ne ae Ne baescarl esrt ls a efi Pek ata) uf Hn am ea tsa a} ee Lai iT Merl Pee Dabet iid Lat i to ior bel dal hey al a cara natn hey Buku rate yt aie) sha 9 6h! reais Neh HE eal Re Apis eligi i amg Pita teeta Oe Sent Ren Blasted rasig id f) eM Ue ae ri Meh Men hy ee MT oY re in Lf Teeth Mate " Rn Nero ae set rey Megat d oceel peel Ei Ker rien ticatry, nt aha MC yen a) Meth l es a i Pym i) 8 Wise a [US Usy 1920 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ry ii GENERAL TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS PREPARED BY THE SCHOOL OF THE LINE THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KAS. 1920 THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS Fort LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 1920 Ba a Higa + ys _& 4 — INTRODUCTION HE course of instruction in The School of the Line is based on the infantry division and the cavalry divi- sion, operating independently or as a part of an army corps oranarmy. With the foregoing in view, the course of study set forth in this book is designed to give to the student a picture of the general functions of an army and an army corps, and the relative functions therein of the infantry division and the cavalry division. Such perspective is es- sential to a correct appreciation of the tactical and supply principles applicable to a division. The principles relating to larger units are touched upon in general terms only, while the statement of decisions and the mechanics of preparation of orders and of handling questions of logistics are covered more in detail. The con- tents of this book should be considered as an introductory course to that contained in the book “Tactical Principles and Decisions,”’ published by this School, in which the infantry and the cavalry divisions are considered in many different tactical situations, and the details connected therewith are thoroughly discussed. With the foregoing in view, a continuous army situation has been pictured in this book, covering an advance of several days and culminating in an attack by the whole army. The first four chapters discuss the situation from the army and corps tactical and supply viewpoints, endeavoring to present a picture of the functions and teamplay of all larger units inthearmy. The fifth chapter takes up a different situation and deals with the interior management of a division as a part of a corps within an army. This chapter discusses how the different arms, trains and services are knitted to- gether to form the fundamental basic unit of our army, the infantry division. It is assumed that the student of this book has already studied the separate arms, trains and the organization of military forces. He is assumed to be familiar with the tac- tics and technique of infantry, machine guns, cavalry, artil- lery, air service, tanks, engineers, signal communications, iii military police and the different trains, and to be able to issue formal field orders for their tactical employment. While The School of the Line gives a short review of the foregoing, preparatory to the study of the division, the above subjects are primarily covered in the courses at the special service schools. The subject matter contained in this book was prepared in mimeograph form by the instructors indicated, and utilized by The School of the Line as a text during 1919- 1920. Captains R. E. BEEBE and C. L. EASTMAN have rendered valuable assistance in compiling the above data for this book. This book has been prepared under the direction of, and its publication as a text for The School of the Line has been authorized by the Commandant and Assistant Commandant of The General Service Schools. H. A. Drum, Major, Infantry, Director, The School of the Line. CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I—AN Army IN AN ADVANCE.____-__-_-______-__-_ 1 Problem for Discussion______.-._.._--______-_-_______ 1 (A) The Field Orders for the Advance_______.____________ 2 (B) The Administrative Orders for the Advance__________ 6 (C) The Cavalry Division in the Advance__________________ 11 CHAPTER II—An Army CorPs IN AN ADVANCE___---.---_---_- 18 Lecture on the Army Corps.__-_-------_-_----_--_-_- 18 (A) The Field Orders for the Advance of the 2d Corps____-- 43 (B) The Field Orders for the Advance of the 1st Corps_____. 49 (C) The Field Orders for the Advance of the 2d Division____ 53 CHAPTER III—Tue Army IN ATTACK.-____------------------ 64 (A) The Field Orders for the Army’s Attack ~_------____ 64 (B) The Administrative Orders for the Attack___-.-__-___ 68 (C) The Army Artillery Plan in Attack__---------------- 72 (D) The Cavalry Division in the Attack_----------------- 79 CHAPTER IV—AN ARMY CorPS IN ATTACK._----~---------- 82 ; (A) The Field Orders, 2d Corps, in Attack______._---_--_- 82 (B) The Artillery, 2d Corps, in Attack_..--------------- 86 (C) The Administrative Plan, 2d Corps____--.----------- 90 (D) The Field Orders, 1st Corps, in Attack___-_-.--------- 92 (E) The Administrative Orders, 3d Corps, in Attack__---_---- 95 CHAPTER V—TuHE INFANTRY DIVISION_--------------------- 101 General Situation and Special Situations__.-__-------_- 101 (A) An Infantry Division in an Advance_----------------- 104 (B) The Infantry Division During an Attack_------------- 111 (C) Functions of the Division Artillery in Combat---------- 128 (D) The Administrative ‘Orders. The Division on the March and in an Attack__-__-------~----------- 138 (E) Co-ordination Within the Division-_-------~---------- 152 (F) Map Problem, Tactical Functions of the Division_____- 171 GENERAL TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS CHAPTER I An Army in an Advance PROBLEM FOR DISCUSSION Masor Hucu A, Drum Infantry Map Reference: (a) General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, 1” = 10 miles. (b) Pennsylvania and Maryland Geological Survey, 1:62500, Mount Airy, Ijamsville, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Gettys- burg, Fairfield quadrangles. (c) Gettysburg-Antietam Maps, twelve sheets centered about Gettysburg, 1:21120. General Situation: The Susquehanna River is the boundary between two hostile states, Red east and Blue west. The Blue inhabi- tants, north of the Pennsylvania—Maryland state line have declared their independence and have formed an alliance with the Reds. War has just been declared. Special Situation (Blue), PartI: The Blue concentration is: The 1st Army (three army corps) on the front Frederick—Mt. Airy, to be completed on 23 November 19; The 2d Army (three army corps) about Baltimore, to be com- pleted by 24 November 19; The 3d Army (two army corps) about Hagerstown, to be com- pleted 24 November 19. By noon 23 November 19, General A, commanding the 1st Blue Army, received instructions from the Blue com- mander-in-chief as follows: “Reliable information indicates that Reds have concentrated on the line Lancaster—Harrisburg and are advancing on Hanover and Gettysburg. Red cavalry and bands of armed secessionists were re- ported 283 November 19, at Hanover and Gettysburg. No Red air- craft has appeared south of Maryland—Pennsylvania state line. All railroads are reported intact. “It is my purpose to force the Reds to accept a decisive battle near the Hanover—Gettysburg line, and then to destroy them by a strong attack against their right flank. With the foregoing in view, the following is ordered: 2 AN ARMY IN AN ADVANCE “(a) The 1st Army will advance without delay north i oe line Hanover—Gettysburg and will prevent the Reds crossing »ou Mountain via Arendtsville, Cashtown and Waynesboro passes. “Zone of action: “East boundary—Parrs Ridge to Union Mills, to Hanover and to East Berlin, all inclusive; : “West boundary—Catoctin Mountains and South Mountains, all inclusive; : 3 “Southern boundary—B. & O. R. R., inclusive; : : “Supply—All railroads in zone of action; regulating station at Point of Rocks. “(b) The 2d Army will have its advance guards north of the state line north of Ebbvale—Parkton by evening of 26 November 19, and will be prepared to extend the 1st Army’s line via Valley Jc. and Hanover Jc. This army’s cavalry will reach the above line on 24 November 19. * * * * * * * “(c) The 3d Army will advance via Greencastle, Chambersburg and Shippensburg and be prepared to cross South Mountain north of Chambersburg on 28 November 19. This army’s air service and cay- alry have been reinforced to screen its movements. Its cavalry will reach Chambersburg on 25 November 19.” * * * * * * * Required: The formal field orders issued by General A, command- ing the 1st Blue Army, for the army’s advance. (A) THE FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE Masor HucH A. Drum Infantry 1st Blue Army, FREDERICK, MD., 23 Nov 19, 2:00 PM. FIELD ORDERS | No 20. f Maps: General Map, 1” = 10 miles; 1:62500, Mount Airy, Ijamsville and quadrangles to north. L 1. Reds have concentrated on the line LANCASTER—HARRISBURG and are advancing on HANOVER and GreTryssBuRG. Red cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported this date at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red aircraft has not appeared south of Mary- LAND—PENNSYLVANIA state line. All railroads to the north are reported intact. Our armies will advance north. The 2d Army will have its advance guards north of the state line north of PARKTON— EBBVALE by evening 26 Nov 19 and its cavalry will reach above line on 24 Nov 19. The 3d Army will advance via GREENCASTLE and SHIPPENSBURG; its cavalry should reach the former place by 25 Nov 19. FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 3 2. This army will advance tomorrow towards the front HANovER— GETTYSBURG (see organization and march table attached). 8. (a) The 101st Cav Div will advance on GETTYSBURG early 24 Nov bag (b) (c) (d) (e) (£) (a) (a) (b) (c) 19 and determine without delay the hostile concentration reported on the line HANOVER—GETTYSBURG. Early informa- tion is desired concerning any hostile movement across SOUTH MOouNTAIN north of EMMITSBURG. Officers’ patrols will be sent this date to learn of hostile movements from HARRISBURG and Pic Contact will be maintained with cavalry of 2d and 3d rmies. The Army Air Service will start its reconnaissance this date and determine without delay the hostile concentration reported on the line HANOVER—GETTYSBURG and any hostile movements across SouTH MountTAIN. Special day and night reconnais- sance will be made until further orders along the following roads and railroads: LITTLESTOWN—HANOVER— Y ORK ; HANOVER— YORK SPRINGS; CASHTOWN—GETTYSBURG—NEW OXFORD—YORK; GETTYSBURG—DILLSBURG—H ARRISBURG; GETTYSBURG—CARLISLE and YoRK SPRINGS—CARLISLE; GETTYSBURG—-SHIPPENSBURG; N. C. Pa. R. R.—W. M. R. R.—P. & R. R. R. leading to York and HARRISBURG. Dropping fields will be so arranged that close co-operation will be insured with the Ist Cav Div. The ist Army Corps will advance as per march table attached.. It will reconnoiter early the front EBBVALE—VALLEY Jc.— HANOVER—LITTLESTOWN. It will cover the right of the army, maintaining contact with the left of the 2d Army. The 2d Army Corps will advance as per march table attached. It will reconnoiter early the front LITTLESTOWN—MaArRSH CREEK. At least two crossings (capacity all arms) over the Monocacy River, north of mouth of ToMs CREEK, will be made available by 5:00 PM 25 Nov 19. The 3d Army Corps will advance as per march table attached. It will reconnoiter early the front MarsH CrEEK—west of HIGHFIELD. It will cover the left of the army, maintaining contact with the right of the 8d Army. Early information is desired of the roads and railroads in the area THURMONT— HIGHFIELD—F AIRFIELD and EMMITSBURG. ‘ For army troops, see march table and special orders. See Administrative Orders No 10. See plan of signal communications. Axis of signal communications: Army—FREDERICK— WOODSBORO—TANEYTOWN. 1st Corps—Mt. AIRY—TAYLORSVILLE—NEW WINDSOR—UNION- TOWN—UNION MILLs. 2d | Corps—LIBERTYTOWN— UNION BRIDGE—TANEYTOWN— LOoNGVILLE. 3d Corps—WALKERSVILLE—ROCKY RIDGE—EMMITSBURG. Command posts, see march table. By command of General A. cs Chief of Staff. Distribution: AN ARMY IN.AN ADVANCE ‘azueyo ou bH ‘adguevyo ou ‘A[ddng *swapsoy s,ydesor IS DH “UMOPSEMAT “I -y (ea) “quowanyL, 0} sAdasat AuIIe ‘ AIG UIT *AULIB SB 9UIeS "*O "N 4q A[ddng pue uojsimey ‘Ajddng : ‘adueyo :Arepunog yseM}| ssuridg Moljax— “yuourny], 02 AIq YIZT| OW ‘PAtasar AuIG ‘ald 4HT ‘sdiog pz se aueg | uMmozsxyooyg—e][tA ‘o10qspoomA OF AIC -UdTT ‘aAtasel sdioo ul AIP T :Arepunog 4seq -solsagQ—jueses[q “sAId 4 suoryeuI0y eureg) PUE SUT] ISIY UL AIP 2UO ‘sdulidg Moljax— “TNT SOFIE pue uitt ‘yq0T ‘% ‘rrered OF, Jo *yaotIQ suamMQ jo aspug plogq sssig eole ul sdoory sdoo1y, st Yytou aq 0} sprens aoueapy| UNou aq 0} spend souvApy :Arepunog yynog ‘apiasieyreM 72 OA sdi0¢ ‘umopsouey, “DH ‘ayflasonig *‘yaoig Yysrel—peod pue umozsousy, ‘A[ddng ‘azueyo ou bY BInqspwuwy7—y2e019, “aU ‘aT[lasuyor ‘azueyo ou ‘s[ddng 2]PPIN— eID swoL ‘°O 8 ‘gq Aq A[ddng VIA alflavonig 01 AI 38 ‘UMOPAPIAGIT 1v9U —aeAly ADBIOUOTL SIV yoW “UOTPeUIOF aUIeg sopyeryuUs.U0D puew sATeS :Arepunog 4ySeM{ —o ATP “eN— ‘uL uog ‘yg AoE -at AUITG SaUIOdEq AIG YI *sd109 4ST SB sUIeg smopoyyleg—e|[lA ‘saId UY: ‘YA pue Avldarey ysno1yy ‘aul, YSAY UL SAIP § rAdepunog 4seq -WOTU A] —U M04 44 pue yyy, ‘uI9 “YU: aul] ySaM pues ysva Jo ‘yaerQ adig BIg jo ‘ayduiny, Aplaqry =| -taqvy vere ur sdoory, sdooiy, sd yytou aq 0} sptens soueapy| YpI0U aq 07 sprens aoueapy :sArepunog yyNog UMOPAPIOGIT LH sdi0g * (@AISNoUL ‘asueyo ou DH 2) yamnyg s§axnT ‘au CW OM A[ddns 4S —eaIN AoUld— SIL uotluq DH *aTLASIO[ABT, Ieou TA 8t04te A —espig ‘aU CW CM 4Iddug SeyVIjUaDU0D pue eATES wou) a][IAuoIu-) *BINQSP[EYIeM BIA -at AUIIG SaeM0D9q AIC YIP :Arepunog 7S9M ‘au JeysuruysaMy OF AIC YIP *aarasat “AUIIG SB aUeG ‘O B ‘ag Aq A[ddng sdiod UL WOIStAIp suo pue :Arepunog yseq| ‘WoqslT—PPyulM sat *UOT}EULIOF BUS “UMOISATIT YsnoLyy aul, ysem pue ysea Jo YOU oq 0} sprens soueaApy aUI[ SIY UL SUOISIAIP OMT ‘peoy uMozUOIU:) J! yyAou aq 07 spxens soueapy + (@ATSNOUL) ayiduany, Ayoqvy :Alepunog yng —uopPeM— AV ‘VAL Bere ul sdoory, “Airy WA PH uly pue ps “PZ ‘4ST sdoo1y, sdi09 sdiI09g 4ST syspuUragy O10qspooMA ‘Wd 00:9 ‘6— ON S& fiq “402090T “Wd 00:9 ‘6— @0N 16 fiq “010007 *aarsnyo -ur yqoq “S}AL YINOS pue ‘s} ulqo0725 : Arepunog 3seM AULIY *ulpeg qseq—ieaoueH—SIIA uoluQ—espry siieg :Agepunog 4seq AWIY yo tapaty OHV uouop fo sauoZz “61 QON &@ 4017000) JwasaLT U027D22UDHL0 “gl AON 9g pue 72 ‘es ‘Auy ond SI —ATEVL HOUVNW GNV NOLLVZINVDYO FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE ‘pauoyjuaut you sdoo.y sure 19uIO—? JLON “paqnquysip sdooxy, “uq T 889] 4B0y 48] OWd . AuIy Japun ozv1edQ ‘yoLapergy by dW suay “a “dO 'N ‘4Iddng “(OLoqspooM JO N) “oTTAsu0} -Ieg Ivau payeso7] 800 41} 9Z 10H ary 04 § “1euLsayT 07 § ‘asuByd ON ayAsuozleg by ulery, AWIy 129 YO Teuzig yeryp Jepuy “yoapaLy sug [PL 3 ‘maoulsuq Jory 2 dapun plpy siay3o ‘yoltapery = ‘A[ddng ‘gd100 yowa 0} 4Zat T ‘yoMapatly jo 4seq SiaaUuoIg AULIY szPZay Q ‘aca sd3 Urq j ‘O BR ‘a Aq 4[ddng bs quiog - *SsoUIpvat *yPLlapaty sd3 usqo ; VV ‘@ dnory 03 d3 uq T Ul YaeIN adig SIgq jo JO"M F *S sdoory, sd3 sind ; WV ‘V dnory 0} d3 ulq T you splay Surpusl savy ‘asueyo ON “AWIB SB sUIBg ‘yotlapeaay = bE DIIAIIG AW Aw ‘umoysauey, ‘A[ddng ; ("qaar “UMOPALIIGIT Md 1 I S891) 4H Bug pg BIA uUMOPsoUBT, OF { Mnoxty “Ua (*MOHT,,.8) AH BIg pi ‘O 8 ‘g@ Aq A[ddng 4H _3ig@ Pe—a dnoip ‘asplig uo ‘A[ddng ‘qd dnoip pue y dnoiy (uns wur 997) AH Sg Pi AH 3g pg 339y 4ST “pOyTB, MAN BIA + UOTZBZzLUBZIO ‘euNqin, eau sdoo1y, (unz ,9) AH 3g 48) 4H 3g 38I—y dnoip uMOJUOIUA, 07 YW dnoay ‘aduvyo ON ‘yoMapaty = bY Ao QV Au . ‘UMOYAUBT, : ‘aa (td) ‘dU ON ‘A[ddng ‘0 "N 4q 4[ddng op “Banqsé}Jay uo sao “AULIe 8B aUBG “OLOQSpOOM IBAN ‘Id AB | ‘Wd 00:9 ‘6T aon Se ‘Wd 00:9 ‘6T aon té “6L QON 8% | uo1udpy fo sauog W017D90] WUuUasaLg U017DZ1UDOLE, syspmay fiq %02.990'T fq uornooT (ponurquop) ‘ 6T AON Gz pue 7 ‘go ‘AWILY eng ISI—ATAVL HOUVA CNV NOILVZINVDYO : 6 AN ARMY IN AN ADVANCE (B) THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE CAPTAIN G. K. WILSON Infantry Situation 1st Blue Army as in “The Field Orders for the Advance in Chapter I, A. ist Blue Army, FREDERICK, MD., 22 Nov 19. FRoM: AC of 8, G4. To: Commanding General, 1st Army Corps. SupsgectT: Supplies. 1. The supply of artillery ammunition is based upon a supply of three days of fire per gun within this army, excluding amount carried in combat and ammunition trains. Front line divisions will maintain a supply as directed by the corps. ‘i Corps will maintain in corps parks a supply consisting of two and one-half days of fire per gun, including amount in divisions and at batteries. : The balance of one-half day of fire per gun will be held in the army depots. ; Army artillery brigade will maintain a supply of two and one- sixth days of fire per gun. The balance will be held in army depots. Ammunition will be allocated to corps, army artillery, and 101st Cavalry Division by G4, based upon daily report of expenditures. Corps will allocate ammunition to divisions and corps artillery brigade, based upon report of daily expenditures. Infantry munitions and pyrotechnics will be supplied, so that combat trains and ammunition trains will have on hand at all times the prescribed amount for these trains, in addition to the amount in the hands of troops. Artillery reports of expenditures will be made daily as of 9:00 AM, and will reach this office (Munitions Branch) by 12:00 noon. Reports of expenditures for infantry munitions and pyrotech- nics will be made every five days, commencing 25 November 19. 2. There will be established in the zone of the army, the follow- ing depots: Engineer—Material and supplies which are furnished upon request approved by corps engineers, or G1, cavalry division. Signal Corps—Material and supplies furnished upon request ap- proved by corps signal officers, G1 101st Cavalry Division, or G4, these headquarters, for army troops. Medical—Supplies furnished upon request approved by corps surgeon, Gl 101st Cavalry Division, and chief surgeon at these headquarters for army troops. Motor Transport—Spare parts, supplies and repairs furnished upon request approved by Gil, corps or division, and chief motor transport officer, these headquarters, for army troops. Ordnance—Spare parts for guns, small arms, automatic weapons and individual equipment furnished upon request approved by corps ordnance officer, G1 101st Cavalry Division, or brigade commanders for army troops. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 7 Quartermaster—Equipage (less rations), spare transportation and harness with spare parts and material for repairs of same, and clothing, furnished upon request approved by G1, corps or division, and proper commanding officer for army troops. All requests for supplies or material from above depots when approved as indicated above will be honored at proper depots. Corps and division chiefs of service will consolidate requests and requisitions whenever possible, thereby reducing the number of requests, and the amount of work at depots, whose personnel is limited. In case sup- plies are not furnished on request, the organization affected will re- port the fact to this office. By command of General A: XYZ, Copies to: Colonel, General Staff. CG, all corps. CG, all divisions. CG, Army Artillery. CG, brigades, Army. Artillery. G38, Army. CO’s, all regiments and separate battalions army troops. Chiefs of services, Army staff. 1st Blue Army, FREDERICK, MD., 23 Nov 19, 3:00 PM. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS t No 10 To accompany FO 20, 1st Blue Army. Maps: Geological Survey, 1 :62500. Part I SUPPLY, EVACUATION AND ROAD MAINTENANCE I. SUPPLY. 1. Railheads: November 24th: No change. November 25th as follows: 1st Army Corps___-------------- WESTMINSTER. Ist Division: ..2s222225s.s-5242S NEw WINDSOR. 2d Division. 222-422 eSsssseeeeee WESTMINSTER. Sd Division cs2-2s425--=s43-n--45 UNION BRIDGE. 4th Division _-_-----------------. WESTMINSTER. 2d Army Corps ~---------------- BRUCEVILLE. 5th Division ____---------------- TANEYTOWN. 6th. Division: —.-<.s2ss-s2--—-, a Ae a 50 —- LU 55 — I ee ‘Corps Troops eos d Jd 7; Res j|| and Trans. Div. i 65 — 70- Vy Lo> LEGEND Plate B. | covery foot and Horse Orawn Troops and Trains Motor Elements 30 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE Suppose that the cavalry develops a resistance on the line where its front elements are. In a short day’s march the leading elements of infantry will reach this line. It will require another day for the rear of the first line divisions to deploy. Twelve miles would be far too broad a front for two of our divisions to deploy. Considering that the corps front will not yet be every- where equally dense we might hurry forward one of the rear divisions. This one would take the third day to reach its place abreast of the leading divisions, and to deploy. Corps artillery must come from even farther back, but as it is motorized it can arrive quickly whenever the roads are free. Let us examine another formation of the corps—one that would require no more roads and the same frontage as before. (See Plate B.) The advantage of this system of march (Plate B) would seem to be: First:—That it is more flexible. It lends itself to changes of direction, even very abrupt ones. Second :—That half of the corps is not involved before the commander’s plan is very definite. It permits a greater maneuvering mass. Third:—That when necessary, three divisions can de- ploy abreast in two days’ march. The flank divisions have better opportunity to hurry their marches, for each has a free road for one of its main columns. The corps artillery is still within a day’s march any time that a road can be opened for it. If more roads were available, we would have an even more flexible formation as shown in Plate C. The corps in this case (Plate C) marches on a broader front. Its changes of direction are much simplified. Divi- sions have more room for the maneuvering of their trains. Security detachments, however, must operate on a broader front and more troops are required for this purpose. Von Alten recommends that if the corps is small, cor- responding in size to the European corps of two divisions, say 30,000 to 40,000 men, and it is necessary to march it on LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS 31 a) =z a CO) =z BEES ea Plate C one road, that the leading division furnish the advance guard for the whole column, using a brigade for this pur- pose if necessary. Also that the corps commander appoint a commander for the main body, so that the latter may look out for such things as halts, supplies during halts, and the general supervision of the march, leaving the corps com- mander free to consider the tactical problem, the informa- tion from his covering troops, reconnaissance of the coun- try and the necessary alterations in his dispositions that 382 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE may arise at any moment. Von Alten’s recommendation, however, was made before the Germans had developed the efficient general staff they have today. With our present system this is not necessary. As I stated before, I have given my ideas of the corps, spread out on its roads, not in order to discuss grand tactics, but to enable us to understand the problem of the direction of this big unit and how it functions. The cavalry is leading. Let us look at its functions. It reconnoiters, screens and perhaps protects flanks. We have two regiments. If a cavalry division is operating in front of the army, it may absorb the bulk of our cavalry as independent cavalry. If it did not, the corps would have ample to make its advance cavalry very strong, and could profitably use some of it for contact purposes with its flank connecting groups. If there were no army cavalry, two regiments, less one squadron, would give us a handy little force of independent cavalry for the corps. Its screen- ing ability would be stretched considerably, but its recon- noitering patrols could observe the corps front of advance and it could concentrate its force inside of three hours to back up patrols that were finding difficulty with hostile mounted troops. A squadron would remain to: be used as advance guard cavalry. The radius of the cavalry’s pack wireless is about thirty miles. It is probable that its messages would have to be relayed by the leading division. The corps should assist it with extra motorcycles. A G8 officer would be a useful man to have along side of the cavalry commander. He would aid the cavalry commander to keep in mind the corps commander’s viewpoint in judging the country and the events of first contact when that takes place. Informa- tion from the cavalry should pass through the leading divi- sion so that it may have immediate knowledge of forward events, but the information must not be delayed. As long as contact has not been made by the corps, the bulk of its information will come from the higher unit—the army. The reconnaissance of its own air service, however, will also be pushed well ahead; deeper, probably, than when a full development of the situation has taken place. The air LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS 33 service must be very active in locating new airdromes as the corps advances. The difficulty lies not in the fact that they cannot operate if the airdrome is left thirty or fifty miles behind the corps command post, but in leaving a con- stantly lengthening line of communication for corps signal troops to keep up. If good airdromes are not available every two or three days’ march, then the air service must at least find auxiliary landing grounds where their planes can come down without crashing. \ G2 has one other. source of. information. He has a trained force of observers. These, furnished with motor- cycles and motorcycle messengers, will be useful to supple- ment the reconnaissance of advance guards while the. corps is marching. As soon as contact is gained and the advance guard situation begins to develop they will be in their proper forward locations, and their usual communi- cation by wire can be established. In the development of contact from the point of view of operations the corps will endeavor to provide that the action develops in accordance with the necessities of its mis- sion. If the forward march of the corps had been gov- erned by march orders alone, there would have sprung up the necessity on the part of a division or other subordinate commander to make an independent decision. Even with our modern rapid means of communication, the corps com- mander would probably learn of it after the movement had started. The task of the corps would then be to exploit, to minimize, or to nullify the results of this decision. In or- der that the two last cases may not occur, the corps has issued general instructions, usually in the form of “letters of instruction,” in which the immediate subordinate com- manders are informed of the mission, and in a broad way, of the general plan of the corps commander for the execution of the mission. These letters look far enough into the probabilities of the future to enable division commanders to make a decision, in the absence of further orders, that will favor the development of the situation on the lines de- sired by the corps commander. As contact with the enemy develops, the operations section also bends every effort to assure contact with neigh- 84 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE boring corps; to keep roads open for bringing up fighting elements; to establish good communications; and to foresee the development of the situation so that troops and means 1n rear may be available in the proper shape and at the place and time, where and when they will be needed. .The tactics of the corps may require either penetration or envelopment. The task of G1 is much the same as when marching except that now ammunition, engineering material, and hospitalization will begin to take precedence. Dumps must be located with view to their use for a period of time. Cir- culation now becomes more or less continuous over the same roads and must be controlled. Headquarters divide into their fighting and non-fight- ing echelons, the latter being placed well behind near the railheads. The former must now be well forward to be able to reduce. the time necessary for the distribution of orders and information. Corps troops and trains will, if they have been held together for marching purposes, now commence to func- tion under their particular services. Suppose that after contact has developed, the mission of the corps becomes for the moment a holding or delaying one, requiring and permitting the organization, to a consid- erable degree, of the sector that it holds.. The whole or- ganization of the area will depend upon the plan of defense and little can be done until that plan takes definite form as to the lines to be held. The general policy of defense and the geographical line to be held will be enunciated by the army. The corps will issue the detailed policy determining much more in detail the lines and zones to be held, and will- oversee the execution of the work by divisions, assisted by corps troops. Divisions are too transient units to have much to do with a permanent policy of defense. They must take the defense scheme as they find it, improve it along the lines of semi-permanent policy prescribed by the corps, and turn it over to the relieving division, which in its turn, con- tinues to improve its positions in accordance with that policy. LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS 35 In preparing the corps standing field orders for defense, see “Form For Field Orders For the Defensive,” issued as insert for Appendix 3, Field Service Regulations. On the defensive the corps regulates the general policy with regard to the enemy; the amount of harassing fire; or the general policy with regard to raids, where and when and with what object they shall be executed, for instance. It is a great co-ordinator of effort on the part of our own ’ troops. For instance, two division flanks do not join up properly and conveniently. It is for the corps to say which shall move and which shall stand fast. Particularly in the matter of artillery fire, the corps plays a great role of co-ordination. The corps designates the command posts of its divisions and directs their movement if necessary. It uses its telegraph and field signal battalions to main- tain communication by all means to its divisions, to adjacent corps, to its own artillery if necessary, to its airdromes and rear echelons, and also to form, maintain, and operate its forward dumps of signal material. Its engineers are generally used for work on communi- cations in rear of the zone of the divisions and for the opera- tion, and maintenance of engineer dumps. They may aid in the construction of battery positions for the corps artillery, posts of command, rear positions, etc. The regiment of pioneer infantry gives a labor force to supplement the work of the engineers. Sometimes there is a large amount of road and light railway to be constructed. It has an air service composed of a group of three ob- servation squadrons, with photographic sections, and five balloon companies. One of each of these is usually desig- nated to work for each division in line. The corps retains the balance for work on the entire corps front. Its air service reconnoiters to a distance behind the enemy lines corres- ponding roughly to the range of the guns of the unit. The corps air service is responsible for a zone roughly eight kilo- meters behind the hostile front line. Again the corps is a co-ordinator of effort, particularly in the matter of photo- graphy; there is no use sending a division plane and a corps plane to photograph the same spot on the same morn- 36 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE ing. Applications for photographs are made to G2 of the corps who gives the mission to the air service. The corps balloons, being old residents, know the sector like a book, and their areas of visibility from different altitudes and positions are all charted, so that their powers and limita- tions are well known. There is a general rule of observa- tion, particularly for the adjustment of artillery fire, which is based on expense and which should be considered by staffs—don’t send a plane if a balloon can do the work, and don’t send up the balloon if ground observation can do it. The working of the corps artillery, its functions and missions, its relation, particularly to G2, to the air service, to the divisional artilleries and to ammunition supply is the subject of a separate lecture and is omitted here. The corps has a battalion for antiaircraft machine guns for the protection of its dumps, parks; railheads and posts of command. They are useful for the protection of bridges against bombing. Its cavalry can, for the moment, find little opportunity, except as reserves. Small detachments may be used to supplement the military police, to take charge of prisoners of war, and for courier purposes. The bulk should be kept in training and available for use as immediate reserves in case of movement. The military police control all traffic in rear of the zone of the divisions and in front of the army; they co-ordinate the work of the divisional military police. They have charge of the prisoner of war enclosure. The sanitary formations of the corps, four ambulance companies and four field hospitals, all motorized, are in general used to supplement the means of its divisions. Sometimes they are employed at the railhead in an evacua- tion capacity, when true evacuation formations are lacking. Sometimes they are used to accommodate special classes of casualties, as gas cases, or for handling severely wounded that will not bear shipment. Amplification of divisional facilities is, however, the governing idea. The corps mobile veterinary hospital and its field re- mount station act in a similar capacity in the evacuation and replacement of animals. LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS 387 The supply train of the corps assures the transportation of rations from the railheads to corps troops, or to distribut- ing points where it dumps its rations or turns them over to the field trains of corps troops. It does not, ordinarily, form a link in the divisional supply. The corps artillery park is in reality a corps ammuni- tion train—all motorized. Its use will be gone into separately. Due to the size of both of these trains and to the fact the number of corps troops to be rationed is comparatively small, G1 of the corps nearly always has a flexible reservoir of trucks with which he can assist divisions, execute road work, move engineering material and help in troop move- ments. The corps also has in the Tables of Organization a troop transportation train, corresponding in size to a sup- ply train, which is intended primarily for the motor trans- portation of troops. Its capacity is roughly 4,500 men at each trip. As we all know, under conditions such as obtained in the World War, the stay of divisions in the forward or battle area of the corps is transient. They are frequently re- lieved, necessitating troop movements in and out of the line. Artillery units, also, are continually coming and going. To do this, the corps is allotted an area in rear of its zone of fighting, where there is sufficient space for temporarily sheltering these troops in passing—in other words, a stag- ing area. The extent of the organization of this area will depend upon the time the corps has been in the sector. If possible, it will be well organized with good shelter—Adrian barracks to increase the billeting, rest stations, amusements, and increased bathing and delousing facilities. It is just as well if this area is within sound of the guns. As well, also, if it is located beyond the reach of all except extraordinary shelling. Under the direct charge of its G8, the corps may in- stitute in this area a training ground where instruction for special purposes may be had by large units in reserve. Such purposes with us have been co-operation between tanks and infantry and co-operation between the air service and zround troops. The British had a more extensive system 38 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE of corps schools, located in the corps rear areas. With us, however, the corps schools were such only in name. They were in reality General Headquarters schools. The zone of this big unit will extend from eight seit: meters or more in advance of its front lines to twenty or thirty kilometers in rear of them and have breadth, likewise, of twenty or thirty kilometers. Its depth will vary accord- ing to the number of divisions in line, the mission of the corps, whether it is more or less aggressive, and with the amount and character of accommodations for troops in its immediate rear areas. This zone is controlled by one mind. This mind in my opinion separates into five parts, but it is nevertheless one mind. There is the decisive part—the corps commander. There is the ca-ordinating part—the chief of staff; and there are the executive parts—the three sections of the general staff. The only personality of the staff is the chief. The other members prepare, put together, and work out in de- tail the data necessary to enable the commander to make his decision. The chief of staff presents this data to the commander and the plan based on his decision is then exe- cuted under the supervision of the staff who must be thor- oughly and equally familiar with all its details. The realm of G1 is the back area. He reaches forward to the combat area in the matter of supplies and traffic. The realm of G3 is the combat area, in which he is responsible to the chief of staff for information of our own troops, for the preparation of orders and their distribution and execu- tion. The realm of G2 begins immediately beyond our own front lines. It extends into the enemy territory as far as the means of the corps will permit. I have discussed briefly the services upon which Gi depends for supply, evacuation, etc., in the execution of the corps commander’s plans. Let us look very quickly at the corps G2 and his relations, above and below. From the army and neighboring corps, he gets by message and summary all available information of the enemy on other corps fronts, and deep in the enemy areas. Frequently this information is of value to him, although the source LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS 39 is an army or group of armies miles to the flank. A tele- phone connects directly to each of his own corps observation posts. In each are highly trained observers, specialists in the use of the field glass and telescope and who know the sector like a book. If the observer sees a battery in action, a switch on his table throws his voice into the phone of the corps counter-battery office, so that action can be had at once. G2 similarly is in close touch with the corps artillery with its extensive system of information. He has an officer at the airdrome who interrogates pilots and observers as soon as they land and who is his representative in assigning photographic missions. He sometimes has a direct line to the corps balloon. The corps prisoner of war enclosure is usually the place where the first exhaustive examination of prisoners is made. Coming up from below in the form of mes- sages and periodical reports is the mass of information gathered by divisional means. G2 of the corps tabulates, analyzes, and sends out this information in three directions: —up to the army by summaries, maps, and reports; down to the divisions by summaries, maps and messages; laterally to the other elements of the staff and services and to adja- cent corps by summaries, maps and studies. In addition he obtains and distributes all maps of the combat areas, and all codes, to the command, staff, corps troops and divi- sions in the corps. G3 drafts orders for reconnaissance, except that which is strictly intelligence work, for combat and troop movement. He insures the transmission of orders and hence must work directly with the signal officer. He is the first assistant to the command in the overseeing of combat, troop move- ment, and training. He is responsible that the location and situation of our own troops is known to the command. The G8 of the corps, like G2, is at the center of an up-and-down and lateral movement of situation, reports, station lists, maps, and messages. He deals with the engineer officer on matters of technical and tactical reconnaissance and execu- tion in combat; ‘with the air service on matters of tactical reconnaissance; with the artillery on matters of co- ordination of their power to further the general scheme; with the gas officer in matters of technical gas defense. A 40 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE great deal of enemy information of course comes in through G3 channels, and G3 is responsible for its proper distribution and usage. It is seen how closely these three sections must work to- gether. When I speak of G1 or G2 or G3, I mean, of course, the section—not the individual. In a corps, G1 will comprise five or six officers, G2 fourteen or fifteen, and G3 ten or eleven. A greater number is necessary than in a division because of the greater sector and greater means at the disposal of the corps, and also because the corps staff faces the tactical situation day after day for weeks on end; even the best officers must have sleep, and that means un- derstudies. A corps staff is a good place to train younger officers for divisional staff positions; but only after they have had experience with troops of a division. A plan of attack has been received by the corps from the army. What does the corps do? The corps com- mander and chief of staff will go over it personally, prob- ably in conference with the army commander, till the mis- sion and broad features and means at the disposal of the corps are known. Personal reconnaissances must be made by the commander and the staff. G2’s work goes on, fol- lowing the general lines which he has before pursued—but very much more intensified. Having his mission, the information of the enemy, a knowledge of the terrain by air and ground reconnaissance, and knowing the means, the troops at his disposal, the corps commander makes his broad plan. It is for the staff to prepare and facilitate his decision as much as possible and after it is made to fill in the chinks so that it works smoothly, and to get up the troops and material. The work of G1 and G3 is closely supervised by the chief of staff. To prepare for the coming attack, G1 must first know the general plan. The result of the decision to pass to the offensive will be in general to push forward all of his in- stallations. Ammunition, rations, and water must be dumped well forward. Engineering material and pyrotech- nics must be within reach of the combat troops. To get these corps parks forward and to facilitate the divisions LECTURE ON THE ARMY CORPS Al in drawing from them, new railway and light railway will have to be laid perhaps and new roads constructed or im- proved. The plan of circulation must be altered and the corps G1 must anticipate in this that the divisions will make their full penetration so that his plan will reach far into enemy territory. Evacuation of the corps also must be rearranged looking to a deep forward bound, so that the sanitary formations of the division may keep well up towards the combat zone of the division. The corps (under its G1) makes provision for establishing lines of straggler posts in rear of those of the divisions and reinforcing them. Those of the corps are designed to move forward as the attack pro- gresses, relieving the police of the divisions. The division cannot afford to have its men drifting back far to the rear in charge of prisoners. The corps G1 plans the location of the corps cage, so as to promptly relieve the divisions. Reports of casualties, prisoners, and material captured are all of. importance to the corps. Gl makes arrange- ments to secure this information promptly from all units in the corps. G8 drafts the orders for the attack in accordance with the corps commander’s plan. He is also charged with the direction of the assembly of the troops allotted for the at- tack. The artillery of the sector will probably be greatly reinforced. The new artillery is turned over bythe army, usually near the rear of the corps zone. It must then be marched to forward assembly positions from which it can make its reconnaissances and move gradually into its posi- tion without attracting enemy notice. Additional technical troops and usually fresh divisions will also have to be brought forward. The divisions -which have occupied the front of the corps will have to contract or be relieved. The front of the corps will usually be con- tracted until it comprises two or three divisions on an attack frontage of from five to seven miles if it is part of an army, six if alone. New corps as neighbors will possibly come in on the flank. Nowadays, all of this work, practically speaking, must be done at night to avoid enemy observation. 42 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE The troop movement subsection of the corps G3 is a busy place, for it must not only order, but also reconnoiter and supervise. Very briefly, in the relief of a division, the corps will order and supervise its move into a forward assembly area, usually within an easy night’s march of the sector it is to take over. It will prescribe routes, times, exact billeting or bivouacking spaces for all elements of the division, loca- tion of the division command post, and designation of its railhead, which has been secured from the army. It will specify and enforce very carefully its rigid restrictions on length of columns, traffic, lights and concealment. It will specify the manner and order in which the relief of the front line unit is to be conducted, the exact sector to be taken over, whether the movement is to be made wholly or in part by night, general character of dispositions to be adopted, routes available, shelled areas to be avoided, disposi- tions to be adopted, disposition of trains and echelons. The time the command of the sector will pass to the new division and the location of its command post will be designated by the corps. The time by which the relief is to be completed and the disposition of the outgoing unit are also specified. The corps always arranges for a conference of incoming and outgoing command and staff and facilitates the advanced re- connaissances of the new division. In its attack order the corps will sometimes supplement the inform&tion of the enemy in paragraph 1, by annexes or special studies issued to division commanders. The infor- mation of neighboring and higher units, its description of the mission of the corps, its boundaries, and of its objectives and time of attack must be so graphic as to give to its divi- sion commanders a striking picture of the maneuver of the mass as a whole. Paragraph 3 of the order must give a clear idea of the maneuvers expected from each of its divisions and how their maneuvers fit into the corps maneuver. It must in- sure that the rate of advance is co-ordinated. The func- tions, missions, and allotment of the special arms must be shown in the clearest form. Also the co-ordination of fire and movement on its flanks. For instance, FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 43 in the allotment of additional 75’s which the army may have placed at its disposal, the corps will decide from the situation, frontage and task assigned, to allot so many batteries or battalions to one division, so many to another. It may keep some to reinforce the corps artillery. Into its paragraph 4 and its annexes go all the results of G1’s planning and labor which I have before described. Into paragraph 5 and its annexes, all that is necessary to insure the transmission of information and orders be- tween all echelons and elements of the corps. It will spe- cify exactly how contact is to be maintained between its divisions and with those of the corps on either flank. When the attack starts, the echelons of the larger units may be likened to an old fashioned carriage. The divisions are the horses, pulling, digging their toes in, putting their weight in the collar, sweating, and getting tired. The corps is the driver guiding them, directing them, looking out for them, urging them on, sometimes with a whip, sometimes with the voice. The army is the owner, who sits in the back seat, pays the bills, feeds the whole outfit, and says where he wants to go and when he wants to get there. (A) THE FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE 2d CORPS CapTAIN ADNA R. CHAFFEE Cavalry This conference involves a discussion of the operations ‘of the 2d Corps, Ist Blue Army. For general and special situations see Chapter I, Field Orders No. 20, and Administrative Orders No. 10, 1st Blue Army. The 2d Corps, on November 234d, is in the area Liberty- town—Unionville—Bartholows—New Market—McKaig, and is disposed as follows (see map published with this book) : 5th Division: Libertytown (exclusive)—Unionville (inclu- sive)—Linganore . (exclusive)—Junction of Dolly- hyde and Linganore Creeks (exclusive). Command Post: Unionville. 44 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE 6th Division: Libertytown (inclusive)—Junction of Dolly- hyde and Linganore Creeks (inclusive)—T in Turn- pike (inclusive). Command Post: Libertytown. 7th Division: T in Turnpike (exclusive)—New London— (inclusive) —Bens Branch (inclusive)—McKaig (inclusive). Command Post: New London. ; 8th Division: Junction of Dollyhyde and Linganore Creeks (exclusive)—Linganore (inclusive)—Bens Branch (inclusive)—-New London (exclusive). Command Post: Linganore. a Corps Troops: Corps Headquarters, Libertytown. Corps Cavalry, in and near Libertytown. Field Signal Battalion, in and near Libertytown. Telegraph Battalion, in and near Libertytown. Corps Observation Group, | Near Frederick. Corps Balloon Group, Artillery Brigade, near New Market. Corps Artillery Park, near New Market. Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battalion, near New Market. Corps Sanitary Train, near New Market. Pioneer Infantry Regiment, near Bartholows. Engineer Regiment, near Bartholows. Engineer Train, near Bartholows. Engineer Ponton Train, near Bartholows. Supply Train, near New Market. Troop Transport Train, near Bartholows. Remount Depot, near Bartholows. Mobile Veterinary Hospital, near Bartholows. Meteorological Section, at Libertytown. Military Police Company, distributed. Required: The field orders of the corps commander for the march on the 24th and 25th and the attack order of the 26th. A Solution 2d Army Corps, LIBERTYTOWN, Mb., 23 Nov 19, 6:00 PM. FIELD aa No 1 Map: qSebUs. Eon nae erase Emmitsburg, Taneytown, Ijamsville and Mount 1. Reds have been concentrating on the line LANCASTER—HARRISBURG and are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported this date at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red aircraft have not appeared south of the MARYLAND—PENNSYLVANIA state line. All railroads to the north are reported intact. The 1st Army advances tomorrow towards the HANovER— z BURG line, covered by the 1st Cavalry Division. Onley of ue from east to west: 1st Corps, 2d Corps, 3d Corps. FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 45 2. The 2d Corps will advance with the 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions in line from east to west, the 8th Division in reserve. Zone of Advance: East Boundary: UNIONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE—MARKERS oe CREEK—ST. LUKES CHURCH (all exclu- sive). West Boundary: Monocacy RivErR—Toms CREEK—MIDDLE oo ee RoapD—MarRsH CREEK (all inclu- sive). 3. (a) The Corps Cavalry (less 1 squadron) will move at 7:00 AM, covering the front of the Corps. It will maintain contact with the 1st Cavalry Division in its front and with the cavalry of the 1st and 3d Corps. It will reconnoiter the Monocacy River, north of the mouth of Toms CREEK, select two cross- ings (capacity all arms), and report same by 5:00 PM, No- vember 24, 1919. It will be prepared to relieve that portion of the 1st Cavalry Division in its front on the 25th instant. One squadron (less 2 troops) is attached to the 7th Division; one troop is attached to each of the 5th and 6th Divisions. (b) The 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions will advance, each in its zone of advance, in not less than two main columns, maintaining connection with the divisions on their right and left, and with the Corps Cavalry in their front. Heads of advance guards will ea line WALKERSVILLE—LIBERTYTOWN—OLDFIELD at 7: 7 Zone of Advance: 5th Division: East Boundary: East boundary of Corps. West Boundary: LIBERTYTOWN (exclusive) — MIDDLEBURG (exclusive) eastern half of TANEYTOWN (inclusive)—-Two TAVERNS (in- clusive). 6th Division: East Boundary: West boundary 5th Divi- sion. West Boundary: CENTERVILLE (inclusive) — LaDIESsBURG— (exclusive) —-NaILorS MILL— (exclusive)—BRIDGEPORT (inclusive) — TANEYTOWN RoapD (inclusive). 7th Division: East Boundary: West boundary of 4th Division. West Boundary: West boundary of Corps. The advance guards and rear elements of each division will reach the lines designated on the dates specified below: November 24th. Advance Guards: North of Bic Pirge CREEK, by 6:00 PM. Rear elements: North of the LiserTY TURNPIKE and NEW WINbsoR RoaD by 2:30 PM, and north of an east and west line, through Prirst- LAND ScHOOL—THE HILL ScwHoot by 6.00 November 25th. Advance Guards: North of an east and west line through LiTTLESTOWN—F AIRPLAY, by 6:00 PM. Rear elements: North of an east and west line through GaLt Kump P. O.—St. JosEPHS ACa- DEMY, by 6:00 PM. The UNIONVILLE—CLEMSONVILLE— UNION BripGeE—BarkK HILL—FAIRVIEW ScHooL—TANEYTOWN road is assigned to the 5th Div until 6:00 PM, Nov 25th. 46 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE The roads east of APPOLDS (incl.) — MottTers (excl.) St. JosSEPHS ACADEMY (excl.) —EMMITSBURG (excl.) — McCuEary’s SCHOOL (excl.) are assigned to the 7th Division until 6:00 PM, Nov 25th. (c) The 8th Division will move on November 24th to the area OLD- FIELD—LIBERTYTOWN— UNIONVILLE. Heads of its columns will remain south of LINGANORE CREEK until 1:30 PM after which hour all roads east of the LiIsBERTYTOWN—NEw LONDON road (excluded) will be available for its movement. On November 25th it will move to the area SHARETT’S—BRUCEVILLE—KEY- MAR—MIDDLEBURG following in the zone of the 5th Division. The 8th Division passes to Army Reserve on 24th November. (d) The Corps Air Service will commence its reconnaissance at day- break tomorrow and will maintain constant observation of the enemy movement on the Corps front south of the YorK PIKE. It will observe and report upon the Corps advance each day at 8:00 AM, 12:00 noon, and 5:00 PM. It will select a landing field near TANEYTOWN and be prepared to move thereto on the 25th. (e) For other Corps Troops see March Table attached._ (x) Division Commanders, in their zones of advance are charged with taking all necessary means of security, both on the march and while halted. 4. For administrative details see Administrative Orders No 5, 2d Corps. 5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication. See Annex No 1. (Omitted.) (b) Axes of Signal Communication: 2d Corps and 6th and 8th Divisions: LIBERTYTOWN—JOHNS- VILLE—M IDDLEBURG—BRUCEVILLE — TANEYTOWN — HARNEY— Low DutcH road. 5th Division: UNIONVILLE—560—BETHEL CHURCH —OTTER- DALE MiILL—TANEYTOWN—528—568—Two TAaveERNS—BOoN- NEAUVILLE. 7th Division: McKaic—MtT. PLEASANT—WALKERSVILLE— FREDERICK TURNPIKE—NEwWw Mipway—KEYSvVILLE—F'AIRPLAY —EMMITSBURG ROAD to GETTYSBURG. (ec) Command Posts: Corps: No change (opens at TANEYTOWN at 4:00 PM, 25 Nov 19). 5th Division: UNION BRIDGE (after 4:00 PM, 24 Nov 19). WASHINGTON SCHOOL (after 4:00 PM, 25 Nov 19). 6th Division: MippLEBuRG (after 4:00 PM, 24 Nov 19). HARNEY (after 5:00 PM, 25 Nov 19). 7th Division: New Mipway (after 4:00 PM, 24 Nov 19). BOLLINGER SCHOOL (after 4:00 PM, 25 Nov 19). 8th Division: LIBERTYTOWN (after 4:00 PM, 24 Nov 19). BRUCEVILLE (after 4:00 PM, 25 Nov 19). By command of Major General F x : Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG 17. Corps Surg. 2.CofS 18. Corps AS Comdr. 8-5. G1. 19. CG Prov Corps Cav Brig. 6-8. G2. 20. Corps Arty Pk. 9-11. G3. 21. CO A-A MG Bn. 12-14. C Corps Arty. 22. CO Sn Tn. 15. CG Corps Arty Brig. 23. CO Corps Pion Regt. 16. Corps Engr O. 24. CO Engr Th. *L9YV] PoPVoUNUWIUIOD aq [IM ‘GIGT ‘GZ TEqUIsAON 10F JUSMIOAOTT 47 West Boundary of 6th Div- 40-41. Adj 2d Corps. 35. CG 5th Div. 36. CG 6th Div. 37. CG 7th Div. 38. CG 8th Div. 39. War Diary. 42. Corps Sig O. 43-49. Spare. 50. Corps Gas O. 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CO Engr Pon Tn. 26. CO Sup Tn. 27. CO Tr Transport Tn. 28. Corps Rmt O. 29. CO 2d Pion Inf. 30. CO 1st Pon Tn. 31-32. CG 1st Army. 33. CG 1st Corps. 34. CG 3d Corps. sdiog AwIY pg ‘T “00929: T ‘AaAIng [eo1so0foaxy : dey ON sdoprg prety Aueduiosse oJ, aTaVL HOUVW ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE 48 LIBERTYTOWN, MD., 24 Nov 19, 12:00 Noon. 2d Corps, TROOP MOVEMENT ORDER No 1. Map: 1:62500. ir forward tinue the movement on the 25th inst. under FO No 1, 2d Corps. ivisions con 2. The following movement of Corps Troops is ordered for the 1. The 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th D 25th inst. ‘ID Aq peep se suy, 410d -suely If, pue dng ‘Wd 08:8 - ouog: alojaq AV MAI SMIdNYAL, ia aieer nt Gia ae MIN ssed 07 JONT MOINAaTY YT ATTIASATY gyooa'yT jul uolg pz [euojop e : das Z4UI ss 3 AIG YXG ayy Jo HOUNHD TTY IIvayILLO jo ATHASN HOP : : au sat pee , Suunjos Zurmoj[oy WHIGg LA yqtou aw 3auGQ jo yseq (sjap Sur Wd 0g: 78 JARISs OF “YIOM Ssal) yay asuq V [eucjop °% (das 27yW1) Uy, ASU “AT 449 24} Jo savoy nd My. 'sd10} __ Suumnos Surmorjoy ouNAIIadIp, pure ae a eee Wd 00:7 48 441ey8 of, aTMATONIg BLA WALSAVAD, te jo uolsay AITIASNHOL q uay Sug T syleuay aqnoy oL wort “IpUIOg FW *31O "ON [Bltag By command of Maj. Gen. A xX Chief of Staff. FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 49 Distribution: 1. CG. 9-14. Brig Gen B. 2. Chief of Staff. 15-17. Colonel A. 3. G1. 18-20. Colonel. F. 4, G2. 21. G83 1st Army. 5. G3. . 22. G1 1st Army. 6. Corps Adj. 23. G4 1st Army. 7. Corps Engr. 24. Corps Sig O. 8. Corps Surg. (B) THE FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE 1st CORPS Magsor H. J. BREEs, Cavalry The 1st Corps, on November 23d, is in the area Mt. Airy—Weldon—Winfield—Lisbon, and is disposed as shown on 1:62500 map issued with this book. Command Post, 1st Division, Gosnell. Command Post, 2d Division, Winfield. Command Post, 3d Division, Welden. Command Post, 4th Division, Poplar Springs. Required: The field orders of the corps commander for the march of November 24th. Note:—1. Administrative orders and annexes are not required. 2. If march tables or maps are used or referred to in field orders they will be required in solution. A: Solution 1st Army Corps, Mr. Airy, Mp., 28 Nov 19, 7:00 PM. FIELD ae No 1 Maps: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, 1” = 10 miles. Geological Survey 1:62500. 1. Reds have been concentrating on the line LANCASTER—HARRISBURG and are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported this date at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red aircraft has not appeared south of the MARYLAND—PENNSYLVANIA state line. The 1st Army advances tomorrow towards the HANOVER—GET- TYSBURG line, covered by the 1st Cavalry Division. Order of battle from east to west: 1st Corps, 2d Corps, 3d Corps. 2. This Corps will advance, with the 2d and 3d Divisions in line from east to west, and cover the right of the 1st Army. 50 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE Zone of Advance: East boundary: Parrs RIpGE—UNION MILLS—HANOVER— East BERLIN (all inclusive). West boundary: UNIONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE (both ex- clusive)—-MaRKERS MILL—PINEY CREEK—StT. LUKES CHURCH (all inclusive). : 8. (a) The Corps Cavalry (less 2 troops) will clear the NEw WINDSOR Road at 7:00 AM. It will cover the front of the Corps. It will maintain connection with the 1st Cavalry Division in its front, and with the cavalry of the 2d Army on its right and the 2d Corps on its left. It will reconnoiter early the front EBBVALE— VALLEY JUNCTION—HANOVER. It will be prepared to relieve that portion of the 1st Cavalry Division in its front on the 25th instant. One troop will be attached to each of the 2d and 3d Divisions. (b) The 2d Division will advance, in its zone of advance, with not less than two main columns. It will maintain connection with the 2d Army on its right, with the 3d Division on its left, and with the Corps Cavalry in its front. Special pre- oe will be taken to insure the security of the right ank. : Zone of Advance: East boundary: Same as Corps. West boundary: TAYLORSVILLE—MARSTON—J ASONTOWN— FRIZZELBURG (all inclusive)—-PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL (exclusive) VALLEY GROVE SCHOOL (inclusive) —FELTY »__ SCHOOL (exclusive). Heads of advance guards will cross the line DENNINGS— Oak ORCHARD at 7:00 AM and will be north of UNIOoN- TOWN Roap by 6:00 PM. Rear elements will clear LIBERTYTOWN TURNPIKE by 12:00 noon, and will be north of an east and west line through WARFIELDSBURG by 6:00 PM. (c) The 3d Division will advance, in its zone of advance, with not less than two main columns. Connection will be maintained with divisions on its right and left, and with Corps Cavalry in its front. Zone of Advance: East boundary: West boundary of 2d Division. West boundary: West boundary of Corps. Heads of advance guards will cross the line DENNINGS— Oak ORCHARD at 7:00 AM and will be north of UNION- TOWN Roap by 6:00 PM. Rear elements will clear Liperty TURNPIKE by 12:00 noon, and will be north of an east and west line through McKInstrys MILL by 6:00 PM. (d) The 1st Division is designated as corps reserve and will fol- low the 2d Division. It will be prepared to cover the right of the Corps. Heads of columns will cross the CABBAGE SPRING BRANCH at 11:00 AM, at which hour all roads east of Ripce Roap, inclusive, WELDON, exclusive, will be available Rear elements will clear the LiperTY TURNPIKE by 4:00 PM. All elements of the Division will be in the area WARFIELDSBURG —BalLeS MILL—MarstoN—DENNINGS—MorGAN CREEK Lees MILL (all inclusive) by 6:00 PM. (e) The 4th Division will concentrate near TAYLORSVILLE. Heads of columns will cross the line WoopBINE—Mr. Ary at 3:00 PM, at which hour all roads will be available. This division passes to Army Reserve on November 24th. (f) The Corps Air Service will commence its reconnaissance at daylight tomorow. It will maintain constant observation of FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 51 the enemy movement in the Corps front, south of the York Pike. It will make special flights toward VALLEY JUNCTION and HANovER JUNCTION and determine the enemy activity in that vicinity. It will observe and report upon the Corps ad- vance at 8:00 AM, 12:00 noon, and 5:00 PM. It will select a landing field in the general vicinity of UNION MILLS and be prepared to move thereto on the 25th. For Plan of Air Ser- vice see Annex No 2 (Omitted). (g) For other Corps Troops see March Table attached. (x) All troops will advance prepared for action. Proper measures for security will be insured both on the march and at halts. 4. See Administrative Orders No 5 (Omitted). 5. (a) Plan of Signal Communications: See Annex No 1 (Omitted). (b) Axes of Signal Communications: Corps: Mt, AIRY—WELDON—NEW WINDSOR—UNIONTOWN— UNION MILLS. 2d Division: TAYLORSVILLE— W ARFIELDSBURG— WEST MINSTER— UNION MiLLS—SELLS STATION—NEW OXFoRD. 8d Division: WELDON—NEW WINDSOR—UNIONTOWN—BEAR Mount ScHOOL—PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL—LITTLESTOWN —WHITEHALL—CEDAR RIDGE. 1st Division: Same as 2d Division. (c) Command Posts: Corps: No change. 2d Division: To open at Sprines MILLs at 4:00 PM. 8d Division: To open at New WINDsoR at 4:00 PM. 1st Division: To open at WARFIELDSBURG at 4:00 PM. Ath Division: To open at TAYLORSVILLE at 6:00 PM. By command of Major General C. XYZ Chief of Staff. Copies to: Corps Staff Corps AS 1st Div Corps Troops 2d Div 1st Army 3d Div 2d Army 4th Div 2d Corps Corps Cav ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE 52 veg A— ug [L— “oso ug 41g I— Aq payeip sv ‘ 6I-PZ-1T 9 dsoH PA FOW— WV 08: IL #8 qBIS T ‘ON [Blas uoryE20'T daq yuay— I ON TeMes moTjoy oF, se oules uopPem queserg ig ureydep 6I-PZ-IT = “9 Wd 088 atojzoq Sey] SOM Ja}Uus 0} JON us sueiy, ITL— oe Wd 00° 8 uopre mM Ya1O0 sues uorye00',T ub dug— ye AY “WA Teapo OL —peoy oeyng JO APULIA queserg tq ureydeQ = 6 T-PS- TT ? ‘Wd THN siepsug 00:7 aLojoq ayiduany, —Yypo1p sues 909 AAIOQUT ssotd 0} JON —ucpla M— uorqoun pe peoy uor}e00'T uy ug— ‘Wd 00:8 78 1838 OL —peoy espny Jo AMUTOIA queseig 79 [00 YI 6I-FS-TT 8 THA, Sxupsug preqoig 3A2O —097—L8F ul, Iuq 2g ZAI— sugrjounpe poy ug SW V-V— ‘Wd 0878 44 SiI®a —preuoqeW— Ad Ayay sdi0g 4sT— 4859 AA ivesla oL set SOM IA savpsugq uol}eo0'Ty aug Va— "Wd 08: 31 32 9487S OL —peoy ojeyng JO ABUL A queserg tq wep 2g = 6T-FZ-TT 3 - uL uog aisuq— U0 TeTAL (das zyuL SS9[) us isugq— —uopleam@— sisuyq— peoy oyeygng UdpSIV]AL uolryzZo0'7™_, yur uolq— “WV 00° IL 48 Heys OL —Ssed 39M jo AQUA quaserg VW PUCOD ~—s- GIFS oT syTeUsy seqnoy oL wo y Slapuswu0g pus ssiC ayeq “ON [ees a1TaVL HOUVA "00989: I ‘AeAing [Bv1sofoax) : dept ‘sdiop Away 4ST ‘T ON OW Aueduodse oF, FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 53 (C) THE FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE 2d DIVISION Magsor R. O. VAN Horn, Infantry The general principles and rules governing the march of a division acting independently apply equally to the march of a division in a corps. There are a few points, some of which apply only to the march of a division as part of a larger force, and others that apply to all marches, which should be brought out particularly. As a basis for the more detailed study of the march of a division as part of a corps, a problem with a solution is included for review. This will be discussed in detail. In the comparison of the march of a division as part of a larger force, with the action of a division independently, certain striking differences appear. These are: 1. THE ASSIGNMENT OF A ZONE OF ADVANCE: A strip of territory within which the division must march may be prescribed. The division may use any or all roads within its zone of advance, but those only. The boundary of the zone of advance should never be a road. 2. THE DESIGNATION OF FRONT AND REAR BOUNDARIES: In an ordinary march not involving battle, the line that a division’s advance elements must reach by a certain time, and the line that its rear elements must clear by a specified time may be, and generally are, stated. This designation of boundaries and the prescribing of a zone of advance is necessary for the reason that other divisions are generally on one or both sides and a division, or the corps troops are following in rear. Every chance for a conflict of authority must be prevented. 3. USE oF CAVALRY: On account of the fact that corps or army cavalry, or both, are out in front of the division, the cavalry of the division can seldom, if ever, be used as independent cavalry. Its employment would be as advance cavalry or as advance guard cavalry. In any case, the army or corps cavalry is in advance or on either flank, or it may be both to the front and on the flanks. 54 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE 4, THE NUMBER OF COLUMNS in which the division must march is determined by its limits of action or boundaries, and whether it is alone or is part of a larger force; also by the proximity of the “approach to battle’ phase. A march on as broad a front as the tactical situation justifies is always desirable for the comfort of the troops and ease of supply. When columns are properly separated, the greater the number, the less is the delay in changing from column of route to approach formation. ‘In all cases the composition of columns must be care- fully studied with a view to a possible deployment. Due consideration must be given to the probable time available for deployment, the number of roads and the size of the command. It might also be well to repeat here that, as march conditions cease and the “approach to battle” forma- tion commences, roads for the march of infantry become less important. The commander of a column, or of any unit, should know its length, the time taken to pass a given point and the time necessary for deployment. This data is used con- stantly. A day’s march should be considered as part of a whole and larger operation, as preliminary to the work of the fol- lowing day or days and never as a single operation in itself. The absolute necessity of avoiding the crossing of columns is of more importance when the division is part of a larger force than when acting alone, as the other forces may become involved in the consequent confusion. Should one division march in rear of another, the order of march of the rear division, if the tactical situation per- mits, should be such as to facilitate its possible deployment on the flank of the leading division. Should two divisions be required to march on one road and the situation be such that the column must be shortened, one method deserving consideration is that of marching the artillery and transport on the road, with the infantry on one or both sides of the road. In this case the advance guard must mark the routes of the infantry and the whole force should be under a single command. FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 55 If a division is split into columns or camped in a single column along the route of march, it may be found better to prescribe in the march order separate initial points for the various organizations, and to designate the time of start of each column or the separate parts of a single column. To camp along the route of march is more comfortable for the command. To close up before halting is better, if the enemy is likely to be met. In a retreat, as all transport must precede troops, the closing up of a long column before halting is necessary, in order to allow the troops to reach their wagons and to allow the wagons to start before the troops march again. If a division is marching on the flank of a corps the same ‘precautions as for all flank marches must be taken, viz.: special security for exposed flank, troops so disposed that deployment toward the exposed flank can be quickly effected, and, if the enemy is near and on the flank, all the elements of the column closed up, and no large units of artillery in a compact body without infantry protection. Night marches under present warfare conditions will be of more frequent occurrence; increasingly so as nearness to enemy and possibility of air bombardment and observation grows greater. : During the concentration of large forces in close prox- imity to the enemy, either during battle or preparatory thereto, forces cannot be formally marched to the place desired without exposing the concentration or possibly suffering heavy losses. Troops in this case can be moved only at night, or in thick weather. The movement must be concealed from the enemy and should be from one cover to another, so that when the movement is finally completed, cover is reached from which the command can be employed in action at the time and place desired. The division commander of a division acting alone or as part of a larger force, whenever the enemy is likely to be met, must be well to the front where he can personally and promptly make decisions. In this connection, it may be noted that less time is lost, even during a march, if the commander maintains fixed command posts than if he oc- cupies a place in column and moves continually with it. 56 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE Such command posts could be established, for example, near the head of the advance guard (depending always upon the actual situation), and could be occupied until the rear of the advance guard approaches. They could then be moved to another place near the head and continue in this manner for the entire march. As stated before, in order to bring out more definitely some of the points involved in a march of a division acting as part of a larger force, the following problem and its solution are introduced for discussion: Situation: Assume the situation of the 2d Division, lst Army Corps, on November 23d on receipt of Field Orders No: 1, 1st Army Corps, as published herewith in Chapter II. Required: 1. The formal order issued by the Commanding Gen- eral, 2d Division, for the march of November 24th. A Solution First Requirement: Assume that a warning order, giving briefly the data relative to the 2d Division, was telephoned from corps head- quarters at 7:00 PM, November 23, 1919. 2d Division, WINFIELD, MD., 23 Nov 19, 7:30 PM. FIELD ORDERS | No 1 Map: 1:62500, Mount Airy and Taneytown quadrangle. This division moves north tomorrow in two main columns: Right Column (Brig Gen B, Comdg), 3d Brig, 2d FA Brig (less 5th LA), So A, 2d Engrs, 8th Amb Co and Tr A, 1st Cav, via WINFIELD—WaR- TIELDSBURG road; left column (Brig Gen C, Comdg) 4th Brig, 5th LA, Co B, 2d Engrs and 7th Amb Co, via TAYLORSVILLE—DENNINGS road. Advance guards both columns will cross OAK ORCHARD—DEN- NINGS line at 7:00 AM. Entire division will be north of Liserty TURN- PIKE by noon. March order will follow. By comand of Major General X, Y oy: Chief of Staff. Pistribution: By telephone and courier to: . 1st Corps CO 2d F Sig Bn Div Staff CO 2d Obsn Sq All Brig and Regtl Comdrs CO Tns CO 4th MG Bn CO Sn Tn CO Tr A 1st Cav FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 57 2d Division, WINFIELD, Mp., 23 Nov 19, 8:30 PM. FIELD ORDERS t No 2 Maps : General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam: Scale 1”=10 miles: U. Ss. Geological: Survey, 1:62500. TROOPS: fa) Right Column: Brig Gen B Comdg Tr A 1st Cav 3d Brig 2d FA Brig (less 5th »LA) Co A 2d Engrs 8th Amb Co 2d F Sig Bn (less dets) Sup Tn (b) Left Column: (c) Brig Gen C, Comdg 4th Brig 5th LA Co B 2d Engrs 7th Amb Co 4th MG Bn Center Column: Col E, CO Tns, Comdg 2d Engrs( less Cos A and B 2d Sn Tn (less 7th and 8th Amb Cos) Am Tn Engr Tn Tn Hq and MP 1. Reds concentrating on the line LAN- CASTER—HARRISBURG are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported this date at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red aircraft has not appeared south of MaryYLAND— PENNSYLVANIA state line. The Blue forces advance north- ward; the 1st Corps on the right of the 1st Army, 2d and 3d Division in front line, 2d on the right; 1st Divi- sion in corps reserve follows 2d Divi- sion, 4th Division passes to army re- serve. Our corps cavalry covers front of corps with the army cav- alry division in its front. 2. This Division with Tr A, 1st Cavalry attached, will advance northward in two main columns. Zone of advance: East boundary: Parrs RipGeE— WESTMINSTER (both incl.). West boundary: TAYLORSVILLE —MarsTton — JASONTOWN —FRIZZLEBURG (all incl.). Head of advance guards will cross the line DENNINGS—OAK Or- CHARD at 7:00 AM and will be north of UNIONTOWN Roap by 6:00 PM. Rear elements of division will clear LIBERTY TURNPIKE by 12:00 noon and will be north of an east and west line through WARFIELDSBURG by 6:00 PM. 3. (a) The Right Column will start from northern exit WINFIELD at 5:40 AM 24 Nov 19, and proceed via 847—732—WaARFIELDS- BURG—SPRING MILLS on WESTMINSTER. Connection will be maintained with the 2d Army cavalry on its right, with the corps cavalry in its front and with the left column of this division on its left. Particular attention will be given to the security of the right flank. Upon arrival at crossroads 732 (13 mi. south of WARFIELDSBURG) the 6th HvA will proceed, paralleling the march of the columns, via STONE CHAPEL and AVONDALE to vicinity of SHRIVERS MILL and await further orders. : : The Supply Train upon arrival at crossroads 732 will pro- ceed to STONE CHAPEL and join center column when it passes. (b) The Left Column will start from northern exit TAYLORSVILLE at 5:45 AM 24 Nov 19, and march via DENNINGS—681—665— WAKEFIELD MiLt—517—-on FRIzZzLeBurG. Connection with corps cavalry in front, and the 3d Division on its left will be maintained. 58 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE The 4th MG Bn after passing DENNINGS, will be utilized as a connecting detachment between our right and left col- umns, paralleling march of heads of columns and covering the march of the center column in its rear. : : (c) The Center Column will follow the left column without dis- tance to DENNINGS, thence via 745—BAILE—STONE CHAPEL to just south of AVONDALE and await further orders. (d) The 2d F Sig Bn will maintain connection between the two columns by radio and will operate commercial wire lines along route and wherever necessary within zone of the divi- sion. (e) The 2d Obsn Sq, operating from corps landing field will recon- noiter to front and right flank of the division with a view to prompt discovery of any signs of the enemy. wets (x) (1) Advance guard distances will be reduced to a minimum until the heavy artillery and center column leave main routes, after which full distances may be taken. | (2) Halts will be for 10 minutes each hour, commencing on the hour. The noon halt will be from 12:00 noon until 1:00 PM. 4, (a) The field trains of each column will march in rear of their re- spective columns without distance until last units clear LIBER- TYTOWN PIKE at noon, after which time such other disposi- tions as desired may be ordered by column commanders. (b) Division Refilling Point after 23 Nov 19, at AVONDALE. 5. (a) Plan of Signal Communications. See Annex I (omitted). (b) Axes of Signal Communications. Division: WINFIELD—-WARFIELDSBURG—SPRING MILLS— WESTMINSTER. ae Right Column: Same as Division., Left Column: TAYLORSVILLE— DEN NINGS— WAKEFIELD STA.— WAKEFIELD MILL—FRIZZLEBURG. (c) Command Posts: Division: WINFIELD to 11:00 AM. WaARFIELDSBURG after 11:00 AM. Sprine Minus after 4:00 PM. Right Column: Initial WINFIELD; 813 (1 mile east of DEN- NINGS) by 11:00 AM. ae eas Initial TAYLORSVILLE: DENNINGS, by 11:00 By command of Major General X Y Distribution: Chief of Staff. 1st Corps CO 2d F Sig Bn Div Staff CO 2d Obsn Sq All Brig and Regtl Comdrs CO Tns CO 4th MG Bn: CO Sn Tn CO Tr A 1st Cav Discussion of Solution WARNING ORDER: Whenever possible troops should have warning, before they go to bed, of a march to be com- menced before the usual hour of rising the next morning. This action can properly be assumed as taken by the corps. As there may be some delay in getting out the formal march order for the division, and as notice of move is only re- ceived at 7:00 PM, it is a wise precaution to issue a short FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 59 warning order at once. The detailed composition of columns cannot be given at this time, but the main combatant units can be designated. This is enough to enable the command- ing officer of each column to decide upon the troops to form the advance guard. These troops should have as early information as possible as they must get up earlier than usual to prepare. PARAGRAPH 1 OF ORDER: This paragraph is simply a repetition of all the information of the enemy and of our own troops, as given in the corps order, with some added informa- tion regarding the division. Everything that may be of interest to senior commanding officers of troops and to staff officers to enable them to comprehend the full nature of the entire movement should be given. The elimination of details that would be of value to the enemy is more properly a function of the commanders whose orders reach down to the individual soldier. PARAGRAPH 2 OF ORDER: Here the tactical decision to march in two main columns is stated, setting forth also the limitations that apply to the command as a whole. The boundaries of the division zone of advance only cover the first day’s march. This is enough for that day’s march. For first consideration comes this question: Is it possible under the prescribed limitations to move the entire division north of the Liberty Turnpike in two columns by noon? To reach the Oak Orchard—Dennings line the right column has to march three and one-half miles, the left column about three miles. Under the conditions of the situation this re- quires the right column to start from Winfield at 1 hour and 24 minutes before 7:00 AM or at 5:36 AM; the left column at 1 hour and 12 minutes before, or at 5:48 AM, say at 5:30 and 5:45 to give a little leeway. Dividing the division into two columns as nearly equal as possible, considering the units desired for each column to fulfill the tactical necessity, not allowing for advance guard distances, and having all trains marching without distance, gives us a total length for the right column of 26,115 yards, or a little less than 15 miles, and for the left column 25,750 yards or about 144 miles. At 24 miles per hour this will take 6 hours, and 5 hours and 48 minutes respectively or, to clear the Liberty Turn- 60 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE pike, a start at 6:00 AM and 6:12 AM for right and left columns. As it was found that these columns must start at 5:30 and 5:45 to reach the Dennings—Oak Orchard line by 7:00 AM;; the difference in time will allow the advance guard of right column 30 minutes’ marching time, and the advance guard of left column 27 minutes’ marching time in which to gain their distances. The distances therefore, until after noon, or until some units leave the columns, cannot exceed 2200 yards and 1980 yards respectively. Considering that the cavalry division of the army, and the corps cavalry as well, are out in front, and also that before the division passes the area now covered by these forces, a center column is formed from troops on each of the two main roads, it is seen that these maximum distances for the advance guard will be ample, until the time the center column is formed, after which the restriction would no longer apply. Therefore, the division can be marched in two main columns and at the same time comply with the order. To go in detail into all sides of the question affecting the decision to march in two main columns, it may be well to point out the other alternatives. These are: (1) to send motorized units, sufficient to shorten columns to desired length, tonight on each main road to points north of the Dennings—Oak Orchard line and have them wait there, off main route, and take place in rear of columns as they pass; (2) to utilize the only other route shown on the map as a good road within the boundaries and which leads north, viz.: the road leading east from Daniel, or the 817 (two miles south of Winfield)—Barrett—713 road and from thence either north or via 840—844 and Bloom; have the designated motorized units march via this road until head of column reaches the route of right column, and there await further orders, or follow right column. Either of these solutions would be satisfactory, but as there seems no likelihdod of delay during the first part of the march on the 24th inst., the decision stated in the order might be a little simpler. , PARAGRAPH 3 OF ORDER: The dispositions of the three columns as ordered in 8 (a), (b) and (c) only present the difficulty of getting the number and kind of troops desired FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 61 for each column into two nearly equalized bodies (the right column to be about a half mile longer than the left on account of the little earlier start). This involves an accurate figur- ing of road spaces for each unit, and the transfer of tacti- cally unimportant units from one column to another until the proper lengths of columns are reached. The orders to columns to insure connection with each other and with units to front and flank are nothing out of the ordinary. This connection must always be assured by the commander of a column, whether specifically ordered or not. Special stress is given in the corps order to the security of the right flank. This is noted in the order for the right column and also, later on, additional precautionary measures are taken by the use of the air service. The heavy artillery is so placed that at all times it can bring fire on the right flank. In order to make room for division and corps troops in rear, as directed in the corps order, the depth of the zone of advance has to be diminished. This is done by forming a center column of motor-drawn vehicles and ordering them to a point, not so far forward as to be unsafe, to await fur- ther orders. These units, or part of them not needed, might be allowed to go into camp upon arrival at the point selected, but it seems advisable to delay until the situation at that time is better known. 3 As a space of about three miles separates the two main columns at times, a detachment of some kind should march between the columns to insure connection between them, and to act as an additional protection to the center column. To visit the head of each column from time to time, a motor unit would be found a saving of hardship to infantry. In the present situation, the division machine gun battalion, motor- ized, can easily and satisfactorily do this work. Removing it from the infantry column is an advantage, and it will also be available to help out either column if needed. Its use therefore for this purpose seems preferable to infantry. The single troop of cavalry with the division is placed under the orders of the right column commander, as most of its work will be on that flank. Perhaps it would have been as well to have given a platoon to’the left column but it 62 ARMY CORPS IN AN ADVANCE is thought the few motorcycles with that body can perform the desired connection with the corps cavalry in front and the 3d Division on the left. ' PARAGRAPH 3 (d) OF ORDER: There is nothing unusual in the situation. No wire is desired to be strung at the present time, and connection is ordered maintained by radio and use of commercial telephones. The radio would also receive messages from the corps and army cavalry radio sets out in front. The signal troops are assigned a place in the right column to be nearer the exposed right flank, but with all the detachments detailed with the various headquarters and working on the axis of communications, very few men will actually march in column. For safety, however, full distance was allowed to the unit in figuring road space. This could have been reduced by at least half if necessary. PARAGRAPH 3 (e) OF ORDER: Whenever a division is operating as part of a corps the division observation squad- ron joins the corps air service and works out from their airdrome, and has use of the corps park for repairs, etc. They are still under the orders of the division commander, however. This procedure is followed in the present instance. They are only ordered to observe the front and flank par- ticularly charged to the 2d Division. PARAGRAPH 3, x (1) AND x (2) directs attention to the necessity for reduced advance guard distances during first part of march. Column commanders have all the data neces- sary to figure this out for themselves, but it is a wise pre- caution to call special attention to it. The division com- mander has a good check on the movement in the copy of the orders sent him by each column commander. These orders will be checked, and if found not to conform with the restrictions, there will still be time to order a change before the march starts. This is better than to order the details of the march of each column in the division order. Halts are a matter of routine and as such are properly left out. Ifa delay of any kind was expected, the noon halt could have been ordered later to get troops north of the Liberty Turnpike before noon, but as no such delay seems FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE 63 likely under the special situation, it seems better not to interfere with the customary hours of meals. PARAGRAPH 4 OF ORDER: The division refilling point should be stated in the field order when no administrative order is annexed. This’is given as Avondale. This location was assumed to be given in the administrative annex to the corps order (omitted in problem). Any other suitable location could have been assumed equally as well. In the present situation all field trains can properly fol- low at the tail of their respective columns. To insure that no extra distance will be taken up by them, they are ordered to march without distance. PARAGRAPH 5 OF ORDER: No change from normal pro- cedure is followed here. It would have been equally as good, perhaps better, to have the division command post make only one jump from Winfield to Spring Mills, as the advance guard will have passed that town before noon. The corps order, however, stated that the division command post would be established there at 4:00 PM and the division order complies. This question in practice would have been settled over the telephone with corps headquarters, and the inter- mediate command post at Warfieldsburg could have been properly omitted. Only the two initial command posts for each column are given, as the exact location of the troops later on in the day cannot be positively foreseen and the column command ‘posts should conform to the situation at that time. CHAPTER III The Army in Attack (A) THE FIELD ORDERS FOR THE ARMY ATTACK Masor HucHu A. Drum, Infantry Special Situation (Blue) Part II: Continuation of Part I, “The Field Orders for the Advance.” During 24-25 November 19, the information received at army headquarters indicated the following situation on the 1st Army’s front by the evening of 25 November 1919: A Red force, estimated to be two army corps (of three or four divisions each) and one cavalry division, had arrived by 24 November 1919, from Harrisburg and Lancaster on the general front Hanover—Gettysburg. On the 25th No- vember 19, the Blue advance guards drove in the hostile covering detachments and by evening of that day definitely learned of the construction of intrenchments on the general line—south of Midway—wWhitehall—north of Two Taverns —Round Top and Pitzer School. The Red cavalry, withdraw- ing to Knoxlyn, has succeeded in preventing the Ist Blue Cavalry Division from advancing north of the Hagerstown Road in that vicinity. Red working parties have been observed intrenching along the north bank of Conewago Creek and hostile columns have been located by 25 November 19 marching south from Harrisburg via Dillsburg and from Carlisle via Mt. Holly Springs. An increased movement of trains on the P. & R. R. R. has been observed. The 2d Blue Army reports few Reds seen west or south of York. The 3d Blue Army reports its cavalry has been stopped by hostile cavalry at Chambersburg, but that its air service has not seen any hostile columns between Car- lisle and Shippensburg. The roads from Thurmont to High- field and the Waynesboro Turnpike are reported practicable 64 FIELD ORDERS FOR ARMY ATTACK 65 for all arms and trucks. Neither side has air superiority. Both sides succeed in observing the other’s rear areas. By 5:00 PM, 25 November 19, the 1st Blue Army is located as follows: Ist Cavalry Division, holding the high ground of, Wilson Hill in contact with hostile cavalry which is holding Carr Hill south of Knoxlyn. ist Corps. The advance guards of the two first line divisions are on the general line Mt. Pleasant—road junction 613 (northeast of Germantown). The main bodies of these divisions are making camp on the general line of the state boundary. The corps reserve division is making camp just north of Union Mills. The corps:cavalry is east of Littles- town on the Union Mills—Hanover road in contact with cavalry of the 2d Army Corps; headquarters and corps troops are at Union Mills. 2d Corps. The advance guards of the three first line divisions are on the general line road junction 6183—Two Taverns—Willow Grove School—Greenmount. The main bodies of these divisions are making camp on the general line of the state boundary. The corps headquarters and corps troops are in and about Taneytown. 3d Corps. The first line division has its advance guard nerth of Plum Run and holds the McCleary School Ridge. The main body is camping on Flat Run, three miles north of Emmitsburg. The corps reserve division is camping on Toms Creek, west of St. Joseph’s Academy. The corps cav- alry has reached Highfield and is in contact with the right of the 3d Army; corps headquarters and corps troops are in the vicinity of St. Joseph’s Academy. The army reserve divisions are located: Ath Division at Westminster, 8th Division at Bruceville, 11th Division at Woodsboro and 12th Division at Thurmont. All other army units are located as given in the march table for Special Situation, Part I. Required: (1) General A’s decision. (2) The formal field orders for attack issued by the 1st Army, assuming no change in the situation. 66 THE ARMY IN ATTACK A Solution 1. Decision. General A decides to attack the enemy at daylight on the morning of 27 November 19. While the whole hostile front will be attacked, the main Blue attack will be driven against the hostile right, i. e., on the front Taneytown Road —Hagerstown Road. The corps will be reorganized as follows: The Ist Corps, no change; the 2d Corps, two divisions in front line on the same front, but limited to’ Taneytown Road, inclusive, and one division in reserve; the 3d Corps to have four divi- sions in line from Taneytown Road to Hagerstown Road, in- clusive, and one division in reserve. By maneuver to the west on 25 November 19, the 1st Cavalry Division will draw the hostile cavalry from Carr Hill. If this does not succeed, then the 1st Cavalry Divi- sion must join in the attack of the 3d Corps and drive the hostile cavalry from Carr Hill. The attack, i. e., the main blow, will be made as a sur- prise. THE FORMAL FIELD ORDERS Note :—Prior to issuance of this order, General A would have held a conference with his subordinate commanders during the night of 25-26 November 19. Preliminary arrangements would have been well under way before the hour of issue of the order. 1st Blue Army, Woopssoro, Mp., 26 Nov 19, 8:00 AM. FIELD ORDERS | No 23 § Map: 1:62500, six quadrangles vicinity of Gettysburg. 1. Advance Red forces, estimated two corps (6 to 8 divisions and one cavalry division) are entrenching on the general line, south of MmwaY—WHITEHALL—north of Two TavERNS—ROUNDTOP and Pitzer ScHooL. The Red cavalry division was last night in the vicinity of CARR HILL. Other Red forces have been seen approach- ing and intrenching the north bank of ConrEwaGo CREEK. Our 2d Army has met only a few Reds south of York. Our 3d Army is advancing opposed only by cavalry. Our Ist Cav Div last night held WILSON HILL in contact with the hostile cavalry. Our advance guards have driven in the hostile outposts and are now in contact with the enemy’s main forces in our front, and are holding the general line Mr. PLEASANT—RJ 613—Two Tav- ERNS— WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL—GREENMOUNT—MCCLEARY SCHOOL. 2. This army will attack tomorrow, enveloping the hostile right. Hour of attack, 7:00 AM. The enemy will be driven north of ConE- WAGO CREEK. 3. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (x) FIELD ORDERS FOR ARMY ATTACK 67 Group “A,” Army Artillery, will support the 1st and 2d Corps from the general vicinity of OAK Grove SCHOOL west of Lit- TLESTOWN. Group “B,” Army Artillery, will support.the 83d Corps from the general vicinity of FairPLAy. (See Arty annex.) The artillery preparation will commence at H minus 4 hours. The ist Corps will attack on the front MipbwaAY—WHITEHALL, making its strongest blow in the direction of FELTY ScHooL— CrepaR Ripce. Zone of action extended: Western boundary from WHITEHALL (inclusive) via Moritz ScHooL—PINE CHURCH—OAK GROVE SCHOOL (all inclusive). Eastern boun- dary same as Army. Southern boundary limited by W.M.R.R. The army’s right flank will be protected and contact main- tained with the 2d Army. ; The 2d Corps will attack on the front WHITEHALL (exclusive) —TANEYTOWN RoaD (inclusive), making its main effort in the direction of Two TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL. Zone of Action— Eastern boundary same as ist Corps—Western boundary TANEYTOWN Roap—HArRRISBURG RoapD (inclusive) —Southern boundary limited by W.M.R.R. The 4th Div, reaching TANEYTOWN during the night 26-27 Nov 19 is placed at the disposal of the 2d Corps as corps re- ae The 7th Div will pass to the 3d Corps at 2:00: PM this ate. The 3d Corps will attack on the front TANEYTOWN RoaD (ex- clusive) HAGERSTOWN RoapD (inclusive) and envelop the hos- tile right. Attack direction MCCLEARY SCHOOL—TABLE Rock. The attack will be made with the 7th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Divs. The 8th Div will be corps reserve and will be held near EMMITSBURG. The 3d Corps will continue to cover the army’s left maintaining contact with the 83d Army and reconnoiter- ing SoutH MounrtaIN as far north as CHAMBERSBURG ROAD. The 7th Div passes to the 3d Corps at 2:00 PM today. The 12th Div passes to 3d Corps at once. Army trucks will reach THURMONT at 7:30 PM today for movement of this division. The 8th Div passes to 3d Corps at 4:00 PM today. Zones of action—Eastern, same as 2d Corps—Western, same as army—Southern, limited by SANDY RUN. The 11th Div, Army reserve, will move during the night of 26-27 Nov 19, to BRUCEVILLE marching via LADIESBURG—KEy- MAR. The 1st Cav Div is this date moving around the.right flank of the hostile cavalry. It will screen and protect the move- ments of the 3d Corps and will observe the passes of SoUTH MouNTAIN north of ORRTANNA. The Army Air Service will continue its present mission (see air service annex).. The bombardment squadron will join in the attack of the 3d Corps by bombing hostile batteries and ground troops on that front. : ‘ All troop movements in preparation for the attack will be made between 5:45 PM and 6:30 AM. Special effort must pe made to keep the enemy in ignorance as to all movements. Rate of advance will be regulated by corps. RouNnpTop— LittLE RouNDTOP—Powers HILL—WoOLF HILu and St. LUKe’s CHURCH will be neutralized by gas and smoke under corps direction. Gas may be employed on other parts of the front by corps orders. During the night 26-27 Nov 19, advance infantry lines will push up close to the enemy’s lines. 68 THE ARMY IN ATTACK 4, See Administrative Orders No 11. The Army truck train will reach TANEYTOWN not later than noon 27 Nov 19 where it will await orders from these headquarters. The LITTLESTOWN—TANEYTOWN, TANEYTOWN—EMMITSBURG and EMMITsBURGC—ZORA—HIGHFIELD roads will be kept sufficiently clear of traffic to permit rapid movements of troops by trucks after noon 27 Nov 19.* 5. Axes of signal communications. (b) Army—Extended to GETTYSBURG via HARNEY and BARLOW. 1st Corps—Extended to New Oxrorp via LITTLESTOWN and IRISHTOWN. ; 2d Corps—Extended to HUNTERSTOWN via Two TAVERNS and BONNEAUVILLE. . 3d Corps—Extended to GOLDENVILLE via GETTYSBURG. (c) Command posts, no change. By command of General A. x, Chief of Staff. Distribution: (B) THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR THE ATTACK Captain G. K. WILSON, Infantry First Blue Army, FREDERICK, MD., 26 Nov 19, 8:30 AM. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS No 11 § To accompany FO No 23, Ist Blue Army. Maps: 1:62500, six quadrangles in vicinity of Gettysburg. Part I Supply, Evacuation and Road Maintenance I. SUPPLY. A. Railheads: Ath Division _-----------___ UNION BRIDGE. 8th Division ------------___ THURMONT. 11th Division _-_---__--_-__- KrYMAR. 12th Division _______________ EMMITSBURG. i 101st Cavalry Division ~-.--_- BLUE RipGE SUMMIT. Other organizations _---_----- No change. B. Ammunition: ; 155 mm Gun 155 mm Gun 75 mm and 6”—8"—75 mm —4.7” 155 mm How. Infantry and Infantry and Pyrotechnics Pyrotechnics '_*(NoTE :—The foregoing could be included in the administrative order, but are placed here to give full picture of plan of attack.) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR ATTACK sat Army Depot No 1 Artillery and No. 2 REELS MILL 1st Corps Depot No 4 WAKEFIELD STATION 2d Corps Depot No 6 LADIESBURG 38d Corps Depot No 3 and BLuE Moun- 101st Cavalry TAIN Division Chemical Warfare CWS Depot Offensive No 2 C. Engineer: . Supplies and Material at Engineer Depots as follows: Army Troops Depot No 1 1st Corps Depot No 2 2d Corps Engineer ‘ Depot No 3 3d Corps and 101st_ Cavalry Division Depot No 4 D. Signal Corps: Supplies and Material Signal Corps Depot No 1 1st, 2d and 3d Signal Corps Corps and 101st Depot No, 2 Cav Div E. Medical: Supplies : Army Troops Medical Supply Depot No 1 1st Corps Medical Supply Depot No 2 2d Corps Medical Supply Depot No 3 3d Corps and Medical Supply 1st Cavalry Depot No 4 Division F. Motor Transport: Spare parts, supplies and repairs Army Troops For all troops Motor Transport Depot No 1 Motor Transport Depot No 2 Depot No 5 SPRING MILLS Depot No 6 LINWwoop Depot No 7 KEYMAR Depot No 8 DETOUR Depot No 3 BLuE Moun- TAIN Depot No 9 Loys Depot No 10 HIGHFIELD ROCKRIDGE FREDERICK WESTMINSTER UNION BRIDGE EMMITSBURG WALKERSVILLE UNION BRIDGE FREDERICK WESTMINSTER UNION BRIDGE EMMITSBURG FREDERICK UNION BRIDGE 69 70 THE ARMY IN ATTACK G. Ordnance: Spare parts for guns, small arms, automatic weapons, and individ- ual equipment Army Artillery, 1st Ordnance and 2d Corps Depot No 1 UNION BRIDGE 3d Corps anf 101st Ordnance Cavalry Division Depot No 2 HIGHFIELD H. Quartermaster: Equipment, material Quartermaster for repairs and cloth- Depot No 1 UNION BRIDGE ing I. Gasoline and Oil: Reserve Supply Gasoline Depot No 1 LEGORE II. EvacuaTION. (a) Men. . Lying wounded Sitting wound- Gassed, sick, ; ed contagious and others. 1st Corps to to to Evac Hosp Evac Hosp Evac Hosp No 3 at No 4 at No 5 at WESTMINSTER New WINpbSoR TANEYTOWN. 2d Corps to to to Evac Hosp Evac Hosp Evac Hosp No 6 at -No 7 at No 12 at TANEYTOWN UNION BRIDGE BRUCEVILLE 38d Corps to to to and Evac Hosp Evac Hosp Evac Hosp Cavalry No 9 at No 10 at No 11 at Division St. JOSEPH’S GRACEHAM State Sanitor- ACADEMY for 3 right divi- ium, sions of corps. SABILLASVILLE. to Evac Hosp No 11, MONTEREY for left divi- sion and 101st Cav Div. Army Troops to nearest hospital, according to classification. Two ambulance companies from army sanitary train will re- port today to the Corps Surgeon, 3d Corps, for duty with that corps. (b) Animals. All troops: To army animal evacuation station: Loys. By Army: To SOS vet hosp as directed by G4. © III. RoapD MAINTENANCE. By the army in the areas south of the WESTMINSTER—TANEY- TOWN—EMMITSBURG—HIGHFIELD road (inclusive). By corps in their respective areas north of this road. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR ATTACK 71 The Chief Engineer of the Army will effect the relief of all corps troops on work south of the above named road by 6:00 PM. November 26th, arranging the details of relief with G1 of the corps concerned. Part ITI Traffic, Circulation and Control, Prisoners of War and Captured Material I. TRAFFIC: (a) Circulation. (See circulation map, Ist Blue Army, November 23, 1919, boundary change between 2d and 38d Corps; Taneytown Road and Harrisburg Road to 2d Corps. See Footnote page 9. Each corps will arrange for the following: 1. Assignment of axial roads to divisions in moving forward. 2. Prepare and post directing signs on all roads. 3. Assign roads and time schedule for corps and army artil- lery moving forward, during attack. 4, Designate time transport is to move forward, according to the following priority: 1st—Combat trains and ambulances. 2d—Anti-aircraft artillery (mobile). 8d—Gasoline for tanks, ammunition and Signal Corps material. , 4th—Road material. 5th—Division field and supply trains. (b) Control. By the Army after 6:00 PM, Nov 26th in the area south of the WESTMINSTER—TANEYTOWN — EMMITSBURG — HIGHFIELD road (inclusive). By corps in their respective areas north of this road and also at all railheads assigned to elements of the respective corps. Arrangement for relief of corps military police will be made by the Army Provost Marshal with G1 of the corps concerned. Control at GETTYSBURG east of G.H.R.R., by 2d Corps. Each Corps will establish officer control posts well forward on all main traffic routes to assure strict compliance with in- structions contained in preceding paragraph concerning circulation. Block system, or other control system, will be installed where necessary to prevent over congestion on critical sections of axial roads. In critical traffic areas adequate patrol posts will be estab- lished to prevent traffic blocks and infractions of road dis- cipline. On congested roads, foot and mounted troops will be kept clear of the roads. Tractors and wrecking crews will be provided to clear roads of stalled vehicles. . During the first forty-eight hours after H hour all officers in the corps who can be spared from their duties should be attached to military police companies, for duty with control posts and patrols. Ii. PRISONERS OF WAR: 1st and 2d Corps: Prisoner of War UNION BRIDGE Enclosure No 2 8d Corps and 101st Prisoner of War Cavalry Division. Loys Enclosure No 1 72 THE ARMY IN ATTACK Evacuation of Prisoners: By divisions to corps enclosures. By corps to army enclosures as In- dicated above. By Army Provost Marshal to Central Enclosure at ANNAPOLIS. Rail- heads UN1on Bripce and Loys for Enclosures Nos 1 and 2, respec- tively. III. STRAGGLERS: Army Provost Marshal and corps assistant provost marshals will institute frequent searches for stragglers in back areas, thoroughly combing same. All organization commanders in these areas will. lend every assistance to detect and arrest stragglers, turning them over to military police for disposition. Corps and divisions will establish effective straggler lines. IV. CAPTURED MATERIAL: No change (see Adm Orders No 10, these headquarters). By command of Lieut Gen A. x Chief of Staff. Distribution: Same as FO (C) THE ARMY ARTILLERY PLAN IN ATTACK Masor PELHAM D. GLASSFORD, Field Artillery Artillery Co-ordination by the Larger Units The following discussion involves the artillery employ- ment of the 1st Blue Army. It is assumed that the army chief of artillery is thor- oughly conversant with the plans of General A, that he has attended all conferences at army headquarters, and that he has been consulted in all matters concerning the employ- ment of the artillery of the command. It is also assumed that the army chief of artillery is thoroughly conversant with the ammunition supply avail- able; that he and his staff are in close touch with Army G1 and that he has actively employed the army artillery in- formation service and the artillery information service of ARMY ARTILLERY PLAN IN ATTACK 73 the corps for the purpose of obtaining all possible informa- tion that will assist the artillery in the attack. When General A commences to prepare the field order to be issued at 8:00 AM, 26 November 19, the chief of army artillery has already framed his artillery annex, and has a skeleton prepared, so that all that is necessary is to fit in the details. It need not follow the form of the five-paragraph field order, but if it does not, all paragraphs and sub-para- graphs should be conspicuously titled. Required: The artillery annex to Field Orders No. 23, Ist Blue Army, 26 November 19. A Solution ANNEX No 1 TO FIELD ORDERS No 23, ist BLUE ARMY ARTILLERY Map: Geological Survey, 1 :62500. 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTILLERY: (a) Army Artillery Group A: Brig Gen X. ( CP Oak GROVE SCHOOL. 1st Brig Hv A, Brig Gen X ” 147th Hv A, Col K 24—6” Guns --CP 354.0—739.0. 148th Hv A, Col L 24—6” Guns -.CP Mr. PLEASANT S.H. 149th Hv A, Col M 24—6” Guns -_CP Oak GRovE SCHOOL. 208d Hv A, Col N 24—8” Guns __CP 359.0—740.0. Group B: Brig Gen Z. CP FatrPuay. 2d Brig Hv A, Brig Gen Y CP 342.0—741.0. 150th Hv A, Col O, 24—155 mm Guns ~-.CP CENTENNIAL HALL SCHOOL. 151st Hv A, Col P, 24155 mm Guns _.CP 342.0—740.0. 152d Hv A, Col Q, 24—155 mm Guns _.CP 341.0—742.0. 3d Brig HvA, (less 203d HvA), Brig Gen Z__-_-_- CP FAIRPLAY. 201st Hv A, Col R, 248” How ___-.--. CP 346.0—738.0. 202d Hv A, Col §, 24—8” How _____-_. CP 340.0—744.0. (b) Corps Artillery Corps commanders will employ the field artillery brigades of the divisions held as corps reserves, to reenforce either the corps or the divisional artilleries, on the fronts where the main efforts are directed. (c) Balloon Companies Balloon companies are assigned to work with the Army Artillery as follows: 74 THE ARMY IN ATTACK Group A Bln Co No 1 with 148th Hv A at CuestnNut Hit. S. H. Bln Co No 2 with 149th Hv A at OAkGROVE SCHOOL. Bln Co No 8 with 203d Hv A at 358.0—739.0. Bln Co No 4 with 147th Hv A at EpGEGROvE SCHOOL. Group B Bln Co No 5 with 150th Hv A at CENTENNIAL Hatt S. H. Bln Co No 6 with 201st Hv A at FAIRPLAY. Bln Co No 7 with 151st Hv A at 343.0—741.0. Bln Co No 8 with 152d Hv A at 340.0—742.0. Bln Co No 9 with 202d Hv A at 339.0—745.0. (d) Air Service (See Air Service Annex) (e) Sound and Flash Ranging* Company A, 1st Sound and Flashing Ranging Battalion, CP, FArIr- PLAY, is established for flash ranging service with stations at_-------- JI. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK—MISSIONS: (a) In General The artillery preparation will commence at H minus 4 hours. The rate of fire will be the maximum hourly rate for all guns. Artillery fire prior to H minus 4 hours will be reduced to the most urgent requirements. Advanced and exposed positions will not be occupied until .the night of 26-27 Nov. Reconnaissance parties will be reduced to a minimum in personnel, and will avoid exposure to enemy observation. The assignment of objectives for the artillery preparation will be based upon all known information relative to enemy positions, including the artillery information service map of artillery objectives, distribution of which will be completed by 9:00 PM this date. Intense fire will be concentrated upon the lines along which the main efforts of the attacks are to be made. Care will be taken not to destroy by artillery fire, roads and bridges that will be used by our troops in the advance. All fire on the town of GETTYSBURG during the artillery preparation will be executed by the Army Artillery. Provisions for co-ordination and concerted action will be made between adjacent corps and divisions. (b) Divisional Artillery The artillery preparation by the divisional artilleries will in general be confined to the enemy front lines, and to the probable support and reserve positions. Gas.—155 mm howitzers will be employed for a neutralization by moderately persistent gas of the region between RouNnpD Tor and Wo.tr Hitt, from H minus 4 hours to H minus one-half hour. This neutralization will be co-ordinated by the 2d and 3d Corps. Non-per- sistent gas will be used on St. LukE’s CHURCH, and on such other points as corps commanders may select within their normal zones. The employment of gas will be cancelled by corps commanders if weather conditions are unfavorable. *EpiTor’s Note :—Not previously mentioned as forming a part of the 1st Army, but assumed, in order to make the artillery plan complete. ARMY ARTILLERY PLAN IN ATTACK 15 (c) Corps Artillery _. The corps artilleries are charged with counter-battery work and with interdiction and harassing fire within the corps zones. All guns not required for the execution of these missions will be used to partic- ipate in the artillery preparation. ° (d) Army Artillery During the artillery preparation the long range guns will execute interdiction and harassing fire on distant objectives with special at- tention to the GETTYSBURG—HaRRISBURG R. R. and the WESTERN MARYLAND R. R. The fire of the 8-inch howitzers will be employed principally in assisting the divisional artilleries in reducing the enemy forward defenses. The Army Artillery will assist in counter-battery work whenever called upon. For partial assignment of objectives to Army Artillery see Table 1, appended. III. Action DuRING THE ATTACK—MISSIONS: (a) In General The artillery support must be continuous, and the advance aggres- ‘sively followed by the successive forward displacement of battalions, commencing with the divisional artilleries. The rate of fire will be the maximum hourly rate for all guns. After daybreak batteries firing on visible objectives will take ad- vantage of every available means to make adjustments. Verification of effect by balloons and airplanes will be made when terrestrial observation is not possible. (b) Divisional Artillery The divisional artilleries will support the early phase of the infantry advance by an intense preliminary bombardment of the enemy front lines from H minus 10 minutes until H hour; and where desir- able, by a rolling barrage of 75’s, beginning at H hour. The 155 mm howitzers will execute successive concentrations not less than 300 meters beyond the barrage line. In addition, the divisional artilleries will cover the front by the fire of such flanking guns as can be emplaced by the divisional com- manders to enfilade or bring oblique fire on the hostile front. They will also perform such special missions in the accomplishment of the infantry advance as may be assigned by division commanders. Infantry batteries and accompanying guns will be employed at the discretion of the division commanders. Smoke.—The region between Rounp Top and Wor HItt will be enveloped in smoke between H minus 10 minutes and H plus three hours. (c) Corps Artillery The corps artilleries are charged with the counter-battery work and with distant interdiction and harassing fire within the corps zones. All guns not required for the execution of these missions will be used to assist in supporting the infantry advance by firing on successive objectives beyond the zones of the Vivisional artilleries. (d) Army Artillery Same as par. II (d), and Table I appended. IV. MUNITIONS: Combat trains will be kept filled for forward movements. Artillery brigade commanders, except those of the Army Artil- lery, will call upon the corps munitions officers for the amounts of 76 THE ARMY IN ATTACK ammunition of various calibers and kinds, estimated to be necessary for the fulfillment of the missions assigned to their units. Not more than two days of fire will be placed in any battery position. V. MESSAGES: To the Chief of Army Artillery at Woopsporo. Forward Infor- mation Center at BRIDGEPORT. TABLE I (Appendix to Army Artillery Annex). ie Map: Army Artillery Objectives (Partial Assignment) here- with. Partial Assignment of Objectives to Army Artillery Assignment will be completed by group commanders so as to utilize the full power of all guns in accordance with par. II (d), Artil- lery Annex. GROUP A (Brig Gen X, CP, OAKGROVE SCHOOL) Unit No. of Period of Fire Objectives Guns 148th HvA All assignments by Group CO. 203d HvA 4 H—4 br to H—1 hr 1. Rounp Top (Hill) 2 ditto 1. LittLeE Rounp Top 2 ditto 1. Rounp Tor (Town) 149th HvA 8 H—4 hr to H hr 2. Mipway and railroads beyond 4 H—#2 hr to H hr 8. New OxrorpD and points on ditto W. Mz. R. R. in vicinity 2 ditto 4, BERLIN JUNCTION 4 H—3 hr to H ur 5. Enemy line N W of Rounp Top HILL 147th HvA 2 H—4 hr to H+2 hr 6. GETTYSBURG 2 ditto 7. GETTYSBURG—BIGLERSVILLE Roap 2 H—3 hr to H hr 8. Pitzer ScHOOL and N W 4 H—4 hr to H+3 hr 9, GRANITE HILL H+3 hr to H+4 hr | 10. Lift to HUNTERSTOWN 2 H—4 hr to H+1 hr | 27, KaTatysine Spr. 2 H—4 hr to H+ hr | 28. Famrptay ScHOOL GROUP B (Brig Gen Z, CP, FAIRPLAY) i \ 150th HvA 2 H—4 hr to H+3 hr | 11. Road NE Rocky Grove SCHOOL 2 ditto 12. Rocky Grove S. H. Ridge 2 H—4 hr to H+23 hr | 13. Gerryspurc—TasLe Rock Roap 2 H—4 hr to H+2 hr | 14. Oax Rince 201st HvA 4 H—1 hr to H hr 15. HmL 523 (352.5—746.5) 4 H—4 hr to H+1 hr | 16. Cemerery HILL and south thereof 151st HvA 4 H—4 hr to H+4 hr | 17. Mr. Vernon S. H. and S W 2 H—4 hr to H+8 hr | 18. Harrispurc Roap 2 H—4 hr to H+2 hr 19, 347.5—753.0 152d HvA 2 H—3 hr to H+8 hr | 20. MummassurG 4 H—4 hr to H hr 21. Half mile N of Two TAveRNS 4 ditto 22. 353.0—745.05 2 H—4 hr to H+2 hr 23. W. M. R. R. at 352.0—750.1 2 H—4 hr to H+3 hr | 24. Railroad south of GoLDENVILLE 202d HvA 2 H—4 hr to H hr 25. 352.0—745.0 8 H—4 hr to H—1 hr 1. (See 1 above) 2 H—4 hr to H—1 hr | 16. (See 16 above) 2 H—4 hr to H+2 hr 6. GETTYSBURG 4 H—4 hr to H+1 hr | 26. Railroad east of SEVEN STARS ARMY ARTILLERY PLAN IN ATTACK qT Discussion of Army Artillery Plan J. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTILLERY : As this is a newly mobilized army, the organization of the army artillery is given in detail. Corps and divisional organization will be given in the corps and divisional an- nexes. The army artillery has only two gun. brigades and one howitzer brigade, one-third the number of heavy ‘guns authorized by organization tables. All of these guns are re- tained under the control of the army commander, though the corps artillery will frequently be reinforced by army artillery units. In the Meuse-Argonne offensive the 5th Corps artil- lery had under its control four regiments of heavy caliber practically throughout the operation. A flash and sound ranging battalion for employment with an army is composed of a headquarters and five com- panies, aggregating 96 officers and 1288 enlisted men. For the purpose of making the picture complete, one company is assumed to be available. This service is under the army artillery for tactical control, but the army artillery intelli- gence service delegates to the corps artillery intelligence service the operation of sections within the corps zones. The activities of the artillery intelligence service are continuous as long as there is contact with the enemy. II and III. MISSIONS: The missions are given in considerable detail because the army has but recently been mobilized, and artillery em- ployment is not yet harmonized by the experience of battle. The object of so much detail is to co-ordinate the efforts of the subordinate artillery commanders with the views of the commanding general, Ist Blue Army, as expressed by his chief of artillery. First, the missions prior to the attack are considered, and then the missions in support of the attack. Artillery employment in a large operation is like a big picture puzzle, with numerous parts to be carefully fitted together. If the parts of the picture puzzle do not fit closely together, or if there are parts missing, a complete picture is not produced. In a like manner, the artillery fire of ad- jacent corps and divisions must fit closely together, other- 78 THE ARMY IN ATTACK wise there will be weak points at the boundaries between zones, and there may be insufficient provision for mutual artillery support, and for bringing heavy fire to bear on the critical points developed during the operation. IV. MUNITIONS: The fact that a four-hour preparation has been ordered, with all guns firing at their maximum rate, is evidence of the fact that the Blue army has a large supply of ammunition, that the conditions of transportation are favorable for plac- ing a considerable supply at the battery positions before the H hour. This intense employment of artillery is no doubt made to demoralize the enemy at the very beginning of hostilities and to weaken his morale by a great show of strength. It will also tend to increase the morale of our troops. To place the large amount of ammunition required for the attack in the battery positions is a stupendous under- taking, and is probably started on the night of November 25-26, before the army attack order was issued. Assuming that batteries will fire an average of six hours before moving forward, the following will give an estimate of the expenditure for that period: Cal. Number of Rounds per Total rounds Approx. Guns hour (7 hours) Total weight 75 mm, 528 100 316,800 3168 tons 155 mm. 264 40 63,360 3168 tons 155 mm. GPF and 6” guns 216 30 38,880 1944 tons 4,7" 72 40 17,280 302 tons 8” How. 72 10 4,320 320 tons 440,640 8902 tons This is nearly 4000 truck loads of ammunition. Suffice it to say that it is difficult task to get all this ammunition up into the positions before 3:00 AM, November 27th. Judging from experience in France, three-fourths of this amount will be sufficient, or about 3000 truck loads. Nearly supply system in general will be taken up in a later dis- cussion. The matter of getting the ammunition forward in this operation, the establishment of dumps, and the ammunition supply system in general will be taken up in a later con- ference. Estimate of gas and other special shell will be consid- ered in the discussion of the corps artillery annex. CAVALRY DIVISION IN ATTACK 79 (D) THE CAVALRY DIVISION IN THE ATTACK Masor H. J. BRezs, Cavalry By 5:00 PM, November 25th, the 102d Cavalry Brigade has advanced to, and is confronting the enemy from, the ridge one mile northwest of McCleary School to road junc- tion 668 on the Hagerstown Road, with two regiments and the machine gun squadron in line, and one regiment in re- serve on Middle Run. The 103d Cavalry Brigade is on Wilson Hill, with two regiments and the machine gun squadron in line, the left resting on the east and west road at the north end of the hill, and one regiment in reserve in the edge of the woods north of Marshall. The 101st Cavalry Brigade is at Fairfield; the 101st Machine Gun Squadron on Sugar Loaf Hill; the 101st Bat- talion, Mounted Engineers, at Liberty Hall School; the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, near Mt. Pleasant School; division headquarters (first echelon) at Fairfield, with advanced command post at Sugar Loaf Hill; second echelon at Liberty Hall School; all trains are parked southeast of Iron Springs; one field hospital is set up at Iron Springs; 1st Battalion, 101st Horse Artillery, is in position north of road junction 650; the 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Horse Artillery, in posi- tion west of Sugar Loaf Hill. The 3d Corps holds McCleary School Ridge with one di- vision. The 3d Corps cavalry has reached Highfield and is in contact with the right of the 3d Army. At 6:00 PM the division commander receives a message from army headquarters directing him to attend a confer- ence at 8:00 PM. At this conference the following decision of the army. commander was communicated : 1. The Red army has been ascertained definitely to be two army corps, of three of four divisions each, and a cavalry division. It is holding the general line Midway—Whitehall—north of Two Taverns—Roundtop—Pitzer School. Other Red forces are intrenching along the north bank of the Conewago Creek and hostile columns are marching south from Harrisburg and Carlisle. No hostile columns have been seen between Carlisle and Shippensburg. The 3d Army cavalry has been stopped by Red cavalry at Chambersburg. 80 THE ARMY IN ATTACK 2. The 1st Army will attack the enemy at daybreak November 27th. While the whole hostile front will be attacked, the main Blue attack will be driven against the hostile right, on the front Taneytown road—Hagerstown road, inclusive. . The 1st Army will be reorganized as follows: 1st Corps: No change. ‘auth 2d Corps: Two divisions in the front line; left limit Taney- town Road. 3d Corps: Four divisions in line from Taneytown Road to Hagerstown Road, inclusive. 4, The 101st Cavalry Division will maneuver to the west and north on the 26th and draw the hostile cavalry away from Carr Hill. It will also screen and protect the movement of the infantry of the 3d Corps on the 26th, and observe the passes of South Mountain north of Orrtanna. . If the plan to draw the Red cavalry off does not succeed, then the cavalry division will join in the attack of the 3d Corps on the 27th instant and drive the Red cavalry off Carr Hill. . Railhead for 101st Cavalry Division after 6:00 AM, November 26th: Blue Ridge Summit. oo ao for) Required: Field orders of the 101st Cavalry Division for the 26th. A Solution 101st Cavalry Division, FAIRFIED, Pa., 25 Nov. 19, 11:00 PM. FIELD ert No 3 Map: 1:62500, six quadrangles, vicinity of Gettysburg. 1. The enemy, on the general line MipwAY—WHITEHALL—north of Two TAVERNS—RouND Top—PITzER SCHOOL consists of two corps, of three or four divisions each. His cavalry on CARR HILL con- sists of one division. Hostile cavalry opposes the 3d Army at CHAMBERSBURG. Other Red forces are intrenching along the north bank of the CoNEWAGO CREEK. Hostile columns have heen observed moving south from HARRISBURG and CARLISLE, but no hostile columns have been seen between CARLISLE and SHIPPENS- BURG. ; Our 3d Corps holds McCieary ScHoou Ripce. Its cavalry is at HIGHFIELD, in touch with the 8d Army. Our 1st Army will attack at daylight on November 27th. The main attack will be made by the 3d Corps, strongly reinforced, against the enemy right, to include the Hacerstown Roap. 2. This division will push to the north tomorrow and draw the enemy away from CarR HILL. It will also screen and protect the move- ments of the 3d Corps on November 26th. 3. (a) The 101st Cavalry Brigade, with the 1st Battalion, 101st Horse Artillery, and 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, attached, will move at 2:00 AM, 26 Nov 19, via VirciInIA MILLS and Mt. PLEAS- ANT SCHOOL to ORRTANNA. This movement must be com- pleted by daybreak. It will make a-vigorous demonstration at 7:00 AM, 26 Nov 19 towards TILLiz. It will also cover the pass at CASHTOWN,. : CAVALRY DIVISION IN ATTACK 81 (b) The 102d Cavalry Brigade (less 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry) : will hold the enemy on its present front with one regiment and the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron. The other regi- ments will be withdrawn tonight to a position in readiness near VIRGINIA MILLS. This movement must be completed be- fore daybreak. (c) The 103d Cavalry Brigade will attack at 7:00 AM, in conjunc- tion with the demonstration by the 101st Cavalry Brigade, and drive the enemy from Carr HILL. (d) The 101st Horse Artillery (less 1st Battalion) will support the attack of the 103d Cavalry Brigade from a position near SuGARLOAF HILL. (e) The 101st Machine Gun Squadron will assist in the attack of the 103d Cavalry Brigade from a position on the north and east slopes of WILSON HILL. (f) The 101st Battalion, Mounted Engineers, will join the 102d Cav- alry Brigade. .(g) The 101st Observation Squadron will start its reconnaissance at daybreak. It will render hourly reports of the progress of the attack; will watch especially the roads from CHAMBERS- BURG, SHIPPENSBURG and CARLISLE; and will observe care- fully and report promptly all enemy movements east of CARR ILL. (x) Each brigade commander is charged with the maintenance of suitable connecting groups on his flanks. 4, One motor ambulance company will accompany the 101st Cavalry Brigade. The Supply Train will move to BLUE RipcE SuMMIT at midnight tonight. All other trains will await further orders in their present po- sitions. Railhead after 6:00 AM, 26 Nov 19: BLUE RipGcE SUMMIT. Station for slightly wounded at road junction at north exit of FAIRFIELD. Other administrative details later. 5. (a) Plan of signal communications: No change. (b) Axis of signal communications: Division: FAIRFIELD—SuGARLOAF HILL—-WILSON HILL— KNOXLYN. 101st Brigade: ORRTANNA—TILLIE—SEVEN STARS. 103d Brigade: WILSON H1LL—KNOXLYN. (c) Command posts: Division: Nod change. 101st Brigade: ORRTANNA. 102d Brigade: VircINIA MILLs. 103d Brigade: SUGARLOAF HILL. Major General. Copies to: Div Staff 101st Bn Mtd 101st Cav Brig Engrs 102d Cav Brig 101st F Sig Bn 108d Cav Brig ‘101st Obsn Sq 101st HA CO Tns 101st MG Sq 3d Corps 1st Army CHAPTER IV An Army Corps in Attack (A) THE FIELD ORDERS, 2d CORPS, IN ATTACK CAPTAIN ADNA R. CHAFFEE, Cavalry 2d Army Corps, TANEYTOWN, MD., 26 Nov 19, 12:00 Noon. No 3 Map: Geological Survey, 1 :62500. 1. Advance Red forces, estimated two Corps (6 to 8 Divisions) are entrenching on the general line: south of MIDwWAY—WHITEHALL —north of Two TAvERNS—RouND Top and Pitzer ScHoot. A Red cavalry division was last night in the vicinity of Carr HILL. Other Red forces have been seen approaching and entrenching on the north bank of CONEWAGO CREEK. The armies to the east and west of our lst Army have met but little resistance to their advance. This Corps has today driven in the hostile outposts on our front and we now hold the line hill 613 (NE of GERMANTOWN)—Two TAVERNS— WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL—GREENMOUNT in contact with the enemy’s main forces. ae the east of us the 1st Corps holds the line MounT PLEASANT —hill 613. To the west of us the 3d Corps holds the line GREENMOUNT— north of PLUM RuUN—McCLEARY SCHOOL RIDGE. The 1st Cavalry Division last night held Wi1Lson HILu. Our Ist Army attacks tomorrow enveloping the hostile right to drive the enemy north of the Conswaco. The 3d Corps drives towards TaBLE Rock; the 1st Corps towards FELTY ScHOOL— CrpaR RIDGE. 2. (a) The 2d Corps attacks with two divisions in line and one in reserve, exerting its main effort in the direction Two TAVERNS —GRANITE HILL. : Objective: The ridge north of the Congewaco from HEip- LERSBURG (inclusive) to BOWLDER (inclusive) . Time of attack 7:00 AM. Artillery preparation for the attack will start at 3:00 AM. (b) Zone of action 2d Corps: Eastern boundary: Unchanged to St. LuKk’s CHURCH, thence Moritz ScHooL—PINE CHuRCH—OAK Grove SCHOOL (all exclusive). Western boundary: Natnor’s Miu (exclusive) —BRIDGEPORT— TANEYTOWN RoaD—HarrispurG ROAD (all inclusive). Southern boundary: The WESTERN MARYLAND RAILROAD. 8. (a) The 5th Division attacks on the right. FIELD ORDERS \ FIELD ORDERS, 2p CORPS IN ATTACK 83 Zone of Action: Right boundary: Same as right boundary 2d Corps. .Left boundary: Crossroads 526 (southeast of LONGVILLE) —528—Two TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN —BELMONT SCHOOL (all exclusive). The 5th Division will drive hard to secure the high ground just north of the WESTERN MARYLAND RAILROAD. It will maintain contact with the 3d Division of 1st Corps on its right. By its penetration it will assist the progress of the 6th Divi- sion through the high wooded country southeast of GETTYS- BURG. It will be ready to advance north from the line FAIRVIEW ScHoot—MoritTz ScHoou when ordered by the corps. (b) The 6th Division attacks on the left. Zone of Action: Right boundary: Same as left boundary 5th Division. Left boundary: Same as left boundary 2d Corps. The 6th Division will exert its main effort on its right flank to quickly seize the ridge northwest of the Low DutcH Roab, and GRANITE HILL, protecting and keeping touch with the flank of the 5th Division. ; With its left it will press the enemy, occupying promptly all ground evacuated by him, to gain the ridge north of the WESTERN MARYLAND RAILROAD. It ol Le touch with the 7th Division of the 3d Corps on its left. It will be prepared to continue its advance in the direction WoOoDSIDE SCHOOL—HEIDLERSBURG when ordered by the corps. (c) Artillery: Artillery fire prior to 3:00 AM will be reduced to the most urgent requirements. Intense fire will be concentrated upon the lines along which the main efforts of the attacks are to be made, care being taken not to destroy roads and bridges that will be used by our troops in the advance. Employment of the Corps Artillery The Corps Artillery assisted by Group A, Army Artillery, is charged with counter-battery work, and with distant inter- diction and harassing fire within the corps zone. All guns not required for the execution of these missions will participate in the preliminary bombardment, and in sup- porting the infantry advance by firing on successive ob- jectives beyond the zones of the divisional artilleries. Employment of Divisional Artilleries : The 4th FA Brig will support the advance of the 5th Div from positions south of GERMANTOWN. After the advance has reached BONNEAUVILLE the 4th FA Brig will revert to corps control. Infantry batteries and accompanying guns will be assigned in the discretion of division commanders. The forward displacement of the 5th FA Brig will commence as soon as practicable after H hour; the 6th FA Brig as soon as CULPS Huu has been captured. . Gas Persistent gas will be used from H minus 4 hours to H minus one-half hour as follows: 84 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK HvA of 6th Div on Powers Hitt, Woir HILL, and Be crossing of BALTIMORE PIKE over WHITE RUN an woods north thereof. The 8d Corps is to use gas on Rounp Top and LITTLE Rounp Top during the same period. . Non-persistent gas will be used by the HvA, 5th Div to neutralize St. LuKE’s CHURCH, from H minus 4 hours until H minus one-half hour. Smoke A smoke screen will be established from Rounp Top to WOLF Hii from H minus 10 minutes until H plus 22% hours. } Accompanying Barrage From H minus 10 minutes until H hour an intense bombard- ment will be placed upon the enemy front lines and organi- zations in rear thereof. The advance of the corps east of ' Y-line 355 will be covered by a rolling barrage. On the right flank of the corps this barrage will be timed to reach the GETTYSBURGC—BONNEAUVILLE road at H plus 3 hours 20 minutes. The barrage of the 6th Div will be co-ordi- nated with that of the 5th Div. North of BONNEAUVILLE the attack will be covered by successive concentrations of fire by corps and divisional artilleries. In the barrage, one gun of each battery will fire smoke shell. ‘The 155 mm. Howitzers will execute successive concentra- tions not less than 500 meters beyond the barrage line. For details see Annex No 4, “Artillery.” (d) Air Service: Divisional squadrons will maintain surveil- lance over their zones south of the YorK PIKE. The corps squadron will observe for the corps artillery and will reconnoiter north of the YorK PIKE to the corps ob- jective. For details see Annex 1 herewith. (e) Engineers: See Annex No 2 herewith. (f) Reserves: , (1) The 4th Div (less 4th FA Brig) will move from TANEy- TOWN during the night Nov 26-27 to concealed bivouacs on ALLOWAY CREEK north of LoNGVILLE. After 7:00 AM it will be prepared to move at 1 hour’s notice. (2) The 2d Cav Brig will remain in its present bivouacs, near PALMER’S Forp. After 7:00 AM it will be prepared to move at one-half hour’s notice. (x) (1) All troop movements in preparation for the attack will be . made between 5:45 PM and 6:30 AM. Special effort must be made to keep the enemy in ignorance as to all movements. (2) During the night 26-27 Nov 19 the 5th and 6th Divs will pe their advance infantry lines up close to the enemy’s ines. (3) Early on the night 26-27 Nov 19, the 6th Div will relieve the 5th Div in that part of the section west of the line 598—548—eastern houses of Two TAVERNS. ; (4) The 7th Div passes to the 3d Corps, at 2:00 PM today. 4. administrative details see Administrative Orders No 6, 2d Orps. 5. (a) For plan of signal communications see Annex No 3 herewith. (b) Axis of signal communications: 2d Corps (extended) Two TAvVERNS—BONNEAUVILLE —HUNTERSTOWN. FIELD ORDERS, 2p CORPS IN ATTACK 85 5th Div: 528—GERMANTOWN—BONNEAUVILLE—GUL- DENS—PINE CHURCH. 6th Div: HarNEyY—Low DutcH RoaD—GRANITE HILL —HUNTERSTOWN. (e) Command Posts: 1st Army: Woopsgoro. 2d Corps: TANEYTOWN. Advanced command post at HarNrEy after midnight Nov 26-27. 1st Corps: UNIONTOWN. 38d Corps: EMMITSBURG. 5th Div: WASHINGTON SCHOOL. 6th Div: HaRNEy. 4th Div: LONGVILLE. 8d Div: LITTLESTOWN. 7th Div: BoLLINGER SCHOOL. Division Commanders of the 5th and 6th Divisions will reconnoiter advanced command posts and will report promptly changes desired in their locations. : By command of Maj Gen a Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG 21. CO A-A MG Bn 2.C of S 22-23. CG ist Army 8-5. G1 24, CG 1st Corps 6-8. G2 25. CG 3d Corps . 9-11. G3 26. CG 5th Div 12-14. C of A : 27. CG 6th Div 15. CG Corps Arty Brig 28. CG 4th Div 16. CG Group A, AA 29-30. Adj 17. Corps Engr 31. Corps Gas O 18. Corps Surg 32. Corps Sig O 19. Corps AS Comdr 33-40. War Diary and Spare. 20. CO Prov Cav Brig, 2d Corps For Discussion (See march and attack orders of 2d Army Corps) The march: The situation with regard to the enemy. The boundaries of the zone of advance of the corps now fixed. The boundaries of the divisions—consideration governing—number of divisions in line—road system. Sufficiency. Function of the cavalry:—Mission—how will it fulfill its mission— signal communications? How far can it be expected to reach on 24th? Examininations of crossings. Action of army cavalry. Effect on corps cavalry. March of the first line divisions: Formation. Team work in starting. Motor and foot elements. Necessity for rear boundary. Necessity on first day’s march for fixing time to clear old areas. Security—how much ordered by corps. Additional roads—G1 order—army. Necessity to be familiar with all army orders. Movement of reserve division (8th): 8th Division is in army reserve, 24th. Why does corps move it? Air Service: Mission—Reasons. : : Axial Roads: Why prescribe—What are they? Who is charged with picking them out? What troops use them? Repair and up-keep. Axes of signal communications—why prescribed—Variance from army / 86 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK order—how adjusted—command posts—movement—necessity for use of radio—How the corps keeps wire communications—Location of first forward communication center. F Second day’s march—What additional orders necessary? Why is problem simpler? Discussion of attack situation: Mission of the corps. What is known of the enemy. Situation of our own troops—frontage of corps. Divisions in line: Terrain. Use the army has prescribed for gas. Direction of army thrusts. What can be done on remainder of front? Attack frontage of corps. What means have we to assist attack? Artillery—Infantry. Movement reserve division. Decision. Artillery preparation. Use of gas directed by corps. Artillery protection for the attacking front. Allotment of attack missions: Frontage. Protection. Co-ordination. Rate of advance. Air service. Reserves—stationing—possible uses. Forms of signal communication to main units. Reasons for wording of command post paragraph. (B) THE ARTILLERY, 2d CORPS, IN THE ATTACK Magor P. D. GLASSFORD, Field Artillery We will now consider the artillery employment in the 2d Corps. Turn back to the attack order of this corps. Par. 3 (c) gives the scheme of employment for the artillery. This paragraph was drawn up by the corps G3, assisted by the corps chief of artillery and his staff, and the instructions therein contained are based upon the army artillery plan discussed in Chapter III. Discussion Par. 3 (c) of the corps field orders above is little more than a repetition of selected extracts from the army plan, with the insertion of a certain amount of detail pertinent to this particular corps front. The sub-paragraph on gas shows that in making plans for gassing the hills south of Gettysburg, the chief of ar- ARTILLERY, 2p CORPS IN ATTACK 87 tillery, 2d Corps, has conferred with the chief of artillery, 3d Corps. This may have been done in person, but more likely by means of a staff officer. The barrage accompanying the attack on the right of the corps front has been co-ordi- nated with that of the 1st Corps. This paragraph of the corps field orders is very com- plete, yet it does not-contain detail that is of interest to the artilleryman only. It is intended to give a complete picture of the plan of artillery employment, and is not used as a means of conveying detailed instructions of minor im- portance to the subordinate artillery commanders. There is very little to place in the artillery annex. The chief of corps artillery has not direct command over either the corps or divisional artillery brigades. Therefore it is not necessary for him to go into the detailed assignment of objectives for any unit. His function is one of co-ordi- nation. The general scheme for artillery employment is outlined in the army plan: it is the duty of the corps com- mander’s chief of artillery to see that this scheme is carried out and thoroughly co-ordinated in this corps. The artillery annex should contain a table showing the organization of the corps and divisional artilleries. This table will take the form given in the artillery annex to the army attack order, but should include the battalions as well as the regiments and brigades. Note that this table gives the numerical designations of units; names and command posts of their commanders; number and caliber of the guns. The table will also give the organization and location of corps and divisional units adjacent to the 2d Corps sector; the units with which close co-ordination is required, and from which a certain amount of support can be expected. The corps artillery annex should also contain a dia- gram showing the important signal communications to be utilized by the artillery. The means of communicating with the corps artillery for counter-battery requests, with the artillery information service, including flash ranging stations, with the artillery units in the adjacent sectors, etc. It may also include a scheme for carrying forward the artillery telephone lines in the advance. 88 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK The annex will designate the balloons and air squadrons that are to work with the corps and divisional artilleries, and their location; or it may refer to the air service annex for this data. There are normally five balloon companies with the corps troops. If all these balloons are available, it is probable that one will be assigned to work with each divisional artillery, and two with the corps artillery. There are three observation squadrons with the corps troops. The annex will repeat the instructions contained in the army artillery plan on the subject of munitions, with such modifications and added detail as apply to the 2d Corps sec- tor. For instance, less ammunition would be placed in the battery positions on the right where a quick forward dis- placement is expected, than on the left where batteries are not to move forward until Culps Hill has been captured. The army artillery plan requires brigade commanders to submit estimates of ammunition required to the corps muni- tions officer. The question of gas employment would be gone into more in detail. The technical instructions relating thereto would not appear in this annex, but would be placed in a memorandum issued only to the artillery units concerned. The army artillery plan requires that certain hills south of Gettysburg be neutralized with gas for a period of three and one-half hours, and specifies that the 155 mm. howitzer will be used. It is not intended that gas shells be continuously poured into this area for three and one-half hours, but that short concentrations be executed from time to time upon selected points. The smoke screen in front of these hills is a more difficult problem. The 2d Corps has a front to screen of not less than 4500 yards. For a thorough screen, three rounds of 75 mm. gas shell per minute will be required for every 25 yards of front, a total of 540 rounds per minute, or 86,800 rounds during the two-hour and 40-minute period. It is doubtful if more than 12 guns can be spared for this smoke screen. Twelve guns could fire only 4800 smoke shells dur- ing the two-hour and 40-minute period, which of course would produce only a very thin screen if distributed over the entire area. ARTILLERY, 2p CORPS IN ATTACK 89 At noon November 26th, the army issues the map of army artillery objectives. On this map are plotted the ob- jectives of the army artillery guns assigned in Table I of the army artillery annex. Much other data of im- portance is placed on this tracing, including the informa- tion obtained by the artillery information service up to this time. A more complete map issued by the artil- lery information service is to be distributed before 9:00 PM. = The latter will have considerable influence upon the assignment of objectives: As soon as all army ar- tillery objectives are plotted by Group A, the corps artil- ‘lery of the 2d Corps will receive a map or tracing showing these objectives. A map or tracing showing both army and corps objectives within the corps sector must then be furnished to the divisional artilleries in order that the artillery effort may be fully co-ordinated. Divisional artil- lery commanders may be so pressed for time that they cannot wait for this information, in which case they would make their assignments of objectives with a view of making a few alterations after the army corps objectives become — known. We have considered the artillery plan of employment only so far as it relates to the attack on the morning of November 27th. Let us look at the question from a broader viewpoint. What exigencies may the artillery be required to meet? If the attack is successful, where will the next object- ives for the big guns be located, and how far and by what roads will these guns be pushed forward to bring effective fire upon these objectives? Is the artillery prepared to resist a counter-attack? How will the artillery be utilized to further the future plans of the army commander? You may be sure that the chief of army artillery has all these matters in mind, and that he has one or more staff officers working exclusively on these plans. 90 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK (C) THE ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN, 2d CORPS CarTaIn G. K. WILson, Infantry Required: The written administrative plan for the attack based upon decision of Major General A, 2d Corps. Administrative plan adopted by Major General A is as follows: Ration supply of divisions to be maintained by divisional transportation from their respective railheads. Railheads: Corps troops --__--__---------- Bruceville 4th Division _.--.--------- Union Bridge 5th Division _-______.-------- Taneytown 6th Division ~---------------- Taneytown To establish a ration distributing point at road junction three- fourths mile west of Longville for the following elements of corps troops that have animal-drawn transportation, and the engineer regiment with engineer and ponton trains attached; viz.: 302d Engineers (plus engineer and ponton trains), 52d Pioneers, 2d Pioneers, 2d Corps Cavalry Brigade. To begin distribution at 10:00 AM. All other corps troops at railhead at Bruceville, beginning distribution thereat at 9:30 AM. Ammunition refilling stations as follows: For corps artillery, infantry munitions and pyrotechnics, Army Depot No. 6 at Ladiesburg. For divisional artillery, Army Depots No. 7, at Keymar, and No. 8, at Detour. For divisional artillery, infantry and pyrotechnics, corps park established night of November 26-27th, near house south- east of road junction 478 (two miles northeast of Harney). Engineer refilling points at Engineer Depot No. 3 at Union Bridge and corps dump east of road junction 528. Signal Corps material and supplies at Signal Corps Depot No. 2 at Union Bridge. ‘ Medical Supplies at Medical Depot No. 8 Union Bridge. Corps medical supply parks at road junction 502 (two miles south of Germantown) and at Mountjoy Church. Motor transport spare parts and supplies at Motor Transport Depot No. 2 at Union Bridge. Ordnance spare parts for all arms and individual equipment at Ordnance Depot No. 1, Union Bridge and corps park at corps mobile ordnance repair shop. Group near road junction 483 (four miles north of Taneytown). Corps artillery park and all division mobile ordnance repair shops to report thereat to corps ordnance officer at 7:00 AM 27th November. Quartermaster equipment, material and clothing at Quarter- master Depot No. 1, Union Bridge. ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN, 2p CORPS 91 To group division field hospitals: 5th Division at road junction 502 (two miles south of Germantown). _ ,6th Division at Mountjoy Church. Division field hospitals to be advanced under direction of corps surgeon. Corps troops to nearest hospital, according to classification. _ Evacuation from division field hospitals by corps sanitary train, under direction of corps surgeon, to following evacuatior hospitals: , Lying wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 6 at Taney- town. Sitting wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Union Bridge. All other cases to Evacuation Hospital No. 8 at Bruce- ville. Animals evacuated to corps veterinary hospital at Alloway Creek west of road junction 528 by divisions and corps troops. By corps to army animal collection station at Loys. Circulation map issued by 1st Army, 23 November (change corps western boundary as indicated in field orders, 2d Corps). Army reserved roads are for motor traffic only, on all other roads south of the 521—road junction south of 598—543— Barlow road (corps lateral road), circulation to be free. Division axial roads north of corps lateral road as follows: 5th Division the 502—-Germantown—621—Bonneauville—570 —Guldens—Pine Church road. : 6th Division 598—Two Taverns—529—516—543—Granite Hill —Hunterstown road. Road signs to be posted by division north of corps lateral road (exclusive) and by the corps south of this road. At H plus 6 hours, the division axial roads north of corps lateral road to be available for use of corps artillery. Advance of army artillery north of corps lateral road will be by special arrangement with G1 of this corps. The corps engineer to arrange to take over at H hour 27 November, all road maintenance south of the 527—-Germantown— 549482—-Barlow road, inclusive. Division to maintain axial roads north thereof and to be relieved progressively by pushing forward corps road troops. Army to maintain roads south of and including Westminster —Taneytown—Emmitsburg road. The army to provide for traffic control south of army road mentioned above except at railheads. Control at railheads by assistant provost marshal, 4th Division. Corps military police to be augmented by mounted detach- ment of one officer and forty enlisted men of 4th Division military police company. Corps provost marshal to arrange for relief of | all division military police south of corps lateral road by 8:00 PM tonight. To establish officer control posts, with mounted patrols at- tached to each, on corps lateral road at all of main road _cross- ings to insure proper traffic control and compliance with in- structions in regard to transport moving forward. To attach a tractor with wrecking crew to each of the two officer control posts at the junction of division axial roads. To have one company of pioneers to report today to each front line division for salvage and burial’ duty. Previous in- structions in regard to burials, salvage and captured material to be complied with. 92 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK Divisions to establish division straggler lines. Corps assistant provost marshal to establish straggler line at H plus 1 hour along the line 621—Two Taverns—491—418—450. This line to be pushed forward from time to time under direction of corps assistant provost marshal, replacing division straggler lines. To have daily check made of personnel at meal times in organizations in area in rear of front line divisions to detect and arrest AWOL’s, turning them over to military police for disposition. All military police in rear area to arrest all wanderers or stragglers, absent from their organization without authority. Division to evacuate prisoners of war to corps enclosure at crossroads one-half mile east of 568 (three miles south of Two Taverns). Priority for trains and transport and hours for movement north of corps lateral road to be as follows: ist. Combat train and ambulances H plus 3 hours. 2d. Anti-aircraft artillery (mobile) H plus 4 hours. 8d. Gasoline for tanks, ammunition trains and Signal Corps material H plus 4 hours. 4th. Road material H plus 5 hours. 5th. Field trains H plus 8 hours. 6th. Supply trains H plus 24 hours. ; Property and baggage after H plus 24 hours as directed by division commanders. (D) THE FIELD ORDERS, Ist CORPS, IN ATTACK Masor Duncan K. Magsor, JR., Infantry Required: The field orders for the attack of the 1st Corps on the 27th November, 19. ‘ Note:—Administrative orders and annexes not required. 1st Blue Corps, UNION MILLS, Mp., 26 Nov i9, 12:00 noon. FIELD alae No — Map: Geological Survey, 1:62500. Gettysburg—Fairfield—Emmitsburg—Taneytown Quadrangles. 1. Advance Red forces estimated two corps (6 to 8 divisions and one cavalry division) are entrenching on the general line south of MIpwAY—WHITEHALL—north of Two TaveERNS—RouND Tor and Pirzer ScHoot. A Red cavalry division was last night in the vicinity of CARR HILL. Other Red forces have been seen approach- ing and intrenching the north bank of CoNEWAGO CREEK. The 3d and 2d Armies have met with little resistance to their advance. The advance guards of the latter will be north of the state line, north of EBBVALE—PaARKTON this evening. Our corps cavalry is in contact with the cavalry of the 2d Army east of LITTLESTOWN on the UNION MILLS—HANOVER road. FIELD ORDERS, ist CORPS IN ATTACK 93 Our ist Cav Div held WiLson Ht last night. The advance guards of the 1st Army have driven in the hostile outposts along the entire front of the army and are now in con- tact with his main forces. Our corps holds the line Mt. PLEASANT—RoaD JUNCTION 613 (both inclusive). The 2d Corps on our left continues the line to the west, holding Roap JUNCTION 618 (exclusive)—-Two TAVERNS—WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL—GREENMOUNT (all inclusive). The ist Army will attack at 7:00 AM tomorrow, enveloping the hostile right and driving the enemy north of CONEWAGO CREEK. The 2d Corps attacking on the front, WHITEHALL (exclusive)— TANEYTOWN Roap (inclusive) will make its main effort in the direction Two TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL. 2. The 1st Corps attacks at 7:00 AM tomorrow on the front Mipway —WHITEHALL. It will drive the enemy north of the CONEWAGO. Zone of Action: Eastern Boundary: UNION M1ILLS—HANOVER—EAST BERLIN. Western Boundary: (Extended) WHITEHALL—StT. LuKE’s CHuRCH—MorITtz ScHOOL—PINE CHURCH—OAK GROVE ScHOOL (all inclusive). Southern Boundary: The WESTERN MARYLAND RAILROAD. Order of Battle, 1st Corps: From right to left: 2d Div, 3d Div. Corps Reserve: 1st Div. 3. (a) Corps Artillery. The Corps Artillery assisted by Group “A” Army Artillery is charged with counter-battery work, and with distant interdiction and harassing fire within the corps zone. All guns not required for the execution of these mis- sions will support the infantry advance by firing on succes- sive objectives beyond the zones of the divisional artilleries. Divisional Artillery. The lst FA Brig will assist in the support of the 3d Div to an east and west line through SQUARE CORNERS after which it will cover the forward echelon- ment of the 8d FA Brig when it will revert to corps control. Non-persistent gas will be used by the HvA, 3d Div to neutralize St. LUKE’s CHURCH area from H—4 hours until H —4 hour. The artillery, 3d Div, will establish a smoke screen south of Sr. LuKr’s CHURCH and from St. LUKE’s CHURCH to SQUARE CorNER from H—10 minutes to H+ 4% hours. Non-persistent gas will be used by the HvA, 2d Div to neutralize McSHERRYSTOWN and Mipway from H—4 hours to H—+z hour. The artillery, 2d Div will establish a smoke screen south and west of MCSHERRYSTOWN and Mipway from H—10 min- utes to H+ 42 hours. From H—10 minutes to H hour a violent bombardment will be placed upon the enemy front lines and organizations in rear thereof. The advance of the 2d Div will be covered by concentrations on sensitive points. The main blow of the 3d Div will be covered by a roll- ing barrage to an east and west line through SQUARE CORNER after which the advance of this division will be covered by concentrations on sensitive points. . The barrage of the 3d Div will be co-ordinated with that of the 5th Div, 2d Corps on its left. The artillery preparation will commence at 3:00 AM. Prior to that hour artillery fire will be reduced to a minimum in order to preserve the normal appearance of the front. 94 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK Care will be taken not to destroy roads and bridges which will be used by our troops in the advance. i For details see Artillery Annex No 4, hereto attached. (b) The 2d Div attacks on the right: Zone of Action: Right Boundary: Mipway—Picron Hit~s—erossroads 532 (northeast GREENRIDGE SCHOOL)—crossroads 503 (east WELCOME SCHOOL) (all inclusive). Left Boundary: Road junction 629—Mr. PLEASANT SCHOOL— road junction 602—road junction (2% miles west road junction 566)—road junction 577—SouTH BRANCH CoNEwAGo—Oak Woop ScHooL (all inclusive). The 2d Div will make its main effort on its left flank and by maneuver force the enemy to withdraw from McCSHER- RYSTOWN and Mipway. It will advance to the heights south of the ConEWaGo driving the enemy north of the creek. A combat patrol of one battalion will cover the right flank of the corps. The 3d Div attacks on the left: Zone of Action: Right Boundary: Same as left boundary 2d Div. Left Boundary: Same as left boundary 1st Corps. | The 8d Div by massing its attack on its right flank in the direction FELty ScHooL—Cerpar RipcE will force a with- drawal of the enemy’s forces in the vicinity of St. LUKE’s CHURCH. It will advance to the heights south of the CoNEWAGO driv- ing the enemy north of the Creek. (c) The 1st Div (less lst FA Brig) (Corps Reserve) will be pre- pared to move at an hour’s notice from 7:00 AM tomorrow. (d) The Corps Cavalry will continue to maintain contact with the cavalry of the 2d Army. It will cover the right flank of the corps during the attack operating in the direction of SPRING Grove and East BERLIN. One squadron (less two troops) will report to the CG, 2d Div by 12:00 midnight this date for duty in covering the right flank of the division. (e) Air Service. The corps squadron will observe for the corps artillery and will reconnoiter north of YorK PIKE to the ConEwaco. Divisional squadrons will observe in their divi- sional zones and south of YorK PIKE. (f) Engineers: See Engineer Annex No 2, hereto attached. (x) The advance of the infantry will be timed to reach an east and west line through SQquaRE CoRNER at H+33% hours. Combat contact groups will be established as follows: Between the 2d and 3d Divs, and between the 2d Div and 5th Div, 2d Corps, on its left. The groups will consist of not less than one platoon and one section of machine guns each and will march along the boundary between units concerned. That between the 2d and 3d Divs will be under command of the platoon leader 2d Div; that between the 3d Div and 5th Div will be under command of the pla- toon leader, 5th Div. During the night 26-27 Nov 19, advance infantry lines will push up close to enemy lines. All troop movements in preparation for the attack will be made between 5:45 PM and 6:30 AM. Special effort will be made to keep the enemy in ignorance as to all movements. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, 3p CORPS IN ATTACK 95 On the night 26-27 Nov 19, the 2d Div will relieve the 3d Div in that part of its sector east of a line, road junction (% mile west road junction 566)—road junction 602—-MT. PLEasaNT ScHooL—road junction ae (all to 2d Div). Movement will start at 5:45 4. For administrative details see Administrative Orders No 6. 5. (a) Plan of signal communications: See Annex No 3 hereto at- tached. (b) Axis of signal communications: 1st Corps: (Extended) LittLESTOowN—IRISHTOWN—NEW OxX- FORD. 2d Div: (Extended) Setts Sta.—BrusHTOWN—IRISHTOWN— NEW OXFORD. 8d Div: (Extended) LittLEstowN—WHITEHALL—SQUARE CoRNER—CEDAR RIDGE—BRUSH Run. 1st Div same as 2d Div. (c) Command Posts: First ARMY: WOODSBORO. 1st Corps: UNION MILLS. 2d Corps: TANEYTOWN. 1st Div: UNIon MILLs. 2d Div: Humpert ScHoo.L. 3d Div: PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL. 5th Div: WASHINGTON SCHOOL. Division commanders of the 2d and 3d Divs will reconnoiter advanced command posts and will report promptly changes desired in their locations. By command of Maj Gen A, 7 Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG 21. CO A-A MG Bn 2.C of S 22-23. CG 1st Army 8-5. Gl 24, CG 2d Corps 6-8. G2 25. CG 1st Div 9-11. G3 26. CG 2d Div 12-14. C of A 27. CG 8d Div 15. CG Corps Arty Brig 28-29. Adj 16. CO Group “A,” AA 30. Corps Gas O 17. Corps Engr - 81. Corps Sig O 18. Corps Surg 82-40. Spare. 19. Corps AS Comdr 41. War Diary 20. CG Corps Cav Brig (E) THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, 3d CORPS, IN ATTACK Captain G. K. WILSON, Infantry The following order is based on Field Orders No. 23, 1st Army, and Administrative Orders No. 11, 1st Army, as- suming four divisions in line disposed from right to left as follows: 7th, 9th, 10th and 12th Divisions with 8th Division as corps reserve. 96 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK 38d Blue Army Corps, St. JosEPH’s ACADEMY, MD., 26 Nov 19, 12:00 noon. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS | ; No 15 To accompany FO 16, 3d Corps. Maps: 1:62560, six quadrangles about Gettysburg. 1:21120, twelve sheets about Gettysburg. I. Suppiy. A. Railheads: Corps Troops _-_---------------- THURMONT. 7th Division _________--_----- BRUCEVILLE. 8th Division __________-_----- THURMONT. 9th Division ____________----- THURMONT. 10th Division _____--___-__---- EMMITSBURG. 12th Division _____-.-_-------- EMMITSBURG. B. Rations: By Divisions from railheads by divisional transportation. Distributing points for corps troops on and after Nov 27th, with hours of issue, as follows: At road junction 494 (2 miles east of EMMITSBURG). 303d Engrs (Plus Engr and Pon Tn) ------ 10:30 AM. 53d:Pion. Inf 2222s cessessccoes eee 11:00 AM. S00 Pion Int. ss te ee 11:25 AM. POON: Cay hich otis sh eee in A tae 11:50 AM. Dith: Cay: oJleussctechitcunsecteeseeccs 12:10 PM. At Railhead, THURMONT. 58d Arty Brig —....----.--.----------- 9:30 AM. 8d Corps Arty Pk ________--_-__------- 10:30 AM. Othe TeluBn (Sistecar Pk ee Scie (oe 10:50 AM. 530:.F Sig Bil 23a 11:00 AM. 3d:Corps Hg Tr 22s-seo--55s3552a7 5-252 11:10 AM. 8d Corps MP Co ______-_-_----.------- 11:20 AM. All other units _-------------------_- 11:30 AM. C. Ammunition: As allocated by Corps Mun O. 75 mm. 155 mm. (How) 155 mm. (Gun) 4.7” Infantry Army Am Dep pyrotechnics. No 3. BLUE MOUNTAIN. 75 mm. Army Am Dep 155 mm. (How) No 9. Loys. 75 mm. Army Am Dep 155 mm. (How) No 10. HIGHFIELD. 75 mm. 155 mm. (How) 600 yards east of Infantry Corps Am Pk St. JOSEPH’S pyrotechnics. ACADEMY. At H plus 24 hours Corps Am Pk becomes Army Am Dep No 11 and a Corps Am Pk will open at same hour at road junction 517 east of McCLearRY SCHOOL. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, 3p CORPS 97 D. Engineer: Supplies and materials Army Engr Dep all kinds No 4 EMMITSBURG. Road material Near road Bridge material junction sand bags, tools and Corps Engr Pk 575, 2 miles N wire. W of FAIRPLAY. Road material Corps Engr Pk FAIRFIELD Sta- TION. E. Signal Corps: Supplies and Army ne C Dep material No 2 + UNION BRIDGE. Material Corps Sig C Pk EmmiIrtsBurc. F. Medical: Supplies Army Med Sup Dep EMMITSBURG. No 4 Supplies Corps Med Sup Pk GREEN MOUNT. No 1 Supplies ‘Corps Med Sup Pk FAIRFIELD. No 2 Medical Supply Parks will be established at H plus 6 hours: G. Motor Transport: Spare parts, supplies Army MT Dep and repairs No 2 UNION BRIDGE. H. Ordnance: Spare parts for guns Army Ord Dep small arms, automatic No 2 HIGHFIELD. weapons and individual equipment Spare parts as above Corps Ord Ruopes MILL (1 and repairs Rep Pk mile S W Fair- PLAY). All divisional and the Corps Arty Pk Mob Ord Rep Shs will be grouped at RuopEs MILL, to which place they will proceed, reporting thereat, to the Corps OO, at.7:00 AM, 27 Nov 19. I. Quartermaster: Supplies and Army QM Dep clothing No 1 UNION BRIDGE. J. Gasoline and Oil: Reserve Supply Army Gasoline Dep No 1 LEGORE. Ammunition and supplies will be furnished as prescribed in letter of instruction from G4, lst Blue Army, dated 22 Nov _ 19. 98 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK II. EvacuaTIon. Sick and wounded. A. Men: At H plus one hour 27 Nov 19, field hospitals will be estab- lished as follows: 7th Division______________-- GREEN MOUNT. 9th Division_________-_____- CLEAR SPRINGS FarM (3 mile NE of road junction 618). 10th Division______.-________ DIEHL’S MILL. ‘ 12th Division._______________ FAIRFIELD. As attack progresses field hospitals will be advanced as di- rected by Corps Surg. ; 7 Evacuation from field hospitals to evacuation hospitals by Corps Sn Tn under direction of Corp Surg as follows: Seriously wounded St JOSEPH’S all troops Evac Hosp No 9 ACADEMY. Slightly wounded all troops (less 12th Div) Evac Hosp No 10 GRACEHAM. Slightly wounded 12th Div Evac Hosp No 11 Monterey. Gassed, sick and STATE SANITOR- contagious IUM, SABILLAS- all troops Evac Hosp No12_ VILLE. Corps Sn Tn augmented by four ambulance companies (motor), two from Army Sn Tn and two from Sn Tn, 8th Div will report to Corps Surg today. B. Animals: By corps To Army Anl Evac Sta Loys. By divisions and To 3d Mob corps troops Vet Hosp Four Points. At H plus 8 hours this veterinary hospital will move to and open at BIGHAM Farm (1 mile N W of GREENMOUNT). JII. Roaps. ’ . Maintenance: By the Army south of the MonTEREY—EMMITSBURG—BRIDGE- PORT road (inclusive). By the corps south of corps lateral road (inclusive). By divisions in their respective areas north of this road. At H hour 27 November, division engineers will push for- ward, being relieved progressively by leap frog method by corps troops under the direction of the corps engineer, who will arrange necessary details with division engineers through G1 of the divisions concerned. Corps engineers will arrange for reinforcing bridges on main and axial roads to axle capacity of 15 tons. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, 3p CORPS 99 B. Circulation: (See Circulation Map, 1st Blue Army, dated 23 Nov, change east boundary of Corps to TANEYTOWN—HARRISBURG roads (exclusive) *). Except on army reserved roads, which are for motor traffic only, circulation is free south of the WILLow Grove S. H.— GREENMOUNT—Yroad junction 476—618—VIRGINIA MILLS road (Corps lateral road). Division axial roads north of corps lateral road are as follows: For the 7th Div the point 547—562—-CONFEDERATE AVE- NUE—point 515-—point 511—GooDINTENT SCHOOL road. For the 9th Div the point 476—McCLEeary ScHooL— road junction 470—road junction 587—road junction 628—GOLDENVILLE road. For the 10th Div the Liserty HaLL ScHoot—road junc- tion 650—north to BM 558—crossroads 498—crossroads 504—road junction 597—625—road junction at “D” in CUMBERLAND—TEXAS road. For the 12th Div Hagerstown Roap—BM 558—KNox- LYN—SEVEN STARS—MUMMASBURG road. The following roads at H plus 8 hours are assigned for forward movement of Corps and Army Artillery north of corps lateral road. Right: The EmmitspurG RoAD—CHAMBERSBURG RoAD— MUMMASBURG ROAD—CARLISLE ROAD. Left: HAGERSTOWN Roap and axial roads of 10th or 12th Divs north thereof. Sign posting by divisions north of corps lateral road and by Corps APM south of this road. C. Traffic Control: By the army south of TANEYTOWN—EMMITSBURG—HIGHFIELD road (inclusive). By the corps south of the corps lateral road (inclusive), ' after 8:00 PM today. By divisions within their respective areas north of this road after hour stated above. By 8th Div (Corps Reserve) at dumps and railhead at . oe eeres and at the BRUCEVILLE and THURMONT rail- eads. The Corps APM will establish officer control posts, attach- ing mounted patrols for forward roads, on the corps lateral road at the junction of all main road crossings. These posts and patrols will see that the provisions contained in para- graph 8 in regard to transport are strictly complied with. A tractor accompanied by a wrecking crew will report at H plus 3 hours to each post at the junction of division axial roads for purpose of keeping axial roads open. IV. SALVAGE AND BURIALS. The corps engineers will send one company of pioneers to report today to G1 of each front line division for salvage and burial duty. The instructions contained in Administrative Or- . ders No 18, these headquarters, in regard to salvage, captured material and burials will be complied with. V. Mivirary POouice. Straggler lines will be established by divisions. The Corps APM will arrange to replace division straggler lines from time *Circulation map not published in this study. 100 AN ARMY CORPS IN ATTACK to time beginning at H plus 1 hour. All military police posts in rear of division straggler lines will arrest all enlisted men ab- sent from their organizations without written authority. This will not apply to chauffeurs, teamsters, couriers or runners. All or- ganizations in rear of division reserves are forbidden to feed or shelter absentees from other organizations, but will turn over all such men to the military police. Check will be made at meal times in order to detect and arrest all men absent without leave. VI. PRISONERS OF WAR. ; ; By divisions to corps enclosure in orchard at RJ 528, one mile north of FAIRPLAY. By Corps APM to Army Enclosure No 1, at Loys. | Mounted detachment of one officer, six noncommissioned offi- cers and twenty-eight privates, 8th Div MP Co and will report at 8:00 AM, 27 Nov, to officer in charge at corps prisoner of war en- closure for duty thereat. VII. Trains. Priority and hours for forward movement of trains and trans- port north of corps lateral road as follows: 1st—Combat trains and ambulances____H plus 4 hours. 2d—A-A Artillery (mobile) __-_------ H plus 5 hours. 8d—Gasoline for tanks, ammuni- and Signal Corps material __--~- H plus 5 hours. 4th—Road material _________-______-_ H plus 6 hours. 5th—Field trains ____-____-_-_-_---__- H plus 10 hours. 6th—Supply trains _.____---__________ H plus 24 hours. Property and baggage at such time after H plus 24 hours as division commanders direct. By command of Major General A = Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG Corps 34. CO 538d Rmt Sq 2.C ofS 85. CO 38d Mob Vet Hosp 3-6. G1- 386. CO 53d Sup Tn 7. G2 37. CO 58d Sn Tn * 8-9. G3 88. 58d Tr Trans Tn 10-23. Chiefs of Services 39. CO Corps AS 24. Cof A 40-42. CG 7th Div 25. CG Corps Arty Brig 43-45. CG 9th Div 26. CO 303d Engrs 46-48. CG10th Div 27. CO 58d Pion Inf 49-51. CG 12th Div 28. CO 3d Pion Inf 52-54. CG 8th Div 29. CO 56th Cav 55-57. CG 1st Blue Army 30. CO 57th Cav 58. CG 1st Cav Div 81. CO 9th Tel Bn ; 59. 2d Corps 82. CO 53d F Sig Bn 60. War Diary 33. CO 3d Corps Arty 61-75. Extra Copy File CHAPTER V The Infantry Division GENERAL AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS Magor R. McCLeEAvE, Infantry Note:—The General and Srecial Situations here outlined will form the basis ot Chapter V Maps: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, 1”—10 miles. : Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120, twelve sheets about Gettysburg. Pennsylvania-Maryland Geological Survey, 1:62500, six quadrangles about Gettysburg. Part I General Situation: 1. Pennsylvania (Red) and New York (Blue) are at war. 2. New York has landed the 1st Blue Army by sea and occupied the line Washington—Baltimore—Havre de Grace. The Blue army moves northwest as follows: 1st Corps—Havre de Grace to York area. 2d Corps—Baltimore to Taneytown area. 38d Corps—Washington to Frederick area. 4th Corps—At Baltimore to follow the 2d Corps. 5th Corps—Occupation duty and lines of communication. 3. The Red army, in full strength, excellent equipment and morale, has completed mobilization in the area Green- castle—Chambersburg—Shippensburg. Upon reaching the line Frederick—Taneytown—York on June 12th, the Blue intelligence department reports that on that date the Red army has started columns east on the roads debouching from the mountains from Highfield to Arendtsville. Movement started in the afternoon. The Blue commander decides to concentrate at once with a view to battle. He directs the following movements: 1st Corps from York to Heidlersburg area. 2d Corps from Taneytown to Gettysburg area. 3d Corps from Frederick to Taneytown area. 101 102 THE INFANTRY DIVISION 4th Corps from Baltimore to Westminster area. Army troops to the area Littlestown—Union Mills—West- minster. 5. Just prior to the concentration on Gettysburg, the 1st Division (center division 2d Corps, which has three divisions in line, and one following the center in reserve) is disposed in two columns as follows: Lert CoLUMN RIGHT COLUMN At Taneytown ; At Littlestown 2d Brigade. Division Headquarters. 1st Light Artillery. 1st Brigade. . 1st Machine Gun Battalion. 1st Field Artillery (less 1st Light 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. Artillery). 1st Engineers. 1st Observation Squadron. 1st Field Signal Battalion. Trains at Union Mills. Part II Functions of the elements of a division during a march. Special Situation, 1st Division: 2d Corps, WESTMINSTER, Pa., 12 June 19, 6:00 PM. FIELD et No 20 1. Hostile columns moved east late today from the area GREENCASTLE —CHAMBERSBURG—SHIPPENSBURG. 2. Our army will concentrate towards GETTYSBURG. Corps Movements: 1st Corps—* * * * 2d Corps—From TANEYTOWN area to GETTYSBURG area. 3d Corps—* * * * 4th Corps—* * * * 3. The 2d Corps will move to a concentrated position about GreTtys- BURG. (a) The 2d Div will * * * (b) The 1st Division will move to a concentrated bivouac just N W of Gertyspurc. Limiting roads; BALTIMORE TURN- PIKE and the TANEYTOWN—HARNEY—BARLOW—GETTYSBURG road, both inclusive; all details at discretion of division com- mander. (c) The 3d Division will * * * (d) The 4th Division will * * * . Corps railhead, WESTMINSTER. . Corps headquarters will open at the town hall at GrerrysspurG at 10:00 AM, 13 June, 1919. Closes at WESTMINSTER same hour. Prompt report will be made on completion of division movements. A, Major General. ae GENERAL AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS 103 Part III Functions during combat of all elements of a division (except field artillery), Chapter V (B). ¥ eq of the division field artillery during combat, Chapter General Situation (Continued): The concentration on Gettysburg was completed on June 14th. The army cavalry division has been moved west into the mountains to delay the hostile columns and maintain contact. The 1st and 3d Corps have moved toward Arendtsville and Emmitsburg respectively, establishing the general army alignment on a north and south line through Gettysburg. During the day of June 14th, the cavalry is driven out of the mountains on all the main roads by ex- tremely aggressive hostile action, and hostile columns are deployed for action on the general line Emmitsburg— Arendtsville, just east of the mountains, opposed by Blue cavalry detachments. : The army command directs an immediate general at- tack on the above position, with a view to throwing the hostile army back into the mountains. (Details of attack omitted except for 1st Division.) Special Situation, 1st Division: Extract from paragraph 8, 2d Corps attack order: 3. (b) The 1st Division will move during the night of June 14-15 to the general line MUMMASBURG—SEVEN Stars, and form for attack blong the eastern branch of Mars CREEK, which flows south between those points. OBJECTIVE: Hostile position from CASHTOWN, inclusive, to ORRTANNA, exclusive. Limits, Northern: MUMMASBURG—HILLTOWN road to bridge over MarRSH CREEK near hill 687—then to northern ‘ exit of CASHTOWN. Southern: SEVEN StarRS—McKNIGHTSTOWN StTA., both in- clusive—ORRTANNA, exclusive. Time of attack, 7:00 AM, 15 June, 1919. Note :—Corps artillery plan directs 30 minutes’ artillery preparation. Army and the corps artillery will concentrate on the main roads and prevent hostile rein- forcements .from moving east. The 2d and 3d Divisions extend the attack of the Ist Division to the north and south. 104 THE INFANTRY DIVISION (A) AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN AN ADVANCE CarTAIN Fay W. BRABSON, Infantry OBJECT OF THE CoURSE:—To study the relation be- tween the various arms and services and how they are com- bined into one smoothly running machine. SUBJECT OF THIS CONFERENCE :—Functioning of the ele- ments of an infantry division during a march. This in- volves a consideration of the relation between the warring countries, and the position of the armed forces and the re- lation of the 1st Division to the 1st Blue Army and the 2d Blue Corps. These relations may be treated strategically, tactically, and administratively. Tactically, the enemy, by reason of his greater distance from Gettysburg, can hardly molest the Blue concentration about Gettysburg. Administratively considered, the army cavalry division probably has already gone over the roads in advance of the march of the division. Its engineers will have repaired the roads and bridges. The corps headquarters now at Westminster will open at 10:00 AM tomorrow at Gettysburg. It will be necessary to have corps communica- tions in mind as related to division communications. The corps has its sanitary train behind the line of divi- sion field hospitals. It would be a proper solution for the division itself to establish a field hospital for slightly sick, contagious sick, and gas cases. Still farther behind the corps sanitary formation would follow the army organization of two evacuation ambulance companies, and two evacuation hospitals per division. The division ammunition train is filled. The mobile ordnance repair shop is sent forward with the troops to Gettysburg in the event that it might be needed in case of hostile contact. The engineer train is full. It is not con- templated that it will be needed for work on the roads; con- sequently, it also is sent to Gettysburg. In this particular circumstance, men and animals will be evacuated to the railhead at Westminster through corps agencies ; consequently, the sanitary train is moved with the column of troops to bivouac at Gettysburg. The corps railhead is at Westminster. INFANTRY DIVISION IN ADVANCE 105 Corps parks would be established there or forward of that place shortly. A corps remount depot, and a corps mobile veterinary hospital would be in position to help the division soon. One section of the ney train of the division is at Westminster. : DETAILED STUDY OF ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION :— Three general situations may arise in a campaign: a march. a battle, and a camp. Here we will be concerned primarily with: (a) Camp in the Littlestown—Taneytown area. (b) March to Gettysburg. (c) Bivouac in Gettysburg area (northwest). LOCATION OF THE TROOPS IN THE OLD AREA:—When corps orders are received, the troops are in two columns; each column having an infantry brigade and a light artillery regiment. The trains are somewhat in rear of the east column at Union Mills. The regiment of heavy artillery is with the east column. An army corps has two cavalry regiments. Normally it attaches one squadron to each division. This squadron is assumed to be with the left column near Taneytown. Detailed study of organization within the division with relation to the mission prescribed and changes required in location of units should be made before the march. The march being in hostile territory, protection is required. There is available the Ist Observation Squadron, the squad- ron of cavalry, and such advance guards as each column commander may consider necessary. In the problem, it is deemed desirable to place a radio section with the squadron of cavalry and to send, in advance of the hour of departure of west column, one motor ambu- lance company for march collection purposes. When con- tact with the enemy is not expected, as in this case, one am- bulance, horsed, reports automatically to each regiment. For an independent regiment, or one on flank guard duty, a camp infirmary may be sent in addition to an ambulance. PRESENTATION (IN OUTLINE) OF Two PHASES OF THE PROBLEM IJ. MarcH CONSIDERATIONS: Formation: Troops and trains. ' Release of trains to heads of services. 106 THE INFANTRY DIVISION Division headquarters echelons; headquarters troop. Protection of columns. Reconnaissance: Airplane, cavalry, advance guards. Zone of advance. Roads. Initial points. Number of columns. Length of columns. ty . Speed of columns. (Mobile ordnance repair shops and service park units move slowly.) Traffic control. March discipline. Halts enroute. Hourly halts. Noon day halts. Quartering parties. Field trains. natn Signal communications. Location of forward communication centers. Message centers. Reports. II. CAMPING CONSIDERATION: Reconnaissance preceding a halt: by airplane service; by army cavalry division; by advance cavalry; by advance guards. Outpost line with relation to infantry brigades, artillery” brigade, and trains. Outpost reconnaissance. Various stages of readiness. Dimensions of camp. Shelter, water supply, accessibility. Relation of halt and disposition of troops to probable mission of the commander for the following day. Depth of position. Concentration required here. Protection against airplane observation. Road systems by which bivouac areas may be approached. Loeation of artillery with relation to infantry. Location of reserves; interior divisions. Location of observation squadron. Location of ambulance companies and field hospitals. Disposition of combat and field trains. THE TRAINS Normally division trains are the third echelon of trains, that is, in rear of combat trains and field trains. However, if contact is expected, the ambulance companies may be moved in advance of the field trains to the rear of the com- bat train column. Camp infirmaries march normally with animal-drawn portion of the sanitary trains, unless attached individually to regiments. The division medical supply unit is attached to the sani- tary train and is under the jurisdiction of the division surgeon. It carries field medical supplies for sanitary troops. It dumps at sorting stations and returns to a corps dump for litters and blankets. Issues forward are made by means of empty ambulances of organizations. INFANTRY DIVISION IN ADVANCE 107 The organization of the Medical Department on a march depends upon the length of march, the number of columns and their length, together with the probability of meeting the enemy. In bivouac area, the depth of the area governs the disposition of medical units. In this particular situation men and animals may be evacuated directly to the railhead at Westminster. In marches where the enemy certainly will not be met, combat trains may march in rear of field trains. The bag- gage would reach camp more quickly under this arrange- ment. When organizations operate independently, the field trains are under direct control of the organization com- manders. When not operating independently, the field trains are ordinarily grouped by the division commander. The senior line officer present with trains assumes com- mand and moves them as directed by superior authority. When field trains are ordered grouped with division trains, they are, for the time being, under orders of the commander of trains. In the late afternoon, or at the end of a march, or at the close of a combat, the division commander directs the field trains to move to a point immediately in rear of the troops. He informs the commander that the baggage section and one day’s rations from the ration section will be at such and such a place. The ration vehicles, upon arriving in camp, un- load, then rejoin the grouped portion of the ration section. The division commander usually returns the baggage section to the grouped ration section early the following morning. In this problem, both sections of the field train are full and ready to move with the columns. The full section of the supply train goes to Gettysburg, issues there tonight, and returns to Westminster tomorrow morning. The empty section is at Westminster tonight. 1st Division, LITTLESTOWN, 12 June 19, 8:00 PM. FIELD gaa No 2 Maps: Gettysburg-Antietam General Map, 1”=10 miles. Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120, twelve sheets about Gettysburg. 1. Hostile columns moved east late today from the area GREENCASTLE —CHAMBERSBURG—SHIPPENSBURG. 108 THE INFANTRY DIVISION Our corps continues to move to a concentrated position about GETTYSBURG. . . 2. This division will move tomorrow to a concentrated bivouac just northwest of GETTYSBURG. Attached march table and quarter- ing table cover details. 3. (a) The Advance Cavalry will maintain contact between the ad- vance guard of each infantry column and the Army Cavalry Division. é (b) Under arrangements with the corps the 1st Observation Squad- ron with radio section will remain in camp at LITTLESTOWN. Beginning at 8:00 AM reconnaissance will be made every two hours of roads in the direction: 1. GETTYSBURG—ARENDTSVILLE—SHIPPENSBURG. 2. BARLOW—GETTYSBURG—CHAMBERSBURG. Reports will be made by dropped message. ; (c) Commanders of infantry brigades will assure local protection for their respective commands while enroute to new area. (x) (1) Commencing at 8:00 AM, and until completion of the move, - commanders of all columns will report their location hourly. (2) Upon arrival in the new area outposts will be established : along the line hill 647—hill 667—GrimEs HovusE—hill 546. Each infantry brigade will be responsible for its . sector; both brigade sectors to include house just south of hill 667. In case of hostile attack the outpost line will be held. 4. Grouped field train columns will follow respective troop columns without distance. Quartering parties of reduced strength will precede units to bivouac area under arrangements to be made by Gl. Administrative orders follow. 5. (a) Plan of Signal Communications: no change. . (b) Division axis of Signal Communications: GERMANTOWN—GETTYSBURG. (c) Forward communication centers will be established at Sr. Mary’s Rr. CHURCH and PENN COLLEGE. Division command post will close at LITTLESTOWN at 11:00 AM and will open at PENN COLLEGE same date and hour. . .Maj Gen Copies to: Div Staff CG ist FA Brig CG 2d Corps CO ist Engrs CG 2d Div * CO ist F Sig Bn CG 3d Div CO 1st MG Bn CG 1st Brig CO Tns CG 2d Brig 109 INFANTRY DIVISION IN ADVANCE 9 Teltag ulof 03 ABD st bg st ‘UL O F A “UL US ULOfat 0} Paseajal aq 07 AyNP jo uonarduios uodn ‘sesodind uo1 -o9][0o Yoreur AoZ uuINjoo urol pue WV 00:9 #8 NMOLAGNVY, 72 ylodet 03 09 qUIy 4ST ‘a0Ue} “sip yoy sdoorz MOTOF 0% SUIeI} P[PY pequiessy ‘Jequinu [eltes styy Aq yey ABpuCOU ONT ‘NV 00:2 38 NaGUD AVMOTIV qTeajo [[IM pens souvape jo [ley ‘a[quiisap ji Ajeyeiedas “ Aa Avg pus ‘Ug dey pz0- qow JO aAOUL azEINse1 ABUT [DH “UOISIAI( ay} Sui4[ddns ul 15 Aq pepeosu jou ale SB papnpoul Ulery, A[ddng jo sped yong “Wd SP 3% STUW NOIN(Q, aABaT 0} UUINJOD Jo pray ‘s0UBYSIP JNOYPIM sSUTeIz yequioo pue sdoor, MOp[OF OF UleIL, PPL (AV 9h: TT 7 NMOL “SUILLI'T aval OF UUUINJOD Jo pea “20U8} sSIP JHoyWM Z| [eHOs MOTOF 0} tuumnjoy doory, ur s}iun Zurpuod -SarI0d jo Japi0_ ut dn peau ‘aaquinu [Bltes sly} Aq 3[ey ABpucou ou oq [[I4 at0yL, ‘WY 00:2 38 "9GUQ AVMOTIV ieao YA prens soueape jo [re], “‘pueUIUIOD UMO S}I UIOf Uey} ‘gare oenoalg 0} 9 ON [®I1ag UJIM YoIeU 02 UIeIy, Jequi0g pus pela “WV 08:9 3e Magu AVMOTTY Jve[o 0} UUINTOD Jo [Te], sy.pmogy auig ound “SUIENVHO BIA aoueyy ‘DUNESAL “195 0} MOTUVG —XINUVH PLA @ [eles se suey z Teves Se seg z [ees se aweg avoy oungsVWANYL BIA aDU9U} $ DUNESALLAY)' 0} GuNIg auOoWILIVg aGvoy NMOLHSVD —SuNdSALIGH 8aqnog T [ereg 88 ouleg T [8l12g se ouleg T [ees se surg T [elas . SB aUIeg (MN) Bole dENOAIG DUNGSALIGD, (MN) vaae oENoAg DYNASALLIH OL <. a1aVi HOUVN 0D qury 4ST ud OW 4ST ‘ WT ¥T Sig PZ QO uey Bug Bole NMOLAINV,L (syop 8591) UZ, dng 4sT (22g W) UL WV IST (29g W) UL 18ugq 4ST (09 Guy 4ST ssey pue 9g H S89) UL US 4ST Bale (99S H S891) DH uL STII NOINQ surely, OO @ [Beg WAH PE ge aueg 9 190 e (929g H) UL WY IST (998 H) UL 18Uq 4ST S}2P_ SSE] (998 H) UL US ST @ [Ses ur uoTeZzt @ [ees -UBZIO JO SsUIvIY, PP se sues” a cep, . . 0D quay UW SPC (soos pea 3 8891) UG 3IS A 3ST sIzuyq 4ST (WAH Ps pus VT WT S891) 3G VA 1 99 dN dHGa eole Big 3ST NMOLSA TLE q wey sug q s0few vale deg PeYy T NMOLAGNV IL, AeQ 48ST DS 4ST LOPUDUWMOOD wmoLg pup suoinzUuDb1E 616T gt eung 6I6T SI eune 616T ST eune 616T gr eure 616T st aun 616T eI eune a70q ‘ON 028 “UOISIAI, 4ST ‘Z ON Out Auedutoooe of, :y F1avE 110 Unit DHQ Hq Tns and MP 1st Sn Tn lst Engr Tn 1st Engrs 1st F Sig Bn Ist Brig 2d Brig lst MG Bn Ist FA Brig Ist Sq 1st Cav 1st Sup Tn (less dets). 1st Am Tn Location PENN COLLEGE buildings and grounds In orchard 400 yds. S. W. of PENN COLLEGE In area bounded on east by Arty Brig area; on north by MUMMASBURG Roap; on west by west- ern_arm of WILLOUGH- BY RuN and on south by a line parallel to north- ern boundary and 700 yds. therefrom In area bounded on east by Arty Brig area; on north by Ist Brig area; on west by a line join- ing western boundary Ist Brig area with cross- road 577; on south by CHAMBERSBURG Roap In small orchard 700 yds. S. W. of PENN COLLEGE Area including woeded hill 582 and_ orchard one mile N. W. of Get- TYSBURG Vicinity N. Grist House In triangle east of PENN COLLEGE grounds In city block just S. E. of PENN COLLEGE grounds THE INFANTRY DIVISION TaBLE B: Quartering Table Gettysburg Zone (N. W.). Remarks Detached elements. Sani- tary Train will be re- lieved in time to rejoin without counter-march- ing To approach by unim- proved road just south of PENN COLLEGE * Camouflage nets utilized around perimeter of woods and orchards will inerease screened area available for vehicles At nightfall to withdraw to rear of outpost INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 111 (B) THE INFANTRY DIVISION DURING AN ATTACK CarTAINn A. R. CHAFFEE, Cavalry This is a continuation of the operations of the 1st Divi- sion of the 2d Blue Corps, whose movement to a concentrated bivouac northwest of Gettysburg was discussed in Chapter V (A). The division as it was established in bivouac on June 18th is situated as follows: The line of resistance of its outposts runs north and south through hills 647—667—J. Grimes and hill 546. The outpost cavalry is reconnoitering in front of its outpost maintaining contact with the army cavalry. Division head- quarters is at Penn College. The 1st Engineer Train, 1st Sanitary Train, lst Ammunition Train and 1st Supply Train are near there and Ist Field Signal Battalion and 1st En- gineers are in bivouac in the orchard 400 yards southwest of Penn College. The 1st Machine Gun Battalion is in the or- chard 700 yards southwest of Penn College. The 1st Field Artillery Brigade is bivouacking in the woods on hill 582. The ist Brigade occupies a stretch 700 yards deep on the south side of Mummasburg Road from Willoughby Run ex- tending back to the artillery brigade. The 2d Brigade oc- cupies a parallel stretch north of the Chambersburg Road. The infantry of the division is thus within the space bounded by Mummasburg Road—wWilloughby Run—Chambersburg Road and the woods on hill 582. General Situation (continued): The concentration on Gettysburg was completed on June 14th. The army cavalry division has been moved west into the mountains to delay the hostile columns and maintain contact. The Ist and 3d Corps have moved towards Arendts- ville and Emmitsburg respectively, establishing the general army alignment on a north and south line through Gettys- burg. During the day of June 14th, the cavalry is driven out of the mountains on all the main roads by extremely ag- 112 THE INFANTRY DIVISION gressive hostile action, and hostile columns are deployed for action on the general line Emmitsburg—Arendtsville. The army command directs an immediate general at- tack on the above positions with a view to throwing the hostile army back into the mountains. (Details of attack omitted except.for 1st Division.) Special Situation, 1st Division: Extract from paragraph 3, 2d Corps order: (b) The 1st Division will move during the night of June 14-15 to the general line MUMMASBURG—SEVEN Stars, and form for attack along the eastern branch of MaRSH CREEK which flows south between those points. a3 It will attack, driving the enemy from his positions east of SoutH MouNTAIN, will hold a position on the general line CaSHTOWN—ORRTANNA and will send out strong patrols to inflict losses on the retreating hostile columns. Objective: Hostile position from CASHTOWN (incl.) to ORR- TANNA (excl.). Limits, Northern: MUMMASBURG—HILLTOWN road from 679 to bridge over MARSH CREEK near hill 687—thence northern limits of CASHTOWN—crossroads 954. Southern: L. Hoppy—SrEvEN Stars—McCKNIGHTSTOWN STA. (ali incl.) ——ORRTANNA (excl.). Time of attack: 4:00 AM, 15th June. Note:—Corps artillery plan directs 30 minutes’ artillery preparation. Army and corps artillery directed to concentrate on the main roads and prevent hostile reinforcements from moving east. The 2d and 3d Divisions extend the attack of the 1st Division to the north and south. Assume that the attack order of the corps was received at 3:00 PM. It is seen that the information of the enemy, which so far is at the disposal of the division commander, is extremely meager. The division commander immediately calls upon his air service, which was left at Littlestown and which was given missions for today of reconnoitering in the direction of the Chambersburg and Arendtsville Roads, for additional information of the enemy dispositions. He will also endeavor to stir up his cavalry reconnaissance, and to obtain news through ground observation. All definite plans of supply, of stationing of rear echel- ons and services, all functions of auxiliary arms must wait until the general plan for the division—the plan for the en- gagement of the infantry—is decided upon. To form the general plan, the division commander must have knowledge of four factors: (a) his mission; (b) the INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 113 enemy; (c) his own troops; (d) the terrain. As to his mission, we have the corps order; it gives the limits and objective of the division. It is silent on the maneuver of the corps as a whole. It would normally tell us what part the 1st and 3d Divisions are to play. It is useful to know these so as to co-operate. It would be useful to know whether each division is to drive independently or whether there are any intermediate reorganization lines. The corps is silent about flank connections between units. About the enemy, we know that he drove our cavalry out of the mountains on the 14th; that he is deployed on the general line, Emmitsburg—Arendtsville. He is in his own territory ; his morale and equipment are in good shape; his ranks are full; he has advanced his heads of columns 15 miles on a front of 15 miles during the past féw days to meet us; he is probably closer to his bases than we are. The ex- act locations of his elements are very indefinite so far. We have, however, from the corps order, a statement that he is in position between Cashtown and Orrtanna. His intentions are certainly aggressive. He needs, and will try to get as quickly as possible, “elbow room” east of the mountains. Our own troops: The 1st Division is a part of an invad- ing army of five corps. Our own corps has three divisions. We are in the center. The 2d Division is attacking to the north of us. The 3d Division is attacking to the south; the 1st Division is not reinforced, except that it has an observa- tion squadron and’a squadron of cavalry attached. Terrain: We have the map, but that must be supple- mented by reconnaissances. These must be made by the division commander, chief of staff, and G3 for the general plan; by G1, G2, division engineer, division machine gun officer, division artillery commander, for special plans, and by heads of various services for the proper operations of ‘ their services. The problem of the division commander might be solved on the map, but it will be much better solved if he and his chief of staff and G8 all know the ground in front of them from personal observation. The division has been in its present bivouac since the night of the 13th. There has been opportunity for the officers stated to make themselves ac- 114 THE INFANTRY DIVISION quainted with the general lie of the ground towards the enemy. Suppose, now, at 3:00 PM on receipt of the corps order that the division commander desires to take another more detailed look at the ground before ordering his at- tack dispositions. Before he goes, he shows the corps order to G1, G2 and the artillery commander ; their reconnaissances can practically be made simultaneously with his own. He will leave the chief of staff at the division command post to maintain supervision and touch with the corps during his. absence. He will take G3 with him on his reconnaissance so that the latter may more thoroughly understand the exact maneuver upon which he decides. Looking on the map he studies the points from which a view of the country may be obtained. Hills -602—-603—626—668—687—627— 667 and the Mummasburg Church afford views. He has rapid means of transportation. He decides to go to three of these near the road and not far advanced from his outpost lines. He chooses 626—668—687. Enroute to these he notices the general lie of the country. East of the eastern branch of Marsh Creek there is a succession of low ridges running generally north and south. The roads run generally in the same direction, with the exception of the Mummasburg Road which runs di- agonally northwest across the position. There is a lack of prominent landmarks. The country is generally rolling. There are a few small patches of woods and the stream valleys are wooded, affording concealment. On his way to the high points on his front, General A stops at the post of the commander of the outpost. He does this for two rea- sons: 1. To get the very latest information first hand from that source. 2. To get a small escort because he wants to go to places which are beyond the infantry line of resistance. The outpost commander tells him (add to the special situation) that the army cavalry is no longer in his front. That it was withdrawn northeast. That the squadron of outpost cavalry is still patrolling in front of the infantry outguards. That they are to withdraw, to bivouac east of hill 687 at dusk, 8:00 PM, and to leave standing patrols at*-Mummasburg and at all the crossings of the east branch of Marsh Creek between Mummasburg and Seven Stars, INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 115 on hill 604, and at road junction 617. He tells General A also, that a message, just received from the cavalry squadron commander, states that at 3:00 PM his patrol on hill 604 was driven by a hostile cavalry platoon to Seven Stars and that small parties of enemy infantry had ap- peared at McKnightstown and on the hill to the north. On his visit to hills 626—668—687, General A notices that he has a good view of the country as far as McKnights- town Ridge. His view is stopped on the north by the heavily wooded hill 969; on the south by the wooded ridge south of Seven Stars. He has been able to see the roofs of Mc- Knightstown Station. He can see some of his cavalry parties on the east side of Marsh Creek. Of the enemy he can see nothing. Further west his view strikes the deeply wooded ridges on the line Cashtown—Orrtanna, roughly on the 900 foot contour. Looking towards the enemy’s position, he sees that the ground is a succession of ridges northwest and southeast. The creeks run in the same direction. None of these is believed to be a serious obstacle to infantry or machine guns. Their banks within the division sector ap- parently are not steep. Horse-drawn elements will find many crossings. The enemy’s advance observation groups which have been reported on a north and south line through McKnightstown have good view as far east as the eastern branch of Marsh Creek. The trees in the creek bottom are tall and thick, affording close concealment. McKnights- town and the patches of woods northwest, and near J. Small, with the prominent hill 653 probably will be the center of any severe resistance in this outpost zone. As the enemy has gained hill 969, he will endeavor to hold on to it ten- aciously because of the observation which it affords. Putting himself in the enemy’s position, General A de- cides that the wooded ravine of Marsh Creek affords cover from view for this assaulting battalion, except from hill 969. That support and reserve troops can be formed up in the ravines east of hill 602 and 603 and east of hills 687—668— 627 with security from view of any observation posts on the high hills west of Cashtown. His forward elements, however, will be seen from hill 969 after daybreak. The enemy can see all tops of ridges as far as the Gettysburg— 116 THE INFANTRY DIVISION Biglersville road, but his view of the 1st Division back areas is at very long range, so that it is not very accurate, and it requires expert observers and perfect visibility. The front on which the division is to attack is initially 3500 yards. The depth of its penetration on its attack is about 7500 yards. Patrols must be pushed still further. Plenty of good artillery positions can be found within 1500 yards of the jumping off line. Lateral communications within his assembly area are excellent. : The distance to the enemy’s first position is a little too great for machine guns to aid the attack by the overhead fire in the initial stages. Targets also are not definite as yet. The general might attack with his brigades in column, one behind the other. This would be an advantage if his sector were very narrow and if he had to make a strong effort to take a second position after he had overcome the first. Considering the lie of the ground in front of him, the general decides that he will attack with his brigades side by side, and his regiments abreast, because he does not expect the maximum resistance until he comes to the ene- my’s main position 7000 yards away. That overcome, he is to exploit with patrols only. The front is broad; having two brigade commanders in line facilitates control and com- munication. He will not specify when the leading bat- talions are to be leap-frogged, but will leave that to the judg- ment of regimental commanders. If there is any opposition at all, 7000 yards is a very long penetration for a front line battalion. The brigades are now placed in their bivouacs side by side, facilitating movement to their lines of de- parture. The head of the 1st Brigade has a little less than three miles to march. The 2d Brigade about two and one- half miles. Artillery must cover four miles at a maximum. From a study of the ground, General A is convinced that all of his movements into position must be made after night- fall and the greatest precaution taken to insure secrecy. He now hurries back to his command post because he has the data on which his order for attack may be written out and because there will be time for further detailed re- connaissances and arrangements on the part of staff officers INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 117 and chiefs of services whose general reconnaissance has been going on simultaneously with his own. Upon his return to the command post General A re- ceives from G2 copies of enemy situation messages which have been received during his reconnaissance, among others the following: TELEPHONE MESSAGE From Division Observer, Hill 626, 14 June 19, 4:00 PM. To G2, 1st Div. Saw twenty enemy infantrymen moving south from crossroad 647 at 4:00 PM. Outpost notified. , T: From Branch Int O, 2d Corps, LITTLESTOWN, 14 June, 4:15 PM. To G2, 1st Div. Reconnaissance 1st Div plane Lt Smith, pilot, Lt Jones, Observer, over CHAMBERSBURG RoapD 38:15 to 4:05 PM. Altitude 1000—3000 meters. Ten horses in woods 500 yds west of hill 604. Two automobiles running from McKNIGHTSTOWN towards CASHTOWN. Smoke in or- chard 800 yds N W McKNIGHTSTOWN. About 1 platoon infantry on road near J. SMALL marching east at 3:40. Deployed infantry north of ORRTANNA west of 616—676 road. Wagons and troops in each town. Column wagons and guns on road 1 mile west of HILL- TOWN. Returning saw small groups deployed infantry in holes on hill 653. Repeated to G2, 2d Corps. ¥ A brief message was dropped at the division command post as the plane passed and the above was telephoned from the airdrome after the observer had been examined by the branch intelligence officer. G2, in addition to his work of gathering, collating and analyzing information, will have a big job of map distri- bution on his hands, if it has not already been done. Suppos- ing that the staffs and command are already supplied with large scale maps'it takes 1043 small scale maps to insure a complete distribution to a division. As he sits down to work out his detailed plan, the divi- sion commander sees that the northern brigade must deal with hill 653 and with flanking fire coming from the slopes of hill 969. Farther west, the orchards near crossroads 662, and Cashtown itself will give trouble. All of these he decides to allot to the northern brigade. In the southern 118 THE INFANTRY DIVISION sector, the difficulties will be the woods near 612 and J. Small and McKnightstown. Farther west there is a strong position on hill 687. Farther west still the woods 1000 yards north of Orrtanna will offer resistance to his troops endeavoring to pass at the north of that town. The diagonal direction of the draws, however, lends itself to outflanking movements on the part of the Blue troops. The line of demarkation, therefore, between his brigades he decides as follows: Hill 647 to the northern brigade. Hill 582 to the southern brigade. Hill 653 to the northern brigade. McKnightstown to the southern brigade. Crossroads 627 to the southern brigade. Crossroads 787 to the northern brigade. Hill 1060 to the southern brigade. This gives to the brigades an initial frontage of 17 50 yards for the northern brigade, and 1650 yards for the southern brigade. ‘a The frontage on the objective of the division is 1660 yards for the northern and 2800 yards for the southern brigade. These are big frontages, but it must be remembered that there has been no time for the enemy to organize. The relative frontage is right, for the southern brigade apparently has the most difficult job in the early stages and the northern brigade in the latter stages. The penetration of the northern brigade must be quickly pushed at the finish because the road leading west through the mountains from Cashtown is a main highway, while that runnning west from Orrtanna is secondary in character. The enemy situation is not very well known. A strong reserve is therefore quite essential. Since fire of position by machine guns at the outset does not seem to be practicable, we have the division machine gun battalion. There are also the regiment of engineers and the cavalry squadron, which can be utilized without depleting a brigade. The total of these, however, does not give the division commander sufficient rifles to use as his weapon of maneuver to influence the combat at critical stages. INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 119 He therefore reserves one battalion of infantry from each brigade. He finds out from the brigadiers the des- ignation of the organizations which will be most suitably placed to furnish these battalions. The desirable points in their initial stationing in this case seem to be: Shelter from shelling. Good communication with the division command post. Good routes leading forward into any part of the sector. Ability to use part of them with the least mixing of units. On this account it is not a disadvantage to have them separated. They should be far enough back to be out of the way of brigade units moving to the attack. Motorized units must have quick access to main roads. The work of the en- gineers will be, primarily, the quick repair of bridges to open lateral communications in the advance. There are six small bridges in the sector of the 1st Brigade and three in front of the 2d Brigade. The 1st Brigade is therefore given the greater number of engineer companies initially. As there is no immediate work in sight for the rest of the regiment, it is held as a reserve and may take a very useful part in the fighting. It will find employment in a technical way the moment the division objective is reached, and this employment will outweigh any present work on roads near Gettysburg. The Gettysburg region will be promptly taken over by the corps anyway. In this case, the placing of the engineers in the reserve is believed to be justified. The airdrome of the division air squadron is at Littles- town, about twelve miles in an air line from our advanced command posts. Close to the command post there seems to be no very good auxiliary landing ground. We will therefore have to content ourselves with hav- ing the squadron commander or his representative present at the command post, and the signal officer must see that there is good wire and radio connection to the airdrome. Chambersburg is a little over 30 miles from the air- drome. The principle mission to be given our squadron will be reconnaissance over mountain roads, particularly the Chambersburg Road, to observe enemy movements. They 120 THE INFANTRY DIVISION will execute surveillance flights over our own lines, and certain planes will work for our artillery. The general has taken one and one-half hours for his reconnaissance. ‘There is still daylight for several hours. The infantry brigadiers can do some planning and recon- naissance before they get the field order. The sun does not set until 7:30 PM. A warning message will set them right. 1st Div, ° PENN COLLEGE, 14 June 19, 4:30 PM. To: CG, 1st Brig. CG, 2d Brig. CG, 1st FA Brig. Map: Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120, all sheets north and west of Gettysburg (inclu- sive). . Division attacks enemy positions on line CASHTOWN—ORRTANNA tomorrow morning. Line of departure: Eastern branch MarsH CREEK from MUMMASBURG (inclusive) to CHAMBERSBURG RoAD BRIDGE (inclusive). Boundaries, 1st Brigade: Northern: MumMMassurG—hill 722—CasHTOWN (all inclu- sive). Southern: Hill 647 (inclusive) —-McKNIGHTSTOWN—cross- roads 627—crossroads 787 (all inclusive). 2d Brigade: Northern: Same as southern boundary 1st Brigade. Southern: Hill 667—Srven Stars—McKNIGHTSTOWN StTa.— (all inclusive) —-ORRTANNA (exclusive). 1st Brigade, supported by 1st LA. 2d Brigade, supported by 2d LA. CG 1st FA Brig will arrange for accompanying guns for assault battalions. All necessary reconnaissance will be made immediately. Orders follow. , By command of Major Gen A x, Chief of Staff. The attack order will follow as soon as it can be gotten out. It will be as follows: SECRET 1st Div, PENN COLLEGE, 14 June 19, 5:20 PM. FIELD ORDERS } No 4 Maps: Gettysburg-Antietam General Map, 1”=10 miles. Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120, all sheets north and west of Gettysburg (inclu- sive, 1, The enemy has advanced into the plain east of SourH MounTaAIN to the general line ARENDTSVILLE—EMmitsBurG. His infantry INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 121 outposts have been seen near McKNIGHTSTOWN, hill 653 and crossroads 647. His main position in our front is on the general line HILLTOWN—CaAaSHTOWN—ORRTANNA. His outposts on hill 458 have dug in. Our army cavalry has withdrawn from our front towards the northeast. : Our Blue Army attacks tomorrow on the front ARENDTSVILLE— EMMITSBURG to drive the enemy back into the mountains, cutting of and destroying those elements which have debouched into the plain. Our 2d Corps attacks on the front ARENDTSVILLE (excl.)— KNOXLYN (incl.) with the 1st Div on the north, the 2d Div in the center and the 3d Div on the south. 2. The Division will attack and conquer the enemy’s main position from CASHTOWN (incl.) to ORRTANNA (excl.). By quick progress in its front it will assist the 1st Div in the capture of hill 969. It will hold a position on the line CASHTOWN (incl.)—ORRTANNA (excl.) pushing out strong patrols to the line crossroads 1112 (335.8—757.1) —hill 1369 (384.7—751.5) to inflict loss upon the enemy’s retreating columns. Line of departure: The eastern branch of MARSH CREEK. Time of attack: 4:00 AM. The attack will be preceded by an artillery preparation starting at 3:30 AM. Boundaries 1st Div: Northern: GOLDENVILLE—HILLTOWN road to bridge over MarsH ‘CREEK near hill 687—Northern exits of CasH- TOWN (all incl.) Summit of Rock Top—crossroads 954 (both excl.). . Southern: CHAMBERSBURG RoaD from L. Hoppry to SEVEN Stars—McKNIGHTSTOWN Sta. (all incl.) —ORRTANNA— hill 13869 (both excl.). 8. (a) The 1st Brig: Boundaries: Northern: Same as north boundary 2d Div. Southern: Hill 647 (incl.)—hill 582—-McKNicHtTstowN— crossroads 787—1060 foot hill (1500 yards SW of cross- roads 787 (all excl.). The 1st Brig will attack with its regiments abreast to secure that part of the division objective within its zone. By a rapid penetration on its righi flank it will assist the 1st Div in the cap- ture of hill 969. It will aid the 2d Brig in the.capture of McKNIGHTSTOWN by turning that place from the north. It will organize and hold a position on the line CASsHTOWN— crossroads 787 pushing out strong patrols to inflict damage on enemy columns retreating on the CHAMBERSBURG ROAD. (b) The 2d Brig: Boundaries: Northern: Same as southern boundary 1st Brig. Southern: Same as southern boundary 2d Div. The 2d ‘Brig will attack with its regiments abreast to secure that part of the division objective within its zone. It will organize and hold a position on the line crossroads 787—crossroads 667 (both incl.), and will push out strong patrols to inflict damage on the enemy retreating southwest- wards. (c) The 1st FA Brig will support the attack from initial posi- tions east of MummaspuRG—hill 626 by concentrations on points of resistance. McCKNIGHTSTOWN, hill 658, CASHTOWN, and the woods east and south thereof in particular, will be heavily bombarded. 122 THE INFANTRY DIVISION The 1st LA and 2d LA will be prepared to advance. their positions rapidly in support of the 1st and 2d Brigs respec- tively. 2 Ereby effort will be made to bring fire on enemy coJumns in retreat through the mountains. (d) Engrs. One bn 1st Engrs (less 1 co) will report to the CG, 1st Brig at road junction 679 at 3:30 AM. ; One co 1st Engrs will report to CG, 2d Brigade at railroad crossing north of L. Hoppy at 3:30 AM. (e) Air Service. Reconnaissance will be made every hour, commenc- ing at daybreak, of the enemy positions and the roads, par- ticularly the CHAMBERSBURG RoapD, leading west therefrom. (See Annex, Field Orders for the Air Service, omitted.) Surveillance missions over our own lines as ordered by the division commander. (f) Divisional Reserves. . 1st Engrs (less 1 bn), 1st Sq 1st Cav, and 1 Bn 4th Inf in ravine east of hill 667. 1st MG Bn (motor) woods at 347.2—755.0. 1st Bn 1st Inf 200 yards southeast of crossroads 679. Each independent reserve unit will send an officer agent, with rapid means of transportation, to report to G3 1st Div at 3:00 AM. (x) General. Direction of attack 277° magnetic. (y) One section of 75 mm guns will be attached directly to each infantry assaulting battalion. The artillery brigade commander will designate the batteries which will furnish these guns. (z) Flank connection with the 2d and 3d Divs will be main- tained by detachments of two platoons of infantry with one section of machine guns furnished by the 1st and 2d Brigs respectively. These detachments will move forward by suc- cessive bounds, in general following the division boundaries. Contact between brigades will be similarly maintained by a detachment of one infantry platoon with a section of ma- chine guns from each brigade. It will move in general, by bounds, along the brigade boundary, starting from MarsH CREEK east of hill 522. Officer to command both detachments will be furnished by the 2d Brigade. 4, (a) Station for slightly wounded at crossroads 1600 yds NW of J. Forney. It will be advanced to the eastern exit of MCKNIGHTS- TOWN when the attack has passed that point. (b) Axial roads: 1st Div: MumMmassurG RoaD to 5983—560—SrvEnN STaRs— CASHTOWN. 1st Brig: MumMMasBuRG—HILLTOWN road to 659—road junction near hill 682—CasHTown, 2d Brig: Same as ist Div to McKNIGHTStOowN—thence roe Other administrative details fol- ow. 5. (a) Axes of signal communications: Same as axial roads. Plan of signal communications: No change. (b) Command posts. 2d Corps: GETTYSBURG. ist Div: Advanced command post will open at farm 200 yards south of crossroads 625 at midnight June 14-15, and at SEVEN Stars as soon as the attack has passed McKNIGHTSTOWN. 8d Div: B. TELLER FARM. 2d Div: TaBLe Rock Sta. INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 123 1st Brig: MumMMasBurG after 12:00 midnight June 14-15. 2d Brig: Farm 300 yards east of hill 626 after 12:00 midnight, June 14-15. By command of Maj Gen A xX Chief of Staff. Distribution: “1. CG 23. Div Sig O 2. C of S 24. DMGO 3-4. G3 25. CO, 1st MG Bn 5-6. G2 26. Div Surg 7-8. Gl 27. Adj 9-12. CG, 1st FA Brig 28. CG, 2d Corps 13-15. CG, 1st Brig 29. G8, 2d Corps 16-18. CG, 2d Brig 30. CG, 1st Div 19-20. CO, 1st Obsn Sq 31. CG, 3d Div 21. CO, 1st Engrs 32. War Diary 22. CO, 1st Sq 1st Cav 33-40. Spare A good assistant G3 will have prepared the march order at the same time. It and the field order must agree. 1st Division, PENN COLLEGE, 14 June 19, 5:00 PM. SECRET FIELD cries No 3 — Map: Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120, Gettysburg, Hunterstown, Arendtsville, Knoxlyn Sheets. 1. The 1st Division deploys tonight in its attack positions on the east- ern branch of MarsH CREEK from MUMMASBURG to the bridge 500 yards SE of SEVEN Stars (inc.) (see FO, 2d Div). 2. The 1st Brigade will move by the MUMMASBURG RoaD and all roads north so as to be in its attack positions by 1:00 AM. All uzits will be north of crossroads 625 at 11:00 PM. 3. The 2d Brigade will move by the 577—L. Hoppy—627—625 road so as to arrive in its attack positions by 1:00 AM. No units will cross the MumMaAsBURG ROAD except between 11:00 PM and midnight, when they may cross between cross- roads 625 and WILLOUGHBY RUN. : 4. The artillery will follow the infantry brigades into position. The head of its column on the MumMMassBurcG Roap will not reach WILLOUGHBY RUN before midnight. It may use the C. ToppER—HAMILTON—-630—648—MUMMaS- BURG road after 10:30 PM. All elements will be in position ready to fire at 3:30 AM. 5. The 1st Engineers will use the MuMMasBuRG Roap to their position following the column of artillery on the MuMMasBuRG Roap. The 1st MG Bn starting at 8:00 PM will move via GETTYSBURG —HAMILTON—630—644 to its position in reserve at woods at 3847.2—755.0. . ; 6. The brigade field trains will be assembled off the roads in their present locations prepared to move to the north under later orders from G1. 7. Every precaution will be made to insure silence and secrecy in the movement to attack positions. 124 THE INFANTRY DIVISION The movement of infantry brigades into position will be covered by security detachments whose advance patrols will not be pushed more than 200 yards west of the eastern branch of MarsH CREEK, No troops will move from present bivouacs before 8:00 PM. 8. The present outpost will stand relieved when brigade columns on the MumMassuRG and CHAMBERSBURG Roaps have passed the line of observation. Infantry of the outpost will join their brigades. Outpost cavalry will reinforce its standing patrols and on their relief by infantry will concentrate in its bivouac east of hill 667. 9. Administrative details as prescribed for FO 4. 10. Command posts as prescribed for FO 4. By command of Maj Gen A x Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG 23. Div Sig O 2.C of 8 24. DMGO 8-4. G3 26. Div Surg 5-6. G2 27. Adj 7-8. Gl 28. CG, 2d Corps 9-12. CG, 1st FA Brig 29. G8, 2d Corps 18-15. CG, 1st Brig 80. CG, 2d Div. 16-18. CG, 2d Brig 81. CG, 3d Div 19-20. CO, ist Obsn Sq 32. War Diary 21. CO, 1st Engrs. 33-40. Spare 22. CO, 1st Sq Ist Cav While we are waiting for these orders to reach their destinations, we can take a look at the work ahead of the man who is directly responsible for the system which will distribute them—the signal officer. The plan of signal communications for the 1st Division has undoubtedly been made up since the division first started on its forward movement. The axes of signal communications for the fight have been decided on by the general in his field order. The signal officer was consulted about this. The numbers below refer to the paragraphs of the Plan of Signal Communications as given in “Signal Com- munications for all Arms.” 1. The forward communication center in this case will be at the divi- sion command post. 2. (a) The division observers will in this case be lucky if they can get any telephone connection. They will have to depend on visual means. If the signal officer can provide them each with a motorcycle messenger it will help. Their posts will have to be pushed forward during the fight from point to point as the attack progresses. They should make all possible use of the chain of communication of the command system. (b) Air observation. The codes, wave lengths, and panel signals i will have already been published. (c) Marking front lines. Panels. Good panel work is very impor- tant in an attack of this character. INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 125 3. (a) Telephones. There is very little accommodation at the ad- vanced command post selected, and a quick move is contem- plated thereafter to Seven Stars. Telephones on the command net will be wanted at the farm house for the commanding gen- eral, and chief of staff. G3, G2, artillery and signal officers and the advanced message center and the remainder of the staff can function at the present location until a jump is made to Seven Stars when G1 and the engineer will come forward to join the advanced echelon. The signal officer will run wire lines from the advanced command post to both brigade command posts tonight and to the 3d Division on the left through the corps system. He will have to connect the advanced command post with the present one at Penn College. (b) Radio. Radio posts will already be familiar with the specified oe call letters, wave lengths. There will be no change in ese. (c) The panel details will have to be on the alert for airplane sig- nals from daybreak to dark. (d), A division visual center might well be placed on hill 668 which could keep in touch with the brigades till they had passed McKnightstown. In this case is seems unnecessary. (e) Pyrotechnic signals will have already been prescribed; there will be no change. (f) Pigeons. The division has not been in its present location long enough for pigeons to be of service. (g) Motorcycle couriers will be best between the division and the brigades. Mounted couriers will be the next best means. These are drawn from the headquarters troop, or the cavalry can be called upon to help. Corps couriers will make routine trips to command post, and division couriers will go to the corps when special trips are needed. If runners are used there must be four intermediate sta- tions between the 1st Division and 1st Brigade commantl posts—three men at each. The 2d Brigade is very close and one post at that brigade will suffice. These men can be drawn from reserve troops. In this case runners are un- necessary, unless the weather turns very bad. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plan of signal communica- tions dealing with codes, time, meteorological data and dumps, will not need changing now. In order to keep information steadily flowing in both directions, information officers have been exchanged. At the division command post will be found those of the corps and the 2d and 3d Divisions, while those of the 1st Division have gone to the division on either flank. The division sends an officer to the corps only when specially directed. The division artillery commander, being in the next room or building, no special representative is needed. An artillery officer is a useful member of the G3 section. At the brigade command post we will find officers from the division, from adjoining brigades, and we will find the a 126 THE INFANTRY DIVISION commanding officer of the light artillery unit supporting the brigade, with his staff. At regimental command posts, initially we will find the artillery battalion commander in the near vicinity. However, the movement of regimental command posts being much more frequent, and the necessity of the artillery battalion commander remaining within command distance of his bat- talion, render here a greater probability of the use of an ar- tillery information officer. There will also be found an ar- tillery information officer with runners and telephone detail with each of the assaulting battalion commanders. As has been brought out in signal conferences, both the command and artillery channels of information are par- allel from the top all the way down. If one goes out, the other can be used. It is seldom that both are out at the same time, except in the very forward areas. In an attack of this character, close co-operation be- tween aviation, the artillery and the infantry which it sup- ports is essential. , The infantry panel details at each command post must literally be able to talk in Table 2 of Appendix 1, Signal Communications For All Arms. They must know when and how to put out panels, which necessitates a knowledge of the form and markings of their own planes, and the pyro- technic signals of Table 10. The infantry detail and artillery observers must be thoroughly familiar with the fireworks code in this opera- tion in order that artillery fire may come down promptly in concentrations on points of resistance, and be lifted promptly when the infantry is provided for and able to make its farther advance. We can take a quick look at the possible dispositions of the Ist Brigade at 2:00 AM. The 1st Infantry is on the north, the 2d Infantry on the south. The line of demarcation between regiments is: point on road, 500 yards north of 560—northern tip of woods in square 35 (to 2d Infantry)—Marsh Creek north of hill 653 (to 2d Infantry) —hill 682 (to 1st Infantry)—crossroads 721 (to 2d Infantry) —crossroads 1112 (to 2d Infantry). INFANTRY DIVISION DURING ATTACK 127 On the road at Mummasburg, we will find part of our contact group in touch with that of the 2d Division. Along the country road and creek bottom running south for 750 yards is the 1st Battalion, Ist Infantry. The 2d Battalion is in the ravine just north of 617, the 2d Battalion, in division reserve, is just south of 679. Part of our contact group is at 617, on a line with the support battalion. The 2d Infantry has its 1st Battalion along the creek bottom and road from just north of the houses north of 560 to the houses just south of that place. Its 2d Battalion is in the ravine just southeast of hill 602. Its 3d Battalion, in brigade reserve, is in the ravine along the road just west of hill 668. Four companies of machine guns are with infantry first and second line battalions. Two companies in brigade re- serve are in the wooded draw just north of the R in Mum- masburg. Each front line company has sentinels pushed, out a few yards west of the creek. a We can now see how the assembly movement of the at- tack worked out. The ist Brigade gave the crossing of Willoughby Run over the Chambersburg Road as its initial point. The head of its advance guard—1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, and Machine Gun Company, ist Infantry, cleared Willoughby Run at 8:15 PM. The main body followed at 500 yards in the following order: Second Battalion, 1st Infantry, with one machine gun company; 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry with two companies 2d Machine Gun Battalion; 2d Infantry with a machine gun company immediately following its two leading battalions. The distances of its advance guard are approximately counter-balanced by the absence from the column of troops on outpost. The length of the brigade, therefore, is 7730 yards or five and one-half miles or two hours and twelve minutes’ marching time. Its tail cleared Willoughby Run therefore at 10:30 PM. The head reached Mummasburg at 9:15 PM. The tail was north of 525 at 10:55 PM and its northern- most battalion could have reached its destination about 11:30 PM. 128 THE INFANTRY DIVISION In the 2d Brigade, the head of the column crossed Willoughby Run at 8:00 PM. Its northernmost front line battalion could have reached its position at 8:48 PM. Its tail would have reached 625 at 11:00 PM, at which hour its elements were free to cross to Mummasburg Road. The movements of the artillery brigade which followed the infantry are discussed later. It could all have been in its positions by 1:00 AM, giving ample time for the engin- eers to follow. (C) FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION ARTILLERY IN COMBAT Magor L. J. McNair, Field Artillery Situation: This discussion will be devoted to the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Division on the 14-15th June, 1919, the day preceding and the day of the attack. The situation is the same as in Chapter V (B). The concentration bivouac of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade was “area including wooded hill 582 and orchard one mile northwest of Gettysburg ;” of the Ist Ammunition Train, “in city block just southeast of Penn College grounds.” The brigade bivouac is rather cramped. The wood is about 300 yards by 1000 yards; its perimeter is some 2350 yards. If the carriages were placed around the edge of the wood, with some 650 carriages in the brigade, each car- riage would have about 3.7 yards of width for parking. The 2700 animals of the brigade would require 1800 yards of picket line. In addition there is a personnel of 4900. Water facilities are apparently poor. However, the situation is practicable and necessary under the circumstances. At 3:00 PM, June 14th, after the division commander has read the corps order just received, General E (the ar-. tillery commander) avails himself of the opportunity for reconnaissance. He is accompanied by his adjutant and his three regimental commanders. Before leaving, General E FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY 129 inquires of the division commander the approximate time he may use in this reconnaissance. It is not possible for General E to give definite orders at this time, as the plans for the division as a whole are unformed. General E’s reconnaissance is therefore confined to determining: Suitable general positions for the regiments. Routes of access and egress forward. Command and observation posts. Possibilities in the matter of signal communications. General visibility of the zone of the attack. These points can be covered only in a very general way, but the impressions gained and notes made will be of ma- terial assistance to General E and his regimental com- manders later when they must study the map and make de- finite dispositions, and will save time. As a result of the reconnaissance, the outstanding feature of the situation will undoubtedly be the great advantage of observation pos- sessed by the enemy, due to the terrain. General E will see at once the importance of the Cham- bersburg Road as a route of advance. He will see also that advanced positions will be necessary because of the depth of the attack and the evident absence of hostile strength near the line of departure. He can therefore decide gen- erally that (a) his pieces will be placed as near the front line as permitted, and (b) with one light regiment in rear of each infantry brigade, the left light regiment and the heavy regiment conveniently accessible to the Chambers-. burg Road. Upon his return to camp, General E receives the divi- sion warning order. The accompanying guns constitute a detachment from his command. The number of guns is not stated, nor is the number of assault battalions. He as- sumes, however, that it is the usual number, four, for the division. Based on a hasty survey of the zones of action of the light regiments, he decides that the 1st Light Artil- lery with the narrower front can best spare these guns. It is, of course, desirable to draw them all from a single unit to avoid crippling several units. His heavy regiment affords a powerful means of leveling any inequalities in the support afforded the two infantry brigades. General E then issues the following warning order: 130 THE INFANTRY DIVISION 1st FA Brig, PENN COLLEGE, 14 June 19, 5:00 PM. To: Regtl Comdrs : Maps: 1:21120, all sheets north and west of Gettysburg, inclusive. Division attacks enemy position on line CASHTOWN-——ORTANNA to- morrow morning. Line of departure: Eastern branch MarRsH CREEK from MUMMASBURG, inck., to CHAMBERSBURG Roan bridge, incl. Boundaries 1st Brig: North, MummaspuRG—hill 722—CaSHTOWN, all incl. South, hill 647 incl—McKNIGHTSTOWN, excl.— crossroads 627, excl.—crossroad 787, incl. . 2d Brig: North, same as southern boundary Ist Brig. South, CHAMBERSBURG Roap, incl. from L. Hoppy to SEVEN STARS —McKnicurTstown STATION, incl—ORRTANNA, excl. 1st LA supports 1st Brig from advanced position near Mum- MASBURG Roap. One battery will furnish accompanying guns to assault battalions of division. 2d LA supports 2d Brig from position near L. Hoppy—625 ‘road and near railroad. 3d HvA supports division from position near L, Hoppy—625 ' road north of 2d LA. Reconnaissance at once. Orders follow. Brig Gen. General E doubtless was consulted in the preparation of the division order, and consequently he obtained early knowledge of its provisions. Moreover, his recommenda- tions in regard to the artillery, where not incompatible with other considerations, probably will be adopted by the divi- sion commander. Upon receipt of the division order, or if possible be- fore, he sets to work on his own order, which thus can be -issued quite promptly after the division order. In accord- ance with General E’s view of the necessities of the situ- ation, the division order permits him to occupy positions east of Mummasburg—hill 626, thus excluding only suf- ficient forward ground for the infantry to form for attack. The general indications of positions in his warning order comply with the division order. In forming his detailed plan a number of questions present themselves for decision. The division order is silent as to the heavy regiment. He might assign a battalion of it to each of the infantry brigades for support. Such an assignment might be ad- visable if the nature and location of the resistance to be en- countered were known more clearly. The situation may develop, however, so that the entire support of the heavy regiment will be needed behind one infantry brigade. It FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY 131 seems best to retain the entire regiment for general support as indicated in his warning order—at least for the early stages of the attack. An important question is whether to advance the artil- lery during the attack; the division order prescribes that the light regiments shall be prepared to advance their po- sitions rapidly. The initial artillery positions will be from 6500 to 8000 meters from the hostile main objective, and about 1000 meters further from the line finally to be held by our troops. These are long but not impossible ranges for both light and heavy weapons, but they are decidedly long for close support on objectives which at present can only be guessed. Communications hurriedly laid will be none too reliable; observation would have to be pushed far forward with difficult communications. Moreover, the full fruit of a successful attack will be gained only if the roads over the mountains are barred effectually to the enemy before he is driven out of his position. To interdict these roads from the initial artillery position would involve ranges of over 10,000 meters. These are theoretically possible with both weapons with suitable shell, but considerable firing at these ranges with the 155 howitzers would strain and prob- ably damage the carriages, and the accuracy would be poor. On the other hand, movement of the artillery will require time and interrupt the support of the infantry; the move- ment almost surely will be more or less visible to the enemy from the numerous points of vantage held by him. General E decides partially to accept the hazard of for- ward movement, and to order forward the light regiments and one battalion of the heavy regiment. The remaining two battalions of the latter regiment can be ordered for- ward later if the situation warrants, probably after the cap- ture of the main hostile position. The forward heavy bat- talion will be sufficient to interdict the two principal routes of egress available for the enemy, and will leave a strong quota of heavy artillery constantly in position to cover the movement of the other units. The vicinity of hill 653 is selected for the advanced position of the 1st Light Artillery because it can be reached with not too much exposure and by other than a main road; 132 THE INFANTRY DIVISION observation can be had at McKnightstown, and the range will be very effective for the main hostile position. A po- sition near crossroads 614, though quickly reached, is re- jected mainly on account of poorer observation. Along the stream just west of hill 604 is selected for the 2d Light Artillery, not because it is ideal, but because in point of cover, observation, and accessibility, it offers fewer objectionable features than more forward positions. The forward battalion of the 3d Heavy Artillery is assigned to a position just south of McKnightstown, utilizing cover of the terrain and woods there. It is eminently proper for General E to prescribe in some detail the forward movement of the artillery, for this movement must be a co-ordinated one in order that appro- priate shifting of artillery support may be made if necessary to cover the movement. The burden of making these dis- positions during the attack will fall principally on General E with or without instructions from the division commander. Similarly it is incumbent on General E to prescribe cer- tain points in connection with the artillery mission to guide his subordinates, insure concerted action, prevent duplica- tion of effort on some objectives and neglect of others, and in a measure control ammunition expenditure. The division order mentions specifically certain points that are to be fired upon. The corps and army artillery can be counted upon for counter-battery work. The corps and division orders call for an initial pre- paration of 30 minutes, 3:30 to 4:00 AM. The corps artil- lery plan prescribes that the corps and army artillery, dur- ing this preparation shall concentrate on the main roads and prevent hostile reinforcements from moving east. This permits the division artillery to place its preparation on points on or near the main objective and in advance of it. Care should be used in this preparation not to destroy roads which will be used by our troops during their advance, par- ticularly the axial roads of the division and brigades. The duration of the preparation and the limited amount of artil- lery and ammunition will not permit serious destruction, and preparation should be placed primarily on the points FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY 183 which are apt to give trouble during the early stages of the attack. As is generally the case, care must be exercised properly to gauge and distribute the available ammunition supply so as to avoid a shortage or exhaustion of ammunition before the mission of the division is carried out. The supply initially available is as follows: ROUNDS PER PIECE Firing battery Combat Train Ammunition Train Total 75's 196 159 155 509 155’s 48 85 42 176 It is assumed that the 75’s have equal proportions of shell and shrapnel, and the 155 howitzers, shell only. The artillery brigade munitions officer, after inquiry of G1 of the division, informs General E that the refilling point remains unchanged at Littlestown. This makes it impracticable to obtain additional ammunition in time for use during the attack unless it develops unfavorably. Gen- , eral E has thus about five hours of fire available for the 75’s and from three to four hours for the 155’s, but since firing cannot by any means be continuous, this should suffice. The munitions officer learns from G1, who is preparing the administrative order, that the ammunition distributing sta- tion will be at the farm east of hill 687 and in the vicinity of road junction 611 for the artillery, and at the latter point for the infantry ; that only the motor section of the ammuni- tion train will be used in rear of the distributing stations; and that the horse section will be available to assist the unit combat trains in supplying ammunition during the action. Shortly after 5:00 PM General E receives the division concentration order and decides to incorporate: its pro- visions in his field orders for the attack.. Restrictions are placed on the use of the Mummasburg Road which prevent the 1st Light Artillery from passing Willoughby Run before midnight, and offer the alternative route via the C. Topper —Hamilton—630—648—Mummasburg road after 10:30 PM. The time from camp to Willoughby Run is 25 minutes, so that the 1st Light Artillery can leave camp at 11:35 PM. The time thence to crossroads 593 is 35 minutes, so that this point will be reached at 12:10 AM. The time to make 134 THE INFANTRY DIVISION the detour is 90 minutes to 593, so that 593 can be reached by this route at 12:00 midnight. There is thus no material saving of time in using the detour, and it would involve considerable loss of rest to the 1st Light Artillery, since it would require the regiment to leave camp at 10:10 PM. The length of the regimental column in time is 35 minutes, so that to move by the Mummasburg Road, the regiment must clear camp at 12:10 AM. It should arrive at its po- sition about one hour later or 1:10 AM, giving it two hours and 20 minutes to prepare for opening fire. It must not de- lay its movement, since the engineers follow it on the Mum- masburg Road. The 3d Heavy Artillery and the 2d Light Artillery must proceed to position via the Chambersburg Road in the order named, following the 2d Brigade. The rate of march of the motorized regiment is taken the same as a light regiment which is substantially correct with the present equipment. The length of an infantry brigade column in time is about 100 minutes. If it is assumed that the rear element of the 2d Brigade clears hill 627 not later than midnight, which seems reasonable, the leading elements of the 3d Heavy Artillery can leave camp at 11:00 PM. Since the length of the regimental column in time is 50 minutes, the regiment should clear camp at midnight. The 2d Light Artillery would clear camp at 12:25 AM. The 3d Heavy Artillery should arrive at its position at 12:45 AM and the 2d Light Artillery at 1:15 AM, which gives sufficient time to prepare for firing. The situation is not especially favorable for signal com- munications; the lines will be rather long between the regi- ments and General E at division headquarters. Initially the artillery brigade lays lines to regimental command posts along the 625—-627 road and the Mummasburg Road. When the division command post moves forward, the artillery axis is advanced along the division axial road from 593 road junc- tion, leaving the original lines in place. Then, when General E arrives at Seven Stars, he still will have communication with all three of his regiments. The forward positions of the units will be conveniently accessible to the artillery axis. Forward battalions also can use it if necessary for com- munication with their regimental commanders. FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY 135 At 5:45 PM, General E issues the following order: 1st FA Brig, PENN COLLEGE, 14 June 19, 5:45 PM. FIELD ne No — Maps: 1:21120, all sheets north and west of Gettysburg, inclusive. 1. (a) The enemy has advanced into the plain east of SourH Moun- TAIN to the general line ARENDTSVILLE—EMMITSBURG. His infantry outposts have been seen near MCKNIGHTSTOWN, hill 653 and crossroads 647. His main position in our front is on the general line HiLLTOWN—CASHTOWN—ORRTANNA—FAIR- FIELD. The Blue army attacks tomorrow on the front ARENDTS- VILLE—EMMITSBURG to drive the enemy back into the moun- tains, cutting off and destroying those elements which have debouched into the plain. The 2d Corps attacks on the front ARENDTSVILLE, excl.—KNOXLYN, incl. with the 2d Division on the north, the 1st Division in the center and the 3d Divi- sion on the south. (b) The 1st Div captures the enemy’s main position from CASH- TOWN, incl. to ORRTANNA, excl., and pushes out strong patrols to the line crossroads 1112 (3835.2—757.1) —hill 1869 (334.7— 751.5) to inflict loss upon the enemy’s retreating columns. Line of departure: Eastern branch of MARSH CREEK. Time of Dae 4:00 AM. Artillery preparation begins at 3:30 s Boundaries 1st Div: Northern: GOLDENVILLE—HILLTOWN road, incl. to bridge over MARSH CREEK near hill 687— northern exits of CASHTOWN, incl._—summit of Rock Top, excl.—crossroads 954, excl. Southern: CHAMBERS- BURG RoaD, incl. from L. Hopry to SEVEN StTars—Mc- KNIGHTSTOWN STA., incl—ORRTANNA, excl.—hill 1369, excl. (c) The ist Brig attacks with regiments abreast and with boundaries as follows: Northern, northern boundary of divi- sion. Southern, hill 647, incl.—hill 582, excl—_McKNicGutTs- TOWN, excl.—crossroads 627, excl.—crossroads 787, excl.— 1060 foot hill, excl. (1500 yds SW of crossroads 787). A rapid penetration will be effected on the right to aid the 1st Div in the capture of hill 69. McKNIGHTSTOWN will be turned from the north to aid the 2d Brig in its capture. A position will be taken up on the line CASHTOwWN—crossroads 787, and strong patrols pushed out on the CHAMBERSBURG ROAD. (d) The 2d Brig attacks with regiments abreast and with boundaries as follows: Northern, southern boundary of the 1st Brig. Southern, southern boundary of division. A posi- tion will be taken up on the line 797 crossroads—667 cross- roads. Strong patrols will pursue the enemy to the south- west. 2. This brigade supports the attack of the 1st Div by a preparation and by covering fire. 3. (a) The 1st LA (less 1 btry) will prepare and support the attack of the 1st Brig from a position near 593 road junction. Spe- cial attention will be given to hill 653 and the spur of 647 crossroads. One battery will be used for accompanying guns, one being attached to each assault battalion. 136 THE INFANTRY DIVISION (b) The 2d LA will prepare and support the attack of the 2d Brig from a position near the L. Hoppy—hill 627 road just north of the railroad. MCKNIGHTSTOWN will be covered by the 3d HvA. (c) The 3d HvA will support the attack of the division from a position near the L. Hoppy—hill 627 road just north of the 2d LA. Its preparation will be placed on MCKNIGHTSTOWN, CASHTOWN and the roads in rear of the hostile main position to a depth of 1000 yards. During the attack one battalion will harass and interdict the roads in rear of the main hostile osition. The remaining battalions will place a covering re on McKNIGHTSTOWN as soon as the attack has progressed to the vicinity of crossroads 612. This fire will be lifted successively to the woods and orchard west of McKNIGHTS- TOWN, the orchard at crossroads 662, the orchard SW of hill 726 and woods to the north, CASHTOWN and the woods west of 676 road junction; or on such other places as may be assigned during the attack. (x) 1. Units will move to position as follows: 1st LA, via MumMaAsBuRG RoapD, will clear camp at 12:10 AM. Head of column will cross WILLOUGHBY RUN not earlier than midnight. 3d HvA, via CHAMBERSBURG Roap, will clear camp at mid- night. 2d LA will follow the 3d HvA. All units will be ready to fire at 3:30 AM. 2. The period 3:30 to 4:30 AM will be used for adjustment of fire and a preparation with shell on known or suspected points of the hostile position, which for the light artil- lery in general will be those expected to offer early re- sistance to our advance. During the advance a covering fire will be placed suc- cessively on the hostile points of resistance immediately opposing our infantry. This fire in general will be lifted on approach of the infantry, by means of signals prear- ranged with local infantry commanders. Shrapnel will be used by the light guns as far as the supply permits. ; After the capture of the hostile main position, the light guns will fire only upon call from the infantry or upon visible hostile troops; the howitzers will interdict the roads used by the énemy to the limit of range. Ammunition expenditure per battery per hour: Light guns, 400 rounds; howitzers, 200 rounds. : All units will be prepared to undertake assigned mis- sions by means of aerial observation. Except where necessary in overcoming actual resis- tance, destruction of roads forward of the hostile main position will be avoided. 3. Forward movement as follows: 1st LA, via hill 602—crossroads 560—across country, to position near hill 653, one battalion to move upon the capture of hill 653. : 2d LA, via CHAMBERSBURG RoaD, to position along stream just west of hill 604, one battalion to move upon capture of this position. Rear battalions to advance as soon as forward battal- ions are in position and ready to resume support of the intake Fattelion of the 8d H A e battalion of the vA assigned to harassin fire will follow the 2d LA forward ie position south of FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY 137 McKNIGHTSTOWN. The remaining battalions to remain in initial peace until further orders. _ 4. (a) Station for slightly wounded, at crossroads 1600 yards NW of . FORNEY and eastern exit of MCKNIGHTSTOWN. (b) Ammunition distributing stations: Farm house east of hill 687 and vicinity of road junction 611. (c) Axial roads: 1st Div, MummMasBuRG Roap to 5983—560—SEVEN Srars—CASHTOWN, 1st Brig, MUMMASBURG—HILLTOWN road to 659—road junction near hill 682—-CaASHTOWN. 2d Brig, same as division to McKNIGHTSTOWN—596—627—676—713. 5. (a) Artillery axis of signal communications, division axial road. (b) ‘Command posts: 2d Div, 1st Brig FA and 3d HvA, farm 200 yards south of crossroads 625 at midnight, and at "SEvEN STARS as soon as the attack has passed MCKNIGHTSTOWN. ist Brig and ist LA, MuMMASBURG after midnight. 2d Brig and 2d LA, farm 300 yards east of hill 626 after midnight. E, Brig Gen. Distribution: CGs Div, 1st and 2d Brigs COs Regts and Am Tn As soon as released by the commander of trains, the com- mander, ammunition train, will report to General E, who will instruct him to empty his train at the distributing sta- tions and refill. The brigade munitions officer works in close touch with the division G1. It will seem by a comparison of the foregoing orders with the division attack order that the artillery order must include a considerable proportion of the division order. Para- graph 1 of the artillery order includes such information of the enemy and our own troops as is necessary for the artil- lery. In this case it should include details of the division attack; and might include also information as to corps and army artillery, units for aerial observation, and engineers working for, or with, the artillery. Paragraph 2 is a brief statement of the artillery support planned. Paragraph 3 has sub-paragraphs based on the regiments or other tactical sub-divisions of the artillery command. Provisions of the division order are included where they are directive to the artillery ; they may be elaborated upon, and others may be added, in conformity with the division plan. Sub-paragraph (x) of paragraph 3 of the artillery order usually contains the following: Details of the movement into position. These must be closely tied to the division plan to avoid interference and loss of time. Details of firing, including adjustment, if any, preparation, covering fire, and restrictions on ammunition expenditure which « 138 THE INFANTRY DIVISION are usually necessary. Care must be used not to circumscribe the actions of infantry commanders but at the same time to insure them full and concerted support. : Indications as to time and route of forward movement of the artillery, if any. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the artillery order correspond closely with those of the division order. The artillery bri- gade axis of signal communications should be announced. The artillery regimental command posts may or may not be prescribed by the brigade commander, depending on the situation. Their announcement tends to avoid confusion, but may hamper the regimental commander. The distribution of the artillery order should include the division and supported infantry commanders. (D) THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS The Division on the March and in an Attack CapTAIN TROUP MILLER, Cavalry 1st Division, LITTLESTOWN, Pa., 12 June 19, 8:30 PM. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS No 1 To accompany FO No 11, 1st Division. ® Maps: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, 1”=10 miles; Gettysburg-Antietam Map, 1:21120. Geological Survey Map, 1 :62500. I. SUPPLY: . A. Railhead—June 13th and thereafter until further orders—WEST- MINSTER. B. Rations: One cooked meal will be carried by all troops making the move. Supply officers will requisition as soon as possible on the Div QM for the necessary forage and rations to complete the allowance prescribed in Par 302, FSR. 4 Distributing Points, June 18th and 14th: : ‘1. Triangle south of M. McLEAN between MUMMASBURG PIKE and PuHiua-ReaDine R. R.: 1st Brig, 4:00 PM. 1st FA Brig, 5:00 PM. 2. Triangle north of LUTHERAN SEMINARY: 2d Brig, 4:00 PM. 1st Sq 1st Cav, 5:00 PM, 1st MG Bn, 5:10 PM. 1st Engrs, 5:20 PM. 1st F Sig Bn, 5:40 PM. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS 139 3. Division Dump—At Sup Tn bivouac: Div Tns and MP Co, 4:00 PM. Div Hq Tr, 5:00 PM. 4. The Div QM will arrange to have rations issued to the 1st Obsn Sq at LITTLESTOWN as the supply train passes that point each day. C. Ammunition: 1. Refilling Point: For all arms. Corps park near LITTLESTOWN R. R. STATION. The Am Tn will use BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. 2. Distributing Stations. To be announced later. D. Engineer Material: Of all kinds, including bridge material, at corps park at SELLS STATION. Division engineer dump will not be estab- lished until further orders. E. Signal Corps Material: Equipment of all kinds at corps park at SELLS STATION. F. Water Supply: From GETTYSBURG system and farm houses. Water carts with troops will be filled prior to the move. II. EvAcuaTION. : A. Men: 1. Dressing Stations: a. To be established later under Adm O No 2. b. Collection Stations for sick on march as follows: LITTLESTOWN columns: LITTLESTOWN—GERMANTOWN— road junction 425—-GETTYSBURG. TANEYTOWN columns: TANEYTOWN—-HARNEY—BAR- LOw—road junction 545—GETTYSBURG. ce. The Div Surg is charged with the details of evacuation from these stations. The Div Surg will retain the necessary transporta- tion and sanitary personnel to complete the evacuation in the old area and cause it to join its proper organiza- tion upon completion of this duty. * 2. Field Hospital: a. One field hospital to be established near RACE TRACK at southern edge of GETTYSBURG. b. Evacuation from field hospital by corps sanitary train. ec. Corps Evac Hosp No 10 at WESTMINSTER. B. Animals: To corps mobile veterinary unit at WESTMINSTER. The division mobile veterinary section will bivouac in GET- TYSBURG south of the supply train and just north of the rail- road. The Div Vet is charged with all details of evacuation on the march and in the old area. III. Roaps. A. The BALTIMORE TURNPIKE and the TANEYTOWN—HARNEY— BarRLoW—GeErrTysBuRG road, with all intermediate roads, are available for the move. B. Maintenance: Instructions will be issued later. C. Circulation: : . Free on the above roads. D. Traffic Control: ee The APM will attach mounted military police to each column of troops. He will establish traffic control posts in GettyspurG and furnish military police on duty thereat with maps showing bivouac locations for all troops and the 140 THE INFANTRY DIVISION locations of all offices and other establishments in GETTYS- BURG. Signs will be posted as soon as possible. As soon as possible after arrival in GETTYSBURG, the APM will have all roads in the division outpost sector reconnoitered and circu- lation maps prepared. IV. SALVAGE AND BURIAL. . : A. Salvage Dumps at Distributing Points. Units evacuate salvage to these dumps by means of ration vehicles. Supply train will evacuate salvage from distributing points under direction of division salvage officer. Corps salvage park at WESTMINSTER. All salvage in old area will be promptly dis- posed of. B. Instructions relative to burial will be issued later. V. Miirary PoLice. Military police will be posted at all important road junc- tions in the new area, at each distributing point, and at the railroad station in GETTYSBURG. VI. PRISONERS OF WAR. Instructions will be issued later. VII. MISCELLANEOUS. A. Billeting: : Reduced billeting parties of one officer per regiment and one NCO per battalion or smaller separate unit will proceed to the new area by truck at 5:00 AM June 13, 1919. The CO Tns will assign for this purpose one truck to each brigade and one truck for all other units of the division. Brigade command- ers are charged with the details of getting their billeting parties off and the CO Tns the same for all other units. Trucks will report immediately. Billeting parties will take bicycles and cooked rations for two meals and upon arrival in GETTYSBURG will report to the division billeting officer at PENN COLLEGE. The division billeting officer under supervision of Capt R, assistant G1, will assign office space in GETTYSBURG to all division headquarters offices. B. Surplus Baggage: Brigade commanders, for their brigades, and the CO Tns for all other units, are charged with having all surplus bag- gage collected and established in dumps under proper guard near the LITTLESTOWN and TANEYTOWN R. R. Stations. The Div QM will be notified of the exact location of these dumps. C. Extra Trucks: The CO Tns will assign extra trucks for the move as fol- lows: DHQ 5 Mob Ord Rep Sh 1 Hq Ist Brig 1 APO No 2 1 Hq 2d Brig 1 Mob Vet Unit 1 Hq ist FA Brig 1 Sales Comsy 2 Hq Each Inf and Arty 5 Regt 1 * _ Trucks will report immediately and will be released within six hours after arrival in the GETTYSBURG area, and proceed to their proper bivouac. These trucks (less Mob Ord Rep Sh) will join serial 5 at LITTLESTOWN. D. Mail: To distributing points. VIII. TRAINS. A. The empty section of the supply train will remain at UNIoN MILLS and after drawing rations will alternate bivouac daily with the section at GETTYSBURG. ‘ THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS 141 B. Marching trains will move in sections of ten vehicles for ani- mal-drawn and nine for motor, with distances between sec- tions of 50 and 40 yards respectively. C. The Mob Ord Rep Sh and Serv Pk U will follow serial No 5 from UNION MILLS and proceed to GETTYSBURG by the BAL- TIMORE TURNPIKE. D. The exact location of all field trains in the GeTTysBuRG bivouac area will be reported to the office of G1 by the CO Tns as soon as possible after their arrival thereat. E. Contact in new area will be maintained with G1 at Div CP by mounted agents from all trains. F. The Div MTO will establish a gasoline and oil station at the Serv Pk U bivouac in GETTYSBURG. By command of Major General A x Chief of Staff. Distribution: 1. CG Blue Army 29. CO Hq Tr 2. CG 2d Corps 30. Div Billeting O 3-6. CG 1st Brig 31. Div MTO 7-10. CG 2d Brig 32. Div OO 11-15. CG ist FA Brig 33. CO 1st Sq Ist Cav 16-20. CO Tns 34. CO 1st Obsn Sq 21-24. Div QM 35. APM 25. CO ist Engrs 36. Div Vet 26. CO ist F Sig Bn 87-55. Div Staff—File—War Diary 27. CO:lst MG Bn —spare—CGs, adjoining 28. Div Surg divisions Analysis Points to be remembered in writing administrative orders for move of division by marching: I. SUPPLY. A. Railhead—location obtained from army or corps order. B. Rations: . . 1. Cooked meal if rolling kitchens not available at noonday halt.* If combat is imminent at end of march, deficiencies, if any, in field and reserve rations should be replenished. 2. Distributing points: For staging area, if any, and for new area, if known, locate as convenient as possible to tired animals. Cc. Ammunition: Refilling point and distributing stations usually not necessary for march. ares D&E. Engineer and signal material: Ordinarily no reference ne- cessary. ; F. Water supply. Where obtainable: Water wagons filled (stand- ing orders require boiling or filtering). II. EvAcuaTION. A. Men: 1. Dressing stations: (a). Not necessary on march. , (b) Location of collection stations for sick on march, usually about 3 or 4 miles apart and at farm houses or villages when possible. ; ; (c) *Division surgeon charged with details of evacuation on march and in old area. 142 THE INFANTRY DIVISION 2. Field hospital: . : ; (a) Location of one in new area, if location known before- hand. (b) How evacuation will be made. : (c) Location of corps evacuation hospital from corps order. B. Animals: Location of corps veterinary unit.* Division veterin- arian charged with details of evacuation on march and in old area. III. Roaps. : A. Statement as to which may be used for marching troops, animal and motor transport (usually from corps or army order). : B. Maintenance: : . Statement that instructions will be issued later. C. Circulation: State whether free or one, two or three-way road, and direction in case of one-way. D. Traffic Control: : *Instructions to assistant provost marshal for police ar- rangements for march and new area; posting of signs; re- connaissance of roads in new area and preparation of cir- culation maps. IV. SALVAGE AND’ BURIAL. s A. Location of salvage dumps in new area. Method of evacuation. B. Statement that instructions relative to burial will be issued later. V. MiLiTary POLICE. - Special points at which military police should be posted. VI. PRISONERS OF WAR. Statement that instructions will be issued later. If there is a probability. of encountering the enemy during the march, give instructions as to disposition. VII. MISCELLANEOUS. A. Billeting: Billeting parties or guides for staging and new area when necessary. B. Surplus Bagguge: When necessary general instructions to brigade command- ers and commanding officers, trains. Report locations of dumps to division quartermaster. C. Extra Transportation: Assign it when necessary from supply train. Instructions to commanding officers, trains. Return promptly to proper organization. D. Mail: : Usual statement as to where it will be distributed. E. Any other matters which do not require a separate paragraph in the order. VIII. Trains. A. Special instructions for supply train or other trains, if neces- sary. : B. Marching formation—distances between sections to be preserved. C. *Special units: Instructions for slow moving units mobile ord- nance repair shop, service park units, and steam disinfec- tors. Instruction for movable sales commissaries. D. Exact location in staging and new areas to be reported to Gl. E. Contact maintained with G1 office. F. Location of gas and oil station in staging and new areas. Notes :—Distribution: Usual distribution, including chiefs of services and indi- viduals specially concerned. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS 143 Remarks (See paragraphs in Analysis marked *) In a well trained division and one which has had much experience in moves by marching, some of the foregoing in- structions, such as surplus baggage, extra trucks, special units, location of gasoline and oil station, detailed instruc- tions to the provost marshal, etc., might be omitted from the administrative orders. These things would be provided for automatically, but in a newly organized or inexperienced division it is considered well to include them at first in the administrative orders to prevent omission of important de- tails. The Administrative Orders in an Attack 1st Division, PENN COLLEGE, GETTYSBURG, PA., 14 June 19, 6:00 PM. (G1) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS } No 2 To accompany FO Nos 8 and 4, 1st Division. Maps: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, 1”=10 miles; Gettysburg-Antietam, 1:21120. (All sheets about Gettysburg) I. SuPPLY. A. Railhead—no change. B. Rations: Distributing Points on and after June 15th as follows: 1. West of road junction 646: 1st Brig, 10:00 AM. 1st Engrs, 11:00 AM. 1st MG Bn, 12:20 PM. . 2. East of Boyp S. H.: 1st FA Brig, 10:00 AM. 2d Brig, 11:00 AM. 1st Sq 1st Cav, 12:00 noon. 8. GETTYSBURG, Supply Train bivouac: Div Hq Tr, 10:00 AM. MP Co, 10:15 AM. 1st F Sig Bn, 10:30 AM. Engr Tn, 10:45 AM. Cos A and B 1st Pion Inf, 11:00 AM. All other units, 11:20 AM. 4, LITTLESTOWN—1st Obsn Sq. C. Ammunition: 1. Refilling Point—No change. Ammunition train will use divisional axial road and BALrtI- “MORE TURNPIKE. ; 2. Distributing Stations: Artillery: Farm house east of hill 687, Artillery and In- fantry, Vicinity of road junction 611. 144 THE INFANTRY DIVISION D. Engineer Material: 1. Corps Park—No change. : ‘i alee 2. When the attacking troops have attained their objective the Div Engr will establish an engineer dump _ well forward, consisting of bridge repair materials, entrenching tools, wire, etc. ; the exact location of this dump will be promptly reported to G1. E. Signal Corps Material: 1. Corps Park—No change. . 2. When the progress of the attack permits, a dump of extra wire and such other material as is needed to install necessary communication in the division sector will be established near SEVEN STARS. F. Water: From all towns and farm houses in division area. Water carts will be kept filled at all times. II. EvAcuATION. A. Men: 1. Dressing Stations: (a) For 1st Brig: One ambulance company to be held in position of readiness near crossroads 679 to cover 1st Brig. (b) For 2d Brig: One ambulance company to be held in po- sition of readiness near road junction 611 to cover 2d Brig. (c) Ambulance companies to be in position by 3:00 AM. Ey enuenen by way of brigade and divisional axial roads. 2. Field Hospitals: (a) Non-evacuable and seriously wounded: Corps Field Hos- pital—GeETTysBurRG (mobile surgical hospital). (b) All other cases: Field hospitals at GETTYSBURG. (c) Two field hospitals to be held in reserve in GETTYSBURG in readiness to move forward when advance permits. (d) Corps Evac Hosp—No change. B. Animals: 1. Corps Mob Vet Sec—No change. 2. Collection station for sick and wounded animals: 1st Mob Vet See in orchard opposite J. FoRNEY house. 3. Div Vet will arrange for evacuation from collection station via division axial road to GETTYSBURG—thence to WESTMINSTER via BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. IIT. Roaps. : A. Axial Roads—see Par. 4 (b) FO No 4. B. Maintenance: By Div Engr—All roads and bridges in the divi- sional area will be inspected as rapidly as the advance pro- gresses and bridges will be reinforced when necessary to ac- commodate artillery and heavily loaded trucks. C. Circulation: : Free on all roads in division area, except for the limita- ie prescribed in FO No 2 for the movement of troops to- night. : As soon as the advance reaches its objective the APM will reconnoiter all roads to the east thereof and prepare circulation maps of the division sector. D. Traffic Control: By Military Police from the MummMAssuRG—SEVEN STARS road to the GOLDENVILLE—GETTYSBURG road (both inclusive). THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS 145 The BALTIMORE TURNPIKE will be policed by the 2d Corps. Traffic control posts will be established at all important road junctions in the divisional area and detachments of military police will be placed on duty at distributing points and sta- tions and field hospitals and at stations for slightly wounded. Traffic control posts will be established in the forward area as the attack progresses. Signs will be posted on all roads by the military police as _ soon as the advance permits. IV. SALVAGE AND BURIAL. A. Salvage: . Corps Salvage Park—No change. . Salvage of the division area east of the 659—McKNIGHTSTOWN —McKNIGHTSTOWN STATION road by Co A 1st Pion Inf (at- tached to division from corps troops). . The Div Salv O will co-ordinate the work of salvage. . Salvage detachments will be located at all distributing points, dressing stations and field hospitals. / . The CO Engr Tn will furnish necessary transportation. . Salvage dumps at distributing points, from which points the supply train will evacuate salvaged material to the corps oe park at WESTMINSTER under direction of the Div alv O. B. Burial: 1. The Div Sn I will co-ordinate the work of burial. 2. Burial including dead animals in the division area east of the 659—McKNIGHTSTOWN—MCKNIGHTSTOWN STATION road by Co B, 1st Pion Inf (attached to division from corps troops). 8. The CO Engr Tn will furnish the necessary transportation and Ne Qu Pw tools. 4. The Chaplain, 1st Engrs, assisted by two chaplains to be desig- nated by the division chaplain, will make the necessary records and reports of all burials. C. In the area in advance of that indicated above, salvage .and burial will be done by the infantry regiments within the limits of their respective areas, evacuating salvaged material to the salvage dumps by regimental ration vehicles. V. Miuirary POLice. The APM will establish a straggler line along the HAMIL- TON—646—601—-N. Grist house road and arrest all en- listed men going to the rear (except teamsters, chauffeurs, messengers) and others when they are not in possession of properly authenticated passes. Stragglers will be sent to collection point at crossroads one- half mile SW of 60f where officer in charge will arrange for their return to proper organization. | When the artillery moves forward, the straggler line will be advanced to the MUMMASBURG—SEVEN STaRS road and the collection point will be moved to road junction 560. VI. PRISONERS OF WAR. . : Prisoners of war will be sent to collection point established by military police at crossroads one-half mile southwest of 601 and road junction 560 after straggler line moves forward. The APM will arrange for evacuation of prisoners to the Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure at GETTYSBURG after they are searched and interviewed by G2. VII. MISCELLANEOUS. A. Eatra Trucks: The Div QM will place at the disposal of the CO Hq Tr three trucks to be held in readiness for movement of the ad- vance division command post. 146 THE INFANTRY DIVISION B. Surplus Baggage: . : Infantry brigade commanders will cause battalion dumps of surplus property that is not to be taken into action, to be formed near the road and left in the bivouac area under proper guard. The Div QM will be notified of the exact loca- tion of these dumps. C. Mail: J Will be sent to distributing points. D. Units to remain in GETTYSBURG: : (a) F Sig Bn (subject to orders of Div Sig O). (b) Hq MP Co. (c)Mob Ord Rep Sh. VIII. Trains. A. CO Tns will release division trains immediately for combat oper- ations. B. Field trains will move north from their present positions under direction of the CO Tns at daylight 15 June 19 and park as follows: ; . lst Brig: Woods south of road junction 646. 1st FA Brig and 1st Sq 1st Cav: Woods along railroad east of C. TopPpER FARM. 2d Brig: Woods along railroad west of Boyp ScHoot House. 1st Engrs: Orchard south of road junction 646. . Movement to be made via MuMMASBURG—crossroads west of Oak Ripce—thence to road junction 601—and destinations by shortest route. ‘ C. Division Trains: 1. Following will remain in GETTYSBURG: (a) Engr Tn—to be held loaded in readiness to move for- ward to establish Engineer Dump under direction of Div Engr. (b) Am Tn—(less H Bn). (c) Sup Tn (including Serv Pk U) less detachment at UNION MIDLts. (d) Hq Div Tns. (e) Hq Sn Tn. 2. Others as follows: (a) oat (H Bn)—Woods 600 yards north of crossroads oho toh (b) Div Vet Sec—Orchard opposite J. FoRNEY house. 3. Contact maintained with G1 at Div CP by mounted agents from all trains. IX. A. Rear Echelon DHQ, Gerryssurc. B. An assistant G1 will be on duty at the advance division com- mand post at crossroads 625. The Division G1 will be at GETTYSBURG until the advance command post is established at SEVEN STars, when he will move to that place. By command of Major General A x Chief of Staff. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS 147 Distribution: 1. CG Blue Army 81. Div MTO 2. CG 2d Corps 82. Div OO 8-6. CG 1st Brig 33. CO 1st Sq Ist Cav 7-10. CG 2d Brig 34. CO 1st Obsn Sq 11-15. CG 1st FA Brig 85. CO Cos A and B, ist Pion 16-20. CO Tns Inf : 21-24. Div QM 36. Div Chap 25. CO ist Engrs 37. Div Sn I 26. CO 1st F Sig Bn 38. APM 27. CO 1st MG Bn 89-55. Division. Staff—File—War 28. Div Surg : Diary—Spare—CGs, ad- 29. CO Hq Tr joining divisions. 380. Div Billeting O Analysis To accompany Administrative Orders No. 2, 1st Division. The following subjects are usually covered in the ad- ministrative orders for a division going into action: I. SUPPLY. A. Railhead: Location and date from corps or army orders. B. Rations: Distributing points. * Location, date, hour each unit draws. Locate near field trains if possible, on good road circuit and under cover. . Ammunition: » Refilling station given in corps orders. Prescribe road to be used by ammunition train. Distributing stations: For artillery as near the batteries as possible. Centrally located for infantry. On side roads if possible to avoid congestion on axial road; good circuits necessary; cover where possible. D. Engineer Material: Corps park given in corps orders: Instructions to division engineer reference establishing dump, giving description of material. E. Signal Corps Material: Corps park given in corp orders. Instructions to division signal officer reference establishing dump, giving description of material. . Water: Location of supply: Instructions to engineers if certain points are to be controlled by them (standing orders in divi- sion require boiling or filtering). Ii. EvAcuaTIon. A. Men: es : . : 1. Dressing stations. For infantry brigades on brigade axial roads if provided for (good communication to front and rear). Evacuation route. ‘ 2. Field hospitals. : (a) Non-evacuable and seriously wounded. Locate on good line of communication out of artillery range. (b) All other cases. ; (c) One or two field hospitals well to the rear on good road (avoid crossroads and other places where traffic con- gestion is apt to occur). NoTe:—All hospitals located on recommendation of division surgeon. Q iy 148 THE INFANTRY DIVISION (d) Location of corps evacuation hospital given in corps or- ders. B. Animals: 1. Location of corps mobile veterinary section given in corps orders. 2. Designate location of collection station for sick and wounded ‘animals and place division mobile veterinary section there. 3. *Division veterinarian is charged with all details of evacua- tion of animals. III. Roaps. A. Axial roads from division field orders or corps field orders if not given in the former. B. Maintenance: ; Instructions to division engineer. C. Circulation: Instructions and restrictions for use of roads (circulation map showing one-way, two-way and three-way roads and direction of traffic in case of one-way usually furnished by corps and distributed to units of division). *Instructions to assistant provost marshal and division engineer to reconnoi- ter roads in division area as fast as the advance permits and report to Gl. *Direct assistant provost marshal to have maps prepared if not furnished by corps. D. Traffic Control: Corps sector of control given in corps orders. Prescribe division sector for traffic control. *Direct establishment of control posts at important road junctions—distributing points, distributing stations, field hospitals, etc. Military police to have maps of area. Signs to be-posted. New control posts to be located in forward area as attack permits. IV. SALVAGE AND BURIAL. A. Salvage: . Corps salvage park from corps orders. . Designate troops for salvage duty in rear of combat troops and define area. . Designate officer in charge of salvage work. . Particular points to be covered by salvage detachments. . Instructions relative to transportation. " . Where salvage will be delivered and how it will be evacuated. B. Burial: *1. Designate officer in charge of burial work. 2. Designate troops for burial duty in rear of combat troops and define area. : 3. Instructions relative to transportation and tools. 4. Designate officers to make records and reports of burials. C. General instructions for salvage and burial in the advance or combat area. V. MitiTary POoLice. Location of straggler line. Brigade straggler line from re- serve troops if necessary. *Instructions reference arrests of en- listed men. Location of collection post. Instructions for moving straggler line forward. Provost marshal to inspect back area of division. VI. PRISONERS OF WAR. Sent to collection post, then to corps prisoners of war enclosure after being searched and interviewed by G2. Ne Aor ow USE OF FIELD TRAINS, INFANTRY DIVISION 149 VII. MisceLLANEOus.: A. *Extra Trucks: Instructions to quartermaster to furnish them to commanding officer, headquarters troop, for movement of advance division com- mand post, specifying number. B. *Surplus Baggage: Instructions to brigade commanders to have battalion dumps formed near roads under proper guard. Quartermaster to be notified of location. C. *Mail: Usual statement. D. Location of miscellaneous units. VIII. TRAINS. A. Give hour of release by commanding officer, trains. B. Prescribe movements of field trains, if any contemplated, giving route to be followed, hour of departure and new locations. C. Give locations of division trains. How contact is to be main- tained with Gl. IX. A. Location of rear echelon of division. B. Where G1 and assistant may be found. Distribution: Usual distribution and to any individual to whom special in- structions have been given in order. Remarks (See paragraphs in Analysis marked *) Whenever it is certain that standing instructions will be carried out automatically, many of the details with re- spect thereto may be omitted from the administrative or- ders. It is largely a question of circumstances in each par- ticular case and the degree of confidence placed by the division commander in the chiefs of services. NOTES ON USE OF FIELD TRAINS, INFANTRY DIVISION 1. COMPOSITION : The field trains are composed of the organizational vehicles provided for carrying rations for men and animals. and the baggage of the command. The field trains of each organization are divided into a ration section, and a ration and baggage section. The ration section comprises the ration cart carrying one (1) day’s reserve rations for the command. The ration and baggage section includes the wagons carrying baggage and two (2) days’ field rations and two (2) days’ grain rations, and all other field train wagons not included in the 150 THE INFANTRY DIVISION ration section, such as the water cart and spring wagon, if any. The rolling kitchen, carrying one (1) day’s field ration, or unconsumed portion thereof when not with the combat train, forms a part of the ration section of the field trains. 2. How HANDLED: The field trains of a regiment may be actually handled in the following manner: (a) First method: Each company’s ration section, consisting of the ration cart and rolling kitchen, if the latter is not with the combat train, and its ration and baggage section, consisting of its ration and bag- gage wagon and a water cart, may be kept with the company. The ration and baggage wagon would issue one (1) day’s field ration to the rolling kitchen each day and refill at the regimental distributing point. This method is particularly adapted to camps and stabilized situations. (b) Second method: In this case, the regimental field trains might be pooled, by the regimental commander, in the supply company under control of the regimental supply officer. In this event, the baggage of the command might be carried on certain wagons of the 22 ration and baggage wagons in the regimental field train, the two days’ field rations on certain others, and the two days’ grain and hay rations on certain wagons.. One of the two days’ field rations and forage rations would be issued daily and replenished from the distributing point. This method is usually employed on marches, and in operations where movement is contemplated. 3. Figuring out the above plan in pounds, on the basis of 2700 pounds per wagon and 800 pounds per ration cart, the following distribution of baggage, rations and forage in the regimental field trains might be adopted for the in- fantry: One reserve ration for the regi- nein 3 pounds per man, 11,502 pounds. Ration SECTION Ration carts (at 800 pounds each) requited. 2.22 2255 2. oeatccccweesouc. 15 Total ration carts 16 The 11,502 pounds might be distributed among the 16 ration carts. USE OF FIELD TRAINS, INFANTRY DIVISION 151 cr Two field rations for the regiment at 4.5 pounds per man, 34,486 RATION pounds. R. and B. wagons (at 2700 eee) required ~___.__-_...________ Two days’ grain and hay for the regiment at an average of 10 pounds grain and 12 FORAGE pounds hay per animal per day 12,204 pounds. R. and B. wagons (2700 pounds each) required_-__---- 6 ¢ Regimental head- quarters _ -____ 500 pounds. Headquarters com- pany ~-.-_---.- 250 ag een AND Machine gun Seon company ______ 250 ” RCTION Supply company - 250 #R Officers (50 pounds eden)” ~ceseccss 1450 en Total______ 2700 ”” or 1 wagon BAGGAGE ~ Battalion head- quarters ______- 250 Four companies ie) pounds CUD) cia ose 00 2 Officers (50 as each): clonesae 1450 a Total per bat- talion ~_.-2700 ” or 1 wagon Total 3 bat- L talions____8100 ”” or 3 wagons “Total regiment__10800 ” or 4 wagons Total, R. and B. wagons in regimental supply company______--___________ 22 a Total, rations, forage and baggage .-------------_______-----______--_-_ 22 ne 4, Considering the ration section only of the ration and baggage section, it will be seen that there are eighteen full wagons of which twelve are carrying the two days’ field rations and six are carrying the two days’ grain and hay ration. The third day’s grain and hay or unconsumed por- tion thereof is being carried on all the vehicles in the regi- ment for the draft animals thereof. In the same manner riding animals carry a portion of their grain ration issued the night before for a noonday feed. Six of the wagons, carrying one day’s field rations, would distribute to the rolling kitchens each day and three of the wagons carrying one day’s grain and hay would dis- tribute one day’s forage ration each day. These nine empty wagons would then go to the dis- tributing point each day and fill with one day’s field ration, and one day’s forage ration. 5 If hay is issued daily, there will always be sufficient wagons to draw the grain and hay daily from the distribut- 4 152 THE INFANTRY DIVISION ing point. If grain only is issyed three wagons could easily carry two days’ supply. Hence, it will be seen from the foregoing that in the ration and baggage section of the regimental field train there are normally two full ration sections, one section distributing daily and then drawing from the distributing point. The same principles apply in the field trains of other organizations of the division. (E) CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION Magor R. McCieave, Infantry 1. DEFINITION: By co-ordination we mean the work- ing of all parts of a division as a team. Considering the division as a heavy and cumbersome piece of machinery of great power, it is evident that the parts must interlock and work together to obtain the best effect, as well as to avoid the danger of a breakdown from the great force exerted, when full power is turned on. In well trained divisions, the co-ordination seems automatic, machine-like in its operation. We may be sure in all such cases that, although only the results are visible, the co-or- dinating control and direction is never absent. When a ma- chine is running smoothly, the engineer does not interfere beyond supplying the fuel and oil needed, observing closely in order to effect necessary repairs, alterations and replace- ments when needed. This is the general line along which a division should be handled to obtain its greatest effect. 2. DIVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT: The subject of co-ordi- nation within a division divides itself into three main. classes : First: Personal Co-ordination, which comprises everything relat- ing to the human element which must never be lost sight of in warfare. Second: Tactical Co-ordination, which comprises: (a) The planning and ordering of action, a command and staff function. (b) The combination of tactical units of different arms for concert of effort, a command and staff function. (c) The execution of orders, including local concentrations of effort, by combined use of different arms and weapons, a line duty. CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 153 Third: Service Co-ordination, including: (a) The planning of action of all service elements in accord- ance with the general action of the division, this being a staff function. (b) The execution of the orders, a line function. You will note that the question of co-ordination neither pertains exclusively to the command and staff, nor to the line, but intimately concerns both. ‘3. We will consider the question under the foregoing general divisions. First: Personal co-ordination, both staff and line. Here the question of command first arises. In France, I remember three distinct types of divisional commanders. One communicated all directions to the chief of staff by written memorandum made of record. The second attended all staff conferences and made verbal decisions on necessary points as they arose; the third had no set method, but handled a difficult situation so well, with excellent military judgment, tactical ability, and great _ knowledge of modern staff work that his lack of fixed method brought no bad effect. Here is the main point about each of these types, that each maintained the command, the gen- eral control and the general direction of affairs in his own hands, this being an absolute necessity to co-ordination in any unit, whatever its size. Strength of command is essential to co-ordination, as all subordinates know that decisions and orders are backed by an absolute and strong controlling command. Beyond this, commanders are directly concerned with the personal characteristics of the commanders of their next lower units. Thus the division commander by con- stant observation must study the personal characteristics of his brigade commanders and senior staff officers, if his division is to operate as a team. Men cannot be handled alike. One man must be driven, another held in with a tight rein; one will exhibit the hide of a rhinoceros while the slightest censure will affect a sensitive man like a blow. The military judgment of one man is excellent, while dif- ferent reasons, such as physical or psychological weakness, will compel reports from other men to be accepted with reservations. One commander will require only general in- 154 THE INFANTRY DIVISION structions, while another will require constant observation and detailed instructions. These considerations were well covered by Napoleon in dealing with the art of war. One other point must be borne in mind by com- manders and staff officers if they desire machine-like pre- cision in movement or maneuver. That is the peculiar human tendency to misunderstand situations and misinterpret or- ders, necessitating following up of orders and observation of execution in order to correct misunderstandings, and to permit prompt and unobserved correction of errors. Another point will suffice for consideration of the per- sonal element. This is the prompt, brief, soldierly expres- sion of approval for excellent work, which, when generally known, leads to rise in morale of the immediate unit, and the desire for emulation on the part of others. When neces- sary, this must be emphasized by equally prompt expression of disapproval directed privately to the responsible party only, with other appropriate action, where failure or poor work has resulted. Enough has been said to emphasize the point that mili- tary commanders cannot expect co-ordinated action unless they take into consideration the limitations of human nature, and handle their responsible subordinates in accordance with their personal characteristics. The more inflexible the system, the poorer the co-ordination. This may not be gen- erally accepted, but this view is backed by the strongest mili- tary authorities—those who have made the greatest suc- cesses in war. How does this apply to a division? First, the division commander and his senior staff officers preferably should mess together, giving an automatic discussion of affairs three times daily. Second, the division commander and staff officers, by personal visits on both sides, should keep in con- stant touch with subordinate commanders and commands; and third, there should be a daily divisional staff conference attended by chiefs of sections and heads of services, for re- port of the day’s operations: and condition of supply, and discussion and instructions as to the following day. In no other way can co-ordination of staff and line effort be effected. I call your attention to this daily staff conference CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 155 for general information and co-ordination. Neither incon- venience nor actual danger should suffice to prevent it. It is vitally important in obtaining co-ordinated effort, as to avoid confusion, the plans and orders must keep ahead of the operations and needs of the troops. The foreseeing of the needs of the situation is not the least difficult of staff duties. All possible eventualities should be considered and tentative plans considered and where advisable actually formulated. The old adage “A stitch in time saves nine” is nowhere more true than in division staff work. 4. In considering co-ordination within the division staff, a line from Frederick Remington applies‘strongly: “Their methods are the methods that proceed without commotion.” In campaign, noise, disorder and confusion about any staff are synonymous with poor staff work. Extreme concen- tration is necessary, and the more difficult the situation, the greater the concentration demanded. Absolute control of staff sections and the turning out of good work with the minimum of observable effort and friction is an excellent indication of self-possession and grasp of the situation. Such work’ also indicates ability to plan logically and sys- tematically, and ability to formulate orders clearly and simply, including all essential points and omitting non-essen- : tials. Let me impress a point upon you here: that after the basic planning, orders and instructions are complete, you should let your subordinates alone, to the fullest extent possible, to handle their individual sections of the machine. If not competent, they should either be trained or relieved, preferably the first, but do not, either as a line or staff officer, hand a piéce of work to a subordinate, and then back him into a corner of doubt and confusion by inquiring about de- tails before he has solved his problem. If the details are his, let him think them out, and give him time and oppor- tunity for logical work, and then critically judge that work. Give the able officer a free rein; check with care the work of those whom you cannot trust. Another point occasionally illustrated by failure of effort in divisions in France is this: A certain chain of command is laid down for purposes of control. It is the 156 THE INFANTRY DIVISION greatest mistake on the part of the division staff or line commanders to disregard this chain. If a battalion or other fraction of the command is to be assigned a particular task or mission, the orders must go through the proper command- ers or confusion is certain. As the greatest concession along this line, when grave emergencies require direct action, copies of the orders must be sent to the senior commanders simultaneously to keep them oriented. The systematic handling of paper work is of great importance. I know of a case in France where the division commander opened and examined all mail in per- son. Where letters are numbered in the hundreds daily, such a system makes a clerk of the commanding general. The chief of staff has no time for this: the secretary of the general staff should open and route all communi- cations to the proper office. Routine matters are handled independently by the adjutant with a specified hour daily for explanation and signature of the commanding general cr chief of staff. Important matters are invariably submit- ted by the chief of staff to the commanding general, but he should be rigidly freed from unimportant matters. Anyone who served at a headquarters in campaign will understand the importance of this systematic and mechanical handling of paper work, which, once systematized, cares for itself. Without a system, the command is buried in the’ mass of detail. This independent handling of routine business by staff sections and services forms an important link in the chain of co-ordination. The training of subordinates along these lines has a distinct bearing upon co-ordination within the staff. There come times of emergency to every staff during campaigns when confusion of effort can be prevented only by the strong- est control and direction on the part of the chief of staff and and division commander, but these are exceptional incidents. Generally, the co-ordination is dependent upon the smooth- ness of the operating machinery. 5. TACTICAL CO-ORDINATION: We consider next the ques- tion of tactical co-ordination. Co-ordination requires careful planning, clear orders, the strongest possible combination of arms and weapons and efficient execution of orders, to- CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 157 gether with independent action in emergency, best suited to the general or the local situation. First, as to tactical -plans and orders. This pertains primarily to the operations section of the staff, as does the combining of the different arms, on the march or for battle, to secure the maximum power. All tactical plans are based on the information of the enemy supplied by G2, a most important member of: the division staff team. 6. It is not necessary for me to discuss the importance and necessity of complete estimate of the situation. No log- ical and complete plans and orders can be formulated with- out it. Let me emphasize one point only, which may assist you in future work with large units in the school. In large units the infantry action forms the basis of all plans. The action of all other tactical units must:be tied into, or around, the infantry action. This is a statement of fact, based on warfare, and not on loyalty to any arm of service. 7. Determine, then, the infantry action, necessities, limits and objectives, from superior orders or available data, and decide on the infantry formation. Your plan must be simple and direct, with concentration of effort, as opposed to dispersion. The one leads to use of every available arm, every unit, every man, and every weapon, which is co-ordina- tion. Dispersion (unless by a fortunate combination of circumstances) will lead to action with only a fraction of your strength available. Detachments should be the abso- lute minimum. Next, consider the questions of reconnais- sance and protection, and cover by air service, cavalry, and advance elements. Next comes the question of concentra- tion of force. Tie in your artillery to obtain the best results if action follows. Next tie in your auxiliaries, tanks, all available machine guns and any other special arms to obtain the maximum of power. These must be so placed that all will be available if needed. Next consider the services— how they can best be used to supply the various needs of the troops. Next comes the question of communications and the lo- cation of the command posts. Outline clearly in your mind, in your plans, and in your orders, the necessities of the par- 158 THE INFANTRY DIVISION ticular case, covering only such details as you desire handled in a particular way, or which are of special importance. 8. Combined with this logical method of planning must be the natural or acquired ability to express your ideas in brief and simple language. In dealing with large units, both in campaign and in the service schools, the time is al- ways too short for mental rambling, and co-ordination of one’s own mental efforts is a necessity for a staff or line officer in campaign or for the student here in the schools. To avoid waste of time in divisional problems, to ensure logical procedure and to assist in the formulation of orders, I strongly advise you to outline in your own mind the form and matter contained in a type form of divisional orders. 9. Returning to the matter of combining the various arms, we find that the lessons of the World War indicate the necessity of assigning artillery units to the direct support of infantry units. With the two infantry brigades in line, this may lead to the assignment of one light artillery regi- ment to support each brigade; with infantry brigades in column, one light artillery regiment may well support each regiment of the leading brigade. The assignment of infantry batteries and accompanying guns is another phase of artil- lery co-ordination with infantry requiring attention. Gen- eral instructions covering these points are usual in division orders, details being left to the artillery commander. 10. In a sense all the auxiliary weapons except tanks, which have a distinct function, can‘be considered as aug- menting the infantry fire by concentration on points or areas, but the artillery support is separate and distinct in its impor- tance. Except in special cases, infantry cannot alone as- sault successfully against a force of all arms. The pecu- liar necessity for understanding the co-ordination between artillery and infantry elements cannot, therefore, be too strongly emphasized. 11. The question of tanks, gas service and other auxil- iary arms is usually similarly handled by attachment to in- fantry units. Machine guns have a normal distribution to regiments, brigades and divisions in Tables of Organization, but get them all into action where it is possible. Idle ma- chine guns do no one any harm, and our object is decidedly CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 159 offensive. Overhead fire can usually be arranged, even for machine gun elements tactically in reserve, including the division machine gun battalion, and this represents a great increase in the fire upon the enemy. 12. This handling of combined fire power devolves upon commanders of units from the platoon up, and battle co- ordination requires ability to concentrate fire from all arms available. It is to be remembered that infantry troops are widely distributed, automatically distributing the rifle fire; the concentrations spoken of therefore naturally fall to the auxiliary weapons, automatic rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, one-pounders, in addition to the artillery. 13. In discussing the diagrams illustrating the general character of possible combinations of arms within the divi- sion, avoid the error, likely in diagramatic illustrations, of accepting these blindly as applying to all cases. They illus- trate what is meant by tactical combinations in general. The particular combination to best solve a particular situation is a matter to be determined by study of the individual case. We seek always to bring not only sufficient power to bear, but if possible overwhelming force. The possible com- binations and the allotment, customary and convenient as a matter of organization, must always be borne in mind by the operations staff and senior line officers. I have endeavored to illustrate the maximum power that can be concentrated to assist the infantry in the usual attack formations of the division, this being the principal Object of tactical co-ordination of effort. All of the forma- tions illustrated were actually used by divisions in the 1st American Army. We will consider, in detail, only the attack in column of brigades, each brigade in column of regiments.. This is the strongest and most powerful attack, when combined with the requirements of, first, narrow frontage assigned; second, great penetration against powerful resistance; third, long period of action probable. Diagram No. 2 illustrates the attack in column of bri- gades with regiments in line, and an attack with brigades in line, each in column of regiments, one of tese forms being indicated when moderate frontage, say 2000 to 2300 yards i) Arty Regts 160 THE INFANTRY DIVISION ATTACK IN COLUMN OF BRIGADES IN COLUMNS OF REGIMENTS Fire effect from Fae ae es ee || | TAN, Fire =_— HvA Zone | ~_____ Rifle Fire : Pa) Cae Pa MG eee eg ocal concentrations Cc] co Oj from accompanying weapons, oO (OO CO Tanks E Assault echelon 1 Regt 1 Regt 1 Brigade oO Oo Diagram No. 1 Air Service CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 161 (1) ATTACK IN CoLUMN oF BRIGADES. (2) ATTACK IN LINE OF BRIGADES. Fire effect from LA Pp ee ee eee ee HvA Fire StSSsStstsosssssesc22e4 Rifle fire ae ee a Div MG 6 E33 Cy) Coq cy Local concentrations — |oo co} sayks Assault Echelon 1 Regt 1 Regt (1) 1 Brigade % § $ . : a q ~ a Q NX 1 Brigade — Regt 1 Regt 3 Regts Arty a | J LA 4 4b 4 Air Service Diagram No. 2 162 THE INFANTRY. DIVISION ATTACK IN LINE OF BRIGADES IN LINE OF REGIMENTS IN COLUMNS OF BATTALIONS Ed ra Ez) | l J L j ( J 1Bn. 18Bn 1Bn 1 Bn, ' 1 ( t 1 ‘ ' i) ' 1 | t ' I ' 1Bn 1Bn. 1Bn. 1Bn 1 ' ' ; ( ‘ ; 18n 1Bn. 1 Bn. 1Bn t 1 | L tHvA ] Leva] io arias waives! cea’ eS I | ! | Diagram No. 3 CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 163 of frontage is assigned, or when powerful defense and long continuance of attack is not anticipated. Diagram No. 3 illustrates the attack with the two in- fantry brigades in line, each with its regiments abreast, each regiment in column of battalions as illustrated in the problem, Chapter V. I may state that some of the best of our divisions used this attack almost to the exclusion of any other, disregarding almost entirely the considerations of frontage, penetration and duration of attack. The great ability of some of the commanders compels respect for their opinions. However, all these forms were successfully used, and my object is accomplished if you will note and bear them in mind, leaving the decision as to the proper forma- tion in any future necessity to your own judgment. Bear in mind that this third form is indicated particularly with wide frontage, say 2500 yards or more to the division, against a shallow or poorly defended position, or when the time ele- ment is likely to be short, and the position carried in one assault. I would go further than this, if I dared to, and advise its use except when the front would be too crowded for four battalions, but that is a personal opinion only. The other forms have advantages, particularly along the lines of replacement and long continued action, which will often lead to their adoption. Often, where conditions are along the border line between these forms, one may make a personal choice. 14. Let us suppose in the problem, Chapter V, the ene- my has fortified from the mountains out as far as McKnights- town and the division has been assigned a frontage of 1200 yards. You might decide to attack in column of brigades, each in column of regiments. Note you first decide your in- fantry formation. The artillery is the twin sister of the infantry. You have two light artillery regiments. You order these to support directly the assaulting regiment. Leave it to the artillery commander to assign one of these regiments to the support of each assault battalion of the attacking regiment. Leave the use of the heavy regiment to him unless you desire special concentration on certain points. What machine gun help is possible? The assault regi- ment has acompany. Often in France, in such a situation 164 THE INFANTRY DIVISION the machine gun company of the second regiment of a bri- gade was temporarily attached to the assault regiment by brigade or divisional command. This method gives the lead- ing regiment two companies. The brigade commander will normally, as you know, assign enough companies from the brigade machine gun battalion to put one company in direct support of each battalion and one platoon in direct support of each assault company. The brigade machine gun battal- ion is to be put into action. The brigade machine gun battal- ion of the reserve brigade, and the divisional machine gun battalion, may well be used in support of the attack, physi- cally placed for overhead fire, and revert to their duties in re- serve as the attack moves on. Here is a tremendous machine gun strength available. It is a mistake not to use it all at first, if the hostile position is clearly outlined. The force brought to bear should be overwhelming. In addition we remember the local concentrations against strong points by infantry batteries, accompanying guns, machine guns, trench mortars and one-pounders. With all these used in addition to the artillery, and they should be used, the in- fantry will not complain of lack of support. You have three companies of tanks, the tank organiza- tion not being built around the infantry organization. At- tach them all to support one battalion of infantry, or two to one battalion and one to the other, depending on ground, obstacles, etc. You have a squadron of air service, three flights of six planes each. How are they to be attached? I am in some doubt, but considering their function and the correspondence of numbers with the artillery regiments, in this case why not assign one flight to each artillery regiment for observation and fire direction, and withdraw one plane from each flight for divisional command and observation? That seems a reasonable use, if it may not be the best one. In handling air service, the bulk should be assigned to observation or to fire direction, as the one or other consideration is more important. 15. I shall not take up your time in minute examination of the other forms. They are in the diagrams for your examination, if interested. The discussion will show the CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 165 general method used in tactically tying in other arms to the infantry action, which must be done to effect co-ordi- nation. 16. The above refers to combinations of arms and wea- pons. We must also bear clearly in mind the necessity for co-ordination of effort. The terrain held by the enemy is not of uniform importance to him. In the problem the ground about Cashtown, where the main road debouches into the plain, is the vital sector. Always, you will find cer- tain sectors of greater importance to the enemy than the others. These are the points upon which the co-ordination of effort must fall. The others are of lesser importance, and attack upon them is of a containing nature and with a view of infiltration, but if study of the problem shows points whose fall will involve the capture of adjacent ground or the whole position, that fact indicates the necessity for . concentration of arms, weapons and means. You will accept this, I think, as axiomatic, but I can assure you that there were many cases in France where this idea was completely lost sight of. This may be called the principle of the decisive blow, concentration of effort against the vital points, while maintaining pressure along the whole front. The divisional | staff is most conveniently situated for studies of this class. Bear in mind that the vital points are not always the strong- est; on the contrary near the close of:the World War con- centrations against the weakest points seemed to be the rule with a view to penetrations, and flank attack against strong points. 17. I desire to call your attention to necessary co-ordi- nation in the deployment and simultaneous attack in all these forms. The deployment is often covered in the division order by assignment of a deployment area for each brigade and other units, the local covering detachments necessary being a normal duty of infantry commanders; the simultaneous attack is arranged by the assignment of the line of depart- ure or jump off line, or by direction that assault units cross a well marked topographical line, such as a road or line per- pendicular to the direction of advance, at the same hour. This line is analogous to the initial point in marches. In the latter case, the duty of working out the time element 166 THE INFANTRY DIVISION devolves upon subordinate commanders. Both are common methods of co-ordinating the attack. 18. Another thought in connection with the problem, and with particular reference to using all available means: The artillery has high explosive, shrapnel, gas and smoke shells, the gas being divided again into non-persistent and persistent; why not direct the use of the class indicated by the conditions? What of this high hill just north of our sector with its magnificent view of our dispositions? Has it any better view than had Mont Sec at St. Mihiel? As a German general once said under different circumstances, “Smoke them out.” Even a Blue Ridge mountaineer will find difficulty in seeing through a smoke screen. The or- chards and woods near the hostile main positions are dan- gerous, and at best some hours away; why not some non- persistent gas to help along the 155 high explosives? The point is, that we have many agencies for assistance. Co-ordi- nation requires forethought and every possible use of the means at hand. The hill is in another division sector, but we are not forbidden to arrange such matters with adjoining divisions. It is a normal procedure. It is in such cases, too, that we call on the corps and army artillery for help—just such cases. My lecture does not include co-ordination be- tween corps and army agencies and the division, but do not lose sight of the functions of corps and army combat troops, air service and artillery, especially in the matter of pro- tection and assistance to the division. They are always sub- ject to call, and this must be understood. 19. Battle co-ordination is a continuing function during action, and here we touch on the functions of lines of signal communications, signal plans and the chain of information officers and agents to tie the command together, and ensure a continuous flow of orders. Do not forget that time spent on thorough organization of message centers is well spent. 20. Another point is this, the greatest single co-ordi- nating agency in campaign is the telephone. Use it to the fullest extent. I have no patience with the failure to use the telephone on grounds of secrecy, listening-in, etc. Time, effort and annoyance are saved by its use, and the advantage of prompt, clear and full understanding outweighs the dis- CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 167 advantage of the occasional fragmentary messages which may be picked up by an enemy. The radio must be used with discretion, but the telephone brings your man to you in the twinkling of an eye for discussion or explanation; therefore, if you want co-ordination, look to the sufficiency of your division telephone system. Never send for an officer, line or staff, when you can equally well use the telephone. His time is as valuable as yours. Force economy of time, al- ways. This refers to tactical use of the telephone only. Un- restricted use of the lines in rear areas would of course almost immediately block the entire system. 21. In addition to co-ordination of fire power, there is another form of battle co-ordination of importance which formed a weak point in‘ American operations in France. I refer to the duty of mutual assistance in emergency. I could quote you cases of divisions held up.by powerful areas of resistance, which received no assistance from ‘successful divisions on the right and left, these sticking rigidly within their own assigned limits; of regiments and battalions in many cases held up by strong points and left to their own devices, with adjoining friendly forces in good position to have turned against the hostile flank. This form of line co- ordination of effort must be thoroughly trained into any modern army, and applies to all units from the smallest to the largest. It has been so often mentioned here that it is clearly understood. 22. Sufficient has been said to show that the question of co-ordination concerns the line officers and troops as well as the staff. 23. Before leaving this subject of tactical co-ordination you will observe that the staff co-ordination in case of a march, as illustrated by the problem, consists first of the planning and formulating of orders based on certain specific considerations which have been itemized in Chapter V, and to which I invite your attention; second, of the cross check- ing these plans and orders by the chief of staff and division commander, and the tying in to the G3 plans of the service plans of G1; third, the safety insurance against misunder- standing or misinterpretation on the part of brigade and other commanders; and fourth, where necessary, the per- 168 THE INFANTRY DIVISION sonal observation and control of the execution of the orders by staff officers. 24. The same general principles apply in combat, as already illustrated in this chapter. The staff plans will be based on the limits of the infantry and the assigned objec- tives. The formation of the division and the possible com- binations of assisting arms and means will be carefully con- sidered. The staff must co-ordinate the deployment and simultaneous attack and the teamplay to gain advantage from ground forms and concentrations against vital points. 25. In the case of a march, the line co-ordination would consist in the preparation of proper plans and orders by subordinate commanders, giving time and place of starting; in the strict observance by troops of the rules of march dis- cipline; in independent and energetic action by troop com- manders in any emergency; the local protection of all col- umns; intercommunication, particularly between columns, in which staff officers with motor transportation may be very useful. These were the rules followed by our 3d Army in the march into Germany, an unusually successful and well managed movement. 26. The line co-ordination in the attack, as pointed out above, in addition to designation of the time and place of starting, would consist of necessary instructions to insure strict control, concentration of fire by different weapons or arms, mutual assistance and a constant interchange of in- formation laterally and up and down, all of which are of. equal importance to co-ordination of effort. 27. CO-ORDINATION OF THE SERVICES: The conference on the administrative details in march and battle has shown you the great scope of this subject. The handling of supply and administrative control of the services is conceded by all great military writers to be more difficult than the tac- tical handling of troops. History is full of examples of dis- aster caused by failure to co-ordinate the services, par- ticularly the supply of all kinds, with the troop movements. 28. Just the recapitulation of the points covered in Chapter V in the march order and the battle plan will do more than pages of explanation. Leaving the march sum- mary to the student to save time, the following subheads CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE DIVISION 169 were covered in the administrative orders for the attack problem. 29. Railhead, supply, distributing stations for all units; ammunition refilling and distributing stations for infantry and artillery; corps and divisional engineer and signal corps dumps; water supply ; evacuation, covering corps evacuation hospitals; brigade dressing stations; field hospitals divided for serious and light cases; circulation, maintenance and traffic control of roads; salvage and burial; military police and stragglers; collecting stations and evacuation of pris- oners of war; time and place of release of service trains to heads of services; position and movements of field and divi- sional trains; assignment of extra trucks; disposition of surplus baggage; mail; and the details of moving his own section—all these would prevent time hanging heavily on the hands of G1. Only systematic planning and formulation of orders will obtain co-ordination of all these elements. 30. The outlines of the tactical and administrative or- ders give little difficulty in actual campaign, as any good staff officer will have in his note book the outhned subjects to be covered in normal classes of action. It is the related questions and conditions that must be borne in mind that cause the trouble in handling the services of all kinds. 81. Let us glance briefly at the problems that confronted the assistant chief of staff, G1, in drawing up his admin- istrative orders. 1. Road system available, with co-ordination of routes and time, to avoid confusion and crossing. . The time elements involved. : . Regimental field trains: are they full or empty, or, as will be normal, half of them full and half empty? . Where are the ration sections? . Is one section of the supply train at railhead, and one section ready to proceed to distributing points? What assignment will he make for distributing points? . Are the distributing points conveniently situated as to roads, distance from troops, facilities for handling wagons and supplies ? 7, Ammunition supply: Is the horse section ammunition train full? Is the motor section full? Are the battery caissons full? 8. Should trains remain under the train commander or be re- leased to heads of services? If so, where and how distributed as to roads? Are special orders required for sanitary and engineer trains? 9. The difference in rate of horse and motorized sections and the necessity of moving motorized sections by bounds. of wb a 170 THE INFANTRY DIVISION 10. The sufficiency of camps or billets, water, etc. : 11. Questions of terrain, road conditions, necessity for protection of supply elements. . : 12. Sufficiency and convenience of evacuating agencies. 32, All these and numerous other points arise to compli- cate the administrative estimate of the situation. Upon the co-ordination of effort between the heads of the different services, the absence of friction and the willing acceptance of decisions will depend the clear, clean cut administrative orders, which, like all other orders, should set forth the de- cisions in simple, clear language. Nothing will better re- pay some effort on the part of officers in high command or responsible staff officers than a thorough study of the ad- ministrative requirements of a division. The best results will come when such officers combine executive ability with grasp of details, executive ability implying ability to use and co-ordinate the work of many men to a common purpose. In the administrative elements as in the line troops, details of execution, time and place and mutual assistance devolve directly upon the cammanders of the units. 33. In administrative work as well as in tactical and line co-ordination, the value of daily situation maps, issued by G3 section, showing the location of all division elements, are of very great assistance. In movement these may well be issued in advance, showing the routes and points to be gained. A well organized map section is a necessity in every staff. A good map, showing details, is often better than pages of written matter. 34. In closing this lecture, this point may be empha- sized: to attain precision throughout, the division must be regarded as a real team in which every officer, line or staff, will play his part and every unit will know its function and through divisional spirit can be depended upon for the ne- cessary teamplay. If these functions are normal they are already known; special functions or action require planning and orders to make the will of the commander known to subordinates, and these orders are more or less detailed, depending on the sphere of action or influence of each. A division is too heavy, cumbersome and complicated a machine to be handled piecemeal, or by any one man. Therefore the success which the division attains, whether in TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION 171 planning or execution, will depend upon the degree of co- ordination within the division. Only co-ordination of all * the elements will give that prompt and powerful response to the will of the commander which is essential in bringing the full power of the division to bear in any military situa- tion. (F) MAP PROBLEM—TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION Map References: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, 1”=10 miles. Gettysburg-Antietam Map, 1:21120. General Situation: 1. Virginia and Maryland (Blue) and Pennsylvania (Red) are at war. _2,. The 1st Blue Army, superior in numbers, morale and equipment, moves north from the line Harpers Ferry— Point of Rocks toward the line Emmitsburg—Taneytown, where a halt for re-alignment and concentration in a position of readiness is directed. March dispositions: 1st, 2d and 3d Corps from right to left. 4th Corps following 1st, in army reserve, along the general route Frederick—Taneytown. 5th Corps—on line of communication. The Blue army reaches the general line Emmitsburg— Taneytown on the night of June 28, 1919. The 1st Division, with one squadron cavalry attached, moving on the Frederick—Taneytown road, is the right divi- sion of the 1st Corps, which has two divisions in front, two following in corps reserve. 3. The Red army (three corps) is known to be concen- trating toward Gettysburg, two corps moving south from Carlisle, and one corps southwest from York, based on Car- lisle and York, respectively. 4, Events of July 1, 1919: (a) The main Red cavalry force moves toward Union Mills, followed by the Blue army cavalry. (b) Extract from G2 Bulletin: “The advance Red ele- ments reached the line Gettysburg—Littlestown last night, and have made no attempt to advance farther. A general deployment 172 THE INFANTRY DIVISION has been made along the Baltimore Pike between Gettysburg and Littlestown, and every indication points to his taking a defensive attitude on that line. Airplane photographs show defensive organization started along the entire length of above line. All attempts to penetrate this front by cavalry patrols or to recon- noiter northwest of Gettysburg and southeast of Littlestown have been defeated by Red cavalry. His forward concentration of army and corps troops and his organization in depth is not com- pleted. Both hostile flanks are strongly protected by cavalry. Small outpost detachments only are covering his front. = (c) The 1st Battalion, Light Tanks, is attached to and joins the 1st Division. 5. The Ist Division on night of June 29-30th reaches the vicinity of Galt and occupies concealed bivouacs in that im- mediate vicinity. In the area between Galt and Longville a strong group of corps artillery is concentrated and army artillery has occupied the line of Piney Creek west and northwest of Taneytown. The division air service is in the open field east of Taney- town. Note:—Problem will be in the general area: Taneytown—Littlestown—New Oxford. Special Situation (Blue): At 4:00 PM, July 1, 1919, the following warning order is received by the commanding general, 1st Division, from the corps commander: 1. The information that the enemy is organizing a defensive position along the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE from LITTLESTOWN to GETTYSBURG is positively confirmed. The position has not yet been organized in depth. Today a raiding force from our army cavalry reached the P. & R. Railroad near Mt. Hotty SPRINGS south of CARLISLE and completely blocked it by the destruction of a tunnel. Our army attacks at 4:30 AM tomorrow with a view to driving the enemy north of the W. M. Railway between HANOvER—NEW Ox- FORD—GETTYSBURG and seizing his line of communications. The army and corps cavalry will cover the right flank of the army, with a detachment covering our left flank. The corps cavalry now covering the front withdraws to the right flank at dark. The attack will be supported by army and corps artillery. 2. The 1st Corps attacks at 4:30 AM tomorrow with the lst, 2d and 8d Divisions in line from right to left, 4th Division in corps re- serve. Corrps OBJECTIVE—the line of the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE from LITTLESTOWN, inclusive, to GERMANTOWN, exclusive. Beyond this line, the attack will be vigorously pushed toward the YorK TURNPIKE between the limits NEw Ox- FORD—BrusH Run, both inclusive. 8. DETAILS oF 1st DIVISION ATTACK: Assaulting echelons will cross the OakGroveE S. H.—528 road near KINGSDALE at 4:30 AM sharp. ZONE OF ADVANCE: TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION 173 Eastern Limit—Gatt, incl—PINEY CREEK, incl.—GEORGE- TOWN, excl.—road junction 575 just east of LITTLES- TOWN-—WASHINGTON MEETING House—LITTLE CoNE- WAGO CREEK—CENTENNIAL, incl.—IRISHTOWN, excl. —NEw OxForD, incl. Western Limit—Crossroads 585 one mile northwest of GaLT—hill 662 just north of Oakcrove S. H.—TOoLt- GATE just northwest of LITTLESTOWN, incl.—Marys- VILLE, incl.—DIEHL’s MILL west of NEw Oxrorp, incl. 4, Fire of preparation of army, corps and divisional artillery will con- tinue for 30 minutes preceding the assault, the divisional ar- tillery being assigned all ground south of and including the BAL- TIMORE PIKE. The army and corps artillery will be confined to sensitive points and areas north thereof, in addition to counter- battery work. . (a) Plan of signal communications: No change. (b) Axis of signal communications: TANEYTOWN—LITTLESTOWN— PLEASANT Hitt S. H.—WHITEHALL—SQUARE CORNERS. (c) Command posts: 1st Corps, (1st) TANEYTOWN, (2d) LITTLES- TOWN. 1st Division: (1st) GaLT, (2d) LITTLESTOWN, (3d) CEN- TENNIAL. 6. Formulate your plans and orders at once. All troop dispositions to be made after dark, with necessary reconnaissance by daylight; minimum of artillery registration to be made. All other details of attack at the discretion of the division commander. on Major General. Required: The formal order issued by General A (omit paragraph 4, administrative details). An Approved Solution Magsor R. McCLEAvE, Infantry 1st Division, GaLt, Pa., 1 July 19, 5:00 PM. FIELD at No 20 Maps: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, 1”=10 miles. Gettysburg-Antietam Map, 1:21120. 1. (a) The enemy is taking up a defensive position along the BALTI- MORE TURNPIKE from LITTLESTOWN to GETTYSBURG. The posi- tion is not yet organized, with the exception of front line ele- ments along the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. (b) Today, the hostile western line of communications was cut be- tween GETTYSBURG and CARLISLE. (c) Our army will make a general attack at 4:30 AM tomorrow with a view to driving the enemy north of the line HANOVER —New OxrorD—GETTYSBURG and seizing the W. M. Railroad. The army and corps cavalry will cover our right. flank. The ist Corps will attack the hostile front on the line LITTLES- TOWN—GERMANTOWN both inclusive, with the 1st, 2d and 3d 174 THE INFANTRY DIVISION Divisions in line from right to left, 4th Division in corps reserve. 2. The 1st Division will attack at 4:30 AM tomorrow. ae (a) Objective: Hostile position between Pumping Station just south- east of LITTLESTOWN and the ToLLGATE just northwest of that town. Beyond LitTLESTOWN, the attack will be pushed in the di- rection of NEw OXFORD. (b) Division ZONE OF ADVANCE: Eastern Limit: Gatt (incl.) —PINEY CREEK (incl.) —GEORGE- * TOWN (excl.)—road junction 575 just east of LITTLES- TOWN—WASHINGTON MEETING HousE—LITTLE CONEWA- GO CREEK—CENTENNIAL (incl.)—IRISHTOWN (excl.)— NEW OXFORD. Western Limit: Crossroads 535 one mile northwest of GALT— hill 662—ToLLGATE just northwest of LITTLESTOWN (incl.) —MARYSVILLE (incl.)—DIEHL’s MILL west of NEw Ox- FORD (incl.). Boundary between Brigades: Western exit of KINGSDALE— main crossroads in LITTLESTOWN—R. SELLS—G. Martz —A. RirLE—Mr. Rocks ScHooL HousE—Main crossroads in NEw OxForpD, all above points to the 1st Brigade, incl. Compass directions will be used in all units. 8. (a) InFantRY: The lst Brigade, keeping east of the TANEYTOWN —LITTLESTOWN PIKE, will deploy southeast of KINGSDALE. The 2d Brigade moving west of the same road will deploy southwest of KINGSDALE. Deployment will be completed before 3:00 AM and assault echelons will cross the GEORGETOWN—OakKGROVE S. H. road at 4:30 AM. Infantry brigades will furnish their own pro- tection on an east and west line through KINGSDALE during deployment. Infantry formation: Infantry brigades abreast—lst Bri- gade on the right. Brigade formation: Two infantry regiments abreast, each in column of battalions, organized in depth. (b) ARTILLERY: The divisional artillery will support the attack on the entire divisional front, one regiment (light) to be as- signed to the direct support of each infantry brigade. Preliminary bombardment of 30 minutes on LITTLESTOWN and the hostile front line works along and south of the BAL- TIMORE PIKE will precede the assault. A three-minute smoke barrage will be laid in front of the hostile position just prior to assault; when compelled to lift the fire by the infantry advance it will be shifted to probable and determined areas of resistance farther north. Two batteries (light) will be reported at 7:00 PM today to each infantry brigade com- mander to be used as infantry batteries and accompanying guns. All details of reconnaissance of routes and positions, and effecting the minimum of registration necessary will be at the discretion of the artillery commander. All artillery will be in position before midnight. (c) MACHINE GuNs: The divisional machine gun battalion will be placed in position before midnight to support the attack on LITTLESTOWN by overhead fire, by means of a standing bar- rage beginning at 4:30 AM. The battalion will later be as- sembled under cover near the OaKkcrove ScHooL House in divisional reserve. TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION 175 (d) RESERVE: One battalion from each of the infantry brigades and the Ist Engineers will remain near GALT in divisional re- serve. (e) TANKS: The attack will be supported by the ist Bn Light Tanks. Two companies will be attached to the 1st Bri- gade and 1 company to the 2d Brigade. Tank units, proceeding via the TANEYTOWN—LITTLESTOWN PIKE, will de- ploy before midnight south of KINGSDALE, and will cross the GEORGETOWN—OAKGROVE S. H. road at 4:30 AM. Infantry brigade commanders will specially arrange the close infantry support of tanks. (f) DivisIoNaL CavALRY: The divisional cavalry will cover the right flank of the division, drive back any hostile cavalry en- countered, and will attack the hostile left flank east of Lir- TLESTOWN. Its further advance north will be east of the LitTLE CONEWAGO CREEK. (g) DivislonaAL AIR SERVICE: One flight will be assigned to each artillery regiment for observation and fire direction. One plane from each flight will be assigned to division headquar- ters for observation and command duties. 4, Paragraph 4 omitted in accordance with the requirement of the 5. problem. (a) Plan of signal communications: No change. (b) Axis of signal communications: GALT—-LITTLESTOWN—PLEAS- ANT Hitz S. H.—G. Martz—Mr. Rocks S. H.—S. A. Sm1itH— NEW OXFORD. (c) Command posts: Division: GALT—Till further orders. Brigades: Will establish command posts in the vicinity of the following points, as they advance: 1. KINGSDALE. 2. Main crossroads in LITTLESTOWN. 3. G. MARTZ. 4, CENTENNIAL. Major General. Distribution: CofS ; CO ist Bn Light Tanks AC of S, G1, G2, G3 CG 1st Corps CO Div AS CG 2d Div Brig Comdrs CG Army Cav CO Tns CG Corps Cav CO F Sig Bn CG 1st Sq ist Cav \ U.S.GEOLOGICAL SURVEY G >B OTIS SMITH, DIRECTOR 27304 EG o-\aee = ANG) ee 22: | Sy pete ef eptioe Rates | | we = 5 ieee : Le Dy) A SZ CA . we = S 7 2 Se > Lia AT ] de . eC : C Yi) ) Z ama : 2 ~ x a \Fa—) 9 C(< = , ' i na 0 y N { O% Mp Ey > LINO y ; ne f o bo 5 ff . \ . ( = 6 a: ))) - Cz c ( | / i . ) | A a\' VM / Hi { ~ a . 4 ' ia 5 hee D ia ( Y.\. San : c™ * 4s f OBS Ove a q 7 oY = WA F BDAY” \ WN . \ . | \ / ee ke i : j —s ES Jax \ ) _ ' , 1 | : e gob ant SN : : t by 2 Afi~ yo \ \ 4 as ao . 2 ’ NS) | J ‘Kt \ \ | : A a at \* 3 $ Z Sik hei) Sa . { Z ee KV J ) (+ ae Wl CG /Antietant — TS CRO ko x) t » % Y b y [pe J, wah WS. 7 | 3 a) Hi l Y ZL Ss oN Ve a B ) VUZAL LL BO IOS

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Carvel Half and L.C Fletcher. 330 33 Control by Coast and Geodetic Survey and ©.B.Kendall Surveyed in 1907 SURVEYED 1% COOPERATION WITH THE STATE OF MARYLAND eugiccss ee ca GRAVED JAN [908 BY US 2 <= . 1 7S Se « Miles ee 5 Kilometers san = SS aa 1 a. v G2 rug nonrs__ \_ jaeneric NORTH Coutour interval 20 feet. PPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1907 Datum in mean sea level. ae fis a REPRODUCED AT THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS Edition of March eeddepn nted i915 I 685 US.GEOLOGICAL SURVEY GRORGE OTIS SMITH, DIRECTOR. TT" got (Newville) . 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Beko TX 2 UM AL “s 3 Mi RSS a4 e ed a> T: - Cf sr ae aw ea! Fimay, r aan Od : SY : as (oP I) RRS Vi i is OG 2 YY L, Ce G : ) wa a 4 js p=. s, k OED A a J mt J bt Ol fi SS és Ban a nl AA | PL KS Pah iv” ye > A SA // 7 NE | f\\ Ala AS\ SY SA *} ~ PAS) y ) a )- ‘ : > if Vv J as _« : ; Po | — od ee > f- / q i Zx¢ \f ~~ {482 os SRO 3 340 345 Scale estos 50 x 4 Miles eh ends Rane = S[S[SSSSS—— xispnasanibieoncads Sate — ; = on — a = — J z ° 1 allo SSS ey nese Ss = & Kilometers z\!2 ‘ \= 3 Contour interval 20 feet. 3) i ee CCC lm OO re tstststi‘(tC lll anil aie Datum is mean sea level. DECLINATION IBO>, Se a OES REPKHI AG 2g \| AEM Set | 20 ee . : f owes ee = eS : ¥ p EndEpenacnee, 0S Nx 7e No Loy Ne ®t. ms ow f \\ a / e a Ja 3S Fouts i GX tN - gNGREN OAC ANS SO a UNOS, SSC IROLWN ON BARRO yx ge XP Ng | | LA ry . CESS Se a Tp EP K<.% . 4 m 5 5 os, BY kb) ~s, {\ __(f & Z = PCAN Dil rT NG Oe es [Sos lame) sh //IIN a pepper New Ont — W SARG advo Coe Af WBE - ; ; a NA I , ° BY \ ‘i < Bs ofr By , At \\ WANS ey PRG A iy , Ze Z wR 1 : Hine? bhtigwh 1g A; d f f aS ~ ~ 5 _ oe SS J i =a cho 7 I a SS \ 6 D b pvp oy > 4 am Sk 3 > Uj J 0 A A) Ae M— CESS ; ,y ; BT C~ Ne Py i ay / A TS ( Ye 4G.) aN / i Ae (\P ) LAN LE C at ft Mee T LAE. APS PLA eT 6 PX Poh MMA (COR : | ae SEY eae f = \s ECR Re N Tipe AI Paes KSA A RV | Ysera aS. i) if (7 ac ey £ | oars a : / 3 Bor b aL Way Vb rn A LAY CPE DD Kt TNT PAG t TM Spon L/h Tey MME SEL 7 1/GY LCN RTE Ve of . FORD LE CRIMI ID Fs ) ‘i Z ENEMY ORGAMZATIONS HosviL€ BATTERIES. O-- Caliber not determined O —75mm. Field Gun 8—/55mm Howitzer Q— /55mm. Gun. © —/98mm. and over OB — Anti Aircraft. 9 —Trench Mortar ¥ — Machine Gun. a — Observation Post 6 -Amm. Dump %— Landing Field (==) -—A/r- Squadron xs 4 ; See Re 1, ARTILLERY ANNEX of ae STN ”? Fielq Orders No.{ ) /st BlueArmy. / VA [RSG ; OQ) oo Nov. IP SS We | aguga By W..S, ist Army, noon, 26 Nov. /9. La, Re Wiley BALLOONS..------------- oY Bdoave CommMaND PosTs.------* wo in ool eg ‘BOUNDARY between zones of Groups Aand B.- WHITE RUN- GRANITE WGERSTOWN- HEIDLERSBURG ak eee <=" = (h d See , Ve ae ts" : ae {fp érmantow nae, 6 ese of Orbisonig OQ psattillo Pi d A Q trasbure NI ‘ Christiana <3 ' . er \ 0 ~ QO 5 . it 1 Le Cae Columbia Ph SS an) UTI Fy “t, } Note i) t one. a PSS Se i> NSS . > i a | A S iS CS = 8 Uf WE fA i \ ) ( SS = rt E ) iA Frederick ca} U ; eff it t 1 i Uy i Ni t vt ) ? Nb NN Ni } Hi il | NY NT uM GENERAL MAP ~«:. ‘a Wi} | | of (ft, ae I~ mati | | l ul ebiron SL A Ie ik U.S.GEOLOGICAL SURVEY S25 = OTIS SMITH, DIRECTOR Ph es A el f/- | (AS PF Yi Ay 2 ld B59 | // iM) Lut 4 NIT F ( ; ‘ = Va a D)) } ts y f: ar a Wii eZ S Y ec y OE RENIN FA ae a ST PMNS MINN) SY Ze SSS Zit MF (ZA / . WEE iy jj agerstown undary Arr 1 Bo 1 M4 we ae AN \\) )) ph \ } / j j }) if j LY, : Salamander ‘Rock — Wes AS aae MARYLAND — PENNSYL 345 ze .ncrrss . VA 7 aT Ky \ 4 /) ) sm fl ; s 7 D i Q cn } e i LY s K LAE “4 ee SS LY TAA AT A i ~~, A if Ly OES . ; ; =~ ee aneytown "~~ : I : K PRS a iH yt A ba X 2: wy Ps Fr A rans y n 4 2 ) } AS ih if if | ee Sp _ fm 47 o \ “Aue. ( 2 { = ae a a Tex é — ts Se rR) E \ \ -™ - a * ; a = \ NAS \ 2 \ ( x te a ay » W G moveAcad z 55) Sela LP? ff fy 4m \ 1, 7 Y K , FP > te Re) g *% Da Vy pal 7 - YF = b , oie Z al % ——= gy Are eA 2 y ; oe Ke 7 , S N ( a“ (ales oP Wa b K a ,) ns cS P “(pa ’ rs cs. ‘ 2 RN, —~ NA a a PoSt \ * Ca e iN eon k | y Ai) ‘ S ’ ‘ey - " Ah > \ > Rt ss d \ A Fy t : A1DpUnog Ai ld JSVI TS Pee EIN EPA NORE - > EPSON SO bh —lAWY— eX VPS SGN SERS : WS * i mu WIS es Dif & i j , = Nii Ry FB Sor a A Ge NA BAN chet A ms Re iis SF ap U7 ee) HAIN a 2 Ey C Pi LRGs 7 =" ny 2 “4 \ oe KY \ at ro ‘ AY fee 1} at SU or iH 5 Cx Bae ls en Te Ay Z 0 37 Pes CS 365 ~~ YEE WRN Baines AR St mA ey f } i = 2 | ‘i Te Naa om , Boe Lic ttl oon Dae P oT } “wy YY aperstown ndary OU ' Salamander ‘Rock = WestsArmy B MOS amsville 335 T10 3 0 [| ih Fo ( hy es Mal o i Peat DRA lah ee ey | Seen Ko MeL eS S ——\ 1s foot LLG PIES EEG SS 35-30 Maupt Airy ) Edition of Feb. 191], reprinted Dec. i914. REPRODUCED AT THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS APPROXIMATE MEAN DCOLINATION 1908.