, with such a zéro of resuit, in the history of the Civil War.
* Baillie, ii. 245.lxxviii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
It was a crisis, therefore, when the various éléments in the leader-
ship of what had ail along been the more Conservative party among
the Parliamentarians—Essex and his stately brother peers, Holles
and his Presbyterian associâtes in the Commons, and the Scottish
Commissioners—might well unité in an attempt to disgrâce and
disable such a représentative of the more revolutionary party as
Cromwell. He was in London, away from his Ironsides, and again
for the time a mere Member of Parliament; and had not his quarrel
with Manchester given them the opportunity ? Why not convert
Manchester’s charge against him in the Lords into a public State
prosecution to be regularly tried at law ? This, in fact, Was the
“ difficile exercise” in which, Baillie tells us, he and his fellow-
Scots in London were engaged, and for success in which he begged
the prayers of his co-Presbyters in Scotland. Probably because it
failed, we hear little more of it from Baillie; but a passage in
Whitlocke supplies the deficiency. It is that famous passage where
Whitlocke describes a private conférence held at Essex House in the
Strand within a few daysafter the date of Baillie’s letter. Summoned
to Essex House, “one evening very late,” by an urgent message from
the lord of the mansion, but not knowing on what business, Whit-
locke and his fellow-lawyer Maynard, we are told, found a small
company already with the Lord General, consisting of “ the Scots
Commissioners, Mr. Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir John Meyrick
[three of the leading Presbyterians of the Commons], and divers
other friends.” After some preliminaries, the Scottish Chancellor
Loudoun, at the request of Essex, opened to the two lawyers the
purpose of the meeting. He did so very warily, and in his peculiar
Scottish dialect, which Whitlocke tries to reproduce. “ Ye kçn
vary weele that Lieutenant-General Cromwell is no friend of ours;”
u he not only is no friend to us and to the government of our Church,
but he is also no well-wisher to his Excellency [Essex], whom you
and we ail hâve cause to love and honour:”—these are two of his
reported expressions, with the addition: “ It is thought requisite
for us, and for the carrying on of the cause of the tway kingdoms,HISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxix
that this obstacle or rémora may be removed out of the way.” Could
this be done ? In Scotland there would hâve been no difficulty in
such a case. By tbe law of Scotland any incendiary might be
brought to trial; and “ we clepe him an incendiary whay kindleth
coals of contention and raises différences in the State to the public
damage.” Now in the Solernn League and Covenant between the
two nations this word had been adopted—one of the paragraphs of
that document expressly binding both nations “ to endeavour the
discovery of such as hâve been or shall be incendiaries,” that they
might be brought to public trial. But did the law of England
recognise the kind of criminal called an incendiary, and provide
means for bringing him to account ? This was the point on which the
Scots desired the judgment of Whitlocke and Maynard. “ Whether
your law be the same or not you ken best, who are mickle learned
therein.” Both Whitlocke and Maynard assured the company in
reply that the law of England did recognise incendiaries and could
deal with them; but they both suggested serious doubts as to the
proposai to bring Cromwell within that category. They were not
aware of proofs against him sufficient for thepurpose; the collection
of such proofs would be difficult; he was a man of great parts, and
great interest in the Commons and throughout the country; it
would not do for persons in such high authority as the Lord
General and the Scottish Commissioners to appear in such a business
unless they could be sure of success. Here, Whitlocke adds, Holles,
Stapleton, and some others, struck smartly in, mentioning acts and
words of CromwelPs that ought to prove him an incendiary, denying
his great interest in the Commons, and urging immédiate procedure.
The Scottish Commissioners, however, had been convinced by the
reasoning of the English lawyers, and thought it would be better to
wait and collect more proofs. With this conclusion the meeting
broke up “ about two o’clock in the morning;” and Whitlocke
u had some cause to believe that at this debate some who were pré-
sent were false brethren, and informed Cromwell of ail that had
passed.” At ail events, Cromwell, though he never mentioned thelxxx
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
subject, seemed to know that Whitlocke and Maynard had done
him a service.®
The idea of a State prosecution of Cromwell having been
abandoned, his quarrel with Manchester, in its two forms of his
charge against Manchester and Manchester^ récrimination upon
him, was left to the ordinary course of process through the two
Houses. Or rather, through the whole of December, it was left to
the course arranged for it by the Commons, the Lords waiting the
resuit of their conférence with that House of December 2nd. It
becomes évident also that the two Houses tended more and more to
opposite moods in the business, the Commons on the whole (not-
withstanding the number of Presbyterians in the House) leaning
somehow to Cromwell, while the Lords were disposed to protect
and abet Manchester.
The State of the business in the Commons immediately after the
proceedings at the conférence with the other House had been form-
ally reported (which was done by Mr. Holles, December 4) had been
this :—The Committee, of which Mr. Zouch Tate was chairman,
already entrusted with the duty of investigating CromwelTs charges
against Manchester, was to proceed in that duty, sending for papers,
examining witnesses, &c., ail under strict injunction of secrecy, and
never fewer than eight of the Committee to be présent. But for
that new form of the business which had been occasioned by
Manchester’s exculpation of himself and counter-charge against
Cromwell in the Lords, and by the communication of both to the
Commons at the conférence, another Committee had been appointed,
with the significant instruction that they were “ to consider whether
the Privilège of this House be broken by the matter of this Report
made by Mr. Holles, and to présent to the House some expédient for
putting the same into a way of examination.” Eighteen members
had been named for this Committee, December 4, among whom
were Holles and other violent Presbyterians, but also Whitlocke and
Maynard, with St. John, Vane, Hasilrig, and others, naturally
a Whitlocke, ed. 1853, i. 343-348.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxxi
favourable to Cromwell ; and the number had been increased,
December 7, by the addition of eighteen more, of different shades
of opinion (Stapleton one of them), and “ail the lawyers of the
House.” Of this second and larger Committee, already in existence
probably when four at least of its members took part in the private
meeting at Essex House, the chairman was Mr. John Lisle, member
for Winchester.
Through the rest of December we are to conceive the two Com-
mittees more or less busy, each over its appointed work. Of the
proceedings of Mr. Lisle’s Committee, which involved the
question of privilège between the two Houses, we hear nothing
through the month ; but of those of Mr. Tate’s Committee,
entrusted with the investigation of CromwelPs charges against
Manchester, we do learn something in the document recovered by
Mr. Bruce, and printed in the présent volume under the title of
Notes of Evidence against the Earl of Manchester. They are brief
and unconnected memoranda of the evidence given in support of
CromwelPs charges by a number of witnesses that had been called
before the Committee. Cromwell and Waller themselves, it appears,
had been among those witnesses -, but Hasilrig, and such officers in
Manchester’s army as Hammond, Ireton, Harrison, Rich, Jones,
Wilson, Hooper, Norton, Pickering, and Desborough, had also been
examined. The particulars to which they testified, and how they
fit into the story of Manchester’s alleged “ backwardness to ail
action,” will be gathered best from a perusal of the Notes. So far
as the Notes bear, the evidence had as yet been ail on CromweH’s
side, or in support of the prosecution, and there had been no evi-
dence for the defence.
It is not to be supposed, however, that the Earl of Manchester
and his frienda were inactive. That the Earl was collecting materials
both for his own defence and for the vérification of his counter-
charge against Cromwell appears from the fact that there hâve
survived among his papers at Kimbolton the two documents, pro-
cured by Mr. Bruce, which are printed in this volume under the
camd. soc.
mIxxxii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
titles Narrative of the Earl of Manchester9s Campaign and State-
ment hy an Opponent of Cromwell. It is possible indeed that he
may hâve had one or both of these in his possession before he made
his charge against Cromwell in the Lords on the 28th of November,
and that they may hâve supplied him with some of the particulars
included in that charge ; but it is as likely that they came to him
after that charge was made and Mr. Tate’s Committee and Mr.
Lisle’s were exploring the matter for the other House. In either
case, they fall to be noticed here:—
1. Narrative of the Earl of Manchester9s Campaign. This, as
we already know, was nothing else than a statement by Man-
chester’s Scottish Major-General Crawford, hastening to the rescue
of his chief, and glad of the opportunity of saying his worst at
some length against his old opponent Cromwell. The substance of
it, as far as to Manchester’s march from Lincoln, with a view to the
conjunction of his army with those of Essex and Waller in the
west, has already been given ; and it is only necessary now to note
the substance of the rest. It is exactly in the strain of the prece-
ding, the same virulent antipathy to Cromwell breaking out, sentence
after sentence, through the same feeble and confused style of narra-
tion and the same inexpertness in grammar. Manchester to blâme
for the incompleteness of the success at Newbury, or for the neglect
of the pursuit of the King’s forces after the battle ! Why, Man-
chester had behaved beautifully, and it was Cromwell that was
in both cases the real culprit. It was the horse of the army that
never were where they ought to hâve been, and never were willing
to do what they might hâve done ; and to whom was that to be
ascribed but to Cromwell and his under-officers? Then as to the
return of the King, his relief of Donnington Castle, his safe retreat
without battle again offered to him, and that lame conclusion of the
campaign about which Cromwell and others were now crying out !
Ail through this tissue of affairs too the backward man had still been
Cromwell, with his precious horse, either out of the way when they
were wanted or reported by him as too weak for action. Major-GeneralHISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxxiii
Crawford himself had at one critical moment pointed out to Crom-
well a way in which his horse might hâve done real service, and he
had declined the hint. And, at the Council of War, where it had
been decided to allow the King to retreat without battle, who had
been the chief advocates of that policy? Why, Sir Arthur Hasil-
rig and Cromwell, the first arguing that the King was too strong
and that a battle with him might be disastrous, and Cromwell
foliowing with “a speech very near a quarter of an hour” to the
same effect. Finally, as to Cromwelfs accusation against Man-
chester that he had acted without advice of Councils of War or
against such advice, Crawford would recall one mémorable incident.
When letters had corne to the Army showing the extreme dissatis-
faction in London with the affair of Donnington Castle and the
poor ending of the campaign, and among these letters an official
one to Manchester and the other commanders from the Committee
of both Kingdoms (No. 69 of the Correspondence), Manchester had
been vexed by nothing so much as by the insinuation, indirectly
conveyed in that letter, that he had not acted duly by advice of
Councils of War. What had then happened?”
In my Lord of Manchester’s lodging in Newbury, in the presence of
my Lord of Manchester, Sir William Balfour, Sir William Waller,
Major-General Skippon, Colonel Barklet, and Major-General Crawford,
Cromwell did say (finding my Lord of Manchester much moved at the
aforesaid letter, after he reads it twice over) that he found nothing in the
letter but what may be written without reflection upon any, and told my
Lord of Manchester : “ My Lord, I hold him for a villain and a knave
that would do any man ill offices ; but there was nothing done but what
was justifiable and by the consent of the Council of War,” and that there
was nothing done but what was answerable. So upon that Council of
War there was presently thought fit that there should be a letter drawn
and sent to the Committee of both Kingdoms representing the whole con-
dition of the army ; which was referred to be done by Lieut.* General
Cromwell ; which accordingly was done, wherein he gave a full relationlxxxiv
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
of the weakness of the Army ; winch, considering the ways he has gone,
much deserves your notice-taking of it.a
2. Statement by an Opponent of Cromwell. This is an anonymous
document, but reveals itself at once as having been written, for the
Earl of Manchester^ use, by some Presbyterian colonel or captain
of his army who had grudges of old standing against Cromwell.
Its peculiarity is that it goes back upon the earlier part of Crom-
well^ military career, and furnishes black réminiscences of him
from the first in his own Eastern Counties. In an evil hour in
December 1642, the writer, having property in the Isle of Ely,
which he wanted to make safe from war-risks, had gone to his
neighbour Cromwell, then only a captain of horse in the district, to
ask his ad vice. The resuit had been that he had been lured by
Cromwell to set up as a captain of dragoons, raising a troop and
equipping them at his own charge, and actually paying the troop
and his under-officers for ten weeks: “ which to this day I hâve
never received one penny.” Thus a captain of dragoons almost in
spite of himself, and with money invested in the concern, he had
continued in the army of the Eastern Association ever since, or at
least till near its late junction with the other armies in the west.
He had thus, of course, had ample opportunities of observing Crom-
a In Manchester's excnlpation of himself to the Lords, he also makes a strong
point of CromwelPs voluntary burst in his defence on the occasion here mentioned
by Crawford : “ And I mnst acknowledge that Lieutenant-General Cromwell was
sensible of a contradiction in this particular; as, when there was hnt an information
of such a report cast ont of London that I had acted without the adyice of the
Council of War, he professed that he was a villain and a liar that should affirm any
such thing.” It is clear that something of the kind mnst hâve happened, however
it is to be recoociled with what followed. Crawford’s farther statement, that Crom-
well himself was the draftsman of a letter in the name of the commanders jointly to
the Committee of both Kingdoms explaining the whole State of matters, does not
appear in the Earl’s own narrative. If snch a letter still exists, it might be impor-
tant. Mr. Bruce’s collection of copies from the correspondence of the Committee
of both Kingdoms contains no snch thing. It stops at No. 69, the letter which so
much vexed Manchester.HISTOR1CAL PREFACE.
lxxxv
well and knowing his principles. He will, therefore, string together
a few facts. Cromwell, when a colonel, had “ made choice of his
officers, not such as were soldiers or men of estate, but such as were
common men, poor and of mean parentage; only he would give
them the title of godly precious men.” He had heard Cromwell
often say that “ it must not be soldiers nor Scots that must do this
work, but it must be the godly to this purpose.” Accordingly he
had packed his own régiment, and then others, with Independents.
“ If you look at his own régiment of horse, see whata swarm there
is of those that call themselves the godly: some of them profess
they hâve seen visions and had révélations.” Little better with the
régiments of Colonels Fleetwood, Russell, Montague, Pickering,
and Rainsborough, “ ail of them professed Independents entire.”
Once, when he, the writer, had done a good stroke of service at
Wisbeach, Cromwell had assumed the crédit of it; which was his
general habit. He had once told the writer to “ hold his tongue,”
for he “ spoke he knew not what.” Cromwell had once told him
he would “ make the Isle of Ely the strongest place in the world,
and he would out with ail the wretches and ungodly men, and he
would place in it godly and precious people, and he would make it
a place for God to dwell in ” : u yet at this day the Isle is in no
[better] posture than it was in at the time he came into it ; only it
is become a mere Amsterdam,” i. e. a refuge of ail sects, where
soldiers occupied the pulpits and the regular ministers dared not
preach. “ They frequently rebaptize the people of that Isle.” Plenty
of money had passed through CromwelPs hands ; there was at Ely,
on the file of letters to the Committee there, one from Cromwell
instructing them “ to pay to his wife 51. per week towards her
extraordinaries ” (which had been done for a great while, and “ I
am sure there is no ordinance of Parliament for that ”) ; and yet the
writer had never been repaid his advances, but had been put off
with fair words. He had heard Cromwell talk against u lords.”
Once, when he was in London, two of CromwelPs troopers and
another man had corne to him with a pétition to Parliament forlxxxvi
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
liberty of conscience, already “ with a great many of hands and
marks to it,v desiring him to sign it.
I was troubled at it and told them I would bave my hand eut off
before I would set my hand to it, and told them if any nation in the
world were in the ready way to Heayen it was the Scots. They told me
they thought I had been a godly man, but now they perceive what I
was, and went away : ever after Colonel Cromwell did slight me.
The writer had been with Manchester’s army at Huntingdon
when the news of Essex’s flight from Cornwall and the loss of his
army there arrived; and he can vouch that the Independents of the
army, instead of being cast down, were positively joyful. He hâtes
the Independents, and “ can say by expérience, The Lord of Heaven
deliver every honest man out of their hands ! ” a
Meanwhile the Lords were becoming impatient over the burial
of the question between Manchester and Cromwell in the silent
procedure of two mere committees of the Commons, Under the
date Monday the 30th December, their Journals contain this
entry : —
A message was sent to the House of Commons by Mr. Seijeant Whit-
field and Mr. Serjeant Fynch, to desire an answer, as soon as it may
stand with their conveniency, touching the conférence concerning the Nar-
rative touching the Earl of Manchester’s business. Mr. Seijeant Whit-
field and Mr. Serjeant Fynch retum with this answer from the House of
Commons : “ That they will send an answer concerning the Narrative
touching the Earl of Manchester’s business by messengers of their
own.”
a The writer of this queer statement might perhaps, by some search, be yet
identified. Can he hâve been the “ Captain Arminger ” mentioned in Crawford’s
Narrative as one of the officers in Manchester’s army opposed to Cromwell and
Independency (p. 60), and who was “ outed ” by Cromwell just after the march from
Lincoln had begnn (p. 61)? If so, can this “ Captain Arminger,” by some error of
transcript, be the same as the “ Captain Margery ” of whom we hear in two of
Cromwell’s letters of September 1643 (Carlyle’s Cromwell, ed. 1857, i. pp. 134-5
and 139-141), when he and Cromwell were still on friendly ternis ?HISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxxvii
The Commons Journals of the same day exhibit the counterpari
entry, but in words implying that the message of the Lords had
been rather urgent.a The phrase “ will send an answer by messengers
of their own ” in such intercourse between the two Houses meant
that the House using it was not prepared with an immédiate answer,
or with the answer expected ; and this was certainly now the case.
In fact, by this time, the Quarrel between Manchester and Cromwell
had become a far less important thing in the eyes of the Commons,
and of Cromwell himself, than it had been three weeks before. It
had been engulphed in a much larger business, engrossing the
Commons through those three weeks. This was the famous business
of The Self-denying Ordinance.
No one that knows anything of Cromwell needs to be told that
Personal enmity was not the motive to his attack on Manchester
That amiable and popular nobleman had simply become, in Crom-
well’s judgment, a type of the lazy and half-hearted aristocratie
generalship that had been the impediment of the Parliamentary
cause hitherto, and that must be removed if the cause were to
prosper in future, To denounce this style of generalship in one
typical example, to blast it out of the army by the publicity and
terror of one well-directed personal impeachment, was a legitimate
method, were there no other. Seeing no other, Cromwell had
ventured onit, with ail the risks; he had, at his own péril, been the
man to bell the cat. But, after ail, might there not be another
method, and a less disagreeable one? After he had made his charge
against Manchester, and Manchester had made his countercharge,
and the two Houses were in perturbation over the affair, this is the
question which Cromwell had begun to ask himself. The State
of mind of the House of Commons, as shown in recent votes,
furnished the necessary hint. Had not the House, in its disgust .at
the lame ending of the late campaign, referred it to the Committee
a As before, Mr. Bruce’s MS. copies are my authorities for these entries in the
Journals of the Houses.lxxxviii
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
of both Kingdoms to révisé the whole “ posture ” of the Armies or
Militia of Parliament, and consider of a new “ frame or model ” for
the same? Did not this prove that the House was in the humour
for a bold measure?- What if one were to drop the prosecution of
Manchester in particular, and propose that ail officers of the army
belonging to either House of Parliament should, not for reasons
personal to any of them, but on grounds of general expediency,
retire from their commands? This would get rid of Manchester; it
would also get rid of Essex, Sir William Waller, and many more ;
it would solve the immédiate problem of the English Army ; and
yet it would do so in a way not irritating to the Scots.
Very few days seem to hâve been spent by Cromwell and his
friends in deliberation on the proposai before it was introduced into
the House. This had been done on the 9th of December, when
Cromwell’s charge against Manchester was but a fortnight old. On
that day, the House sitting in grand Committee, and very silent for
some time, as if expecting something unusual, Cromwell himself
had broken the silence. “ It is now a time to speak,” he had begun,
“ or for ever hold the tongue. The important occasion now is no
less than to save a nation out of a bleeding, nay, almost dying,
condition.” Then, after some intermediate sentences :—
What do many say, that were friends at the beginning of the Parliament?
Even this, that the members of both Honses hâve got great places and
commands, and, what by interest in Parliament, what by power in the
army, will perpetually continue themselves in grandeur, and not permit
the war speedily to end, lest their own power should détermine with it.
This that I speak here to our own faces is but what others do utter behind
our backs. I am far from reflecting on any. I know the worth of those
commanders, members of both Houses, who are yet in power ; but, if I
may speak my conscience without reflecting upon any, I do conceive, if
the Army be not put into another method, and the war more vigorously
prosecuted, the people can bear the war no longer, and will enforce you
to a dishonourable peace. But this I would recommend to your prudence,
Not to insist upon any complaint or oversight of any commander-in-chiefHISTORICAL PREFACE.
lxxxix
upon any occasion whatsoever ; for, as I must acknowledge myself gnilty
of oversights, so I know they can rarely be avoided in military affairs.
Therefore, waiving a strict inquiry into tbe causes of these things, let ns
apply ourselves to the remedy; which is most necessary. And I hope we
baye such true English bearts, and zealous affections towards the general
weal of our motber conntry, as no members of eitber House will scraple
to deny themselves, and tbeir onr private interests, for tbe public good,
nor account it to be a dishonour done to tbem, whatever tbe Parliament
shall résolve npon in this weighty matter.a
The way having thus been prepared by Cromwell, and the actual
motion having been made by Mr. Zouch Tate, and seconded by
Harry Yane, it was resolved the same day:—
That, during tbe time of this war, no member of eitber House shall bave
or execute any office or command, military or civil, granted or conferred
by botb or eitber of tbe Houses of Parliament, or any authority derived
from botb or eitber of tbe Houses, and tbat an Ordinance be brougbt in
accordingly.
The Self-denying Ordinance, so proposed, was duly brought
in. Though opposed by Whitlocke and others, it went through the
House with singular rapidity, and was passed December 19. AIL
London was astounded. 44 The House of Commons, in one hour,”
writes Baillie, “ has ended ail the quarrels which was betwixt
Manchester and Cromwell, ail the obloquies against the General,
the grumblings against the proceedings of many members of their
House. They hâve taken ail office from ail the members of both
Houses. This, done on a sudden, in one session, with great unanimity,
is still more and more admired by some, as a most wise, necessar,
and heroic action; by others as the most rash, hazardous, and unjust
action as ever Parliament did. Much may be said on both hands.”b
Baillie’s words are suggestive. They show, for one thing, that the
Self-denying Ordinance, though a Cromwellian measure, must some-
how hâve had the approval of a large number of the Presbyterians
of the House, and that even the Scots in London were perplexed
* Carlyle’s Cromwell, ed. 1857, i. 160-162.	b Baillie, ii. 247
CAMD. soc.	nxc
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
about it rather tban hostile. They recognise, still more distinctly,
that the Ordinance had been offered by Cromwell and his friends,
and accepted by the rest, as a means of honourably ending and
hushing up the Manchester impeachment and ail other personal
quarrels. Cromweirs own words in the House, in preparing the
way for the Ordinance, illustrate this very remarkably. In almost
express terms he asks the House to let him waive his prosecution
of Manchester, retire from the disgusting task of recollecting the
past oversights or delinquencies of any particular person, and join
with them in a larger and better way of attaining the main object.
In passing the Ordinance the House doubtless understood that this
was the implication; and, when they sent it up to the Lords, it was
virtually an appeal to that body whether they would concur in this
method of quashing the Manchester prosecution, with much of the
same sort, or compel the House to continue that prosecution.
In reminding the Commons on December 30 of the Manchester
prosecution, the Lords, who had then the Self-denying Ordinance
before them, had in effect intimated that they would rather see the
prosecution go on than pass the Ordinance. For the Peers, indeed,
the Ordinance was a more terrible test of self-denial than for the
Commons : it was like asking them to superannuate themselves and
abjure the hereditary and historié rights of their order. Neverthe-
less, the Commons waited to see definitely how they would act, and
put off from day to day the reports from Mr. Tate’s Committee and
Mr. Lisle’s, notwithstanding another request from the Lords for
haste in that matter. On Wednesday, January 15, 1644-5, there
was no longer such reason for delay; for on that day the Lords
rejected the Self-denying Ordinance. On that day, accordingly,
the Commons ordered the Reports to be brought in on Friday. On
Friday they were put off till Saturday, and on Saturday again till
Monday ; on which day (January 20, 1644-5) they were brought
in, as follows:—
Mr. Lisle reports, from the Committee to which it was referred, the
opinions of the Committee concerning the Report [December 4] of a con-HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XC1
ference had with the Lords made by Mr. Holles, touching a narrative
made by the Earl of Manchester concerning the business of Donnington
Castle, the winch reflects in some particulars, by way of charge, in the
opinion of the Committee, upon a member of this House—to consider of
and examine which narrative . . . the Lords made a Committee and
desired this House to appoint a Committee of a proportionable number.
He likewise presented from the Committee a paper containing the matter
of the narrative delivered by the Lords at the conférence conçerning the
business of Donnington.
Eesolved, &c., That the appointing of a Committee by the House of
Lords for the examination of the matters contained in the first part of
the Report made by Mr. Holles (wherein Lieut.-General Cromwell, a
member of the House of Commons, is concerned) in such a manner as is
therein expressed, is a breach of privilège, notwithstanding their desiring
the House of Commons to join in the same.
Resolved, <fcc., That the first part of Mr. Holles his Report that
which contained Manchester’s narrative, in exculpation of himself, with
incidental references to Cromwell’s military conduct] is not to be put into
a way of examination, in regard of the breach of privilège.
Resolved, &c., That a Committee ofthe House of Commons be appointed
to examine the particulars contained in the papers now delivered in by
the Committee [z.e., the paper first given in by Mr. Lisle, recapitulating in
some new form, free from the taint of breach of privilège, the matter of
the narrative of the Earl of Manchester].
Resolved, &c., That a Committee of the House of Commons be appointed
to consider of the second part of Mr. Holles his Report [i.e., that which
referred to the paper of charges, not merely military, but of ahigh political
nature, against Cromwell, with which Manchester had backed his exculpa-
tion of himself, and which the Lords had merely communicated to the
Commons, without themselves taking any steps in the matter].
Resolved, &c., That this Committee, to which the particulars in the two
former votes [z.e., in the two last paragraphe] are referred, be the Com-
mittee formally appointed, Decembris 4, to consider of the matter of
Mr. Holles his Report of the conférence [û., Mr. Lisle’s Committee: see
ante> pp. lxxx., lxxxi.].
Resolved, &c., That a conférence be desired with the Lords concerning
these particulars.XC11
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
Mr. Lisle [here, it seems, acting for Mr. Zouch Tate, the chairman of
the other Committee] further reported the state of the matter of the
narrative made, upon the order and injunction of this Honse, by Lieut.-
General Cromwell and Sir William Waller, concerning divers passages
and proceedings of the armies, wherein the Earl of Manchester is much
concerned, and the state of the proofs npon examination of the business
and hearing wifcnesses by the Committee. He likewise produced a letter,
written unto him by the Earl of Manchester, of January 16, desiring that
he might know what those informations are that he hears are given in
against him at the Committee before the Report made, that he might give
satisfaction. [The Lords Joumals show that Manchester had leave from
that House to write such a letter.] The which were ail read, and im-
mediately re-delivered to the Reporter.
Resolved, &c., That the considération of this Report shall be resumed on
this day sevennight.
Ordered, That the Committee of Decembris 4 [Mr. Lisle’s], to which
Mr. Holles his Report . . was formerly referred, be revived, and meet
de die in diem, to consider of the particulars this day referred to them.a
Substantially, these resolutions of the Commons were a rebuke to
the Lords. They had been offered, in the Self-denying Ordinance,
a large and comprehensive way of hushing up the quarrel between
Manchester and Cromwell, and much besides; and they had rejected
the Ordinance. Well, in that case, the Commons were prepared
still for the narrower and meaner method of procedure. First of
ail, they would inform the Lords that their manner of receiving and
dealing with Mahchester’s exculpatory narrative, involving, as that
narrative dia, reflections on a member of the House of Commons,
a As before, these extracts from the Joumals are supplied me by Mr. Bruce’s
collection of MS. memoranda. I observe, however, that he has omitted the following
entry, which occurs in the Joumals immediately before the last paragraph he has
quoted*:—“ Ordered, That the Committee where Mr. Tate has the chair do examine
who was the author, printer, and divulger of the book which bears the name of
Mr. Simeon Ashe, a minister, and is concerning the business of Newbury and Don-
nington, and likewise to consider of the particular carriages about the printing and
divulging of that book, or the publishing any matter contained therein.” This book
or pamphlet by Ashe, Manchester^ chaplain, might be worth looking after.HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XC111
was a breach of privilège; but, that having been explained, they
were willing to go on with the whole inquiry, both as it regarded
Manchester and as it regarded Cromwell, and to prosecute it to the
utmost. They had, therefore, reappointed Mr. Lîsle’s Committee,
with fresh instructions; and they had ascertained the progress of the
evidence in Mr. Tate’s Committee and left that Committee to pro-
ceed. Ail this was to be regretted; but the responsibility lay with
the Lords. They and the Earl of Manchester must take the con-
séquences.
In fact, however, the proâecution had now run aground. The
last references to it in Mr. Bruce’s extracts from the Journals of the
Houses are on Jan. 21 and Jan. 22. On the first of these days
there was read in the Commons a letter from the Earl of Manchester
to the Speaker asking for information as to the charges against
him; and on the second, in answer to his request to bé heard in
person before Mr. Tate’s Committee, the Committee were empowered
to do as they might think fit. Thenceforward the business dis-
appears. For, though the Self-denying Ordinance had been rejected
by the Lords, the Commons had found another way of effecting
their great purpose of Army Keform. One reason given by the
Lords for hesitating about the Ordinance being that they did not
know in what précisé shape the army was to be reconstituted, the
Commons had met that difficulty by requiring the Committee of
both Kingdoms to report at once the New Model of the Army
which they had been instructed to devise. This had been done on
the 9th of January; and by the 28th of January the New Model
complété had passed the Commons. According to this New Model
the existing armies of the Parliament were to be weeded, Consoli-
dated, and re-organised into one compact army of 22,000 men
(14,400 foot, 6,600 horse, and 1,000 dragoons), the commander-
in-chief of which was to be Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the major-
general of which, or third in command, was to be Philip Skippon.
The place of Lieutenant-General, or second in command, was left
vacant as y et; and, though the Commons had at first designatedXC1V
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
most of the colonels, it was thought better to refer their appoint-
ment to Fairfax with the future sanction of the two Houses. That
so sweeping a measure should hâve emanated from such a body as
the Committee of both Kingdoms, containing not only English
Presbyterian Peers and Commoners, but also those Scottish Com-
missioners whose sole or main rule of action was the Presbyterian
interest, is certainly remarkable. The Scottish Commissioners, as
we hâve seen, had been exerting themselves for the destruction
of Cromwell ; and yet they now concurred in a measure framed
according to CromwelTs heart.a Altogether the juncture was such
that the Lords had to yield to the Commons. They demanded, in-
deed, that there should be no officers or soldiers in the New Model
Army that had not signed the Solemn League and Covenant ; but, a
compromise on that subject having been effected, they succumbed
Feb. 15, when the New Model Ordinance became law. Possibly
it was hoped that the Treaty of Uxbridge, which had been going
on since Jan. 30, would render the New Model unnecessary in prac-
tice; but any such hope must hâve ceased Feb. 22, when the treaty
a Godwin, in his History of the Commonwealth (i. 403-405), finds an explanation
of the changed mood of the Scottish Commissioners in the fact that the Marquis of
Argyle, the suprême man of the Scottish Kingdom, and a more subtle and far-seeing
politician than any of the rest, had corne to London at this crisis. He founds on
a passage in Clarendon (p. 541, ed. 1843), where it is said:—“ The Marquis of Argyle
was now corne from Scotland, and sat with the Commissioners of that kingdom. . . .
From the time of his coming to the town, the Scottish Commissioners were less
vehement in obstructing the Ordinance or the New Modelling of the Army.” This,
however, is one of Clarendon’s hallucinations. Argyle’s name was certainly
included in the safe conduct given by the King at Oxford, January 21, 1644-5, for
those Commissioners from the Parliament and from the Scots that were to treat at
XJxbridge ; but he never appeared there. He was detained in Scotland by the
necessity of opposing the terrible Montrose. His defeat at Inyerlochy, the greatest
disaster of his military life, was on February 2 ; and he was in Edinburgh, with the
disaster on his mind, for some weeks afterwards. When he did corne to London
sixteen months later, the opening words of his speech before a Committee of the
two English Houses (June 26, 1646) were these:—“ Though I hâve had the honour
to be named by the Kingdom of Scotland in ail the Commissions which had relation
to this Kingdom [of England] since the beginning of the war, yet I had never the
happiness to be with your lordships till now.”HISTORICAL PREFACE.
XCV
was broken off, with notbing accomplished. It was then évident
that the year 1645 was to be one of continued war, and that the New
Model would hâve abundant work. It was of no use then for the
Lords to stand out against the Self-denying Ordinance either.
That ordinance, in fact, was already realized in the fabric of the
New Model; and, accordingly, having been reintroduced into the
Commons in a modified forra, and having passed there, it received
the assent of the Lords April 3, 1645. On the preceding day
(April 2) the Earls of Essex and Manchester, with the Earl of
Denbigh, had simplified matters by formally resigning their military
commands, both Houses agreeing in a vote recognising the high
sense of duty shown by “ this action of these lords in this conjuncture
of time,” and resolving “ that their services and fortunes ” should
be taken into considération, and ways found for expressing uthe
acceptance and value both Houses hâve of their faithfulness and
industiy in the commands and hazards they hâve undergone for the
public good of the kingdom and safety of the Parliament.”
Thus, after having been dead for two months and a-half, the
Quarrel between Manchester and Cromwell received an honourable
burial. The accurate student of English history will note that the
termination of this famous quarrel coincides in time with another
great event, distinct from that New-Modelling of the Army and
that Self-denying Ordinance which gave it directly the coup de grâce.
This was the Establishment of the Presbyterian System
in Engl and, the first express votes for which in the two Houses
were in January 1644-5. The Independents, having had so much
of their own way in army matters, had made this inévitable con-
cession to the general bent of Parliamentarian feeling in Church
affairs, satisfied with keeping open the still vital question of the
amount of toleration to be granted to Dissenters.
Cromwell, exempted by spécial vote from the operation of the
Self-denying Ordinance, was at once inserted into the New Model
Army in that post of Lieutenant- General, or second in command, whichxcvx
HISTORICAL PREFACE.
had been purposely kept vacant for him. Thence, through succes-
sive stages, came the rest of his career, ending in his Protectorship of
the United Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, with
their Colonies and Dominions. Through that great career his
quarrel with Manchester was an ail but forgotten affair, only heard of
now and then when Lilburne and other Levellers reverted to it for
their purposes, maintaining that Cromwell ought to hâve brought
Manchester to the scaffold, and that his abandonment of his pro-
secution of the Earl had been his first step out of the straight path
of démocratie duty, and the beginning of his truckling with aristo-
cracy and expediency.
Of the Earl himself little more needs here be said. Parliament
did remember their promise to take into considération his past
services, and especially his handsome acquiescence at last in the
Self-denying Ordinance. In December, 1645, when the successes
of the New Model Army had shattered the King’s power and
brought peace again within view, it was proposed, as part of the
terms of the expected peace, that the King should be requested to
confer dukedoms on the Earls of Essex, Northumberland,Warwick,
and Pembroke, and the honours of the Marquisate on the Earls of
Manchester and Salisbury—inferior peerages, with money pensions,
to be conferred on others of the Parliamentarian chiefs, including
Fairfax, Cromwell, and Waller. As the King, however, would
not even then acknowledge himself beaten, that proposai came to
nothing; and Manchester, still only as Earl, sat on in his place in
the Lords, a leader on the Presbyterian side of the Parliamentarians,
and for a while the Speaker of the House, till about the time of
the trial and execution of the King. Then, the House of Lords
having been abolished to make way for the Commonwealth (February,
1648 9), he retired from the scene, and lived on for about nine
years as a mere private and reluctant subject of the Commonwealth,
holding no post, except (for a time) that of Chancellor of the
University of Cambridge. In 1658, when Cromwell tried the
experiment of re-instituting a House of Lords on new principles,HISTORICAL PREFACE.	* XCVÜ
Manchester was one of the few of the old hereditary peers that were
summoned to sit in it; but, though he is thus remembered in
history as one of “ CromweH’s Lords,” the honour is merely nominal,
as he seems not to hâve obeyed the summons. When CromwelFs
death in that year, and the wreck of the Protectorate of his son
Richard, had made the Restoration probable and désirable, Manches-
ter took a very active part in the arrangements for it. Accord-
ingly, after the Restoration, he had a place in the Court and Coun-
cils of Charles II. that seemed strangely out of keeping with his
antécédents. “ That he [Charles IIr],” says Clarendon, “ might
give a lively instance of his grâce to those who had been of the
pàrty which was faulty, according to his déclaration from Breda, he
made, of his own free inclination and choice, the Earl of Manchester,
who was looked upon as one of the principal heads of the Presby-
terian party, Lord Chamberlain of his house ; who, oontinuing still
to perform ail good offices to his old friends, complied very punc-
tually with ail the obligations and duties which his place required,
never failed being at chapel, and at ail the King’s dévotions, with
ail imaginable decency; and, by his extraordinary civilities and
behaviour towards ail men, did not only appear the fittest person
the King could hâve chosen for that office in that time, but rendered
himself so acceptable to ail degrees of men that none but such who
were implacable towards ail who had ever disserved the King were
sorry to see him promoted.5’a Notices and anecdotes of Manchester
in his capacity of Lord Chamberlain to Charles II., and in other
posts of dignity held by him towards the close of his life, are to be
collected from the memoirs of the period. He died at Whitehall,
May 5, 1671, at the âge of sixty-eight years. He had been five
times married. The présent ducal house of Manchester is descended
from the second marriage.
a Clarendon, ed. 1843, p. 1,005 {Life).
CA MD. SOC.
OERRATA IN DOCUMENTS.
Pp. 48, 49, 50, 52 : for tlie signature “ W. Jhonston ” in these
pages, read “ A. Jhonston.” He was the Scottish Commissioner, Sir
Archibald Johnston, of Warriston ; and the mistake has arisen from the
peculiar shape of “ A ” in the copy of his signature.
P. 60, the sentence should stop after “ Yorke ” in line J, and the
word s from “In the aforesaid ” to “Lincolne” should run into one
sentence with the following words, “ the sinister endes,” &c.
P. 61, line 7 from bottom, for “ Montagne18 ” read “ Montaguë8.”
P. 63, last footnote, for “ Rushwood ” read “ Rushworth.”
P. 64, line 4, for “ lefte on seconded ” read “ lefte onseconded ; ”
which is a Scottish form for “ left unseconded.”OLIVEB CROMWELL
AND
THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
No. 1.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lobds and Gentlemen,
The great necessities that the Scoch army and mine were in hath
caused us to dévidé our armies, and to march into fresh quarters.
I am upon my marche, and doe hope, God willing, to be at Don-
caster to-morrow nightr and there to stay untill I shall reseive
your comands. My men, through want of clothes and other
necessaries, fall sicke dayly. I hope the Lord will preserve ua
from any pestilentiall disease, yet the Scoch army and mine is very
much weakened through sicknes. I thinke fitt to give your Lops
an account where our quarters are. The Scotts are quartered at
Leeds and Wakefield. I am quartered at Doncaster, and soe
forward towards Newarke. Wee hâve left the Lord Fairefax with
his forces in Yorke, and he hath now only some few castles that
make oposition to him. My Lords, I shall not give you further
trouble at this tyme then by offering the service of
Your LoP® humble servant,
Manchester.
Fèry brig, 22 Juljr, 1644.
CAMD. SOC.
B2
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
No. 2.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, sitting
at Derby House.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Since my comeing to this place I hâve intended, as much as in
mee lyes, the freeing of these parts from the violence and oppressions
which they suffered under the garrisons of the enemy. Tychill
Castle being the nerest and the most prejudiciall to the Isle of
Axholme, I summoned at my first coming, and sent into the
towne three hundred dragoones. Whereupon those of the place
desired a parley, and hâve rendred the place unto mee. I hâve
taken some 120 armes, some 80 horse, and hâve given libertie to
the gentlemen to goe unto their severall dwellings, because they
referred themselves very much to my disposall. The place is of
conséquence, in respect it lyes to hinder ail commerce betwixt
Derbyshire and these parts. I hâve sent to the Lord Fairfax to
give him an accompt of it, that he may dispose of it as he pleases.
I hâve nothing further to offer up unto your Lops but to let you
know that I waite your commands here, and shall be ready to obey
them as
Your Lopa humble servant,
Manchester.
Doncaster, 27th July, 1644.
No. 3.—For the Eight Honoürable the Committee of
both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Upon the receipt of your lettre of the 25th of July, the Earle of
Leven, the Lord Fairefax and my selfe, with ail the other chiefe
officers belonging to our armies, had a consultacion what was fittest
to be done upon the consideracion of your Lo?8 lettre. Wee foundmanchester’s correspondence.
3
by our owne certaine intelligence that your Lo?8 informacion con-
cerning Prince Rupert’s being in Lancasbire was not such as wee
could rely upon ; for the Prince, with ail his best horse that he had
remaining, quitted Lancashire upon Wednesday was senight, and
past over into Cheshire at Haie Foard. His dragooners and such
remainder of foote as he hath are dayly boated over from Leverpoole
into Gheshire ; the rest of his horse under the comand of Goreing,
together with some foote under Col. Clavering, the Earle of
Montrosse, are marched towards Cumberland and Westmoreland,
soé as Lancashire hâve onely some petty garrisons left, which the
forces in the county, if well imployed, may easily master. Wee
therefore thought fitt thus to dévidé our forces, that I should march
southward, and that the Scotts with their army should march for
the security of those northerne counties, and to intend the takeing in
of New Castle. Upon the takeing of this resolucion, I intend (God
willing) to be my selfe at Lincolne by Satterday night, and shall
intend the recruiting and refreshing of my forces with what speed I
can, and I shall attend your Lops commands which way you will
hâve mee to march, and what you will hâve mee to doe. I shall
humbly offer this unto your Lops. I hâve sent to the Committee
at Cambridge and the Committees of the sevrall counties to desire
them that they would speed away recruites for this army, both of
horse and foote. They returne mee this answere, that they hâve
lately received an Ordinaunce of Parliament injoyning them to
rayse a new force of horse, foote, and dragoones, which they are
preparing to observe, and therefore doe desire mee to excuse them
in that they are not able to doe, for they cannot pay nor recruite
this army and raise such other forces as are required by that
ordinance. I shall therefore desire to know which way your Lops
please to hâve those forces disposed, and I shall readily obey your
orders, for it doth much frustrate my desires in doeing my duty at
this time to want those recruites and supplyes which I thought to
hâve found ready. But I submit ail to your Lo58 better judgment?,
onely I shall desire to cleere one thing which I heare is very4
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OP MANCHESTER.
confidently insisted iipon, which is, that this army is really and
fully payd. I shall as confidently affirme unto you that they are at
this tyme in arrëare since the first of January, upon halfe pay three
moneths. The arreares before the first of January is more then
since; and the Treasurers, which are two gentlemen of good creditt
and esteerae, doe assure mee that within these few dayes there was
yet unpaid 30,000Z. of the former three moneths assessments; of
these last foure moneths, which is almost illapsed, there is nothing
as yet brought in. I must confesse, and I doe acknowledge it as a
blessing from God, that both the officers and soldiers hâve never
yet refused any marching or duty for want of pay, and I hope they
never will. It is therefore some trouble unto mee to see their
necessities, and yet to heare the confidence of some affirmations
that wee are payd to a day. My Lords, this I write that I may
cleerly give you the truth, not that I will plead to be exempted
from any duty or service that you shall command mee, for I am
ready with that force I hâve (which yet I hope may doe you some
service) to obey your orders as,
My Lords and Gentlemen, your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Bloyth, 1° Augusti, 1644.
Since my comeing to Bloyth I heare there is two régiments of
horse corne into Newarke from Prince Rupert, with the assurance
that the Prince will send some foote thether with ail speed, but I
hope neither his horse or foote shall doe any hurt to that county.
I shall make the more hast into it.
No. 4.—To the Earle op Manchester.
Mt Lord,
Wee hâve taken into consideracion the necessitie of hindering
the recruites of Prince Rupert, and wholly to breake his army,manchester’s correspondence.
5
îf it bee possible. And to that end wee desire you to gather what
force you can together forthwith. And with them, together with
the forces of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and Lancashire, as also
those of Sir William Brereton and Sir Thomas Middleton, to ail
of which wee hâve written to that purpose, and to receive your
orders to march toward Prince Rupert, and attend his motions,
and follow him which way soever hee shall goe, and to take ail
advantages against him that shall bee offered. As to the money
that is behind from the Associacion, wee hâve written to the
several countyes, that with ail expédition it may bee sent unto
you whereever you shall bee, and hâve also appointed it to bee
reported to the House that they will also use meanes to the countyes
for expediteing thereof. Wee hâve your recruites in présent con-
sideracion, and hope to give you good satisfaccion concerning it,
and that the ordinance shall be rather to the advantage thereof than
other, and for Lincolneshire it is without the ordinance, and your
Lop may doe there what you thinke fitt.
Signed, &c.
W. Say and Seale. Jo. Maitland.
Gather your
forces together.
Derbyshire,
Nottingham-
shire. Sir W.
Brereton and
Sir Tho. Mid-
dleton to joyne
and receiye
orders.
Counties writ-
ten to for your
money.
Your recruites
in considéra-
tion.
Lincolneshire
notinthe Ordi-
nance.
Derby House, 6° Augusti, 1644.
Sent by Mr. Potter att night.
No. 5.—For the Right Honourable the Committee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
In my march from Yorke towards Lincolne I was earnestly
intreated, by divers in those parts of Yorkeshire about Sheffield,
that I would consider of the great spoyle that the guarrison in
Sheffield did unto the places neere adjoyning, and likewise of the
conséquence of the place in regard of the great comoditie of iron6
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OV MANCHESTER.
wares that were vented there. I was further moved by tbe Com-
mittee and gentlemen of Nottingham for the reduceing of the
guarrison in Welbeck to the obedience of Parliament, because it
was a great anoyance to those parts. Whereupon I resolved to goe
myselfe with a great part of my forces to Welbecke, and to send
Generall Major Crawford with the rest unto Sheffeild. Upon my
comeing neere Welbecke, I sent in a summons to the place, and
they, with great civillity, sent to parley with mee; and the next
day being Friday they rendred the house unto mee upon com-
posicion. I was willing to give them the larger termes, because I
was not in a condition to beseidge a place soe well fortified as that
was; and therefore I gave the officers and soldiers liberty to march
with ail their armes, colours flying, and other pontillions of warr.
But when I came to take possession of the house, most of ail the
soldiers came unto mee to lay downe their armes, and would not
carry them, but desired ticketts of mee to goe to their owne homes,
the which I graunted them, soe as I had 350 musquetts in the
house, 50tte horse armes, 11 peeces of canon, great and small,
whereof one the governor had libertie to carry away. I had like-
wise 20tie barrells of powder and a tonne of match. The house I
preserved entire, and hâve put a guarrison into it of Nottingham-
shire men untill I know your Lops resolucions, whether you will
hâve it slighted or not. The place is very regularly fortified, and
the Marquesse of Newcastle’s daughters and the rest of his children
and family are in it, unto whome I hâve engaged myselfe for their
quiet aboade there, and to intercède to the Parliament for a com-
pleate maintenance for them. In the which I shall beseech your
Lordships that they may hâve your favour and furtherance. I am
now my selfe corne to Lincolne, and those forces that were with mee
I hâve quartered about Gainsborough and those places, that I may
give them some refreshing after the great hardship they hâve
endured. And I expected here to hâve found the recruets for
this army, according to the often and earnest lettres that I hâve
written unto the Committees of these associated counties. But ailmanchester’s correspondence.
7
the retume I hâve is your LoP8 lettres pressing them to raise and
set forth a new force both of horse and foote under other comanders,
which it seemes are already chosen. This puts me into an unservice-
able condicion, and therefore I desire to know what your LoP8
intencions are in the disposeing of these forces, and 1 shall readily
obey your comands. If your Lo58 please to hâve me to deliver
over the remainder of this force I now hâve into the hands of those
collonells and captains that are to be chosen to give a supplie to
that army that is now to be raised, I shall very readily obey your
order. If your Lo?8 intencions be to dispose of these forces other-
wise, I shall with ail care observe your comands as
Your Lops humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, Angnst 6th, 1644.
No. 6.—To my Lord of Manchester.
My Lord,
In the close of our last wee assured your Lop that wee would
hâve care of your recreutes, and that wee hoped the new Ordinance
should rather bee to the advantage of your recreuts than otherwise.
Accordingly wee hâve reported it the Houses, who hâve agreed that
1800 foot bee sent for the recruiting of your army out of the forces
to bee levied upon the new Ordinance within the Association.
Signed, &c.
W. Say and Se ale. Jo. Maitland.
Derby Houae, 7° Auguati, 1644.
By the Post.
1800 foot for
your recruit.8
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
No. 7.—To the Earle of Manchester.
Orders of the
House appoint
you 1800 foot
for your re-
cruit.
1000 to bee
raised in
Essex.
My Lord,
Wee sent unto you yesterday the Orders of the Houses appointing
1800 foot for recreuting of your forces out of the forces of your
Association now levying upon the new Ordinance. Wee hâve
received lettres from the Committee of Essex, desireing the recruites
required of them by you to bee respited for some tyme, till the
forces they are now levying bee first raised. Wee doe therefore
desire your Lop to take noe more recruites from them than necessity
shall require, because that an entire formed régiment of 1000 is to
bee raysed out of that county upon the new Ordinance.
Signed, &c.
W. Say and Seale. Jo. Maitland.
Darby House, 9° Augusti, 1644.
By Rowland Fankerd, about two afternoone.
No. 8.—For the Right Honourable the Committee of
both Kingdomes, sitting at Darby House.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I received your LoP8 lettre yesterday, by which your comands
were that I should gather what force I could and march towards
Prince Rupert, and to attend his mocions and follow him which
way soever he shall goe. This appeared to me so large a comission,
and a worke so difficult, considering the weake condicion of the
forces that are here with mee, who are now under great indisposi-
cions and infeccions, as that upon the receipt of your Lops order and
comand I called together such of my chiefe officers as were here
with mee to consult which way I might serve your Lops according
to your comands. And from them I received this inclosed paper,manchester’s correspondence.
9
which I take the boldnes to offer to your Lops, as the resuit of our
debate here, which I doubt not but will carry more weight and
receive the better acceptacion, because it is not a single opinion.
My Lords and Gentlemen, these I tender to you in dutie, and
submit them to your better judgments, and beseech you to believe
that I doe not dispute your comands, but only give you a true
accompt of my condicion, and shall observe what further you shall
comand mee, as
Lincolne, 10° Aug. 1644.
Your humble servant,
Manchester.
Considérations concerning the marching of the Sari of Manchester s
army into Cheshire.
1. By marching thither, as is required, it cannot be expected
wee should force Prince Rupert to a second ingagement in the field
this summer, neither (considering the posture he lies in about
Chester, and the opertunity of shifting his horse through Chester
from one side of the river Dee to the other, whereof he possesses ail
the passes for twentie miles upwards from Chester, and below there
are none at ail) is it likely that we can force his horse to quitt their
quarters about Chester and goe away. If we could doe soe, should
we draw away presently, they might returne; should we follow
them with our horse through Wales, or where ever they goe, it
would be a surer way to ruine our horse then the enemies.
To beseidge Chester is not a worke for one moneth in the latter
end of a summer, neither is it likely wee shall gather there a
sufficient force (free from other ingagements) suddenly to doe it,
the worke requiring as great a force as the seige of Yorke, or
greater.
The end, therefore, and busines intended, we suppose, will be to
lye with a comanding body of horse near Chester, to hinder Rupert
CAMD. SOC.	C10
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
from raising any new force in thoee parts, or receiving any accession
of such as would corne or be sent from other parts of this Kingdome
(for from Ireland we cannot hinder any whilest they hâve ail the
ports on their side), and either this or the seiging of Chester would
necessarily keepe us there ail winter.
2. If then wee should goe farr of to soe long a worke, wee must
either take with us sufficiencie of force and ail stores and accomo-
dacions to serve us for the whole tyme, as to need noe supplves
while we are like to stay, or we must provide for a certain way of
ail supplyes to corne unto us. For the first we cannot goe so
provided, being in présent great want of ammunicion and équipage
of ail sorts for the traine, but especially of match (our supplyes
thereof sent for by sea being lately taken by the enemie); our
régiments in great need of recreuts, especially our foote, and of the
men wee hâve boÆi horse and foote (by the former hardships
suffered) soe many sick and wounded, and more dayly falling sicke,
as if we should now march wee must leave a third part behind us; our
arrears of pay intollerable (our horse having had little or none since
the 25th March, which hath cast them into extreame want of ail
necessaryes) ; neither hâve we money in tresurie to take with us
for better encouragements in the future. If we could goe soe well
provided in ail these respects for a long time, yet it were noe
wisdome (depending thereon) to engage soe farr of, and not pro-
vided for a way of new supplyes, if we should happen to want before
that worke were done.
For the second, therefore (the securing of a way for our supplyes),
there being noe possibility of any comeing to us by sea on that side
of the kingdome, nor by any navigable river in our power, ail
supplyes and recruets we should want (of men, horses, armes,
ammunicion, tresury, or any thing) must corne to us by land from
this side the kingdome, and passe under the danger of Belvoyr and
Newarke, and of Bolsover and Tidbury Castles (if the nearest way
from those parts), or of other enemy[s] guarrisons, if any other
way about.manchester’s correspondence.
11
3.	Upon ail these consideracions, tlierefore, it cannot be fit to
goe with this army into Cheshire unlesse (at least) those four
guarrisons were first taken, or provision made by a sufïicient force
to blocke them up or insconse them.
Neither indeed can this army soe well march hence any way
without providing against Newarke, least that active and politicke
enemy (having already got together againe a body of 800 horse
with Hastings his horse, who joyne continually to serve each others
turnes, and are even now continually daring to attempt or annoy
our horse quarters) doe (if they hâve scope left to range) over runne
these partes againe, weaken, if not destroy, our guarrisons, greaten
themselves, and gather fresh force against the spring. This is easie
to forsee and twice taught by expérience wlien they hâve bin
weaker then now, and our Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire forces
stronger. Whereas, these fierie enemyes guarrisons being taken and
blocked up, it will gaine unto the Parliament the advantage of
raiseing new forces, and maintenance for them, out of five or six
counties thereby cleared, which hâve hitherto beene soe infested as
we could never yet by ail our garrisons in them, either raise any
force considérable in them, or support what they hâve had. And
this done will render also most of our guarrisons in these partes
needlesse, or able to spare the greatest part of their présent strength
into field service.
4.	To this soe necessary a worke (and without which first pio-
vided for we cannot goe to stay and doe the busines in those westerne
partes) this army will not suffice, and spare any foote at ail to march
thither as is required, our foote, sicke and Sound, being not above
6000.
5.	This army may doe that worke of these parts, and both keepe
its selfe entire, and lye fitly the while to receive our recreuts and
supplyes needful, and ready also to secure and further serve the
Associacion and Southern partes upon occasion.
6.	The Associacion by which wee were raised and should be payd
(as they hâve been already much discontented at our drawing soe12
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
farr into the North, and leaving them naked ; soe if wee shall now
again draw off soe farre westward and leave them soe long without
the protection for which wee were designed, and Newark, Belvoir,
&c. at liberty to infest them with incursions) will hâve just cause to
withdraw or slacken their hands from our further recreuting or
maintenance, and seeke for some other body and head to protect
them, and the same only to be maintained by them.
No. 9.—To the Earle of Manchester.
Welbeck
House taken
in.
The souldiers
voluntarily
render their
armes.
Ordinance of
July the 12th
noe hindrance
to your
recreuts.
Lincolneshire
not within the
Ordinance.
My Lord,
Your Lops of the 6th présent from Lincolne wee hâve received,
conteyning your takéing in of Welbeck house. Wee congratulate
with your Lop that good successse which God is pleased still to
give to your endeavours, and doe approve your Lops termes granted
them, as whereby your Lop hâve not only gained the house but the
men also, as appeares by their voluntary render of their armes.
And wee shall give ail furtherance to your Lopa desire to the houses
for makeing good your engagements to them. As to your Lopa
recreuts mentioned, wee are sorry they were not ready to attend
your order; yet wee are assured you shall hâve a better account of
them than those lettres. And wee hope before tliis tyme our letters
are corne to your hands, whereby you will discerne that the Ordi-
nance of the 12th of July shall be noe disadvantage to your forces;
for, besides that 1,800 of those are ordered for your recreuts, your
Lop may doe as you please in Lincolneshire, which is not within
the Ordinance. And besides the countye hâve assured us that they
are about those levyes for your LoP; however, by those letters they
would represent their difficulties to see if they could gett any ease,
especially this harvest tyme. And wee desire your Lop to beleive
that it was not the intention of the Houses to doe any thing in that
Ordinance that should in any sort préjudice your army, which,MANCHESTER S CORRESPONDENCE.
13
under your conduct, by tbe blessing of God, hath beene soe pros-
perous and serviceable to the whole Kingdome, and of which, by
the same blessing, wee hâve reason to hope for the same good
service and successe for the future.
Signed, &c.
Darby House, 13° Augusti, 1644.
By Col. Fleetwood, who went the 15th instant.
No. 10.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes sitting
at Derby House, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I received your Lopps letter of the 9th of August, signifying
your pleasure that I shall take noe more recreutes from the county
of Essex then necessity shall require, because an intire régiment of
1000 is to be raysed in that county. I shall obey your Lopa
comands, only I thinke fit to acquaint your Lops what order I had
formerly setled for the recreute of these forces. Those countyes out
of which the regimentes were at first raised I had appointed to
supply the defectes of such regimentes as were by them raised, and
I found this way to give the best satisfaction to the counties, and
made the soldiers more united among themselves. My owne
regimente being raised in Essex, I thought to hâve recreuted it
from thence, it being much weakened through some service it hath
done, and by reason of sicknes that is amongst them. Yet, your
Lops having otherwise ordered it, I shall rather runne the hazard of
other inconveniences which I feare then give a checke to your
other désignés.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I am your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 14th August, 1644.14
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Send a party to
hinder Prince
Rupert’s
recruites.
Rest of your
forces to stay
where you
thinke fittest
for their
recrnits.
Keepe intelli-
gence with the
Scottish and
Lo.Fairfax his
army.
Send 1000 foot
to Abbington.
•	No. IL—-To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
The State of Prince Rupert’s army being other than hee conceived
when wee wrote last unto you, there being soe many of his forces
marched northward, together with the considération of your Lops
lettre ; and the reasons inclosed hâve caused us to al ter our
resolution, and to desire that your Lop will send such a party as
you shall thinke fitt, to joyne with the forces in our former lettres
expressed to bee sent from Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire,
Cheshire, and Sir Thomas Middleton, and to make what improve-
ment may bee of those. joyned forces to hinder his recreuts, and to
proceed further as there shall bee occasion and opertunitie offered.
The rest of your forces may stay where you thinke fittest for their
recreuts from the Association, and for further service. In the
meane tyme wee desire you to keepe constant intelligence both
with the Scottish army and with the Lord Fairfax, that you may
bee ready for the assistance of Yorkshire, if the forces that are in
Westmorland and Cumberland should againe fall intb those parts.
And wee desire also that your Lop will send one thousand foot to
Abbington with ail speed.
Signed, &c.
W. Say and Se ale. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 14° Augusti, 1644.
By Col. Fleetwood.
No. 12.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
The forces of Hartfordshire levied upon the new Ordinance
having received order from us to march to Abbington hâve thismanchester’s correspondence.
15
morning sent us word that they are upon their mardi ; therefore, Hertfordshire
wee desire your Lop that they may bee part of that 1000 which partof°i000
your LoP was to send thither. Your LoP may please to appoint men for Ab-
over them such a major as you shall thinke fitt, or to imbody them bmgfc011*
with other forces to make them a régiment. And for the forces of
Norfolke or Suffolke, the disposition of the major being by the
Ordinance left to this Committee, wee desire your Lop to appoint
over them whom you please. But for the Major of Essex, att the
instant request of the Committee of that county, wee hâve bestowed
it upon Major Moore. And for the supplying of the rest of your
] 000 wee hâve appointed that Colonell Ayloff’s men now att Col. Ayloff’s
Newport shall march thither, which with 200 of your men att yoursatAyles-
Aylesbury shall make up that number which wee desired for bnry^° make
Abbington, which wee conceived most convenient in respect ofupp e
their neerenesse to * the rendey vous, and that thereby there will bee
none drawne from your LoP8 army. Wee hâve just now received
the newes (by a lettre from your Lop® Scout-mastr to Doctor
Stomes) of the takeing of Sheffield Castle. Wee blesse God for
your good succcesse, and give your LoP thankes for that good
service.
Signed, &c.
W. Say and Seale. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 15° Augnsti, 1644.
By Colonell Fleetwood.
No. 13.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee hâve received from the gentlemen of Yorkshire here in Yorkeshire
towne the proposition which wee send herewith inclosed, and doe yoïr^^care
recommend it and the State of that county to your LoP, and desire16
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
that by intelligence held with the Êarle of Leven and the Lord
Fairfax (to whom wee hâve written in like manner) such course
may bee taken therein as to you (who are nearer the place) shall
seeme fitt.
Signed, &c.
W. Sat and Seale. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 21° Augusti, 1644.
By the post att night.
No. 14.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes.
I hâve received your lettres by Maister Harrison, and returne
your Lops many humble thanks for the notice you were pleased to
take of those services which hâve been lately done by the forces
under my command. I shall desire to doe my uttmost in discharge
of that trust the Parliament hath beene pleased to honour mee with,
and I trust that God will blesse the endeavours of your servantes.
This day I recieved advertisement from my forces that lyes before
Wingfield Manner, that that place is rendred unto them upon
composition, soe as I hope I shall now hâve ail my forces together
to refresh and recreute them, and be ready for any further service
your Lops shall comand. In obedience to these last lettres, I shall
préparé a party to send into Cheshire. But, before I send them
away, I shall consult with the Committees of Derby and Nottingham,
to know what assistance they will give, their countryes being now
free by the takeing of these guarrisons. I shall from tyme to tyme
give your Lops an account of the occurency of these parts, and be
always ready to obey ail your comands as,
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 21th Aug. 1644.manchester’s correspondence.
17
No. 15—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Sir William Waller takes ail his forces speedily from Abbington, Sir W. Waller
and goes westward for my Lord Generall’s assistance. Sir Charles ^^hetllwest
Gérard and Sir Baynam Throgmorton (as wee heare) is corne out sir Charles
of Wales with his forces on this side Bath. Sir Francis Dorrington ^^rington
hath a thousand horse. When Sir William Waller is past them, may joyne.
they may joyne and bee able to le vie men to raise the seige at
Basing, and to remove the Parliament forces now att Abbington,
any of which will bee of very ill conséquence. Wee hâve therefore
written to the Committee in Essex to send their new régiment to Essex regi-
Abbington, understanding from them that as yet they had noe ^e^ta^e^d
direction from your LoPP. These and your other forces are there Abbington.
as part of your army, and to bee joyned with it when this émergent
necessitie is over. Wee hope God will soe prosper our affaires in
the north that your LoP may corne with your army neare Oxford,
and then this régiment will bee in a readines for you, and in the
meane tyme kept from a long march backward and forward.
Derby Honse, 22° Augusti, 1644.
By the Post.
No. 16.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee wrote unto your LoP formerly that wee had given order to
the Committee of Essex to march to Abbington with their new
régiment, the forces of Sir W. Waller being to remove from thence
speedily, and to bee employed in the west for the assistance of my
Lord Generall. This day wee hâve received a lettre from that
CAMD. SOC.	D18
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Committee désireing more cleerly to understand our orders, to whom
wee hâve written that our intentions were that they should march
both horse and foot to Abbington, wherewith wee thought fitt
likewise to acquaint your LoP. Wee bave also given order to
300 of the Hartfordshire forces to march to Abbington, and the
remaining two hundred to march to Aylesbury to supply the
absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Sadler’s forces, whom wee hâve
sent to Abbington.
Signed, &c.
Th. Wharton. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 24° Aug. 1644.
By Rowland Fankerd att ten att night.
No. 17.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, sitting
at Derby House.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
According to your comand I prepared a considérable party of
horse and dragoones to send into Cheshire, and consulted with the
Nottingham and Derby Committees what numbers they could aford
in conjuncture with those whom I should send, but I find that they
are not able to give any assistance at ail. I find likewise, by lettres
from Sir John Meldrum, that the Lancashire forces, being a very
great body, and having done very considérable services lately in
routing the forces of the enemy, are not willing to corne out of
their owne country. I hâve received this day intelligence, both
by lettres from Sir William Brereton and others, that Prince
Rupert is marching southward. Of these things I thought fitt to
give your LoP8 an account, and to knowe your further pleasure,
whether you will hâve those horse which I send, to march into
Cheshire, notwithstanding these advertisements, and that there canmanchester’s correspondence.
19
be noe assistance expected from Derby and Nottingham. What-
soever your LoP* sbali further comand shall be obeyed by
Your LoPs most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 26th Aug. 1644.
No. 18.—For the Committee op both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your lettre winch mentions your comanding the
Essex forces to march to Abbington. Ail your comandes are very
willingly obeyed by mee. I hâve likewise received a lettre from
your LoP8 with some proposicions that were tendred to you from the
Yorkeshire gentlemen concerning the raysing of more forces in that
county. I thinke it a very fitt thing, and gave my advice to the
Lord Fairfax at my first comeing into those partes that it was of
absolute necessity to raise a good strength. I am certaine the
condicion of those partes are such as they hâve not only oportunity
to raise men, but alsoe meanes to defray the charge. I shall not
further trouble your LoP8 at this tyme, but rest,
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Your LoP8 most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 27 Aug. 1644.
No. 19.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee hâve here inclosed sent to your LoP the informations wee wee doubt not
hâve this day received from Lancashire and Cheshire. Wee doubt a passent to
J	Sir John Mel-
not but according to our former direction you hâve sent a party to drum and Sir
joyne with Sir John Meldrum and Sir William Brereton and to WühamBrere-20
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Copies to your
Lop of Lord
General Sir W.
Waller and
Col. Middle-
ton’s.
Prince Rupert
marched south;
joyned with
Westmorland
party; is con-
sidérable.
To march with
your whole
army upp to
Woodstocke.
Ready to assist
our forces in
the West.
If Rupert’s
horse onely
march, then
lett your horse
march and
foote follow.
suppresse the forces with Prince Eupert by the [aid1] of the forces
from Westmoreland. Wee recomend to your especiall care that
such a party may bee forthwith sent as may prevent this great and
growing mischeife, and that your Lop would carefully observe the
desires in our former letters sent to you concerning Prince Eupert’s
army.
Derby House, 27° Augusti, 1644.
By the Post.
No. 20.—To the Earle of Manchester.
Wee hâve herewith sent you copies of our lettres from my Lord
Generall Sir W. Waller and Collonel Middleton, whereby your
Lop will understand the condition of our affaires in the West. By
your lettres of the 26th of this instant wee perceive your intelligence
is that Prince Eupert with his force is marching southward, with
which our informations doe concurre, and that, the Lancashire and
Westmoreland horse being joyned with him, hee is a considérable
body, which may distresse the party with Colonél Middleton, and
by calling off that party will in probability ruine the army with
my Lord Generall. Wee therefore, upon serious debate, conceive
it most necessary if Prince Eupert do march upwards, that your
Lop with your whole army doe march towards Woodstocke, which
wee conceive the readiest way to assist our forces in the West, but
wee leave it unto your Lop; and wee earnestly desire'you that
notwithstanding any seige or recreute you would (leaving sufficient
forces to secure your association) with speed march aecordingly.
But if Prince Eupert corne upp with his horse onely, wee desire
your horse may forthwith goe on and your foote follow, because in
probability the tyme of releife of the party with Coll. Middleton
1 Blank in MS.manchester’s correspondence.
21
and my Lord Generall’s army will bee past before your foote can
corne upp. But if upon good intelligence your LoPp doe find that
Prince Eupert with his forces doe not march upwards, wee desire
your Lopp will then send a considérable party to joyne with the
Cheshire and other forces. And for the other part of your army,
besides the party sent into Cheshire and those left to secure your
association, wee offer this to your considération, that your Lop with
the rest of your forces will speedily corne upp to Abbington where
two of your régiments will bee, in which parts wee very much
want forces for the publique good ; and where your forces may doe
very great service and your recruites goe on. For this last
particular if you approve of it wee desire you speedily to putt itt
into execution ; if not, wee desire speedily to heare from you.
Derby House, 28° Aug. 1644.
By Gardner.
No. 21.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Upon information given us that Sir John Norwich and the horse
under his command had beene for a long tyme out of any employ-
ment, wee sent for him to this Committee, and gave him orders to
march to Abbington ; but, being informed by him that his horse
was a part of your Lops army, wee altered our resolutions, and
ordered him with ail expédition to march to your Lopp, which hee
accepted very willingly and promised to performe. It is now above
a moneth since hee received our orders, and wee doe not under-
stand as yet that hee hath putt them in execution. We doe there-
fore desire your Lop to command him speedily to repaire unto your
army, and obey such orders as hee shall receive from your LoP,
which, if hee shall neglect to doe, wee desire your Lopp to cashiere
him of his charge, and to take such course as you shall thinke fitt22
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Necessity of
jour march
westward.
Prince Rupert
marched to-
ward Bristoll.
to secure the horse under his command, and their armes for the
service of the State.
Signed, &c.
Northumberland. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 29 Augnsti, 1644.
By Rouland Fankeard.
No. 22.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
By the enclosed copie of my Lord Generall’s letter your Lop
will see the State of our affaires in the west, and the necessity of your
speedy march that way with ail the forces you can, according to our
former orders. Wee desire you with ail expédition to bend your
course that way, and wee hope there will bee such union and
agreement among yourselves, and ail différences soe composed and
forgotten, as shall enable them to prosecute the warre effectually
to an happy and speedy end. Wee hâve given order to the rest of
our forces to corne to a rendez-vous for the joynt prosecution of
the warre.
Signed, &c.
Derby House, 1° Septembris, 1644.
By John Arnold att five att night, and a duplicate of this by
Mr. Binding att eleven att night.
No. 23.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee hâve received informacion that the forces that were with
Prince Rupert are marched toward Bristoll. Wee therefore desire
your Lopp to send ail the horse you can spare with ail expéditionmanchester’s correspondence.
23
to Abbington (leaving onely soe many as may serve to march upp Send ail the
with your foot), with wbich, and the rest of your horses, wee desire ^pare to Ab^
you will also march accprding to our former orders. And for those bington.
forces that are gone toward Cheshire, wee desire (seeing the forces
that lately fought with Sir William Brereton^s are marched away)
that you will give order to them to march the nearest way forth-
with to Abbington.
Signed, &c.
Northumberland. Jo. Maitland.
Derby House, 2° Septembris, 1644.
One by Mr. Potter, another by the Post, third by K. Fankeard Howandwhen
on Tuesday att night September the
No. 24.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your lettre of the 29 of Aug. and shall observe
your comands in marching towards you as soone as I can. I had
designed a party of horse and dragoones for Cheshire, and they
were 20 miles onward of their march. But receiving lettres from
Sir William Brereton which doe assure me of the Prince’s being
gone out of those parts, and his horse and foote gotten very neare
Bristoll by the way of Wales, I hâve recalled my horse and
dragoones, and intend to march with ail the force I hâve to
Abbington. I shall from tyme to tyme give your Lopps an account
of my marches, and shall obey your Lops comands as
Your Lop3 most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 2° Sept. 1644.24
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OP MANCHESTER.
No. 25.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your lettre of the second of September, and
likewise the duplicate thereof. I shall obey your comands, and am
now upon my march. As soone as I can get some money, which
I hâve sent for, and expect it to morrow night or Thursday, I shall
then send away before me to Abbington as many of the horse as
shall be judged convenient to be spared from the foote, and, with
the rest of the horse and foote, I shall make what haste I can to
Abbington according to your comandes. I am,
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Your most humble servant,
Manchester.
Lincolne, 4° Sept. 1644.
No. 26.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your LoP8 lettre of the third of this instant and
am making what hast possibly I can to obey your comands. I
quarter this night at Bowme, and shall hâve, God willing, ail those
forces of horse and foote to morrow night quartered at Peterborough
or Stamford, and soe to Huntington ; for it is of absolute necessity
wee march that way in regard of money and other necessaryes
which wee want and hope to be supplied of them there. I intend,
God willing, to be at Huntington to-morrow night my selfe to get
in readinesse ail things that shall be wanting for the horse, that I
may send them away before the foote, and shall march away withmanchester’s correspondence.
25
the foote and the rest of the horse as fast as possibly I can to
Abbington. My Lords and Gentlemen I sball be always ready to
observe your comands as,
Your LoP® most humble servant,
Manchester.
Bourne, 5° Sept. 1644.
No. 27.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
Mt Lords and Gentlemen,
I received this morning your LoP® lettre, together with a copy of
my Lord Generall’s lettre, which gives a very sad account of his
présent condition, of the which I hâve a very deepe sense. The Lord’s
arme is not shortned though wee be much weakned. I trust he will
gives us a happy recovery. I shall, with ail the speed I can, march
in observance of your former orders. I cannot expect to hâve any
recreutes, being I am to march soe sudden from these partes, which
will be a great disàppointing to me considering the weakenes of
these forces. I shall from tyme to tyme acquaint your LoP® with
my marches. Concerning those différences which your LoP® take
notice to be amongst some of this army, I hope your LoP® shall
finde that I shall take such care as, by the blessing of God, nothing
of the publique service shall be retarded.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am
Your LoP® most humble servant,
Manchester.
Huntington, Sept. 8°, 1644.
CAMD. SOC.
E26
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Connties
written too to
hasten your
recruites.
Appoint some
officers to
conduct them.
Behre and
Middleton
joyned.
Foote on their
way to South-
ampton.
King intends
for Oxford.
No. 28.»—To the Earle of Manchester.
Mt Lord,
Wee hâve written to ail the countyes of your Association to speed
away the remainder of the forces assigned to your LoPp for recreuts,
or otherwise; a copie whereof wee send inclosed, and desire your
LoPP to give your orders accordingly, and appoint some officers to
conduct them to your LoPP, and not retard your march.
Signed, &c.
Derby House, 9° September, 1644.
By John Preistly.
No. 29.—To my Lord of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee hâve received agayne this day intelligence that the horse
of my Lord Generall, under the command of Commissary Generall
Behre, and those with Lieutenant-Generall Middleton, are joyned
together, and are marching toward Somerton and Weymouth.
And that the foote were ail corne as farre as Okehampton, towards
Southampton, where there will bee both armes and cloathes for
them, and wee hope there will bee speedily a very good army on
foote agayne. The King intends with his army to march to
Oxford if he can get through. Therefore wee desire your LoPP
to make ail the expédition you can possible to Abbington, and to
give us advertisement ofyour marches as you proceed.
Derby House, 11° 7bris. 1644.
By Binding att nine att night.manchester’s correspondence.
27
No. 30.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your Lops lettre of the 21th of this instant,
together with the votes of both Houses of Parliament, the which I
shall readily obey. I am now upon my march to Reading àccord-
ing to your former orders. I hâve already written to Sir William
Waller to give him an account where I intend to be according to
your orders, and I shall from tyme to tyme keepe as an exact
intelligence with him as I can. Your Lo?8 shall not need to feare
any disagreement on my part in point of comand. The only
difficulty I looke upon (which I hope your LoP5 will take into your
consideracion), that when wee doe joyne wee may hâve such a
considérable strength as may keepe up the reputacion of an army.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am
Your Lops humble servant,
Manchester.
Watford, 22 Sept. 1644.
No. 31.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
By the order enclosed your LoPP will see the resolucion of the
House of Commons conceming your march, and what they expect
in reference to that order, which wee hâve therefore sent your Lopp,
and doe most earnestly desire you that according to that order and
our former requests your Lopp will speed your march into the west.
The enemies horse wee heare are corne to Bridgwater, the foote
to Crediton, and comeing eastward. Your Lopp was présent att our
dcbates and doe know the necessitie of this’ service. Wee desire by
Speed your
march into the
West accord-
ing to your
order from the
House.28
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
the messenger to heare from you. The House of Commons will
expect a dayly knowledge of your Lop® pursuing their desires.
Derby House, 24° Septb8, 1644.
By Mr. Binding.
No. 32.—For the Right Honorable the Committee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES, &C.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your LoP® lettre, together with the vote of the
House of Commons. It is very probable that that House and your
LoP® may be informed of my being at Uxbridg; for the bridge of
Maydenhead being broken, I am constrayned to stay untill it be
soe mended as that I may passe over; which my carpenters enformed
me could not be done untill this night. This also being the fast day
I thought it a duty to seeke God. Your LoP® may be assured that
I shall march as soone as with any conveniency I can, and, there-
fore, I shall desire that favour from your LoP® that my former
observances to your commands may somewhat prevaile in lessening
the opinions of my backwardnesse to obey your comands. I was
présent at some of the debates which your LoP® mention, and your
LoP® know what my humble opinion was. I am still of the same
minde, that if the King be upon his march, in that condition that I
see those armyes in, you doe expose us to scorne, if not to ruine;
but, my Lords, when my sense is delivered I shall obey as farre as
in me lyes. Your LoP® desire me to send my horse before me
westward. Your LoP® know that you hâve comanded most of my
horse and some foote and dragoones to Banbury. I hâve with me
but a compleat number to guard the foote that are with me. Your
Lop® shall hâve a dayly account of my pursuing your orders.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am your humble servant,
Manchester.
Harfeild, 25 Sept. 1644.manchester’s correspondence.
29
No. 33.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee received your lettre, and doe assure ourselves your LoPP Our orders
will speedily march with your forces westward. But where your^Ri^ert att*
Lopp writes of this Committee’s ordering most of your horse, some Evesholme.
dragooners and foote, our orders were because of the forces of
Prince Rupert about Evesholme, and the enemies entring your
Association, that 1500 of your horse and dragoones should stay 1500 horse and
about Oxford; but how many dragoones was left to your pleasure, stafabout*0
and out of which 1500 your LoPP might send some into Lincolne- Oxford,
shire soe they exceed not 500; and ail the rest of your horse and Alltherest to
foote were forthwith to march into the West, and your horse to goe int°the
on before your foote, excepting soe many horse as shall bee necessary
to march with your foote.
Derby House, 26° Septembris, 1644.
By John Preistly att eight att night and duplicate.
No. 34.—For the Right Honoürable, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your letter and shall with what I can obey your
comands. I hope you will be carefull to hasten such forces as
were in yoür intentions to send, for these that are with me are not
a strength sufficient to hazard the issue of our affayres upon. This
day most of my forces are to passe over at Maydenhead, which they
could not hâve done sooner. l'have sent 500 horse into Lincoln-
shire. I hâve left Lieut.-Generall CromwelPs régiment of horse at30
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Sir Thomas
Glemham
marched from
Newarke.
If S06, Col.
Fleetwood to
retnrne ont of
Lincolneshire.
To leave 1500
horse and
dragoones
about Oxford.
Use ail possible
expédition in
your march
westward.
Sir. W. Waller
to stay about
Shaftsbury if
the King stays
westward.
Banbury with 3 companyes of dragoones and 7 companyes of foote.
The rest of the horse and foote are with mee. I am,
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Harfeild, 27 Sept. 1644.
No. 35. —To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee hâve received information from Lieutenant-Generall
Cromwell that Sir Thomas Glemham with 21 col[ou]rs of horse
and dragoones is marched from Newarke by Ashby, as it is beleived
with an intention to raise the seige at Banbury or joyne with
Prince Eupert. Wee hâve written to Colonell Fleetwood, if that
information shall prove true, to returne with the 500 horse sent
into Lincolneshire under his command, to such place as Lieutenant-
Generall Cromwell shall appoint for his assistance against them-
selves. Wee wrote unto your Lop formerly to leave onely about
Oxford 1,500 horse and dragoones, and with ail the rest of your
forces, horse and foot, to march westward, and to send your horse
before your foot, leaving onely with your foot a sufficient guard.
According to the order of the House of Commons, the copie whereof
is here inclosed, wee againe desire your Lop to use ail possible
expédition in your march westward, and to send your horse before
your foot, leaving onely with your foot a sufficient guard, which
wee conceive five hundred to bee upon consideracion of the informa-
tions wee hâve received concerning the marching of the King’s
forces eastward, and of the waies and meanes to oppose their désignés.
Wee hâve thought fitt to Write to Sir W. Waller that if the King’s
forces shall continue westward that hee stay about Shaftsbury, if
hee can doe it with safety. And if the King shall march eastward,manchester’s correspondence.
31
that hee corne to Marlborough or thereabouts, to which places my
Lord Generall (according as hee shall heare of the King’s motions)
is to send 1,500 of his horse, or at least soe many as hee can hâve in
readinesse; and wee doe likewise desire your Lo? to send your horse send your
(soe many as may guard your foote excepted) to the same places °f ^ftebnry or
Shaftsbury or Marlborough, according as y ou shall understand of Marlborough.
the motions of the King’s forces. Wee hâve desired my Lord
Generall to send his foot to Newbury, to which place wee desire
your Lop to cause your foot to march; and wee shall use our best
endeavours to hasten thither the citty forces.
Derby House, 28° Septembris, 1644.
By Mr. Butler.
No. 36.—For the Committee op both Kjngdomes, &c.
Mt Lords and Gentlemen,
I am now at Eeading, and hâve received letters from. Sir William
Waller by which he advertises mee of his being at Shaftsbury with
a reasonable good body of horse and dragoones, but the foote which
he had with him he hath beene inforced to divide into Plymouth
and the port townes of those countyes, soe as he hath none or but
few with him. I believe, therefore, your Lops will not think it
wisdome in mee, nor to stand with the safety of the présent con-
dition of your affaires, to march further with soe inconsiderable a
strength as I hâve. Since I came hither I hâve made some inquiry
into the strength of Abbington, and I heare that it is in such a
condition as I much feare it will not be a place for you to rely
upon. This towne is of very great conséquence, and it is a great
préjudice that the fortifications hâve beene soe neglected. I am
much troubled to heare of the enemyes over running most part of
Lincolneshire. It cannot but much distract and distress those
associated countyes. I heare that the King with his strength was32
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
expected at Sherborne on Friday last. If he march speedily infco
these partes it will concerne your LoP8 to hâve your forces in as
good a posture as you can., My Lords and Gentlemen, I shall
alwayes desire to approve my selfe
Your most humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 29° Sept. 1644.
Postscript.—Since I wrote the other part of my letter I hâve
intelligence that Prince Rupert is corne to Welles, and that a
good party of the Kinge’s horse bend their march for Malborough.
I sent this day to view the Castle of Dunington, and I am informed
that there is little probability of takeing it without more tyme then
it is probable they will hâve. There are very good gunns, which
if they be not tymely brought off they may be in danger to be lost.
Your LoP8 will finde that if the King march into these partes
Abbington will not be able to resist him, but those men will be a
prey unto him. I thought it my duty to give your Lo?8 this
account, and I referre the determining what shall be done unto your
LoP® wisedomes.
No. 37.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your Lops lettre of the 28th of this instant, by
which I perceive your LoP8 hâve given -order for the recalling of
Colonel Fleetwoode’s régiment of horse, which I had appointed to
goe into Lincolnshire to their assistance. The number I appointed
was by your LoP8 comand, and therefore I hope I hâve not erred in
it. I shall be very glad if those parties may be in such a condicion
as they may not want such a strength to releive them. I am mis-
informed if the enemy within these few dayes be not broken into
Lindsey Coste, and plundered and spoyled the country of Lindsey,manchester’s correspondence.
33
soe fane as L ou the, soe as most of the people of those partes are
fled into Boston for their safety. According to your LoP® former
orders I hâve left about Oxford Lieutenant-Generall Cromwelles
régiment of horse and three troopes of dragoones, with the rest of
the horse and foote I am marched thus fane westward. Most of
my horse are quartered betwixt Newberry and Basing. I did in
my last lettre to your LoP® take the bouldnesse to acquaint you how
unsafe I thought it for me to march further then this place with
soe small a number of foote as I yet hâve with me. When any
further strength shall be gathered together in these parts I shall
be very ready to doe the best service I can. Your LoP® very well
know the obligacion I haue to those countyes who haue, as farre as
in them lay, put this trust upon mee. I receive from them dayly
lettres expressing their great trouble that their forces are drawne
soe farre from them ; and your LoP® well know that by Ordinance
of Parliament these forces are not to be comanded any whether but
with the consent of the Comittees of the Associacion. The Comittee
for Suffolke sent mee some reasons why they did conceive the distance
of these forces might be of sad conséquence to them, the which I
send your LoP® here inclosed; it being a duty which I owe both
to your Lop® and to them to represent things cleerly and plainly
unto you, and to desire that your comands may be such as that in
giveing obedience to your LoP® I may discharge my duty towards
them who hâve placed this trust in me for their owne security.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am
Your Lop® most humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 30° Sept. 1644.
No. 38.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Sending this bearer, Mr. Cullemburg, Cheife Engineere, to Mr. Cullen-
view the towne of Keading and to give his judgment concerning ^^T1to view
CAMD. SOC.	F34
CROMWEL'L AND THE EARL OP MANCHESTER.
the fortificacion thereof, wee doe recommend him to your favour,
desiring your LoP to speake in his behalfe with the Committee
there, that when hee shall give his opinion therein meanes may bee
providing for the perfecting thereof, and himselfe favoured for his
safe joumey from thence to Abbington.
Derby House, 30° Septemb», 1644.
No. 39.—To the Earle op Manchester.
My Lord,
Your LoP® lettre of the 30th of September from Reading wee
hâve received, and touching the orders of this Committee for
recalling of Colonell Fleetwood’s régiment of horse, they were
conditionall upon information from Lieutenant-Generall Cromwell
that Sir Thomas Glemham with 21 colours of horse was marched
from Newarke by Ashby to joyne with other forces, which if it
should hâve proved true Colonell Fleetwood was to retume, and
not otherwise. Wee hâve upon receipt of your Lop® lettre written
to Colonell Fleetwood, if that former information doe not prove
true and the enemie bee still in Lincolneshire, to proceed in his
journey to Lincolneshire, and there to use his best endeavours
against the enemie and for the secureing of those parts. Wee hâve
likewise thought fitt to renew our former desires to your LoPP to
Send your send your horse and foot according to our former orders. Your
accor(Hngftote ^°P receive here inclosed a copie of the Ordnance past both
our former Houses, according to the intent whereof wee are considering of
persons and instrucions wherewith your LopP shall bee acquainted
speedily.
Derby House, 1° Octobris, 1644.
By his LoP® owne messenger.manchester’s correspondance.
35
No. 40.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Having taken into considération how prejudiciall délayés hâve
alwaies proved to the publique service, and how necessary it is that
your Lop should advance speedily westward, wee hâve thought fitt
againe to renew our desires to your Lop to send your horse and foot Send yonr
according to our former orders, which wee hope you will doe with ^ccording to0t
that expédition that wee shall not need to iterate ytt againe to your former orders.
Lopp. Wee hâve sent your LoP here inclosed a copie of my Lord
Generall’s lettre with our answer to the same, and of the information
wee hâve received from Sir William Waller.
Derby House, 2° Octobris, 1644.
By Mr. Binding.
No. 41.—For the Comittee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Since my last letter to your Lops I hâve received a lettre from
Sir William Waller, by the which he certifies me that the King is
marching eastward. I had it likewise from my owne scoutes that
he quartered upon Wednesday night five miles on this side Dor-
chester, and that he marches very fast. It is thought by the most
and it is reported at Oxford that he will corne by Newberry and
Abbington, and soe to Oxford. Others think he will bend his
course to Winchester, but it is most probable that he will corne this
way ; and therefore I thinke it may be very necessary to hasten the
marching of the Citty foote up hether. I shall be ready to doe
the best service I can with those forces I hâve, and therefore I hâve
sent Lieut.-Generall Cromwell to make what hast he can unto me
with those horse and dragoones that are with him. This gentleman,36
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Colonell Sparrow, coming this day to me and acquainting me with
the condition of Abbington, I thought it my duty to desire him to
wayte upon your Lops and to make a true relacion to you of it,
considering I had intelligence of the Kinges march this way.
Your Lops may be pleased to thinke of sending downe match and
powder for your forces in these partes, for I hâve lessened my store
I brought with me by furnishing of them, and I shall not hâve
enough to serve them and my selfe, I shall dilligently inquire after
the King’s motions and give your Lops an accompt of them.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am
Your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 3° Octobr. 1644.
I desire to know your Lops pleasure whether you will hâve my
horse goe to Malborough.
No. 42.—For the Comittee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your Lops lettres, by which I perceive your Lopa
remaine unsatisfied with mee for my not marching further west-
ward. In a lettre lately to your Lopa I did humbly represent my
condicion to you. I hâve since that time received other lettres
from the county of Norfolke by which they represent unto me their
feares with their desires that their forces may not be carryed soe
farre from them as they heard they were intended ; and they did
request me to improve my interest in effecting their desires, other-
wise they feared they should be disabled as to further recruites or
payments of mony. I should faile in my duty both to them and
your Lops if I should not déclaré this unto you. As to my marching
further westward, which I conceive is to Newberry, because I had
intimacion in a letter that that place was appointed for a rendezvous
for my Lord Generalles foote and mine. I hâve ordered twomanchester’s correspondence.
37
régiments of foote to lye in Newberry, which is more then the towne
can well hold with those forces that are there already of Major-Generall
Browne’s. The rest of my foot are quartered in this towne and the
villages hereabouts, and they shall be within a dayes march of the
rendezvous. I confesse I hâve ordered it in this manner because it
gives some satisfaction to the countyes who intrust mee and it
refreshes the foote, for whom I hâve not as yet mony nor clothes,
which I expect within few dayes. As for those horse your Lops
appoint me to send to Malborough, they are thus disposed at this
présent: Fower troopes I hâve sent to Baseing at the eamest request
of the Comittee of that county ; nine troopes lye quartered as near
Newberry as they well can, that they may be assistant either to
Newberry or Abbington if there be occasion. The rest of those
that are with mee lye quartered about this towne. There are
twenty troopes of horse and dragoones with Lieut.-Generall
Cromwell about Banbury according to your LoP® comand. Since I
came into these partes I hâve in what way I could beene serviceable
to those guarrisones. I received this day a lettre from Major-
Generall Browne, which, according to his desire, I thinke fitt to
send unto your LoP®. My Lords and Gentlemen, I hope the
publique shall not suffer by my délayés, for I hope it shall appear
that I shall not be the last at the rendezvous your LoP® hâve
appointed. I intend (God willing) to goe myselfe to morrow to
Newberry, but shall be here againe by Saturday.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am
Your LoP® most humble servant,
[Manchester.]
Reading, 3° Octobris, 1644.
No. 43.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee are advertised from Major-Generall Browne that hee, by a
lettre from the Comittee of Essex, understands that Colonell38
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OP MANCHESTER.
Colonell Spar-
rowes régiment
to make npp
recreuts.
Comittee of
Essex written
too to let it bee
where it is.
Keepe intelli-
gence with Sir
W. Waller
and my Lord
Generall.
Joyne your
horse with
theirs.
Citty brigade
to march on
Monday,
appoint two
troopes to meet
them att Cole-
brooke.
Citty forces to
joyne with
yonr Lpp.
Colonell
Washborne’s
troope to
fctend that
Sparrowes régiment is to recreut your Lp and to bee putt under
new officers. In regard of the conséquence of the keeping the
towne of Abbington, where that régiment is employed, wee hâve
written to the Committee of Essex that they will take some other
course for your Lops recreuts, and that the same régiment may not for
the présent bee broken, but left as it is for the service of Abbington,
from which it cannot bee as y et spared. Wee desire. also ‘that you
will keepe a constant intelligence with Sir W. Waller and my
Lord Generall ; and, their horse being now joyned, you will soe
order the march of your horse as you may also joyne with them in
one body att such place as shall bee most fitt, and to give us speedy
notice of what you doe herein. The brigade of the cittie is appointed
to march on Monday next; wee desire your Lop to appoint two
troopes of your horse to bee ready to meet them when they shall bee
at Colebrooke. They are, by the order of the House, to bee joyned
to your Lop or Sir W. Waller, and wee hâve appointed them to
joyne with your Lop. Wee hâve also appointed a troope of horse
of Colonell Washbome’s to attend that brigade, and. desire your Lop
to appoint the troope of Captayne Middleton to bee another to
attend them, unlesse your Lop knowes some cause to the contrary,
and then wee desire you to appoint some other troope as your
LoP please for that service.
Derby House, 4° Octobris, 1644.
No. 44.—For the Comittee oe both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your Lop* lettre of the 4th of October. As
conceming that régiment under Colonell Sparrow the Comittee
for Essex doe much desire that I would take it for part of recreutes
for my régiment. But 1 shall not take upon mee the disposeing of
it without your LoP® approbation, and shall expect some other
course to be taken for my recreutes. I doe observe your LoP*manchester’s correspondence.
39
comands in keeping constant correspondence with my Lord
Generall and Sir William Waller. Most of my horse are quartered
in Hungerford and thereaboutes. And I hâve written to Sir
William Waller to let him know that upon any occasion, if he will
appoint whether they shall corne to him, they shall be ready to
serve him. I hâve appointed two troopes to be ready to wayte
upon the citty brigade when they shall be at Colebrooke. As for
Captaine Middleton*s troope I left it at Huntington to be recreuted,
and he is now there. And I beleive those parts atthis tyme are in
soe great feares as if I shall call him from thence it may prove
inconvénient, but if your LoP® please to comand mee I shall doe it,
being always ready to observe your LoP® comands as
Your LoP® most humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 5° Octob. 1644.
No. 45.—To the Earle op Manchester.
My Lord,
Upon consideracion of the information wee hâve received from
Sir William Waller, whereof this enclosed is an extract, wee hâve
thought fitt to desire your LoP® without any further delay to send Send ail your
ail your horse to joyne with my Lord Generall and Sir William
Waller’s, leaving onely 500 about Banbury and 500 to guard your Généralisé
foot, conceming which wee hâve likewise written to Lieut.-Generall f^her delay.
Cromwell, whereof wee desire your Lopp to hâve extraordinary care
that it may bee put speedily in execution, and to give us from tyme
to tyme notice of your proceedings. Upon advertisement of the
surprizall of Crowland wee hâve written to the Comittee of
Cambridge to send 300 foot to Horsey bridge to keepe that passe, Cambridge to
or to such place as Lieut.-Governor Treton or Colonel Walton shallsend 300 foote*
appoint. And if any recreuts intended for your LoP may bee in Recreuts, if
readinesse to send them to the Isle of Ely, and to call in the ^ee sTnfto the
countrey thither and to the towne of Cambridge. Wee hâve Isle of Ely.40
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
likewise written to the Yorkshire, Nottingham, and Darbyshire
forces, which are joyned in Lincolnshire with your Lops forces, to
attend the enemies forces in those parts. Upon receipt of your Lops
lettre of the [5th] of this instant, wherein your Lop doth informe
us that Captaine Middleton’s troope is att Huntingdon, wee desire
Leave Captain y0ur Lopp to leave that troope to bee disposed of by the Comittee
troope att of Cambridge for opposeing the enemie that is now fallen mto their
Huntington, association. These two troopes which your Lop hath appointed to
attend the Citty brigade wee desire that they may bee sent to Cole-
brooke against the morrow att night to convey the [train of
artillery] to Eeading, to bee sent to my Lord Générales army,
which wee desire your Lop to keepe safely till your Lop shall under-
stand from my Lord Generall to what place to send the same.
Derby House, 7° Octobris, 1644.
Nottingham
and Derby-
shire
written too to
joyne and
attend the
enemie.
No. 46.—To the Earle of Manchester.
Send your
horse upp to
Sir W. Waller
speedily.
Order of the
House tomarch
west with ail
your forces.
Two troopes
att Colebrooke
to corne to
Brainford to
convey Lord
GeneralPs
traîne.
Send two
other troopes
to Colebrooke
for the cittie
brigade.
My Lords,
According to our former orders we desire your Lop, if your horse
bee not already marched, to send them speedily upp to Sir William
Waller. Your Lop will receive here inclosed the Order of the
House of Commons for your Lo?8 marching forthwith westward
with your forces, which we desire you accordingly to pursue with
ail expédition ; for the more safe conveighing of my Lord Generall’s
trayne of artillery and other carriages we hâve appointed those two
troopes sent by your Lop to Colebrooke to corne to Brainford, from
whence they are to convey the same to your Lop. And wee desire
your Lop to send other two troopes to Colebrooke on Thursday
night to attend the Cittie Brigade.
Derby House, 8° Octobris, 1644.
By Hanbury, sen.MANCHESTER^ CORRESPONDENCE.
41
No. 47.—For thé Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your LoP8 letter, together with an order of the
House of Commons, by which I am directed to march westward.
I hâve often received orders from the House of Commons for my
marching westward, but they ne ver designed any place to which I
should march. I hâve received comands from your LoP8 formerly
to march with my foote to Newberry, which was the place your
LoP8 did désigné for a rendezvous of my Lord Generall’s foote, the
Citty forces, and these forces of the associated countyes. According
your LoP8 comands my foote hâve beene, and are still ready at any
time within a few howers to be at the rendezvous. If it be your
Lops intention that I should march further then the place you first
appointed, if you please to assigne the place whither you will hâve
me to march I shall obey your comands. I hâve according to your
LoPs comands ordered two more troopes to march to morrow night
to Colebrooke. I did yesterday send orders to those horse that lay
at Hungerford to march to Salisbury, and that they should give
notice to Sir W. Waller of their readiness to obey his comands.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am,
Your LoP® humble Servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 9° Octob. 1644.
Since I writt this letter I received intelligence from Sir W.
Waller that the King is advancing with his army, and that he
intends to retreat according to your LoP8 orders to Marlborough.
I only offer this as my humble opinion to you that the sooner your
foote corne up altogether it will be the more advangeous to your
affaires.
camd. soc.
G42
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
King march-
ing eastward.
Agréé upon a
convenient
place where
jour foot may
meet together
to keepe the
Kiug wesfc.
King
adyanceth east.
Order Lieut.-
Generall Crom«
well’s horse
left about
Banbury to
march to him.
Agréé with
Lieut.-
Generall for a
place to joyne
your forces.
No. 48.—To The Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Wee understand by the postseript of your LoP8 letter of the 9th
of this instant, that the King’s army is marching eastward, upon
considération whereof wee hâve thought fitt to desire your LoPP
by correspondence with m y Lord Generall to agréé betweene
yourselves upon a convenient place where ycur foote may meet
together soe as they may best keepe the King’s army westward.
Wee shall use our best endeavours to hasten the citty forces to
follow you speedily. Your LoP will receive here inclosed the vote
this day past the House of Commons.
Derby House, 10° Octobris, 1644.
By Craven.
No. 49.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Having received certaine of the King’s advance with ail his
forces, wee thinke it fitt to send what forces wee can to oppose
his march. And tlierefore desire you immediately to give order to
the horse of the régiment of Lieutenant Generall Cromwell that
are left behind att or about Banbury, or any of your LoP* horse
that are there, that they forthwith with ail expédition march up to
the rest of your horse to goe along with the rest of the horse in
this service according to former directions. Wee desire your Lop
according to our former orders by correspondence with my Lord
Generall to agréé upon a convenient place where your forces may
meet together, soe as they may best keepe the King’s forces west-
ward, and will bee most for the advantage of the publique service,
and soe to looke to the enemies motions as you may not bee hindered
to joyne with my Lord Generall for that end.
Derby House, 11° Octobris, 1644.
By Mr. Potter.manchester’s correspondence.
43
No. 50.—For the Comittee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your Lops letter of the lOth of this instant, and
shall accordingly send unto my Lord Générait to know where he
will comand me to wayte upon him with those foote I hâve here.
I hâve likewise received a vote of the House of Commons which
orders me to observe such orders as I shall from tyme to tyme
receive from your Lops, which I am ready to obey. 1 sent my
horse, according to your Lops comands, towards Salisbury, but upon
the receipt of a letter from Sir W. Waller, by which he gave mee
notice he was marched from Shaftesbury towards Marleborough, I
called backe my horse to their former quarters, which were neare
unto Marlborough. This day I heard from Sir W. Waller, and
he desires me to send my horse to Woodford. which accordingly I
shall doe. I heare the King with his army is about Blandford.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am,
Your Lops most humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 11° Octob. 1644.
I heare that my Lord Generalfs traine of artillery will be heare
this night. I shall immediatly give my Lord Generall notice of it.
No. 51.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve received your letter of the llth of this instant. I can give
you this account, that I hâve kept intelligence with Lieut.-Generall
Cromwell, and as I hâve heard of the King’s advance I hâve sent
him advertisemt thereof and wished him to advance hither. And
when I hâve heard of the King’s retreating backe or lyeing still I
wished him to remaine in his quarters, because I had no positive44
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
orders to remove his horse from thence. Yet, having intelligence
on Thursday last that the King was advanced as farre as Blandford,
I sent an order to him to mardi away with ail his horse with what
convenient speed he could. And, though I hâve not heard from
him sinoe, yet I believe he is upon his march. I hâve now this
day upon the receipt of your Lops letter sent him a copie of it, and
hâve renewed my orders to him for his présent marching up to the
rest of the horse. I hâve sent unto my Lord Generall to know
what place he will appoint me to attend his comands with the
forces I hâve here, and I cannot tell which way to march untill I
doe receive notice from my Lord Generall which way he will direct
mee to wayte on him. Those souldiers that are here with mee doe
thinke that I am in as fitt a posture to joyne with my Lord Generall
as I can be. I take ail the care I can to hâve certaine informacion
of the King’s motions. I thinke fitt to give your Lops notice that
my Lord GeneralPs traine of artillery, money, and carnages came
hither the last night.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am,
Your humble servant,
Manchester.
Reading, 12° Octob. 1644.
Post.—If your Lops thinks fitt that I should march to Basing or
that way to meet my Lord Generall I shall observe your Lops
comands. I shall desire to know what your Lops will hâve me doe
with the money and traine of artillery.
No. 52.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
Mt Lords and Gentlemen,
Since I writt my last letter to your Lops I received a letter from
my Lord Generall by which he is pleased to let me know that he
will not be ready to begin his march till Wednesday. Hee hath
likewise sent mee the places of his march from day to day. I intend
(God willing) to be about Basingstoake upon Wednesday and soemanchester’s correspondence.	45
to hâve our foote to lye betwixt Newberry and Basingstoake, and
there to meet with my Lord Generall. Lieut.-Generall Cromwell
is corne hither this night. His troopes are yet at Henly, but I
bave given order they shall march forwards to-morrow, according to
your Lop® direction. I heard this day from Sir W. Waller, who
remaines still in the same quarters he was in, and the King
remaines still at Blandford, and these quarters he formerly was in.
I hear likewise that P. Kupert is bringing the remainder of his
forces from Bristoll to the King.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am,
Your humble servant,
Reading, 14° Octobr. 1644.	MANCHESTER.
No. 53.—To the Earle of Manchester.
My Lord,
Your Lop® of the 12th instant wee hâve received, whereby we
perceive you hâve written to my Lord Gçnerall for a place of
rendezvous. Wee desire you, according to our former orders, that
you will in the meane tyme be marching westward the more to
hinder the King’s advance this way and the sooner to meete the westward to
Lord Generall, and for the particular place wee leave that to your
Lop upon your corresponding with my Lord Generall.	yance.
Derby House, 14° Octobris, 1644.
By Mr. Newman.
No. 54.—For the Kight Honourable the Comittee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES, &C.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I received your Lop® letter yesterday in the afternoone of the 12th
of this instant and shall humbly offer your Lop® this account that
upon the receipt of your LoP® first letter I sent to his Excellency to
know where he would appoint me to wayte on him with these
forces under my comand. But I hâve not received any answere46
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
from my Lord as yet. Upon the comeing hither of my Lord
GeneralPs traine of artillery and mony, I sent againe unto him to
let him know of their being here, neither hâve I received an answere
of these letters as yet ; therefore, feareing my former messengers
might be intercepted, Mr. Gerrard, who brought the mony, and the
Comptroller of the Artillery are gone to Portsmouth to my Lord,
and I hâve againe written to my Lord to certifie him that where-
soever he please to appoint his rendezvous I shall not faile (God
willing) to wayte upon him. As for the forces under my command
the most of the horse that were with mee are with Sir W. Waller,
according to your Lops comands. The most of the foote are
advanced forward excepting three regimentes that are here for the
guard of my Lord GeneralPs artillery, my owne, and the carnages.
Nor can I tell which way to order my march untill I know where
my Lord Generall please to appoint me to joyne with him. If the
King march this way before wee be conjoyned or before the citty
forces corne up, I shall desire to know your Lops directions whether
y ou will hâve me engage with those foote and horse I hâve, joyning
my selfe with Sir W. Waller’s horse, if I can. If you please to
give me a possitive command in this particular I shall punctually
observe it, for I hope it shall never be justly sayd that I either
décliné action or retard it. I shall be glad to serve any of your
Lops number when they doe corne downe.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Your humble servant,
Reading, 14° Octob. 1644.	MANCHESTER.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am desired to offer this unto your
Lops that in regard of our great want of money, whether your
Lops would be pleased that wee might make use of two thousand
pound of this money of my Lord GeneralPs, and it shall be payd
here againe within one weeke. Or if your Lops please to furnish
us with soe much from London it shall be repayd againe there by
Mr. Léman, the treasurer of the association, within a weeke.MANCHESTER S CORRESPONDENCE.
47
No. 55.—To my Lord Generall and Lord Manchester.
My Lords,
The House of Cornons hath recomended to this Comittee that
some of your LoPs forces should be sent to the seige of Bassing for
the reduceing of that garrison, whieh is a service of very great
concernment.
Wee desire your Lops being upon the place, and knowing best More forces to
the State of your forces, to send such of your forces thither for that BasSg.*0
purpose as you thinke fitt, soe as it may stand with our other
affaires which wee hâve formerly written to your Lops about.
Darby House, 16° Octobris. 1644.
By Mr. Boyce, Lord Generall Messenger.
No. 56.—For the Committee op both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
According to ad vice with Sir W. Waller, and in order to a con-
junction with my Lord Generall, I am marched to Basingstoke,
and came hither upon Thursday. Yesternight late, I received a
very hott allarme from Sir William Waller’s quarters that the King
with ail his army was corne to Andover, and that he was upon his
retreate towards mee, whereupon I drew out my foote and those
horse that were with mee, in order to hâve done the best service I
could for Sir W. Waller’s security. But, blessed be God, he is
safély retreated hither with little or noe losse. And Sir William
Balfour is likewise corne hether with my Lord Generall’s horse.
Upon this alarme I sent to my Lord Generall to advertise him of
it, and to desire his speedy advance, who, notwithstanding some
difficulties, is marched this night to Alton. Upon this suddaine
occasion I tooke upon me to write to Sir James Harrington, to
desire him to bring up 4 of the Citty Régiments hither to mee.48
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER-
I thought it necessary for the safety of Eeading to leave one
régiment there. If I hâve erred in this I humbly ask your pardon.
I doe not heare that King doth march this day, onely I heare that
some of his horse were drawn up about White Church.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I shall be glad to receive your
comands, as
Your Lops most humble Servant,
Manchester.
Basingstoake, 19° Octobris, 1644.
My Lords and Gentlemen, Wee are both now corne hither and
can give your Lops noe further intelligence then what is conteyned
in this letter. Wee are glad to heare that the Citty Eegiments are
corne so neare, and doubt not but you will give my Lord Man-
chester thankes for that; he desires your pardon. Wee remayne
your most humble servants
W. Jhonston. Jo. Crewe.
No. 57.—For the Eight Honourable the Comittee
of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Yesterday upon Buckleberry Heath wee received your letter,
which gave us hope that the army will shortly receive the provisions
which you hâve sent. The newes of Newcastle came very seasonably
unto us, which much encouraged the souldiers, and soe affected them
that many of the régiments went presently of their own accord to
solemne prayer. The army, about an hower before night, came
within a myle and within view of the enemy, who was drawne
forth in a body upon a place of advantage neere Newberry. Our
dragoones and theirs fired one upon another for two howers ; twenty
of our horses were killed, but not one of our men lost. A Captaine
of our horse, who came up in the vann, was shott in the thigh, six
of the clock in the evening. It was resolved last night that themanchester’s correspondence.
49
field should be viewed by the chiefe officers early this morning. It
will be an advantage to us to set upon his army on this side New-
berry, because wee shall be betwixt the enemy and our provisions ;
and to fall upon him on the other side, because we shall be betwixt
the enemy and Prince Rupert, who is dayly expected with addition al
forces ; the ground not having beene viewed they could détermine
nothing herein. Being informed by those that came from London
that they met many souldiers going homewards, wee renew our desire
that some exemplary punishment may be inflicted upon them. Wee
remaine,
My Lorde,
Your LoP® humble servants,
W. Jhonston, Jo. Crewe.
Thatcham, 26° Octob. 1644.
Wee hâve had a faire night (blessed be God), and hope for a faire
day.
No. 58.—For the Right Honourable the Comittee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES, &C.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
The forces mentioned in our last lettre came from Wickam
Heath towards the place where the King’s forces were drawn up,
betweene Dennington and Newberry, neere the Castle, having noe
way to passe but by a wood and through laynes. Wee mett workes
and fortifications Crossing those laynes which they had at night
beene casting up, and wherein they planted ordinance ; they had
also other ordinance, two bodyes of their horse and two brigades
of foote, at a little distance. They played also from the Castle upon
our men with great shott ; they were hard to gayne, yet it pleased
God soe to incourage the [their?] spirit, among wThom my Lord
Generall’s forces had a most speciall care, and soe to blesse their
endeavors, that about five a clocke (which was but the space of an
CAMD. SOC.	H50
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER,
hower after their falling to worke) they tooke it by storming, and
got 4 peece of ordnance ; afterwards, beating the enemy of his
ground, they got other five ordnance ; my Lord GeneralPs foote
tooke much contentment in regaining some of their ordnance.
Our horse stood very gallantly under the view and danger of the
canon playing directly upon them when they were drawing them-
selves together to secure the foote, and in charging the enemy put
them to a retreate, and hath taken the Earle of Cleveland, who had
that brigade.
That ail the generall officers did very resolutely their partes ; my
Lord of Manchester fell upon the other passe in a seasonable tyme.
Your LoP® most humble servants,
W. Jhonston, Jo. Crewe.
F rom our league betweene Dennington and Newberry,
27° Octobris, 1644.
No. 59.—For the Right Honourable the Committee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES, &C.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
As wee wrote in our last lettre, and as we repeate lest that should
miscarry, yesterday, about 4 of the clocke, those forces which went
from Thatcham towards Newberry by the way of Wickam Heath
and were there drawen up set upon a worke and breast-worke, well
guarded with ordnance, horse, and foote, which commanded ail the
wayes which lead to that side of the field betwixt Newberry and
Dennington Castle, where the King’s army was drawne up. The
workes were made strong, although they had but little tyme, that
the gaineing of them would hâve lost much tyme and beene doubt-
full if the foote (amongst whom my Lord Generalles particular
forces deserved very wellj had not with extraordinary resolution
stormed them, which they did within an hower after the first
charge. Upon their unexpected entrance into the workes theirmanchester’s correspondence.
51
foote which secured them ail ran and left the ordnance that were
placed in and about the workes. Maior Generall Skippon hazarded
himselfe to much. Sir W. Balfour used great dilligence, there
being but few field officers of horse. Sir William Waller, Sir
Arth. Hesilrige, Sir James Harrington, Lieut.-Generall Middleton,
Lieut.-Generall Cromwell, Major-Generall Crawford, Major-Generall
Holborne, Coll. Greemes, and diverse others did very good service.
The Earle of Manchester, about 4 of the clocke, endeavoured to
force a passage through Shaw, a village on the other side of the
field where the King’s forces lay. P. Maurice was on that side, and
many of the King’s best foote, who maintained those passes, although
they were very bravely assaulted. The Earle of Manchester for
want of day light and by reason of the great guards did not take
the passages ; but his employing soe many of the King’s forces on
that side was of great advantage to our other forces. The battaile
lasted about three howers. They fought at least an hower by moone-
shine. The Earle of Manchester and those on the other side were
ignorant of each others successe till the next morning. The Earle
of Cleveland was taken prisoner and is sent up to London, and, as
wee heare, Colonell Goring’s younger brother was slayne. Captaine
Galler, one of my Lord Générales captaines, was slaine. Our side
tooke nine pièces of ordnance. Major Skippon guesseth that the
number slaine on both sides were betweene two and three hundred.
The King’s forces were ail gone before this morning. Some few
carts were left on the field, but the carriages were put into Den-
nington Castle and soe neare it that they could not be taken off.
Ail our horse and dragoones, except 1000 which stay with the
Earle of Manchester, are gone after the King’s forces, which wee
heare are gone toward Wallingford. Wee desire you to take into
your consideracon how the foote army shall be disposed, and how
they may be provided for ; none of your provisions are as yet corne,
but wee hope will be shortly. Wee desire to give God the glory
of this victory, it being His worke and upon His day. The Earle52
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
Opinion of
Councell of
Warre to stay
the army about
Newbury.
Houses’ lettre
not to goe.
Left to them
upon the place.
To take
Denington
Castle.
A régiment to
Basing.
of Manchester marcheth to-morrow to Blewbury. We rest, my
Lords,
Your Lo*8 humble servants,
W. Jhonston. Jo. Crewe.
Newbury, 28° Octob. 1844.
Wee eamestly entreat you to take care that the want of chirur-
geons may be supplyed. It is a misérable thing to see men want
meanes of cure who hâve beene wounded in the defence of the
publique.
No. 60.—To my Lord Manchester and the Comanders-in-
Chiefe.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Understanding by my Lord Wareston and Mr. Crew that it was
the unanimous opinion of a Councell of Warre that the carriages
necessary for the army cannot passe to Abbington, and that the
forces should continue united at Newbury and thereabouts till the
King’s army went to winter quarters, wee stayed a lettre written
from the Houses for your advancing forward till this morning, to
the end wee might acquaint them in generall that the opinion
of a Councell of Warre upon the place was for another way. Upon
winch report from this Comittee the Houses hâve appointed that
their lettre should not be sent. Wee hâve given you notice hereof
with ail speed, and leave it to you, if you thinke fitt, to goe backe
with your foote to Newbury, and to make the best use you can of
your horses and dragoones. Wee desire you to keepe your forces
together, and to endeavour to take in Denington Castle. Battering
peeces and amunicion will be quickly with you for that purpose.
Wee recommend unto you the sending a régiment to Basing, and
to hâve an eye to ail the notions of the enemy in the meane tyme.
Darby House, 5° November, 1644.
By Durant, at 12 morn.manchester’s correspondence.
53
No. 61.—For the Bight Honourable the Committee of
BOTH KlNGDOMES.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I hâve receieved your Lops lettre of the 5th of this instant, and
„ acquainted the rest of the Comanders-in-Chiefe with the contents of
your Lo*8 lettre, and accordingly wee are ail this night corne to
Newbury. Wee hâve very uncertaine intelligence where the
enemy is, but wee heare his intentions are to fetch the artillery
and amunicion in Denington Castle. I thought fitt to give your
Lops what we heare of the enemyes motions, and what is done
by us.
My Lords and Gentlemen, I am,
Your Lops humble servant,
Manchester.
Newbury, 6° November, 1644.
No. 62.—To my Lord Manchester and the Comanders-in-
Cheife.
My Lord and Gentlemen,
By the inclosed Order you see the minde of the House concern-
ing Basing and Wiltshire, which wee recommend to your speciall Conceming
care and speedy execution. Wee are of opinion that the Citty^^^d
Eegiment which hath beene ail this tyme in Eeading may most fitly The Citty
be sent to Basing, and in the roome thereof a régiment of my ^fadin^be
Lord Manchester’s, or such other as you thinke fitt may be put into sent to Basing.
Eeading. The régiment being sent to Basing wee desire that
Colonell Ludlow’s Eegiment of horse may be sent into Wiltshire,
and this to be done with ail expédition.
Darby House, 6° November, 1664.
By Bulmer.54
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
No. 63.—To my Lord Manchester.
My Lord,
B y the copie enclosed your LoP sees what intelligence wee hâve
received. Wee desire by ail meanes you can to enforme yourselves
of the certainty thereof, and if you finde the intelligence to be true,'
To send after to send after them such a body of horse as may prevent them
bodj^fhorse. e^^er iR spoyling and plundering the country, or attempting any
guarrisons, or maching toward the associacion, which wee recomend
to your especiall care.
Darby House, 6° Novembris, 1644.
By Bulmer.
No. 64.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
I received two lettres from your LoP8 the last night, both of them
of the 26th of this instant, and they hâve beene comunicated to the
rest of the comanders-in-chiefe. Ail our intelligence is that the
King is corne to Wallingford with his whole army, and that he
intends to march to Dennington Castle. And therefore, their
opinion is, that it is not safe to make any division of our forces
untill we know certainely what the intentions of the enemy are.
I hope a day or two will discover what wee shall résolve of, which
I shall acquaint your LoP8. I hâve nothing else at présent to offer
to you but the service of
Your LoP8 humble servant,
Manchester.
Newberry, 8° Noyemb. 1644.MANCHESTER’S CORRESPONDENCE.
55
No. 65.—For thé Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
Yesterday, late in the evening, wee had certaine intelligence that
the enemies’ whole army were within 5 or 6 mile of us. And this
day, betwixt 10 and 11 of the clocke, they drew up to Dennington
Castle, and from thence, they both with their horse and foote drew
into a plaine field betweene the towne Newberry and the Castle.
It was not held safe for us to draw out, in regard the Castle by
their ordnance would hâve done much spoyle upon us. Therefore
wee resolved to make good the towne. The enemy came on upon
us, but by the blessing of God he received such a repuise as that he
is retreated. And the night falling on wee could not pursue them.
But wee hâve sent out scouts to observe their motions, and doe
intend to follow them. Wee shall hâve a particular care of the
towne of Beading, according to your Lops comands in your lettre of
the 8th of November, which wee received this night.
My Lords and Gentlemen, wee hâve nothing more to give your
Lops an account of, but rest
Your Lops humble servantes,
Manchester.
William Waller.
W. Balfour.
Newberry, 9° Novemb. 1644.
No. 66.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
By our last wee gave your Lo*8 an account of the King’s
attempts to force us out of Newberry. It was impossible for us to
hinder the King from takeing his traîne out of the Castle, and to
keepe the towne of Newberry, he comeing with soe considérable an56
CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
army, for had we drawne up between the Castle and the King, the
King had wheeled about and possessed the towne. Then the
weather and want would hâve driven us to a retreate. The King
would not only hâve his traîne, but the towne as a quarter, and
B^ing releived, and that had been the best. Wee heare the last
night he drew out some of his traîne, and sent it to Wallingford.
This morning early wee found him drawne up in battalia, both
horse and foote, about a mile from the Castle. Wee drew out,
intending to hâve faine upon his army. But considering his many
advantages of ground and the weather falling bad, following might
breake our army, the officers of the foote complaining of the
lessening of their foote, and many hundreds of our hoïses be already
dead, and the living very weake, and many of the troopers run
from their colours. And being assured that upon our quitting
Newberry the enemy would forthwith take it, wee thought it fittest
to retume to Newberry, where wee now are watching the King’s
motions and waiting your LoP® further orders. And in the meane
tyme wee will do what to our best understandings wee apprehend
fittest for the publique, and are
Your Lop® humble servantes,
Manchester.
William Waller.
W. Balfour.
Newberry, 10 November, 1644.
No. 67.—To the Earle of Manchester, Comànder-in-
Cheife in the Army.
My Lord and Gentlemen,
This morning wee received your lettre of the 8th of this instant,
by which wee understand that the King is corne to Wallingford with
his whole army, and that hee intends to march to Dennington
Castle, and wee are very glad that you hâve taken that resolutionMANCHESTER’S COREESPONDENCE.
57
whicli was our advise to you in our last letter, that it is not safe to Send ns fre-
divide your forces untill you know certainly what the intentions g^ce of^he
of the enemie are, concerning whose motions and your resolutions enei?ies
, .	i	/»	• it	motions and
wee desire you to send us frequent intelligence.	your resolu-
Darby House, 9° November, 1644.	tions.
By Durant.
No. 68.—For the Committee of both Kingdomes, &c.
My Lobds and Gentlemen,
It is the desire of the chiefe officers in these armyes that your
Lops may hâve a right understanding of this late action of the
King*s advance towards us, and of his releiveing of Dennington
Castle, and therefore they hâve thought it fitter that Sir Arthur
Hesilrig, who was présent here, should give your Lops an account
of it^ then to make a relation of it by letter. We haveing nothing
further to offer to your LoP3 but the service of
Your LoP3 most humble servants,
Manchester.
William Waller.
W. Balfour.
Newberry, 12° Noyember, 1644.
No. 69.—To my Lord Manchester and the rest of the
COMMANDEES, &C.
My Lord and Gentlemen,
Wee hâve received your letters concerning the releife of Den-
nington Castle by the enemie, and are very sory that they mett not Sony the
with that opposition that was expected from an army that God had w^^notarmy
blessed lately with soe happy a victorie against them. Soe long as °PPosed*
the enemie continues in the field, wee cannot advise that you
should goe to your winter quarters, but are very desirous that,
CAMD. SOC.	IKeepe your
forces together
whilsttheKing
is in the field.
Prevent the
releife of
Basing.
Wee cannot
send commis-
sioners into
the army.
Your under-
takings to bee
resolved by
comraon
adyise.
58	CROMWELL AND THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
keeping your forces together, you will use your best endeavours to
recover the advantage the enemie hath lately gained in releiving
Dennington.
This upon consideracion of the présent posture of affaires wee
hâve thought fitt to advise, but leave it you who are upon the
place if you find reason to the contrary to doe therein as you shall
thinke most for the advantage of the publique. And because the
enemie probably doth intend the releife of Basing, wee recoinmend
it to your speciall care to prevent that désigné, which not pre-
vented would exceedingly encourage the enemie and bee very
prejudicall to the publique affaires. Diverse of this Committee goe
along with the propositions of peace, soe that wee cannot for the
présent send any to the army. And, that ail your affaires may
bee managed with the greater unanimitie and executed with the
more cheefulnesse, it is our desire that ail your undertàkings and
enterprises bee resolved upon by common advise of a councell of
warre, and from time to time give us frequent advertisements of
your proceedings.
Darby Honse, 12° Novemb. 1644.
By Mr. Hanbury.NARRATIVE
OF THE
EARL OF MANCHESTER’S CAMPAIGN.
a In the beginning at my comîng into the Earle of Manchester^
army in February last I was commanded to goe with Cromwell
towards Hilsdan Howse, wbich was taken, and so ordered to con-
tinue about Buckingam and thereabouts with bothhorse and foote.
Cromwell went to Cambridge for the further seulement of things
there, and in his absence one Leiftenant Paker,b a notorious Ana-
baptiste disobeyed Major-General Craufurd’s orders neere Bedford,
whereupon the head of the armie gave the said Paker a' sore chèque
and putt him in arest, so that the said Paker complayned to the
said Cromwell, who uppon my returne to Cambridge sent Leiftenant
Coll. Kichc to signifie unto mee that I did exceeding ill in chequing
such a man which was not well taken, hee being a Godly mand and
so further of that there was no more. At Stanford uppon our
advance to Lincolne for the reduceing of it there was a party of
horse sent out uppon intelligence given of the Earle of Newcastle’s
horse coming to Tuxford and Mansfeild, and Cromwell went with it
towards Lincolnee but did nothing at ail ; and shortly after wee
a This appears to be the document mentioned by Carlyle.—Cromwell'$ Letters,
&c. vol. i. p. 242.—G.C.
b Packer. This is not John Packer the proprietor of Donnington Castle but
Robert Packer, afterwards a Major-General.—G.C.
c One of the most trusted officers of Horse. Colonel Rich, however, attempted to
betray Cromwell during the Protectorate.—G.C.
d Underscored by a subséquent hand.
e “ towards Lincolne ” added by another hand.60
NARRATIVE OF THE
advanced to Lincolne, which was taken, and so shortly after that
my Lord of Manchester did joyne his forses with the Scots and my
Lord Fairfax in the takeing in of Yorke in the aforesaid tyme from
the beginning of our coming out from Cambridge till wee came to
Lincolne. The sinister endes of Cromwell weare not knowne but
by the putting out of ail brave gentlemen in the army by false
suggestions to my Lord and bringing in of others in theire places,
whoe afterward proved traytors and cowards, and still fomenting
further mischeife in the army, notably seconded by Pickering.
Before Yorke, our horse being absent from my Lord of Manchester
in pretence of doeing good service to the publicque, Cromwell and
his créatures did nothing but foment sédition and dissention in my
Lord’s army of horse, in so much that hee, to withdrawe the hearts
of people from the Earle of Manchester, by some sinister and
pernitious course hee framed a pétition which was managed by
Leiftenant-Collonell Whaley and Leiftenant-Coll. Lilburne, and in
the procureing of the officers’ hands unto it, sundry denying the
underwriting thereof, as Cap. John and Samuell Moody, Cap.
Pattison, Cap. Arminger, Cap. La Hunte, and Major Wilde, who
uppon there refusall weare threatened with these words : “ Take
heede what they did, for it was to goe through the army, and
Cromwell did take an accounte who had not underwrytten it, mutche
wilijieing them that did not.* The pétition was of such stuff that it
was highly mutinous, and to putt out ail men out of the armie
that were not Brownists, or of such like sects, much diminishing
my Lord’s honor and the rest of the gentlemenain the army. The Péti-
tion is still extant in Cromwell’s hands; so that uppon the takeing
of Yorke articles weare granted to theenemy to march away with
armes and baggage, who weare uppon the way, notwithstanding the
safe conduct from the three generalls, robbed, and most what they
had taken from them by my Lord of Manchester’s horse, of whom a
Leiftenant and many troopers and other officers weare taken and
brought before a Martialls Court at Doncaster, where Cromwell thrust
a The words underscored are interlined by another hand.EARL OF MANCHESTER’S CAMPAIGN.
61
himselfe without order* or law, to bee president. It was found in the
court that the Leiftenant was highly guilty of the robbery with ail
the rest. Notwithstanding ail that hee, haveing the name of a Godly
man, beeing an Indépendant, was sett at liberty by Cromwell, which
highly incensed our enemies for our falshood against them at
Doncaster. Major-General Craufurd was sent into Darbyshire with
a party of my Lord of Manchester’s army for the reduceing of that
country to the obedience of the Parliament, which after it was
done by command the said Craufurd returned with the army to
Lincolne. At that tyme there weare severall letters too the Com-
mittee of both Kingdomes to my Lord of Manchester for the send-
ing of a strong party into Chesehire, and so resolved so soone as the
Major-Generall came home that the party should goe, which was
accordingly ordered under the command of Coll.. Wermonden, and
uppon theire march another order came from the Committee of
both Kingdomes commanding my Lord of Manchester to march with
his army into the west, which presently was done ; and if the highe a
of mutinie by Cromwell and his juncto who endevoured the
hindring of the army by perswading them to a mutiny would hâve
bine sooner and more able to putt things in execution then was
done. However, my Lord of Manchester to testifie his willingness
did march by 12 or 14 miles a day, no less. At that tyme my Lord
of Manchester had enough to doe to kcepe the army from mutining,
being put on by Cromwell and his juncto, who absolutely refused
orders from Major-Generall Craufurd, especially Coll. Pickering's
and Mountagne’s régiments.b These heavy distractions invented by
Cromwell hee went on in a rnost high way, and, to shew his power
in the army against those who weare the refusers to under-
write the scandalous pétition, he outed Cap. Arminger, who
was sent, and by leave of his Collonell, to London, and his
troope given away to a notorious Independent, who uppon the
receiveing of it into his charge the said Cromwell command-
* Something seems to hâve been omitted here.
b Underlined to note that they were partizans of Cromwell.—G.C.62
NARRATIVE OF THE
ing the said Fleetwood to cashire the whole troope and putt
in none but Independents, that theire pernitious endes might the
better bee accomplished, which accordingly was done. Ail this tyme
the said Cromwell endevoured to worke Major-Generall Craufurd’s
ruine by diswading the Earle of Manchester’s army not to obey him,
and, giveing his charge away to others, makeing them to doe the duty,
did in the most notorious manner traduce and callumneate the said
Craufurd to make him odious to the army and to discontent him,
that so hee the said Cromwell the better might advance his wicked
endes, uttering many speeches highly to his disadvantage and utter
ruine, and for drawing of factions in the army, which highly dis-
tracted the publique good in Lincolne, who still sate at theire con-
sultations how to insult over my Lord of Manchester and his army,
and still continuing uppon theire mischeivous actions in fomenting
of mischeife ail the way betweene Lincolne and Huntington; the
said Cromwell attributing a ail the praise to himselfe of other mer!s
actions, whose only reason ivas to cloud those who desiered to doe
good servise. The pressing desiers the Earle of Manchester had to
putt in execution the Committee of both Kingdomes there com-
manda for the joyneing with my Lord of Essex, and his releife of
Abington at his first coming to Reading, was cleerely demonstrated
by his willingness in sending necessaries which they stood in neede
of at Abington, and wayting uppon CromwelPs returne from Banbury,
which action there deserves notice to bee taken of it. Uppon his
Excellence’s first letter from Portsmouth to the Earle of Man-
chester for a conjunction, my Lord of Manchester marched away
to Baseing with his foote and a fewe troopes of horse, send-
ing ail the most parte of the horse to joyne with Sir William
W aller at Sallsbury, who weare repulsedb and forsed to retire to
Basing, my Lord of Manchester’s resolution there beeing so bent
a By means of the Press. Military réputations were much helped by the Diumals.
It is probable that Cromwell did not reject the overtures of spécial correspondents as
Colonel Hutchinson did. His name is often mentioned.—G.C.
b At Andover.—G.C.EARL OF MANCHESTER^ CAMPAIGN.
63
for fighting that hee himselfe, my Lord Wareston, Sir William
Balfore, Major-Generall Skippon, with diverse others, went to looke
uppon the fields, that, if the enemie advanced, to sett out the place
every army should stand uppon, which was seconded by his
Excellente the Earle of Essex at his coming to Basing ; and for the
subsistence of the armies at Basing-S toke it was concluded to march
to Redding and so to corne uppon the other side of the Kennet upon
the enemy, and to forse the King to fight, notwithstanding the
enemy beeing in theire strength, my Lord of Essex beeing in
Redding leaft sicke. As it was concluded so it was performed,
that in the latter ende of October ; the resuit of the first debate
beeing that Major-Generall Craufurd should march about with the
Earle of Manchester’s foote and ail the cavalry, saveing 1,000,a which
should stay by the foote uppon the hills neere Dolman’s howse ; and
after Major-Generall Craufurd had orders to march the first resuit
was alltered, and the seacond was that Major-Generall Skippon and
the citisens should march about to Spen Hill,b and Craufurd to
stay uppon the hill neere Dollman’s howse ; so that night the enemy
not beeing so much as allarumed, the next day both horse and
foote as is mentioned marched where they came about 3 of the
clock in the afternoone, where both our armies and the enemy
began to play uppon one another with greate canon and about 4
a clock began to play with musquetts. Uppon the right wing was
Sir William Balford {i.e. Balfour) and upon the leaft wing
Lieftenant-Generall Cromwell with my Lord of Manchester’s horse,
the bodies of foote advanceing engaged with the enemy, that by
the report of the best there, if Cromwell had played the parte that
became him, the enemie had bine totally routed; ail the horse
under his command stood still when Coll. Bartklettc brigade
was charged three tyms. Notwithstanding ail that they stood still,
Cromwell himselfe not beeing uppon the head of themd Generall
Under Ludlow.—G.C. b Making a wide circuit of Donnington Castle.—G.C.
c i.e. Berkeley,—G.C.
d See the Earl of Manchester’s statement as given by Rushwood.—G. C.64
NARRATIVE OF THE
Leiftenant Middleton came seeing so greate absurdities and over-
sights, and desired the said Cromwell’s horse to charge, who refused
him till hee went with one of the squadrons and charged the
enemy, who was routed and lefte on seconded to fly for his life,
beeing in the middle of his enemies, so that day there was no
servise performed att ail by Cromwell. Night came on, the enemy
marched away in the night in great disorder, in so much that the
van was at Wallingforde when the reare was at Dunnington.
Notwithstanding of CromwelFs knowledge of the enemies running,
there was no course taken for the preventing of theire running away,
which by Cromweli’s horse should hâve bine performed. Both Major-
Generall Skippon, Coll. Barklett, and Coll. Dawies intimateing
theire running unto the head of the horse, and nothing done till the
next day at nyne a clock in the morneing, where they had not so much
as a scout out to know if the enemy weare gone or not, neither was
there any sent unto the Earl of Manchester to lett him know of theire
goeing till about eight in the morneing.a My Lord of Manchester
in the day preceding did labour with a greate deale of toyle and
greate danger of his life, in so much that the men who weare
rydingh with him weare shott. Notwithstanding these greate
dangers hee was in hee endeavoured the utmost of his abilities by
rideing to and fro and commanding things to bee putt in execution
as first in the morneing. Hee commanded a party of 400 mus-
queteers to falle over the little river which passes by Dunington
Castle, over a bridge, which most dextrously hee commanded the
night before, to préparé for the diversionc of the King’s forces from
goeing to Spen Hill, where they learned in the morneing our
greatest force was a marching, which accordingly was done, and if
ft This statement seems to show that Cromwell was quite as much in fault as the
Earl of Manchester.—G.C.
b Inserted in the margin by another hand.
c A rather perilous manœuvre on the part of the Earl of Manchester, as it might
hâve drawn the whole of the King’s forces upon him—for at this time the rest of the
Parliament army were making their flank march.—G.C.EARL OF MANCHESTER’S CAMPAIGN.
65
those who weare commanded had not exceeded theire commission
[they] would hâve had greate victory, and as it was they tooke two
workes from the enemy, wherein they tooke a captayne and severall
prisoners, and advanced too farr without order and weare repulsed,
to the greate greife of the Earle of Manchester. So that tyme the
Earle of Manchester did continue in his very greate toyling to pré-
paré the falling uppon the enemy in and neere Dollman’s howse,
and above 500 commanded musqueteeres, commanded for the
falling on first as forlome hope, which to the amazement of the
enemy weare severall tymes drawne on and off, and at last they fell
on, seconded by the severall brigades of foote. If the forwardness of
Major-Generall Craufurd's régiment had been seconded the howse
and garden had bine gayned, but they weare bett off with the loss
of one of Major-Generall Craufurd’s collours and twoe drakes, lost
for want of lookeing unto beeing carried headlong on ; the faulte of
the losing of the draks was Capiten Hamond.a The next morneing
a councell of warr was called at Speen, the resuit whereof was that
the horse should followe the pursuite of the enemy, who went no
further then to Blewbery and thereabouts, giveing the enemy ail
the advantages in the world, so that in few dayes folioweing wee
marched with the foote to Blewbery and Hagburne, Harwell and
Chilton, where wee resolved in a councell of warr to stay till wee
received orders from the Committee of both kingdomes ; uppon
the receipt whereof wee marched the whole army, both horse
and foote, and quartered the foote in Newbery and thereabout,
and the horse betweene Redding and Hungerford, uppon both
sides of the Kennett, where wee continued with a constant resolu-
tion to fight the enemy and to prevent the relieveing of Dun-
nington Castle, and to that purpose Major-Generall Skippon and
Major-Generall Craufurd were sent to looke upon the feilds, and
a Words underscored interlined by another hand.
This is probably Colonel Robert Hammond, afterwards the King’s gaoler at Caris-
brook. The passage seems like a covert insinuation that there was wilful neglect
on the part of Hammond.—G.C.
CAMD. SOC.	K66
NARRATIVE OF THE
so resolved to meete the enemy neera Dennington Castle towards
Compton Downs upon Bussokeh Heatli, and if our intelligence had
bine good we had accordinglie followed our resolutions. The
enemy did advance towards Wallingford, of whose motions wee
had dayly good intelligence till the very instant of the enemies
advance, the length of Compton Dounes. At five o’clock at night a
leiftenant of the enemies did corne to Newberry to Sir William
Balfore’s howse, where my Ld of Manchester was, who related that
the enemy was in his march uppon Compton Downes with a resolu-
tion to fight, and reported to bee 15,000 horse and foote, so that
instantly ail the commanders-in-chiefes weare called to a councell of
war, the resuit whereof was to drawe very early ail the horse into
Newberry Wash, which was not performed. The enemy marching
very furiously came in view at Dunnington Castle, where not so
much as one to oppose them, farr less such numbers as became to
knowe of the enemies motions. The enemie presently drew over
the little river6 at Dunnington to Speene Fields, where the enemy
posessed themselves, which, without ail peradventure, if our horse
had bine according to the hower appointed, we had beaten the
enemies army régiment afterd régiment as they marched over the
narrow passages before they should hâve corne to the posture of
fighting. Major-General Skippon railling uppon the horss on the
head of the armied upon the feilds before Newbery Townes ende,
and in a little howse in Newbery Towne, and towards Schew,
wee held councells what to doe, the resuit whereof was that
wee could not fight the enemy upon the feild before Newbery,
the Castle of Dunnington commanding ail that feild with
theire ordinance ; al the ojfficers of horss mutche aganst drawing
the horss throghe the tonne from Newbery wasche, saying that
a Interlined by the other hand.
b Bussock is about a mile and a half northward of Donnington Castle. Here are
the remains of Roman encampments. It seems to be the place alluded to by
Clarendon in his acconnt of the relief of the Castle 9th November, 1644.—G.C.
c The Lambome.—G.C.
d Interlined by the other hand.EARL OF MANCHESTER^ CAMPAIGN.
67
the horss could not stand without great danger of the great
losse.a My Ld of Manchester said what ever was thought fitfc
by the councell of warr hee should bee very veryh well contented,
and so acte. But some weare for fighting and draweing the
whole force into the feilds befor Newburry, but opposed by
others, especially Major-Generall Skippon, Middleton, Craufurd;
and Hoburne tolde that if they continued uppon that posture wee
resolved uppon wee would suffer dishonor and bee buried quick.
The enemy weare about 12,000 horse and foote resolved to fight
us, wee in our trenches lookeing uppon them, a body of horse
charged our horse, who routed ours and beatt them into our foote,
but our foote received the enemy very bravely and repulsed them,
so that Major-Generall Craufurd, not one of the officers of the horse
in chiefe eæcepting Sir William Balfourc there, marched towards
the enemy and made them give ground, in so much that if our
horse had corne to us wee had undoubtedly routed the enemy. " So
the night came on. Then Cromwell and the horse began to corne
through the towne when ail was done, so about 8 o’clock at night
wee knew of the enemyes marching away, it was resolved that ail
the horse should follow the enemy the nexte morninge by the breake
of day.à At 9 e o’clock the next morneing ail the horse weare
standing uppon the feild neere Dollman’s howse, so that Major-
Generall Craufurd presently drew the Earle of Manchester’s foote to
the horse at Dollman’s howse. So then, ail the comanders-in-chiefe
rideing to the topp of a hill to looke uppon the enemy, Major-
Generall Craufurd desired wee might fall uppon them in the reare
before they went away. My Lord of Manchester answered, With
ail my hart, what wee doe lett it be quîckly done. Sir Arthure
Haselrigg and Cromwell enquireing of mee the way of it how I
could doe it, I told them that it beeing so neere I desired that 3,000
horse and a musquetèir behinde every one,f to plant in the hedges,
a Interlined by the other hand.	b Sio.
c Interlined as before.	d The like.
* Originally written “ 8,’’	f A common practiee in those times.—G.C.68
NARRATIVE OF THE
might be sent and the rest to follow* which undoubtedly would be
the only way. Cromwell said that the horse was so weake it could
not bee, so presently my Lord of Manchester said, Gentlemen, lett
us doe quickly what wee doe, so that presently ail the commanders-
in-cheife wente to a little howse on the head of the army, where Sir
Arthure Haselrig b entered in speech first, saying that the King did
march in a very good posture and that he was stronger than
hee expected them to bee, and made a very regulare retreate ; that it
was impossible for us to corne at him without greate disadvantage,
and that it was not councellable to fight them or follow them, for
our horse was very weake, and though wee beate the King hee would
still bee King, and wee should not be able to doe any good uppon any
of his garrisons, nor take any of them, for his army was a greate deale
more true unto him than ours was, and though they should bee
routed they would gather themselves togeather againe, and if the
King beat us the kingdome of England would bee lost, for neither
officers nor garrisons would make any of our runners stand, but bee
a meanes to loose Abington, Redding, and ail other places. More,
hee would not only be able to overrun ail the country where the
Parliament friends are, and drawe a greate party to himselfe by
such an overthrowe, and would bee able to goe to the very gates of
London, and wee had no meanes to shun it or keepe him back,
neither was there any reliefe neerer than Newcastle which we might
expect, no releife so suddenly from it, and so if wee followed the
King, considering the weakeness of our horse and the feweness in
number, as hee supposed them not to exceede my Lord GeneralPs
1,000, Sir William Waller’s 1,500, and my Lord of Manchester’s
2,000; but to lye still at Nubery with our foote and to quarter our
horse as neere as can be to attend the enemies motions, whereby
wee might bee able to enterpose betweene them and Basing, and so
not to lett them poppe into Nube[rry], and so further bee a meanes
to releive Basing and the looseing of Nubery, ail which hee humbly
» Interlined as before.
h Sir Arthur Haselrigg was always a timorous counsellor in the field.—G.C.EARL OP MANCHESTER^ CAMPAIGN.
69
conceived was the best ; and so Cromwell presently speakeing did in
these same very words make a speech very neere a quarter of an
hower ; so that ail joyning did presently order the foote to New-
bery, and the horse thereabouts. Awhile after there came letters
to Major-Generall Craufurd, the substance whereof was that ail the
blâme at London lay uppon Manchester, Middleton, Craufurd, and
Hobum; and this letter was seconded by a letter from the Com-
mittee, which, though in downe right termes did not say wee weare
to blâme, but so much that nothing should be done without a joint
consent of the whole councell of warr, which letters much touched
my Lord of Manchester and the most parte of the commanders-in-
cheife ; and in my Lord of Manchester’s lodging in Newbery, in the
presence of my Lord of Manchester, Sir William Belfore, Sir
William Waller, Major-Generall Skippon, Coll. Barklet, and Major-
Generall-Craufurd, Cromwell did say, finding my Lord of Manches-
ter much moved at the aforesaid letters after hee reads it twice over,
that hee found nothing in the letter but what may bee written
without reflexion uppon any, and told my Lord of Manches-
ter: My Lord, I hold him for a villain and a knave that
would doe any man ill offices, but there was nothing done but
what was justifiable and by the joint consent of the councell
of warr, and that there was nothing done but what was answerable.
So uppon that councell of warr there was presently thought fitt
that there should bee a letter drawne and sent to the Committee
of both Kingdomes representing the whole condition of the army,
which was referred to bee done by Leif.-Generall Cromwell,
which accordingly was done, wherein hee gave a full relation
of the weakeness of the army, which, considering the wayes hee
has gone, much deserves your notice takeing of it. So ail wayes it
was held fitt in ail councells of warrs, by reason of the greate con-
séquence both Abington and Reading weare unto us, to continue
our quarters at Newbery, and so to waite uppon the enemies
motions. So that our intelligence was that Prince Rupart had an
intention to releive Basing House with a party of horse, which to70 NARRATIVE OF THE EARL OF MANCHESTER’S CAMPAIGN.
prevent it was ordered by a councell of warr that the three armies
of horse should releive one another for the hindring of that désigné,
which accordingly was done. So, uppon our intelligence of the
King’s remove from Marlburrow, it was supposed hee was marching
to Basing to releive it with his army, wee conceived it fitting to
march that day to Oldermeiston, where wee continued upon the
feilds, and if the enemy went to Baseing to endevour to intercept
him ; and so at Oldermeiston at a councell of warr, where the
question was only whether it was councellable to fight or not, and
concluded by ail, no man speaking so much against fighting as
Cromwell, and so unanimously consenting not to fight, but to
endeavour to hinder the releife of Baseing, or to withdrawe the
forces which weare lying before Baseing, and so to keepe our
armies intire, dividing ourselves the foote at Kedding and Henly
and our horse ail about Fernham, Okingham, Windsor, Mayden-
head, and Stwins.
[Endorsed] “ A brieff recollection of passages in my Lord of
Manchester’s armie.,,a [“ Fromh Maior-Generc
* In the same handwriting as the interlinéations.
b Major-General Craufurd. It seems likely that the interlinéations may be those
of Sir William Balfour. This narrative, like that which bears the name of Crom-
well, omits ail mention of the failure of the combined forces to take Donnington
Castle, which they summoned the day after the Battle of Newbnry. (See Claren-
don's History.) It is probable that the assailants who were defeated by the little
garrison were ashamed of their failure and did not wish to make it public.—G.C.
c Added in another hand, probably that of the Earl of Manchester.STATEMENT
BY
AN OPPONENT OF CBOMWELL.
About tbe middle of December, now allmost two yeares sine, the
now Leiuetenant-Generall Cromwell being tben captaine of a troope
of horse under the command of the Earle of Essex, and 1 well
knowinge that he had some part of his estate lyingè in the Ile of
Ely, and a good part of my owne estate lying in the same Ile, and I
well understood the dayly approch of the enimie upon our bordering
counteys, and that the enimie and many of the inhabitants did plott
to take that Ile for theire quarters, and soe to annoy ail the adjacent
counteys that bounde upon the sayd Ile.
Thés motives moved me to goe to Captaine Cromwell and to
acquaint him with it, and did desire his assistance in that matter ;
he well conceived the danger and how it might be prevented,
wherupon he moved the House to take it into their considération ;
and he being in some hopes to attaine his desire he told me that he
would not goe upon the buisness without I would take command
and goe with him, which I could ill hâve done, I having soe much
buisness both in the citye and country; y et I left ail and raysed a
troope of dragoones, horse, armes, bridles, saddles at my great
charge, and payed my troope and officers for tenne weeks together
out of my owne money by Captain Cromwell’s perswasions, and
many promises that I should hâve ail my money with the first,
which to this day I hâve never received one penny, though ther72
STATEMENT BT
hath been great sums of money payd him, and he and some of his
officers did, as I conceive, take away great sums of money from the
subject injuriously and contrary to the ordinances of the Parliament.*
Now, to give an account of what I hâve observed and what I
hâve heard and seene to doe this bleding State servis, here I shall
déclaré Coll. Cromwell raysing of his régiment makes choyce of his
officers, not such as weare souldiers or men of estate, but such as
were common men, pore and of meane parentage, onely he would
give tliem the title of godly pretious men ; yett his common practise
was to casheire honest gentlemen and souldiers that ware stout in
the cause as I conceive, witnes thos that did suffer in that case.
I hâve heard him oftentimes say that it must not be souldiers nor
[the] Scots that must doe this worke, but it must be the godly to
this purposs. When any new English man or some new upstart
ïndependent did appeare ther must be a way mayd for them by
casheiring others, some honest commander or other, and thos silly
peopell putt in ther command. If you will examine this you will
hâve proofe enough.
If you looke upon his owne régiment of horse see what a swarme
ther is of thos that call themselves the godly ; some of them profess
they hâve sene vissions and had revellations.
Looke on Coll. Flettwoods régiment with his Major Harreson,
what a cluster of preaching offecers and troopers ther is,
Looke what a company of troopers are thrust into other régi-
ments by the head and shoulders, most of them Independents,
whome they call Godly pretiouse men ; nay, indeed, to say the truth,
allmost ail our horse be mayd of that faction.
If you looke on Coll. Russell’s régiment, Coll. Mountegue’s, Coll.
Pickerin’s, Coll. Rainsborough,b ail of them proffessed Independents
a Originally written “ peopell,” and altered by another hand.
b An officer yery mnch thought of by Cromwell. He was afterwards made
an Admirai, but, being discarded by the navy, he retumed to his command of foot,
and was shortly after killed at Doncaster by a party from Pontefract who had
intended to make him a prisoner.—G.C.AN OPPONENT OF CROMWELL.
73
intire, and besides in most of our regements they hâve crammed in
one company or other that they or ther offecers must be Indepen-
dents. When will our warrs be ended by thos whose command
gloryes in themselves whilst we hâve warr, and will be ther shame
when we hâve peace ?
The first winter after some buisness was done in Huntingdon-
shire, and the enemie had taken Crowland and fortified it ; he then
commanded me to Wisbidge, and there to maintaine guard upon
the Crowlanders, which I did with mine owne troope onely, and
att the springe took that towne in ; yett that servisse, and ail other
done by me and others5 must goe in his name or élis ails was not
well. Collonel Cromwell, perceiving what might be done in the Ile
by a smalle party, at my coming to him at Cambridge he told me
he would make the Ile of El y the strongest place in the world, and
that he would out with ail the wreches and ungodly men, and he
would place in it godly and precious peopell, and he would make it
a place for God to dwell in. I speaken to him to helpe me to some
of moneys that I had layd out of my purse longe before and some
moneys to pay my souldiers ; he tolld me I might sett a tax upon
the inhabitene of the Ile to pay myselfe, which I denyed, and
thought it was not fitt for me to rayse moneys to pay myselfe.
About the seige of Linn Coll. Cromwell made Major Ireton
deputy-governour of the Ile of Ely, who did report well of him,
but he noe sonner came amounge us ther but he begins to levy
great sums of money, some by ordinance of Parliament, some other
wayes, pretending he would fortifie the Ile, and it is reported to me
and others by the treasurer that he in aleuen mounths did receive
at the least £15,000; yett at this day the Ile is in noe posture then
it was in at the time when he came into it, onely it is become a
meere Amsterdam, for in the chefest churches on the Sabbath day
the souldiers hâve gonn up into the pulpitts both in the forenoone
and the afternone and preached to the whole parish, and our
ministers hâve satt in ther seatt in the church, and durst not
attempt to preach, it being a common thinge to preach in priva te
CAME. SOC.
L74
STATEMENT BY
houses night and day, they having gott whole famalyes as Indépen-
dants into that Ile from London and other places under ther com-
mand, lykwise haveing mayd poore men of that Ile captaines onely
as I conceive because they proffess themselves Independents, and
such as hâve filld dung carts both before they were captaines and
sine; they frequently rebaptise the peopell of that Ile, and thos
captaines hâve power to commit to prison, and by a letter from
Coll. Cromwell to the Committee, the coppy whereof I hâve, he
doth command that Committey that they should not release any
prisoner committed by his offecers, soe that the hole Ile is soe awde
that they dare not seeke for ther libertyes.
I see at Ely upon the fiai of letters to that Committee a letter
from Collonell Cromwell to them that they should pay to his wife
£5 per weeke towardes her extraordinaryes, which hath benn duly
payd her a great while ; I am sure there is noe ordinance of Parlia-
ment for that.
Major Ireton is still makeing a show of raysin of fortifications,
but it is verely beleived it is but a pretenc to gett moneys ; cove-
tuo[sness] doth best agréé with a coward.
About a yeere sine they ware very forward to drain that Ile, and
I had some speeche with Collonell Cromwell here at London, I well
knowing what ther aime was. The Coll, tolld me that he would
draine it by the laboure of the souldiers, and Sir Cornélius Virmuden
should doe it, and by draning he would fortifie it and make it
invincible, and make a 100,000 ls. a yeare of thos grounds. I then
asked the Collonell how the gentlemen that ware the undertakers
should be satisfied for ther moneys layd out ; he tolld me they did it
for their owne ends and lett them loose ther moneys, and this
should be for a publique good to settle godly men in. About that
time Collonell Cromwell and Major Ireton ware seutours to the
Committey at Cambridge for 3 score peices of ordinances for to
strenghthen that Ile, and other vast demands they mayd to that
Committe, as the Committe will satisfie y ou.
At our first being at Stamfourd after Crouland was taken therAN OPPONENT OF CROMWELL.
75
was newes brought to Colonell Cromwell that ther was some lords
of the King*s side slaine, and he replyed that God fought against
them, for God would hâve noe lording over his peopell, and he
verily beleved that God would sweep away that lord in power out
of this nation.
I did heare Collonell Cromwell about a yeare senc say to a
gentleman as we ware going to the Earle of Manchester’s quarters
in St. Jones,a that if he had but Marsland and Holland joyned to the
Ile of Ely he would make it the strongest thinge in the world, for
ther he had three of the finest ports of the world, and that he could
keepe them against ail the strengh that could be mayd against them.
About some 4 dayes after there came two of Collonell CromwelFs
troopers and an other man to them to my house in London and
showed me a pétition with a great many of hands and markes to it,
and desired my hand to it, and I red the pétition, and it was to
the Parliament for libertye of consciencs ; I was troubled at it and
tolld them I would hâve my hand eut of before I would sett my
hand to it, and tolld them if any nation in the world ware in the
ready way to Heaven it was the Scotts. They tolld me they thought
I had been a godly man, but now they perceive what I was and
went away ; ever after Coll. Cromwell did sleight me.
At the springe, I being at Camebridge, we haveing ther intelli-
genc that Prince Eupert was comming to rayse our seige at Newark,
I walkin over the market hill there with Collonell Cromwell, I speak
to him thus : Sir, if you would march up to Newarke with but
1,500 of your horse you would spoyle Prince Eupert’s market. He
sayd againe ther is Sir John Meldrum and the rest would take the
towne for ail the Prince ; I sayd to him againe it ware as cheape for
our horse to march as to ly still in the stables ;, wherupon he was
angry and bid me holld my tounge, I spoke I knew not what; yett
he had then gallant horse, and I hâve heaïd him say that he had
more horse in his troope that was at Edg hill then the Earle of Essex
had in his whole armie.
11 Sic.76
STATEMENT BY
When Collonell Cromwell this last summer quartered neare
Ferrebrige, I was with him there, and I spake to him to quitt me
from the armie; he gave me very good words, but delayed me till
I came neare Yorke; but there Leuetenant-Collonell Whirlya
tooke me by the hand and told me that if I would not be soe
violent but résolve to agréé with them he knew his Lieutenant-
Generall would make me Collonell of ther régiment.
Shortly after I went to Wetherby to Collonell Cromwell to des-
path me, wher upon he told me if I had ben ruled by Major Ireton
in the Ile then that ail would hâve gon swetlye on, and the
busn[ess] of the Ile had ben in a good forwardness, but yett if I
would march with him, and be but conformable to pretious godly
men, I should se that I should hâve better preferment then I did
immagin; but I did desire to be gon and hâve my despatch; wher
upon he writt to the Earle of Manchester to lett me hâve 3 mounths
pay, my troop recruted with horse and armes, soe many as I marched
withall from London, and to hâve the publique faith for the rest
of my moneys and arreares. When we ware last at Huntington
ther was the first report that the Earle of Essex was routed, and
that. he had totally lost his artillery and fought,a wherupon the
Independents many of them ther did as it ware to show themselves
soe joyfullb as though it had been a victory new gained to them-
selves. Ther is many a gentleman I believe had as sad a hart as my
selfe that day will beare me wittnes of there rejoycing, the yett I doe
beleive that if the State should protest against that sect, and they
should hâve noe command, the best part of them would be noe
Independents, for ther is many of them of ther opinion of ther pre-
ferment ; but for the absolute Independent he is cruell without
mercy, covetuoss without measure; he will hâve the spirrit though
it be a false oune lying; is ther best guard, by which he défends
a Whalley.
b ? foot.—G.C.
c This amusing observation probably has much truth in it. The feeling between
Presbyterians and Independents was, at this time, very bitter.—G.C.AN OPPONENT OF CROMWELL.
77
himselfe and offends others, by takeing away the esteme of a man.
Then bis will is a law to doe what he will with him. This I can say
by expérience, the Lord of heaven deliver every honest man out of
ther handes.
[Endorsed] delivered by Co.CROMWELL’S NARRATIVE.
An accompt of the effect and substance of my
narrative made to this House for soe mucb thereof as
concernd the Earle of Manchester.
Being commanded by the House to give an accompt concerning
the many opportunityes lost and advantages given to the enemy
since the la te conjunction of our armyes (a which seemed to be by
some miscarriage or neglect in the conduct of the armyes), and
especially of our not prosecuteing the victory at Newbery in time
to prevent the King’s rallying, of our suffering him (after he had
recollected and gott to an heade againe) to relieve Dennington
Castle and fetch off his ordnance (with ail hee had left there b) in
the face of our armyes, and to goe off without fighting; of our
quiting of Newberry afterwards, and withdrawing the siégé from
Basing. I did in my narrative of the story freely déclaré that I
thought the Earle of Manchester was most in fault for most of those
miscarriages and the ill conséquences of them. And because I had
a greate deale of reason to think that his Lordshipp’s miscarriage in
these particulars was neither through accidents (which could not
* The marks of this parenthesis inserted by another hand.
b Ail the King’s baggage waggons were left at Donnington Castle ; also his
papers (which his enemies would gladly hâve seized to tum to good account, as
they did afterwards at Naseby). There was, besides, some treasure.—G.C.cromwell’s narrative.
79
be helped) nor through his improvidence only, but through his
backwardness to ail action, and had some reason to conceive that
that backwardnes was not (meerely) from dulnes or indisposednes
to engagements but (withall) from some principle ofb unwillingnes
in his Lordshipp to hâve this warre prosecuted unto a full victory,
and a désigné orc desire to hâve it ended by accommodacion (and
that) on some such termes to which it might be disadvantageous to
bring the King too lowe. To the ende therefore that (if it were
soe) the State might not be further deceived in their expectations
from theyr d Army, I did (in the faithfull discharge of my duty to
the Parliament and kingdome) freely discover those my appré-
hensions, and what grounds I had for them, and, to that purpose,
1.	I did not onely in the accompt of the particulars in question
(since the conjunction of the armyes), but alsoe in many precedente
carriages upon former opportunityes since our coming from Yorke
(whereof I had been a wittnesse), déclaré his Lordshippes continued
backwardnes to ail action, his aversenes to engagement or what
tendes thereto, his neglecting of opportunityes and declineing to
take or pursue advantages upon the enemy, and this (in many par-
ticulars) contrary to advise given him, contrary to commaunds
received, and when there had been noe impediment or other im-
ployment for his army.
2.	I did likewise déclaré how his Lordship had (both in words
and actions) expressed much contempt and scorne of commaunds
from the Parliament/ or the Committee of both kingdomes, which
hâve required his advanceing westwards, and his desires and
endeavour to hâve his army drawn back into his association to lye
* Originally written “ fighting,” but altered by another hand into “ engagement.”
b A word struck ont here—perhaps “ great.”
c “ a” has been struck out here.
d Altered from “ the.”
e Altered from, perhaps, “ pretenced.”
f This and many other similar passages look like an attempt to excite a préjudice
against the accused.80
cromwell’s narrative.
idle there, while. the businesse of the kingdome hath needed it, and
the aforesaid commaunds required it to be employed elsewhere.
3.	I did also déclaré in diverse circumstances of the said omissions
and miscarriages what shuffleing pretences and évasions his Lordship
had used, sometimes to delay and put off (till ’twas too l^te), some-
times to deny and avoyde things propounded to him, tending to
action or engagement, when thadvantage and security of the same
hath been clearely urged upon him, in which he had seemed
studiously to décliné the gayneing of such advantages upon the
enemy, and sometimes to désigné the draweing off the army off
from the advantages it hath had, into a posture of lesse advantage.
4.	I did alsoe déclaré some such speaches and expressions offred
by his Lordship concurrent with the said sériés of his actions and
carryages, whereby hee hath declared his dislike to the présent
warre, or the prosecution thereof, and his unwillingnesse to hâve it
prosecuted unto a victory or ended by the sword, and desire to make
up the same with some such a peace as himself best fancyed.
[Marginal Of these heades the particulers of the first and third which I
another hand ] e^er toucht upon or related more at large in my narrative are
briefely these :
The neglect of That at our coming from Yorke (which was about the middle of
Newarke.UP °f ^ast) Lis Lordship having many advantages represented to him,
and time enough to hâve taken or blockt up Newarke before he was
comaunded into the south, and having then noe other employment
or impediment to hinder his army from th*attempt thereof, did lye,
first, with his whole army, eight or ten dayes about Doncaster, and
afterwards with the greatest part of it about Lincolne for a month
or more, without attempting anything either to reduce Newark or
secure the country against it.
Tickhill	That lyeing at Doncaster, and Tickhill Castle being hard by, and
Welbeck House with Sheffield and Bolsover Castle not farre off,
he was very unwilling to the summoning of Tickhill Castle, and
expressed much anger and threates against him that (being sent to
quarter in the towne) did summon it, though upon the bare summonscromwell’s narrative.
81
it was surrendered. And whereas, while he laye thereabouts, he
might in that time hâve taken in those other garrisons alsoe, soe as to
hâve had his army intire to march with him in good time against
Newarke, hee would not be perswaded to send any party against
any of them till he marcht from Doncaster, and then sending a
party against Sheffeild, and afterwards (with much difficulty)
giveing way for the same party in their returne to attempt Bolsover
and Wingfield Mannor, hee made that serve for an excuse for that
greater part of his army which went with him into Lincolneshyre to Newarke,
lye idle there, till the returne of the other, without attempting of ^the^placelf
any thing against Newarke, Belvoyr,a Wereton, or Shelford.	neglected.
That in his way to Lincolne hee was very backward and hardly
perswaded to march near Welbeck, to induce the surrender of that
house.
That at Lincolne his Lordship being much prest by some of his
officers to certaine proposicions for the takeing or blocking-up of
Newarke, although the forces he had there with him ail the
while were sufficient for the service propounded, yet his Lordship
first put off the considération thereof till the returne of that party
from Sheffield, pretending that then hee would advise upon it.
But, when that party was returned, he further deferred the con-
sidération of it, till, at last (through importunity), a councell being
cald, his Lordship, labouring with various objections to avoyd the
service, made the time left by those délayés a mayne argument
against it. And when (notwithstanding ail) the counsell did con-
clude, and his Lordship thereupon seemed to agréé to drawe downe Newarke still
to quarter about Newarke, and doe what we would while we had ne£lected-
time, yet his Lordship after this put it off againe with other pre-
tences, and at last did nothing at ail.
That dureing the suspence of those propositions his Lordship,
haveing letters from the Comittee soone after his coming to Lincolne Letters to the
to marche into Cheshire, was very angry and much displeased ® horse to
Cheshire.
* Originally written “ Bolsorer.”
CA MD. SOC.
M82
cromwell’s narrative.
Neglecting of
Belvoyr,
Wereton, and
Shelford.
thereat, sent up reasons against it, pretending a necessity of doeing
something against Newarke to secure those partes before he would
march soe farre thence, and in the answer thereto, being left to
follow the service of those partes with his army, and required only
to send some horse into Cheshire, hee was utterly against that alsoe,
and (notwithstanding many letters out of Cheshire pressing him
thereto, and signifying the great need and danger of those partes)
y et he would not, nor ever offred to send any till after that resolution
taken against Newarke as before, and then, though by later lettres
thence he was advertised that their danger was past, and their need
lesse then before, yet he pretended that he must needes send horse
thither, and thereupon broke of the resolution against Newarke (that
being soe putt off there went none).
That he caused his army (while it lay about Lîncolne) to quarter
upon our friendes in the more secured' partes of the country,
leaveing the other partes free for a the enemy to range on, rather
then he would allow a sufficient part thereof to drawe downe
towardes Newarke to quarter upon the enemy and to straiten and
keep them in.
That though his Lordship while he thus lay idle about Lincolne
(to avoyde ^the consideracons against Newarke) did sometimes
prétend he would attempt the lesser garrisones about it (Belvoyre,
Wereton, and Shelford), and was much desired thereto in case he
would not meddle against Newarke, yet haveing put off the one, he
did nothing against the other, not soe much as to secure the country
against any of them.
That by the said neglects thereof, while he had time, hee was
occasioned for secureing of the country (when he was cald south-
ward) to leave much the more force behinde out of his feild army,
besides the force of the country, which otherwise by themselvesb
might hâve served to secure it, and the country soe cleared (as it
might hâve been in that time) might hâve rayesed and maintayned
“ from ” originally written.
b “ by themselves ” is an insertion.cromwell’s narrative.
83
a great accession of force a to our feild armyes; at which (with much
more of the advantages of that service and disadvantage by the
neglect) was timely and often foretold and urged to bis Lordship
by his officers while he lay idle as before, but his Lordship, from
the time he came from Yorke (which was about July the fifteenth) £^I^1£alIlc
till his coming from Lincolne (which was about September the about July the
third), did not vouchsafe to call his Councell of Warre to advise on ?rd (*}?)'• .
n	#	b	from Lincoln
any action or employment for his army, saveing that one Councell towards the
before mentioned upon the propositions against Newarke, when, ter1ird!ei>tem"
indeed, the best opportunity and advantages for that service were
lost by the former délayés.
That though when (before any reall danger in the South
appeared) these things were propounded for the cleareing and
secureing of his Association, and that expressly to them his army
might be the more free to leave those partes for the southerne
service (if there should be need), his Lordshipp then (to avoyde
these services) would sometimes prétend the keeping of his army
free and ready to advance into the west if he should be required,
yett when he sawe a reall danger and need of him in the West, being
cald up and commaunded thitherwardes, hee was then much dis-
pleased thereat, and averse thereunto, pretending that he must Unwillingness
provide for the security of his Association, that that was his proper
business, and accordingly his Lop hath shewed himselfe both
extreame backward to be drawne from his Association towards the
West, and (being with much réluctance drawne but a little that way)
he was averse to ail good service thereaboutes, and desireing and
endeavoring to be drawn back to his Assotiation agayne, as may
appeare by what followes.
The first letters for his advance from Lincolne comeing about I3th Septem-
the end of August, hee made it September 13th ere his army got eomes^o St.7
to St. Alban’s, lyeing by the way about Peterborrough and Alban’s.
Huntingdon fower nights or more, though he was in that time
a “ of force ” is an insertion.84
cromwell’s narrative.
quickened by fresh letters and desired to hasten by his chiefe
ofEcers, whom he threatned to hanga for such advice.
Stayatst68 At St. Albanes be caused tbe army to lye still 8 or 9 dayes,
Alban's 8 or 9 and then marching slowly to Redding he stayd there till about
dayes.	October 16th, and then advanced not westwards directlyb to Sir
William Waller, but southwards to Basingstoke, notwithstanding a
desire from this House, an Ordinance of both Houses, and many
letters from the Committee of both Kingdomes, ail requireing his
The Earl speedy advance westward to Sir William Waller, and Sir William
advanceth to Waller’s earnest desires in frequent letters to that purpose; there
Basing when	^	^ .	J. r 7
commanded to bemg this while nothing justly to hmder but that his army must
wards, and" ^iave advanced directly to Sir William Waller, and the Lord
desired by Sir Générales and the City foot might soe hâve marched securely after
W W letters	J	J
them to hâve had the conjunction about Salisbury.
This might hâve been securely donc, the Earle of Manchester’s
foot with his owne and Sir William Waller’sdraggoones, being then
above 6,000nd (without the Lord Generall’s and the Citty regimentes),
, and the Kinges not soe many, and their horse with the Lord
Generall’s much superior to the King’s. And, if his Lordship had
advanced thitherc accordingly, the King would not (in probability)
hâve passed Salisbury river, or the plaines, for this winter ; and soe
itf the^arfhad the seiges of Dennington, Basing, and Banbury Castles had been
wardhe<i W6St" securec^ and th°se places ours ere now, and the King by this time
not had a foot on this side Salisbury, except Oxford, Winchester
Castle,d and Wallingford, and those distressed by our quarters.
That by neglect hereof Sir William Waller being forced to give
back to Andover and from thence to his Lordship, and the King
coming on, his Lordship being then at Basingstoke, the City régi-
ments then with him and the Lord-Generall’s within seaven miles,
and the King not corne much nearer than Andover, his Lordship
The Earl’s
resolution to
goe to Odiam
but diswaded.
a ? Cromwell himself. See déposition before the Committee.—G.C.
b “ directly ” inserted afterwards.	« “ thither ” subscquently inserted.
d “ Winchester Castle ” subsequently inserted.cromwell’s narrative.
85
drew out his army in ail haste to retreate to Odiam (leaving Basing
and the beseigers exposed to the enemy)a had not Sir William
Waller and Sir Arthur Haslerig, coming in the nicke, diswaded
him from the dishonour of it.
That after this conjunction, wee being at Basing, neare 11,000
foote and about 8,000 horse and dragoones, and the King (with not
above 10,000d horse and foote) marching by Kingscleare to New-
berry, on Tuesday, October the 21th, it being agreed (as we
thought) to march towârds him or to interpose betwixt him and
Kedding about Aldermaston Heath, and our horse marching before
to the Heath. our foot struck down to Swallowfield, and thence
next day to Bedding, as if we had declined to fight; and thus
makeing fower days* march from Basingstoke to Newberry (which ^he slownes
might hâve been little more than one th’other way), wee gave the Newberry
King opportunity to hâve got cleare to Oxford (if hee would) and incon-
without fighting, and stayinge there he had therebyb time to fortify ^ttending it
himselfe against our approaches to Newberry, and by our coming
that way wee gave him th’advantage of Dennington river interposed
betwixt him and us, the passes whereof he soe comanded by the
Castle and Dolman’s house as put us to the hazard of divideing and
the difficulty of marching about by Boxford to corne upon him by
Speene, which tooke two day es more, whereas by a direct march
from Basing, on the other side of Newberry river, we had had noe
such interposicion betwixt us and Newberry, but the towne open
andc naked to us, and neither the Castle nor the horse to annoy us
(as they did) in our falling on ; and our horse being thus for thesed
six dayes, and two before, kept together out of quarter wayteing for
that service (which the other waye might hâve been dispatcht in
*■ The words in parenthesis subsequently inserted.
b “ thereby ’’ subsequently inserted.
c A deep river, the Kennett, however, flows through the town of Newberry, so that
if some of the King’s forces had possessed it the capture of the town would not hâve
been easy.—G.C.
d “ these ” subsequently inserted. e “ the other way ” subsequently inserted.86
cromwell’s narrative.
The Earl
keepes not the
agreement to
fall on att
Shawe when
the other forces
were engaged
att Speene.
The EarPs
men fall fowle
one on the
other in the
darke ; loose
two peeces.
two dayes)a were both lessen’d and disabled for the service when
they came to it, and from pursueing the victory when we had it.
That on Saturday, October 26,b when we came up to Eedhill
Feild, within shot of Shawe, and found the passes of the riverc soe
possest against us, it was agreed that the Lord General’s and the
City foote with the greatest parte of the horse should march about
by Boxford and attempt to breake in upon the enemy on that side
by Speene, and that his Lordship with his owne foote and about
1,500 horse should stay behind at Shawe side and fall on there at
the same instant that he should perceive the other part to fall on at
Speene (which was already in his viewe), yet that other part falling
on upon Speene side about two o’clock next day, though he had
notice of our engagement by the first fireing of cannon on both
partes, and saw the enemy retreateing from hedge to hedge in
disorder, and was much importuned to fall on by diverse about him
(and his men likewise ail the while within shott of Shawe), yet his
Lordship would not suffer the men to fall on, but commanded the
contrary, till allmost halfe an hour after sunsett,d about which
time we on the other side (haveing gayned most of the hedges
towardes Newberry Feild) did cease and drawe our men together
to avoyd confusion in the darke by that scattred way of fighting ;
and his Lordship going on so late, his men presently fell fowle one
upon another, and were put to assault Dolman’se house on that
onely side where it was inaccessible (Vhereas ’twas open on the
a “ dayes ” subsequently inserted.
b “ Oct. 26 ” subsequently inserted.
c The Lamborn.—G.C.
d This differs, as far as I am aware, from the other accounts of the battle whether
Royalist or Parliamentarian, which state that the Earl “ fell on not later than 4 p.m.”
—G.C.
* Shaw House was protected by a broad rampart faced with stone (which now
exists), a ha-ha, and a paling. The defence nnder Astley, Lisle, Page, and Thel-
wall, was desperate. The “open side,, here spoken of seems to be that next
Newberry, and would hâve necessitated a circuit of the house and an attack in rear
of it.—G.C.cromwell’s narrative.
87
other), by which meanes he lost two peices of ordnance and many
gallant men ; whereas bad he fallen on by daylight and according
to agreement he might, on the open side, hâve taken that house
with the men and ordnance in it, and, if so, we had betwixt our
two bodyes in probability ruined the enemy, who had then had noe
free passe over that river to gett away,a nor ground to stand on
betwixt it and Newberry, nor comaunded by us.
That the enemy flying away in the night, his Lordship’s body
lying close by Dolman’s house on that side of the river to which
they lied, suffred them to pass over the river and goe by himb without
prosecution ; yea. suffred those in Dolman’s house, which was on Dolman’s
the same side of the river soe neare him, to goe cleare away with to &00
their owne and his ordnance.6
The next morneing, being Munday, October 28th, ail the horse
on Speen side marching a fier the enemy, his Lordship with ail the
foot stay’d at Newberry, and the horse coming to Blewberry late
that night, the enemy being got cleare over the river at Walling-
ford many houres before, and we haveing noe passe to foliow them
nearer than Abbinton, and our horse being tyred out with eight or
nyne dayes continued hard duty without any quarters (as before), it
was thought fit to let them goe to quarters that night, but some-
thing close together, and upon consultation it was judged both
hazardous and uselesse to pursue further with the horse alone and
intangle them amongst rivers and woodlands without foote ; where-
upon Sir William Waller, Sir Arthur Hasslerig, and myselfe
(meeting by the way a letter from the Earle of Manchester to desire
our return to Newberry) did goe back thither to get some foot to
enable the horse for further pursuite. There we prest earnestly,
first to hâve the whole army march speedily into the quarters
a “ to gett away ” subsequently inserted.
b “ him ” subsequently inserted.
c But Cromwell himself appears to hâve been equally to blâme. The rest of the
King’s army went close past him with their own and captured ordnance, which was
also placed in safety at Donnington Castle.—G.C.88
cromwell’s narrative.
The Earl
refuseth to
send foote to
pursne the
enemy.
Lord Wareston
and Mr. Crewe.
Adyantages of
marching
forward
towards Oxon,
et contra.
beyond Oxford (about Wittney, Burford, and Woodstoek), where
the enemy began to rally, and that being denyed to hâve two or
three thousand foot sent with the horse, but neither would be
granted, his Lordship expressing extreame unwillingnesse thereto,®
making excuses and délayés, speakeing for his returne into his
Association, and much for peace; neither would he be perswaded to
stirre till the Satturday following, November 2,b and then marching
but to Harwell (eleaven miles towards Abbington) in two days
(which at his returne hee dispatcht in one) he stopt there and would
advance noe farther at ail, some excuses being found, but especially
unpassablenesse of the wayes to Abbington and beyond (though they
were indeed good enough and proved both before and since to be
passable for the enemy but not for us ; and at this time, ere we
went away, his Lordship allowed them passable to Abbington for the
heayy carriage of his victuals, ail which he sent thither) ; and the
Lord Warreston and Mr. Crewe going from Harwell to London,
possesst with that and other suggestions against advancing further
and for our draweing back, his Lordship engaged himselfe by promise
to them not to stirre thence till he received from them the
directions of both Kingdomes, and made that promise c serve while
hee stayed at Harwell to stop their mouthes that moved for
advancing further.
And whereas (as it was timely represented to his Lordship) our
timely marching into those quarters about Oxford and soe forward
would hâve forced the enemy westward, prevented his re-collecting,
occasioned his broken forces in frequent and hasty motions to droppe
offd and dissipate still more, had hindred the conjunction with
Rupartes and Garrett’s forces, and kept the King from re-enforceing
his army to appeare any more in the feild for this yeare. By our
neglect thereof the King gathers the head againe with Rupartes and
* “ thereto ” subsequently inserted.
b “ Novemb. 2 ” subsequently inserted.
c Originally written “made this serve.”
d “ off ” subsequently inserted.cromwell’s narrative.
89
Garrettes forces and otheres out of garrisones, gettes ail to Oxford,
and thence reinforceth his trayne and (the old being left at Denning-
ton) résolves to fetch it thence and releive that place; and in order
thereto ere we came from Harwell he drew thorowe Oxford, had a
rendezvous or two at Bullington Green, yet drewe in againe, not
dareing to corne on that way till wee, draweing back to Newberry,
gave him the way cleare by Dorchester and Wallingford, as
followes.a
Wee being thus brought to the défensive part againe, while we lay
[at] Harwell, some of us thought our présent posture or some other
thereabouts very good for lying in the Kinges way to fight ere he
got over those plaines, and others propounded to crosse the ri vers
to Dorchester, to possess that towne and passe, and to quarter on
this side the rivers, for more secure quarter and nearer interposition
in the Kinges way to Dennington, and to prevent ail other hazardes
of his impressions towards London or other partes on this side
Thames. Ail were against drawing back to Newberry that I know The Earl
or heard save his Lordship onely. The inconveniencyes of that,
and the greate advantages of the other postures, were represented to against adyice.
his Lordship. But those that were for any advance beyond
Harwell his Lordship silenced with pretence of his promise not to
remove till the directions came, yet the day before they came he
did on Tuesday, November 5,b appoint a rendezvous for next
morning at Compton, 4 or 5 miles back towards Newberry, without
any counsell that I or those that were for the other postures know
of, but (to stopp our mouthes) he pretended he would hâve a
councell at the rendezvousc before he would résolve whether to
dispose the army from thence, yet his Lordship goeing early to the
rendezvous when we came thither we found the army ordred before
to Newberry, in such haste as (I believe) the vanne was by noone
a “ as followes ” subsequently inserted.
b “ on Tuesday, Noy. 5,” subsequently inserted.
c “ at the randezvous ” subsequently inserted.
N
CAMD. SOC.90
cromwell’s narrative.
The drawing
backe to New-
berry caused
the losse of
Donington.
at or a neare Newberry, and this before any counsell met; his Lord-
ship (when they were corneb together) alleginge for what was
done tbat be had there received the letteres from the Committee of
both Kingdomes commanding his return to Newberry.
From this rendevous ail the victualls (which were corne up by
water for the army) were sent by his Lordship to Abbington to
excuse his not going beyond the river nor staying thereabouts
to secure it. And that sending away of our victualls served after-
wards for an occasion to necessitate the army to drawe homewards
the sooner.
That our drawing back to Newberry was the chiefe or onely cause
of our losse of the busines of Dennington, giveing the Kinge a cleare
advantage to releive it, and putting us almost out of possibility to
hinder him for haveing thus left the King the way clear by
Dorchester toc Wallingford, and a large secure quarter in that
corner on the north side of Thames close by his poste at Walling-
ford (beyond which we could not corne to disturb or discover him,
and by which he could corne to annoy or discover us even to our
quarters, and beate in small guards at pleasure). In that case if we
at Newberry (upon every party appearing to drawe over at
Wallingford and beate in our scowtes) should hâve drawn our
horse together, the King might lye quiet with his body beyond the
river till wee had been forced to dismisse them back to quarters
weary and faint, and then might he hâve taken the opportunity to
drawe speedily over, and be at the Castle before*we could recall
them, so as there was noe end of our draweing our horse together till
certaine notice that the Kinges mayne d body was drawne over at
Wallingford, and staying for that (since the notice would not corne
to us till three hours after or more) hee might, in that time, be
a “ by noone at or ” inserted in place of “ then.”
b “ corne ” inserted.
c “ to ” instead of “ and.”
d “ mayne ” inserted.CROMWELl/S NARRATIVE.
91
got over the plaines, and consequently (before wee could possibly
after that drawe our horse together or a get our foote out to inter-
pose) he might be at the Castle and hâve donne his businesse.
And this being foretold and demonstrated before his Lordship
upon the first intelligenee of a party drawne out from Wallingford
the day after we came to Newberry (which after drew in againe),
and it being therefore moved to remove thence with our whole
army to some better posture of interposition, his Lordship was
content indeed to hâve had our horse drawne together if we would
(which the King would soone hâve made us weary of as before), but
would not hearken to drawe the foote thence till the King should
corne on, alledging that he might not quit Newberry; neither
would he as yettb seeme to acknowledge but that (lying still till
the King came onc) we might well enough prevent the releife
of the Castle.
On the Fryday after, November 8,# the King draweing over in
earnest, about two a clock advanced forward, and about five cer-
taynee worde was brought us by a fugitive (sooner than we could
otherwise expect). Wee sent orders immediately for our horse to
meet att Redhill feild, but a counsell being called it was then found
infeisible to drawe out time enough to interpose, and concluded
that we must give the Castle for releived, and should only stand
upon our guard till the enemy retreated, but then to fall on. And
upon this the rendevous for the horse was altered to Newberry
washe on the south side of the towne and river, the Castle and the
enemy being on the north side. The next morneing (our horse being
corne together before day, and the King, contrary to expectation,
staying ail night at Ilsley, six miles short of the Castle) it was then
urged by diverse that we might drawe out, but the debate being
* “ or ” inserted instead of “ and.”
b “ as yett ” a correction of the first writing.
c “ there ” as first written altered to “ till the King came on.”
<\ « Nov. 8 ” inserted.
® “certain” inserted.92
CROMWELL5S NARRATIVE.
held long till wee could not doe it time enough to interpose, the
former resolution stood, his Lordship in these debates being most
ready to finde the danger or infeisibility of draweing out to inter-
pose, most earnest against it, and (in that last dispute) to protract
time.
The enemy came on, releived the Castle, drew downe into New-
berry feild, braved us at our workes, and (that while draweing
their ordnance and carriages out of the Castle) in the evening they
retreated up to the Castle and the heath beyond it. Upon intel-
ligence that they continued their retreate in the night it was con-
cluded that our horse should be drawne over into Shawe feild by
three in the moming to pursue the enemy and endeavour to put
them to a stand till our foote could corne up, which were to follow
by break of day. By light day we discovered the enemy not gone
but drawne up on Winterbourne Heath,a and whereas before
(while we thought they wôuld be gone) we seemed forward to fight
and regaine our lost honour, being now prest to hasten out the
foote, there appeared much backwardnesse thereto, espetially in his
Lordship (the foote with much importunity being nott got outb till
about eleven a clock), and the enemy being not yet gone, soe as we
might fight if we would and hâve the advantage (before pretended
to be lookt for) of a retreating enemy. His Lordship having now
noe further évasion left to shift it off under another name, playnely
declared himself against fighting, and haveing spent much time in
viewing the enemy while they drewe off, and preparatory discourses,
a councell being call’d, hee made it the question whether ’twere
prudent to fight. With ail earnestnesse and sollicitousnesse he urged
ail discouragements against it, opposed ail that was said for it, and,
amongst other things, it being urged that if now we let the King
a About two miles from Donnington Castle in a northerly direction. I hâve
somewhere read that the King halted here for Divine Service, this being Sunday,
lOth November.—G.C.
b “ not got out ” an alteration.cromwell’s narrative.
93
goe off with such honour it would give him reputacion both at
home and abroade to drawe assistance to him, especially from
France, where (wee heard) endeavours were to get ayde for him.
But, if wee beate him now, it would loose him every where, and
therefore it concern’d us now to attempt it before such ayde came.
His Lordship replyeing told the councell he would assure them
there was noe such thing, adding (with vehemence) this principle
against fighting : that if we beate the King 99 times he would be
King still, and his posterity, and we subjects still ; but if he beate us
but once we should be hang’d, and our posterity be undonne. Thus
’twas concluded not to fight, the King suffred to march off un-
sought (being within a mile of us), and we retreated into New-
berry.
The King (thus encouraged) retires not back towards Oxford,
but goes to Marleborough, hovers there for an opportunity to
releive Basing alsoe. The Earle of Manchester (the while)a hangs
homewardes to be gone into his Association his agentes, and savour
(some) to procure command for it, (others) to stirre up the soldieres
mindes to it, for both extremityes are needlessly put upon the
soldieres, and pretended to be greate where they are not; his
Lordship’s treasurer telling the soldiers (when they complayn’d
of their wantes) that they should hâve neither money nor clothes
till they came into the Assotiation, but then they should hâve
both.
And* whereas (for our coming back to Newberry from Harwell)b
’twas sometimes pretended by his Lordship that Newberry must be
fortifyed for a winter quarter, yet when we came there noec order
was taken for it, and though the importance of that place (espetially
in reference to the seige of Basing) was by the former councell
a “ (the while) ” inserted.
b “ from Harwell ” inserted.
c Clarendon says, “ that after the failure of the last assanlt on Donnington Castle
the commanders could not agréé about anything, but remained at Newberry quarrelling
amongst themselves.—G.C.94
CROMWELL*S NARRATIVE.
judged to be greate, and *twas readily apprehended by his Lord-
ship as a reason to avoide our marching out to figlit the King,
least he should wheele about into Newberry and soe releive Basing,
yet afterwards (the King staying at Marlebrough for an oppor-
tunity to releive Basing) the Earle of Manchester was very forward
to quitt Newberry, and at last, upon intelligence of a greate party
drawne out from Marleborowe to goe to Basing another way, wee
did drawe out from Newberry ; but then it was pretended to the
councell that we should goe to Kingscleare for a more direct inter-
posicion in the King’s way to Basing, and that there we might fight
with him upon the downes, if he came that way, and lye ready (if
he should bend towardes Newberry) to repossesse it before him ;
and on those grounds onely and to that end was our remove agreed
to in a full councell. But being thus got out, and upon our way
to Kingscleare, having intelligence that the King was coming on a
by Hungerford towardes Newberry, his Lordship would then
neither go on to Kingscleare nor return into Newberry, but upon
new pretences (without the councell of warre) turn*d his course to
Aldermarston (which was five miles homewards from Newberry,
and seaven miles nearer home then Kingscleare.) And, though
Kingscleare was the knowne direct roade to Basing, yet he pre-
tended to turn to Aldermarston with intent to goe directly to
Basing, and that he would fight the King there which way soever
he should corne if he attempted to releive it. This gave some
satisfaction for présent, but from Aldermarston his Lordship would
not be got to Basing (makeing excuses) ;b but with much adoe being
got out next day to Mortimer heath, he would not be perswaded to
goe on any further, alledging that many of his soldiers were run to
Redding, and more would goe thither (being got so neare it) ; that
(when he pretended for Basing) draweing the army to Alder-
marston (which was cleare out of the way) he brought the soldiers
a “ on ” inserted.
b “ excuses” an alteration ; originally written “ promises.”cromwell’s narrative.
95
soe neare Redding that they would be running thither, and then
made their running thither an occasion to avoyde going to Basing
at ail, and at last to drawe ail to Redding.a
[Indorsed] Lieutenant-Generall Cromweirs Narrative.13
a The words “ and withdrewe the seige from Basing,” with which the paper
concluded, hâve been struck out.
b This narrative may or may not correspond exactly with the charge of Cromwell
in the House. Probably it differs in many particnlars. It is quite unlike the usual
style of Cromwell. This document is compiled with great care and skill, and is
remarkable for terseness and perspicuity; and is also notable for the absence of
scriptural language and allusions common to most of Cromwell’s speeches and letters.
It may be the work of several hands. Probably Waller and Hasilrigg had something
to do with it. A question might arise as to whether Vane, who was no doubt very
active in the “ Independent Plot,” may not hâve had a chief hand in its compilation.
It is to be regretted that there appears to be no answer on the part of the Earl of
Manchester extant. It does not, however, appear by any means certain that the Earl
of Manchester was ever permitted to see this particular document. It is worthy of
note that no allusion is made to the failure of the attempt to take Donnington
Castle by assault as described by Clarendon.—(Clar. Hist. vol. iv. p. 589, et seq.)NOTES OF EVIDENCE
ÀGAINST
THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
? Harrison.
? Rich.
? Walton or
Watson.
? Jones.
1.	That the Earl by his constant backwordnesse to action, and
unwillingnesse to ingage with the enimys, hath lost many faire
advantages and opportunityes, and hath neclected the commands of
Parlement and booth Kindomes in matters of importance.
1.	Ha. that ther weare propositions made to the Earl when he
came from Yorke to beleauger Newarke, which was a thing very
feasable* but the Earl wold not consent unto it,
2.	Ki. that after the Earle came from Yorke he found him
allwayes backward to putt his armye to action.
3.	Wa. that when ther wear propositions made to the Earl to putt
his army into action he was very backword, and, beeing advised
to build a fort a[t] Musham Bridge to block upp Newark, he
refused it, and when ther wear propositions sent to march into
Cheshire he refused to goe.
4.	Jn. that when the Earl had advantages to blocke up Newarke
he shewed himselfe very backward, and lay still at Pomfrett,
Doncaster, and Lincolne, about 9 weekes, contrarye to the advice of
his counsill of warr.
Then wear ther 16 letters reade from the Committee of
booth Kindomes.
14th and 28th August to Lincoln.
14th October to Eeading.
2nd Sept. 9, 11, 26, 28 Sept.
And others to Newberye.
Then wear the orders of the House of Parlement to the Earle
reade.NOTES OP EVIDENCE AGATNST THE EARL OP MANCHESTER. 97
5.	Hen. Ha. that the Earle refused to martch from Lincolne to the
west, and sayd that y f any moved he shold goe westward he wold hange
him, and venture himselfe to be casherred rather then he wolde goe.
6.	Cr. when he desired the Earl to goe westward he sayd he ? Cromwell
wold hang him or them that shold move it.
CiT Then was an order of the House, made 8th October, read,
requiring his remove from Reding to Shaftesburye, yett he did not
then martch untill the lOth of October, and when he did he went
to Basing Stocke and not westward as he was ordered.
7.	Jr. That the Earl went to Basing when he shold hâve gone
to Salisburye to hâve mett Sir William Waller.
8.	S. W. W. that it was his opinion that my Lord George and ?SirW. Waller,
the Earl might hâve joyned with him at Shaftsbury, which yf it
had binn doone the enimye could not hâve releived Dunnington,
but the seidge wold hâve continued still.
9.	Sir A. He. that ther weare severall letters sent to the Earl to ? Hesilrigg.
goe to Sir W. W., which not being observed, Sir W\ W. was con-
strayned to retreat, and by that the enimye advanced.
10.	Ha: that the Earl retreated to Odium out of the way, and at
that time he had 7,000 foote and 7,000 horse, which was a sufficient
force then to hâve fought the King’s whole army.
The principall backwardness of the Earl appeered at Shawsfeild
or Speein, neere Nuberye, wherby agreement the Earl was to fall on
presently after the warning peece was shott off, but that he did not
doe untill an hour and a halfe after it was shott off.
1.	Rawlins: he was présent, and did presse the Earl after the
warning was given to fall on, and heare Watson corne and tell him
that the warning peec was shott off.
2.	Wat : that the Earl did not fall on untill a quarter of an hower ? Watson.
after sunn sett, two howers after the fight begun at Speen, and after
the warning, &c.
3.	Coll. Hooper agréés it was a quarter after sunn sett.
Wever.
camd. soc.
o? Harrison.
? Pickering.
98	NOTES OF EVIDENCE AG A INST
*
4.	Col. Norton agréés, and that the Earle was verye backward
to prosecute the victorye after the battayle.
5.	Col. Jones: that fower dayes after the batayle he told the Earle
that he had a great opportunitye to make an end of the warre, to
which the Earle replyed that he had reason now to return to
his Association and refresh his men.
6.	Coll. Hooper: that he advised the Earle to send out scouts for
discoverye how, wher, and in what condition the enimye was inn,
and did relate to the Earl the great good he shold hâve done yf he
had prosecuted the victorye.
7.	Sir W. W. : that after the baytale he did pursue the enimye,
but was sent for back once or twice by the said Earl, but he refused
to corne.
8.	Sir A. He : that they pursued the enimye as farr as Blew-
berrye, but wear sent for back ; yf they had not they had kept the
enimye from ever joyning; that the Earl wold not advance, but yf
he had advanced from Spine it had binn of great advantage.
The meanes by which Dennington came to be relieved was by
the Earl default.
1.	Ha: If the Earl had continued betwin Wallingford and New-
berry as he was advised to doe, he had kept the castle from beeing
releived.
2.	Harrington 1
3.	Ireton J a§ree in this'
4.	Wat: that he hath binn at many counsills of warr and he
never heard the Earl give his advise for fighting or advancing.
5.	Pic: that the Earl was allwayes backeward to ingage himselfe.
6.	Ri: that the Earl since he came from Yorke was allwayes
backword in the service.
and therfore it is good reason to conceive that the Earrs backword-.
nesse was out of désigné to protract the warr.THE EARL OF MANCHESTER.
99
1.	Proved by his actions as formerlye.
2.	By words as foliowethe.
1.	Ir: that he heard the Earl say that this warr wold never be
ended by the sword but by accommodation, and that he wold not
hâve it ended by the sword, and that yf we should beat the King 99
times and he beat us but once we shold ail be hanged.
2.	Wall: agréés in the same.
3.	Collonell Jones : he heard the Earl say u God send us peace ;
for God will never prosper the victorys to us soe as to make them
cleer victoryes to us.”
4.	Ha : he heard the Earl say that this warr wold never be ended
by fighting.
5.	Ir: at Huntingdon the Earl did receive the commanda from ? Ireton.
the Comitte of Kindomes and Parlement with much indignation,
and sayd they were ridiculous and frivilous, and he must not looke
for reason in their commands.
6.	Cr : that he would hang him or them that shold move him to ? Cromwell,
goe to the west, and one of my Lord’s friends in the Earl’s presence
sayd that the Parlement could not rule in an army which the Earl
rebuked not.
7.	Desb: the Earl say that yf the Comitte of the Assossiation ? Desborough.
shold move him to corne to them he wold doe it ail tho were hanged
for it.
.	8. Wat: that his army was raysed by the Assossiation, and could
not be removed without ther consente, and the Earl sayd that yf he
shold be commanded awaye without ther consent he wold be
hanged or cashered before he wold obey.
9. Pic: the Earl sayd that the Parlement never cared how they
hurried ther forces soe they satisfied them that desired it.a
a This document appears to be a summary of the evidence given (in support of
CromweH’s charge) before the Committee of which Tate was chairman. The
witnesses appear to be mostly either connections or partizans of Cromwell.—G.C.INDEX
Abingdon, troops ordered to march to,
17,18
Ayloff, Colonel, ordered to reinforce
Manchester, 15
Basing, the siégé of, to be raised by
Walker, 17; orders to Manchester to
raise the siégé of, 47
Behre, Commissary-General, marches to-
wards Somerton and Weymonth, 26
Charles I. exgected to go to Oxford, 26;
expected to march by Newbury and
Abingdon, 35; reported to be marching
eastwards, 42; said to be about Bland-
ford, 43 ; fights the Battle of Newbury,
60	; goes to Wallingford, 54; cornes to
the succour of Donnington Castle, 66 ;
relieves the castle, 57
Cheshire inyaded by Prince Rupert, 3
Chester, Rupert’s strong position at, 9
Clayering, Colonel, with Prince Rupert, 3
Cleveland, the Earl of, taken prisoner,50
Crawford, Major-General, sent to Shef-
field, 6; arrests Packer, 59; his ruin
said to hâve been intended by Crom-
well, 62
Cromwell, Lieutenant-General, his horse
régiment at Banbury, 29; is left near
Oxford, 33 ; ordered to join Manches-
ter, 43; joins Manchester, 45; is pré-
sent at the Battle of Newbury, 57;
complains of Packer’s arrest, 59; sup-
ports a pétition to Manchester, 60;
accused of setting a robber at liberty,
61	; hisproceedings criticised, 62-70; his
sélection of Independent officers blamed,
71; his proposais for defending the
Isle of Ely, 74; pétition of his troopers
for liberty of conscience, 75; défends
his proceedings, 78
Cuttemburg, Mr., sent to view Reading,
33
Donnington Castle reconnoitred by Man-
chester, 32; the King’s forces drawn
up near, 49; attack upon ordered, 52;
succoured by the King’s forces, 66
Dorrington, Sir Francis, about to join
Manchester, 17
Ely, Isle of, proceedings of Ireton in the,
73
Essex, recruits from, not to be taken by
Manchester, 8,13
Fairfax, Sir Thomas, left by Manchester
at York, 1
Fleetwood, Colonel, ordered to place
himself at Cromwell’s disposai, 30 ;
recalled by Manchester, 34
Gérard, Sir Charles, leaves Wales, 17
Glemham, Sir Thomas, his march re-
ported by Manchester, 30
Hammond, Colonel, loses some gnns, 65
Independents supported by Cromwell,
61; selected as officers by Cromwell,
71 ; are said to be pleased by the news
of Essex’s defeat, 76
Ireton, Major, Deputy-Govemor of the
Isle of Ely, 73
Ludlow, Colonel, ordered to Wiltshire,63
Manchester, Earl of, séparâtes from
the Scotch army, 1; takes Tickhill
Castle, 2; détermines to march south-
wards, 3; complains of want of
money, 4; receives the surrender of
Welbeck, 6; recruits for, 8; hésitâtes
to besiege Chester, 9; recommends
the siégé of four castles, 10; thinks
he ought to obtain recruits from
Essex, 13; ordered to send forces to
CAMD. SOC.
P102
INDEX.
Cheshire and Abingdon, 14; ordered
to send troops against Prince Rupert,
19; directed to march towards Wood-
stock, 20; marches sonthwards, 24;
directed to march to Abingdon, 26;
stopped by the breaking of the bridge
at Maidenhead, 28; remains at
Reading, 31; reconnoitres Donington
Castle, 32; sends orders to Fleetwood,
34; reports the disposition of his
troops, 36; reports that the King is
advancing 41 ; is ordered to send for
Cromwell, 42; colïects his forces,
43-48; cornes in sight of the enemy
near Newbury, 48; fights a battle at
Newbnry, 60; ordered to attack
Donnington Castle, 52; refrains from
attacking the King, 55; danger of
mutiny in his army, 61; his pro-
ceedings before and at the Battle of
Newbury criticised, 62-70; his pro-
ceedings criticised by Cromwell, 78;
Notes of Evidence against, 96
Middleton, Lieut.-Colonel, marches to-
wards Somerton and Weymouth, 26
Montagne, Colonel, his régiment refuses
obedience to Crawford, 61
Montrose,Earl of, with Prince Rupert, 3
Newbury, Battle of, 50,66
Newcastle, intention of the Scots upon, 3
Newcastle, Marquis of, his family taken
at Welbeck, 6
Norwich, Sir John, to be cashiered if he
does not obey orders, 21
Packer, Lieutenant, disobeys Crawford,
59	.
Pickering, Colonel, his régiment refuses
obedience to Crawford, 61
Ri ch, Lieutenant-Colonel, sent by Crom-
well to Crawford, 59
Rupert, Prince, marches into Cheshire,
3; threatens Newark, 4; his strong
position at Chester, 9; marches south-
ward, 18 ; goes towards Bristol, 22,23;
arrives at Wells, 32
Scotch Army, the, qnarters at Leeds and
Wakefield, 1 ; aims at taking New-
castle, 3
Sheffield, spoil done by the garrison, 5;
. capture of, 15
Throgmorton, Sir Baynham, marches
from Wales, 17
Tickhill Castle surrenders to Man-
chester, 2
Waller, Sir William, leaves Abingdon,
17 ; ordered to stay about Shaftesbury,
30; joins Manchester, 47
Wallingford, the King at, 54
Welbeck surrenders to Manchester, 6
Wingfield Manor, surrender of, 16