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Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia:
Sawito and the Phantom Coup
David Bourchier
Interim Reports Series
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Ithaca, New YorkDynamics of Dissent in Indonesia:
Sawito and the Phantom Coup
David Bourchier
Interim Reports Series
(Publication no. 63)
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1984© 1984 Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
ISBN 0-87763-029-1
PRICE: $9.00TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction	.................................. 1
Chapter One:	The Political Background ....................... 9
Chapter Two:	The Announcement of the Sawito Affair ......... 22
Chapter Three:	"The Smiling Tiger"............................ 37
Chapter Four:	The Trial
Part A:	The	Opening ..................... 54
Part B:	The	Witnesses.................... 63
Part C:	The	Defense ..................... 77
Chapter Five:	An Analysis of the Government	Reaction ........ 89
Conclusion:	Interpreting the Sawito Affair	............ 109
References:	Glossary of Terms............................. 123
List of Principal Characters ................ 127Sawito Kartowibowo
after his arrestINTRODUCTION*
In June 1978, a forty-five year old Indonesian named Sawito Karto-
wibowo was pronounced guilty of subversion. He was charged with
having composed a number of inflammatory documents criticizing the
government’s failings and requesting that Suharto stand down as
President. These documents would have been quite insignificant if
those who had endorsed them had not been so well known. Their sig-
natories included former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and four very
prominent and well-respected religious leaders: the head of the Catho-
lic Church in Indonesia, Cardinal Darmoyuwono; the Moslem publicist
and writer, Hamka [H. Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah]; leading mystic
and founder of the Indonesian Police, Said Sukanto Tjokrodiatmojo;
and retired General T. B. Simatupang, a Protestant leader and former
Armed Forces Chief of Staff. As it was, the controversy over the
documents became a national issue.
The Sawito affair is one of the enigmas of recent Indonesian his-
tory. Puzzles abounded from the afternoon in September 1976 when
the government dramatically announced the discovery of a "plot to
topple the President," and a number of subsequent arrests. Had a
coup been planned? Who was behind it? And who on earth was Sawito,
the man the government declared had tricked Hatta and his fellow sig-
natories into the "dark conspiracy"?
Sawito, at the time of the announcement, was an obscure ex-
employee of the Agriculture Department. In the course of the long
and spectacular trial which ensued, he became a popular hero. For
almost a year his case was a cause celebre, attracting front-page
* The original version of this study was submitted as a BA Honours
thesis in 1982 at Murdoch University, Western Australia. After a visit
to Indonesia in 1983 I revised the manuscript and incorporated new
material. Sincere thanks are due to all those who contributed their
ideas and criticisms, including Herbert Feith, Keith Foulcher, Dick
Robison, Max Lane, Ong Hok Ham, Ben Anderson, and several Indo-
nesian friends who, unfortunately, must remain anonymous. I am espe-
cially indebted to Paul Stange, who supervised my work in 1982, for
his constant interest, insight, and inspiration. For providing me with
primary material or invaluable contacts, I would kindly thank Yap
Thiam Hien, William Liddle, Graham O'Rourke, Anton Lucas, Margo
Lyon, and Rodney Lewis. I am also very grateful to my mother Ray
Bourchier and my brother Michael for their help in proofreading and
typing the draft manuscript.
12
coverage both in Jakarta, where the trial was staged, and in some of
Indonesia's provinces.1 The political significance of the trial also
attracted attention from the overseas news media.
Much of the public interest in Sawito, in the months following the
announcement, derived from the publicization of a diary written by a
former Indonesian diplomat describing a series of spiritual pilgrimages
undertaken by Sawito in the early 1970s. According to the diary,
Sawito had meditated on a sacred Javanese mountain-top and there re-
ceived supernatural signs that he was destined to rule Indonesia.
Subsequently, in a solemn and archaic ritual involving symbols of the
fifteenth century Majapahit Kingdom, Sawito had been invested as
Ratu Adi!, the messianic Just King. The press, and later the courts,
drew the conclusion that Sawito, convinced of his regal destiny, had
then embarked on a mission to replace Suharto as President. In order
to achieve this, so the story went, he had drafted a number of sub-
versive documents and, with guile and deceit, obtained the signa-
tures of several gullible dignitaries. One newspaper ran a cartoon of
a demented-looking Sawito, praying before a row of Javanese daggers
(keris) and a fuming incense pot, dreaming of the presidential throne
(see p. 3). The tiny figure running towards him and brandishing a
piece of paper calls to Sawito: "It's not the age for that sort of thing
any more, mas!"2 The general impression was thus created that the
affair was essentially a product of Sawito's mystically inspired claim to
power. This became the accepted perception of the Sawito affair, both
for a large majority of Indonesians and in a number of Western aca-
demic treatments of the subject. 3
1.	Detailed reports of the trial appeared regularly in North Sumatra
(Waspada) and in East Java (Surabaya Post).
2.	"Mas" is a friendly but respectful term of address for Javanese
males. Its function here is to emphasize the "Javaneseness" of the
tableau. The cartoon appeared first in the liberal Protestant daily
Sinar Harapan and was reprinted in Sumi Narto, Sawito: Ratu Adil,
Guruji, Tertuduh [Sawito: Just King, Master of the Cosmos, Accused]
(Semarang: Aneka, 1978), p. 22. This booklet was one of two pub-
lished shortly after the trial of Sawito. It was popular and was still
selling well in 1983.
3.	The affair has been discussed in: William Liddle, "Indonesia 1976:
Challenges to Suharto's Authority," Asian Survey (February 1977),
p. 103; R. M. Grant, "Indonesia 1978: A Third Term for President
Suharto," ibid. (February 1979), p. 143; Paul Stange, "Interpreting
Javanese Millenial Imagery" (Paper presented at ANZAS Conference,
Adelaide, May 1980), pp. 15-18; and Ulf Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis
in Indonesia: Facts, Fiction, Predictions," Asian Survey (August
1981), pp. 816-67. A much fuller treatment was provided by Mel-
bourne postgraduate student Graham O'Rourke in "Between Dreams
and Reality: The Sawito Affair" (MA preliminary thesis, Melbourne
University, 1980). For a comprehensive work written from a legal4
A classic historical pattern of political challenge seemed to be re-
peating itself, and parallels were drawn between the "Sawito challenge"
and messianic Ratu Adil movements of Java's past. k Analysts also
invoked Javanese cultural tradition in an attempt to come to terms
with the government's remarkably severe response to the affair. Some
sought to explain the danger Sawito posed to Suharto by referring to
traditional conceptions of the linkage between earthly and supernatu-
ral authority still exercising an influence in Indonesian society.* * * 4 5 As
some readers will be unfamiliar with the cultural-historical frame of
reference alluded to here and elsewhere in this study, it is necessary
briefly to identify a few key elements of the Javanese cosmology.
Traditionally minded Javanese have a strong sense of a finely bal-
anced natural order. Communal selamatan rituals are held regularly
in order to monitor and maintain a delicate homeostasis. Ideally, the
function of a leader in this complex is to act as an absorber and re-
solver of contradictory trends, to preserve equilibrium. A mystically
derived conviction in the synonymity of microcosm and macrocosm, or
the underlying unity of all being, helps to sustain a notion that a
ruler, as guarantor of order, should ensure stability in all dimensions,
that is, within himself, his family, his government, society, and in the
natural environment. 6
perspective, see Rodney Lewis, "The Trial of Sawito Kartowibowo in
Indonesia," Justice (Journal of the International Commission of Jur-
ists, Australian Section), 8 (1981): 36-56.
4.	Stange ("Interpreting Millenial Imagery," pp. 9-18) locates the
Sawito affair in the same current as the rural millenarian movements
of the nineteenth century and, more firmly, with those which appeared
with the rise of nationalism in Indonesia. He argues that the cultural
perceptions which combine to sustain the millenarian impulse in Java
are shared by sections of the urban elite and villagers. Indonesian
historian Ong Hok Ham also regards the Sawito affair as a Ratu Adil
movement in the old tradition. (Personal communication.)
5.	Liddle, "Indonesia 1976," Grant, "Indonesia 1978," Stange, "In-
terpreting Millenial Imagery," and Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis," all
offer explanations in this general vein.
6.	For the best studies on the interplay between cultural/mystical
conceptions and the magical role of kingship in traditional Java, see
Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java, Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project Monograph Series No. 43 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1968), ch.
2; B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies Part II (The Hague and
Bandung: van Hoeve, 1957); J. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic
Expectations—Their Origin and Cultural Context," Comparative Studies
in Society and History, 1, 4 (1959): 299-323; Merle C. Ricklefs, Yog-
yakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792 (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1974); and Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in
Javanese Culture," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire5
Legitimacy in the classical tradition of Javanese government (and
here I am referring to the Hindu-Javanese ideals which found their
most elaborate expression in the Mataram Kingdom of the sixteenth to
nineteenth centuries), was contingent to some extent on the possession
by the king of wahyu kedaton, a form of divine radiance. This aura
could either be cultivated through asceticism or received via revelation,
called wahyu or wangsit. Proof of the king's wahyu was to be found
in the overall success of his rule, his possession of pusako (power-
charged heirlooms), his liaisons with leaders of the spirit realms, and
in the general welfare of his subjects. If, however, the king exhibited
signs of self-interestedness at the expense of his obligations to society,
or pamrih, this was interpreted as a signal that the candescence of his
wahyu was failing. * * * 7 Without the wahyu, he would enjoy neither the
right nor the ability to rule.
As the king's power faded, the portents of change multiplied. The
forces of disintegration gradually gained ascendence, bringing a loosen-
ing of morals, social unrest, and an increasing incidence of natural
calamities, such as earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. 8 The
first signs, however, were metaphysical, and discernible only to the
most clear-headed of mystics in retreat. 9 A common pattern, according
to the court chronicles, was that the wahyu would leave the king, fly
across the sky in the form of colored lights, and enter the meditating
Holt et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) . See also Ong
Hok Ham, "'Wahyu' Dalam Sejarah Raja-Raja Java," Tempo, October 30,
1976, pp. 14-15.
7.	In a broader sense, pamrih signified personal indulgence, selfish-
ness, or any other forms of behavior considered immoral. (See Ander-
son, "Idea of Power," p. 39.) I am emphasizing here the cultural
"theory." The linking of pamrih to the idea of power-diffusion in the
Javanese cosmology probably had a structural foundation. While ex-
tracting surplus from the people, a ruler or government had to ensure
that channels of reciprocation, facilitating the "downwards" flow of
goods and wealth were maintained. (See Stange, "Interpreting Millen-
ial Imagery," p. 16.) Since many relied on this "trickling down,"
blockages could cause deprivation and revolt. Therefore excessive
siphoning off of wealth at high levels, or indeed any form of overly
exploitative behavior (read pamrih) by officials, had potentially dire
consequences for all.
8.	Van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations," p. 307; Moer-
tono, State and Statecraft, p. 54; and Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological
Studies, pp. 77-78.
9.	Paul Stange has suggested that the active cultivation by mystics of
an intuitive capacity called rasa may help them attune themselves to
subtle currents in the environment. Stange, "Rasa in Javanese Cul-
ture" (Paper presented at the AASR Seventh Annual Conference,
Melbourne, August 1982).6
mystic.10 The recipient of the wahyu would usually visit a number of
keramat or "power points" in the country to meditate, accumulate
kesakten (similar to the Indie shakti or our "life force"), and seek the
aid, again through meditation, of Java's spirit kingdoms.* 11 If he did
not already enjoy the backing of a dissident political faction, he might
then take the name of Eru Cakra12 or Ratu Adil and thereby appeal to
the messianic yearnings of discontented elements in urban and rural
areas. His prophesies of a prosperous reign or dynasty would help
generate the support he needed to make an attempt to seize temporal
power and restore order to society and the cosmos.
Benedict Anderson has argued that the assumptions made in the
traditional Javanese world view were based on a conception of power
quite different from that found in the West. He described Javanese
"power" (kesakten) as concrete in form, homogeneous in origin, and
constant in total quantity, in contrast to Western "power," which he
characterized as abstract, deriving from various sources, and without
inherent limits.13 Movements in "power" were held responsible for
political change, not the other way around, so the pursuit of kesakten
through asceticism or pilgrimage was regarded as an inherently "polit-
ical" act. Those who managed to remain nonengaged from the adminis-
trative system and steeped themselves in meditative practice, therefore,
became objects of suspicion for the authorities. Because of their access
to kesakten (and, by extension, to ultimate truth) and their lack of
10.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, p. 83, and Moertono,
State and Statecraft, p. 56.
11.	Such "power points" or sacred sites (in Javanese called punden)
are dotted all over Java. They are often places where saints became
enlightened or were buried. Many are associated with a particular
wayang or spirit figure. Kesakten is the force regarded as vitalizing
not only power points but also pusaka and ancestral spirits. (See
Stange, "Rasa," and Stange, "Sumarah as a Microcosm" [Paper pre-
sented at the ASAA Fourth National Conference, Monash University,
May 1981].) Diponegoro is perhaps the most famous Ratu Adil-in-the
making to have visited sacred spots to meditate and gain the assent of
the spirit realms. See J. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro, Progeni-
tor of Indonesian Nationalism," Far Eastern Quarterly 8 (1949) : 124-50,
and Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 74. Senapati, founder of the
Mataram royal line, is also described in the chronicles as having risen
to greatness with the help of a falling star, an alliance with Kangjeng
Ratu Kidul (Goddess of the Southern Ocean) and holy pusaka. See
Merle C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (London: Macmillan,
1981), p. 38.
12.	Eru Cakra is the Javanese version of Ratu Adil, the coming
messiah.
13.	Anderson, "Idea of Power."7
a vested interest in the political structures which purported to govern
them, their opinions were seen by rulers and ruled alike as carrying
special weight.14 Their confidence in a ruler helped to confirm his
legitimacy, while their criticisms, especially accusations of pamrih,
were seen to undermine the moral-religious basis of the king's author-
ity and signify that his downfall was near at hand.15
The Javanese cultural and intellectual tradition to which the above
ideas belong is usually referred to as kejawen. But those who regard
themselves as adherents of kejawen do not necessarily subscribe to all
the ideas outlined above, for the term is often used in the modern con-
text to signify a general orientation toward the Javanese cultural com-
plex which includes kebatinan (mysticism), traditional ritual cycles,
wayang mythology, and the syncretic, nondoctrinal philosophical ideals
associated with them.16 Nevertheless, several of the concepts which
underpin traditional Javanese ideas of power endure to the present
and are thought to shape a significant proportion of Javanese people's
perceptions of political legitimacy.17
Given the persistence of these ideas and the preoccupation of the
Indonesian press with the mystical/messianic dimension of the Sawito
affair, it is perhaps not surprising that scholars have tended to ex-
plain the affair in terms of the logic of the traditional Javanese mindset.
Yet I would argue that more attention needs to be paid to its political
aspects. While Javanese ideas of cosmic legitimation were certainly
important, they cannot explain why the challenge occurred, who was
involved, or why the government reacted in the way it did. The im-
pression that the challenge was a relatively isolated messianic intrusion
onto the political stage derives largely from the Indonesian govern-
ment's efforts to promote the notion that Sawito was the auctor intellec-
tuallis, the driving force behind the affair. The available evidence
suggests, however, that the challenge was less the product of one
man's delusions of grandeur and manipulation of others than the act
14.	Ibid., pp. 52-57.
15.	Ibid., p. 53.
16.	For two informed studies of the priorities of modern kejawen, see
Suffridus de Jong, Salah Satu Sikap Hidup Orang Jawa (Yogyakarta:
Yayasan Kanisius, 1976), and R. Subagya, Agama Asli Indonesia (Ja-
karta: Sinar Harapan/Yayasan Cipta Lokra Caraka, 1981). A frowning
Moslem view of kejawen can be found in Mh. A. Jaiz, Masalah Mistik
Tasawuf dan Kebatinan (Bandung: Alma'arif, 1980).
17.	See Stange, "Interpreting Millenial Imagery," for instance. Ander-
son has also argued that the "cultural grip" of traditional conceptions
of power remains strong. ("Idea of Power," p. 63.) See also the
editorial comment in Tempo (February 12, 1977, p. 12) affirming the
extent of the belief in Javanese society in the connection between
"wahyu" and political power.8
of a group of highly prestigious and articulate (and for the most part
nonmystical) opponents of the Suharto government. Research saps
the affair of its millenarian flavor and reveals a more conventional
"political11 substratum.
As no analysis has yet managed to explain adequately either the
motivations of the participants or the government's vehement response
to them/ my aim in this work is to provide a comprehensive account of
"what happened" in the Sawito affair and to use the insights thereby
gained to analyze the political basis of the challenge and, more signifi-
cantly, the conduct of the Suharto government. In doing so, I am
attempting to cast fresh light on events, and put forward new inter-
pretations which, I believe, help to answer some of the outstanding
questions surrounding the affair.
Insofar as this study is descriptive, it follows the chronological
sequence of events in the public sphere. After first setting the polit-
ical scene, I will go on in chapter 2 to describe the announcement of
the affair and the intriguing rumor mongering which the announce-
ment provoked. In chapter 3 I look at Sawito, relying on journalistic
reports and interview sources to explore those aspects of his personal,
political, and philosophical background which have a bearing on the
affair. Sawito's prolonged and controversial trial is the focus of
chapter 4. In many respects this trial forms the backbone of the
study. Not only did it reveal in fascinating detail the events leading
up to the affair in 1976, but it was an important political phenomenon
in itself. Documentation from the trial, comprising defense speeches,
indictments, and testimonies of witnesses, provides the basis of my
broader analysis.
Political trials, by their nature, tell us much about the regimes
which stage them. In Indonesia, where relative freedom of speech
exists in court, trials also provide outsiders with valuable insights
into ideas current among the opposition. In a sense, the Sawito trial
was a microcosm, demonstrating in condensed and undisguised form
the power relations existing between the regime and its urban middle-
class critics. It is this relationship between state power and dissent
that I consider in the two final chapters. The aim in my conclusion is
to illustrate how the criticisms made by Sawito and his colleagues are
symptomatic of a broadly felt dissatisfaction with the Suharto regime
and how the government's reaction to the Sawito affair helped to reveal
its chronic political insecurity.CHAPTER ONE
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The Sawito affair was first and foremost a product of its political
environment. If the affair is to be understood in context, therefore,
it is necessary to be familiar with the political landscape of Suharto's
Indonesia. This chapter surveys the first decade of military rule and
the patterns of social discontent which emerged in response to it.1
The first day of October 1965 was a turning point in Indonesian
history. It marked the beginning of a rapid decline in the power of
Sukarno and a decisive victory for the army as a political force. Amid
rumors of a military coup against Sukarno, a group of radical middle-
ranking officers, led by a regimental commander of the palace guard,
abducted six top generals, announced the formation of a revolutionary
council, and claimed power. The revolutionary government was short-
lived. Within hours, General Suharto had assumed control of the army,
outmaneuvered the rebels and brought Jakarta under his control.
It was only after five months, however, of deepening economic
chaos and army-backed demonstrations and massacres of Communist
sympathizers, that Suharto consolidated his position by extracting a
mandate from President Sukarno to "take the necessary steps to guar-
antee security and order." Although never intended as a notice of
abdication, the Order of 11th March, or "Supersemar" as it came to
be known, was employed by Suharto as a legitimizing device, and be-
came the legal foundation of his New Order regime.
Much of the leadership's energy during their first years in power
was directed towards destroying the political potential of their van-
quished enemies, i.e., the Communists and supporters of Sukarno.
Widespread arrests and purges, first of Communist sympathizers and
more gradually of Sukarnoists, flushed the state of "disloyal" elements
and filled prison camps throughout Indonesia.2 The scouring also
1.	I am, in this chapter, concerned primarily with those social forces
and individuals that have a bearing on the Sawito affair. My treatment
is biased accordingly.
2.	Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib, said in an interview
in 1976 that 750,000 people were arrested and another half a million
Communists killed after the coup. Televisie Radio Omroep Stichting,
October 9, 1976, cited in Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report
(London: Amnesty, 1977), p. 41. Most of those imprisoned were later
released, but Amnesty estimated that about 100,000 were still being
held in 1977 (p. 9).
910
created a reservoir of bitterness among politicians, soldiers, and civil
servants whose political credentials branded them unemployable.
Support for the military was nevertheless substantial. A common
fear of communism and the arbitrary methods of Sukarno had united a
cross-section of Moslems, indigenous bourgeoisie, Christian and other
right-wing party leaders, urban professionals, and liberal intellectuals
with the greater part of the army. It was not, however, only the
army's opposition to communism that attracted the backing of Moslems
and these middle-class elements but also its professed commitment to
an "absolute correction" of deviations from the 1945 Constitution and
the promise to restore a sound economy. Themes of stability, effi-
ciency, moral honesty, freedom from corruption, economic develop-
ment, and rule of law dominated the government's statements from the
early years. 3 The technocratic, "anti-ideological," and Unitarian tone
of the regime was attractive to those groups in society which had felt
threatened by the populist and volatile political atmosphere of Guided
Democracy. 4
The support given by these groups to the military was by no
means unreserved. Although Indonesian political thinking in the post-
independence period had been extraordinarily diverse, a commitment
to the ideals of independence and nationalism in the political and eco-
nomic spheres remained firm. The Suharto government's decision to
pursue an "open door" policy towards the formerly "neo-colonial" West
was in one sense going against history, and was not, in itself, acclaimed
by the military's supporters. 5 But neither was it opposed, for, given
the spiraling prices and the disastrous state of the economy, the New
Order's allies were prepared to lay aside their ideological qualms, pro-
vided the shift ensured stability, offered them a chance of improved
living standards, and did not seriously harm the interests of indige-
nous capital. There were few indications of radical disaffection within
the civilian alliance supporting the New Order during the first year or
two of military rule.
In the meantime, the military leaders set about remolding the ad-
ministrative apparatus of the nation to fit their needs. Suharto's
3.	A. H. Nasution, Laksanakan UUD '45 Secara Murni dan Konsekwen
(Jakarta: Yayasan LKB, 1981), provides a good account of Suharto's
promises from the mid-1960s. See also B. R. O'G. Anderson, "The
Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto?" Southeast Asia Chronicle 63 (July-
August 1978) : 10, and Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political
Format," Australia’s Neighbours (May-June 1968), p. 1.
4.	For a description of the "anti-political" mood prevailing among sec-
tions of the intellectual elite, see William Liddle, "Modernizing Indone-
sian Politics," Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, ed. W. Liddle,
Yale University Monograph Series No. 19 (New Haven, 1973).
5.	Seth Lipsky and Raphael Pura, "Indonesia: Testing Time for the
New Order," Foreign Affairs 57, 1 (1978) : 195-96.11
earliest and most significant act after banning the Indonesian Commu-
nist Party (PKI), was his establishment of Kopkamtib/ the Operations
Command to Restore Security and Order. Largely secret, all-pervasive,
and with virtually unlimited powers in the realm of internal security,
Kopkamtib came to function, in effect, as a shadow government, re-
sponsible only to the very highest authorities.6 Another step towards
the centralization of control was the flooding of traditionally civilian
positions with military officers. During the early years of the New
Order, more than 20,000 military officers were appointed as ministers,
departmental heads, ambassadors, university rectors, governors,
managers of state enterprises, and even as village headmen.7
The armed forces themselves (ABRI) were also being reorganized.
To ensure a responsive command structure, Suharto set about install-
ing loyal men from the highest to the lowest levels of the elaborate
regional military networks. Support for Sukarno among the armed
forces in some areas was a serious impediment to the process, but after
several purges toward the end of the 1960s, Suharto had secured full
control over all provincial commands.8
The first real signs of dissidence within the New Order camp came
from a core of right-wing generals from the prestigious West Java Sili-
wangi division. This group, which had been the cutting edge of the
anti-Sukarno campaign following the takeover, was particularly angered
by growing evidence of corruption among the military leadership.9 The
Siliwangi generals were also at odds with Suharto over the future of
the political parties. Blaming party rivalries for the inefficiency and
disorder of Guided Democracy, they insisted that all existing parties,
especially the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), be disbanded. By
6.	Kopkamtib directs and overrules even the Defense Department and
the High Command. Rather than maintaining a large corps of its own,
it generally works through existing structures, assigning executive
authority to selected functionaries at several levels. See J. Southwood
and P. Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (London:
Zed Press, 1983), chs. 4-5.
7.	David Jenkins, "Operation Regenerasi," Far Eastern Economic Re-
view (henceforth FEER) September 15, 1983, p. 44.
8.	The transfer of operational command of the Army, Navy, Air Force
and Police to Suharto as Commander of the Armed Forces in 1969 was
another crucial step in the centralization of power. Harold Crouch,
The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1978), p. 228. On the extent of internal army purges,
see Ernst Utrecht, The Indonesian Army, Vol. 1, South East Asian
Monograph Series No. 4 (Townsville: James Cook University of North
Queensland, 1979), p. 168.
9.	Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 235. Crouch adds, however, that
their dissent had arisen "as much from a sense of being left out in the
division of power, prestige and spoils ... as it had from ideology"
(p. 236).12
1969, however, Suharto had negated the threat posed by Siliwangi
hardliners such as Generals Dharsono, Kemal Idrus, and Ishak Juarsa
by either sending them off into diplomatic exile or paying them off
with provincial military postings.10
Suharto was reluctant at that time to implement any radical struc-
tural transformations of the party system for fear of provoking the
largest parties, NU (Moslem Scholars' League) and the PNI, both of
which retained their mass bases. Furthermore, the young regime was
eager to present a democratic, civilian face to its domestic and foreign
allies. So Suharto retained the parties and coopted several of their
representatives, as well as civilian intellectuals and technocrats, into
the provisional MPR (People's Consultative Assembly). On paper this
parliament was the supreme authority in the nation, but it soon became
apparent that it enjoyed little real power. Its persistent requests for
an election, for example, were not met until 1971.
The leadup to the 1971 elections, then, saw a progressive erosion
of the power of the political parties. A "Special Operations" body
called Opsus was assigned the task of steering them towards acquies-
cence and impotence.* 11 Several means were adopted, from intimidation
of branch members to direct installation of party heads. Particularly
hard hit were the modernist Moslems who had been excluded from poli-
tics since 1960 when Sukarno banned their large and active party, the
Masjumi. Having supported the rise of the New Order, they expected
to reemerge as a powerful political force. As it was, the activities of
their new election vehicle, Parmusi, were heavily circumscribed by
Opsus. 12
The PNI's mobilization capacities received a major blow when
Korpri, the Civil Service Corps, was established. The PNI had tradi-
tionally dominated the civil service,and the party had used the huge
administrative hierarchy as a means by which to dispense patronage
and support. 13 Now as members of Korpri, civil servants were
10.	General Dharsono was sent as ambassador to Thailand; General
Kemal Idrus to Sulawesi; and General Ishak Juarsa, who had been in
command of the Aceh Military Region until 1967, was moved to South
Sumatra. Ibid., pp. 234-36. Ishak Juarsa was later to become in-
volved in the Sawito affair.
11.	Opsus, a business congromerate as well as a "positive clandestine
intelligence agency," was run by General Ali Murtopo, originally a
friend of the President and for many years a powerful faction leader.
On the manipulation and weakening of parties before 1971, see ibid.,
ch. 10; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1978), chs. 8 and 9; and Ken Ward, "Indonesia's Moderni-
sation: Ideology and Practice," in The Showcase State: The Illusion of
Indonesia's ‘Accelerated Modernisation, ‘ ed. Rex Mortimer (Sydney:
Angus and Robertson, 1973), pp. 67-82.
12.	May, Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 252-55.
13.	Ibid., p. 238.13
required to renounce their ties with the old parties and be "mono-loyal"
to the government.
The great beneficiary of all the "retooling" was Golkar, the cor-
porate assemblage of military, religious, youth, trade union, business,
and other "non-ideological" groups, sponsored by the government.
Golkar's main function was to win elections. Because it had the ser-
vices of both ABRI and Korpri at its disposal, it was able to exert
leverage at every level in Indonesian society, from the capital to the
smallest village.14 Nevertheless, Golkar officials expressed surprise
at the absolute majority of 63 percent it polled in the 1971 elections.15
Emboldened by the Golkar landslide, Suharto called on Opsus to
emasculate the parties even further. In 1973, the nine parties that
had contested the elections were dragooned into forming two blocs, the
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or the United Development Party,
a conglomerate of Islamic-oriented parties) and the PDI (Partai Demo-
krasi Indonesia, a nationalist, non-Moslem hybrid).16
It was the New Order's unwritten policy to depoliticize society, to
render independent political activity impossible by either eliminating
autonomous organizations with political potential or coopting them into
government-controlled umbrella bodies. As the regime's ideological
monopoly took hold, the interstices of political life narrowed. Atten-
tion came to be focused increasingly on a small band of Jakarta gener-
als and their appointed civilian counterparts. At the same time, a
sense of frustration and betrayal was spreading among middle-class
elements who had hoped for greater participation in government.
Support from the New Order's middle-class allies, however, was
contingent less on Suharto's political pledges than on the government's
ability to provide them, and the country at large, with the promised
"modernization," economic rationality, stability, prosperity, and effec-
tive development programs. Thanks to the inflow of foreign aid, in-
vestment, and petrodollars, the government was able to satisfy the
most pressing demands of the middle classes. Salaries of civil servants
were raised substantially, government spending on education and other
public facilities was increased, and numerous perquisites and opportu-
nities were made available to professionals and bureaucrats.17 Publicity
14.	Julian Boileau, Golkar: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia
(Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), pp.
98-101.
15.	Personal communication from David Reeve, who was present at
Golkar headquarters on election day.
16.	The Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti became PPP,
and the remainder, the PNI, Murba, Partai Katolik, IPKI, and Parkindo
became PDI. The contradictions within each of these amalgamations
served to incapacitate them.
17.	See Herbert Feith, "Political Control, Class Formation and Legiti-
macy in Suharto's Indonesia," Kabar Seberang 2 (June 1977) : 3.u
given to the more successful of the state enterprises, such as the oil
giant Pertamina, provided the prospect of future stability and pros-
perity.18
Counting against the New Order leadership was its corruption and
the alliance it forged with local Chinese and foreign economic interests.
Many indigenous producers, unable to compete with the high technol-
ogy companies which established themselves in the manufacturing sec-
tor, went bankrupt.19 The disadvantages suffered by the smaller
entrepreneurs were compounded by the reluctance of the military-
dominated banks to provide them with credit. 20 On the whole, those
who received credit, contracts, and concessions were the large joint-
ventures established by high-ranking military bureaucrats in partner-
ship with cukong (domestic Chinese financiers) or foreign capital.21
Resentment against the Suharto group and the Chinese associated
with it was especially apparent among the modernist Moslem community,
to which a majority of small traders and indigenous manufacturers be-
longed, and whose economic discontent was sharpened by their mistrust
of the government's motives in the religious sphere. Many Moslems saw
the kejawen-oriented generals, with their Christian and Chinese confed-
erates, as actively opposing the interests of organized Islam.22 The
promulgation of a secular marriage law in 1973, which would have under-
mined the standing of the Moslem court system, drew a heated response.
One of the foremost spokesmen of the modernist Moslems, Hamka, 23
18.	Pertamina, despite its cavalier management, was a great boon to
Indonesia in the early 1970s. Oil export revenues leaped from $232
million in 1966 to $5.2 billion in 1974. Lipsky, "Indonesia: Testing
Time," p. 187.
19.	Richard Robison, "Towards a Class Analysis of the Military
Bureaucratic State in Indonesia," Indonesia 25 (April 1978):
20-23.
20.	According to an Indonesian government source quoted in ibid.,
p. 22, n. 15, up to the end of 1973, state banks had given only 17
percent of available investment credit to asli or indigenous business-
men.
21.	Ibid. See also May, Indonesian Tragedy, p. 300.
22.	See Donald Emmerson, Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and
Cultural Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976),
p. 257.
23.	Hamka [Haji Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah] was born in West Suma-
tra in 1908. He was a writer, broadcaster, and novelist as well as a
publicist and prominent figure in Indonesian Islam. Politically he had
been close to the Masjumi and was a leading member of the Muhammadi-
yah. He headed MU 11 (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) for
many years until he resigned in May 1981, shortly before his death.15
protested that being extremely weak in every field, all the Moslems
had left was their faith, which "they" would now take away too.2<+
The military leaders' diversion of valuable funds to their personal
or political use also caused frustration among a broader section of
Indonesia's middle classes, including civil servants, intellectuals, and
white collar workers. A growing body of opinion among the intelligent-
sia, too, was critical of the development model adopted by the govern-
ment. 25 Many argued that the benefits in terms of overall economic
growth gained from the free participation in the domestic economy of
multinational corporations were offset by spreading unemployment, a
widening gap between rich and poor, and the concentration of power
in the hands of businessmen who had little interest in the welfare of
the people. In addition, the influx of aid from Western donor nations
was criticized for serving the desires of the urban elite rather than
the country's broader needs. 26
Without any effective institutional means for articulating griev-
ances, younger critics of the regime occasionally took to the streets.
Student campaigns against corruption began as early as 1967, and
developed into larger protests in 1971, when, together with some lib-
eral intellectuals, students formed a so-called "moral force," speaking
out against official mismanagement of funds and the coercive methods
the military had used in the 1971 elections. By 1973, a new, more
broadly based movement was voicing opposition on such fundamental
development issues as foreign economic domination, unemployment,
and poverty. 27 As the protests grew louder in the last months of
1973, demonstrations broke out in Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Jakarta,
culminating in a series of violent riots in the capital in 1974. Known
as the Malari affair, the upheaval, which involved urban poor people
as well as students, ended in a number of deaths and about 770 arrests.
Seven newspapers and magazines were subsequently shut down.
The Malari riots were sparked by the visit of Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka of Japan, a nation whose large and conspicuous interests in the
manufacturing sector had made it a focus of nationalist resentment.
One of the immediate targets of the protests, however, was the tiny
clique of generals forming Aspri (Assisten Pribadi), Suharto's
24.	Hamka, "Dari Hati ke Hati: RUU Perkawinan yang Menggoncang-
kan," Marian Kami, August 24, 1973, cited in Emmerson, Indonesia's
Elite, p. 231.
25.	Max Lane, "Voices of Dissent in Indonesia," Arena 61 (1982) :
113-15. Lane discusses the issues topical among PSI (Indonesian
Socialist Party) groups and their followers in the early 1970s.
26.	May, Indonesian Tragedy, p. 303.
27.	See Lane, "Voices of Dissent," pp. 113-15. Lane believes that
the 1973 dissent was not a continuation of the anti-Sukarno movement,
as the 1971 "moral force" had been, but the budding of a new radical-
ism .16
"personal staff." Two generals in particular Ali Murtopo and Sujono
Humardani, were attacked as prominent advocates of Japanese invest-
ment capital in Indonesia. The deep antagonism felt by the activists
against these individuals would never have been expressed so openly
had they not been supported in their actions by a like-minded military
faction led by General Sumitro, Chief of Kopkamtib.28 Despite its
failure and Sumitro's consequent demotion, the Malari episode under-
lined the degree to which interactional rivalry was now a feature of
Indonesian politics.
By the mid-1970s large-scale corruption was becoming more evident
than ever among the generals enjoying the patronage of the President,
and was further damaging the regime's integrity. 29 At the same time,
disturbances in rural areas were also spreading. 30
Church organizations became increasingly outspoken in their criti-
cisms of the government during this period. Although Christians in
Indonesia form only about 7 percent of the population, 31 they have
28.	May, Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 289-307. In the year preceding
the riots, Sumitro had courted the sympathy of Moslem, military, and
student/intellectual critics of the regime in an attempt to mobilize
backing for a high-level challenge to Suharto.
29.	A notable example was Suharto's failure to prosecute Ibnu Sutowo,
the notoriously corrupt general responsible for the $10 billion collapse
of the state oil corporation Pertamina. A mainstay of the Indonesian
economy, Pertamina had filled the national coffers with petrodollars
and expanded enthusiastically into a wide range of non-oil ventures.
The huge corporation, however, was run with abandon, and much of
its profits helped to finance private military concerns. In early 1975
it was revealed that Pertamina was unable to pay back money borrowed
from overseas. The debt incurred to Indonesia was considerably more
than the total debt contracted during both the Sukarno and Suharto
periods. Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 328. One economist reckoned
that the Pertamina collapse caused the greatest peacetime loss any
country had ever incurred. Quoted in Lipsky, "Indonesia: Testing
Time," p. 189. On the culpability of Ibnu Sutowo, and his links with
the President, see Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Melbourne:
Fontana/Collins, 1980), ch. 7.
30.	For examples, see Donald Emmerson, "Orders of Meaning: Under-
standing Political Change in a Fishing Community in Indonesia," in
Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate,
ed. Ben Anderson and Audrey Kahin, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Interim Reports Series No. 62 (Ithaca, 1982), esp. p. 158, and Lane,
"Voices of Dissent," p. 117.
31.	Emmerson, Indonesia's Elite, p. 21. Protestants outnumber Cath-
olics by about three to one, and are well represented in Minahasa,
Ambon, and North Sumatra. Flores is predominantly Catholic.17
considerable political influence due to their disproportionate presence
in the academic, business, bureaucratic, and military elites. At the
national level, they have tended to identify with the "secular right"
of the political spectrum, and have supported, in particular, the
Suharto regime's initiatives designed to keep politicized Islam at bay.32
Their social-religious organs, however, active in projects to aid politi-
cal prisoners and the rural and urban destitute, have on occasion
been sharply critical of the New Order leadership.
At a conference in 1976 convened by the Indonesian Council of
Churches (DCI), a Protestant body chaired by retired general T. B.
Simatupang, 33 a number of controversial issues were raised. 34 The
council stressed the tensions being created in the society through
inequality between the downtrodden poor on one hand, and the high-
living "neo-feudal" authorities on the other. Misuse of government
power and concentration of wealth in the hands of a small group, they
claimed, was evidence of a callous new "priyayiism."35 This was linked
to the spread of multinational firms in Indonesia, which, it was argued,
caused unhealthy competition and provoked unrest among indigenous
entrepreneurs. The DC I also emphasized the need for full popular
participation in development, and demanded that the status of law be
elevated. 36
The Catholic Church under Cardinal Darmoyuwono took a stronger
line. 37 Following the example of their colleagues in Latin America in
32.	Ibid., pp. 184, 196, 215.
33.	T. B. Simatupang is a Toba Batak born in 1920. Instilled with a
high degree of professionalism from his training in the Dutch Colonial
Army, he rose quickly in the young Republic to become Armed Forces
Chief of Staff. There he stayed until the position was abolished in
the wake of the abortive October 1952 army coup against Sukarno.
Simatupang had strong informal links with the PSI, which was banned
in 1960. In the New Order period, as a Protestant spokesman, he has
generally been temperate in his criticism of the government.
34.	The resolutions from the 1976 DCI conference, held in Salatiga,
are to be found in a book entitled Melfhat Tanda-Tanda Jaman, Penga-
molkan Pancasfla Dalam Membangun Masa Depan, quoted extensively in
Sawito's defense speech Hatf Nurani Menuntut, read at the Central
Jakarta State Court (Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat) May 22 and 23,
1978, pp. 136-43.
35.	Priyayi are the traditional administrative gentry in Java. "Priyayi-
ism" suggests narrow-minded elitism, superciliousness.
36.	See Melihat Tanda-Tanda Jaman, in Hatf Nurani and "Pesan Natal
Bersama DCI dan MAWI 1977" [A Joint Christmas Message from DCI
and MAWI 1977] reprinted as Appendix IV of ibid.
37.	Justinius Darmoyuwono was born in 1914 and grew up the son of
a (non-Catholic) lurah or village head in the district of Djering in18
the late 1960s, the Catholic hierarchy in Indonesia paid particular
attention to the links between structural inequalities and social injus-
tice. Mawi (Majelis Waligereja Indonesia), the corporate Catholic coun-
cil headed by the cardinal, criticized the government leadership for
its "etatism" and blamed the regime's development strategy for a
serious deterioration in the fabric of society.38 The council complained
of a breakdown in justice, both on a national scale, as reflected in the
misfunctioning of constitutional institutions, 39 and in the field of law
itself, where, it was stressed, people had no protection or guaranteed
rights. The resulting disintegration of national solidarity, warned
Mawi, could lead to a "social crisis."40
Many of the concerns articulated by the religious bodies were
shared by the nationalist parties. One of the leading motifs within
the Indonesian nationalist ethos was the rejection of "free-fight" capi-
talism. Early nationalists had argued that an economy dominated by
large-scale free enterprise was conducive to exploitation and morally
corrupting individualism.41 Such opinions had led to the inclusion of
Central Java. (This was also Suharto's place of provenance, and the
two are reported to have known each other.) After growing up in the
village, he attended a Jesuit teacher-training college. At the age of
21 he entered a Dutch-run seminary and was ordained in 1947. He
subsequently worked in small towns and villages, mixing freely with
the poor, until sent to Rome to study. On his return, he worked his
way up the ecclesiastical ladder and was eventually inaugurated as
Indonesia's first cardinal. He is widely regarded as being sincere in
his social concerns. In the mid-1970s he headed Mawi and its Socio-
Economic Development branch.
38.	"Tanggapan Mawi Terhadap Perkembangan Negara dan Masyara-
kat" [Mawi's Stance on the Development of the State and Society], in
Kompas, November 10, 1977.
39.	Ibid. Darmoyuwono referred to the MPR (which is supposed to
outrank the President) and the DPR (the People's Representative
Assembly), DPA (Supreme Advisory Council), and the Judiciary, all
of which are supposed to be more or less independent bodies on a par
with the President. With the partial exception of the DPA, none of
the institutions mentioned by the cardinal functions autonomously.
40.	Ibid. On an even less forgiving note, the Catholic Church else-
where challenged people to "look analytically at the structures, the
institutions, the state laws and regulations which influence our actions
in the economic, cultural, and political spheres. Do they ensure the
execution of justice, or are they the very source of injustice?" "Surat
Gembala Uskup Agung Jakarta Menjelang Masa Prapaskah 1978" [A Pas-
toral Letter of the Archbishop of Jakarta on the Eve of Lent 1978],
signed by Leo Soekanto S.J., printed in Appendix VI of Hoti Nurani.
41.	See the discussion of five prominent old generation political fig-
ures, Mohammad Hatta, Ahmad Subardjo Djojoadisurjo, A. A. Maramis,19
an Article in the 1945 Constitution prescribing state ownership of "all
branches of production which are of importance to the state and the
livelihood of the masses." This Article also decreed that all natural
resources were to be controlled by the state and used for the greater
prosperity of the people.
That this ethos was still alive in the mid-1970s is attested to by
Suharto's anticapitalist rhetoric.4+2 The fact could not be concealed,
however, that by 1973, 33.5 percent of investment in agriculture and
fisheries was in foreign hands, along with 59.3 percent of forestry,
96 percent of mining, and over 30 percent of industry.43 Interna-
tional capitalism's penetration of the Indonesian economy, as has been
seen, was a central cause of social ferment among a variety of groups
in the early 1970s.
One of the more prestigious nationalists to take issue with the
government's economic policies was former Vice-President Mohammad
Hatta.44 Hatta had long promoted a socialistic model of economic de-
velopment, based on cooperatives and state control of industry. In
Sunario, and A. G. Pringgodigdo in Moh. Hatta, et al. [Panitia Lima],
Uraian Pancasila (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1977), pp. 59-65. This "Committee
of Five" was established at the behest of Suharto to define the Panca-
sila. Suharto's intention seems to have been to quieten nationalist
opposition to the regime by coopting these widely respected figures.
The effort, however, backfired, as their interpretation of the Panca-
sila differed in many respects from that of the government. The
minutes from their meetings circulated in stencilled form among nation-
alist students. See Kompas, June 12, 1978 (translation published in
United States Embassy Translation Unit Press Review [hereafter
U.S.E.]).
42.	See, for example, a 1975 speech in which Suharto claimed that
"Pancasila society is a socialist-religious society based on a rejection
of capitalism, feudalism, colonialism and imperialism." Quoted in Dar-
moyuwono, "Tidak Identik Dengan Pancasila," part 3 of a written
interview series entitled "Sosialis-Religius, Apa Itu?" in Derap, 15, 3
(February 1978): 57.
43.	Robison, "Towards a Class Analysis," p. 24, n. 23.
44.	Mohammad Hatta was born in West Sumatra in 1902. He attended
Dutch-run schools in Padang and Batavia before studying Economics
and Law in Rotterdam. In the late 1920s in Holland, he chaired the
early nationalist group Himpoenan Indonesia. Resuming his nationalist
activities in his homeland he was jailed for several years. On August
17, 1945, with Sukarno, he proclaimed Indonesia's independence, and
from then till 1956 served as Vice-President, acting concurrently as
prime minister between 1948 and 1950. Because of disagreements with
Sukarno, he distanced himself from politics after the mid-1950s. Al-
though not permitted to return to active politics after 1966, he re-
mained widely respected as an elder statesman.20
the 1970s he repeatedly criticized the New Orders "pro market forces"
technocratic approach to development for contributing to a decline in
living standards among the poor and the domination of the economy by
nonindigenous private enterprise. **5
Hatta was also concerned with the fate of law in Indonesia. He
publicly expressed his frustration with the "fascist" tendencies of the
Suharto regime1*6 and frequently criticized the government's lack of
respect for the spirit and letter of the 1945 Constitution. The govern-
ment's disdain for legal and constitutional norms, he observed in 1975,
meant that, contrary to the leadership's claims, Indonesia was not fit
to be called a negara hukum (Rechtsstaat or "nation based on law"). 47
Hatta was by no means alone in his espousal of law. The military
elite's patrimonialism and monopolization of economic and political
power, as has been demonstrated, marginalized several groups in
middle-class society. Anxiety and frustration became widespread, not
only in Moslem and student circles but also among churchmen, profes-
sionals, journalists, civil servants, small businesspeople, and some
military officers. These groups saw the law as providing the best
available means of protection against the arbitrary nature of military
rule, and of ensuring a measure of regularization in the political and
economic realms.1*8 As Suharto's political base weakened, then, there
emerged a semblance of cohesion among the disaffected; a loosely knit
"middle-class front," interested in the rule of law and greater partici-
pation in decision making.1*9
45.	Hatta et al., Uraian Pancasila, pp. 91-125; Merdeka, November 12,
1976; and Bung Hatta Menjawab (interview with Dr. Z. Yasni) (Jakar-
ta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp. 185, 199, 215 ff. In the former work,
Hatta compares aspects of social justice under the Dutch very favor-
ably with 1975 conditions. Then, he pointed out, the minimum wage
could buy far more rice than could 1975 wages (p. 57). Panitia Lima
in its meetings bemoaned the use of American political science text-
books in universities because of their tendency to treat politics and
economics separately (p. 93). The reading that Panitia Lima recom-
mends is almost all from the 1950s and early 1960s.
46.	Cited in Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Indonesia," The New
Yorker 6 (April 1974) : 82.
47.	Mohd. Hatta, Menuju Negara Hukum (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu,
1975), p. 14.
48.	See Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an
Indonesian Rechtsstaat," Law and Society Review, 13, 1 (1978) : 40ff.
and Herbert Feith, "The Indonesian Student Movement of 1977-78"
(Talk given to Contemporary Indonesia Study Group at Monash Centre
of Southeast Asian Studies, March 15, 1978), pp. 6ff.
49.	Feith, "Indonesian Student Movement," was to my knowledge the
first to draw attention to the trend toward lateral cohesion among
middle-class groups which had hitherto remained distinct.21
The nature of the "front" was not radical. The only middle-class
groups which could be said to have positively opposed the New Order
regime before the late 1970s were its early victims, the Sukarnoists
and left-wingers who had been purged or otherwise ostracized by the
military. For the most part, those who had been party to the New
Order alliance and who became disaffected after 1971, believed that
compromises could be reached and their demands accommodated without
a change in national leadership. By the mid-1970s, however, as I
have tried to show, the intransigence of the Suharto government in
the face of criticism was testing the tolerance of even some of the more
moderate middle-class groups.CHAPTER TWO
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SAWITO AFFAIR
September 1976 was a relatively quiet month. The Indonesian
economy was still reeling from the aftereffects of the Pertamina col-
lapse and preparations were under way for the coming general elec-
tions. The Jakarta press was debating the perennial problem of
corruption, "greedy" officials being blamed one day and the people
who tempted them the next. Curiosity was aroused on the twenty-
first by an extraordinary statement. President Suharto, apparently
unprovoked, let it be knoWn that he had never used his position to
accumulate wealth, either for himself or for his family.1 The public
were given a day to digest this statement before being dramatically
informed on September 22 that a "dark conspiracy to replace the Presi-
dent" had been foiled.2 3 4 The startling announcement declared that a
number of prominent figures had been deceived into signing several
documents which were to be used to support what Kopkamtib chief
Sudomo later referred to as a "palace revolution.113
The revelation came in a seven-page prepared release1* which
announced that the key document, "Towards Salvation,"5 dated July
17, 1976, bore the signatures of Dr. Mohammad Hatta, Cardinal Darmo-
yuwono, Dr. T. B. Simatupang, Prof. Dr. Hamka, R. Said Sukanto
Tjokrodiatmojo,6 and an unidentified Sawito Kartowibowo. "Towards
1.	Merdeka, September 23, 1976.
2.	All major Jakarta newspapers, radio stations, and television net-
works reported this as the leading news item on September 22 (radio
and TV) and September 23 (newspapers), 1976.
3.	Kompas, October 18, 1976.
4.	My references to the announcement are drawn from an official
transcript obtained from the Indonesian Embassy, Canberra, entitled
Pengumuman Pemerintah: Terdapat Petunjuk? Adanya Kegiatan Gelap
Untuk Adakan Penggantian Kepala Negara Secara Inkonstitutionil
[Government Announcement: Indications Found of Seditious Activity
Aimed at Effecting the Unconstitutional Replacement of the Head of
State], dated September 22, 1976.
5.	This is an imperfect rendition of "Menuju Keselamatan." The idea
conveyed by "keselamatan" is more like "physical and spiritual well-
being."
6.	Raden Said Sukanto Tjokrodiatmojo founded Indonesia's police
2223
Salvation," it was explained, contained "very negative evaluations of
the present day situation [and] called on those who love their country
and people ... to contribute toward a 'General Restoration'7 in
accordance with their capabilities."8 The bulk of this important docu-
ment consists of criticisms of the moral degradation perceived to have
blighted the New Order leadership. The following are translated ex-
cerpts from the original:
Only self-expression based on awareness of an all-embracing
Unity can guarantee a just and civilized humanity as a testimony
to the descended power of Almighty God, as is written in the
Pancasila. . . .
. . . the leadership of the Indonesian people is not restricted
only to those who run the State or who take an active role in the
government leadership, but rather is the right of anyone who
feels himself called by an awareness of the Unity of life. [This
awareness] will strengthen and reinforce the SOLIDARITY OF
LIFE, bringing a fitness of life, spiritual as well as corporal,
forming a world ordered on the basis of freedom and indepen-
dence, eternal peace and social justice for all people in accor-
dance with the ideals of Indonesia's Proclamation of Independence.
... If the current progress in national development is
evaluated in the context of the way in which it has really bene-
fited the Indonesian people as a whole it is clear that apart
from advances in the pioneering of physical means, it has
brought about an obvious deterioration in the standard of human
dignity. This [deterioration], already in its critical stages, is
leading us into the valley of gross indignity and has endangered
both national life and the Indonesian National Character to the
extent that the very unity of the society and the process of
National development are threatened. The danger of this threat
force and served as its chief until sacked by Sukarno in 1959. Sukan-
to, as the former general is more generally known, is an upperclass
liberal intellectual whose political sympathies lay with the PSI before
it was banned in 1960. His main interest, then and now, is mysticism.
In the 1950s he joined the Rosicrucians and the Freemasons, and at-
tained the level of Grandmaster in the latter before these organizations
were banned by Sukarno. He was also involved in yoga, and after a
trip to India, tried to introduce it into the police force. In the early
1960s he founded the mystic gymnastics organization Orhiba (see n.
13, next chapter). When the SKK (Secretariat for Cooperation among
Mystic Faiths—a New Order umbrella body) was founded in 1971,
Sukanto became its head. He is the stepfather of Sawito's wife Nuning
and knows Sawito well.
7.	"Penyelamatan Umum" in Indonesian. "Penyelamatan" more liter-
ally means "preservation," but the sense intended is that a restoration
of the standard of human dignity, etc., should take place.
8.	Pengumuman Pemerintah, p. 2.24
is already quite apparent in the throttling of the sovereignty of
law. The sovereignty of law is weak and its invulnerability can
no longer be relied upon to provide protection to the broad and
defenseless masses.
In the face of these facts, it is appropriate that elder states-
men, spiritual leaders, intellectuals, those who love their coun-
try and the Indonesian people and who desire a free, united,
just and prosperous society should contribute to a GENERAL
RESTORATION in accordance with their own capabilities and
methods in a way commensurate with the message of sang Merah
Putih [the "Red and White" Indonesian flag]—brave and sacred
—adhering firmly to the path of deliberation, the constitution
and the avoidance of revenge. 9
The second of the five documents mentioned was a "Declaration,"10
dated September 7, 1976. Signed by Hatta, Sawito, and a left-wing
nationalist figure Drs. Singgih,* 11 the "Declaration" warned that:
the present economic and social situation for humanity in general
and the Indonesian people in particular is so serious it does not
permit a natural peace of mind; . . . This state of affairs is a
consequence of an erosion of humanist values in the world. For
the Indonesian people the spirit of the Pancasila is not being
applied sincerely by those in charge of the government, giving
rise to unrest in society which could lead to fragmentation of
the nation's unity and the failure of national development; . . .
This situation calls for immediate resolution, and this is possible
only by implementing the Pancasila as the basis of a way of
life. . . .
The document went on to affirm that an agreement had been reached
between the three signatories to use "Towards Salvation" as "the basis
for the implementation of the Pancasila ... in order to achieve Justice
and Prosperity for the Entire People of Indonesia.1,12
The third document revealed in the announcement, entitled "Re-
treat in Order to Advance More Perfectly,"13 was reputedly composed
by Sawito himself. Undated and unsigned, the document reportedly
contained a condemnation of President Suharto, and urged the Presi-
dent to surrender power to Hatta.14 It was over a year before details
9.	"Menuju Keselamatan," copy of original document, dated July 17,
1976, Bogor.
10.	"Pernyataan" is the original title.
11.	Drs. Singgih is perhaps best known for his role in the kidnapping
of Sukarno and Hatta in August 1945 to try to force them to proclaim
Independence.
12.	"Pernyataan," copy of original document, dated September 7, 1976.
13.	"Mundur Untuk Maju Lebih Sempurna" is the Indonesian title.
14.	Pengumuman Pemerintah, p. 2.25
of the text appeared in the press and provided a clue to the puzzle of
the President's surprising comments on the day prior to the official
announcement:
. . . Present social trends among the Indonesian people impose a
harsh verdict on the person of mas Harto.15 Public opinion,
represented unofficially in government and state institutions,
accuses mas Harto of having denied and betrayed his own sacred
struggle and failed to provide an example of the ideals he
preaches, i.e., simple living (a maxim and way of life of spiri-
tual people). In this way also, directly or indirectly, he is
accused of transgressing his oath of Presidential office for hav-
ing, for instance, provided opportunities to others via his rela-
tives and close friends and other people near to him to enrich
himself in a truly scandalous way. The good that mas Harto
has rendered the Country and People is no longer regarded by
society. As the saying goes, "a year's heat disappears in a day
of rain.11
In order to conclude and put behind us society's harsh ver-
dict, it is appropriate that mas Harto contemplate his own being
and assume a wise and chivalrous attitude as a true soldier
holding firmly to the noble values of the Indonesian nation. For
[his] good name and for the public welfare, even the path of
resignation could be highly honorable, both in the eyes of the
public and in the eyes of the Lord of the Universe, for it would
be in accordance with the essential and natural laws of life. So
if mas Harto were now to choose a way to resign from the Presi-
dential throne [we would agree that] the time is right because
he is at the pinnacle [of his power]. This would really be an
exemplary action and would cause society's will to reverse its
orientation at once [from condemning] to applauding mas Harto
as a sacred hero and a hero of the merah putfh, brave enough
to carry out supremely sacred karma. In this way it becomes
easier [for Suharto] to resume Presidential office (after a gen-
eral election) if that is indeed what mas Harto so desires. This
would quickly nullify public opinion's harsh verdict mentioned
above.
It is already certain that Almighty Cod will give his consent
and will respond with an invaluable reward, the greatness of
which cannot be estimated before it is bestowed. In this matter
all people believe strongly that sacred conviction will be attended
by miraculous strength from the Most Sacred One whose great
truthfulness is testimony to his presence.
The document then made a concrete proposal:
The conclusion of society's scrutiny is that mas Harto must
directly choose and identify a successor to receive the job of
15. "Mas Harto" refers to President Suharto. "Mas" is a colloquial
yet respectful term of address for males among Javanese.26
President/Mandatary of the MPR. The choice of a successor
from within the government administration would entail a great
national danger. Therefore it is . . . imperative that someone
from outside the present government apparatus be chosen.
To answer this need it seems that the All-Loving God is still
giving the Indonesian Nation a chance—he has preserved the
life of our proclaimer [of independence,] BUNG HATTA.16 Bung
Hatta in the view of society is the one most fitted to take on this
conciliatory responsibility. The problem is that an intermediary
must be found, capable of persuading Bung Hatta to be prepared
to accept this temporary appointment, who must afterwards be
made responsible to the MPR and oversee a general election.
As a man who believes in Almighty God, mas Harto must
convince himself that an intermediary to manage the transfer of
powers from mas Harto to Bung Hatta is certain to arise, pro-
vided that the initiative to search for such a person comes from
mas Harto himself. The person will of course be someone who
enjoys the personal trust of both mas Harto and Bung Hatta.
It probably needs to be stressed here that on the basis of
MPR decisions, a legal foundation for the surrender of presi-
dential power to an outsider certainly exists. If carried out
[using these mechanisms] the transfer will be constitutional and
will ensure that revenge is avoided.
. . . [Such a transfer] would definitely sweep away the
criticism and the verdict of the Indonesian people against mas
Harto for all time. . . .17
The next document referred to in the announcement was the
“Letter of Transfer."18 Modeled on Suharto's Supersemar (the Order
of March 11, 1966, signed under duress by Sukarno, bestowing wide
powers on Suharto), the "Letter of Transfer" was described as a blue-
print for the transfer of Presidential tasks and jurisdiction from
Suharto to Hatta. The only other information revealed about this
central document was that it "was composed, on his own admission,
by Sawito Kartowibowo." The complete text runs as follows:
LETTER OF TRANSFER
In the name of All Compassionate God
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
(1) motivated by noble aspirations and [dedicated to] chivalrous
action founded on the morals of the Pancasila;
16.	"Bung Hatta" is Mohammad Hatta. The term of address "Bung,"
literally "brother," was used especially in the revolutionary period for
leading Republican figures.
17.	"Mundur Untuk Maju Lebih Sempurna," copy of undated original
document. Limited extracts of this document were printed in Kompas,
October 28, 1977.
18.	"Surat Pelimpahan" is its Indonesian title.27
(2)	the present progress of National Development;
(3)	the need to raise the spirit of unity and integrity of Nation
and State for the good of Development and to achieve social
justice for the entire Indonesian People in accordance with
the ideals of the 1945 Proclamation of Independence;
(4)	the need to intensify the guarantees of National defense,
security and order in all fields of this independent, united,
sovereign, just and prosperous nation, as well as contribute
to [the building of a] world order founded on the principles
of independence, lasting peace and social justice.
Considering:
a.	The 1945 Constitution;
b.	The People's Consultative Assembly's Decree No. X/MPR/
1973 of March 22, 1973;19
c.	The People's Consultative Assembly's Decree No. IX/MPR/
1973 of March 23, 1973; 20
19.	This Decree governs the procedure to be followed in the eventual-
ity of "The Absence of the President and/or the Vice President of the
Republic of Indonesia." The Decree notes that man is mortal and that
anything can happen to prevent him from "rendering his daily services,
(or) performing his job and duties (either) permanently or temporarily."
"... Should such a condition befall the President and/or Vice Presi-
dent" the Decree points out, "it will carry nationwide effect and impact.
. . ." Noting the inadequacy of existing legislation, the Decree de-
clares: "it is imperative to define a legal basis to accommodate such a
situation." Of the two pages of articles decided upon, the following
points are most relevant in the present context:
Article 3(1) In the event the President is temporarily absent, the
President shall charge the Vice President with the
duties of the President.
(2)	Should the Vice President, in the event as laid down
in clause (1) of this Article, be absent, then the
President shall charge one Minister with assuming
the duties of the President.
(3)	The term of duty appointment as referred to in
clauses (1) and (2) of this Article shall be deter-
mined by the President.
Article 5(1) In the event the President and the Vice President
are permanently absent (i.e., dead, ceasing from
executing or unable to execute their duties during
their term of office), the People's Consultative
Assembly shall not later than one month after the
President and Vice President are permanently absent,
hold a Special Session of the Assembly to elect and
appoint a new President and Vice President.
Translated in Documentation Section (Microfiche) of Oey Hong Lee,
Power Struggle in Southeast Asia (Zug, Switzerland: Biblio Asiatica
13, Inter Documentation Company, 1976).
20.	This Decree concerns "The Appointment of the President of the28
HAS RESOLVED:
I.	To delegate the tasks and jurisdiction of the President/
Mandatary of the People's Consultative Assembly
1.1.	to: DR. H. MOHAMMAD HATTA
Proclaimer of the Independence of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia /Compiler of the 1945 Consti-
tution-Pancasila;
1.2.	so that:	in the name of the President/Mandatary of the
People's Consultative Assembly the necessary
steps are taken to ensure the preservation
and maintenance of the unity and integrity of
the Nation and State, the strengthening of
National defense, security and order, the
survival of Pancasila democracy as well as the
preservation of the Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution in order that a just and prosper-
ous society may be achieved, founded on the
Pancasila and in accordance with the 1945
Proclamation of Independence.
1.3.	immediately to inform the People's Representative Coun-
cil and make the people's Consultative Assembly respon-
sible for all matters relating to the duties and responsi-
bilities of this transfer of the tasks and jurisdiction of
the President/Mandatary of the People's Consultative
Assembly.
II.	This Letter of Transfer is valid from the date of its
endorsement.
Signed in Jakarta,	1976
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA/MANDATARY OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY,
[unsigned]
(SOEHARTO)21
The fifth and final document mentioned in the government announce-
ment was entitled "Pardoning Bung Kamo"22 and dated September 1976.
Republic of Indonesia." The purpose of this Decree, dated March 23,
1973, was formally to appoint Suharto as President for his first term.
It would appear that the following point is pertinent in the context of
the "Letter of Transfer": "... to implement the authority of the State
Administration on the basis of the 1945 Constitution it is deemed neces-
sary to nominate a President/Mandatary of the Assembly to carry out
the Policy of the State as outlined by the 1945 Constitution or by the
People’s Consultative Assembly.11 Ibid, (emphasis added).
21.	"Surat Pelimpahan," copy of original document.
22.	The Indonesian title, "Pernyataan Pemberian Maaf Bagi Almarhum
Bung Kamo" translates literally as "Statement of Forgiveness for the29
Signed only by Sawito and Hatta, it argued that, despite his short-
comings, the late President deserved clemency and respect. The
extracts reproduced below convey the central thrust of the document:
... A feeling of fraternity and fellowship among humanity
must be cultivated in which there is mutual respect, mutual aid,
and mutual forgiveness stemming from an equality founded on
an awareness of the unity of life . . . giving form to a world
order and a new natural order based on freedom, lasting peace
and social justice.
. . . The Indonesian nation holds firm to the Pancasila as a
guide ... to realize this new and pure atmosphere, nature and
human environment.
. . . The Pancasila was propagated by the foremost leader
of the Indonesian nation, Bung Karno . . . and announced on
June 1, 1945 in Jakarta. It was also the tongue of Bung Karno
which, on August 17, 1945 proclaimed Indonesian Independence
together with Bung Hatta as the Dwitunggal Proklamator Kemer-
dekaan [the single entity comprising the fused energies of these
two leaders on the occasion of the proclamation23] in the name
of the Indonesian people.
... It was on the basis of the Pancasila that the 1945 Con-
stitution was compiled, even though the term Pancasila is not to
be found in the Constitution itself.
. . . Mindful of the fact that Bung Karno has passed away,
and was, as a human, of course not free of mistakes and short-
comings, it is only right that in the spirit of Idul Fitri 1 Syawal
. . . 1396 H,24 we the undersigned ... do officially PARDON
... all the mistakes and shortcomings of the late:
DR. Ir. Haji SOEKARNO/Bung Karno
. . . This statement indicates the magnanimity of character
of the Indonesian peoples who adhere to the Pancasila as a way
of life and can be seen as an example to be followed by the entire
Indonesian populace and the human community in general. . . ."25
Late Bung Karno." My abbreviation is adopted for convenience only.
"Bung Karno" refers to President Sukarno.
23.	"Dwitunggal" in one sense means duumvir, but "Dwitunggal Pro-
klamator Kemerdekaan" has a transcendent quality—it is sometimes
conceived as an abstract entity independent of and more potent than
its corporal constituents.
24.	Idul Fitri, or Lebaran, is the last day of the Moslem fasting
period. It falls on the first day of Syawal, the tenth month of the
Arabic calendar. The year is reckoned on the Hijriyah system begin-
ning in 622 AD. Idul Fitri is a time of forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion.
25.	"Pernyataan Pemberian Maaf Bagi Almarhum Bung Karno," copy
of original document, September 1976.30
Of the eleven documents which the authorities claimed were related
to the affair,26 only the above five were explicitly referred to in the
announcement. In the course of the trial, two further documents sur-
faced. The first was a "Letter of Authority,"27 an unsigned document
which seems to have closely resembled "Letter of Transfer." The
other document, discussed at length in the trial, was an open letter
addressed to "My Nation," entitled "Welcoming a Just Government in
Indonesia."28 A mid-ranking army intelligence officer and childhood
friend of Sawito's named Tommy Darmadi29 signed this with Sawito and
Hatta. No date is mentioned. The following is an incomplete composite
transcript of the document assembled from references in Sawito's de-
fense speeches and press sources. 30
It is my intention only to provide a rational and pragmatic pic-
ture [of the nation, based on] . . . the directives specified by
the New Order Government itself, and respond to the message
of the President. 31
. . . With the nation in its present condition it is not possi-
ble to talk seriously about the participation of the people in
development. The people are enveloped by a fear of politics
and the might of the authorities. The facts indicate that any
26.	This figure was reported in Merdeka, September 24, 1976, the
day after the announcement.
27.	"Surat Perintah," which was an earlier draft of "Letter of Trans-
fer. "
28.	"Menyongsong Negara Adil di Indonesia" is the Indonesian title.
29.	Darmadi was also known as Setio Utomo Darmadi. He is the
younger brother of revolutionary hero Supriyadi. Apart from working
as an officer in the Intelligence Service of the Army General Staff
(Dinas Intelijen SUAD I), Darmadi apparently told Sawito that he
was an army inventory officer (Inventaris Angkatan Darat). Hati
Nurani, p. 229.
30.	Hati Nurani, pp. 24, 234-36, and Kompas, October 28, 1977.
31.	Sawito is referring here to an old Javanese adage used by Suharto
which runs, in Sawito's formulation:
"Rumangsa handarbeni wajib hangrungkepi,
mulat sarira, hangrasa wani"
Translated, this conveys the sense: To feel that one has a share in
something which is the property or interest of the state and nation; to
share responsibility for defending and sustaining this common proper-
ty or interest and to have the courage constantly to examine ourselves
and see how far we have really acted to defend the common property
or interest. See Harian Kami, March 14, 1972, quoted in Ben Ander-
son, "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communica-
tion in Indonesia," in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia,
ed. Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), p. 312.31
action which is not exactly in line with the governments wishes
can have serious consequences for those involved. Because the
people are pushed around by the powerholders, there are none
brave enough to defend themselves with clear explanations—
they can only pray.
. . . Accusations of being remnants of G/30/S/PKI, 32 the
Old Order, subversive, antidevelopment, a sower of hatred, a
danger to political stability and national security33 are like the
sharpest samurai swords and greatly feared by the people.
. . . The existence of indefinite detention without trial and
other psychological threats intimidate people everywhere. These
matters clearly betray the essence and spirit of the Pancasila
and 1945 Constitution.
. . . Apparently the ex-freedom fighters who now hold
powerful positions have banished the memories of the support
that the people gave in the revolutionary struggle for indepen-
dence.
. . . Indonesia is facing a crisis . . . especially in the
economy. If not quickly treated by a strong, honest, and
authoritative government supported by the people, our national
stability will break down and national security will be threat-
ened. National and state life will be destroyed. So, with this
open letter and a heart full of humility I appeal to your better
side and invite all patriotic Indonesians to step forward without
pamrih to take up patriotic tasks.
. . . The time has arrived for Suharto and his government
to resign and surrender the responsibility of national leader-
ship ... to Bung Hatta.
. . . With this we do not mean to spread hatred and we
should not be regarded as provocateurs or subversives . . .
or accused with other trumped up charges designed to have us
put away.
... If this doesn't strike a chord in your31* heart then
please excuse it.
After describing five of the documents and assuring the public
that investigations were under way, the government announcement
carried sober statements from the best known of the signatories—Hatta,
the cardinal, Hamka, Simatupang, and Sukanto. The gist of these
statements (their synonymity was remarkable) was first, that Sawito
was the instigator of the affair; second, that they had signed either
without closely reading the document(s) or under the impression that
they they were providing Sawito with their autographs as "personal
32.	This refers to the September 30th Movement, the group which
executed the abortive coup in 1965.
33.	These are all charges commonly used against political and ideo-
logical adversaries of the New Order regime.
34.	This appeal is addressed to Suharto.32
mementos"; and third, that they disagreed with the use to which the
documents had been put. 35
Finally the announcement cryptically revealed that a Mr. S, K,
Drs. S, and SK had been arrested. "Mr. S" referred to Mr. Sudjono,
known as a former diplomat and one-time captain in the Japanese army
who had lived in Japan in the late 1930s and returned to Indonesia an
advocate of fascism in 1942. 36 The others were Kama Radjasa, an
activist in the left wing of the PNI and son of former prime minister
AN Sastroamidjojo; Drs. Singgih and Sawito Kartowibowo, declared by
the Chief of the State Secretariat Lt. General Sudharmono to be a
follower of kebatinan who had claimed to have received wahyu. 37
Over the next fortnight, "anti-subversion" measures were intensi-
fied. Numerous people connected through friendship and family with
Sawito were interrogated, as were several mystic figures. Newsweek
reported that fifty-two military officers had been rounded up for ques-
tioning, 38 and at least eight more people were arrested, including
Indonesia's ambassador to Yugoslavia, Major General Ishak Juarsa. 39
Hamka was temporarily forbidden from broadcasting his religious ser-
mons 40 and rumors circulated that the cardinal, Hamka, and Simatu-
pang had been prohibited from leaving the country.41
The government announcement and the arrests sparked widespread,
and at times heated, debate about the real meaning of the affair. Ang-
koton Bersenjata, the Defense Department's newspaper, set the tone
by proposing "larger scale complicity," and declaring that Sawito was
"just a pawn."42 The detention of Kama Radjasa and Singgih suggest-
ed the involvement of left-wing nationalist elements.43 This suspicion
35.	Pengumuman Pemerintah, pp. 3-5.
36.	After a schooling in Indonesia, Sudjono studied in Holland, where
he graduated in law, gaining the title Mr. (Meester in de Rechten).
He was close to Subardjo and entered the Foreign Ministry when he
was minister in 1952. He served as ambassador to Japan 1952-53 and
later to Brazil and Scandinavia.
37.	Merdeka, September 23, 1976. Sudharmono was the man responsi-
ble for the announcement of the "dark conspiracy."
38.	Richard Smith, "Indonesia: Fading Hopes," Newsweek, October 8,
1976, p. 10. This article, containing criticism of the President, led to
the banning of Newsweek in Indonesia.
39.	O'Rourke, Between Dreams and Reality, p. 4.
40.	Merdeka, September 30, 1976.
41.	Tempo, October 9, 1976. As often the case in Indonesia, the
official denial of the rumor was the first printed mention of it.
42.	Angkatan Bersenjata, September 23, 1976.
43.	Kama Radjasa, it should be noted, was set free in early Novem-
ber. Pos Kota, November 12, 1976.33
was strengthened by President Suharto's statement at a briefing for
top bureaucrats that Sawito was a cadre of Soepeno, a Pesindo leader. ^
The minister of the interior, Amir Machmud, elaborated upon this,
accusing left-wing PNI and PKI elements of manipulating Sawito. 45
General Widodo, the commander of Central Java, took this line even
further, charging that Sawito was associated with a Moscow scheme to
reestablish Nasakom.1*6
Several indications also fueled speculation that the affair was a
product of bureaucratic in-fighting. Bakin head General Yoga Sugama
announced to the press that "the principle behind the Sawito affair was
the same as that behind Malari," and said he supported comments made
earlier by AI i Murtopo of Opsus to the effect that the Sawito affair was
"leftist," whereas Malari had been "rightist."h7 Amir Machmud provided
a less oblique glimpse into the intriguing arena of Indonesian court
politics when he told over one thousand officials and society leaders
that he, Justice Minister Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and Koptkamtib
chief Sudomo had been slanderously accused of involvement in the Sa-
wito affair, and that he had also been accused of having designs on the
Presidency. The interior minister added that the slander (coming, he
claimed, from a well-known but unnamed person), was intended to turn
the people against the Armed Forces.1*8 A possible clue to the identity
of this accuser appeared the following week, when AM Murtopo, in the
course of condemning Newsweek magazine for having printed an article
44.	Merdeka, September 30, 1976. Pesindo was a Socialist-Communist
youth organization started in revolutionary times. Soepeno, regarded
as a Sukarnoist, was lecturing in 1976 at the PNI-oriented Universitas
Tujuhbelas Agustus, where Kama Radjasa also lectured and Mr. Iskak
Tjokrohadisurjo was curator.
45.	Kompas, October 8, 1976.
46.	Ibid., November 23, 1976. Nasakom was a slogan of Sukarno's in-
vention. While he claimed that it embodied a synthesis of nationalism,
communism, and religion, the army leadership, then, and now, per-
ceived it as favoring the Communist element. General Widodo was re-
ferring specifically to the document "Pardoning Bung Kamo," when he
made the comment. The fact that PKI publications Suara Rakyat Indo-
nesia (Peking), OISRAA Bulletin (Peking), and Api Pemuda Indonesia
(Albania) in the period 1976-78 pay little or no attention to the affair
suggests a lack of Communist backing for, or even interest in, the
events.
47.	Pelita, October 21, 1976. The "principle" Sugama is referring to
is presumably the manipulation of social discontent by elements within
the elite in order to create conditions favorable to their political ad-
vancement. Beyond this, the comparison with Malari (the interfactional
power struggle manifest in the January 1974 riots) Is obscure. Sugama
qualified his use of the term "leftist" by pointing out that it meant
"unconstitutional" rather than "Communist."
48.	Sinar Harapan, November 4, 1976.34
unfavorable to Indonesia, mentioned "that magazine's claim that Amir
Machmud, Deputy Armed Forces Commander General Surono and General
Sudomo were involved in the Sawito affair."49 The banning of the mag-
azine ensured that few were aware that in fact the Newsweek article
had not even mentioned the three generals.
Some claimed that the affair was an attempt to mobilize religious
groups. General Yoga Sugama linked the "Sawito plot" with the distri-
bution of "inflammatory pamphlets intended to set religious groups
against one another" and with Moslem anti-vice riots which took place
in Bandung soon after Sawito's arrest. 50 General Widodo claimed that
"one of the perpetrators of the scheme . . . had sought to have the
government arrest the five [prominent signatories of "Towards Salva-
tion"] . . . [and thereby] stimulate mass anti-government . . . protest
demonstrations by a combination of religious people and adherents of
mysticism . . . including Armed Forces members. . . ."51
There were yet others, such as the leadership of the Partai Demo-
krasi Indonesia, 52 who claimed that Sawito had acted alone. Five weeks
prior to his attack on Amir Machmud, AM Murtopo too had seemed anxious
to contain the impact of the affair. He told the press at the end of
September that Sawito had no support, and that the whole business
would be over before the general elections of May 1977. 53 Sudharmono,
likewise aiming to restrict the blame to Sawito, stated that Sawito's
wangsit had been the basis of the affair. 5l* Contradictory reports
about Sawito's sanity added to the confusion, as well as to the interest
generated by the affair. 55
Vigorous disclaimers were published by groups implicated in the
mud-slinging which followed the announcement. The PDI leadership,
accused of direct involvement by its own regional branch members from
Central and West Java, were quick to disassociate themselves from the
"plot" and affirm their support for the government. 56 Minister for
49.	Merdeka, November 11, 1976. The article he was referring to was
by Richard Smith, in Newsweek, November 8, 1976.
50.	Suara Karya, September 23, 1976 (U.S.E.).
51.	Kompas, November 23, 1976.
52.	Merdeka, October 7, 1976.
53.	Pelita, October 1, 1976.
54.	Merdeka, October 9, 1976.
55.	Amir Machmud, in Kompas, October 8, 1976, claimed that Sawito
was insane. This statement stands in marked contrast to Attorney
General AN Said's comment in Berita Buana, October 5, 1976 (U.S.E.),
that Sawito was definitely not insane.
56.	Merdeka, October 7, 1976, and Pelita, October 16, 1976. Allega-
tions that PDI Chairman, Sanusi Hardjadinata and several other ex-PNI
figures in the PDI leadership, including Ir. Anjar Siswoyo and Sulomo,35
social affairs and United Development Party leader Mintaredja, the
Central Leadership Council (DPP) of the government-sponsored youth
organization KNPI, and the corporate Pentecostalist Council were also
hasty in distancing themselves from the affair. 57 Carefully worded
statements were issued by the Indonesian Council of Churches (DG1),
the Uskupan Agung of Semarang (Darmoyuwono's archiepiscopacy),
and the Secretariat for Cooperation among Mystic Faiths (SKK), which,
while affirming confidence in their leaders and not explicitly disagree-
ing with the sentiments expressed in the documents, made it clear that
they opposed all unconstitutional activity. 58
While many condemned the documents' supposed lack of regard for
constitutional process, the government itself did not emerge free of
blame. Police General Domo Pranoto, Head of the ABRI faction in Par-
liament was quoted as saying "Let this be a warning to all, including
the government. . . ."59 The PDI claimed that it would not have hap-
pened had there been two-way communication and active participation
in decision making.60 Analogies were drawn between the "crooked
Thai dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn" and the government in Indo-
nesia61 and some newspapers called for "active discussions of the
problem of succession."62 Soon after the announcement, Mohammad
Hatta denounced the government development programs for having
created "a tiny wealthy class amid poverty" and called on the people
to "oppose any deviations from the ideals of the revolution."63
Throughout October and November, "official" statements on the
Sawito affair were hazy and often inconsistent. As rumors multiplied,
it became apparent to the politically astute public that factional rivals
were trying to exploit the affair for their own political ends and that
nobody within the administration appeared interested in providing the
public with a clear picture of what it was actually about. The govern-
ment's reticence produced growing uncertainty and impatience in society.
Three separate student councils, as well as newspaper editors and the
were involved in meetings with the "conspirators" were contained in
the documents circulated in Java and Sumatra. Calling for a purge of
the upper echelons of the party, they appear to have been written by
dissatisfied younger, non-PNI branch members.
57.	Pos Kota, September 23, 1976, and Pelita, September 29, 1976.
58.	For the DGI statement see Pos Kota, September 28, 1976; the
Uskupan Agung's, Merdeka, October 11, 1976; and the SKK's, Mer-
deka, October 2, 1976.
59.	Kompas, September 24, 1976.
60.	Merdeka, October 7, 1976.
61.	See Merdeka, September 23, 1976.
62.	See for instance Sinar Harapan, October 13, 1976.
63.	Merdeka, November 12, 1976.36
DPR itself, demanded that a full and honest accounting be given, at
least to the DPR.61* In the meantime, public curiosity about the affair
was nourished, or, I will suggest diverted, by a profusion of press
reports dealing with the singular life and adventures of Sawito Karto-
wibowo.
64. Tempo, October 9, 1976, and Merdeka, October 11 and 9, 1976.CHAPTER THREE
"THE SMILING TIGER"
There is little ordinary about Sawito Kartowibowo.1 Born into a
priyayi family in Blitar, East Java, in 1932, Sawito was the eighth of
twelve children. His father, Raden Soepari Kartowibowo was a talented
and dynamic man, having taught at OSVIA (School for Native Govern-
ment Executives) and served as an assistant agricultural consultant
to the colonial administration. 2 Sawito was well placed to experience
the exciting intellectual and social ferment of the revolutionary years.
His family was intimately involved with the nationalist struggle, and
this certainly had a great impact on Sawito's ideological development.
Not only was the wartime hero Supriyadi a regular visitor to his house-
hold, but Sukarno was a cousin of Sawito's father, a factor which, al-
though he made little of it, must have given Sawito a strong sense of
the ideals of the revolution and may well have instilled in him a feeling
of personal responsibility for Indonesia's destiny.3
1.	The following biographical information on Sawito's youth and career
is drawn from Tempo articles; Sumi Narto, Sawito, Ratu Adil, Guruji,
Tertuduh; Titania, Sawito; Siapa, Mengapa dan Bagaimana (Solo:
Sasongko, 1978); O'Rourke, Between Dreams and Reality; newspaper
sources; Sawito's pleidooi or defense speech, Hati Nurani Menuntut;
and interviews carried out in Jakarta in 1983.
2.	Raden Soepari Kartowibowo was educated at the Sekolah Bupati
(school for the children of the native administrative elite) in Probo-
linggo. Graduating at the age of fifteen he was sent to the Agricultural
Academy at Bogor. He reportedly taught at the highly prestigious
OSVIA, and at a Normaalschool (teacher training college) in Blitar, and
also wrote historical tales and, at one stage, a series of cheap and popu-
lar booklets on rice cultivation techniques. He was awarded De Orde
van Oranje Nassau for his efforts to eradicate hunger in the Purwodadi
area of Central Java. He is reported to have been a progressive think-
er, who disapproved of the ritual deference traditionally practiced
toward men of his standing, and was not, as reported in the press, a
practitioner of Javanese or Islamic mysticism, but was an adherent of
Theosophy. He died in 1948 when Sawito was sixteen, leaving his wife
to look after the family of twelve.
3.	See Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 18, and Hati Nurani, p. 231. H.O. S.
Tjokroaminoto, another revolutionary hero, was also well known to
Sawito's father and no doubt added to the nationalistic atmosphere of
the family circle. Ibid., p. 230.
3738
Encouraged by his father to read from an early age, Sawito did
very well at school and decided to pursue a career in agriculture. This
took him from East Java to the Agricultural Academy in Bogor, near
Jakarta, where he studied to become an "Insinyur" (academic title) of
agricultural science. He joined the Agriculture Department's Balai
Penyelidikan Karet Rakyat (Rubber Smallholders Research Office) and
rose quickly through the ranks. When, in the early 1960s, the office
was assigned wider responsibilities and renamed DATAK,4 Sawito was
put in charge. This gave him the opportunity to travel all over Indo-
nesia inspecting plantations and becoming acquainted with the day-to-
day problems of the poorer cultivators. The job also provided him with
an insight into the pattern of ownership of the larger, more lucrative
plantations commandeered from the Dutch by the army leadership in
1957.
In 1968 DATAK was disbanded and, although Sawito was kept on
the payroll until his arrest, he was never given another job. 5 The
reason, according to Angkatan Bersenjata, was that "he refused to ad-
just himself to the New Order"6—a phrase commonly understood to im-
ply a "left-wing" or Sukarnoist orientation.7 Reportedly Sawito was
deeply angered by the sweeping purges carried out against PNI sympa-
thizers in the late 1960s, not only because he himself was a victim but
also because he saw so many of his accomplished colleagues in the
department (which since the days of Guided Democracy had been a PNI
stronghold) being replaced by "incompetents" loyal to the New Order.8
Although he did indeed sympathize with Sukarno and the left wing
of the PNI, Sawito had never affiliated himself in an organized way with
any political party. He preferred to portray himself as nonparty, de-
claring his allegiance to the State and the foundations of the State
ideology, the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In doing so, he was
careful to distinguish between the State (Negara) and the Suharto
regime:
The State is the possession of every citizen, not the possession
of those in power. . . . Upholders of law—the hope of the people
—must resolve to become PIONEERS in support of the State . . .
4.	DATAK = Dana Tanaman Keras, an office designed to provide assis-
tance to poorer cultivators of perennial plantation crops such as rubber,
coconut, and cacao.
5.	Sawito's pay while not employed was Rp. 5,000 a month (about US
$14). Tempo, August 13, 1977. see also Pos Kota, September 24, 1976.
6.	Angkatan Bersenjata, September 23, 1976 (U.S.E.).
7.	The retrenchment probably had as much to do with his family links
with Sukarno. Most of Sukarno's relatives were removed from their
positions in the mid to late 1960s.
8.	Indonesian source. Prof. Dr. Soenardi, an internationally known
expert on plant diseases and Sawito's bapak (mentor/protector) in pro-
fessional matters, was one of those purged from the Agriculture Depart-
ment.39
and not LACKEYS of those in power who terrorize the HUMAN
RIGHTS of citizens. 9
Sawito's courtroom critique of the New Order in 1978 certainly contained
Sukarnoist overtones, notably in the condemnation of foreign multina-
tional involvement in the economy and support for national capital, land
reform, popular participation in development, and the cultivation of an
Indonesian national identity,10 but his attack was broader. His concern
with militarism, corruption, and particularly rule of law suggests that
he is perhaps more appropriately characterized as a spokesman for the
constellation of interests represented by the emergent "middle-class
front" referred to in chapter one.
Having been very active and yet restless in his job,* 11 Sawito was
not content to stagnate unemployed in Bogor. After 1968 he searched
for work, but was always turned down on account of his family relation-
ship with Sukarno. During this period of unemployment and frustra-
tion, Sawito became deeply involved in mysticism. This became particu-
larly evident after his marriage to Nuning Sri Nungrahaningsih, a
graduate of the Faculty of Pedagogy at Gajah Mada University, whose
father, Raden Mas Panji Trisirah,12 a distinguished spiritual figure
living in Solo, was to become Sawito's mystical mentor.
In 1969 Sawito joined Orhiba, a popular yoga-related organization
founded by Indonesia's first police chief and Nuning's "adopted father,"
R. Said Sukanto.13 Most likely through this group he met Mr. Sudjono
9.	Hati Nurani, p. 71.
10.	Ibid., pp. 19, 87, 193-95, 197. There are two broad streams of
"Sukarnoism" in Indonesia today. The left wing stresses the dynamism
and potential of the people and is pro-mobilization. The "right wing"
concerns itself more with nationalism, emphasizing self-reliance in the
economic, political, cultural, and intellectual fields. Sawito cannot be
regarded as belonging exclusively to either stream. Many of his sym-
pathizers however were from the left wing.
11.	See Tempo, October 9, 16, 1976.
12.	R. M. Trisirah, now deceased, was a son of Paku Buwana IX,
Sultan of Solo. He had been a student of Sawito's father in the 1920s,
though Sawito did not meet him until the 1960s. Sawito mentions that
Trisirah was a close friend of Harmoyo (K. R. M. T. H. Sumoharmoyo),
Suharto's father-in-law. See Sawito's demurrer or eksepsi: Sic Transit
Gloria Mundi, read in Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat [The Central
Jakarta State Court] on October 27, 1977, p. 20.
13.	Sawito had known Said Sukanto before 1969, but came to be close
to him after marrying Nuning. He referred to Sukanto as "mertua ang-
kat saya" ("my adopted father-in-law"). Orhiba, or New Life Gymnas-
tics, was founded in the early 1960s by Sukanto. The method had been
"revealed" to a mystic in Central Java in about 1941. The aim of the
practice is to "preserve the physical body by infusion with spirit
energy," according to an English language Orhiba pamphlet (New Life40
who, since his retirement from the diplomatic service in 1963, had been
drawn increasingly toward kebatinan.14 Sudjono was fascinated by
Sawito, and together they became involved in what Sawito later referred
to as their "mystical studies."15
With time on their hands and a common drive to develop their under-
standing of ilmu kehidupan (the science/art of life), they set out to
explore some of "the several 'mysteries' or 'secrets' . . . which are still
hidden from our knowledge." Sawito gave an example of the type of
mysteries they initially wished to investigate:
On January 4, 1970 ... a whirlwind swept the [Presidential]
palace at Bogor. [At the time] President Suharto was engaged
in the . . . administration of an obviously unsuccessful fund-
raising project called "The Irian Barat Humanitarian Project."
. . . Hundreds of large trees in the Presidential complex and in
the Bogor botanical gardens were uprooted, causing several
deaths and tens of people to suffer injuries.
... We were interested by the reports by local officials
(The Head of State Prosecution, Head of the City Police and
others) of the finding of footprints on glass, walls, and other
places inaccessible to humans. . . . These were 43 cm in length
and certainly not made by humans. We undertook to discover
whether they were the footprints of a "supernatural being"
[makhluk halus] and whether they had any connection with the
destruction at the palace.16
"It became our study," he wrote, "to search for answers to the mys-
teries we encountered."17
The results of this study were recorded by Sudjono in an unpub-
lished journal with the English language title, Mission Impossible, 18
which was later used as evidence against Sawito in his trial of 1977.
Gymnastics [Jakarta (?) : Yayasan Orhiba, 1970]). Although Soebadio,
one of the organization's spokeswomen, stressed that Orhiba should be
seen in its Javanese mystical context, she added that the movement is
followed by many people who generally do not respond to purely mysti-
cal movements. Mrs. Haryati Soebadio, "Orhiba, a Modern Indonesian
Concept of Yoga," Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture 3 (January
1974) : 108-12. She claims that Orhiba was (in 1974) the largest "mysti-
cal" movement in Indonesia after Subud and Pangestu (ibid., p. 105).
14.	Tempo, October 2, 1976, p. 4.
15.	Hati Nurani, p. 134.
16.	Pancasila Menggugat [The Pancasila Accuses], Sawito's Memori
Banding (Statement of Appeal), read at the Pengadilan Tinggi Jakarta
on August 31, 1981, p. 21.
17.	Ibid.
18.	Mr. Sudjono's journal, described by Tempo journalists as "very
professionally written," was actually prepared for publication as a41
According to it, their subsequent investigations began in April 1972,
when Sawito visited Sudjono with the news that he had received
wangsit or a "divine whisper" ordering him to make a trip to Gunung
Tidar to retrieve a tumbal or talisman reputedly planted there long ago
by the legendary Syech Subakir. Sudjono thought it an opportunity
not to be missed, and in early May he set out with Sawito, Nuning, her
father Trisirah, and a few others on the first of three lelono broto or
"rambling pilgrimages."19
The first significant contact with the spirit world was made at the
summit of Gunung Tidar, a mountain behind the Central Javanese town
of Magelang. There Sawito met20 the figure of Syech Subakir, who
Sudjono describes as having looked like U Nu, the former prime minister
of Burma. The mighty Semar, custodian of Subakir's power, was also
present.21 In a short ceremony involving two of Trisirah's ancient
pusaka (a keris and a clay pitcher) Syech Subakir presided over the
transfer to Sawito of Semar's awesome responsibility and power over
Java's spirit kingdoms. Borobodur was the next stop. As if to bestow
upon Sawito the blessings of the Buddhist faith, one of the stone Bud-
dhas atop the ninth century temple smiled at him.
novel, but had been turned down, presumably because it promoted the
notion that the supernatural world had "turned against" the Suharto
government leadership. See Tempo, October 2, 1976.
19.	There is no English phrase which captures this Javanese term accu-
rately. Sumi Narto, Sawito, translates it into Indonesian as "wandering
freely in a state of tapa," tapa being a deep variety of meditation in
which bodily functions are suspended. Zen-like paradoxes are frequent
in the language of Javanese mysticism. Apparently eager to represent
these journeys in a scientific light, Sawito in about 1977 referred to
them as "metaphysical research expeditions." Sawito Kartowibowo,
"Urutan Kejadian" [Sequence of Events], p. 1. This is an undated six-
page typescript listing events which Sawito regarded as having an im-
portant bearing on the affair. Most of my information about the lelono
broto comes from Sumi Narto, Sawito, and a number of Tempo articles of
late 1977.
20.	This of course should not be taken to mean "met" in the material
sense. In this, and I suspect in most of Sudjono's references to miracu-
lous occurrences, the sense implied is that people were met, sounds were
heard, and things were seen while in deep meditation, i.e., it was only
meditative awareness which was able to register these phenomena. This
may explain why, despite Sudjono's claim that he took modern recording
equipment on the journeys, no empirical evidence of these happenings
has emerged.
21.	Semar plays a number of roles in Javanese spirituality, from the
jocular buffoon to the omnipotent tiwi krama form he occasionally assumes
in the wayang cycles. Semar is believed by many to represent the pri-
mal essence of the Javanese race and has been understood to symbolize
the life force associated with procreation. Paul Stange, "Interpreting
Javanese Millenial Imagery," p. 6.42
From Borobodur the group headed south to Mancingan (= Peman-
cingan) near Parangtritis, known as the place where Senopati meditated
before founding the Mataram empire in the sixteenth century. It was
also the abode of Ki Ageng Arisboyo, described as the "Head of the
Spirit World Intercommunications Center in Indonesia/1 with whom
Sawito was able to communicate through meditation. (As usual in this
type of quest, the group was only interested in elite spirits.) To com-
plete the first trip they visited the Moslem coastal town of Demak,
where Sawito paid homage at the famous Demak mosque to one of the
nine Moslem wali, Sunan Kalijaga. Symbolically bridging a centuries'
old theological schism, he also prayed at the tomb of Syech Siti Jenar.22
The group's second journey took them to Gunung Muria, located
near Kudus in north central Java. The villagers of Rahtawu, a settle-
ment on the upper slopes of the mountain, reportedly believe themselves
to be direct descendents of the five Pandawa brothers, heroes of the
wayang.23 Near this village Sawito, Trisirah, and Sudjono performed a
ritual involving incense and pusaka, and were successful in contacting
three senior wayang spirits, who told Sawito, "Lord, you will lead the
government of a just nation."21* En route to nearby Gunung Sapto-
renggo, Sawito received a further message, this time advising him that
in forming a cabinet he should provide for five advisors.
It was at the peak of this mountain, however, that the group wit-
nessed the first tangible display of supernatural confidence in Sawito.
Near midnight, deep in meditation, they saw two bright lights shoot
down from the eastern sky and enter the body of Sawito. The force of
the rays, Sudjono later told the court, knocked Sawito over backwards.25
Sawito also commented, "Everyone present saw them . . . including the
villagers from Rahtawu who came along as guides and porters. Evidently
there were some down in the village who witnessed them too, including
the Village Head."26 Trisirah interpreted the lights as a sign that
Sawito would receive a gift from God or become Head of State.
22.	Whether these two wali, or saints, ever actually lived is conten-
tious. The point here is that they are often understood to represent
two poles of the religious spectrum in Java, Sunan Kalijaga being asso-
ciated with orthodox Islam and Siti Jenar with a thoroughly Javanized
stream of Islam.
23.	It is reported that the culture of this area forbids the staging of
wayang performances, perhaps because the characters are regarded as
too sacred. Tempo (August 13, 1977) describes the people of Rahtawu
as Buddhist.
24.	These appear to have been Palasura, Sakri, and Abiyasa, grand-
parents of the Pandawa brothers. Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 31.
25.	Sudjono's testimony as a witness in court, paraphrased in Keputu-
san Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat [The Decision of the Central Ja-
karta State Court] read on July 18, 1978, p. 13.
26.	Urutan Kejadian, p. 1. This is one of the few occasions on which
Sawito refers to details of the lelono broto.43
The following morning, beneath the place where Sawito had been
sitting, a flat stone was unearthed with his likeness apparent on one
side. On the other, the group discerned the profile of a long-nosed,
big-bearded man who they agreed must be Jesus.27 In the forest near-
by, Trisirah came across a piece of very rare wood which he said would
be carved into a walking stick, scabbard, gavel, and command cane for
Sawito.
After a brief rest in Bogor the group set off again, this time
accompanied by Sudjono's daughter, Sitawati. Their destination was
Alas Ketonggo, a teak forest near Ngawi, containing many often fre-
quented keramat or "power points," the most famous of which is the
istana gaib. Linked in some way with the Majapahit kingdom, 28 the
palace appears to be part of a "separate reality," invisible to untuned
minds. Kebatinan experts, however, and villagers from the area (at
least one of whom claims to have been involved in construction work
there in the 1920s) reportedly can indicate its exact location and orien-
tation. 29
The group was greeted at a clearing near a red lead outcrop known
as Tugu Manik Kumala by a 60-year-old caretaker who had foreseen
their arrival thirty-five days earlier. Sudjono writes:
. . . What we all saw, including my daughter Sita, was astound-
ing. From the early evening, daru-daru [luminous points of
energy] of all colors came from every direction toward the place
we were sitting, near the Tugu. Although we were in the depths
of a very large teak forest, far from any roads ... all sorts of
lights appeared. . . . Some were like car headlights, zipping
along a highway. ... It was as though there were great bus-
loads of people, . . . very heavy traffic. The lights sometimes
dazzled us, while the noise drowned out voices.
In the sky there was a lot of movement, as if the stars were
all being changed about. The glow of fire was visible through
27.	Tempo, August 13, 1977, p. 8. The likeness may not have been
particularly striking. Describing a similar stone found on another
occasion, Sitawati, Sudjono's daughter, said, "Using our imaginations
we could make out the profile of an old man with a beard, while on the
other side was a profile like that of Sawito. Sitawati's courtroom testi-
mony paraphrased in Keputusan Pengadilan Negeri, p. 23.
28.	See Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 42.
29.	Alas Ketonggo is situated on the plain northeast of Mount Lawu,
about half way between Ngawi and Magetan. A Javanese-speaking
Australian friend of mine recently spoke with the lurah (village head)
of a nearby village (Babadan) and several of the villagers, who sup-
plied consistent information about the "palace." Tempo (November 13,
1976, p. 34) reported a story of a village stonemason who was "em-
ployed" there in the 1920s. The lurah lives in an inordinately large
house and has insinuated that the President has been among his guests.44
the trees, even though there were no villages nearby. ... At
about two o'clock in the morning we witnessed a row of lights—
long and very bright—like a silhouette of a far away city, . . .
like Jakarta on August 17. 30
During the night a large ceremony was held at which it was felt
that the authority of Hyang Kamajaya (Cod of Sexual Desire) was trans-
ferred to Sawito. The following day his wife, Nuning, who at that time
was on leave from her job teaching at a Catholic school, felt that she
had become Sang Ratu Dyah Mekarsari, the daughter of the famed Bra-
wijaya I and Sawito's incarnate queen. On being invited to the palace
that night, the couple reportedly "flew around, exploring spaces and
meeting many friends."31 So the group continued, from mountaintop
to power-charged glade, with ever greater spirits submitting to the
supremacy of Sawito, until their return to Bogor in August 1972. 32
Excitement over Sawito's revelations was not limited to members of
the entourage. In Holland, Alfred van Gennep, a Yogyakarta-born
Dutch parapsychologist instrumental in the founding of Orhiba, had
received telepathic news of the rise of a Ratu Adil. With his wife, he
flew (in a plane) to Jakarta, where he contacted Sukanto and Sudjono.
They, in turn, took him to meet Sawito, whom he believed to be Indo-
nesia's future king. Though the two men had never met before they
embraced warmly, for, Sudjono tells us, van Gennep was believed to
be "Cod's envoy" whose task it was formally to invest Sawito as Ratu
Adil.33 Describing the investiture Sudjono wrote:
After having carried out some acts of obeisance, van Gennep
approached the place Sawito was standing, step by step, while
they fixed their eyes intently on one another. When he reached
Sawito, van Gennep placed his right hand on Sawito's left shoul-
der. Holding a keris in his left hand, he made signs around
Sawito's head. Sawito responded by gripping van Gennep's
shoulder several times. Afterwards they pressed their free
hands to their hearts. 31*
30.	Tempo, October 16, 1976, quoting an article by Mr. Sudjono:
"Sebuah Pengalaman Ghaib" [A Mysterious Experience] in Mawas Diri,
May 1976. August 17 is Indonesian Independence Day.
31.	Tempo, August 13, 1977, p. 8.
32.	Other places visited by Sudjono, Sawito, and Trisirah were
Karang Gupito (on the eastern slopes of Mount Lawu), the summit of
Mahameru or Mount Semeru (in East Java, traditionally regarded as
the world's highest mountain), and Krakatoa off the west coast of
Java.
33.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 39. Van Gennep knew Said Sukanto
through a mystical organization called the "Divine Life Society."
Titania, Sawito, Siapa, p. 39.
34.	Sudjono, quoted in Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 40.45
Van Cennep then presented Sawito with the white and red standard of
the Majapahit kingdom, which he regarded as Sawito's rightful posses-
sion as Ratu Adil. 35 Jolono, the retainer of the Majapahit crown, was
expected to manifest himself during this ceremony, but he did not, and
six days later, on September 16, 1972, a second meeting was held at
Sudjono's house.
All those taking part in the second ceremony attended in their
roles as incarnations of kings from the Majapahit royal house. Brawi-
jaya I was Trisirah, Brawijaya II was van Cennep, and Brawijaya III
his 51-year-old wife Francien. Sukanto was to have represented Bra-
wijaya IV, but since he could not come, Prof. Mr. Suyono Hadinoto,
once a top PNI leader and economic affairs minister, 36 took his place.
Sudjono was present in his capacity as King Wikramawardhana or
Brawijaya V.37 Together this "dynasty" succeeded in evoking Jolono,
who appeared "five meters above the ground" (to all but Mr. Sudjono's
wife, who saw nothing), but he did not speak. Sawito ended the eve-
ning by expressing the consensus of the group that it was time to open
a new page in Indonesian history.38
As if to gain final approval, a group of eight, this time including
another former minister and PNI leader, Mr. Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, 39
35.	Uruton Kejadian, p. 1. The white and red of the "Majapahit"
standard were arranged vertically, the hoist white and the fly red.
36.	Suyono Hadinoto was a PNI leader in the late revolution and early
liberal period. He served as economic affairs minister in the Sukiman
Cabinet 1952-53, but was subsequently pushed aside by Sidik and
Sarmidi. He later served as Indonesia's ambassador to Argentina.
37.	The "casting" of roles here was not as arbitrary as it may seem.
Trisirah reportedly received the spirit of Brawijaya I while with the
lelono broto group in Karang Cupito in late July 1972. Van Cennep
and his wife had long believed that they were reincarnations of Brawi-
jaya II (Prabu Jayanegara) and Tribuwana Tungga Dewi (who later in
life became Queen Brawijaya III). Suyono Hadinoto claimed that many
years previously in Yogyakarta he had received the news that he was
the reincarnation of the great Hayam Wuruk or Brawijaya IV, and Su-
djono had dreamed "over three nights" that he had been crowned
Brawijaya V in the Majapahit capital, Mojowarno. Tempo, August 13,
1977, p. 5. There were at least five Majapahit monarchs after Wikrama-
wardhana (Sudjono), so the group represented only the first half of
the royal line.
38.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 42.
39.	Mr. Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, 76 years old at the time of these
events, was trained as a lawyer in Holland after which he returned to
Indonesia and joined Sukarno in founding the PNI. In the early 1950s
he served as minister for the interior (1951-52) and finance minister
(1953-54). He was known from the late 1960s as a steadfast opponent
of the Suharto regime.46
left for Siti Penjalu, a sacred lake high in the hills of West Java. An
island in the lake, covered in huge trees and inhabited by large cobras,
bats, and, according to the locals, a pair of tigers, is the site of an
ancient graveyard and also the home of Sang Hyang Prabu Cakradewa,
grandchild of the seer Jayabaya who ruled in Kediri in the twelfth cen-
tury. At Siti Penjalu on December 22, 1972 all except Mr. Iskak wit-
nessed a spirit delegation which assured them that the spirits were on
their side and would cooperate in overcoming the difficulties theywould
face during the transition to the New Age.
Mr. Sudjono's account of these events was featured widely in the
Indonesian press. Pelita serialized his journal, and magazines such as
Tempo created cover stories out of it. Sawito's attitude towards Mission
Impossible is ambiguous. He rarely referred in court to the incidents
described in the journal. When he did so it was not to deny their
veracity but rather to argue that they did not contravene any existing
laws. He is unlikely to have played any role in publicizing the account,
for it was released to the press only after both he and Sudjono were
imprisoned.
Having briefly surveyed some wondrous episodes from Sawito's life
seen through the eyes of Mr. Sudjono, we should now turn to Sawito's
own words, as they appeared in the Jakarta monthly Mawas Diri41 and
in his defense speeches, to gain some idea of where his own priorities
lay.
The central themes in Sawito's writings of the 1970s are ideas con-
cerning an evolution of consciousness and the related notion of the
imminent arrival of a New Age. He takes as a starting point the wide-
spread mystical understanding of a divinity manifest in the unity of
ail things, and of man's capacity to awaken an awareness of that divin-
ity and merge with it. Acknowledging the influence of European philos-
ophers such as Chardinand van der Leeuw,£f3 Sawito argued that
40.	Tempo, October 16, 1976 and August 13, 1977.
41.	Mawas Diri was edited in those years by Dra. S. K. Trimurti, a
journalist and nationalist figure,formerly one of the leaders of Partai
Buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Labor Party—nonradical Marxist). She
served as minister of labor 1947-48 and from 1969 to 1971 was a member
of the MPRS. Mawas Diri printed articles about philosophy, mysticism,
wayang, parapsychology, etc. Its small circulation and limited scope
gave it some freedom from censorship, but it rarely printed controver-
sial articles.
Sawito knew Trimurti and on a few occasions spoke at meetings she
organized. He wrote at least eleven articles for Mawas Diri in the period
1973-76. Perhaps to avoid overexposure he wrote under three names—
his own, "Dharmakusama" and, curiously, "D. Switz." (See Tempo,
October 16, 1976, p. 8). If we try to relate themes in his works with
his choice of pen names, no pattern is apparent. Sawito also wrote
two articles for the nationalist newspaper Merdeka.
42.	Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), a French Jesuit paleon-47
man, or, more precisely, man's consciousness, was evolving towards
supreme awareness or self-realization. He wrote that this ongoing
process would culminate in an age of harmony and compassion in which
all living things would relate on the basis of their common semangat or
vital energy. 44
Departing from the traditional Javanese ideal of passive acceptance,
Sawito emphasized the importance of intervention, of the role of man's
will in shaping the evolutionary process.45 He regarded it as man's
purpose to strive to clear the path so that evolutionary development
could proceed. He saw desires such as avarice and power-lust, as
well as low levels of awareness, as the principal obstacles to this pro-
cess, and frequently emphasized the urgent need for morality and the
necessity to listen to one's own inner voice.
In 1973 Sawito wrote an article entitled "The Basis of an Awareness
of Real Life"1*6 in which he stated his belief that the Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution were the products of divine inspiration. Equipped
with these sacred guidelines, Indonesia, in his view, was advantaged
in its evolutionary progression towards a New Age, and by faithfully
adhering to them, would become a real example among nations. But
the bestowal of these symbols, warned Sawito, brought heavy respon-
sibilities, and any deviations from the guidelines would not only retard
the course of evolution but also lead to the spread of disharmony and
"mental corruption."
Sawito's overriding concern with the implementation of these canons
highlights his sense of the link between morality, political power, and
the New Age. "The Head of State," he wrote, "must serve as the
supreme example of Pancasila living."47 In another work, he urges
tologist who, on the basis of scientific study as well as his personal
mystical experience, held that the history of life on earth revealed a
tendency for consciousness to become increasingly self-aware. The
Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1960) is his best known work.
Sawito quotes from it extensively in his defense speech.
43.	Prof, van der Leeuw was a Dutch philosopher who argued that
mankind passed through three ages, the natural period, the cultural/
scientific period (now), and then into the creative period or New Age.
His major work, which Sawito drew on, is entitled Historisch Idealisme.
44.	Sawito Kartowibowo, "Kaum Agama dan Kebatinan Bersatulah!"
[Religious and Spiritual Communities Unite!], Mawas Diri (October
1975), pp. 10-11.
45.	Hati Nurani, p. 95.
46.	Sawito Kartowibowo, "Pijakan Kesadaran Hidup Nyata," Mawas
Diri (December 1973).
47.	Sawito Kartowibowo, "Evolusi Kesadaran Hidup Berjazad" [The
Evolution of an Awareness of Physical Life], Mawas Diri (September
1973), p. 20.the state's bureaucrats to "examine their consciences" (mawas diri) by
answering over sixty of his soul-searching questions such as: "Do you,
in every action of everyday life, devote your life totally to God?"; "Do
you differentiate between the state's property and your own?"; "Have
you ever felt incapable of carrying out a duty [and if so] would you
be prepared to resign on your own accord?"1*8 These writings reveal
Sawito's misgivings regarding the moral integrity of the nation's leaders
and his belief that others might be more suited to the task. Nowhere,
however, does he suggest that he himself would make a better leader.
Another theme which resonates in Sawito's writings is that of unity.
Consistent with the general mystical insistence on the principle of
homogeneity, Sawito appealed for unity on several levels—between
moral, social, and cosmic dimensions of awareness, and between the
spiritual, philosophical, and scientific foundations of knowledge. 49
The story of the lelono broto would seem to indicate that Sawito was
deeply involved in the "power" and "spirit" oriented tradition of Java-
nese kebatinan. This, however, he repeatedly and forcefully denied,
disliking the hermitic, occult associations which the word kebatinan
often carries in Java. 50 Sawito preferred to count himself among "the
spiritual," whose role he saw as being "attuned to society's 'vibrations,'
thoroughly learned in rationality and science," and actively upholding
divine justice such as was enshrined in the 1945 Constitution.51 In
another elaboration of this idea, Sawito perhaps provided an insight
into the way he saw himself:
Without understanding the criterion of a spiritual person's beha-
vior, the judges followed their own whims and regarded my atti-
tude and my words as being far removed from those of a spiritual
person. The judges' view was mistaken and dangerous. The
judges had forgotten that prophets [nabi-nabi] are young,
brave, and dashing people with harsh and thundering voices
which they use everywhere, in deserts, mountains, and in the
middle of crowds. The image of a spiritual person is not at all
48.	Sawito, "Pijikan . . . ," pp. 7-11.
49.	See, for instance, Hati Nurani, p. 53.
50.	In Hati Nurani Sawito rejects the "family of kebatinan" as klenik,
or too closely related to black magic. This may appear to stand in con-
tradiction to his lauding of kebatinan in his 1975 article "Kaum Agama
dan Kebatinan Bersatulah!" In fact it was only Sawito's understanding
of the connotations of the word kebatinan that changed, not his philos-
ophy. His desire to associate himself more positively (at least in writ-
ing) with the "consciousness-oriented" mystical outlook reflects a simi-
lar trend among some of the larger Indonesian spiritual groupings such
as Subud, Pangestu, and Sumarah.
51.	See Sawito Kartowibowo, "Republik Indonesia adalah badan per-
juangan modern kaum spirituil" [The Republic of Indonesia is an agency
for the struggle of the spiritual community), Mawas Diri (March 1976).49
that of a stiff old man with a soft voice, scared of a fight, living
in a cave, and distancing himself from modern society.52
Similarly, in his philosophical writings Sawito tended to eschew
direct reference to the "parochial" Javanese literary and mythological
traditions, 53 preferring to draw on Islamic and Christian teachings as
well as "world class" thinkers such as Shakespeare, Sun Yat Sen, and
Vivekananda to supplement his arguments. Whether or not this was
intended to impress an audience, which he felt may not otherwise have
taken him seriously, is unclear. Sawito never seemed concerned with
reconciling his consorting with localized spirits during the lelono broto
of 1972 with the universalist frame of reference and emphasis on
"rationality" and "science" of his later writings. The apparent dis-
crepancy might be accounted for if we understand that Sawito was
operating within the tradition of elite kejawen, a cultural philosophy
often characterized not so much in terms of its limits as of its tendency
to draw on and digest those outside strains of thought which converge
with its basic set of ideals. It may have been a combination of Sawito's
conviction regarding the common aim of all spiritual endeavor and his
manifest anxiety to play a role in the transformation of modern society
which impelled him to seek common ground with cosmopolitan religions,
sciences, and philosophies.
Whatever the case, Sawito's spiritual and moral convictions were
certainly very strong. One of those who knew him said "his convic-
tions mattered more than anything else. I have never met anyone
whose faith was stronger." Another went further, claiming that "his
spirituality and intelligence were absolutely astonishing, ... he was
like a satellite only just being held in orbit by the earth's gravity."5If
Others, while confirming Sawito's unusual intelligence, described him
as "not quite real" or as "having a head full of dreams and illusions."55
One of his "dreams" apparently concerned power. A woman who
worked with him in the late 1950s said that she was not at all surprised
to see Sawito's name in the headlines in September 1976, for, even
though he was very junior in those days, she claimed that "his ambition
52.	Pancasila Menggugat, p. 28.
53.	There are some exceptions to this, notably in Sawito's article,
"Jadikan Bendera Pusaka Sebagai Tanda Kebesaran Negara Republik
Indonesia" [Make the "Heirloom Flag" a Symbol of the Might of the
Indonesian State], Mawas Diri (August 1976), where he discusses
pusaka, and in Hati Nurani, p. 50, where he praises the fourteenth
century Oath of Cajah Mada. Given Sawito's reported expertise in,
and admiration of, Javanese mythology, however, it is surprising to
find him using so few examples. In his eleven articles in Mawas Diri
and his extensive speeches before the court, he made, for example,
very few, if any, references to wayang culture.
54.	Interview with "Javanist" source.
55.	Interview with "Westernized" source.50
was great and his target clear—he wanted at least to be a minister,
and with any luck, President."56 Sawito's ambition (regarded among
the Javanese as a negative trait) was also commented upon by some
who knew him later, but it is difficult to know how seriously to treat
claims that Sawito was convinced he would become President after he
returned from the lelono broto in 1972. 57
By all accounts Sawito had a strong character and tremendous self-
confidence. One source likened him to the wayang hero, Bima, saying
he was afraid of no one. Many described him as berwfbawa or "com-
manding," and felt that his family name Kartowibowo (which translates
as "Well of Power") suited him well. Some, however, said that Sawito
would go out of his way to impress his authority on those he met, some-
times talking at length about his convictions, and in return being very
responsive to flattery. There were suggestions that, had Sawito ever
become President, he would have been "another Sukarno" in this re-
spect. 58
But despite these shortcomings, Sawito's acquaintances expressed
widespread admiration for him, describing him as an extraordinarily
friendly and generous character, with a powerful sense of social jus-
tice and a strong sensitivity to the needs of those suffering in his
midst. As one of his friends said "he was a good and genuinely com-
passionate man, . . . indeed he was perhaps too honest and trusting
to bring about the changes he wanted to see."
Sawito certainly did not lack friends. Many observers who had
initially supposed that such national figures as Hatta had been fooled
into signing documents by the "trickster" Sawito were surprised to
discover the remarkable and diverse circles of friends and acquain-
tances with whom he actually mixed in the 1970s. Mr. Iskak Tjokro-
hadisurjo, for instance, had been close to Sawito and his family for
about twenty years. Through his wife's stepfather, Said Sukanto,
Sawito also met General Hugeng (also an ex-police chief) 59 and (possi-
bly) Police General Domo Pranoto,60 both of whom were to participate
56.	Rayahu Yusuf, "Sawito yang Saya Kenal" [The Sawito I Know],
Tempo, October 9, 1976, pp. 12-13.
57.	"Perkara Sawito: Macbeth, Tanpa Darah" [The Sawito Case: Mas-
beth Minus the Bloodshed], Tempo, October 2, 1976.
58.	Confidential interview sources.
59.	In 1966 General Hugeng Imam Santoso (b. 1921) was minister of
the presidium of Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet. Under the New Order he
was Commander in Charge of the Indonesian Police Force until dismissed
in 1971. Reputedly one of Indonesia's incorruptible generals, Hugeng
is widely believed to have been sacked for his role in uncovering a
smuggling racket reportedly controlled by Tien Suharto (the President's
wife) in partnership with a Chinese businessman.
60.	Raden Ng. Domo Pranoto in 1946, as second in command of police
in Surakarta, had been associated with the "July 3" kidnapping of51
in the Sawito affair. Sawito's membership in Sukanto's Orhiba organi-
zation also provided him with access to several important people, in-
cluding Mr. Sudjono who in 1969 was one of its chairmen.
In late 1972, after returning from the lelono broto expeditions, Mr.
Sudjono told Sawito that his old friend and fellow Orhiba practitioner,
Mohammad Hatta, was interested in meeting him.61 The first meeting
between Sawito and Hatta, arranged by Sudjono in December 1972,
marked the beginning of a long and apparently warm friendship.
Sawito recalls:
The most important things we spoke of were metaphysical ex-
periences. Bung Hatta spoke of a miraculous divine force which
he said assisted the struggle for Indonesian Independence.
Bung Hatta believed in the miraculous. 62
Whether this was the way Hatta viewed the occasion is less certain,
but the two met frequently and casually over the following four years.
A witness to one of their 1976 meetings said he had been amazed to see
how easily Sawito fraternized with Hatta.63 Two cards, said to have
been withheld from display in court, indicate a common concern for the
national condition. One was a photograph of Hatta with a handwritten
Independence Day message: "For ananda Sawito, The Proclamation of
Independence promised a free, united, sovereign, just, and prosper-
ous Indonesia. Struggle on to ensure its fulfillment!" (signed) Moh.
Hatta, August 17, 1976. The second was a photograph of Hatta and
Sawito side by side, with Hatta's signature and caption: "Young and
old struggle together! " 64
Sawito's acquaintance with Hatta led to introductions to some of
Hatta's colleagues, such as General Ishak Juarsa and Hamka. Although
Sawito had known Juarsa in 1957, he only became a regular associate
after 1973. 65 Judging from the testimony of other participants at their
Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. In 1964 he was a representative of the
police in Sukarno's Parliament, and in 1971 he became one of five vice
chairmen of the MPR/DPR and the leader of the ABRI faction there.
He is possibly related to Suharto. Domo Pranoto died in office in 1977.
61.	Urutan Kejadian, p. 1.
62.	Ibid.
63.	The witness was Drs. Singgih. Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 126.
64.	Both cards are referred to in Sawito's formal request for articles
of evidence confiscated from his house, dated January 23, 1978. This
document is included as Appendix 8 in Hati Nurani Menuntut. Sawito
claimed these pieces of evidence had been "slyly concealed" from the
court (ibid., p. 90). I have a copy of the second photograph.
65.	In 1957, Juarsa and Sawito were involved in a civilian-led but
military-sponsored "Council for the Return to the 1945 Constitution"
[Panitia Kembali ke UUD 45]. Ibid., p. 122. For Juarsa's brief sum-
mary of his post-1973 meetings with Sawito, see his testimony as a
witness in Angkatan Bersenjata, April 4, 1970 (U.S.E.).52
meetings, their common bond was apparently their shared dissatisfac-
tion with the Suharto regime and a desire to take positive action to
remedy the situation. 66 Sawito had probably first met Hamka in about
1975, and he made a formal request that an Idul Fitri card addressed
to him from Hamka be produced as evidence of their friendship. 67 A
witness at the trial who had been present at Hamka's house when Sawito
called in with the document "Towards Salvation" testified that the two
seemed "good friends."68
According to Sawito's acquaintances, he was also friendly with
Cardinal Darmoyuwono, traveling more than once to Semarang in Cen-
tral Java to visit the cardinal, who also called on Sawito at his house
in Bogor.69
Yet another important contact was Dr. Cunawan, Sawito's doctor
and a well connected military figure. Through him Sawito met several
people including General T. B. Simatupang. Although Sawito and
Simatupang never forged much of a relationship, the general harbored
no evident malice towards Sawito, judging from the agreement he ex-
pressed with the sentiments in "Towards Salvation" even after his
official "retraction." 70
Among Sawito's younger acquaintances were a number of well-
known Sukarnoists71 and some mid-ranking army intelligence officers
he met through his military friend Tommy Darmadi.72 It was revealed
66.	See the testimonies of Sudjono and Juarsa and the defense speeches
of Sawito, all discussed in the following chapter.
67.	Document in Appendix 8 of Hati Nurani. See also ibid., p. 37.
In Sic Transit Gloria Mundi, p. 36, Sawito mentions that the card dated
from one year before his arrest. He also refers to a letter received
from Hamka advising him to read certain of his works.
68.	Testimony of Drs. Abu Yamin Rachman, a civil servant. Indonesia
Times (January 17, 1978) was the only newspaper to reveal this aspect
of his testimony.
69.	Confidential interview source.
70.	See Pos Kota, September 28, 1976. An incident which occurred
about a year later, however, suggests a different picture. One of
Simatupang's relatives who was a fellow prisoner of Sawito gave Sawito
a letter addressed to the general. A relative of Sawito, who took the
letter to Simatupang's home, was not received cordially. (Confidential
interview source.)
71.	These included the lawyers Permadi and Soenardi. Soenardi be-
came Secretary General of Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen, an overtly Sukar-
noist organization, and acted as defense counsel for Sawito's 1981
appeal, just before he himself was imprisoned.
72.	Hati Nurani, p. 229. These officers appear to have been mostly
colonels from an intelligence branch of the Army General Staff. Sawito
also mentions his friendship with Brigadier General Abdul Rakhman53
in the trial that Sawito also mixed freely with employees of Bakin and
the Attorney General's Department. 73
How active Sawito was in cultivating his friendships with the dis-
tinguished figures mentioned above is an open question. Whatever
Sawito's motivations, however, it is clear that several prominent people
were sufficiently attracted to his intelligence, spirituality, or determi-
nation for them to establish and maintain friendly relations with him.
Obscure as Sawito may have been as far as his professional, and possi-
bly his mystical, reputation was concerned, he was far from unknown
to some of Indonesia's most respected figures.
Soehodo, First Assistant (Security), of the Second Regional Defense
Command in Yogyakarta. Ibid.
73. The testimonies of attorney general's department employee Sunarto
Toto Minggu and witness Dadi Bujonegoro both suggest this. Pos Kota,
January 24, 1978. Concerning Sawito's Bakin contacts see the testi-
mony of Bakin employee Katri Atmojo in the next chapter. Sawito also
corresponded with a former Bakin general.CHAPTER FOUR
THE TRIAL
Part A : The Opening
The trial of Sawito Kartowibowo was a major political event, its
effects reverberating far beyond the walls of the Jakarta courtroom.
In addition to the intense media coverage, the trial attracted much
popular attention. At the courthouse crowds spilled out onto the
streets to hear first hand the testimony of Sawito and of the witnesses.
There was considerable interplay between events in the trial and the
growing tensions in society at large, so before launching into the de-
tails of the trial I will briefly sketch in the immediate political context.
The months preceding the Presidential election of March 1978 were
extremely volatile. Despite Golkar's easy win in the 1977 general elec-
tions, considerable hostility, particularly among PPP supporters and
students, was still directed at the government over its conduct of
these elections. In fact, during the intervening year an increasingly
broad spectrum of society joined in antigovernment criticisms. Re-
spected nonparty men including General Jatikusumo and Buyung Nasu-
tion spoke publicly on issues such as official authoritarianism and the
government's lack of respect for law.1 Bung Tomo, the Moslem hero
of the revolution, condemned many of the government's actions, and
toward the end of 1977 suggested that the President resign.2 His call
reflected increasingly outspoken criticism of the President's perform-
ance.
The students were the most active in their denunciations. Scandals
that broke over Suharto's ranch, the communications satellite Palapa,
Bank Bumi Daya, Bulog, and Suharto's mausoleum fund, as well as
1.	Gusti Pangeran Hario Jatikusumo (b. 1917) is a retired general
from Central Java who served as ambassador in Singapore, France,
and Morocco. He was reported as saying: "Indonesia is a dictatorship
of the bureaucracy. We are all being manipulated instead of partici-
pating." Buyung Nasution, then head of the Legal Aid Service said,
among other things, "... the general situation of the law has wor-
sened . . . [and] has become more arduous and squeezed." Merdeka,
July 1, 1977.
2.	Bung Tomo, who died in 1981, spent much time lecturing and writ-
ing about the persecution of Moslem groups in the elections and after-
wards. He was arrested in November 1977 for "making libellous and
misleading statements meant to incite the people." See Merdeka and
Indonesia Times of November 17, 1977 as well as Hati Nurani, p. 17.
5455
clear evidence of foul play in the elections3 4 and dissension among the
Jakarta military elite,11 gave the students ample reason to take to the
streets again in 1977. Their critiques of the government were more
articulate and broadly based than ever before. 5 They accused the New
Order regime of institutionalizing the syphoning off of development
funds, pursuing a development strategy contrary to the interests of
both indigenous capital and the rural and urban poor, totalitarian
strongarm tactics in day-to-day administration, defending gross struc-
tural inequalities in the electoral and parliamentary system, and ne-
glecting the supposed "sanctity of the law."6
3.	Suharto's 600 hectare cattle ranch is located at Tapos, Cibedug,
near Bogor. In 1958 this former Dutch estate was nationalized and was
controlled for a period by General Ishak Juarsa. At some time after
1966 it was presented to Suharto by an unnamed commander of West
Java "as a gift." Run under the auspices of a company called P.T.
Rejo Sari Bumi, the ranch is managed by the President's son, Sigit
Harjoyodanto. Numerous irregularities surrounded its establishment
and supply. Tempo, October 9, 1976, Hati Nurani, p. 164, and Mr.
Sudjono's testimony as a witness in Keputusan Pengodilan Negeri Jakar-
ta Pusat, p. 17. The Palapa scandal involved a $40m payoff. Bank
Bumi Daya was revealed to have $984m worth of defaulted loans. A
provincial chief of Bulog was found to have embezzled $4. 5m. McDonald,
Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 238-39. Suharto's mausoleum fund was a
Rp. 437.8m enterprise involving the restoration of Mangkunegara tombs
and the construction of a large mausoleum for Suharto's family and fol-
lowers. Kompas, November 22, 1977. A book published by the PPP
party documents all the alleged cases of election irregularities (Doku-
mentas: Pandang dan Saran, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan dan Pemili-
han Umum 1977 [Jakarta: Penerbit DPP PPP, 1978], cited in Boileau,
Golkar, p. 78). See also Heri Akhmadi, Breaking the Chains, pp.
65-68.
4.	Most outspoken of the generals were two Siliwangi figures, Kemal
Idris and Dharsono. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 246-47.
5.	Lucid articulation of student grievances and criticisms can be found
in The White Book of the Students' Struggle (translated in Indonesia,
25 [April 1978]); the eksepsi of Lukman Hakim and Heri Akhmadi (trans-
lated in Indonesia, 21 [April 1979]); and Heri Akhmadi's Breaking the
Chains. The criticisms expressed here go far beyond campus issues.
The list of those prohibited from press treatment at the time of the
government clampdown on students in January 1978 suggests that the
students spoke for a broad range of middle-class elements. Included
on the list were A. B. Nasution; the dramatist W. S. Rendra; Prof.
Ismael Suny; film director Sjuman Jaya; Bung Tomo; journalist Mahbub
Djunaedi; General Dharsono; and ex-Armed Forces' Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Nasution. See also Feith, "Indonesian Student Movement," pp. 6-7.
6.	See Heri Akhmadi, Breaking the Chains, ch. 3.56
One of the more specific issues at the time was the government's
temporary dissolution of the DPR in late 1977, an action which, for the
months of September and October, removed the only official channel
for expressing dissent. In response, students at the University of
Indonesia established a "Provisional DPR." Although praised by T. B.
Simatupang, this body was criticized and ultimately destroyed by the
government. 7 Suharto's refusal to provide a report of his last five-
year term in office to the outgoing MPR, the only body to which he was
officially responsible, further exacerbated political tensions.8 At the
time of the opening of the Sawito trial, the atmosphere was described
by some senior government figures as "tinder dry."9
Little had been heard of the Sawito affair since the initial commo-
tion had died down in November 1976. Preparations and interrogations,
however, had proceeded, and it was eventually announced that Sawito
would be brought to trial in October 1977. Exactly why this particu-
larly uneasy time was chosen, after Sawito had spent fourteen months
in detention, is uncertain. It seems likely that his trial was timed
deliberately to coincide with the lead-up to the Presidential elections,
but the motive is ambiguous and will be dealt with later.
The selection of witnesses was a matter of some contention. Whereas
originally it had been supposed that the signatories of "Toward Salva-
tion" would be called on to give evidence, AN Said told the press in
July that they would not.10 Later, however, it was reported that
thirty-seven people, including Hatta, Hamka, Simatupang, Darmoyu-
wono, and Sukanto would in fact be heard.* 11 Only when the trial was
almost over did the public learn that these figures would not be giving
witness. Ever since the original announcement it was clear that the
government was treating the affair very seriously. This was confirmed
in July, when the attorney general, after naming the panel of judges
and prosecutors, declared that Sawito was to be charged under Presi-
dential Decree No. 11 /1963, the much-feared subversion law which
carried a maximum penalty of death by firing squad.12
7.	For a detailed account of the establishment, functioning and ultimate
demise of this body, see Heri Akhmadi, "Eksepsi," pp. 24-28. Simatu-
pang's remarks were reported in Kompas, August 17, 1977.
8.	Hati Nurani, pp. 205-8. Suharto did however report to the incoming
MPR. The grievance was that the President was appearing not to take
seriously the body which appointed him in 1973.
9.	Hamish McDonald, quoted by Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 37.
10.	Tempo, July 30, 1977.
11.	Indonesia Times, October 7, 1977.
12.	Tempo, July 30, 1977. This announcement also revealed that
charges were being drawn up against Mr. Sudjono, Mr. Iskak, Drs.
Singgih, and Ishak Juarsa, but no formal charges were subsequently
brought against them. Singgih, however, was kept under detention
for at least six years.57
Preparations for the defense were not allowed to run smoothly. In
July Yap Thiam Hien, one of Indonesia's top civil rights lawyers,
offered to defend Sawito free of charge. According to Sawito's later
testimony, however, the prosecution repeatedly implored him to accept
"anyone but Yap," asserting that Yap would charge exorbitant fees
and be sure to incur the wrath of presiding judge Sumadiyono, one of
his least sympathetic adversaries.13 Furthermore, the prosecution
denied Yap access to his client until the trial had actually begun.lt+
These initial frustrations compelled Sawito to submit a request for a
team of five lawyers to represent him. His submission was at first re-
jected, then partially granted, and eventually accepted. The indeci-
sion and, it would appear, the wilful obstruction of the prosecution,
caused the defense to be in disarray when the trial began on October
6, 1977. As Sawito had not yet had a chance to meet his lawyers or
study the charges, after a brief first sitting, the trial was postponed
for three weeks.
At the second session, held on October 27, Chief Prosecutor Mapi-
gau read the charges. These claimed that between 1972 and 1976 Sawito
had engaged in conduct which undermined the authority of the lawful
government and spread feelings of enmity, discord, disorder, and con-
flict among the populace. The charges referred to the documents,
"Letter of Authority" and "Letter of Transfer." Sawito was further
charged with composing and distributing false news as contained in
"Welcoming a Just Government," "Towards Salvation," and "Retreat in
Order to Advance more Perfectly." These charges derived from the
1963 subversion law. A secondary accusation was that Sawito had en-
gaged in plotting to overthrow the government.15 Third came the
charge that he had intentionally slandered President Suharto,16 and
last, Sawito was deemed to have spread false, inaccurate, excessive,
or incomplete opinions in order to sow unrest in society.17
As is usual in Indonesian courts, after the charges had been read,
Sawito was given an opportunity to present an eksepsi, or argument
that the case be immediately dropped.18 Sawito made good use of the
opportunity, giving the spirited audience and the solemn bench the
first taste of his oratorical skills and mordant wit. Rejecting outright
Mapigau's charges, he contested the right of the criminal court to try
13.	Hati Nurani, p. 218. Sawito claimed he was told, "Even a profes-
sor would be better"!
14.	Under the then valid procedural code, the right of the advocates
to see their clients was a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
15.	Article 2 of Presidential Decree No. 5/1959. Hati Nurani, p. 14.
16.	Article 134 of the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP). Ibid.
17.	Article 15 of Law No. 73/1958. Ibid.
18.	The English translation of eksepsi is "demurrer." Due to the un-
familiarity of this technical legal term, however, the Indonesian has
been used throughout this study.58
him, arguing that, since what he and his friends had done concerned
the President, the case should be heard in Parliament.19 Moreover, he
said that Indonesian law was based on divine justice, and that therefore
the judges, unless they had "the souls of Ratu Adil11 and were experts
in the realm of metaphysics, could not reasonably be expected to act as
interpreters of the law. 20
To the surprise of those assembled in the courtroom, Sawito em-
barked on a detailed description of how he21 had been framed by some
of the most powerful generals in the New Order. He started by ex-
plaining that he had been arrested on the basis of information he him-
self had been supplying to Bakin. His arrest warrant, he argued, was
not valid because it had been signed by Attorney General Ali Said,
who, he claimed, had "helped us behind the scenes." Setting the
rumor mills turning even faster, he said that Ali Said "had told us that
it was true that Suharto and his family had engaged in illegal activities"
and had admitted that the attorney general's office had "secretly pre-
pared charges against Suharto to be used at some future time when he
was no longer in power." Sawito went on to state that he suspected
the reason he had been provided with data on the "misdeeds of Suharto"
and then brought to trial was to expose the President in a bad light in
the eyes of the people.
Elaborating on the conspiracy theme, Sawito declared that, before
making his approach,22 Ali Said had deliberated with Bakin head Sugama
and Kopkamtib head Sudomo, the highest ranking intelligence chiefs in
the country. He claimed he himself had had to witness the sealing of
the bundle of evidence which was to be shown these people. The net
was thrown yet wider when Sawito spoke of Ali Said's claim to have
been a member of a "chain of five" proteges of the late commander of
19.	Sawito Kartowibowo, Sic Transit Gloria Mundi [the title of Sawito's
eksepsi], p. 1. The following discussion of Sawito's presentation is
based on this 46-page document. Reporting on the court hearing was
unusually open. See, for instance, Tempo, November 5, 1977.
20.	Sawito quoted a clause from Law No. 14/1970 which read:
"Justice is carried out for the sake of Justice based on Divinity."
This, he argued at some length, was proof that justice in Indonesia
was characterized by, and proclaimed, abstract and transcendental/
metaphysical concerns. To have the "soul of a Ratu Adil," he ex-
plained, was to have a "divinely just" soul.
21.	Sawito often used the word kami, which, in normal speech, means
"us" (excluding the interlocutor). In rhetorical speech, however, kami
can be used to mean "I," so unfortunately it is not always possible to
ascertain whether Sawito was referring to himself or the group he was
part of.
22.	It is unclear here whether Sawito means both Ali Said's alleged
cooperation and his staging of the trial, or only the latter.59
the army, Ahmad Yani.23 The other members were Sudharmono, Ismail
Saleh (cabinet secretary and assistant to Sudharmono at the time of the
affair), Mudjono (secretary general of the MPR/DPR), and another mili-
tary lawyer whose name Sawito had forgotten.24 This group, he claimed,
was linked with Sudomo through a common aliran kepercayaan (mystical
cult/brotherhood). 25
The thrust of Sawito's argument in his eksepsi was that, as one
devoted body and soul to the moral and spiritual basis of the State ide-
ology and to the upholding of justice, he was an ally of the State, while
those who eroded these ideals were its enemies. He declared he was
involved in exactly the same struggle as the Dwitunggal Sukarno-Hatta
23.	Sawito, Sic Transit Gloria Mundi, p. 13. An officer in the Central
Javanese Diponegoro division Ahmad Yani had commanded the forces
which put down the PRRI rebellion in Sumatra in 1958, and was appoint-
ed army commander four years later. While willing to cooperate with
Sukarno, he was fiercely anti-Communist. He was kidnapped and killed
on the night of the Untung coup attempt in 1965. When Suharto took
control of the army he replaced almost all of Yani's senior appointees.
Ali Said had reportedly said that the group were Yani's jago-jago,
a term usually translated as "champions" or "strongmen," but which in
this context seems more closely allied to the meaning of "protege." Ali
Said, claimed Sawito, had said that the "chain of five" (lima serang-
kaian) were to have become leaders (had Yani survived). Ibid.
Sawito's claims were dubious. In 1962 Sudharmono was head of the
secretariat of Peperti (Supreme War Authority). After Yani's influence
was strengthened in 1963, Sudharmono was made an assistant to the
intelligence section of KOTI (Supreme Operations Command), signifying
no obvious favor on the part of Yani. When Yani was assassinated,
Sudharmono, rather than being removed, became one of Suharto's
closest generals. There were no apparent links between Yani and Ali
Said, Mudjono, and Ismail Saleh although there were ties between the
latter three. (See "The Fourth Development Cabinet Announced March
17, 1983," Indonesia 35 [April 1983]: 37, 42, 49.)
24.	Sawito, Sic Transit Gloria Mundi, p. 13. These men were all
graduates of Akademi Hukum Militer (The Military Law Academy) and
were still functioning together as part of a small but powerful faction
led by Sudharmono in the early 1980s. The fifth man, Sawito claimed,
was involved in the 1965 coup.
25.	Ibid. Sawito wrote: "There has been a connection between Sudhar-
mono and Sudomo since middle school. . . . (A)s followers of an aliran
kepercayaan they have participated together in spiritualist conclaves
[sarasean kebatinan] at Ciumbuluit, Bandung, while Ali Said has held
conclaves with Prof. Dr. Ir. Soetami at Cibinong, also in the realm of
kebatinan. . . .
This shows that those mentioned above form a group of kepercayaan
devotees with a particular aim. We should not be surprised to see
them wanting to expose the affairs of [Suharto] to the public via the
forum of this court. ..."60
after the Proclamation of Independence, namely to join in establishing
a negara hukum (nation based on law), and a just, clean, and effective
government. 26 It was in this context that he introduced the name of
the vice chairman of Parliament, Major General Domo Pranoto, a figure
who was to be portrayed throughout the trial as Sawito's major inspira-
tion (with Hatta) in the affair. He claimed that the initiative for the
creation of "Towards Salvation" had come from Domo Pranoto, as had a
plan to "purify the Presidential group" in the event that the unity of
society and the stability of the State were threatened.27 Explaining
further his story, which few at the time thought credible, Sawito told
the court how he had been asked to help the general with the prepara-
tion of the plan by composing a document ("Towards Salvation") which
could be signed by men of "psychological influence."
Those men, the most significant of whom were Hatta and Cardinal
Darmoyuwono, were to have formed a group which, had a major disrup-
tion or "force majeur" occurred, could have been called upon to pre-
serve the authority of the State and prevent the outbreak of hukum
bolas dendam (law of the jungle, revenge). According to Sawito, Domo
Pranoto had thought such an outbreak imminent because of widespread
dissatisfaction with the behavior of the President. The expenses he
had incurred in helping Domo Pranoto with this plan, Sawito claimed
(which had involved a trip to Semarang to visit the cardinal), were met
by the MPR itself, via the vice chairman.
Responding to the prosecutor's charges, Sawito argued that what
Domo had done had been his right and duty as the vice chairman of
Parliament, for, according to the government's own regulations, he
had to supervise the President. Sawito argued that, since they were
engaged in an effort to help "guarantee the manifestation of social jus-
tice, affirm the national character, and safeguard the unity of the
people," he could not possibly be charged with subversion.
The subversive ones, he charged, were Sudharmono and Ali Said,
who had "shocked society" by making the government announcement,
and who then decided to stage the trial for their own purposes. To
illustrate that the trial went against the wishes of the President (and
thereby, in a curious way, reinforce his charge of subversion), Sawito
drew attention to a New Year's Message in which Suharto, with special
reference to the Sawito affair, "admitted that in implementing develop-
ment in recent times there were certainly negative matters to be found,
but that these need not be overemphasized."28
26.	Ibid., pp. 8-9.
27.	Ibid., p. 16. Sawito's description of the "plan" was fragmentary
and framed in terms of its abstract ideals. He provided a more detailed
account later in the trial, which is discussed in the third section of
this chapter.
28.	Ibid., p. 21. Suharto did indeed ask in his New Year's Message
that the Sawito (and "Newsweek") affairs not be overemphasized.61
If the prosecution were taken aback by Sawito's verbal attack on
their superiors, they must have been even more surprised by the wit-
nesses he asked to be called. To assure the judges that "the problems
being investigated in court directly concerned the President," Sawito
requested that the following people testify:
President Suharto
Domo Pranoto
AM Said
Adam Malik
Yoga Sugama
Ali Murtopo
Sugih Arto
Sigit Suharto
-	Vice Chairman of the MPR/DPR/Head of the
ABRI Fraction in MPR
-	Attorney General
-	Foreign Minister
-	Head of Bakin
-	Deputy Head of Bakin
-	ex-Attorney General
-	President Suharto's son29
Later in his speech Sawito revealed how each of the documents came
into being and, in so doing, implicated several people. Most frequently
he named Hatta, Mr. Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, Ishak Juarsa, and Mr.
Sudjono who, with Sawito, were the principal figures of what will hence-
forth be referred to as the "Mega Mendung" group. 30 Sawito said that
the group met frequently, and he went on to describe the warm sense
of fraternity among its members. When accused of having taken the
initiative in organizing their meetings, Sawito retorted: "To think that
among [these people] I would be the most prominent is truly amazing.
On the contrary ... I only listened and asked questions." In con-
cluding, Sawito asked how he could be charged with subversion when
his Mega Mendung colleagues and the religious figures who signed
"Towards Salvation" were not. "If we broke the law," he reasoned,
"we must face the consequences together."
Most of the issues raised in Sawito's eksepsi he was to discuss more
fully toward the end of the trial in his pleidoof, and they will be elabo-
29.	Ibid., p. 18. Six months later Sawito was more specific about his
reasons for wanting these people called. He wanted Suharto to be
cross-examined about his discussions with General Domo Pranoto; Ali
Said for his supposed discussions with him (Sawito); Adam Malik for
his role in ousting Ali Sadikin from the position of governor of Jakarta;
Ali Murtopo for his role in helping to cover up Suharto's supposed
smuggling ring in Aceh; Sugih Arto in connection with the reporting to
the President of a smuggling operation suspected of being sponsored by
his wife, Tien; and Sigit Suharto, for his connections with the Tapos
ranch. Sawito's reasons for wanting Yoga Sugama to be heard were not
reported. Domo Pranoto died in 1977 so was not called a second time.
Surabaya Post, April 11, 1978.
30.	Mega Mendung is the name of a mountain resort area on the north
side of the Puncak, where Hatta's villa was situated. Some of the
group's meetings took place there. I have attached this label to the
group purely for convenience's sake. The primary topic of conversa-
tion at their meetings was the political and economic plight of Indonesia.62
rated later. Suffice it to say here that he raised several controversial
and intriguing questions which heightened public interest in the affair
and which, no doubt, caused concern at the palace.
The other speech of significance at the session was that of Yap
Thiam Hien. Yap's main thrust was that, since the Sawito trial was ob-
viously of a political nature, the judges were not in a position to try
the case impartially. The judges, he pointed out, were the same as any
other members of the civil service, in that they were paid and promoted
by ministries ultimately responsible to the President. "Have the judges
formed their own opinions about the Sawito controversy?" asked Yap.
"Will the accused be tried without prejudice?" 31
The three judges he was addressing were the chairman of the Cen-
tral Jakarta State Court, H. M. Sumadiyono, described by Hamish
McDonald as "a balding man in his fifties with a wide mobile mouth that
turns down at the corners when events displease him," 32 and two senior
"member judges." These were Anton Abdulrachman Putra and John Z.
Leodoe, "a saturnine fellow who wears inpenetrable dark glasses in
court."33
After the presentation of eksepsi, a defendant is usually examined
by the prosecution. Sawito, however, having been advised of his
rights by his lawyers, took the extraordinary step of demanding that
the witnesses be heard first. His demand was at first rejected, but,
faced with his resolute refusal to answer the prosecutor's questions
and the legality of his action, the judges eventually ruled (not without
annoyance) that the hearing of the witnesses should proceed.34
It should be noted that, before a trial, all witnesses are interro-
gated and a report of these "preliminary investigations" is read by the
prosecutor and serves as their statement. In court the witnesses are
expected to respond to questions put to them by the prosecutor, judge,
defense team, and the defendant. The defendant is usually allowed to
comment on the testimony of the witness when the hearing is over. All
questions and answers are subject to censure by the judge. In this
trial the judge intervened frequently to overrule questions asked of
31.	Tempo, November 5, 1977.
32.	Hamish McDonald, "Justice Indonesian Style: Two Highly Political
Trials," National Times, November 7, 1977, p. 45.
33.	Ibid.
34.	Article 289 of the HIR (Revised Procedural Code) dictates that
examination of witnesses shall precede examination of the accused.
Since 1950 it has been "customary" to reverse the procedure. The
"customary" practice has been widely and consistently challenged since
1950, but Sawito's attempt was one of the rare instances when it suc-
ceeded. See Tempo, November 19, 1977, and Julie Southwood, "Indo-
nesia's Political Trials: 'Legal' Dimensions of a Continuing Tragedy,"
Tapol Bulletin, no. 37 (January 1980), p. 15.63
witnesses by the defense team and Sawito. 35 It is also worth noting
that some of the witnesses claimed they had been forced to say certain
things during their interrogations. At least one witness withdrew his
entire preliminary investigation report. 36 Despite the obvious pres-
sures put on the witnesses, their evidence was sufficient to lend con-
siderable credence to the claims made in Sawito's eksepsi and to spread
the "blame" well beyond the accused.
Part B: The Witnesses
The first witness, Mr. Sudjono, was escorted from his place of
detention to the courtroom on November 14, 1977. After recounting in
detail the lelono broto, Sudjono told the court of Sawito's associations
with members of the Mega Mendung group. In 1973, he recalled, Hatta
had discussed with Sawito a series of issues, including the nonimplemen-
tation of the Pancasila and Constitution of 1945, the huge national debt,
and the lack of social justice in Indonesia. 37 He said that Sawito had
been greatly roused by Hatta's determination to improve the situation.38
Hatta suggested that, if Sawito wished to discuss these matters with an
honest general, he should contact Ishak Juarsa, which he did. Accord-
ing to witness Sudjono, Juarsa, as well as other figures with whom
Sawito came into contact in the early 1970s (such as Iskak Tjokrohadi-
surjo), was convinced that the only feasible way to remedy the situa-
tion was to request that President Suharto stand down in favor of
Mohammad Hatta.
Agreeing that this had to be effected constitutionally and without
bloodshed, Sudjono and Sawito had talked with Iskak, who came up
with the idea of drafting a "Letter of Authority." Hatta, however,
thought this document was "not in the style of Pak Harto's conscious-
ness" and advised that it be altered. 39 After some editing, said
Sudjono, the document was renamed "Letter of Transfer." The witness
35.	All detailed reports mention this. The defense team made many
bitter complaints about it. See, for instance, the speech of lawyer
Abdulrachman Saleh, referred to in Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 175. Yap
Thiam Hien was later to state that "the Head Judge persistently and
absolutely without explanation overruled the questions the Defense
Team put to the witnesses as 'irrelevant, irrelevant, irrelevant.
This, among other things, had convinced the public that the Sawito
trial was a "farce." Memori Banding, Yap's appeal against the decision
of the state court, read in the Jakarta High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi
Jakarta) on August 31, 1981, p. 5.
36.	Pos Kota, January 24, 1978.
37.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 41.
38.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 87.
39.	Keputusan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat [The Decision of the
Central Jakarta State Court], p. 14. This 53-page verdict and sum-
ming up of evidence will henceforth be referred to as Keputusan.64
mentioned that the group had agreed that Drs. Singgih, "a close friend
of Suharto's/1 should be responsible for delivering "Letter of Transfer"
to the President. **°
Sudjono went on to reveal that at Hatta's birthday party in August
1976, Hatta had told those present (Juarsa, Iskak, Sawito, and Sudjono
himself) to prepare speeches urging people to act in accordance with
the Pancasila. Speeches and writings containing criticism of the gov-
ernment were, he said, to be surrendered to Hatta "so that the authori-
ties didn't get the wrong idea."1*1 Sudjono also told of a body to mediate
the transfer of power from Suharto to Hatta, consisting of two military
figures (Juarsa and General Surono)1*2 and two civilians (Iskak and
Soedjatmoko). 43 When asked by one of the judges what would have
happened if the President had refused to accept the proposal that he
resign, Sudjono answered, "Well, that would have been the end of it."1*1*
The 81-year-old former cabinet minister, Mr. Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo,
was the next witness to appear. Iskak recalled that in 1973 Sudjono
had spoken about the lelono broto and about his plans to use spiritual
40.	Ibid., p. 15.
41.	Ibid., p. 16.
42.	The name of General Surono Reksodimejo, the reform-minded
deputy commander of ABRI, cropped up often in relation to the Sawito
affair, but it is uncertain how closely he was involved. There is no
evidence to suggest that he was informed of his nomination as a member
of this body. In 1975 he administered the mildly controversial "Panitia
Lima," of which Hatta was chairman. Surono, in addition, chaired the
National Plenary Board of "Angkatan 45" (an organization of prominent
members of the "Generation of 45"). Drs. Singgih was a member of
this board. It is also interesting to note that Imran, the Moslem hi-
jacker, claimed during his 1982 trial that Juarsa had once told him of a
meeting attended by Generals Surono, Jasin, Hugeng, Ibnu Sutowo,
and himself (Juarsa), at which it was decided to nominate Surono as
President. Pleidooi of Imran bin Mohammad Zein, in Imran, Dari Hukum
Sampai Islam (Yogyakarta: Institute of Legal Aid, 1982), p. 41. In
April 1978 Surono was removed from his high-ranking military post to
become coordinating minister of social affairs.
43.	Keputusan, p. 15. Sudjono was reported to have turned down a
position in the body in favor of Soedjatmoko, who, he said, was exper-
ienced in problems of foreign affairs and held sway with foreign intel-
lectuals. Soedjatmoko had been appointed Indonesia's ambassador to
Washington in 1968; in 1974 he was accused of involvement in the con-
spiracy which led to the Malari riots, when he was interrogated and
forbidden to travel abroad. After that time he acted as an adviser to
the head of Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency.
Soedjatmoko had belonged to the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia).
44.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 41. This is consistent with the claims
made by Sawito in his eksepsi. (See Tempo, November 19, 1977, p. 54.)65
power to help solve the world's problems. Being more pragmatic, Iskak
suggested that he ought first to direct whatever energies he had toward
the problem of the Indonesian government.45 He said that like the
others in the (Mega Mendung) group, he thought Suharto's resignation
was a necessary step towards the resolution of the nation's difficulties.1*6
Asked about the nature of the group, Iskak said that the members
felt close to one another and that there was no leader. He explained
that Sawito's involvement had nothing to do with his mystical status,
and that the group never discussed spiritual matters, only politics.
Iskak admitted he had played a key role in composing the "Letter of
Transfer," and made a point of relating it to its model, Supersemar.
With Yap's vocal support, he argued that, if Supersemar was constitu-
tional, his document too must be legitimate. 47 Elaborating on Sudjono's
testimony, he pointed out that, were Suharto to accept the suggestion
that he resign, he would remain President while Hatta held real power.48
At one stage Iskak was prevented from answering a question put by
Sawito about a "Body for the Nurturing of the Pancasila Spirit," an
ABRI group chaired by General Surono which had supposedly agreed
to Hatta's receiving power.49
Immediately following Mr. Iskak to the microphone was Mr. Sudjo-
no's daughter Sitawati. According to the judges' summing up at the
end of the trial, Sitawati told the court of a vision that Sawito had had,
in which a shining man in robes asked him what he would do if he be-
came President. 5<r She did not say how Sawito replied. More surpris-
ing was her claim that Sawito had often been visited by ABRI officers,
as well as civilians who "could not bear to see the state of the Mother-
land." These ABRI officers, she reportedly said, were just waiting
for a command from Sawito to start riots.51 According to her, Sawito
said that he "didn't agree with this strategy, as it would bring too
many victims." He had, she pointed out, preferred a peaceful path.
45.	Keputusan, pp. 18-19, confirmed by an interview with Mr. Iskak
Tjokrohadisurjo in Jakarta in 1983.
46.	Pelito, December 6, 1977.
47.	Ibid.
48.	Ibid.
49.	Kompas, December 6, 1977. Badan Pembina Jiwa Pancasila was the
name of the body. Sawito also questioned Mr. Sudjono and the fourth
witness, Tommy Darmadi, about this group, but in all cases the topic
was deemed irrelevant by the judge. Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 101. Mr.
Iskak told me in conversation that he had had nothing to do with Surono
and that as a group, the members of Mega Mendung never sought ABRI
or any other outside support.
50.	Keputusan, p. 24.
51.	Ibid. This peculiar claim did not appear in the press reports of
Sitawati's testimony and does not seem to have been repeated by any
of Sawito's acquaintances in court. It is probably false.66
The next testimony was presented by Ki Setio Utomo, better known
as Tommy Darmadi, the younger brother of Supriyadi, leader of the
Blitar uprising against the Japanese in 1945. Darmadi was an old
friend of Sawito's and had signed the document "Welcoming a Just Gov-
ernment in Indonesia." Showing a good deal of familiarity with the
defendant and accepting full responsibility for this document, he pro-
ceeded to explain its origins. Darmadi's old father was reportedly
dismayed at the corrosion of ideals and the spread of corruption in the
New Order regime, particularly in the upper echelons of ABRI. De-
ploring the emergence of a "new elite class," and comparing the situa-
tion in Indonesia to South Vietnam under Thieu, he had, just before
his death in 1973, requested that Darmadi reveal his feelings to the
President. 52 Knowing Sawito to be a skilled writer, Darmadi asked him
to compose the letter. He did so, but added a phrase proposing that
Suharto stand down in favor of Hatta, which he told Darmadi was sym-
bolic, Hatta being synonymous with the Pancasila and the 1945 Consti-
tution. 53 Some reports mention that Sawito and Darmadi exchanged
insults in court over this point, but their differences cannot have been
too great because Darmadi offered to replace Sawito in prison.51* In his
pleidooi Sawito claimed that Darmadi had discussed with B. M. Diah,
editor of Merdeka, the possibility of publishing the letter in the
press. 55 Nothing came of this, and the letter was apparently sent to
the President. Darmadi was subsequently interrogated and assaulted
by Bakin operatives in early 1976. 56
During the hearing Sawito asked Darmadi forty-four questions,
very few of which he was allowed to answer. One of them concerned
the readiness of the ABRI fraction (in the MPR, led by General Domo
Pranoto) to accede to Hatta's assumption of power. 57 Several officials
from Bakin, ABRI, and the State bureaucracy were also mentioned,
including Lieutenant Colonel Imam Sudarmo and Major General Witarmin.58
Finally, Sawito asked Darmadi about some of Suharto's spiritual connec-
tions, revealing the names Boedjonegoro, Sudjono Hadi Sumarto, Ki
Kere Sawitosidi, and Ki Klantung. Ki Klantung, he said, had stayed
at Cendana (Suharto's Jakarta residence) and had had his trip home
to East Java arranged by inspector general of development, General
52. Pelita, December 6, 1977, Pos Kota, December 20, 1977.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
Sumi Narto, Sawito, p.
Sumi Narto, Sawito, p.
Hati Nurani, p. 232.
Sumi Narto, Sawito, p.
Sumi Narto, Sawito, p.
99, Keputusan, p. 26.
104.
103, and Pelita, December 6,
101.
1977.
58. Pelita, December 20, 1977, and Kompas, December 20, 1977. Major
General Witarmin was the commander of the Brawijaya (East Java) mili-
tary region at the time. He is not mentioned anywhere else. Lieutenant
Colonel Imam Sudarmo is unknown to me, although he is rumored to
have some connection with Suharto's mystical activities.67
Sujono Humardani. 59 Press reports were never clear regarding the
exact nature of the questions put by Sawito to Darmadi, but presum-
ably the names he cited had some relevance, for Darmadi was reported
to have become very dizzy and implored the judge to stop Sawito.60
Dr. Gunawan, another old acquaintance of Sawito's, also appeared.
Gunawan told his interrogators that he had taken Sawito to Simatu-
pang's house so that "Toward Salvation" could be signed. He added
that, upon presentation of "Towards Salvation," Simatupang had quick-
ly glanced at it, laughed, and signed it.61 Gunawan also mentioned
that he had, on his own initiative, given a copy of "Towards Salvation"
to PPP leader Mintaredja "to ensure that Islam would not oppose a
smooth transition of power."62
Witness Gunawan made two points which attracted considerable
attention. The first was that Sawito planned to take over power from
Hatta after the "transfer of power" had taken place;63 and the other
that Sawito was a psychopath and a megalomaniac, whom he had once
tried to commit to a lunatic asylum.64 What most papers did not report
was that later, in response to Yap's questioning, he admitted that the
interrogators had forced him to make these statements in an effort to
prove Sawito guilty of subversion and, apparently, insane.65 By the
end of the sitting, he had conceded to the court that he agreed with
the contents of "Towards Salvation," and that actually Sawito was very
intelligent and "just a middle-class man."66
A number of heated disputes arose in the course of examining the
witnesses, in which the defense team accused (and were accused by)
59.	Kompas, December 20, 1977. For some details on Ki Kere Sawito-
sidi (Ki Kere Suwito Siji) and Ki Klantung (alias Ki Kasan Ulama, Ki
Kasan Munawi, and Ki Kasan Rejo), see note 18, chapter 5. Sujono
Humardani is a Diponegoro general in Suharto's inner circle. As well
as acting as a key figure in economic negotiations with Japan, he is
known as a mystical adviser to the President. He has engaged in
several lelono broto-type expeditions.
60.	Kompas, December 20, 1977. Darmadi said that to mention those
names was "dangerous."
61.	Pos Kota, December 20, 1977. See also Tempo, November 19,
1977, p. 55. Gunawan's account was rejected by Sawito, who insisted
that Simatupang read the document closely and wished to be kept in-
formed of developments [Hati Nurani, p. 253).
62.	Keputusan, p. 22.
63.	Kompas, December 20, 1977.
64.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 108.
65.	Pelita, December 20, 1977. As has been mentioned, Gunawan was
threatened with jail if he did not comply.
66.	Indonesia Times, December 20, 1977.68
the bench of ignorance of legal procedure and making irrelevant inter-
jections. Each advised the other that they needed to go back to law
school. Sawito too was involved in the clamor. When, on one occasion
Mapigau urged him to visit a psychiatrist, Sawito quipped that he
would be delighted to if the prosecutor would be so kind as to accom-
pany him. 67 The howls from the public gallery no doubt encouraged
Sawito, but they did not help to ease the friction between bench and
bar.
At the first sitting of 1978, Maximus Mangunradji, a member of the
Bogor Regional Parliament and head of Sawito's neighborhood associa-
tion, was presented. He was one of the "Catholic contingent," con-
sisting of Romo Tjipto Prawoto, Dr. Riberu, Bishop Harsono, and
Cardinal Darmoyuwono, all of whom became involved with Hatta's
circle.68 Mangunradji testified that at Sawito's request, he had
arranged for Cardinal Darmoyuwono to meet Hatta.69 This meeting
occurred on July 23, 1976 when Darmoyuwono, accompanied by Bishop
Harsono, Riberu, and the witness, drove to Mega Mendung. After an
hour and a half's private talk between Hatta and the cardinal, the
others, including Sawito, joined in. Here the cardinal learned of the
activities of the Mega Mendung group and expressed his willingness to
participate in actions against the President "in order to protect the
state from further danger."70 The witness said that the group had
also discussed the document "Towards Salvation," and the cardinal
was apparently given a copy to study.
Mangunradji went on to explain that the group met again three
days later at the house of General Hugeng, where they were told of
improprieties directly traceable to the President's family, and in par-
ticular to his wife. 71 Hugeng had played some role in uncovering these
67.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 78. Elsewhere Sawito accused the judges
of behaving like "katak dalam tempurung" (frogs under half coconut
shells) and suffering from "stupid syndrome"!
68.	Romo Tjipto Prawoto was a navy chaplain close to the cardinal.
He gave testimony on January 30, 1978, but did not say anything of
significance. Dr. Riberu was a history lecturer at Atmajaya (Catholic)
University. He worked also for Mawi and knew the cardinal well.
Bishop Harsono was then bishop of Bogor. He too was close to the
cardinal.
69.	Keputusan, p. 28.
70.	Indonesia Times, January 3, 1978.
71.	These included a smuggling ring "worth billions of rupiah," report-
edly controlled by Tien Suharto in partnership with a cukong, and the
mausoleum project in Central Java. Hugeng, according to Mangunradji,
had evidence of these enterprises. Kompas, January 3, 1978, and
Tempo, November 19, 1977. Sawito tells us that Hugeng lamented to
the cardinal the decline in the President's authority. This was reflect-
ed, he said, in the fact that whenever Suharto came on the radio or
TV, "people just turn it off." Hati Nurani, p. 181.69
activities but, like Juarsa, had received telephone calls advising him
to cease investigations "if you love your family."72 The cardirlal was
reportedly taken aback by Hugeng's stories and offered to confront
the President. 73 It was at Hugeng's house that Darmoyuwono signed
"Towards Salvation."
Sawito's Orhiba colleague and principal Bakin contact, Kadri
Atmojo, also testified at this session. He stated that he had known
Sawito since the 1950s, and had, over the years, been extremely help-
ful to him, providing him with books and several "state secrets." He
testified that he had once told Sawito that Bakin was noting the license
plates of cars visiting Hatta's residence.71* On another occasion, Kadri
Atmojo said, he had told Sawito that Yoga Sugama had in 1975 com-
plained to him that his most difficult task as head of Bakin was to look
after the security of the President's wife. 75
Kadri Atmojo also told the court that Ishak Juarsa had approached
him in March 1976 with instructions to pass on a copy of "Welcoming a
Just Government in Indonesia" to Sugama.76 This revelation lent some
credence to Sawito's claim that his group had been cooperating with
Bakin. 77 The witness went on to say, however, that he had reported
Sawito's activities to Bakin, and claimed he had tried to protect Hatta
from the influence of Mr. Sudjono and Sawito. 78
Suardi Tasrif, head of Peradin (the Indonesian Bar Association)
and one-time defense counsel for student leader Hariman Siregar, was
the next witness. Tasrif testified that fellow lawyer Iskak had called
on him to ask his advice about constitutional means of effecting Suhar-
to's resignation. He said he had warned Iskak against basing the
"Letter of Transfer" on Supersemar, because in 1966 when Supersemar
was drafted there had been no Vice-President. 79 Tasrif had told Iskak
that the subversion law was very flexible, and that it could be used
against him if he proceeded with his plan. 80 According to Sawito's
72.	Indonesia Times, January 3, 1978.
73.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 43, and Tempo, November 19, 1977,
p. 55. The cardinal was a boyhood friend of the President.
74.	Kompas, January 3, 1978.
75.	Keputusan, p. 29.
76.	Ibid.
77.	Sawito confirmed the passing of the document to Sugama, saying
that it had been sent with the message that, if it was "unclear," Su-
gama should contact Ishak Juarsa. Urutan Kejadian [Sequence of
Events], a comprehensive 6-page chronology written by Sawito in
1978 (?), p. 3.
78.	Keputusan, p. 29.
79.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 111.
80.	Kompas, January 17, 1978.70
summing up of Tasrif's testimony, the witness stated that courts in
Indonesia were not empowered to debate matters of constitutionality
and that, as far as he knew, Sawito could not be convicted of any
criminal offense.81 Tasrif told the bench that he had never met Sawito
before appearing in court.
On January 16, 1978, a man who had been present at Hamka's
house at the time of Sawito's visit, Drs. Abu Yamin Rachman, appeared.
Once again there was a significant discrepancy between the preliminary
interrogation records and the evidence given in court. According to
the interrogation records, the witness had said that Sawito had rudely
interrupted his conversation with Hamka, boasted about his wangsit,
and virtually bullied Hamka into signing "Towards Salvation."82 In
court, however, he testified that, in his estimation, Hamka and Sawito
had behaved like good friends.83 Sawito requested Hamka's son Rusdi
to be called to court to clear the confusion by presenting his version
of the meeting. 8h
By mid-January 1978 street demonstrations and opposition out-
spokenness had reached their highest level since the Malari affair.
Newspaper articles were tending toward overt support for student de-
mands and even carried reprints from semi-underground journals.85
On the 22nd, however, came the clampdown. Kopkamtib banned all
activity by student councils, and seven leading newspapers were tem-
porarily closed down.86 Reporting of the trial was severely curtailed.
It may have been no coincidence that during this virtual news blackout
two very interesting witnesses were brought to testify. The first of
these was Toto Sunarto Minggu, a businessman and operative of Attor-
ney General AM Said.
Toto Minggu testified that he had met Sawito in July 1976. He said
that he had told Sawito about deposits made by the President's wife in
81.	Hati Nurani, p. 15.
82.	Tempo, November 19, 1977, and O'Rourke, "Between Dreams and
Reality," p. 40.
83.	Indonesia Times, January 17, 1978.
84.	Kompas, January 3, 1978.
85.	See for instance Kompas, January 7, 1978 (U.S.E.), where an
article reprinted from Sendi, a university journal, claimed: "the press
has sold its honor by borrowing large sums of money from the govern-
ment," and "information from the government can only be called deceit
when there is no independence of the press." For graphic reports of
student unrest see Merdeka, Pelita, and Kompas, from December 1977
to mid-January 1978.
86.	Berita Yudha, January 23, 1978 (U.S.E.). The newspapers
closed were Pelita, Merdeka, Kompas, Sinar Harapan, Indonesia Times,
Sinar Pagi, and Pos Sore. Pos Kota and regional papers such as Sura-
baya Post took over as leading papers for about two weeks.71
one bank, totaling "tens of billions of rupiah."87 Witness Toto also
recounted that Sawito showed him a draft of "Towards Salvation" bear-
ing Hatta's initials on the front page.88 Later, when the document had
been properly drawn up and signed by Hatta and the religious figures,
according to his testimony, Toto had been asked to take a copy to AM
Said, but, although he had taken the document, he had not given it to
AM Said. 89
Sawito strongly contested this account and accused Toto of lying
to protect his boss. According to Sawito, Toto had given the document
to Ali Said and passed on the message that the attorney general sup-
ported it. Sawito also claimed that AI i Said had given his group infor-
mation concerning Suharto's distrust of his generals. 90
Toto Minggu's testimony and Sawito's elaboration of it would not be
particularly significant had the next witness not corroborated Sawito's
claims. This witness was Dadi Bujonegoro, ex-head of the Institute
for Plantations, and AI i Said's first cousin. Of all the witnesses heard,
his evidence was perhaps the most intriguing. According to the record
of his preliminary interrogation, Bujonegoro allegedly had testified that
Sawito had often boasted about his lelono broto experiences and bragged
of his plan to usurp power from the President. 91 Supposedly Bujone-
goro had also admitted that he himself had become involved in Sawito's
"cabal" in return for promises of personal wealth.92 In the witness
stand Bujonegoro spoke more freely, explaining that the claims he made
in his interrogation report were false and that he had been "forced to
make them by the interrogators."93 Bujonegoro claimed that he had
been subjected to very harsh treatment in prison and had been inter-
rogated there by the very man he stood before in court, Head Prose-
cutor Mapigau. He further testified that he was in close and regular
contact with the head of the ABRl fraction in Parliament, General Domo
Pranoto, 95 and had talked with him about "widespread corruption, the
87.	Keputusan, p. 31. Adam Malik was apparently the first to make
this claim.
88.	Ibid. This draft, a copy of which I possess, is evidence that
Hatta played a part in deciding the contents of "Towards Salvation."
89.	Pos Kota, January 24, 1978.
90.	Hati Nurani, pp. 258-59.
91. Pos Kota, January 24, 1978, and Surabaya Post, April 11, 1978.
92.	Hati Nurani, p. 264.
93.	Pos Kota, January 24, 1978. Bujonegoro consequently withdrew
his record of interrogation, claiming that, since it was made under
duress, it was invalid.
94.	Ibid. Bujonegoro was the only witness interrogated by Mapigau.
95.	The link between Domo Pranoto and Bujonegoro went back to colo-
nial times, when the former worked in the colonial police under Bujone-
goro's father, who was bupati of Boyolali from 1942 to 1953.72
existence of unrest in society, and the deterioration of law and justice
in Indonesia." 96 Bujonegoro surprised the court by stressing that the
initiative for the creation of "Towards Salvation" had not come from
Sawito, but (as Sawito had claimed) from Domo Pranoto. The document
was part of the general's plan for a jalur penyelamat, or "preservation
channel" in which Hatta and Cardinal Darmoyuwono would head a coun-
cil designed to receive power in the event of an emergency. The wit-
ness went on to explain that Domo Pranoto had thought highly of Sawito
and knew him to be friendly with Hatta. Because of this and the need
to lay the groundwork for the plan, Domo Pranoto had requested that
Sawito travel to Semarang to contact the cardinal about the idea. Bujo-
negoro said that he had received Rp. 50,000 from the general to cover
Sawito's expenses on the trip. 97 On another occasion Bujonegoro had
been asked by Domo Pranoto to deliver a message to Hatta.
As the preparations for the jalur penyelamat proceeded, Sawito
had asked the witness to report on its progress to his cousin, Ali Said.
He had initially done this, but Toto Minggu had soon taken over the
duty. 98 Bujonegoro also spoke of his efforts to arrange a meeting be-
tween the cardinal and the President, 99 and how in gatherings at Mega
Mendung, Mangunradji and other associates of the cardinal had dis-
cussed the possibility of doing this through Catholic technocrat Frans
Seda. Toto Minggu, also attending, had suggested Ali Said would be
better suited to the task.100 Concerning the distribution of "Towards
Salvation," Bujonegoro explained that he had been ordered by Domo
Pranoto to give copies to Ali Said, a police lieutenant colonel, Sunardjo
Mulyokusumo, and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who was at that time
Vice-President.101
Sawito asked Bujonegoro several questions in court about Domo
Pranoto and the general's alleged conversations with President Suharto.
96.	Keputusan, p. 33.
97.	See Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 121.
98.	Surabaya Post, April 1 1, 1978. If, at this juncture, the reader is
losing track of the numerous people involved, I should remind him/her
of the "Cast List" which follows the glossary at the end of this paper.
99.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 121.
100.	Surabaya Post, April 11, 1978.
101.	Pos Kota, January 24, 1978. Mulyokusumo was a retired officer
who had some connection with Suharto's mystical affairs. When he tes-
tified on February 6, 1978 he claimed to be the head of a kepercayaan
group named "Tri Sabda Tunggal." (Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 133.)
Keputusan (p. 33) records that Bujonegoro also gave copies of "Towards
Salvation" to figures named Sunaryo, Tjokrodiningrat, Madjid, and
Andjar Sewoyo. Mulyokusumo admitted passing on copies of the docu-
ment to Martono (private secretary to the head of the police force),
Police Major Tohdjiwo for P. K. N. Mabak, the Defense Department,
and Colonel Said Hussein (Keputusan, p. 39).73
Sawito later complained:
Discussion of the talks between Domo Pranoto and President
Suharto was always "torpedoed" by the prosecutor in court, and
even in the records of interrogation this matter was never men-
tioned. The disturbing thing was that the judges always sided
with the prosecution when this issue was raised. . . . When I
asked witness D. Bujonegoro about the talks between these two
national figures which were the "starting point" of the Sawito
case, he was always forbidden to answer by the Head Judge on
the pretext that [my questions were] "irrelevant."102
At the next session, more than seventeen months after being
arrested, Suardi Tasrif's brother-in-law, Drs. Singgih, was heard.
Singgih was friendly with Hatta, Sudjono, and Iskak but it is not clear
how far he was associated with the Mega Mendung group as such. Wit-
ness Singgih testified that in early September 1976, Sawito had shown
him a signed copy of "Towards Salvation," and he was surprised when
Sawito told him that the document was to be dispatched to the President.
To resolve his doubts about whether Hatta had actually understood the
possible implications of this action, Singgih, together with Sawito and
another witness, Sofyan, visited Mega Mendung on September 7. Upon
hearing Hatta's affirmation of the plan, Singgih, Sawito, and Hatta
together drafted and signed the "Declaration," vowing to use "Towards
Salvation" as a "basis for the implementation of the Pancasila . . .
towards the achievement of Justice and Prosperity for the Entire
People of Indonesia."103
As a member of the National Plenary Board of the "Generation of
45," Singgih had attended the annual Independence Day reception at
the palace. According to him, he had met Suharto there and been in-
vited to return in early September for a private chat.101* When Hatta
was told of this, he thought it a good opportunity to have "Towards
Salvation" delivered to the President, and instructed Singgih to do
so.105 (The judges' summing up of his testimony revealed that Singgih
had also intended to give "Retreat in Order to Advance More Perfectly"
and the "Declaration" to Suharto. According to Sawito, however,
Singgih, after helping draft "Retreat ..." had, with Hatta, eventually
cancelled this document.) Before a date had been fixed to see the
President, Singgih received a phone call from an adjutant at the palace
advising him not to leave town. Soon afterwards he was arrested.
102.	Pancasila Menggugat, p. 23. It is also interesting to note that
the judges' summing up of the evidence presented by Bujonegoro makes
scant mention of Domo Pranoto.
103.	Pos Kota, January 31, 1978; Sumi Narto, Sawito, pp. 126-28; and
Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 45.
104.	Kompas, February 7, 1978, and Sumi Narto, Sawito, pp. 126-27.
105.	Pos Kota, January 31, 1978; Kompas, February 7, 1978.As the March MPR session approached, tension heightened notice-
ably. In early February 1978 troops violently occupied the Bandung
Institute of Technology and numerous arrests and interrogations of
journalists were reported.106 On the 13th people turned up in droves
to hear the testimony of the most senior military officer publicly impli-
cated in the Sawito affair, General Ishak Juarsa. But Juarsa, who
since his arrest in 1976 had been held by the ABRI military police,107
did not show up. The court was adjourned for two weeks. On the
27th one of the many exasperatingly inconsequential witnesses, Dr.
Riberu was heard, and again Juarsa was not permitted to attend. Over
the protests of the defense lawyers and probably on orders from their
superiors, the judges postponed the next hearing for a month. Four
days after the new MPR had reelected President Suharto, the trial re-
sumed. Despite Mapigau's insistence that he was doing all he could to
produce Juarsa, the general still did not appear. Only on April 3,
1978 was Juarsa's testimony finally heard.
Juarsa started by confirming Sawito's story of their meeting in
1957. He then stated that they had regained contact in 1973 when they
began meeting often in the framework of the Mega Mendung group.108
Juarsa told the court that at Mega Mendung they discussed such mat-
ters as the problem of domestic capital, military-controlled business,
and his own experiences as commander of the Aceh military region.109
Apparently it was while he was in Irian Jaya in 1970 that Juarsa
had proposed to Hatta that he accept the Presidency, and Hatta report-
edly agreed.110 At the celebration of Hatta's birthday in 1974, the
Mega Mendung group reached a firm agreement that, if Suharto could
not manage Indonesia^ problems, he would have to go.* * 111 Juarsa
stated that "all of us" persuaded Hatta to accept the Presidency, and
that Hatta agreed to this, provided it was effected constitutionally and
without violence.112 The witness assured the court that the entire
process was to have been constitutional and that, in the end, "every-
thing depended on Hatta."113
Juarsa recounted how he had given Sawito a copy of a speech he
had made to the Defense Department, and that "Welcoming a Just
106.	Sinor Harapan, February 13, 1978, and eyewitness reports.
107.	Titania, Sawito: Siapa, p. 189.
108.	Angkatan Bersenjata, April 4, 1978 (U.S.E.). In 1957 Juarsa
was head of the Military Subarea Command (KOREM) of Surya Kencana.
109.	Tempo, November 19, 1977, and Keputusan, p. 40.
110.	"Sawito, Singa Podium dari Blitar," p. 8. Sawito claimed that
Juarsa was one of the organizers of Pepera, the so-called "Act of Free
Choice" in Irian Jaya at the time. Hati Nurani, p. 179.
111.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 145.
112.	Keputusan, p. 40, and Surabaya Post, April 4, 1978.
113.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 146.75
Government in Indonesia" contained the essence of that speech.114 He
also revealed that Sawito had sent him a copy of "Towards Salvation"
via the diplomatic bag to Yugoslavia.115 Although he said he agreed
with all of Sawito's opinions, he did not portray him as anything more
than "one of the group." When asked for his view of the proposition
that Sawito be a candidate for Vice-President, he replied that such an
idea was "impossible," and that he had never taken it seriously.116
Juarsa evidently affirmed that he was a candidate to become one of
Hatta's military advisers in the event of a transfer of power, and he
supported Sudjono's testimony that General Surono was to have been
the other.
Apparently eager to provoke discussion on Suharto's fortune,
Sawito and the defense team asked Juarsa over fifty questions about
such matters as the President's alleged smuggling activities in Aceh,
the Bogor ranch (which had once belonged to Juarsa), and the "Rp. 61
million a day" clove monopoly controlled by Suharto's step-brother,
Probosutedjo, all of which questions were overruled as irrelevant.117
Juarsa was also forbidden to explain his absence from the previous
three sittings. Before this seventeenth session was adjourned, the
prosecutor announced that the head of the personnel office from the
Agriculture Department (the fifth person from that department to be
linked with the affair) was to be heard the following week. It was
characteristic of the seemingly badly coordinated nature of the trial
that this (unnamed) witness never in fact appeared.
The question of calling additional witnesses dominated the next
session. After discussions with the prosecution, the judges eventually
ruled, to the dismay of Sawito and the defense team, that enough had
been said about the signatories to render their appearance in court
unnecessary.
At this session an important exchange took place which was report-
ed in none of the major newspapers in Java. According to Waspada, a
114.	Ibid.
115.	Keputusan, p. 41. It will be recalled that Juarsa had been
posted as ambassador to Belgrade in early 1976.
116.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 46.
117.	Surabaya Post, April 4, 1978. Probosutedjo, besides owning sub-
stantial shares in plastics, car distribution, real estate, glass, chemi-
cals, building, and banking enterprises, directs Mercu Buana, a
company which, with a Chinese partner, controls 100 percent of the
clove importing trade. For details, see Richard Robison, "Capitalism
and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia 1965-75" (Ph.D. Thesis,
Sydney University, 1977), Appendix B. Sawito quotes trade docu-
ments that estimate the daily profit of Probosutedjo's company to be
Rp. 61,643,835 (Hati Nurani, p. 27). For Sawito's account of Juarsa's
smuggling tales see below, ch. 5, n. 32. Juarsa had reportedly told
Sawito that Suharto's ranch, Tapos, was stocked with 6,000 cattle,
each costing US$20,000(!). Hati Nurani, pp. 163-64.76
Medan daily, on April 10 the prosecutor produced the interrogation
records of Domo Pranoto. Both the judge and Yap demanded why this
key testimony had not been submitted earlier when the judges had
asked for it. The prosecutor replied that the prosecution had not then
yet received it from the “preliminary examiners."118 Whatever the
reason, as testimony from the witnesses had already been declared
finished, this evidence was not heard. Nowhere else was there any
mention of the fact that the government took Domo Pranoto's role in the
affair seriously enough to have him interrogated. In fact, after the
initial government announcement, virtually the only news to appear on
Domo Pranoto was the report of his death in mid-1977. 119
On May 1, 1978 the prosecutor proceeded to read his two and a
half hour indictment. Mapigau charged that Sawito's belief that he
was the “Ratu Adil" and his theory of nonmaterial evolution had caused
him to make use of and deceive Hatta and the religious figures to
achieve his aims.120 There was some suggestion that Sawito had used
his mystical powers to dupe the signatories of "Towards Salvation."121
The prosecutor further charged that Sawito, by using the signatures
of prominent people, aimed at gaining mass support for himself, and
that he had planned to take over control from Hatta had the scheme to
install him as President been successful.122 Hatta's role in the plot,
argued Mapigau, was as an "intermediary."123 The prosecutor went on
to say that his accusations were strengthened by the fact that "the
accused was aware of the possible repercussions of his actions," and
that he showed no sign of remorse or repentance for his activities. m
Apparently unconcerned that Sudjono, Iskak, and Singgih had ad-
mitted having helped draft the "Letter of Authority," "Letter of Trans-
fer," and "Joint Declaration"; that Darmadi had accepted responsibility
for "Welcoming a Just Government in Indonesia"; that Bujonegoro had
testified that the initiative for "Towards Salvation" and the jalur pen-
yelamat idea came from Domo Pranoto; that Dr. Gunawan had explained
that he had been under pressure to portray Sawito as a subversive;
and that none of the reported evidence suggested that Sawito had used
psychic powers to influence the signatories, the prosecutor concluded
that Sawito had been proven guilty of all the charges originally laid
against him. He subsequently demanded a twenty-year prison sentence.
118.	Waspada, April 11, 1978.
119.	Domo Pranoto reportedly died of a heart attack on June 13, 1977.
Tempo, June 25, 1977. Unsubstantiated rumors circulated at the time
that he had in fact died at the hands of the security police.
120.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, pp. 156-57.
121.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 38.
122.	Surabaya Post, May 2, 1978, and Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 157.
123.	Mapigau's word was perantara. Ibid., p. 157. The implication
was that Hatta was to have ruled only until Sawito took over.
124.	Ibid., p. 158.77
Lawyer Abdulrachman Saleh expressed the defense team's despair at
the prosecutor's logic by accusing him of "only wanting to please his
superiors."125 As usual, Sawito was in good spirits. Upon leaving the
courtroom he was heard to say, "I thought I was getting the death
sentence. Twenty years isn't too bad"! 126
The government's evident determination to assert their authority
was reflected in the presence of a number of police sharp shooters
lounging ostentatiously outside the courthouse.127 In the streets of
Jakarta, troops were under orders to shoot troublemakers on sight.128
Four prominent critics of the government, W. S. Rendra, Prof. Ismael
Suny, Bung Tomo, and Mahbub Djunaedi, were under arrest, and scores
of students were still in detention.129 Against this backdrop Sawito
presented his encyclopaedic pleidooi, or defense speech.
Part C: The Defense
To a courthouse packed with interested well wishers from a range
of social groups, Sawito presented the longest defense speech in Indo-
nesian legal history.130 The 110,000 word pleidooi, entitled Hati Nurani
Menuntut or "An Accusation from the Heart," included lengthy pas-
sages on morality, philosophy, theology, mysticism, history, literature,
and Indonesian economic, political, and legal problems, as well as
Sawito's version of the entire affair with references to all the testi-
monies of witnesses and to contemporary political events. Taking two
full days to read, Sawito's delivery was by all accounts a spectacle to
behold. An Australian observer at the trial wrote: "He took no water
made no pause, spoke strongly at all times and did not falter at all in
his delivery. His presentation . . . only added to the aura which
apparently surrounds him as a mystic."131
125.	Ibid., p. 176. "To please one's superiors" is a translation of the
Indonesian asal bapak senang (literally "as long as the boss is happy").
This phrase is commonly used in criticizing officials for servility in
Indonesia.
126.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 47.
127.	McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 45.
128.	Merdeka, March 24, 1978.
129.	All these arrests did not take place simultaneously. Bung Tomo
was arrested on November 16, 1977 (Merdeka, November 17, 1977),
Mahbub Djunaedi on April 11, 1978 (Merdeka, April 12, 1978), Ismael
Suny on April 12, 1978 (Merdeka, April 13, 1978), and W. S. Rendra
on May 2, 1978 (Pelita, May 3, 1978). The charges, mentioned by
Kopkamtib head Sudomo in Merdeka, May 5, 1978, state that they were
jailed for "inciting students." He also stated that 129 students were
being held.
130.	"Sawito, Singa Podium," p. 7. Most of the following account
draws upon the 315-page document itself.
131.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 47.78
Sawito began by reminding the judges of their heavy responsibili-
ties, stressing that, according to their official guidelines, they should
act on the basis of a knowledge of both divine justice and the prevailing
currents of opinion in society. Divine justice, he explained, was acces-
sible to those who heeded their consciences and responded accordingly.
Failure to do so, Sawito assured the bench, could lead to torment and
suicide. 132 Enlarging on the second point,he referred to extensive
examples of unrest and discontent within society and went on to quote
the President's own admission of its existence.133
Responding to the charge that he was responsible for documents
designed to support the unconstitutional replacement of the President,
Sawito made a number of points. The witnesses had proven, he
argued, that the only document for which he could be held completely
responsible was "Pardoning Bung Kamo," and even that, he said, had
been endorsed by Hatta. The charge of unconstitutionality, Sawito
claimed, was nonsense. He explained that, after Suardi Tasrif had
advised Iskak against basing any of the documents on Supersemar,
they had looked to Parliamentary Decision No. VII/MPR/1973 for a solu-
tion; but Hatta had reportedly said that this law governing emergency
transitions of power had so many conditions contingent upon it that it
was virtually unusable.1Zk Sawito claimed that due to these develop-
ments, and also because of a missive from Domo Pranoto, the "Letter of
132.	Hati Nurani, p. 8. Sawito draws parallels between the judges of
the court and those judges of Hugo's Les Miserables who, due to their
dependence on purely material evidence in pronouncing their verdicts,
were tormented by their consciences and committed suicide.
133.	Critics in Indonesia have evolved a habit of quoting government
officials to back up their statements. Sawito repeatedly stressed that
he never made his own evaluations of the political or economic situation.
One of the speeches he quoted most extensively was by Lt. General
Alamsyah, one of Suharto's inner circle and vice chairman of his Su-
preme Advisory Council (DPA). At a social science seminar in Sulawesi
on November 14, 1977 Alamsyah launched a scathing and comprehensive
attack on the economic policies of the Suharto regime. (See Sinar Hara-
pan, November 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1977.) Among the main points taken
up by Sawito were the failure of the New Order's first two five-year
plans, the high level of Indonesian corn, sugar, and salt imports, mis-
management of Pertamina, and the demise of indigenous enterprise.
Sawito writes, "similar expressions have been voiced by high ABRI
officials, an ex-State Secretary and an ex-Ambassador to Holland, . . .
therefore I act here as the mouthpiece of all Indonesians." Hati Nurani,
p. 20.
The earliest evidence of Suharto's admission of unrest I have been
able to find was in July 1979. (Report from Asia: ABC, July 12, 1979,
transcribed in Indonesian News Selections, August 1979.) It is a mea-
sure of the restrictions on freedom of speech that such seemingly
innocuous statements are accorded great importance.
134.	Hati Nurani, p. 240.79
Authority" and "Letter of Transfer" were cancelled. These documents,
he added, were but preliminary versions of "Towards Salvation."135
Sawito went on to say that "Towards Salvation" was designed to
make use of Parliamentary Decision No. X/MPR/1973, a law which, he
claimed, allowed the President "at moments when the unity of the nation
and the success of national development were threatened"136 to transfer
responsibility for the government to someone else. (Just why they felt
they had to give the President permission to use this emergency law
was never made clear. In any case, the law provides only for the
transfer of responsibilities to a minister, and then only if the Vice-
President is absent.)137 Sawito explained that, had power been trans-
ferred to Hatta, he (Hatta) was to have addressed the MPR and assigned
them the responsibility of electing a new President.138 A regu penyela-
mat or "savior team" was to have assisted Hatta until the MPR could be
convened.
Moving on to respond to the charge of composing and disseminating
false news and conflict (a charge which related to the production of
"Welcoming a Just Government in Indonesia," "Retreat in Order to
Advance more Perfectly," and "Towards Salvation"), he replied that
the prosecutor was wrong on all counts. Darmadi had accepted respon-
sibility for the first document; the second had been cancelled by its
maker, Singgih; and the third, he repeated, was made on the initiative
of Domo Pranoto. Although Sawito admitted writing "Towards Salva-
tion," he went on to say that Hatta had corrected it and Domo Pranoto
had added a few sentences toning it down.139
Sawito rejected the charge that he had disseminated any of the
documents, insisting that they had been circulated to a select audience
only. Although conceding that Darmadi had intended to have "Welcom-
ing a Just Government in Indonesia" printed in Merdeka, it was, he
stressed, ultimately State Secretary Sudharmono who was responsible
for the publication of the documents.1If0
The charge that the information contained in the documents was
false played directly into Sawito's hands. To prove that the claims
made in "Retreat in Order to Advance More Perfectly" were correct,
he listed twenty-six businesses and ten large plantations owned by the
135.	Sawito claimed that the unsigned copies of the "Letter of Author-
ity" and "Letter of Transfer" produced in court had been confiscated
from his personal files. The signed originals, he said, had been
crossed with the word "Dibatalkan" or "cancelled." Surabaya Post,
June 28, 1978, and Hati Nurani, pp. 241, 248, and 271.
136.	Hati Nurani, p. 240.
137.	See ch. 2, n. 19.
138.	Hati Nurani, p. 16.
139.	Ibid., pp. 22-24 and 36. See also Tempo, November 19, 1977,
p. 54.
140.	Ibid., pp. 247 and 277.80
President's family.141 He dwelt particularly on Yayasan Mangadeg and
Astana Giribangun, two enterprises engaged in the construction of
tombs for Suharto, his relations, and, curiously, senior members of
the Public Works Department.142 Included in the text of Hati Nurani
Menuntut is a document from Yayasan Mangadeg (claimed to have been
signed by Tien Suharto) listing the names and prospective tomb num-
bers of over one hundred figures graded according to proximity to the
Presidential family from the outer yard, inner yard, and verandah, to
the inner chamber. In Sawito's opinion, this reflected the feudal nature
of the Suharto regime. He likened the building of the tombs to the
founding of a dynasty, and went on to deplore such outrageous extrav-
agance in the midst of poverty suffered not only by the people at large
but also by civil servants and members of the armed forces.143
Sawito then contested the charge that he had tricked the prominent
figures into signing "Towards Salvation" and the other documents.
Citing the testimonies of the witnesses and the signatories' own writ-
ings, he painstakingly argued that the opinions reflected there were
consistent with the statements in the documents, and that Hatta and
the other signatories had been fully aware of what they had signed.144
Further, Sawito questioned the validity of the retractions issued
by the signatories, claiming that they could not have been written
voluntarily. He argued:
Their being forced to submit such statements would be [in tune
with] the reversal of facts by government officials who have
their own designs. . . . The interrogation records do not square
at all with the facts. There exists a secret plan by some of the
highest government officials to set me up as a scapegoat and
ultimately to attack the President.145
141.	Ibid., pp. 26-32. Sawito claimed that he had been given this in-
formation while awaiting trial. The detail of the list indicates that it
originated from government files. It goes further than does the cata-
logue of Suharto's business interests contained in Appendix B of
Richard Robison, "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State." Robison's
thesis was the standard "underground" source of information on the
Suharto family's business holdings. It was used by Heri Akhmadi in
preparing his defense speech in late 1978-early 1979. (Personal com-
munication with Richard Robison.)
142.	In "Sawito, Singa Podium" (p. 11) several of the figures named
by Sawito as prospective tenants of the mausoleum are identified as
Public Works Department employees.
143.	Hati Nurani, pp. 32-35.
144.	Ibid., pp. 37-38, 57-65. Many of the sentences in the documents
either paraphrase or closely resemble parts of the signatories' works.
Most of the works to which Sawito referred are cited above, ch. 1.
145.	Ibid., p. 38.81
Here Sawito was taking a similar tack to that in his eksepsi, accusing,
albeit in a less direct way, Ali Said and Sudharmono. Elsewhere in the
pleidooi he took issue with a larger, less specific group, which he indi-
cated was equally eager to sacrifice him to their own ends. This group
of "villainous army officers" were motivated by their "criminal interests"
to "protect Suharto, and have him portrayed as clean, honest, just,
. . . accepting of criticism and a true Pancasilaist, or in other words,
perfect."1If6 These had been the ones, he explained, who had tried to
prevent him from accepting Yap Thiam Hien as his defense counsel,
who had threatened him with a long jail term if he discussed Hatta in
court, and who had ensured that none of the key witnesses (the signa-
tories of "Towards Salvation") was ever brought to testify.lhl
This situation, Sawito went on to argue, demonstrated that nobody
in power was on the side of justice:
What is most worrying for all of us is that it is precisely the
officials working in the legal field who ensure the weakness and
nonexistence of the negara hukum. This is what is meant by the
phrase "the fence eating up the crops." Given these conditions,
it is not unusual to hear of police who are thieves, soldiers who
pillage and murder the people, watchmen who always sleep,
cashiers who embezzle money, customs officers who smuggle,
teachers who become prostitutes, leaders who are corrupt; of
the powerful exercising force, the poor being asked for dona-
tions, the rich being given credit, the destitute being preyed
on, bosses doing as they wish while subordinates are half dead,
bosses overeating while subordinates go hungry, and of leaders
getting fatter while the people grow more afraid.
... So don't be too surprised if in this trial the accused
becomes the prosecutor, the prosecutor the accused, or if the
judge becomes the advocate and the advocate the judge!
Isn't this "the world of ghosts"?
. . . The Indonesian nation aspires to build GOD's justice,
and all we get is GHOST justice, the exact opposite.
(By this stage the audience was reported to have been exploding with
laughter.)
... A patriot is accused of being a traitor, a proclaimer
[of Independence] an agitator, a fighter a protestor, and a
cardinal a braggart, while an Ulama is branded an idolator.llf8
146.	Ibid., p. 217. Bangsat is the Indonesian word I have translated
as "villainous."
147.	Ibid., p. 218. This "group" (virtually synonymous with "the
government" it appears) included "the prosecutor and other authorities
who attempted to persuade me, or more precisely, tried their hardest
to cajole me into eschewing the mention of Bung Hatta in order to avoid
a harsh verdict."
148.	Ibid., pp. 219-20, and Indonesia Times, May 27, 1978.82
Explaining the evolution of the plan to replace Suharto with Hatta,
Sawito stressed the necessity of recognizing the existence of two sepa-
rate threads. The first of these involved the discontented Juarsa,
who had, he said, approached Hatta in 1970 about his willingness to
stand for President.149 Hatta, Sawito claimed, had accepted Juarsa's
plan, and the two of them appear to have remained committed to this
idea until Juarsa's arrest in 1976.
Sawito made many references in his pleidooi to discussions with
Juarsa at Mega Mendung. Apart from tales of Suharto's alleged smug-
gling activities, Juarsa had told the group that as ambassador in Cam-
bodia, he knew of Indonesian troop support for Lon Nol. Sawito argued
that, but for Juarsa's resolute action, Indonesia's "free and active"
(nonaligned) foreign policy was in danger of being discredited.150
Juarsa, he said, had also decried the low moral standards maintained
by many high officials in Indonesia and had linked this to an elaborate
system of "covert colonialism" being carried out by foreign intelligence
bodies, which, he explained, relied on blackmail to extract information
and direct activities from behind the scenes. 151
According to Sawito, Juarsa was particularly worried by a widening
rift within the armed forces, which if left, he believed, would become
open and dangerous. Juarsa had reportedly labeled one group "ABRI
149.	"Sawito, Singa Podium," p. 8.
150.	Hati Nurani, pp. 179-81. Sawito wrote:
It is no longer secret that Indonesia trained Lon Nol's commando
troops. Besides that, [Indonesia] also had troops there.
So it is not surprising [to discover that] in the last moments
[before the fall of Phnom Penh], the Khmer cabinet, which was
led by Lon Nol and which had the Indonesian ambassador [Juarsa]
as a member, decided to surrender the defense of the capital to
Indonesia. [!] [This was] immediately rejected by Major General
Ishak Juarsa because such an action would mean interference in
the internal affairs of the Khmer Republic itself. It is fortunate
that even though our central government at that time was in-
clined to support [this level of involvement]—thanks to the
strong opinions of Juarsa—who held tight to our "free and active"
[bebas aktif] policies, Lon Nol's decision was unconditionally re-
jected by our ambassador and our troops were saved from involve-
ment in foreign combat. . . . That was what Major General Ishak
Juarsa said.
Sawito then referred to a document written by Juarsa entitled "The
Fatal Weaknesses of the Khmer Republic of Lon Nol." This had been
among the articles submitted as defense evidence, and in it Juarsa re-
portedly drew close parallels between conditions in Lon Nol's Cambodia
and Suharto's Indonesia.
151.	Ibid., pp. 176-77. Sawito claimed that Juarsa had also spoken of
foreign intelligence networks "pampering" key Indonesian officials.83
Rakyat" or the "Popular Army," consisting of those who faithfully
served the people and honored their oaths of office, and the other
"ABRI Bangsat" or the "Villainous Army," consisting of venal, selfish,
intolerant bullies, who, instead of serving the people, preyed on
them.152 Sawito went on to say that Juarsa had emphasized the need
for a national leader to enjoy the support of all groups in society and
had felt it imperative that Suharto resign in favor of Hatta.153 From
Sawito's account, one gets the impression that Juarsa's ideas provided
the primary impetus for the Mega Mendung meetings.
The second "thread," running parallel to Juarsa's but without his
awareness (and perhaps that of one or two of the other members of the
Mega Mendung group) concerned the elusive figure of Domo Pranoto.
The general's messenger and assistant, Bujonegoro, was the only wit-
ness to substantiate Sawito's story.
According to Sawito, in late 1975 and early 1976 Domo Pranoto, as
head of the ABRI fraction in Parliament, was growing extremely worried
about the stability of the Suharto regime. Observing the "magma" both
within the MPR and in society at large to be near boiling point and in
serious danger of erupting into a "terrible disaster," Domo also "sensed
clear signs that ABRI would not maintain its cohesion" in the event of
such an upheaval. His immediate concern, however, was President
Suharto's apparent disdain for constitutional processes. Suharto's
lack of response to the (1971 elected) MPR's requests for an accounting
of his term of office was seen by Domo as setting a perilous precedent.
(According to the Constitution, the President is required to provide a
report of his term of duty to the Parliament which appoints him.)
Alarmed by Suharto's loftiness and aware of the disquiet in society,
Domo became increasingly uneasy about the absence of any viable pro-
vision for succession. According to Sawito, Domo then proposed to
the President that he (Suharto) choose one man from each of the four
services. The idea was that these men could be watched, and, without
their knowledge, groomed to accept the Presidency if the need were
suddenly to arise. Upon hearing Domo's proposition, the President
reportedly snapped, "Are you telling me to end the show when it has
barely begun?"151* This outburst, explained Sawito, had stunned Domo,
for until then he had regarded himself as close to the President.
Ostracized for the following three or four months, Domo Pranoto
reportedly grew wary. He told Sawito that the President had become
"reckless, forgetting law ..." and abandoning purwo duksino or the
"righteous way." He was "seduced by desires" and like the "fence
152.	Ibid., p. 177.
153.	Ibid., p. 178.
154.	"Belum-belum sudah disuruh tancep kayon?" was Sawito's rendi-
tion. Ibid., p. 204. Tancep kayon (or Tanjebkayon) is a technical
term in wayang for closing down or dividing segments of a performance
by implanting the kayon (large leather figure) in the horizontal banana
trunk at center screen.84
that consumes the garden, had created the conditions of his own vul-
nerability."155 Domo reportedly told Sawito that he feared that Suharto
would avoid choosing a successor for as long as he possibly could.
Sawito maintained that, as vice chairman of Parliament, Domo felt re-
sponsible for insuring against the possibility of an open and violent
competition for the Presidency. Domo envisaged that such a struggle
would occur in the event of a major eruption in society or within the
MPR, and indeed, that such an eruption was likely to happen in the
period leading up to the Presidential elections of 1978. This, claimed
Sawito, had led Domo Pranoto to consider alternative means of averting
potential anarchy, and to the idea of a jalur penyelamat or "preserva-
tion channel."15^
Since the trouble that Domo sensed was likely to involve opposing
political factions, he reasoned that only a highly respected nonpartisan
group could be expected to bring it under control. To this end,
claimed Sawito, Domo had selected Hatta to lead a "savior team" con-
sisting of the four religious figures.157 "Towards Salvation," it would
appear, was conceived by Domo to serve as a statement of solidarity
between the members of the team.
Domo first put this plan to Sawito in January 1976. (Apparently
feeling the need to assure the court of his credibility, Sawito at this
point explained that he had won the trust of the general because of his
moral character, his relationship with Police General Said Sukanto, his
standing as a public servant, and his friendship with Hatta.) Domo
reportedly told Sawito to pass on the idea to Hatta "in casual conversa-
tion," but not to inform anybody else until he (Domo) had met with
155.	Sawito, Sic Transit Gloria Mundi, p. 16. The Indonesian reads:
"President Soeharto . . . telah disebut meninggalkan 'purwo duksino1
dan tergoda hawa nafsu dan yang diibaratkan pula sebagai pagar makan
tanaman yang berarti menciptakan kerapuhannya sendiri."
156.	Ibid., pp. 209, 244. This somewhat awkward translation should
be understood to refer to a "channel" for action by which Indonesia
would be preserved from disaster. It is related to the idea of a safety
valve.
157.	Ibid., p. 244. Domo Pranoto's plan, if it really existed, was not
unprecedented. In 1953, Natsir and the Masjumi groups had lobbied
for the introduction of an "escape clause" to the Constitution of 1950
which would allow a Hatta-led cabinet to assume power in an emergency.
In both cases the assumption was that Hatta, as a "neutral" statesman
commanded enough authority to be able to quell factional disputes and
set things right in times of crisis. Just as Domo was reported to have
felt the presence of a looming upheaval, Natsir was quoted as warning
"the state is in fact in danger at this time, although this is not evident
on the surface." See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional
Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp.
331-32.85
Hatta. 158 Sawito made a comment here which raised the possibility that
he was not fully aware of what Domo Pranoto's plan involved., He said:
"Of course [this matter] will raise questions among members of the
judiciary. I too had several questions to ask Pak Domo, which he said
could be answered when he met Hatta."159 While Hatta was contacted
by Bujonegoro, the meeting with Domo Pranoto never eventuated, sug-
gesting that Hatta and Sawito knew, but did not inform the religious
figures (except perhaps the cardinal), that they were being drawn
into an important, but rather hazy, plan being drawn up by the vice
chairman of Parliament.
Sawito later told the court that he had reported the progress of
this plan to Bakin and the attorney general via witnesses Kadri Atmodjo
and Bujonegoro. Although he never specified why he did so, he said
that Bakin and AM Said (the attorney general) must have come to see
the "preservation channel" as a threat to their interests. By first
announcing the affair and later bringing him to trial, their aim, Sawito
claimed, was to both smash the "savior team" and ensure that the
"weaknesses of Suharto" would be revealed in court.160 "What a great
pity," said Sawito, "that the judges dare not call the head of Bakin
[Yoga Sugama] or the attorney general to court so that they could be
confronted by the other witnesses. If this request was granted, the
prosecutor's 'deceitful games' would be destroyed and his despicable
tactics exposed."161
In response to a charge in the prosecutor's argument that the first
"phase" of Sawito's subversion had involved "mental spiritual prepara-
tion," Sawito stressed that receiving wahyu and being crowned Ratu
Adil broke no laws. These matters, he added, had very little connec-
tion with the "affair." ^Dwelling at some length on the matter of wahyu,
Sawito maintained that all religions recognized it, and indeed, that
without wahyu there would be no religion.162 Quoting both from the
Koran and from one of Hamka's works, Sawito argued that divine reve-
lations in the form of inner voices were not very unusual,163 and went
on to claim that he could not help it if from time to time he received
wahyu.
158.	Hoti Nurani, p. 209.
159.	Ibid.
160.	Ibid., p. 249.
161.	Ibid., p. 250.
162.	Indonesia Times, May 27, 1978.
163.	Hati Nurani, pp. 115-16, 146. In an apparent effort to educate
the judges and prosecutor and prove to them that his sanity was intact,
Sawito read them a passage of the Koran which stated that wahyu could
be received by anything, animate or otherwise. Sawito referred to
Hamka's Peladjaran Agama Islam (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), pp.
114-16, to point out that (even) in Hamka's view there exist many
people who hear messages from Cod and see angels.86
Sawito concluded that, because of the inept and heavy-handed
management of the trial, the concealing of evidence, mistreatment of
witnesses, the overruling of most questions put to witnesses, and the
withholding of key witnesses, he could not be regarded as having had
a fair trial.164 He stated that, had President Suharto, Yoga Sugama,
Ali Said, and Hatta been heard, the prosecutors charges would be re-
vealed as being without basis.165 "What a terrible pity," Sawito
lamented, "that my request that Pak Harto be heard was not granted.
I wanted to examine him about the discussions he had with Pak Domo.
Because I am sure that Pak Harto would tell the truth about what hap-
pened with Pak Domo."166 And elsewhere:
It is very clear that the Judges and prosecutors are afraid of
hearing Bung Hatta's testimony, for [you] are well aware that
Bung Hatta was the source of this affair. Meaning that if we
had not known Bung Hatta, none of this would have occurred.
. . . Quite honestly I say here, your Honor, that by not summon-
ing Bung Hatta and the other signatories of "Towards Salvation,"
Indonesian Justice is degraded . . . it is degraded not only in
the eyes of the Indonesian people but in the eyes of the world.167
Woven into practically all of Sawito's arguments in Hati Nurani
Menuntut was the theme of morality. Morality was directly related in
Sawito's speech to national defense, foreign policy, investment guide-
lines, recording of history, and constitutional awareness, as well as to
the more familiar areas of human rights, social justice, and corruption.
Quoting Aristotle, he wrote, "It is better to have a nation qoverned by
men of good character than one governed by good laws."166 In another
place he complained: "The morals of those in power are not pure enough
to execute honestly the state's laws,"169 and elsewhere: "This pleidooi
is a moral accusation from every Indonesian citizen who has an aware-
ness of freedom."170
On May 29 and 30, 1978 the defense lawyers read their pleidooi,
expanding on many of the points that Sawito had raised and challenging
the validity of the 1963 subversion law. The title of the defense team's
four-part address to the court, "Safeguarding Political Justice in an
164. Hati Nurani, pp. 13, 277, 285-87, and Surabaya Post, June 28,
1978. Sawito's claims were nicely underpinned by a comment from the
Chief Justice of Indonesia's Supreme Court two weeks earlier, declaring
"A fair trial [in Indonesia] no longer exists."		Pelita, June 16, 1978.
165.	"Sawito, Singa Podium," p. 9.	
166.	Hati Nurani, p. 223.	
167.	Ibid., p. 221.	
168.	Ibid., p. 2.	
169.	Ibid., p. 47.	
170.	Ibid., p. 43. Such quotes can be found	on almost any page of
Hati Nurani Menuntut. The point I am trying to make is that the moral
element in his vision runs deep and should not be dismissed as a facade.87
Authoritarian Political System" is indicative of the scope of issues dis-
cussed. Yap Thiam Hien immediately launched an attack on the council
of judges, criticizing the "inept and sloppy" management of the court
proceedings. "Never before was the functioning of the court made
into such a tragicomedy," declared Yap, before the electricity to his
microphone was suddenly cut off.171 Later, he charged that the beha-
vior of the judges had been more colonial than in Dutch times,172 and
that the trial of Sawito was a political show trial designed to remove the
defendant from the scene and educate the people to obey the will of the
regime.173 He went on to deplore the feudal mentality of the power-
holders and cited Louis XIV's "L'etat c'est moi" as an appropriate dic-
tum for Indonesian rulers.174
Abdulrachman Saleh argued that human rights had been trampled
on in the court, and that Sawito had by no means been proven guilty.
He complained that in developing countries law was often "castrated"
under the guise of national interest, and said that there was "a ten-
dency to pronounce a defendant guilty before trial." The correct
implementation of the law was not only important for the public, but
also for the judges, because, he warned, to the delight of the audience,
some day they too could be on the receiving end.175 (Little did Abdul-
rachman Saleh realize the prophetic nature of his warning. Within
three years both the head judge Sumadiyono and member judge John
Loedoe were in detention on corruption charges!) 176
Lawyer Nurbani Yusuf referred to Sawito's detention as an "arbi-
trary act of atrocity" and asserted that he was a victim of calumny on
the part of some of Suharto's opponents, whom she referred to as
"hidden directors" of the trial.1'7 She went on to launch a virulent
attack of her own on the government's performance, citing no less than
sixty-five "facts of rottenness" that she had compiled from newspapers.178
Yap Thiam Hien, quoting Sawito, summed up by declaring that it was
"the Indonesian people who were on trial for their freedom." He went
171.	Indonesia Times, June 6, 1978.
172.	Ibid.
173.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 53.
174.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 184.
175.	Indonesia Times, June 6, 1978.
176.	Tempo, December 11, 1982, p. 12. On January 28, 1981, the two
judges were suspended by the minister of justice, Mudjono. Soon
afterwards Loedoe, whom the article described as a man known for his
activity in bribery, was sentenced to a one-and-a-half-year prison
term. Sumadiyono, the chairman of the Central Jakarta State Court,
however, was only placed under house arrest.
177.	Pelita/Kompas/Merdeka (U.S.E.), May 31, 1981. See also Lewis,
"Trial of Sawito," p. 51.
178.	Pelita/Kompas/Merdeka (U.S.E.), May 31, 1981.88
on to reinforce the demands of the other lawyers by calling for Sawito's
acquittal on all charges.179
At the next session the prosecutor quickly answered the pleidooi
of the defense team and Sawito, claiming that they contained many use-
ful confessions of guilt.180 He said that Sawito's admitted role in the
creation of the documents and his taking part in the Mega Mendung
meetings proved that he was certainly planning to replace the Presi-
dent. 181 The prosecutor said that, if there did indeed exist a plan for
a "preservation channel," as Sawito had described, then the case for
the prosecution was strengthened rather than diminished.182 Sawito's
arguments that certain documents were null and void he rejected on the
grounds that this point had been raised only at the end of the trial.183
Mapigau stuck to his demand for a twenty-year sentence.181+
The defense and the defendant were given opportunities in the
following two hearings to present their duplik or rejoinders (respond-
ing to the prosecutor's answer to their pleidooi). Although these were
lengthy speeches, few new points seem to have been raised.
At the final session of the trial, on July 8, 1978, Judge Sumadiyono
sentenced Sawito to eight years in jail, pronouncing that he had been
proven guilty of all the charges originally laid against him. The fact
that this was Sawito's first offense was apparently instrumental in miti-
gating his sentence. Upon hearing the verdict, Sawito, still as calm
and immaculately tailored as ever, announced, "I cannot accept the
decision and therefore I would appeal to a higher court." 185 And appeal
he did, but it was not for another four years that he was to return to
the national spotlight.186
179.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 185.
180.	Ibid., p. 189.
181.	Ibid., p. 190.
182.	Surabaya Post, June 28, 1978.
183.	Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 189.
184.	Ibid., p. 190.
185.	Far Eastern Economic Review, July 28, 1978, p. 5.
186.	Sawito's appeal to the High Court took place during late 1982. His
defense speech or Memori Banding, entitled Pancasila Menggugat, was
even longer than Hati Nurani Menuntut and contained much new material,
but little of direct relevance to the events of 1976. The High Court
judges reduced Sawito's sentence, without giving any clear reason, to
seven years. In February 1983 a new appeal was launched at the level
of Kasasi (appealing against the decision of the High Court), but no
concessions were made. Due to a recent change in the Procedural Code
(from HIR to KUHAP—Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana),
Sawito was permitted a final appeal in May 1983 (see Kompas, May 4,
1983), but this also failed. Yap Thiam Hiem remained Sawito's (unpaid)
defense counsel throughout. Sawito was released from Nirbaya prison
on September 20, 1983.CHAPTER FIVE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT REACTION
Both when the Sawito affair was first announced and throughout
the trial, questions arose concerning the strangely harsh and incon-
sistent behavior of the Indonesian government. In this chapter I
address two broad problems which require some clarification. My first
concern is to explore why the authorities handled the initial stages of
the affair in the way they did, looking in particular at why they may
have felt threatened. Secondly I will examine a number of questions
surrounding Sawito's trial and probe the possibility that it may have
been manipulated by some third party, as the defense suggested.
The arguments in this chapter draw mainly on the testimonies of
witnesses, lawyers, and Sawito himself. Although the picture which
emerges from these sources is a little blurred, it is coherent enough in
general to provide a basis for analysis.
Why did the government initially think it necessary to react to the
documents? The principal reason they reacted, I believe, was because
the documents threatened to undermine the regime's legitimizing ideol-
ogy. In the document "Towards Salvation," representatives of all the
primary religions in Indonesia1 and Mohammad Hatta endorsed the claim
that the Suharto government's development program had brought about
an "obvious deterioration in the standard of human dignity," and that
it had imperiled the "very unity of the society and the process of
National development," as well as "throttling . . . the sovereignty of
law."2 What is more, they called on "elder statesmen, spiritual leaders,
intellectuals, those who . . . desire a free, united, just, and prosper-
ous society" to contribute to a "General Restoration."3
1.	The qualification should be made here that, although the signatories
of "Towards Salvation" may have appeared to speak for Indonesia's en-
tire religious community, they in fact did not. Hamka, for instance,
could only claim to represent the urban santri community. Sukanto's
SKK certainly does not speak for the range of mystical groups, even
within Java, and it is doubtful whether MAWI and DCI's editorial lines
reflect the total spectrum of Christian opinion.
2.	See above, ch. 2, pp. 23-24. Development, law, and social unity
were recurrent themes of New Order ideology.
3.	Exactly what is meant by a "general restoration" (penyelamaton
umum) is unclear. The important point is that the signatories appeared
to be urging people to oppose the government.
8990
It is important to realize that between them these figures command-
ed considerable moral authority in urban Indonesian society. Within
the framework of the government's corporatist ideology, a system in
which legitimation is derived from the appearance of consensus among
representatives of various social interest groups, the religious figures
played a key role. The government, therefore, was keenly aware of
the destructive potential of "Towards Salvation." It not only threat-
ened to deprive the regime of much needed legitimation, but could, if
taken in conjunction with the other more strongly worded documents,
have been seen by a susceptible audience of Moslems, Christians, and
mystics alike as a cue to further protests and, conceivably, civil
disobedience. h
There is no reason to believe that the authorities had an accurate
idea of how widely the documents had spread or whether they were the
only ones in circulation. There was always the danger, too, that they
would be published. 4 5 The government reacted, it would seem, on the
assumption that the documents had been disseminated widely, or at
least that rumors of them had spread.6
The government's options were limited. If they had ignored the
documents, or denied their validity without specifying what they were
4.	The argument here is similar to that of Stange, "Interpreting Java-
nese Millenial Imagery," pp. 16-17. Stange, however, sees the impor-
tance of elite consensus more in terms of the mindset associated with
political organization in traditional Javanese kingdoms, i.e., the idea
that a lack of consensus among the elite was taken as a sign that the
leader no longer enjoyed the wahyu. I am suggesting that of more
importance here is the corporatization of politics after the demise of
the parties. The "defectors" undermined the government's claim to
speak for all interests previously represented by parties, and thereby
threatened the government's hold over those groups who put their
trust in the individual defectors.
5.	Sawito was charged in the trial with having planned to have "To-
wards Salvation" printed in Mawas Diri (see Hati Nurani, p. 247).
Sawito was inconsistent on this point. In an early draft of his pleidooi,
he said he had not disseminated the documents "because there wasn't a
single daily paper which was prepared to print them" (page 7 of sten-
ciled typescript, wrongly entitled "Eksepsi Sawito" [published by Ban-
dung Institute of Technology], and actually an excerpt from an early
draft of Hati Nurani Menuntut). In the final draft, Sawito declared
that, apart from "Welcoming a Just Government in Indonesia," which
Darmadi had tried to have published in the newspaper Merdeka, he had
no intention of publishing any of the documents. He went on to admit
that Sukanto might have intended to print "Towards Salvation" in the
SKK's monthly, Bulanan SKK. (See Hati Nurani, p. 247.)
6.	It was reported in the Government Announcement (Pengumuman
Pemerintah, p. 6) that, while Sudharmono said it was not known
whether the documents had been disseminated, Yoga Sugama claimed
they had been spread far and wide.91
denying, the public would have believed the rumors and received the
impression that the authorities were trying to cover up the issue.7
This would have amounted to an admission that Hatta had in fact re-
quested Suharto to resign and that the government no longer enjoyed
the confidence of organized religion. Direct and public action may have
been the only way for the authorities to defuse the criticisms without
appearing weak. The government, I believe, had to expose the docu-
ments in order to "demonstrate their fraudulence" and neutralize the
potency of the criticism they contained. Clearly the regime would not
have publicized the documents had they not also been able to publish
concurrently certified retractions.
There was a second reason for the government to make a big issue
of the documents. The authorities, I believe, wanted to whip up an
atmosphere of alarm, in which a few arrests and "tidying up" would
seem not only justified but necessary. In the turmoil, created ostensi-
bly by an attempt to overthrow the government, the authorities were
more easily able to strike at those people who had not signed any of
the documents but about whom ultimately, they were just as worried,
such as Ishak Juarsa, Drs. Singgih, Bujonegoro, and Domo Pranoto.
Names had only to be linked with the "plot" to justify arrests.8
Others, however, were beyond arrest. As De Gaulle could not
imprison Jean Paul Sartre over his theoretically illegal expressions of
solidarity with the Algerian liberation forces, Suharto could not lock
away Hatta and the other "untouchable" signatories. Neither could he
pay them off, co-opt them, or send them to overseas postings as he
had done with so many elite malcontents in the past. The only weapon
available for the occasion was character defamation. By arranging for
the signatories to issue statements claiming that they "had not read
the documents properly," the government managed both to preserve its
own image and in a nimble way discredit the signatories. 9 While they
7.	We need only remember the government's handling of the "Petition
of 50" in May 1980. In that instance the government issued a denial
without clarifying what exactly they were denying. As a consequence,
considerable suspicion was generated in society and the government's
credibility suffered.
8.	It may seem odd to some that the government felt it necessary to
justify its arrests. The Suharto government, however, has usually
seen the need to give some reasons for its (non-"purge") arrests of
well-known figures. Southwood and Flanagan (Indonesia: Law, esp.
ch. 6) provide an excellent analysis of the propaganda/legitimation
value of such shows of "legality."
9.	According to a reliable Indonesian source, government agents vis-
ited each of the signatories of "Towards Salvation" at their houses and
ordered them to write retraction statements in the form of letters
addressed to the President. It is interesting to note that it took three
statements by Hatta before the government was satisfied with the re-
sponse. The first of his letters, dated September 16, 1976, revealed92
were officially freed from the "stigma" of being involved, they were on
another level being made to appear either as halfwits for having signed
documents which they had not read, or cowards for pulling out when
they sensed danger. 10
Sawito, however, was the real victim of character assassination.
In that he was unknown to the public he was a relatively easy target.
The process was begun when the government, in its announcement,
strongly implied that Sawito was a trickster. It was he who was held
to blame for "deceiving" the prominent figures into signing "Towards
Salvation." On the day of the announcement it was reported that he
was a follower of kebatinan.11 These two themes dominated the press
coverage of Sawito, each becoming more elaborate until, by the time of
the trial, the image was of an arrogant and ambitious braggart who was
willing to manipulate anyone in his quest for the Presidency.12
that he had been visited the previous day by both Adam Malik and Emil
Salim, who brought copies of the documents bearing his signature.
Hatta went on to say that he had signed the documents "because they
defended the Pancasila . . . with the semangat [vital spirit] of kebati-
nan. ..." A letter he wrote the following day showed more remorse.
On the 20th he wrote a letter which pleased the authorities, saying that
he had been "told by Sawito that the documents defended the Pancasila,"
and that he "had not read them carefully." (Three letters from Moham-
mad Hatta to President Suharto dated September 16, 17, and 20, 1976,
in my possession.) On December 1, 1976 Hatta was visited at home by
Sudharmono, Ali Said, and Emil Salim. After the meeting he was pre-
sented with a list of questions inquiring into his relationship with
Sawito, Mr. Iskak, Juarsa, and Drs. Singgih. Sri Edi Swasono [Hatta's
son-in-law], "Bung Hatta Tokohku, Bung Hatta Mertuaku," in Bung
Hatta: Pribadinya Dalam Kenangan, ed. Meutia Farida Swasono (Jakarta:
Penerbit Sinar Harapan/Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1981), p. 95.
10.	The government seems to have deliberately fostered these images.
It was often implied that Hatta's old age had made him senile. See for
instance Lien Bian Kie's comment in O'Rourke, "Between Dreams and
Reality," p. 53, or Tempo, October 2, 1976, p. 5, where Hatta is por-
trayed as decrepit and easily fooled. Contrast these reports with Sinar
Harapan, August 12, 1976 (U.S.E.) and Kompas, August 13, 1977 de-
scribing Hatta on his 74th and 75th birthdays respectively. On both
occasions Hatta is depicted as perspicacious and "with the habit of cal-
culating the cost of every endeavor." Several Indonesian informants
told me that the signatories were perceived as faint-hearted when they
issued their retractions.
11.	Merdeka, September 23, 1976. The juxtaposition of these claims
served to invoke a strong smell of charlatanry.
12.	It is not being suggested that the Indonesian press deliberately
invented lies about Sawito. Rather, there seemed to be a campaign to
emphasize and exaggerate those aspects of his life and character which
confirmed the image required by the government. The (government-93
This campaign was continued in court. One of the prosecutor's
charges, it will be recalled, was that Sawito had managed by mystical
means to dupe the religious figures and Hatta into signing the docu-
ments. Witness Gunawan revealed convincing evidence of officially
sanctioned libel when, as mentioned above, he told the court that he
had been threatened with jail if he did not portray Sawito as a psy-
chotic and a megalomaniac. 13 The most probable explanation for the
prosecution's determination to indict Sawito is that they wanted it to
seem more feasible that the whole affair was brought about by Sawito
and his manipulation of others. Thus the government-coined term
"Peristiwa Sawito," the Sawito Affair.
In drawing attention to the documents and the way in which the
government acted to defuse the threat they posed to the legitimacy of
the regime, we should not overlook the possibility that there existed
other less public reasons for the reaction. Several reports indicate
that President Suharto was deeply angered and disturbed by the issue.lif
Some observers have explained this by referring to the Javanese
mystical tradition and linking Suharto's anger to the claim that
he [Suharto], and many of those around him (as well as others
who might seriously attempt to replace him) are seekers of mys-
tical truth through meditation and the interpretation of spiritual
signs.15
The prominent Indonesian historian Ong Hok Ham supports this idea.16
The principle involved, outlined above in the introduction, was that
Suharto, to retain the Presidency, must enjoy cosmic assent. Several
of the kejawen-oriented generals surrounding Suharto are said to be-
lieve that changes in the cosmic power balance will be presaged by
pralambang, portents accessible to mystically attuned minds. A few of
these people practice meditation themselves, while others rely on their
contacts with established mystics to keep themselves informed.
Suharto's commitment to traditional Javanese spiritual practices
and beliefs is well known. He has frequently visited the caves at the
Dieng Plateau and at Srandil, both associated with the spirit of Semar.
He is also known to rely, at least in part, on the advice of a group of
gurus in his day-to-day decision making. Stange writes that Romo
provided) photograph, used in the media showed Sawito looking like a
stealthy assassin with black holes where his eyes belonged. The un-
fairness was underlined by the fact that, being in prison, Sawito had
no chance to answer back.
13.	Pelita, December 20, 1977.
14.	See for example David Jenkins, "The Man Who Would Be King,"
FEERf November 18, 1977, p. 40, and Liddle, "Indonesia 1976," p. 104.
15.	See Liddle, "Indonesia 1976," or, for a similar interpretation,
Grant, "Indonesia 1978," p. 144.
16.	Personal communication.94
Sudiyat, a prominent guru within the cult family Suharto belongs to,
stated that Suharto had assigned him to find the Kembang Wijoyokusuma,
a blossom which, according to old court traditions, a new ruler needed
as an indication that his rule was aligned to cosmic will.17 Several well-
placed Indonesian sources have confirmed Suharto's strong concern
with the symbols and attributes of cosmologically defined legitimacy.18
If these accounts are correct, and if Suharto's "courtiers" are also as
involved with these concerns as has been alleged, it would not seem
unreasonable that the reports of Sawito's wahyu and his association
with leaders of the Javanese spirit kingdoms (especially Semar) would
have had some reverberations in the President's circle.
Any conclusions based on such a theory, however, would have to
be highly speculative. Less metaphysical explanations exist, I believe,
for why Suharto may have seen the affair as a threat to his authority.
The issue which deserves consideration here is the fragility of Presi-
dent Suharto's political position and the extent to which he has, so to
speak, painted himself into a corner.
The system of authority in Indonesia is extremely personal and
"upwards orientated."19 Suharto has presided over, and to some ex-
tent created, a state in which virtually all institutions are controlled
from the center via a system of appointments. This "dependency" has
been evident in Parliament, the military hierarchy, the provincial ad-
ministration networks, and, to a slightly lesser degree, in the political
parties. At the highest levels, Suharto has held a number of competing
political/military/economic factions in approximate check with favors
17.	Stange, "Interpreting Javanese Millenial Imagery," p. 12.
18.	Confidential interview sources. There is an interesting story that
in 1975, a renowned mystic near Klaten, Central Java, named Ki Kere
Suwito Siji, sent Suharto a letter advising him that he no longer en-
joyed a divine mandate and that he should step down. Ki Kere (or Ki
Sapda), thought by many to be a personification of Semar, was imme-
diately arrested. From prison he ordered some of his followers to
"retrieve" one of Suharto's most potent and vital pusaka, the keris
Kyai Brojol. The keeper of Suharto's keris, a certain Ki Klantung,
recognizing the god-like authority of Ki Sapda, surrendered the keris
to his envoys. Only after the pleas from Suharto's trustee Ki Klantung
did Ki Sapda the following day grant an extension to the President's
term of office. After this incident, Ki Klantung and three of Ki Sapda's
disciples proceeded to Jakarta, where they slept the night at the Presi-
dent's residence, Cendana.
That Ki Sapda is taken seriously is suggested by the fact that
since that time, he has received several very valuable gifts from prom-
inent political contestants in Jakarta.
19.	The present tense is used here and in the following paragraphs
because I am referring to structural conditions which characterized the
Suharto regime both in the 1970s and at the time of writing.95
and disincentives. Most of the generals heading these factions origi-
nally rose to their positions through personal friendships with the
President and a disproportionate number of them have ties with
Suharto's own Diponegoro division.20 These faction heads have main-
tained their own mutually exclusive hierarchies, which have tended to
align themselves with certain policies and economic interests.
It is widely held that Suharto's successor will need to be Javanese
and command support in more than a single faction of the armed forces.
The President has so far ensured that no prospective replacement has
been able to emerge, and indeed has created conditions making it very
unlikely for such a man to emerge. 21 Given this situation, the ques-
tion arises as to how Suharto's successor will secure a foothold without
there first being considerable interfactional rivalry, and second a re-
organization of virtually the whole administrative structure, at least in
terms of personnel. Any succession is likely to be followed by several
months of turbulence and realignment, a situation which Suharto and
the economic interests backing him must be anxious to avoid.
A more immediate anxiety for the President, however, may be more
personal. Since 1965 there have been allegations of Suharto's complicity
in the Untung coup attempt of September 30. 22 Such suspicions were
fanned in early May 1978 when Suharto's ex-comrade Colonel Latief,
the "number two" man in the coup, was brought to trial. Latief claimed
20.	I am thinking in particular of generals such as Amir Machmud,
Yoga Sugama, Sudharmono, Alamsyah, Sujono Humardani, and AM Mur-
topo, all of whom remained close to the center of power after the rise
of the New Order.
21.	Suharto's Vice-Presidents have either been nonmilitary (Sultan
Hamengkubuwono) and/or non-Javanese (Adam Malik and Umar Wira-
hadikusuma). Key positions, such as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces and head of Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve), have either
been filled with non-Javanese generals or rotated rapidly. "Current
Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia, 29 (April 1980), pp.
158-62.
22.	In Sawito's appeal entitled Pancasila Menggugat (read August 31,
1981 at the Jakarta High Court) is the sentence, "At the time [ 1965]
there were various questions which circulated in limited circles in
hush-hush ways" (p. 175). W. F. Wertheim discussed the suspicions
in his article "Suharto and the Untung Coup: The Missing Link,"
Journal of Contemporary Asia [hereafter JCA ], 1, 2 ( 1970): 50 ff.
See also "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed," Documents
section, JCA, 9, 2 (1979): 248, which states "it had . . . attracted
the attention of several observers that Suharto was not on the list of
generals who were to be kidnapped; still more remarkable was the fact
that, in contrast with the other strategic buildings around Merdeka
square, the grounds of Kostrad ... of which General Suharto was at
that time commander, had not been occupied by Untung's units."96
that he had informed Suharto of the plan to abduct the generals, and
that Suharto had approved of the plans. He said that Suharto had
used his foreknowledge to take personal advantage of the situation.23
While Professor Wertheim had raised this matter in print in 1970,
after Latief's trial it reemerged as a topic for discussion, both in
Western academic works by Wertheim and others and within Indonesia.24
At least one man, Latief's defense counsel Soenardi, took the bold
step of openly accusing Suharto of involvement in the coup. 25 Given
23.	"The Latief Case," p. 249. Latief said he called on Suharto at a
hospital where he was visiting his son on the night of the coup to tell
him of the plan to abduct the generals and to appeal for support. Com-
pare Latief's account of this meeting with Suharto (quoted in ibid., p.
249) with Suharto's own account in an interview in Arnold Brackman,
The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1969), p.
100. Here Suharto claimed that Latief wanted to "check on him." Latief
cited a contradictory account given by Suharto in an interview in Der
Spiegel (No. 27 [ 1970], p. 98), where Suharto claimed that Latief came
to the hospital to murder him. ("The Latief Case," p. 249.) Suharto
was called as a witness "a de charge" by Latief during his 1978 military
trial but did not appear.
24.	See Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup": W. F. Wertheim,
"Suharto and the Latief Trial—A Painful Revelation," Tapol Bulletin,
29 (August 1978); and idem, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965
Events," JCA, 9, 2 (1979). Extracts of Latief's eksepsi can be found
in "The Latief Case," and extensive reference to the details of the
night of September 30, 1965, based on Latief's account, in Sawito,
Pancasila Menggugat, pp. 174-80. For evidence that others in Indone-
sia apart from Latief and Sawito have discussed this matter, see docu-
ments printed in a 1981 copy of Berita Tan pa Sensor ("Uncensored
News," a Holland-based periodical which specialized in publicizing
"underground" Indonesian documents); "Fakta-Fakta Bicara"; and
"Peranan Presiden Soeharto dalam Peristiwa G.30.S." I also have in
my possession a document entitled "Kedudukan Soeharto Selaku Presi-
den R.l. Adalah Tidak Sah" [Suharto's Presidency of the Republic of
Indonesia is Illegitimate], dated July 1983 and another entitled "Perge-
seran Kekuasaan—Fakta Fakta Terbius" [The Power Shuffle—The Dis-
torted Facts]. The last of these documents, interesting because it
does not seem to be based on Latief's evidence yet arrives at the same
conclusions, comes from a group calling themselves Sandi Yudha Indo-
nesia (probably a deliberate allusion to Kopassandha [Komando Pasukan
Sandi Yudha] or RPKAD). See also the note below.
25.	In a document sent to provincial governors, military territorial
commanders, regional defense commanders, commanders of the army,
navy, air force, and police, leaders of parliamentary factions, and the
chairman and vice-chairman of Parliament, and which circulated among
youths, students, mass organizations, and prominent figures in society,
the Sukarnoist lawyer Soenardi S.H. quoted liberally from a very de-
tailed section of Sawito's Pancasila Menggugat which charged that97
that Suharto's claim to legitimacy rests in part on his image as the man
who smashed the coup and "saved Indonesia from the Communists/'
Latief's charges were, and still are, very damaging and remain sup-
pressed.26 The charge of implication in G/30/S/PKI, or the coup
attempt, has been a standard "legal" weapon used by the New Order
in prosecuting and persecuting its enemies.
The primary reason that New Order generals have not openly used
this "revelation" against Suharto is that they benefit from his patron-
age, and, given the delicacy of the balance between the factions, they
know that any assault on the Presidency would be messy and protract-
ed. The same conjunction of economic interests and political disincen-
tives ensures that other accusations against Suharto27 never became
formal charges. The Presidency is the mechanism which has allowed
Suharto to build up a massive business empire and shielded him from
formal accusations of wrongdoing. Were he to lose his position, this
mechanism would of course vanish and he would almost certainly be
unable to retain control of this financial empire. 28 Suharto's successor,
even if hand-picked, would not necessarily be able to protect the un-
seated President from charges that might well be leveled against him
by his political opponents. There is, then, reason to believe that the
safety of the President and probably that of his family and closest
supporters as well, is guaranteed only for as long as Suharto retains
power. He is most unlikely to surrender the Presidency voluntarily,
Suharto had secretly called his troops to Jakarta in a state of "front
line" combat readiness on September 21, 1965 in order to smash a coup
against Sukarno which was being prepared by a council of generals.
(Soenardi document 079/SND/AD/XIl/1981 dated December 10, 1981.)
In a second document (015/SND/AD/IV/1982 dated April 10, 1982),
sent to the same people, Soenardi stated himself that Suharto was in-
volved in the September 30/PKI movement. Soenardi was arrested on
the basis of these documents and charged with insulting the President.
26.	The government's hurried release in 1978 of a "White Book" on
the events of 1965 suggests that it was sincerely worried about Latief's
claims. "The Latief Case," p. 250. (The "White Book," it should be
noted, was actually prepared some time before 1974 when Sumitro was
Kopkamtib chief, but was suppressed because it contained things that
were sensitive. The "White Book" released in 1978 was probably a
sanitized version of the earlier report.) The February 19, 1982 raid
on AN Sadikin's Jakarta office by security agents in pursuit of (among
other things) one of Soenardi's documents regarding Suharto also
seems to indicate the government's serious concern about this matter
(AFP Telex, February 19, 1982).
27.	See above, ch. 4, nn. 3 and 71; and n. 32 below.
28.	Robison, "Towards a Class Analysis," analyzes the ways in which
military-bureaucratic business empires are built in Indonesia. He
shows the close relationship between political power and the ability to
accrue and maintain wealth.98
and it is understandable that he is extremely sensitive to any serious
suggestion that he do so. 29
With this in mind, we should now return to General Domo Pranoto.
Sawito's tale of the split between Suharto and Domo Pranoto and the
subsequent birth of the "preservation channel" idea was recounted in
the previous chapter. Domo Pranoto's confidant, Bujonegoro, support-
ed most of Sawito's points when he gave evidence in January 1978. 30
Sawito's counsel for the appeal, Soenardi, also lent credence to his
account when in 1981 he stated in an open letter to government leaders
that the initiative for the actions by Hatta and Sawito had come from
Domo Pranoto.31 If he did not believe this to be true, Soenardi surely
would not have placed his career in pointless jeopardy by inventing it.
Finally, we see that Domo had in fact been interrogated and that re-
ports of this were severely restricted.
Taken together, although they do not prove anything conclusively,
these factors certainly indicate the likelihood that some plan existed
similar to the one outlined by Sawito in his defense—one designed to
offset the dangers inherent in the fragility of Suharto's rule by making
provisions for a transfer of power. They also suggest that the man
most frequently named as its architect, vice chairman of the MPR/DPR
Domo Pranoto, played a role in encouraging the production of at least
one of the documents.
President Suharto, beneath his calm exterior, may well feel inse-
cure, revealing this in the extreme sensitivity to personal criticism he
has displayed in the past. The "Sawito affair," it seems, preyed on
Suharto's anxieties from three separate but related directions. If Domo
Pranoto, by most accounts a close confidant of Suharto's, was in fact
scheming behind the President's back, Suharto would probably have
regarded the plan as a danger to his authority, even if it were not
29.	Suharto rarely shows emotion in public. In the cases where he
has, it has usually been in response to criticism of himself or his family.
Suharto first exhibited his sensitivity when he angrily defended his
wife's "Indonesia Mini" project. On another occasion he reacted strong-
ly when the magazine Pop printed an unauthorized (and spurious) ver-
sion of his family tree. (McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 9, 235-
36.) Yet another instance occurred after rumors circulated that he
had an actress as a mistress. Suharto accused the purveyors of these
rumors of wanting to topple him from power. A Jakarta newspaper
called this puzzling reaction "thunder and lightning out of a clear sky."
(Report from Asia, April 20, 1980, ABC Broadcast, transcribed in
Indonesian News Selections, June 1980.)
30.	See Kompas, February 7, 1978, Sumi Narto, Sawito, pp. 121-22,
and Pos Kota, January 24, 1978.
31.	Soenardi document, December 10, 1981. He stated ". . . R.
Sawito Kartowibowo's group, led by Hatta and on the initiative of Police
Major [sic] Domo Pranoto, undertook a 'general preservation' of the
President's group, the President and his family."99
intended as such. The fact that Domo Pranoto was interrogated in
connection with the affair, and his associate Dadi Bujonegoro impris-
oned for six years without trial, suggests this was the case.
A second threat, either real or imagined, came, I believe, from the
individual members of the Mega Mendung group, and those associated
with them. General Hugeng, and possibly Ishak Juarsa, had evidence
of smuggling activities which could be used against Suharto at any
time.32 Hatta was in a similar position. In 1969 he had agreed to par-
ticipate as an advisor to a face-saving "anti-corruption" body, Komisi
Empat. 33 It is well documented that this body unearthed details of
massive corruption in high places, and that its full list of recommenda-
tions was never officially released.3£f According to Sawito, Hatta had
32.	Prosecution witness Mangunradji testified in court that at a meet-
ing, General Hugeng had told Darmoyuwono that the smuggling opera-
tion he uncovered at Tanjung Priok in 1971 was sponsored by Tien
Suharto. (Indonesia Times, January 3, 1978.) For a report on the
discovery and Hugeng's dismissal from office four days afterwards, see
Kompas, September 10 and 15, 1971, cited in Crouch, Army and Poli-
tics, p. 292.
The evidence on Juarsa comes from Sawito. He wrote: "we were
startled when . . . Ishak Juarsa stressed to us that at the time of his
administration as Panglima Kodam 'Iskander Muda1 [commander of the
Aceh military region], he caught a smuggling ship in action. It became
clear, after an examination, that the smuggling was sponsored by the
New Order leader President Suharto . . . Juarsa withheld the informa-
tion about the smuggling. . . . The evidence had included the name of
the smuggler, the ship's name, the articles smuggled, the loss to the
state, [and] the name of the Head of Police . . . who was in charge of
the smuggling case. . . . Juarsa still has that information." Hati
Nurani, pp. 158-59.
Imran, the Moslem hijacker, made a similar claim during his trial
in 1982. Paraphrasing Ishak Juarsa, he said:
Even in the days of the establishment of the New Order, when
the people were in the midst of clamoring to oppose Sukarno's
Old Order and corruption in the Motherland . . . Suharto was
involved in ... a smuggling case which I uncovered in Aceh.
Later [Suharto] called me to Jakarta . . . and requested that I
shelve the case. ... I asked to be moved and was sent to be-
come Panglima Kodam IV Sriwijaya [commander of the South Suma-
tra military region]. . . . There [I found] Suharto to be involved
in the same deviations as he had been in [Aceh],
The Pleidooi of Imran bin Moh. Zein, pp. 40-41.
33.	Komisi Empat or the "Commission of Four" was set up in direct re-
sponse to the student demonstrations of 1970. Several of the corpora-
tions it found fault with, including Bulog, Pertamina, and C. V. Warin-
gin were not investigated. Crouch, Army and Politics, pp. 296-98.
34.	Ibid., pp. 297-98.100
told him that, in the course of investigations into Pertamina, it had been
discovered that the Suharto family profited from rakeoffs. To Hatta's
request for a full-scale inquiry, Suharto had reportedly responded
that this could proceed so long as it did not name members of his fam-
ily. 35 Regardless of the truth of Sawito's story, Hatta, in this capac-
ity or in his role as a Presidential advisor, 36 is highly likely to have
had access to information embarrassing to Suharto.
So it seems that Suharto was in debt to at least some figures asso-
ciated with the Mega Mendung group, and their commitment to action
probably worried him. The interrogation of Mr. Iskak and the intern-
ment, without explanation, of Mr. Sudjono, Drs. Singgih, and Ishak
Juarsa would seem to support this idea.
It is possible that Suharto was also worried by Sawito. In a 1981
document, Sawito has listed as one of the background factors to the
affair, Suharto's complicity in the 1965 Untung coup attempt. 37 Sawito's
passionate devotion to ensuring that "true justice" was upheld in Indo-
nesia, combined with his Sukarnoist ties and his easy acceptance into
a circle of very high-ranking critics of the government, were good
reason for Suharto to want Sawito out of circulation.
The third major reason for the strength of the government's reac-
tion to the affair concerned the documents themselves. As I have sug-
gested, the criticism and challenges they contained were damaging to
Suharto's authority and would have been more so had the government
not acted swiftly.
So while Sawito may have upset the authorities, he was by no means
their only cause for concern. By highlighting his person and claiming
that an attempt had been made to overthrow Suharto, the government
created a dust storm which served to obscure its real motives, which
were to castigate Domo Pranoto, dismantle the Mega Mendung group,
and negate the impact of the documents.
* * *
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Sawito affair was the
staging of the trial itself. Why was the decision made to try Sawito in
such a manner five months prior to the Presidential elections?
35.	Hati Nurani, pp. 166-67.
36.	Sawito wrote that it was to preserve the government's image in
the eyes of the people that Hatta accepted the job of "Penasihat Presi-
dent" or Presidential advisor (in 1969). Ibid., p. 209.
37.	Sawito Kartowibowo, Bagan Perkara Sawito [A Sketch of the Sawito
Case], a six-page typescript document appended to Pancasila Menggu-
gat, Sawito's 1981 appeal. It is possible this was written with hind-
sight, as no mention was made of the matter in Sawito's 1977-78 trial.101
The essential purpose of the trial was demonstrative. Ever since
the original announcement there had been considerable rumor monger-
ing and uncertainty over the actual character of the affair. 38 In
bringing Sawito into the spotlight, the government wanted to show the
public that he was the driving force behind the whole affair, and that
he was not supported by any elite civilian or military group, i.e., to
make it appear that Sawito was isolated in his opposition. In doing
this, the government also wanted to prove that he was not a Ratu Adil,
in order to prevent the spread of such rumors, particularly in Central
and East Java where messianic expectations and the influence of dukun
(sorcerers, folk healers) on the people are still powerful. 39
Secondly, by making an example of Sawito, the authorities were
warning not only those figures involved with him, but any other groups
which may have been engaged in unsponsored "antigovernment" activi-
ties. As Yap Thiam Hien (quoting a Chinese proverb) put it: "The way
to scare a monkey is to cut up a chicken in front of it."40
Furthermore, the government seems to have been stressing that
political appeals to religious groups were forbidden, 41 a warning in
line with the New Order's unofficial philosophy that religion and poli-
tics do not mix. Finally, the trial may have been designed to release
some of the rising pressure as elections approached. With the trial
pursuing its steady, albeit snail-like progress, the government may
have hoped that opponents of the regime would see their frustrations
being aired somewhere, even if only in the context of a subversion
trial.
More generally, a major aim of the trial was probably to restore
credibility to the Suharto administration. By carefully programming
38.	This was illustrated above in ch. 2. See also a letter to Tempo
(January 7, 1978, p. 3) in which considerable skepticism is expressed
about the official version of the affair.
39.	Interview with Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Ulf Sundhaussen ("Regime
Crisis in Indonesia," p. 817) raised a similar point, arguing that the
government's prosecution of Sawito was an attempt to "demonstrate its
power vis-3-vis the potentially enormously influential community of
dukuns ..." who, he noted, could cause trouble for Suharto if they
agreed that Sawito was correct in his interpretation that Suharto had
lost the wahyu. In personal correspondence (August 1982) he stressed
that this was the only reason the Sawito affair was resolved in the way
it was. It may seem odd that Sawito's arrest was not proof enough in
itself that he was not a Ratu Adil. Ong Hok Ham reported, however,
that there were rumors of chains spontaneously rattling, doors slam-
ming, etc., in the prison where Sawito was incarcerated after his
arrest. (Personal communication.)
40.	Personal communication.
41.	See Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," p. 53.102
witnesses, withholding important testimonies and articles of evidence,
as well as exerting pressure on the press, the authorities apparently
hoped to present a convincing trial which would serve to clear Suhar-
to's name and show that he was still in firm control. In addition, pub-
lic arrests in Indonesia are usually followed by the trial of at least some
of those arrested within a year, so, moderately sensitive to civil-rights
criticism from domestic and foreign sources, the government may well
have been anxious to clear the air with a "fair trial."1*2 Such a trial,
they may have reasoned, by its conduct and reporting would help
prove Indonesia's "democratic" nature. In a speech in December 1977
President Suharto actually stated that "differences of opinion heard in
recent times are a true indication that democracy in Indonesia is a
reality." 43
Many reports, however, conclude that the government's interests
were not well served by the trial. Journalist David Jenkins wrote:
"Some say the government has opened a Pandora's box in bringing
Sawito to trial." **** O'Rourke noted: "Many Indonesians to whom this
writer talked expressed their inability to understand why the govern-
ment proceeded with the trial of Sawito, particularly as the trial showed
up many of the government's great failings."1*5 This indeed remains
the most frequently identified puzzle of the Sawito affair. Yet it is a
problem only so long as the government is perceived as a unified force
rather than a constellation of competing factions. Many aspects of the
Sawito affair make more sense if we regard it as the product of a con-
flict of interests within the leadership. It is possible that an elite fac-
tion used the trial (and possibly even organized it) in order to have
anti-Suharto sentiments expressed in the period before the Presidential
elections. A number of factors, none of them conclusive but together
quite plausible, suggest the involvement of at least one "third party"
and possibly of others.
The first hint that Suharto was not fully in control of handling the
affair came before it was even announced. His claim that he had never
used his office for private gain appeared, in hindsight, very much like
a defensive action in anticipation of the announcement of the Sawito
affair the next day. The actual announcement, apart from disclosing
those parts of the documents which were most damaging to Suharto,
initiated a process in which Javanese mysticism or kebatinan was por-
trayed in a somewhat ridiculous or even sinister light. Given Suharto's
well-known personal commitment to promoting kebatinan, it would seem
42.	This was suggested by Max Lane (personal communication). It
was stressed in the Jakarta press that Sawito was to receive a "fair
trial" (English was used). See, for instance, Attorney General Ali
Said's comments reported in Titania, Sawito: Siapa, pp. 89-90.
43.	Indonesia Times, December 23, 1977.
44.	FEER, November 18, 1977, p. 38.
45.	O'Rourke, "Between Dreams and Reality," p. 59, n. 16.103
both out of character and politically inexpedient for him to have wanted
Sawito "exposed" in the way he was.1*6
The selection of witnesses was another occasion when apparent
conflicts of interest surfaced. Why, for instance, did contradictory
reports appear as to whether or not Hatta and the religious figures
would be heard? Presuming that the authorities had a reasonable
grasp of what was involved in the Sawito affair, they would have known
that, were Hatta allowed to speak freely in court, the prosecution's
case would be considerably weakened. If indeed it was seriously in-
tended that Hatta would appear, some group in the hierarchy must
have been eager to see Suharto criticized.
Another hint of third party intervention can be discerned in the
framing of the charges. Accusing Sawito of spreading false news (de-
spite the fact that this charge is not so rare) was paramount to inviting
him to prove publicly that the President had used his office to enrich
himself, broken his oath of office, and so on. Taken in conjunction
with the possibility that those who prepared the charges were aware of
46. The legal status of kebatinan improved markedly and with clear
official backing once the New Order had established itself in power.
An important threshold was crossed in 1973, when the government,
against strenuous Moslem opposition, succeeded in inserting a clause
into the Broad Outlines of State Policy elevating the standing of "be-
liefs" vis-a-vis "religion." (See McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p.
132. J. A. N. Mulder, Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary
Java [Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978], ch. 1, provides
a good overview of the growing influence of organized kebatinan.) The
government's support for kebatinan was motivated partly by its concern
to counterbalance politicized Islam and provide for a stricter supervi-
sion of nativist groups with messianic potential. But there is also
reason to believe that Suharto was interested in promoting it as a faith.
In 1973 he opened a congress of Subud, a well known spiritual organi-
zation, and was later to lend financial and moral support to a large
kebatinan conference (McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 132). A long
extemporaneous talk by Suharto in 1982 provided an insight into the
President's views on the subject. He argued at some length that the
"theories and esoteric arts" of the Javanese ancestors were the inspira-
tion not only of a way of life but of the ideological foundation of the
state itself, the Pancasila. The President said that, while some intel-
lectuals and modernists claimed the old arts were ilmu klenik (occultist),
this was incorrect. He went on to implore his audience to study the
teachings of the ancestors "in order to achieve our aims of freedom,
sovereignty, unity, and social justice." An informal talk given by
President Suharto to the Leadership Council of the Indonesian Youth
Committee (KNPI) on July 19, 1982. Extracts are printed in Mawas
Diri, 10 (October 1982): 4-8, and 11 (November 1982): 8-12. Because
of the sensitive nature of the talk, newspapers were forbidden to men-
tion it. (Mawas Diri received no suppression order.)104
the sensitive nature of the material Sawito was compiling for his de-
fense, tf7 this point could be important.
The delay in producing Ishak Juarsa, however, was perhaps the
strongest indication that conflicting interests were at work. Juarsa
was, potentially at least, one of the most "dangerous" witnesses, and
there was probably considerable concern in some quarters about his
appearing as a witness immediately prior to the opening of the MPR
session. It is quite possible that the prosecution were, as they said,
trying to have Juarsa testify on schedule, but that the military police
authorities holding him refused to allow him to give testimony until the
situation had quietened down. If there had not been a high level dis-
agreement over the issue, it is difficult to imagine why the government
would have purposely exposed itself to charges of clumsiness and in-
efficiency by repeatedly promising that Juarsa would be heard "at the
next session," and then adjourning it when he did not show up.
These cumulative "clues" led lawyer Nurbani Jusuf to declare in
her duplik that Sawito had been "victimized by power holders who
opposed Suharto" and, as has been mentioned, that the court was
being used by "hidden directors."1+8
Who can these "hidden directors" have been? Sawito persistently
mentioned Ali Said and Sudharmono in this context, contending that he
had been "stabbed in the back" by Ali Said. Apparently under the
impression that the attorney general and he were part of the same
struggle to oppose Suharto's lawbreaking, 49 he had told Ali Said about
the progress of the "preservation channel" plan initiated by Domo Pra-
noto. According to Sawito, Ali Said had, in return, assured him of
his support and told him about Suharto's "mistrust of his generals,"
and his corruption, and that charges had been drawn up against him.
47.	Sawito compiled his defense speeches while in detention at Rumah
Tahanan Militer (Jakarta's principal military prison) from material and
advice he received from visitors. It is quite possible that those respon-
sible for his detention knew about and made little attempt to discourage
his use of documents such as those listing Suharto's wealth.
48.	Lewis, "Trial of Sawito," pp. 51-52.
49.	Sawito wrote that the attorney general's office was disgusted by
the lawbreaking of top officials (Hati Nurani Menuntut, p. 278). It is
not impossible that Sawito believed Ali Said to be honest. Despite
heading a remarkably corrupt prosecution, and allegations that he
profited from rakeoffs from prosecutorial extortion, his public image
is relatively good. After the 1965 coup he was active in Sugih Arto's
anticorruption team and was among the first to draw attention to irreg-
ularities in several dozen enterprises, including Bulog and Pertamina.
(Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 296.) Yap Thiam Hien said he had re-
garded Ali Said as "with us" (moderate liberal intelligentsia) after the
coup. (Personal communication.)105
Once the plan was under way, i.e., once the documents had been pro-
duced and were about to be delivered to the President, AN Said and
Sudharmono stepped in to smash the "preservation channel" by pub-
licly exposing the documents, blaming Sawito for making them, and
portraying the affair as a "dark conspiracy to replace the Head of
State." Under the pretext of fighting subversion and holding a "fair
trial," they were actually attacking Suharto to advance their own cause.
Implicit in Sawito's description of the affair is a two-party conflict,
which, because of A11 Said's "betrayal," developed into a three-way
conflict. Bujonegoro's testimony supported the claim that a link existed
between Sawito and Domo Pranoto, and also that Sawito, through the
witness and later through Toto Minggu, had reported to Ali Said.
Bujonegoro's evidence, then, indicated that Sawito had believed a
community of interest (strategic or heartfelt) existed between Domo
Pranoto, Hatta, himself, and Ali Said against Suharto. If Sawito be-
lieved this before September 1976, he certainly did not afterwards.
The crackdown and the announcement showed Sawito that any faith he
may have had in Ali Said was misplaced. Sawito's arrest warrant was
signed by the attorney general himself.
But what of Sawito's claim that Ali Said and his colleague Sudhar-
mono made the announcement in order to have Suharto attacked? There
is little doubt that these two were responsible for the government
announcement, and it is also likely, as argued above, that Suharto did
not fully support it. A couple of comments made by President Suharto
appear to strengthen the thesis that the two generals were not acting
in accordance with his wishes. On December 29, 1976, in Palembang,
the President complained, "Negative and immoral actions such as cor-
ruption, abusing of power and overacting of government officials are
fomenting community unrest."50 Four days later in Jakarta, Suharto
referred again to "negative practices . . . aimed at undermining the
prestige of the government and the national leadership," and, with
reference to the Sawito affair, he cautioned that these should not be
exaggerated.51 Note also a remark made by Hatta. In a book pub-
lished after his death he was reported to have expressed his puzzle-
ment over why, after he had met with Suharto to explain what the
affair was about (and presumably hearing Suharto's views on it), Ali
Said and Sudharmono should have acted as they did.52
Though no particular incidents in the trial indicated that Ali Said
and Sudharmono were aiming to attack Suharto, as a whole it did bring
into the open certain allegations embarrassing to the President. Most
had been made before, but never had they been made so publicly and
been allotted such space in the media. 53 It is also interesting to note
50.	Indonesia Times, December 30, 1976 (emphasis added).
51.	Ibid., January 3, 1977.
52.	Hatta as recalled by his son-in-law Swasono, "Bung Hatta Tokohku,"
p. 94.
53.	The accusation that first lady, Tien Suharto, was involved in a106
that the Sawito trial was one of many political trials staged while Ali
Said was attorney general. The hearing of Col. Latief (early 1978)
and the series of student trials in early 1979 also publicized informa-
tion damaging to Suharto. (Although Ali Said in fact had no official
jurisdiction over the military courts which tried Latief, he probably
had considerable influence with them, as he had been a leading figure
in the Mahmillub or Special Military Tribunal before being appointed
attorney general.) Since his removal from the post of attorney general,
sensational trials have been far less frequent. 54
Lastly, if there was any intention to use the trial to sully Suharto's
name before the elections, Ali Said would have been well placed to de-
termine its timing, duration, and the nature of the charges to be
brought against Sawito. It seems unlikely, however, that Ali Said and
his friends could have staged the trial without Suharto giving his
acquiescence at some stage.
Before reaching any conclusions with regard to this matter we
should look a little more closely at Ali Said and Sudharmono and their
possible motives in becoming involved in the affair. Both attended the
Akademi Hukum Militer (Military Law Academy) in the 1950s, and each
has a solid background as military prosecutor. After the coup, Ali
Said became well-known as presiding judge of the military tribunal
which prosecuted leading figures of the Communist party and the
September 30 movement. He was also involved in Kopkamtib before
being appointed attorney general in 1972. 55 Sudharmono, regarded as
the most powerful figure among the graduates of the Military Law
Academy, was appointed cabinet secretary in 1966 and has continued
to hold posts close to Suharto. 56 Ali Said and Sudharmono, together
smuggling operation, for instance, had not been made in public and
printed in the papers before the Sawito trial. See The Indonesia News-
letter (Hong Kong), 98 (December 1977): 3.
54.	Herbert Feith has pointed this out (correspondence August 1,
1982).
55.	In the late 1950s while studying at the Military Law Academy, Ali
Said also served as military prosecutor in Denpasar. He was later made
head prosecutor for the whole of eastern Indonesia. From 1962 until
1966 he headed the Jakarta courts martial. The most famous figures he
tried after the coup at the Mahmillub were Dr. Subandrio (Sukarno's
foreign minister) and Nyono (an Indonesian Communist party politburo
member). See “The Fourth Development Cabinet," p. 42.
56.	Sudharmono graduated from the Military Law Academy in 1956,
four years before Ali Said. During the late 1950s and early 1960s he
held several senior positions, first in Peperpu (Nasution's Central Mar-
tial Law Administration) and later as a leading military prosecutor and
intelligence adviser. After becoming Suharto's cabinet secretary, he
was in 1967 appointed as one of the President's personal staff (SPRI).
He is regarded as one of the so-called "palace generals." Since the
late 1960s he has worked as a minister of state for the administration107
with their partisans Ismail Saleh and Mudjono, 57 are essentially bureau-
crats and have little claim to a political base of their own, either within
the army or in society at large. This is probably one reason why they
have been permitted to maintain positions of authority in the New Order
regime. Although some observers include this group among those most
close to Suharto, the extent of its influence in court politics is un-
clear. 58
These factors lead me to suspect that, if Sudharmono and AN Said
were in fact trying to make use of the trial, it is unlikely to have been
with the intention of doing Suharto any real harm, but rather to exert
"gentle pressure" on him. To what end? The Sudharmono group's
intention may well have been to extract financial or political concessions
from Suharto. If this were the case, the benefits of increased influence
or favor would not necessarily have been obvious to the observer. It
is possible, however, that the rewards were reaped more openly. It is
interesting to note that in October 1977 AN Said was promoted to the
rank of lieutenant general,59 though it is uncertain whether this was a
spinoff from the Sawito affair. If Sawito were correct in his claims
that Said was drawing up a list of charges to be used against Suharto,
it would be surprising to see the attorney general "punished" so lightly.
Many were surprised that Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani, two key
operators in the intelligence world, maintained such a low profile
throughout the Sawito affair. It is not often that where intrigue is
involved, AN Murtopo's name does not feature prominently, either in
the open or on the rumor circuit. But after implicating Generals Amir
Machmud, Surono, and Sudomo in the affair60 (probably little more than
petty feuding), AN Murtopo seemed little concerned with it. The arrests
and interrogations of Sawito's associates, however, were carried out by
a branch of Kopkamtib called Satuan Tugas Intelijen or Intelligence
Task Force. This body, thought to be responsible for much of the
and finance of nondepartmental state agencies, and minister of the state
secretariat. In the latter position he is known to have appointed many
of his own clique. See ibid, and a document entitled "Kelompok-
Kelompok di Sekitar Suharto" [Cliques around Suharto] by a group
called Asosiasi Pengamat Politik Indonesia. Published by Berita Tanpa
Sensor (early 1982), pp. 2-3.
57.	Ismail Saleh was then deputy cabinet secretary and assistant to
the state secretary (Sudharmono). Mudjono was minister of justice.
Both are graduates of the Military Law Academy. It should be noted
that nowhere are there any claims of a connection between this clique
and Domo Pranoto.
58.	The authors of "Kelompok" regard the Sudharmono group as the
faction closest to Suharto, on account of their authority to handle the
President's "tactical" or "nonbudgetary" funds. "Kelompok," p. 2.
59.	Indonesia Times, October 6, 1977.
60.	Pelita, October 1, 1976, and Merdeka, November 11, 1976.108
direct intimidation against dissident groups in Indonesia, was under
the command of Benny Murdani,61 who was a protege of AM Murtopo
and an important member of Opsus.62 Given the determined and thor-
ough nature of the crackdown against Sawito and the extent of Murtopo
influence at the time, he could well have had a hand in the pressure to
withhold witnesses and evidence from the court in order to shield
Suharto from criticism. His faction may well correspond to those "vil-
lainous army officers" referred to by Sawito, the group who were
trying to defend their "criminal interests" by having Suharto portrayed
as "clean, honest, just," etc. If this were so, Opsus could have been
using the court in some way as an arena in which to check the powers
of the Sudharmono group, one of their main political rivals at the time.
But it is probably an oversimplification of the power relations be-
tween various factions to propose that only two groups were involved.
Taking into account the smear campaign which followed the original
announcement of the affair, implicating virtually every political faction,
any number of byzantine interests could have been working at cross
purposes during the staging of the trial. This would be consistent
with a view of the Indonesian government as comprising a number of
competing and sometimes opposing factions.
Conversely, in a situation where political power is held by a num-
ber of factions whose interests are not coordinated, it is very difficult
to analyze the actions of "the government." The Sawito affair clearly
illustrates that in understanding governmental behavior the influence
of factional interests cannot be ignored.
61.	See Max Lane, "Climate of Fear: The Rise of General Benny Mur-
dani," Inside Indonesia [Melbourne], November 1983, p. 3. Benny
Murdani was also head of the Defense Ministry's intelligence apparatus
in the mid-1970s.
62.	See ibid, and "Kelompok," pp. 4-7. Opsus (Operasi Khusus,
Special Operations) is a "positive clandestine intelligence" task force
long directed by Murtopo. It played a leading role in the normalization
of relations with Malaysia, the annexation of Irian Jaya, the domestica-
tion of political parties, and the East Timor invasion. The group also
runs CSIS, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Its
business interests are well documented in Appendix B of Robison,
"Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State." In March 1983 Murdani, pro-
moted far above the head of Murtopo to the position of Commander of
the Armed Forces and head of Kopkamtib, became a political (and in-
creasingly an economic) force in his own right.CONCLUSION
INTERPRETING THE SAWITO AFFAIR
In this chapter I want to assess the Sawito affair in the context of
the broader Indonesian social and political scene. I will suggest that
it is best understood when set against the changes made in the political
structure since the rise of the New Order.
In the period from independence to the mid-1960s, it was relatively
easy to identify the conflicting groups in the Indonesian polity. Parties
existed which expounded their ideologies and articulated the class and
sectarian interests of communities within the society. The conspicuous
alignments between the dominant political parties and the major cultural
subgroups, especially in Java, led several scholars to approach the
analysis of political conflict with reference to the concept of a!iron
(social-cultural "streams" in society)1 or the idea of "primordial loyal-
ties." 2 Despite some success by the PKI in sowing the seeds of class
consciousness, vertical cleavages remained at least as pronounced as
horizontal ones.
1.	The first to systemize an approach to Indonesian politics and socie-
ty using the a!iron concept was Clifford Ceertz in The Religion of Java
(Glencoe, III. : Free Press, 1960). Strongly influenced by Max Weber's
"Social Psychology of the World Religions" (see H. Gerth and C. W.
Mills, eds., From Max Weber [New York: Oxford University Press,
1958]), Ceertz argued that virtually all social and political organization
in Java (and by extension, Indonesia) was conditioned by three social,
occupational, and culturally defined aliran, the sontri, the abongan,
and the priyayi. The santri he described as devoutly Moslem, largely
involved with trading and small commerce, and followers of the Nahdatul
Ulama or Masjumi parties. The abangan he characterized as the cul-
turally pre-lslamic majority who formed the bulk of the peasantry, and
who had broadly identified with the PKI and its mass organizations.
The priyayi were depicted as a philosophically oriented, aristocratic
officer class which had found expression in the PNI. Geertz's formula-
tion was a point of departure for such varied scholars as Jay, Siddique,
Peacock, Mortimer, and Tichelmar.
2.	Soedjatmoko argued that parties should be seen as "the political
representatives of cultural solidarity groups, which are tied together
by primordial loyalties of great intensity." (See Soedjatmoko, "Indo-
nesia: Problems and Opportunities," Australian Outlook, 21, 3 (Decem-
ber 1967): 275.
109no
With the entrenchment of the New Order and the concentration of
power into the hands of a small military elite, the ground rules of
political activity changed. Power, it was made clear, was something
to be granted from above, not recruited from below. 3 Ideology, or
more precisely any ideology which did not accord with the designs of
the military-technocratic elite, was not to interfere with the mission of
“accelerated modernization" and development. The emasculation of the
political parties meant that the barriers which had existed between
their respective support bases became less significant. So too did the
usefulness diminish of the "cultural" model as a framework for analysis.
The range of people who became involved in the Sawito affair hinted at
a new kind of polarization.
The briefest glance at the more prominent figures involved con-
firms their remarkable cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. No
less variegated were their past political affiliations. At least five of
those implicated, Drs. Singgih, Kama Radjasa, Sawito, Bujonegoro,
and Mr. Iskak, are regarded either as Sukarnoists or as PNI sympa-
thizers. The others had all been on the other side of the political
fence in the early days of the New Order. The Siliwangi General Ishak
Juarsa (and probably Domo Pranoto) were anti-party. Said Sukanto,
Simatupang, and Hugeng (and to a much lesser extent Hatta) had ties
with the Indonesian Socialist Party, a small, "Westernized" nonradical
party, banned by Sukarno in 1960. Hamka had been a leading member
of Muhammadiyah (a modernist Islamic organization linked with the
Masjumi/Parmusi parties) and Darmoyuwono was presumably affiliated
with Partai Katolik.
A major issue which needs to be addressed, then, is the way in
which the interests of these politically heterogeneous figures converged
But before dealing with this question, it is important to recall that the
maneuverings which preceded the affair were informal, and the degree
of involvement of the various characters is still far from certain. Inso-
far as the Sawito affair is seen as a simple expression of lack of confi-
dence in the Suharto administration, which on one level it was, then
all the religious figures who endorsed "Towards Salvation" should be
seen as key actors. But while their action was symbolically significant
and was probably the main reason for the government's reaction, they
were by no means at the center of events.
The "core" group, as became evident in the trial proceedings, con-
sisted of Hatta, Sawito, Sudjono, Juarsa, and Iskak. Other important
figures maintaining contact with the group, or individual members of
it, were Cardinal Darmoyuwono, Domo Pranoto, Singgih, Sukanto,
Bujonegoro, Hugeng, Kama Radjasa, and possibly a few others.
Several of these men had identified with, or in some cases were active
within, the left wing of the PNI, a political party subjected to severe
3. I am not suggesting that political advancement had not been linked
to Presidential favor under Guided Democracy, but rather emphasizing
that comparatively little depended on the mobilizational capacity of the
parties after the late 1960s.111
government repression early in the New Order. Well before the military
takeover this group had been at odds with, if not opposed to, that sec-
tion of the army typified by Suharto, and it was among its most signifi-
cant targets in the late 1960s. Opposition from these elements thus had
a clear historical basis. But what of the participation of those figures
who had been part of the structural alliance which supported the New
Order in its rise to power, such as Hatta, Darmoyuwono, General
Hugeng, and General Ishak Juarsa? They can hardly be seen as left-
wing sympathizers, and in the early years it would have been incon-
ceivable to find them all conspiring with Sukarnoist/PNI elements.
It is, I believe, a measure of their disenchantment that they should
have come to recognize in Suharto a common adversary. They had
originally lent him their support for a number of reasons, particularly
a shared belief that their interests, both ideological and material, would
be safeguarded. I have shown that these men, by the early 1970s,
had little to be thankful for. Their ideals of clean and constitutional
government had been seriously compromised by the regime, and they
themselves were excluded from positions of effective influence. Rather
than restricting themselves to criticizing the government's behavior
and policies, as most dissenting middle-class elements were accustomed
to do, they, as a group, appear to have been increasingly convinced
that the sorts of reforms they desired stood little chance of being im-
plemented without a change in the nation's leadership. This emerging
commitment facilitated the cooperation between the ex-New Order ele-
ments (referred to collectively these days as Orbala—Old New Order)
and the Sukarnoist/PN I figures. In their disaffection the former sup-
porters of the New Order not only bridged differences among them-
selves, but also found they were in harmony (insofar as their immediate
objectives were concerned at least) with representatives of a current of
dissent which had never sanctioned the rule of Suharto. 4
4. If the alliance being forged between ex-New Order elements and
Sukarnoists was a symptom of the frustration of politically marginalized
middle-class elements, it also reflected the gradual reemergence of
Sukarnoism in the political arena. In early 1978 the government decid-
ed officially to recognize the overthrown President as a national hero.
Ali Murtopo was in the forefront of the campaign, giving a cautiously
"pro-Sukarno" speech to a youth rally at Senayan (Pelita, February
28, 1978). In June, the first officially organized ceremony was held at
Sukarno's graveside, and portraits were for the first time made freely
available. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 249-50, and Merdeka,
May 27, 1978. Soon afterwards, a grand mausoleum was erected for his
body in Blitar. McDonald interpreted these moves as an attempt to
generate some popular support for the regime. It was also, however,
an attempt to accommodate resurgent (and nascent) Sukarnoists. On
"neo-Sukarnoism," see Feith, "Indonesian Student Movement," pp.
9-10, and an article entitled "Resurgence of Sukarnoism," from Frank-
furter Rundshau, July 28, 1978 (translated in Indonesia News Selections,
August 1978). See also Feith's discussion of the perceived need to112
It would be unrealistic, however, to regard all who participated
directly or indirectly in the Sawito affair as having as their common
goal Suharto's removal. Notwithstanding the grand objectives of the
"core" group, I believe it is useful and legitimate to interpret the
Sawito affair in one sense as a manifestation of the struggle for rule of
law in Indonesia. A central concern of the "Towards Salvation" docu-
ment signed by the religious leaders was to decry the weakness of the
"sovereignty of law," and, by implication, to demand its implementa-
tion. Two questions arise: why law, and why those people?
The lowest common denominator of all those involved in the affair
was their membership of a small and insecure urban middle class. The
tendency among this group, and in particular among those sections
which, in Lev's terms, are "disadvantaged by existing patterns of
political, economic and social regulation and [which] have begun to
regard old authoritative relationships in the state as morally bank-
rupt,"* * * * 5 has been to seek in law a means of gaining a semblance of
social and economic security. As Lev argues, demands for rule of law
have typically aimed at guaranteeing "security, personal rights and
liberties, and political participation via legal and constitutional routes
to change," as well as achieving procedural certainty and uniformity
in the economic realm.6
Lev identifies a number of sources of support for the idea of a
negara hukum, or "nation based on law," in Indonesia. Among the
most important of these are ethnic and religious minorities and political
out-groups. In particular, he stresses the importance attached to the
concept by the Catholic, Protestant, and urban modernist Islamic
groups. 7 The distinctions drawn between these elements, however,
are less significant than their common experiences, aspirations, and
interests. Despite the fact these groups have differing ideas about
the specific benefits to be derived from the establishment of a negara
hukum, it is a principle upon which many middle-class elements, disad-
vantaged in some way by the New Order, agree. These people all see
accommodate Sukarnoists, in an interview in Kompas, May 7, 1981
(U.S.E.). Many student boardinghouses and homes of lower middle-
class Indonesians I visited in 1981 prominently displayed large portraits
of Sukarno.
5.	Lev, "Judicial Authority," p. 39.
6.	I am emphasizing here the cross-cultural, sociological basis for the
demand for rule of law. If, however, we view it in Sawito's terms, the
call for a negara hukum or "nation based on law" takes on a much more
specific meaning—one which closely resembles ancient longings for a
Ratu Adil. (Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 165, have
drawn attention to the fusing of the two concepts.) Sawito wrote:
"The coming of the Negara Hukum, which we all look forward to, will
bring with it a NEW AMBIENCE or the NEW AGE which we crave and
covet." Hati Nurani, p. 46.
7.	Lev, "Judicial Authority," pp. 44-46.113
in it a promise of guarantees of increased political and economic partici-
pation, as well as regularization of legal, administrative, and constitu-
tional processes. The pattern of allegiance to the concept of the negara
hukum, referred to in chapter one as a loose "middle-class front," is
the context in which we should understand the consensus, in events
leading to the Sawito affair, between such figures as Hamka, Darmoyu-
wono, and Simatupang and those more closely involved with the main
group.8
One important question yet to be answered is why the Mega Men-
dung protest/challenge assumed the form it did. The character of the
challenge was conditioned by the nature and objectives of the group
itself and the ideological environment within which it operated. I have
mentioned that they were interested in getting rid of Suharto and were
proponents of rule of law. Beyond this they were vague. Indeed Mr.
Iskak admitted that they as a group had no particular ideas about what
form a Hatta-led administration would take.9 There were certainly no
plans to exclude the military from the political sphere and no plans to
alter existing class relationships.10 Most members of the Mega Mendung
group and several who were associated with them can be categorized as
aristocratic "old generation" intellectuals. Some had received Western
legal educations and enjoyed considerable privilege and political promi-
nence in the 1950s. Their political experience had been among the
8.	The three figures mentioned here can, despite the qualifications
made in n. 1 in chapter 5, be regarded as spokesmen for urban middle-
class "modernist" Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism respectively.
The vehicles for the articulation of their group interests, the Muham-
madiyah/Parmusi, Partai Katolik, and Parkindo, had all suffered badly
under the New Order, a fact directly related to their discontent as
revealed in their writings (see above ch. 1), and their participation in
the affair. It is interesting to note that there was no Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) figure among the signatories. This can be explained by the fact
that, whereas the "Sawito group" was urban-based, the strength of
the NU, a conservative, orthodox Moslem party, is primarily rural. It
is also true that the NU, although it occasionally resisted government
initiatives, was the most compliant of the large parties and was there-
fore subject to less executive domination. Related to this was the fact
that there was no credible NU spokesman at the national level.
9.	Personal communication.
10.	Judging from their criticisms of the Suharto regime we can suppose
that what they were looking forward to was a reformist,* essentially
capitalist, legalistic administration, which would cooperate closely with
sections of the armed forces (typified perhaps by Domo Pranoto, Ishak
Juarsa, and Hugeng), and pursue economic policies which favored
national capital rather than domestic Chinese or foreign capital. A
feeling among the group that the corruption of the Suharto regime was
linked to the shortage of "noble blood" in its ranks provides an insight
into the elitist brand of nationalism still prevailing among many of the
older, especially PNI-oriented opponents of Suharto.m
relatively cozy civilian elite that inherited Dutch power and to which
political competition was largely restricted until the late 1950s. It was,
I believe, their conditioning and their ultimate conservatism which was
responsible for their basically intraelite approach to issues. It was not
their style to seek popular support or forge strategic alliances with
sympathetic sections of the military. They were, after all, not keen to
disrupt the social order and did not want to provoke an open confron-
tation with the authorities. Instead they chose to exert leverage in the
realm of ideology, to use their "nonpartisan" prestige to apply moral
pressure on Suharto.
The strong "moral" element of their attack was in one sense a re-
flection of the group's powerlessness, but it also reflected a real con-
cern with the moral quality of the ruling elite. With the executive
exercising effective control over all major organizations of the state,
including the political parties and the legal apparatus, there are very
few checks on its power.11 Many of the ruled look to the individual
moral consciences of the rulers as a potential restraining influence and
as their last court of appeal. The Sawito documents, for example,
addressed themselves to Suharto's personal honor, urging the Presi-
dent to "contemplate his own being and assume a wise and chivalrous
attitude as a true soldier holding firm to the virtues of the Indonesian
nation."12 General Hugeng stressed the practical importance of moral
integrity when he said to the cardinal that the responsibility for en-
forcing laws was "ultimately a human matter." He went on to complain:
The undermining of authority is taking place from the inside,
from Suharto himself, and from the State apparatus. The
problem is that there is no one to supervise the supervisors,13
Elsewhere, Hatta underlined the significance attached to individual
character in Indonesian political structures when he argued that:
11.	The checks which do exist are structural, that is to say the gov-
ernment cannot exploit its power to the extent that some significant
section of society comes to feel so oppressed that it resorts to opposing
the established order by violent means. With an ever-more elaborate
apparatus of repression and propaganda, the threshold at which the
threat of rebellion becomes real is probably higher now than it has
ever been.
12.	"Retreat in Order to Advance more Perfectly" (see above, ch. 2).
13.	Hati Nurani, p. 168. This is only one of many comments in the
same vein. Sawito, for instance, wrote:
... It is clear then, that the human element plays the dominant
role. And it is the MORAL[ITY] of those people which affirms
and guarantees the ongoing life and greatness of the Nation and
the State. Thus the validity of the slogan: — "The MORAL of the
man behind the gun."
(Emphasis in original, and the slogan was in English.) Ibid., p. 181.115
the 1945 Constitution was no more than a broad outline. The
success or failure of its implementation is entirely dependent
on the semangat [resolve, fighting spirit] of the leader.lh
The severe limitations imposed by the government on the range of
legitimate ideological vocabulary available to critics may also have con-
tributed to their moral emphasis.15 From the early days of the New
Order it was clear that the military leaders had a low tolerance of for-
eign political ideologies. Not only were political analyses inspired by
Marxist-Leninist teachings outlawed, but the terminology of Western
liberalism was held in official (though not such public) contempt.
During the Sawito trial, lawyer Yap Thiam Hien was accused of pining
for the period of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Many others
have been similarly criticized for their use of concepts such as freedom
of speech, trios politico, and human rights. Also regarded as highly
suspect is the political language of Sukarno and his Old Order bureau-
cracy. Suharto remains wary of the potential power that Sukarno's
ideas and symbols may still exercise among the population. In attempt-
ing to undermine efforts to reestablish Islam as a focus for dissent, the
Suharto regime has, in addition, made it very clear that political criti-
cisms should not be framed in Islamic terms. Faced with so many locked
doors, critics of the New Order have tended to exploit ideological areas
which the government has, via its official proclamations, appeared to
sanction.
In spelling out its objectives, the New Order leadership has stressed
three major themes: technocratic efficiency, devotion to upholding the
1945 Constitution, and moral purity. Amid the "negative" crusades
against communism, personality cults, Sukarnoist adventurism, and so
forth, these concerns have stood out to many as "positive" elements,
or, we might say, as electoral commitments. As such they have been
interpreted as open to scrutiny and critical comment. Criticism of the
government's "technocratic" performance has come primarily from stu-
dents, first in the form of demonstrations against corruption, and later
in more critical analyses such as the "White Book" of 1978, which used
detailed graphs and figures, as well as much technocratic jargon, to
argue for better controls and competence in the field of economic admin-
istration. 16
As has been seen, the government's deviations from the constitution
have also provided a central target for middle-class criticism. The
Suharto regime's establishment of, and continued reliance upon, extra-
constitutional agencies such as Kopkamtib, as well as their lack of
regard for legal process and judicial independence, have been recurring
issues among those who have attacked the regime from under the banner
of constitutionalism.
14.	Hatta etal., Uraian Pancasila, p. 23.
15.	This point was suggested to me by Max Lane.
16.	"White Book of the Students' Struggle."116
Finally, there is the matter of the emphasis that the government
has placed on morality—religious morality in particular. Indonesian
official pronouncements and statutes abound with divine references.
Harmonious relationships with God and a balancing of the material and
spiritual are frequently cited as essential to the process of "fulfilling
the nation's aims."17 Religious devotion and moral strength are fre-
quently described as central components of the Pancasila, that ubiqui-
tous underwriter of government policy.18 In the same way that the
government's commitments to technocratic efficiency and constitutional
process have provided foci for criticism, accusations employing the
concepts and language of religious morality have appeared. One exam-
ple is the attack launched by the Sawito group. While the documents
and Sawito's defense speeches drew on technocratic and constitutionalist
arguments, their thrust was unmistakably moral.19 This broadening of
oppositional (as opposed to critical) sentiment into the moral sphere
may well be a logical outcome of the government's official encouragement
of spiritual and moral endeavor. 20
Whatever the reasons for the Sawito group's challenge taking the
form it did, however, it clearly did not work. President Suharto did
not resign and neither was there any chance of his doing so in response
to the moral pressure from the signatories of the documents. So why
did a group of intelligent people think that he might?21 It is hard to
say. Perhaps they had become so disgusted with Suharto and so fer-
vent in their agreement that he was not worthy of the Presidency that
they came to believe he was a lot closer to the brink than he really was.
Confident that they had, or could gather, enough evidence against the
President, they may have thought they possessed the means to urge
him out of office. Whatever the case, I think it is reasonable to con-
clude that their analysis of the political situation was naive. They did
not seem to have come to terms with the fact that Suharto has never let
himself be unduly constrained by questions of morality or, for that
17.	See for instance MPR Decision No. 4, 1973, Chs 2 and 3 (quoted in
Hati Nurani, pp. 86-87); Law No. 14, 1970 (ibid., p. 7); or MPR Deci-
sion No. 2, 1978 (ibid., p. 155).
18.	Southwood and Flanagan (Indonesia: Law, p. 173, n. 13) write:
"Under Sukarno, equal stress was placed on all five principles [of the
Pancasila], while Suharto stresses just one point: Belief in God."
19.	A distinction should be made between the moral thrust in the Sawito
affair and that of the "moral force" student movement in the early 1970s.
Although their language was similar, the Sawito attack, by virtue of its
objectives, was far more "political" in character.
20.	I am grateful to Keith Foulcher for suggesting this idea to me.
21.	Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, for instance, reportedly said in court that
he had felt sure that the President would sign his powers over to Hatta.
Sumi Narto, Sawito, p. 93. Conducting interviews in Jakarta I found
that there had existed the notion among some of those involved with the
affair that it could "succeed."117
matter, legality. No matter what "proof" is assembled documenting his
"immoral" or "illegal" activities, the inescapable fact remains that Su-
harto holds the Presidency because he has control over the armed
forces, and because he is backed by the most powerful economic inter-
ests within (and outside) Indonesia. He did not come to power by
virtue of his morality or legal standing but via armed force and
through skillful power broking, and, for reasons indicated in the
previous chapter, it would probably take military might to convince
him to forgo his position.
This is not to say that the Sawito group's attack on the government
was totally ineffective. While it failed to bring about any change in the
political status quo, it did challenge the ideological infrastructure of
the regime. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, it threatened
to sabotage the appearance of elite consensus upon which the corpora-
tist ideology of the government rests.
In other ways, too, the challenge harmed the government. It
undermined, for instance, the regime leadership's claim to moral author-
ity based on their status as members of the revolutionary "Generation
of 45." At an army seminar in March 1972 a prominent general had
proclaimed that the "values of 1945" were
steadfastness of the heart to struggle for the interests of the
people, an unconquerable spirit, the basic principles contained
in the prologue of the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila . . .
all these values infuse the New Order at the present time."22
The general was defining a central element of New Order ideology and
implicitly identifying the "Generation of 45" as the guardians and the
only legitimate interpreters of the ideology. Contrast his sanctimonious
words, or a thousand similar protestations of the New Order's faithful-
ness to the revolutionary spirit and the semi-sacred canons of nation-
hood,23 with this extract from "Welcoming a Just Government in
Indonesia":
The existence of indefinite detention without trial and other
psychological threats intimidate people everywhere. These
matters clearly betray the essence and spirit of the Pancasila
and 1945 Constitution. . . . Apparently the ex-freedom fighters
22.	Harlan Kami, March 16, 1972, quoted in Anderson, "Cartoons and
Monuments," p. 313.
23.	See an official "Diagram of the Structure of Power in the State of
the Republic of Indonesia," in Indonesia Handbook 1976 (Jakarta:
Department of Information, 1976), p. 92. In the top box is "The
Nation's Spirit and Outlook of Life, Pancasila," the second the "Pre-
amble of the 1945 Constitution," the third the "1945 Constitution," and
in the fourth the "People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)." In humble
fifth position is the President, with the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Audit Board, the DPR, and the Supreme Advisory Council.118
who now hold powerful positions have banished the memories of
the support that the people gave in the revolutionary struggle
for independence. 24
Coming from students, this letter, addressed to the people of Indo-
nesia, might not have worried the government too much. But the words
had come (supposedly) from the father of Supriyadi, one of the great
freedom fighters of the independence struggle, and had been endorsed
by Supriyadi's brother Tommy Darmadi and one of the authors of the
1945 Constitution itself, Mohammad Hatta. The document, therefore,
had weight. It was saying, in effect, "Don't listen to the banter of
these New Order gangsters, for we can assure you that they are hypo-
crites unworthy of your support." Demystification is the key here.
The document threatened to demystify a fundamental element of the
government leadership's legitimizing ideology: their claim to speak for
the nation's spirit.
It was likewise the authority of the signatories of "Towards Salva-
tion" which gave that document its sting. What value were the govern-
ment's daily statements proclaiming the New Order's commitment to
moral honesty, legal-constitutional principles, and development for the
benefit of society when such irreproachable figures as Hatta and the
religious leaders could charge that the government's development
efforts had led the people into the "valley of gross indignity" and had
"throttled the sovereignty of law"?25
Both documents were a blow to the credibility of official ideology
or, more accurately, propaganda. The government reaction to them
provided two interesting insights into the Indonesian political scene.
First it highlighted the role played by "neutral" elements (i.e., "estab-
lishment" figures who do not depend on the government for their
authority) in maintaining the structure of domination. Whether they
liked it or not, the tacit consent (normally) lent by Hatta and the reli-
gious figures did much to assure the silent majority of middle- and
24.	"Welcoming a Just Government in Indonesia" (see above ch. 2).
Similar statements appear in the other documents. In "Declaration"
for example, are the words "For the Indonesian people the spirit of
the Pancasila is not being applied sincerely by those in charge of the
government. ..." Or in "Retreat in Order to Advance more Perfectly,"
"Public opinion . . . accuses mas Harto of having . . . [f]ailed to pro-
vide an example of the ideals he preaches. ..."
25.	I do not mean to imply that Hatta and the religious figures were
untarnished—they had all been compromised to some degree by the
Suharto government—but only that they retained enough independence
to be seen by many as something akin to "moral referees." One news-
paper in 1975 referred to Hatta, very revealingly in terms of under-
standing the government's reaction, as "pangwasane panguwasa" or
"the monitor of the power holders." Article in Jaya Baya (a Surabaya
based Javanese language paper), September 21, 1975, reprinted in
Hatta, "Menuju Negara Hukum," p. 47.119
lower middle-class Indonesians of the regime's acceptability. More
significantly, the government reaction underlined the importance which
it attaches to its "legitimizing ideology" as a tool of social control. If
one of the objects of the challenge had been to expose the regime in its
true colors, the response was an attempt to resurrect the image of the
Suharto government.
Several aspects of the Sawito affair referred to in the foregoing
chapters, from the extensive and intensive interrogations of people
connected with Sawito to the charges and counter-charges made by
high-ranking officials following the announcement, betrayed the politi-
cal insecurity of the Suharto regime. So too did the government's
nervous concern with its apparatus of legitimation. Had the govern-
ment leadership felt confident of the people's support, it would have
been unlikely to make such a fuss over the documents. (And neither,
most likely, would the documents have appeared in the first place.)
The only reason the criticisms in the documents could snowball into a
real threat to the regime was that they affirmed and encouraged senti-
ments already latent in the community.
The trial, too, revealed a government fighting for the minds of its
people. Despite the efforts of the authorities to portray Sawito as a
scheming Rasputin, he was hailed as a minor folk hero, attracting great
sympathy not only from those who attended the trial but in society at
large as well. 26 He was popular because he was giving voice to people's
frustrations over issues such as the government's handling of the
economy, their lack of concern for ordinary people, their alliance with
foreign economic and strategic interests, their authoritarianism, ineffi-
ciency, and so on. Sawito's popularity was also a measure of the fear
and repression in society, for I believe that it was his reckless bravery
as much as the particular criticisms he made, which earned him his
acclaim. More than anything else, his defense speeches were accusa-
tions. He accused Suharto of gross corruption; he accused the judges
of incompetence; and he accused the head prosecutor of subversion
with an audacity that would have impressed even Sukarno. This was
exactly what the public flocked to the courtroom to hear—articulate
and open defiance from a man untainted by power and uninterested in
moral compromise. 27
26.	David Jenkins (in FEER, November 18, 1977, p. 38) used the
words "minor folk hero." Indonesian sources in the Central Javanese
city of Solo inform me that Sawito became so popular there that news-
papers containing reports of the trial were quickly sold out. A booklet
relating his exploits (i.e., Sumi Narto, Sawito) was still, in 1983, selling
well in the larger Javanese cities.
27.	At one stage in his defense speech Sawito expressed amazement at
his meteoric rise to popularity. Perhaps he should not have been so
surprised. The middle class's loss of faith in the ruling elite's moral
honesty has led to the creation of a new status system, independent of
control by the center, based on "cleanness" or "morality." The upper
echelons of this status pyramid are remarkably empty and open to120
The Suharto government's failure to convince the public that Sawito
deserved his jail sentence helped to expose its legitimation problem.
The government's so-called "etatisme" was, in turn, one of the most
important factors in spawning the criticisms which led to the Sawito
affair. These criticisms can be seen as a response to the government's
waning legitimacy, and the outcome of the affair a confirmation and
catalyst of the process.
A further indicator of the government's political insecurity was the
high degree of coercion exercised by the courts. There can be no
doubt that the Sawito trial was unfair. While the atmosphere of intimi-
dation may not have been as great as in the show trials of the immediate
post-coup period, it should be seen as part of the same tradition. As
has been shown, the legal process was subject to perversion at almost
every stage of the affair, from the openly prejudicial "announcement"
in 1976 to the procrustean reasoning of the judges in court. 28 Much
anyone who dares to build himself a corruption-free reputation and
confront the authorities from a standpoint of "moral honesty." Ishak
Juarsa, Hugeng, Ismael Suny, Buyung Nasution, and W. S. Rendra all
owe some of their prestige to their reputations for moral honesty and
their refusal to be bought off. In anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu's
terms, "cleanness" in Indonesia has become a form of "symbolic capital,"
an asset in the "wider" economy. See Outline of a Theory of Practice
(Cambridge/London/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1977), esp. pp. 178-83.
28. A comprehensive catalogue of complaints against the procedural
irregularities, unjust treatment of the defendant, and cases of insulting
and heavy-handed behavior on the part of the judges can be found in
Yap Thiam Hien, Memori Banding.
Two sworn statements which came to light during the 1981 appeal
suggest that the judges who presided over Sawito's 1977-78 trial were
under heavy pressure from above. The statements, signed by Bujone-
goro, alleged that head judge Sumadiyono and member judge Anton
Abdulrachman Putra had both admitted privately that the Sawito case
was non-justiciable. Sumadiyono reportedly told one of his colleagues
that he was forced to sentence Sawito to eight years because "he was
afraid of losing his job and being dismissed by the President/Govern-
ment." Sworn Testimonies of Dadi Bujonegoro, November 30, 1979 and
January 9, 1980, presented as articles of evidence No. 1 and No. 2 at
Sawito's 1981 appeal to the High Court. Bujonegoro's informants were
the legal functionaries Drs. R. M. Tjokrodiningrat S.H. and Walujo
S.H. respectively.
Concerning the third judge, John Zinto Loedoe, it is worth quoting
Sawito's Pancasila Menggugat:
J. Z. Loedoe even went so far as to ask me for a Surat-Kuasa
[Letter of Authorization] so that he could defend me and explain
to the responsible authorities that the sentence which he himself
took part in passing down, was WRONG and request that [I] be
freed from all charges . . . and be rehabilitated immediately in121
has been written about the structural constraints on judicial indepen-
dence in Indonesia, 29 and the trial of Sawito only confirmed the degree
to which the Indonesian legal system is wired to serve the political
interests of those in power.
This study has revealed that several aspects of the Sawito affair
conflict rather markedly with the images conveyed to the public in the
Indonesian media. Instead of being the work of an unknown trickster
who manipulated others in his quest for the Presidency, we find that
it arose from demands and criticisms actively supported by several
prominent figures who enjoyed considerable respect in Indonesian
middle-class society. These men, who came from remarkably varied
backgrounds, were drawn together by their common frustration with
the military elite's monopolization of power and the related lack of pro-
cedural certainty in the economic and political realms. They shared a
sense of betrayal, both of themselves and of their earlier faith in the
ideals of the New Order, and a sense of alarm at the spread of material
and moral corruption. They also shared the conviction that Suharto
was the man responsible for what they perceived as Indonesia's most
disgraceful and pressing problems.
It is clear that President Suharto did not wish to have the truth
about the affair appear. Aiming to defuse the criticisms and save itself
the embarrassment of having a number of its prominent former support-
ers publicly turn their backs on Suharto, the government undertook a
campaign in both the media and the courtroom to obscure the essence
of the affair. It was largely the results of this campaign that came to
be known as the "Sawito affair."
In conclusion, it is important to stress that, despite its singular
character, the Sawito affair was primarily a product of social and polit-
ical tensions existing within the Indonesian polity. The criticisms
expressed by the participants were one manifestation of the acute dis-
satisfaction with the Suharto regime felt by sections of Indonesian
middle-class society. For as long as the sources of this discontent
my original occupation as a Civil Servant. J. Z. Loedoe was
very shocked when he came to know the truth about this Sawito
affair and said that at the time of the trial no chance was given
to [me] to explain what really happened. . . . J. Z. Loedoe
wanted to help in cancelling the incorrect verdict and freeing
[me] immediately, . . . therefore I produced a Surat Kuasa for
him (p. 3).
Sawito did indeed produce a "Letter of Authorization" for Loedoe,
giving his ex-inquisitor authority "to stand in for him [hak substitusi]
in organizing the appeal . . . and anything connected with the court
case."
Surat Kuasa from Sawito to J. Z. Loedoe S.H., dated June 22,
1981. Article of evidence No. 3 at Sawito's 1981 appeal.
29. The best account is Lev, "Judicial Authority." See also
Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, esp. ch. 4, 5, and 7.122
persist and channels for its expression remain blocked, pressure will
continue to mount and steam will find ever more unpredictable ways of
escaping.GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ABRI
aliran
Aspri
Bakin
DGI
Diponegoro
DPA
DPR
duplik
eksepsi
Generation of '45
Golkar
HIR
jalur penyelamat
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
literally "streams," used here in the sense of
cultural-ideological groupings
Asisten Pribadi (Presiden), Personal Assistants
to the President
Badan Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence Body
Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, the Indonesian
Council of Churches, a Protestant body claiming
six million members; T. B. Simatupang is one of
its leaders
Central Javanese Military Division
Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory
Council
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative
Assembly, a lower, legislative house of Parliament
rejoinder by defense in response to the prosecu-
tion's indictment following the defense's presenta-
tion of their pleidooi
demurrer, preliminary plea for a case to be
dropped
the generation of Indonesians who took part in
the revolution; the generation of Suharto and, in
the 1970s, the great majority of top military per-
sonnel
Golongan Karya, Functional Groups; the govern-
ment umbrella organization consisting of selected
representatives of nonparty groups, the govern-
ment's election vehicle
Hirzein Inlandsch Reglemen, the colonial Proce-
dural Code still used in the 1970s
"preservation channel," a plan reportedly con-
ceived by Maj. General Domo Pranoto whereby, in
the event of an emergency, Suharto could resign
without recriminations and Indonesia could be pre-
served from disaster
123124
Javanist/m	see kejawen
Kasasi	the highest level of appeal in the Indonesian court system short of a plea to the President
kebatinan	a blanket term for Javanese spiritualism
kejawen	the cultural core of the Javanese heartlands; the philosophy or approach to life of those elements in society, irrespective of status, for whom the Javanese tradition provides deep meaning
keramat	"power points" or sacred sites in Java
keris	sacred Javanese dagger
kesakten	magical power, energizing principle
klenik	occultism, black magic
Kopkamtib	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, an extremely powerful internal security network
Korpri	Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Civil Service Corps
KUHP	Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, the Indone- sian Criminal Code
lelono broto	a rambling pilgrimage to sacred sites
lurah	village head
Malari	Malapetaka Limabelas January, Calamity of Janu- ary 15; violent street riots in Jakarta in 1974
Masjumi	Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Moslems, a large modernist Moslem party banned by Sukarno in 1960
Mawi	Majelis Waligereja Indonesia, Indonesia Council of Church leaders
merah putih	the "red and white" Indonesian flag symbolizing courage and sanctity
Mega Mendung	a mountain resort area near Bogor; used here mainly in reference to the group consisting of Hatta, Ishak Juarsa, Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, Sudjono, and Sawito
Memori Banding Mr.	High Court Appeal Meester in de Rechten, Master of Law
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consul- tative Assembly, a higher executive house of Parliament125
Muhammadiyah	a large modernist Moslem social-political organiza- tion with earlier links to Masjumi
MU II	Majelis Ulama Islam Indonesia, the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars, led until 1981 by Hamka
negara hukum NU	nation based on law, or Rechtsstaat Nahdlatul Ulama, Moslem Scholars' League
Opsus	Operasi Khusus, Special Operations, a "positive clandestine intelligence" body
Orhiba	Olah Raga Hidup Baru, New Life Gymnastics, a Hatha yoga type practice, and a large organiza- tion founded and led by Said Sukanto
pamrih	concealed personal motive under the cover of social or political duty; personal desire; a precursor to disintegration in Javanese cosmology
Pancasila	the official philosophical basis of the Indonesian State—Faith in One God, National Unity, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice
Parmusi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Moslem Party, a resurrected and diluted version of Masjumi
PD 1	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party, an amalgamation of PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, IPKI, and Partai Murba
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party, outlawed in 1966
pleidooi	speeches by defendant and defense team in answer to the prosecution's summing up and recommenda- tion for sentencing
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Develop- ment Party, an amalgamation of Moslem parties— Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party, a liberal anti-Communist party, banned in 1960
priyayi	Java's lesser nobility, traditional bureaucratic class
pusaka Ratu Adil	power-charged heirlooms Just King, the Messiah
semangat	vital energy, resolve, charisma126
Siliwangi
SKK
Supersemar
Uskupan Agung
wahyu (kedaton)
wali
wangsit
wayang
West Javanese Military Division
Sekretariat Kerjasama Kepercayaan, the Secretariat
for Cooperation among Mystic Faiths, led by Said
Sukanto
Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Order of March 11
(1966), the document signed by Sukarno bestowing
wide ranging powers on Suharto
archiepiscopacy
divine radiance, or revelation
saint, usually referring to the legendary figures
said to have introduced Islam to Java
divine guidance, via revelation
traditional Javanese theaterLIST OF MAJOR CHARACTERS
AN Said S.H. (b. 1927) Attorney General (1972-81), then Minister
of Justice. Appointed Head of the Supreme Court 1984.
Commonly regarded as a member of the Sudharmono faction.
(Lt. General, Army)
Ali Murtopo (1924-84) Head of Opsus. Led a powerful faction con-
sisting of some of Suharto's ex-Diponegoro officers. One of
Suharto's personal assistants. (Lt. General, Army, Dipone-
goro)
Dadi Bujonegoro Ex-Head of Plantations Service, Department of Agri-
culture. Close to Maj. General Domo Pranoto. Cousin of Ali
Said. Spent six years in prison. Gave evidence January 23,
1978.
Darmadi, Tommy Army intelligence officer. Younger brother of
nationalist hero Supriyadi. Also known as Ki Setio Utomo.
An old friend of Sawito's. Gave evidence December 19, 1977.
Darmoyuwono, Justinius (b. 1914) Catholic Primate of Indonesia.
Chairman of Mawi and Head of Mawi's Socio-Economic Branch.
Held discussions with Hatta before signing Sawito document.
Domo Pranoto (1916-77) Became Vice Chairman of MPR/DPR in 1971
and Head of ABRI Fraction in Parliament. (Major General,
Police, Central Java)
Hamka, Prof. (1908-81) Full name [Haji] Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah.
Prominent Islamic scholar, writer, teacher, publicist, and
leader. Head of MUM until 1981. Linked politically with
Parmusi.
Hatta, Dr. Mohammad (1902-81) Prewar nationalist leader and co-
proclaimer of Indonesian Independence. Vice-President
1948-56 and Prime Minister 1948-50. Adviser to Komisi Empat,
Chairman of Panitia Lima, follower of Orhiba, and widely re-
spected as elder statesman.
Hugeng Imam Santoso, Drs. (b. 1921) Head of National Police,
1968-71; Golkar representative in MPRS. Reform-minded
and close to PSI. Reputation as an honest general. (Gen-
eral, Police, Central Java)
Ishak Juarsa (b. 1925) Commander of Aceh (1964-67) and South
Sumatra (1967-70) military regions. Fell out with Suharto
in late 1960s and was later sent as ambassador to Cambodia
(1975) and Yugoslavia (1976) before being arrested over
127128
Sawito affair. (Major General, Army, Siliwangi). Gave evi-
dence April 3, 1978.
Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, Mr. (b. 1896) Dutch-trained lawyer. Found-
ing member of PN I and nationalistic Finance Minister in the
early 1950s. Steadfast opponent of the Suharto regime.
Close to Sawito and involved with Orhiba. Gave evidence
November 28, 1977.
Kama RadjasaM.A. Son of late PN I leader and Prime Minister Ali
Sastroamidjojo. Active but low profile Sukarnoist. Close to
Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo. Jailed briefly in connection with
Sawito affair.
Simatupang, T. B. (b. 1920) Armed Forces Chief of Staff in early
Republic. Protestant writer and leader. One of the chair-
men of DGI. Politically linked with PSI. (General, Army,
Siliwangi, North Sumatra)
Singgih, Drs. Revolutionary figure. Known as one of the radicals
who kidnapped Hatta and Sukarno to hurry on the proclaim-
ing of Independence. Regarded as a Sukarnoist. Spent
about six years in jail for his role in the Sawito affair. Gave
evidence January 30, 1978.
Sudharmono S.H. (b. 1927) Minister of State/State Secretariat.
Led a faction close to Suharto consisting mainly of alumni of
the Military Law Academy. Responsible for announcing the
Sawito affair. (Lt. General, Army, East Java)
Sudjono, Mr. Dutch-educated lawyer, who later became a captain in
the Japanese Imperial Army. Entered Indonesian Foreign
Ministry in 1952 and served as ambassador to Japan, Brazil,
and Scandinavia. Involved with Orhiba. Sawito's “spiritual
father." Jailed for a period in connection with the Sawito
affair. Gave evidence November 14, 1977.
Sukanto Tjokrodiatmojo, R. Said Prewar colonial police official.
Founder of Indonesian Police and Police Chief until 1959.
Founder of Orhiba and head of SKK. Stepfather of Sawito's
wife Nuning. Links with the PSI. (General, Police, Cen-
tral Java)
Surono Reksodimejo (b. 1923) Deputy Commander of Armed Forces
(1974-78). In April 1978 was transferred to become Coordi-
nating Minister of Social Affairs. Appointed Coordinating
Minister for Politics and Security 1983. (General, Army,
Central Java)
Trisirah, R. M. Sawito's father-in-law and spiritual teacher from
Solo, Central Java.
Yap Thiam Hien S.H. Prominent lawyer and human rights activist.
Defense Counsel for Sawito 1977-83.