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Gorvell University Library
Ithaca, New York

White Historical Library
THE GIFT OF PRESIDENT WHITE

MAINTAINED BY THE UNIVERSITY IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE GIFT
Cornell 1886 Library

DA 47.65.J55 18

won
RUSSIA'S WARNINGS

COLLECTED FROM OFFICIAL PAPERS

BY

HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM, M.P.

=

Second Bvition

LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED

1885
   
        
  

    

 

VERS, i
ry |
‘ 8 mY
1 President White j
\ Paul f
NM eiven Sf

ji wah UN
oe Th
INTRODUCTION.

THE subjoined Memorandum has been drawn
up from such official papers on Central Asia
as have at different times been presented to
Parliament.

The accompanying letter from the Editor
of The fortnightly Review will show that if
the Memorandum has somewhat outgrown
the limits of an ordinary article, it is mainly
due to his encouragement that I venture to
offer it to the public in its present form. |

No words but the utterances of responsible
persons having been used, facts speak for
themselves, and require no comments in these
pages.

It may, however, be noticed on the part of

Russia that, excepting on the single point of
iv

the independence of Afghanistan, no Russian
promises to England were ever unqualified ;
that in the development of a long and well-
conceived policy of aggrandisement, Russian
statesmen always cleverly hinted at the
directions which their gradual advance would
next take ; that the causes of possible future
disputes with neighbouring tribes entailing
redress were never altogether kept back ; and
that the frontier over which we are now
quarrelling was studiously ignored from the
agreement come to before the capture of
Khiva in 1873.

On the other hand, it will be observed that,
bearing in mind our own progressive conquest
of India, Her Majesty’s Government, to which-
ever political party they belonged, ever treated
Russian advances as facts which it was too
late to notice, and continued to place honour-
able faith in promises which perhaps they

were too ready to look upon as absolute, or
Vv

maybe to which they were loath to ascribe the
conditional character they possessed.

Lastly, it must be acknowledged that, come
what may, the perusal of the official papers
presented to Parliament by the responsible
Executive, forces the conviction that the
limits of patience, of concession, nay, even of
diplomatic faith, have been reached, and that
the time has arrived when proper delimita-
tions of frontiers should be fixed, such as will
preclude all encroachments of territory in the
future, whether on one side or the other, for
such flimsy motives as have hitherto been

alleged, and condoned.

HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM.
DEAR MR. JERNINGHAM,

I am exceedingly glad that you have given
effect to the idea which some little time since you
suggested to me, and which, as you will remember,
I warmly approved, of bringing together in a com-
pendious shape all that is most essential to the
present Anglo-Russian dispute in Central Asia,
contained in the official despatches which you have
mastered with such thoroughness.

I am obliged to you for allowing me to see the
proofs, and I congratulate you on the success with
which you have accomplished a task of great
service and considerable difficulty. You would, in
my opinion, be wrong in withholding from the
public the results of your labours, and I am pleasec’

to hear that you have decided on printing them.

Yours sincerely,

T. H. S. Escort.
vil

THE MEMORANDUM IS DRAWN FROM
THE FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

Central Asia, No. 2, 1873 ...

Central Asia

” ”

” ”

Turkey,

”

entral Asia, No. 2, 1878 ...

» ”
entral Asia
1879

2ntral Asia, No. 1, 1880...
No. 10, 1881 ...

‘rkey,

ntral Asia
”

”

1873. sss
No. 2, 1874...
No. 1, 1878 ...

No. 39, 1878 ...
No. 44, 1878 ...

No. 1, 1879...

and Quetta,

, No. 4, 1881 «..
No. 1, 1882 ...

March 27, 1869 to Feb. 14, 1873
(inclusive of Russian Memo-
randum of 1864)

Oct. 17, 1872 to Jan. 19, 1873
Dec. 20, 1873 to Jan. 4, 1874
Dec. 20, 1873 to Sept. 30, 1878
Appendix 1, 1865
% 2,,1870-3

Protocols of Berlin Conference
Treaty of Berlin

Sept. 30, 1878 to Nov. 28, 1878
Dec. 4, 1871 to jan. 15, 1879

.. Return: Despatches of 1867

Dec. 31, 1878 to Dec. 16, 1879

Demarcation of Russo-Turkish
frontier

March 28, 1881 to Oct. 31, 1881
Sept. 28, 1881 to Jan. 23, 1882

No. 1, 1884... Dec. 30, 188: to Feb. 15, 1884
MEMORANDUM
ON THE PROGRESS OF RUSSIA
IN CENTRAL ASIA.

ReLyinc on the principles which he sets
forth, that “ Asiatics have no respect for any-
thing but palpable and visible force,” and
that ‘retreat in their eyes is always set down
to weakness,” Prince Gortchakow, in a cir-
cular despatch, explains that the neighbour-
hood of half-civilised tribes has obliged
Russia, at various times, first to chastise,
next to repress, then to protect, and finally
not to retreat.

This course obliged Russia to settle first
on the Syr Daria, then on the lake Issyk-
Kaul, and next in ‘ advanced forts” between
those points.

This line of frontier being, however, on
the limit of the desert, Russia, notwithstand-

B

Prince Gortcha-
kow to Kussiau
Representatives,
21 Nov. 1844.
Circular des-
patch, 21 Nov.
1864.

lbid.

2

ing her ‘‘repugnance” to its extension, was
compelled to take possession of Tchemkend,
in order to consolidate what she already
possessed.

“Being thus face to face with the better
civilised and trading populations of Khokand,
Russia has reached the limits. Here interest
and reason comimand her stopping any for-
ward movement; not only because such
movements would bring her in contact with
more regularly constituted States, which it
would: require greater efforts to subdue, and
might entail a series of annexations, but
because she hopes that, notwithstanding the
instability of their political condition, she may
establish regular relations with them which
shall be for the advantage of all.”

Notwithstanding that “ interest and reason
commanded a pause,” Samarkand was an-
nexed in 1868, and in 1869 Lord Clarendon
proposed to Baron Briinnow “the recognition
of some territory as neutral between the
possessions of England and Russia, which
3

should be the limit of those possessions, and
be scrupulously respected by both Powers,”
whereupon Prince Gortchakow “ gave a posi-
tive assurance that Afghanistan would be
considered as entirely beyond the sphere in
which Russia might be called to exercise her
influence”; and in conversation with Mr.
Rumbold said: “that Lord Clarendon, hav-
ing first suggested Afghanistan as the terri-
tory which should be considered neutral, he
had adopted the suggestion.”

Mr. Rumbold remarked that Lord Claren-
don ‘“‘ was not yet sufficiently informed as to
whether Afghanistan would fulfil all the con-
ditions required”: and on the advice of the
Indian Council, Lord Clarendon wrote “that
the Indian Government would not hear of
Afghanistan, and proposed the Upper Oxus,
south of Bokhara, as a boundary line, which
neither Power should permit their forces to
cross.” But Baron Briinnow observed that
“ Khiva was south of the Oxus, and that the
Khivan territory might become obnoxious to

B2

Lord Clarendon
to Sir A. Buch-
anan, 27 March
1869.

Prince Gortcha-
kow to Baron
Briinnow, 7
March 1869.

Mr. Rumbold
Lord Clarendon,
6 April 1869.

Lbid.

Lord Clarendon
to Mr. Rumbold,
17 April.
Mr. Rumbold to
Lord Clarendon,
2 June 1869,

Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Claren-
don, 26 July
1869.

4

Russia if made neutral”; a remark which
was given force to by Prince Gortchakow,
who merely maintained that “ Khivan territory
south of the Oxus was Bokharian.”

By way of confirming this view, the Em-
peror informed Sir A. Buchanan that ‘he
had no ambitious views, and trusted no com-
plications would arise, though an irruption of
Khivans into the Government of Orenburg
had recently taken place, and such incidents
could not be permitted.”

In September, however, Prince Gortchakow
being at Baden, and Lord Clarendon at
Wiesbaden, an.interview between the two
Ministers was arranged at Heidelberg, when
the Prince assured Lord Clarendon “ that he
entirely shared his Emperor's opinion that
extension of territory was extension of weak-
ness’: that ‘he could give no better proof
of His Majesty’s determination not to pro-
ceed southwards,” than to state that ‘it was
the Emperor's intention not to retain Samar-
kand,” though “it was true that Bokhara
5

might be taken at any moment, as it depended
on Samarkand for its supply of water,” and
‘expressing a hope that Lord Clarendon
would not press the line of the Oxus, as a
portion of the country south of the Oxus
was claimed by the Emir of Bokhara.”

In November, however, the principle of
the despatch of 1864 had reasserted itself,
and Sir Andrew wrote that while the “ Kras-
novodsk establishment was to be a mere
_factory, protected by a small force against
the Khan of Khiva,” it appeared that, “ with
respect to Samarkand, there was some diffi-
culty in ascertaining how it could be restored
to Bokhara without loss of dignity,” and
though a month later Prince Gortchakow
‘denied positively the existence of any in-
tention on the part of the Russian Govern-
ment to despatch a military expedition to
Khiva,” adding that he would never ‘‘con-
sent to an extension of the territory of the
Empire,” the Prince, on being reminded of
his pacific utterance, explained that “his

Lord Clarendon
to Sir A! Buch-
anan, Sept. 3,
1869.

Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Claren- '
don, Nov. 1.

Lbid., Nov. 2.

Lbid., Dec. 1,
Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Claren-
don, Dec. 29.

Lbid.

Ibid., Feb. 8,
1870.

Lord Clarendon
to Sir A. Buch-
anan, Feb. 16.

6

statement could only mean that he himself
would disapprove of it, as he could not pre-
vent it were the Emperor to decide in its
favour.” ;

He consoled the Ambassador, however, by
assuring him that “though he might with-
hold information from him, he might rely on
what he did tell him being true,” and request-
ing him at the same time “not to ask him in-
formation officially.”

Prince Gortchakow shortly afterwards
assured Sir Andrew that the policy of Russia
was the same as that of India, viz., to create,
on the frontiers of the Empire, ‘‘a series of
influential but not tributary or neutralised
States, to secure to them national indepen-
dence, and to put an end to that state of con-
flict and internal disturbance which had for
ages prevailed in those regions.”

This policy was warmly commended by the
English Government, but on the British
Ambassador truly observing that ‘“‘a commu-
nication to Her Majesty’s Government as to
7

the steps taken by the Russian Government
to restrain the Khan of Bokhara from acts of
aggression against Shere Ali would greatly
strengthen the Viceroy of India in the in-
fluence he exercised over Shere Ali,” the
Prince considered that his sincerity was being
““questioned,” which, indeed, it might well
be, for at that moment, on the pretext of the
Emir of Bokhara not interfering with Shere
Ali's States, Kolab, which belonged to him, was
annexed by Russia. Krasnovodsk was also
occupied, ‘but this,” said the Emperor of
Russia, ‘was hardly a conquest, as the terri-
tory had been almost without a sovereign”;
Prince Gortchakow remarking, however, a
month later, that the Khan of Khiva, “ dis-
satisfied with the occupation of Krasnovodsk
by Russia, would probably show his dissatis-
faction by some covert act of hostility, in
which case he would be punished”; but
‘that the most positive assurances had been
given to Persia that the frontier of the Attrek
would be respected.” General Miliutine, the

Sir A. Buchanan,
Feb, 21, 1870.

Ibid.

LIbid., April 8,
1870.

Ibid, Feb. z
1870.
Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Claren-
on, March 8.

Lbid., March 22.

8

War Minister, “apprehended that the Khan
of Khiva, untaught by the lesson of the Kir-
ghize insurrection, was exposing himself to
the danger of a Russian war,’ and was in-
formed that ‘General Kauffmann was far from
being satisfied with his relations with the
Khan of Bokhara,” while at the same time he
“regretted that a rumour was abroad to the
effect that Shere Ali was about to con-
struct a fort on the Oxus in the district of
Andkhoi.”

On Sir Andrew remarking that Andkhoi
had been “an Afghan province ever since
1850,” the General, without disputing the
possibility of the fact being such, thought
“the fort might be a cause of jealousy with
Bokhara.”

While these hints of aggression from every
point of the compass were being conveyed to
Sir Andrew, the Russian Government was
directly informed that Afghanistan recognised
its frontier to extend no further in Badakshan

than Maimena, with the exceptions of
9

Kerkee and Chargui, which are not dependent
on Cabul,” and in return the Russian Govern-
ment informed Sir Andrew that ‘ Abdul
Rahman, who has arrived at Samarkand, and
will not fail to proceed to Tashkend,” had
offered to use his influence in Afghanistan in
favour of Russia, but that General Kauffmann
had rejected these offers, though he had
received him at Tashkend with honour and
cordiality from feelings of hospitality toward
the unfortunate, but not as supporting him
as a rival to the Ameer Shere Ali.”

In May, Lord Mayo sent the limits of
Afghanistan as the Indian Government under-
stood them. They are those of Dost Maho-
med’s kingdom.

‘“Oxus, the recognised boundary between
Bokhara and Afghanistan, from Balkh to
the extreme end of Badakshan, including
Khulm, Maimena, Andkhoi, Shibargan, and
Siripool.

“North-west boundary runs from a point on
the Oxus between Khoja Saleh and Kerki,

Sir A. Buchanan
to Prince Gort-
chakow, 17
March 1870.

Lbid., 25 April.

Lbid., 13 June,
Inclosure in
Lord Granville
to Sir A. Buch-
anan, May 20,
1870,
S _A. Buchanan
o Lord Gran-
ville, Aug. 18.

Ibid.

IO

including Maimena and Herat, with the de-
pendence between the Mhurgab and Herirood.

“North, the Oxus from same point to Punjab
and Dakhan, and thence to the Pamir Steppe.”

While pressing these limits on behalf of
Her Majesty’s Government, Sir Andrew
was instructed to say that “if Khoja Saleh
were admitted to be within the territories of
the Ameer of Cabul, Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment would not object to a definition of the
frontier by which the rights of Bokhara
should be determined to commence at a
point on the left bank of the Oxus, imme-
diately below that place.” A month later Sir
Andrew was informed “that the opinions of the
Government of India’ had beensent to General
Kauffmann, ‘“‘ whose acceptation of them as
correct would be equivalent to an engage-
ment that their definition of the frontier would
be respected,” and ‘that with reference to
Khoja Saleh, no objection would, perhaps, be
made to include it within the Afghan frontier,
but that great care would be required in
II

tracing a line from thence south, as Merv
was becoming commercially important.”

N.B.—Merv is north of any line drawn
south of Khoja Saleh.

In June 1871, Lord Granville asked for
a reply to his despatch about the Afghan
frontier of May 1870, and in November
1871, Prince Gortchakow instructed Count
Briinnow to “protest against the rights of
Shere Ali being those of Dost Mohamed
in the delimitation of the Afghan territory.”

In October 1872, General Kauffmann’s
report not having been received, Lord Gran-
ville informed Lord A. Loftus ‘that Her
Majesty's Government could not wait any
longer,” and laid down the principle “that in
their opinion the right of the Ameer of Cabul
to the possession of the territories up to the
Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh, is fully
established, and they believe, and have so
stated to him through the Indian Govern-
ment, that he would have a right to defend

these territories if invaded.”

Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Gran-
ville, Sept. 21,
1870,

Prince Gortcha-
kow to Count
Briinnow, 1-13
Nov. 1878, com-
municated to
Lord Granville
Dec. 13.
I2

Lord Granville informed Lord A. Loftus,
besides, what territories and boundaries Her
Majesty's Government considered as fully
belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, viz. -—

1. Badakshan and Dakhan, from Sarikal to
junction of the Kokcha and Oxus
(Penjah), northern boundary.

2. Afghan Turkestan, Kunduz, Khulm,
Balkh, from Penjah, to Khoja Saleh.

3. Internal district of Aksha, Siripool,
Maimena, Shibbergan, and Andkhoi.

4. Western Afghan, between dependencies
of Herat and those of the Persian
province of Khorassan, “this frontier
being well known, and not in need of

Lord Granville

Lord A. i Me
en being defined.

ae To this despatch, in December, Prince

Gortchakow replied, through Count Briinnow,
that from General Kauffmann’s report, re-
ceived in October, “it would seem that No. 2,
the frontier from Penjah to Khoja Saleh is not
to be objected to; that as to No. 1, Badak-
shan and Dakhan are independent States, and
re

not provinces of Afghanistan; and that No. 3,
though doubtful, would not be opposed,” while
not a word was said about No. 4.*

Count Schouvaloff, in 1873, confirmed the
Emperor's decision not to let boundary points
be a bar to the good relations between
England and Russia, and at the same time
informed Lord Granville that an expedition
against Khiva would set out in 1874, “but it
was far from the intention of the Emperor to
take possession of it.” It was very desirable,
therefore, to come to an early decision on the
boundary question; and Lord Granville having
insisted on Badakshan and Dakhan being
Afghan provinces, Prince Gortchakow in-
formed Count Briinnow that ‘vu le plus de
facilité qu’a le Gouvernement Britannique de
recueillir des données précises, et surtout vu le
désir de ne point donner a cette question de
détail plus d’importance qu’elle ne comporte,
nous ne refusons pas d’admettre la ligne de

démarcation anglaise.”

* The frontier now in dispute.

Prince Gortcha-
kow to Count
Briinnow, 7 Dec
1872.

Lord Granville
to Lord A.
Loftus, 8 Jan.
1873.

Lbid., Jan. 24,
1873. 7
Mr. Doria to
Lord Granville,
Dec. 20, 1873.

14

This concession to English views, which
had never been, nor could ever have been,
seriously opposed, was followed by the taking
of Khiva, and the publication of the treaty of
peace with the Khan, Article II] of which
declared “‘ the whole of the right bank of the
Amu Daria and the lands adjoining thereunto,
which have hitherto been considered as be-
longing to Khiva, shall pass over from the
Khan into the possession of Russia.”

No wonder that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment ‘saw no practical advantage in examin-
ing too minutely how far these Treaty arrange-
ments were in strict accordance with the
assurances given to Lord Granville in January
1873 by Count Schouvaloff as to the inten-
tions with which the expedition against Khiva
was undertaken,’ and that in view of the Ameer
of Cabul’s ‘apprehensions that the result of a
Russian expedition against Merv will be to
drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the
province of Badghees in Herat,” they ‘thought
it right to state candidly, and at once, that the
i

independence of Afghanistan is regarded by
them as matter of great importance to the
welfare and security of British India, and to
the tranquillity of Asia.”

Prince Gortchakow merely replied by “re-
iterating to Lord A. Loftus the positive as-
surance that the Imperial Cabinet persisted in
considering Afghanistan as entirely without
its sphere of action,” and gave another promise
that the Imperial Government “had no inten-
tion of organising an expedition against the
Turkomans,” though, “if these turbulent
tribes were to indulge in acts of aggression or
of brigandage, it would be the duty of Russia
to punish them.”

The Emperor of Russia held exactly the
same language to Lord A. Loftus, and Prince
Gortchakow further added to the Ambassa-
dor that, “happen what might, the Imperial
Government would never interfere in the
internal state of Afghanistan,” while at the
same time he announced that “a scientific
mission was intended to explore and survey

Lord Granville
to Lord A.
Loftus, Jan. 7,
1874.

Prince Gortcha-
kow to Count
Briionow, Jan.
ar, 1874.

Lord A. Loftus
to Lord Gran-
ville, Jan. 19,
1874.

Ibid., Jan. 28,
1874.
Prince Gortcha-

kow to Count
Briinnow, 24
March 1874.

Lord Loftus to
Lord Derby, 24
June 1874.

Inclosure in
above.

16

the course of the Lower Oxus,” and “it had
been suggested to him that it should extend
its researches to the Upper Oxus as far as
Sirikul, the boundary of Afghanistan.” That
Imperial orders could be enforced is shown
in a letter of Prince Gortchakow, who, in order
to ensure “no cloud on the political horizon
during the Emperor’s visit to England,” in-
formed Count Briinnow that ‘orders of the
Emperor that no expeditions should be under-
taken against the Teké Turkomans, which
means in the direction of Merv, have been
given in such peremptory terms that no local
ambition will dare to take the liberty of
transgressing them.”

But a Russian soldier who was missing was
willingly supposed to be imprisoned at Merv,
and to rescue him the chiefs of the tribes
between the Attrek and the Goorgan were
invited to “meet” General Llamakin at ““Ashu-
rade on the Caspian,” and swear friendship to
Russia, guaranteeing their oath “bythe promise
of an attack on the Merv Turkomans,” while
17

the General himself addressed a circular “to
the whole of the Turkoman chiefs occupying
the line of country lying between the Caspian
Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjui,” advis-
ing them “that the orders of the sovereign of
the world should be carried out,” and that
they should again meet him at Krasnovodsk,
as he had been appointed “to the supreme
authority on the Attrek and the Goorgan”
by the Emperor of Russia ; which meant that
‘“‘this unquestionable Persian territory” had
been annexed to Russia. M. de Westmann,
acting for Prince Gortchakow, explained that
“the whole circumstance had been misrepre-
sented”; that another country’s possessions had
been annexed, “through incorrect translations
from the original Tartar text of the Circular,”
and that the matter had been arranged between
Persia and Russia, but ‘‘he could not com-
prehend in what way the incident referred to
could affect Great Britain.”

In March 1875, Lord Derby, “who of late
had been reluctant to seem to indicate distrust,

Cc

Mr. T. Thomson
to Lord Derby,
May 28.

Inclosed
above.

Lord A. Loftus
to Lord Derby,
Nov. 17, 1874.
Lord Derby to
Lord A. Loftus,
March 19, 1875.

Prince Gortcha-

kow to Count
Schouvaloff,

April 5, May 11.

18

by unnecessarily requesting explanations as
to the Russian Government’s proceedings in
Central Asia,” expressed to Count Schou-
valoff his opinion that “the only case in which
he conceived an advance of British troops
westward as probable, was in the event of any
Russian movement tending to the occupation
of Merv,” reminding him of “the great
importance which the Indian Government
attached to Merv.” This elicited another
Imperial assurance that the Emperor ‘has no
intention of extending the frontiers of Russia
such as they exist at present in Central Asia,
either on the side of Bokhara or on that of
Krasnovodsk and of the Attrek,’ and an
elaborate Russian memorandum as to past
events, showing that having undertaken some
years back “to establish order and tranquil-
lity in the Kirgheez steppes,” Russia could
‘only stop her frontiers at that place where
fixed populations began and presented ele-
ments of a stable social organisation.”

For that purpose the line of frontier from
19

Tchemkend to Issik Kul had first been
resolved upon, but the difficulty of dealing
with “‘semi-savage populations” obliged Russia
to proceed to Tashkend, where she was “in
presence of the army of the Emir of Bokhara”:
this could not be allowed, and “ Samarkand
was compelled to surrender.” Difficulties
having then arisen as to the views of Russia
and England with regard to the provinces of
Vakhan and Badakshan being Afghan, Russia
gave way, and “sur ces entrefaites l’expédition
de Khiva fut decidée”: then, in order to
“preserve the autonomy of Khiva,” Russia
was obliged “to annex to her possessions the
arid desert which stretches from that place
to the-newly constructed fort on the right

bank of the Oxus”; and finally, that it having

been recognised by both countries “that in
the present state of things the Russian and
English frontiers in Central Asia could not
be considered definite, an international ar-
rangement with regard to this point would
be fruitless,” while particular stress was laid

C2

Memo. inclosed
in above
despatch.
Lord G. Hamil-
ton to Lord
‘Tenterden, June
22, 1871.

20

on the agreement with Mr. Forsyth, that, 1, it
was desirable to have an intermediary neutral
zone between the two frontiers of England
and Russia in Central Asia, and, 2, that
Afghanistan should be that zone.

_ Lord Salisbury remarked upon this memo-
randum that the neutral zone of Afghanistan
proposed by Lord Clarendon, and jumped at
by Prince Gortchakow, dropped when India
refused to admit it, and was never revived by
Mr. Forsyth, and that the line of the boundary
proposed by Lord Granville in 1872 “can
never be looked upon by the English Cabinet
otherwise than as a recognition of a fact which
had never really admitted of question,” and
suggested that Lord Derby should “intimate
the inability of Her Majesty’s Government to
accept the version now put forward of the
negotiations of late years.”

To Mr. Doria, Baron Jomini was more
explicit. ‘If Russia,” he said, “lived at peace
with her frontier reaching to Austria and
Germany, why should the fact of her territory
2I

touching the borders of the British Empire in
India be a reason for warfare?” and “as to
the neutral zone which had been talked of,
it is an impossibility in a territory of barba-
rians”; but, added Mr. Doria, “the main
points in His Excellency’s conversation went
to show the fixed idea existing in his mind
that the British and Russian Empires must
eventually become coterminous.”

A month later the language was still more
categorical. Speaking ‘“ without reluctance or
hesitation, Baron Jomini stated that there was
no cause for, or advantage to be gained by,
an expedition to Merv. If there was, then,
although they would be very sorry to be dis-
agreeable to England, ‘everyone for himself,
and God for all’; but if they took Merv, they
would find themselves, on account of the
marauding tribes, necessitated to make a
further advance in order to curb and restrain
them, and where was it to end ?”

While Lord Derby, at the suggestion of
Lord Salisbury, was informing the Russian

Mr. Doria to
Lord Derby,
June 23.

(bid, July 13.

Tbid., Aug. 3.
Mr. Doria to
Lord Derby,
Sept. 18.

Lbid., Sept. 27.

- In Lord
Derby’s to Mr.
Doria, Oct. 25.

Prince Gortcha-
kow, Count
Schouvaloff, 3, 1
Feb. 1876.

22

Government that ‘steps had been taken to
obtain the release of the solitary captive
Russian soldier at Merv,” General Kauff-
mann was invading Khokand for no other
apparent reason than that “ Dieu sera toujours
contre ceux qui prennent les armes contre les
Russes”; but when the British offer was made
to Russia, the one prisoner turned out to be
‘“several,” and Baron Jomini talked of
“Russia having ceded her pretensions to
Maimena in behalf of the Ameer of Af-
ghanistan at England’s instance.” Lord
Derby’s memorandum followed, and in this
the grounds of English apprehensions were
given, but not a word of warning ap-
peared.

No wonder that Baron Jomini expressed
delight ‘that all points which might give
rise to sterile discussion had been omitted in
the memorandum of Lord Derby,” and that
the Emperor called this “les largeurs de vue
de Lord Derby,” while Prince Gortchakow
obtained his object, and was able to declare

’
=o

that “while maintaining on either side the
arrangement come to as regards the limits of
Afghanistan which is to remain outside the
sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets
should regard as terminated the discussions
relating to the intermediate zone”; so as
to clear the way for Russian advance up to
the Afghan frontier.

In March the Khanate of Khokand was
annexed, under the title of the Province of
Ferghanah, and Mr. Disraeli declared in the
House of Commons that he did “not see
why Russia should not conquer Tartary as
England had India”; an expression which
was hailed with “enthusiasm in the Russian
press.” Meanwhile, General Kauffmann so
constantly communicated with the Ameer of
Cabul through Russian agents, that Lord
Lytton expressed ‘“‘a decided opinion on the
necessity of remonstrating with Russia on the
subject”; but though the General's agents
and communications were known and given,
Prince Gortchakow instructed Count Schou-

Prince Gortcha-
kow to General
Schouvaloff, 3, 15,
Feb. 1876.

Lord A. Loftus
to Lord Derby,
March 27, 1876.

Inclosure in Lord
A. Loftus’s to
Lord Derby,
May 12, 1876.

Viceroy to Lord
Salisbury, Sept.
16, 1876.
Colonel Sir F.
Pollock to Mr,
Thornton, June
19, 1876.
Lord Derby to
Lord A. Loftus,
Oct. 12, 1875.

Lord Lytton to
Lord Salisbury,
Sept. 18, 1876.

Lord A. Loftus
to Lord Derby,
Nov. 17, 1876.

Ibid., June 4,
1877.

Lord Derby to
Lord A. Loftus,
June 13, 1877.

24

valoff ‘to deny categorically that Kauffmann
was acting at Cabul either through agent or
otherwise,” not having probably quite forgotten
that on the 2nd November 1869, “he had
agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian agents
should not visit Cabul.”

Notwithstanding categorical denials, how-
ever, M. de Giers acknowledged in November
that “the agent was simply charged to deliver
a letter of courtesy from General Kauffmann
to the Ameer, which was the usual custom of
the Governor-General of a neighbouring
State’”—a fact questioned by Lord A. Loftus,
who said ‘‘that the Khanate of Bokhara was
still to be regarded as an independent State.”

But to hurry matters, the Turcomans were
appealed to, to help the Russians against the
Teké tribes; Kizil Arvat was taken, and Gene-
ral Llamakin having pushed on in the direction
of Merv, Lord Derby informed the Russian
Government that “such an undertaking would
impose upon Her Majesty’s Government the
necessity of making a corresponding advance.”
25

M. de Giers assured Lord Derby, through
Count Schouvaloff, that he need have no fears,
as “the military expedition against Kizil
Arvat is only such as the troops of the
Caucasus undertake every year for the main-
tenance of tranquillity on the frontier.”

In 1878 the official press of St. Petersburg
set forth that as ‘“ Persia and Russia were
equally interested in subduing the Turcomans,
this could only: be effected by a Russian
occupation of Merv”; and ‘to produce a
counterpoise against the growing influence of
England in Beloochistan, it was necessary that
Russia should occupy Herat,” and that ‘“ both
measures could be more successfully carried
out by marching on these two points through
Persia.”

Rumours of war with Russia on account
of Turkey died away, and a conciliatory
despatch of Lord Salisbury only brought
about an explanation, “that in view of a
possible war, General Kauffmann had acted
in accordance with the course imposed upon

Inclosure in Lord
A. Loftus’s to
Lord Derby,
Oct. 23, 1877.

Inclosure in Lord
A. Loftus’s to
Lord Salisbury,
June 5, 1878.

Lord Salisbury
to Mr. Plunkett,
Aug. 19.
Lord Salisbury
to'Mr. Plunkett,
Sept. 30.

Lord Salisbury
to Lord A.
Loftus, Dec. 13,
157 8.

26

him by the force of circumstances ; but that
the former assurances of the Russian Gov-
ernment in regard to Afghanistan had now
recovered their validity.”

In November, however, the Russian ‘“mis-
sion of courtesy” to the Ameer of Cabul
took place, and when the Russian Envoy
left Cabul, the Russian Mission remained
there.

Lord Salisbury’s remark to Count Schou-
valoff on the subject was answered by the
admission that ‘‘the course followed by the
Russian Government was abnormal.”

Count Schouvaloff then insisted that “ Eng-
land had engaged to respect the independence
of Afghanistan,’—a peculiar mode of putting
the question, which, however, Lord Salisbury
refused to admit; but he subsequently in-
formed the Russian Ambassador that “ when
the Russian Mission is withdrawn from Cabul,
Her Majesty’s Government will consider that
all engagements on both sides with respect
to Afghanistan and Central Asia will retain
27

their obligatory characters”; which was looked
upon as an acknowledgment of all the con-
quests of Russia till that date.

In June 1878, Lord Salisbury informed
Lord Odo Russell that he had been appointed
with himself and Lord Beaconsfield a Pleni-
potentiary at the coming Congress of Berlin,
where ‘“‘the proposed annexations in Asia
which have an injurious bearing upon the
interests of Great Britain are not likely to
excite any serious opposition on the part of
the other European Powers,” and where
“there is no ground for believing that Russia
will willingly give way in respect to Batoum,
Kars, or Ardahan,” but where he was not
“on that account to abstain from earnestly
pressing upon the Powers and upon Russia
the justice of abstaining from annexations
unconnected with the professed object of the
war.”*

Batoum, which Count Schouvaloff declared
in the Congress was “necessary to Russia
for the purpose of securing her communica-

* Late war with Turkey.

Lord Salisbury
to Lord A,
Loftus, Dec.
1878,

Lord Salisbury
to Lord Odo
Russell, June 8,
1878. Turkey
(No. 39), 1878
28

tions with the large territory which Russia
already possesses on that portion of the coast
PioolefCon- of the Black Sea,” was declared by Article

ference, p. 210.
Turkey (No. 39),

278. wo, LEW of the Treaty of Berlin “a free and

ae essentially commercial port,” and Article
LVIII ‘ceded to the Russian Empire in
Asia the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and
Batoum.”

Article LX obliged the Porte to “cede to
Persia the town and territory of Khotour, as
fixed by the mixed Anglo-Russian Commis-

Treaty of Settle. sion,” although from the Protocols of the

eet wen

julyxs70.° Berlin Conference some doubt as to the
Turkey (No. 44), : .
ae necessity of this step on the part of Powers
not interested in Persia’s friendship was ex-
pressed by Prince Bismarck, who wished to
know from Malcolm Khan whether, “if this
cession were decided on, it would be accepted

Protocols pp by the Shah”; and the political significance

No. 39), 878. : i i
(oss Of the cession as strengthening the ties

between Russia and Persia was evinced in
the declaration of Count Schouvaloff, that
“Russia gives up Bayajid and all the valley
29

of Alachkerd under the reservation that Tur-
key will return the territory of Khotour to
Persia.”

Meanwhile, the proceedings of Russian
agents at Cabul, and the unsatisfactory
relations between the Government of India
and the Emir of Afghanistan, were seriously
occupying the thoughts of Her Majesty’s
Government; and the invasion of Afghanistan
having been decided upon, the opinions of
competent officers opposed to such move-
ments were published, in obedience to an
address of the House of Commons on the
2oth February 1879.

A report of Colonel, now Sir Peter, Lums-
den with regard to the means of defending
Afghanistan was published, in which he de-
clared ‘‘ that the only safe policy to be pursued
is to maintain the neutrality of Afghanistan,
to secure the natural strategic points of our
line of defence, to strengthen her, to obtain
for her oppressed subjects the benefits of a
stronger administration,’ and then, “ with

Preteens
p. 209. Turkey
(No. 39), 1878,

Central Asia and
Quetta. Retunn,
25 Feb. 1879.
P. S. Lumsden,
Simla, 15 Sept.
1867.

H. D. Norman,
Simla, 5 Oct.
1867.

30

Afghanistan independent, and her capital,
Cabul, secured and connected with our in-
ternal lines of communication, our right would
be safe, while an aggressive Power could only
attack our left,” but here “the extreme nature
of the climate of Scinde would prevent such an
attack being made in the cold season.”
“With our communications perfected, and
our base on the sea, there is no reason why
we should not be able to concentrate from
70,000 to 150,000 men on the line of the
Indus, prepared to prevent the deployment
of any columns from the passes in front.”
Colonel Norman thought no course so
likely to “lose us our Indian Empire as our
pushing forward our army into Central Asia.”
Sir W. Mansfield held that England,
“being encamped in India as in a foreign
country, the commonest prudence forbade to
treat the foreign country as if it were England,
for the purpose of invading another, and
sustaining a great conflict with a third Power
of great strength and prestige, at a long dis-
31

tance from its border,” and -concluded “that
all the circumstances of India prescribed that
that conflict, if come it must in future times,
can alone be prosecuted to a successful con-
clusion by us on our side of the mountain
barriers of India.”

‘““Common sense,” wrote Mr. Taylor, “ must
convince anyone that the military difficulties
of a Russian advance on India are almost
insuperable,” and “can only bring serious and
irretrievable disaster upon Russia herself.”

And finally, all the members of the Bombay
Government informed Lord Cranbourne
“that they were unanimously opposed to the
project of occupying Quetta, suggested by
Colonel Sir H. Greene,” while Sir Stafford
Northcote agreed ‘‘the measure would be
inexpedient, both on political and on military
grounds.”

But, in the course of 1879, events set all
these utterances at nought, and the current of
Russian opinions is gathered from the number-

less newspaper extracts, forwarded officially

Sir W. Mansfield,
Simla, 14 Oct.
1867.

Hon. G. N, Tay-
lor, Simla, 19
Oct. 1867.

Sir John Law-
rence and others,
23 Jan. 1867.

Sir S. Northcote.

No. 1s, Secret, 26
Dec. 1867.
In Lord A.
Loftus’s despatch
to Lord Salis-
bury, Jan. 29,
1879-

In Lord Duf-
ferin’s despatch
to Lord Salis-
bury, March 12,
1879.

32

from St. Petersburg, and published by order
of Her Majesty’s Government, to the detri-
ment, it must be allowed, of more reliable
information, which was not vouchsafed.
Thus, in January, the Movoe Vremyia
“looks upon the Russian occupation of Merv
as necessary,” for ‘“‘while the Ferghanah region
is valuable, owing to its natural wealth and

”

dense population,” ‘Merv will serve as an
advanced post, from whence we may easily
effect demonstrations against Western Afghan-
istan and menace India”; but in February
the same paper, commenting on the death of
Shere Ali, thinks “that the English will
probably demand no more than the surrender
of the passes and the right of maintaining a
permanent Resident at Cabul. In all pro-
bability we will, in time, be able to strengthen
our influence in that part, but there can be no
idea of any expedition to India. It is only
in presence of an alliance with Afghanistan
that Russia can reckon on a successful issue
of such an expedition.”
a0

In March the Moscow Gazette acknow-
ledged “ that now that Russia’s accounts with
Turkey are settled, it is time to confess that
the Central Asian Question and the East-
ern difficulties, though accidentally connected,
possess for Russia important significations.”

But English successes in Afghanistan were
producing their effect upon the Teké Turko-
mans, whose daring led them to attack not
only Chat, but even Chikishlar ; and Consul
Churchill, at Rescht, was able on the 11th of
March to telegraph that “it was quite true
that 10,000 men under General Llamakin,
and 20,000 men under General Lazareff, were
preparing to march from Chikishlar and
Krasnovodsk respectively, on Merv.”

Lord Dufferin confirmed this report on
the 30th of April, and the first of the engage-
ments with the Tek¢é Turkomans was reported
by Mr. Plunkett in May.

In June came the news that a steamer had
successfully performed the journey ‘from
Petro Alexandrovsk to Khardjui, 279 miles,

D

In Lord Duf-
ferin’s despatch,
March 12, 1879.

Consul Churchill
to Mr. Thomson,
March 11, 1879.

Lord Dufferin to
Lord Salisbury,
April 30, 1879.

Mr. Plunkett to
Lord Salisbury
May 17, 1879.
34

or 446 versts, in 74 days; and from Khardjui
to Khoja Saleh, which was unknown to its
sailors, a distance of 173 miles, or 260 versts,
in eight days, stopping at Budarlik, Narajins,
and Karki’; and M. Bykoff, the surveyor of
the upper course of the Oxus, stated in his
report that ‘he had no ground for supposing
that the steam vessel could not have pro-
ceeded at least over the whole of that part of
the river which he had surveyed,” viz., “to
the river Vaksha, a distance of 1,000 miles, or
1,500 versts,” and “that this great Central
Asian river is fully adapted to the purposes of

In Mr. Plun- i i mm
kett’s of Tune 4 nav igation.

tis Meanwhile, the peace of Gundamak between

England and Afghanistan having been conclu-
ded, the Russians at once acknowledged that °
“English supremacy was definitely established
in Afghanistan,” and that “the line of the
Oxus had become the limit of their supremacy
in the southern part of Central Asia,” while
St. Petersburg “* the so-called neutral zone between Russian

ay 24

Gazette, anc 6,

1879. and British possessions had become abolished.”
35

They had therefore to look elsewhere, and
the line of the Attrek on the Persian frontier
seemed to meet their views. The Godos very
pointedly remarked that “the Persian Govern-
ment, projecting a line of railway from Teheran
to Rescht, rendered it very probable on the
part of Russia that she would on the other
hand construct a line of railway towards
Persia, and thus the most direct and simple
way towards Afghanistan and India would be
found.”

Lord Salisbury was informed in July by
Count Schouvaloff that “ Merv did not lie
upon the nearest road between the Caspian
and Herat,” which statement entirely de-
pended on the starting point from the Caspian,
Chikishlar, or Krasnovodsk ; but while M. de
Giers assured Lord Dufferin “in the most
positive manner that there was no intention
on the part of the Russian Government to go
to Merv,” Baron Jomini warned His Excel-
lency “that though they did not intend to go
to Merv, he was not to deceive himself, for

D2

Golos. Extract
in Mr. Plunkett’s
June 18.

Lord Salisbury
to Lord Duf-
ferin, July o.
Lord Dufferin
to Lord Salis-
bury, July 16,
1879.

Tbid., July 30.

Lbid,, Aug. 13.

36

the result of their present proceedings would
be to furnish Russia with a base of operations
against England hereafter, should England,
by the occupation of Herat, threaten the
Russian position in Central Asia.”

A few days later M. de Giers conveyed to
Lord Dufferin the express ‘approval by His
Majesty. of the assurances he had given as to
the non-advance of Russian troops on Merv,”
and said that Baron Jomini had been mis-
taken in supposing that ‘“ the contemplated
operations would extend so far eastward” as
200 versts from Merv; while a fortnight later,
the Emperor himself ‘was pleased to assure
Lord Dufferin that there was no intention of
the Russian troops advancing to Merv”; but
on these assurances being conveyed by Mr.
Stanhope to the House of Commons, M. de
Giers explained to Lord Dufferin that “he
had not meant to imply that under different
circumstances, and in view of unforeseen con-
tingercies, the occupation of Merv might not
become necessary ; that, in fact, the Russian
ae

Government had never intended, by a solemn
pledge given for all time, to preclude them-
selves from ever going to Merv.”

The frontier line between England and
Russia in Asia was again alluded to in an
influential paper, which declared that “the
excellent natural buffer of Afghanistan having
disappeared, a natural line of demarcation
must be looked for and found in Afghanistan
itself, the range of the Hindoo Kush and the
lower range of the Heri Rud being especially
suggested.”

Following as it did some inspired articles
on the necessity of England and Russia
agreeing to the partition of Asia, it gave the
cue to the Russian press generally, which
urged, after the Cabul massacres, “that the
sooner the two countries became coterminous,
the sooner will disappear one of those dread-
ful phantoms which constantly embitter the
relations between England and Russia’; and
inspired the Golos with the nature of the
changes likely to take place in consequence

Lord Dufferin
to Lord Salis-
bury, Aug. 26

Herald article in
Mr. Plunkett’s,
Sept. 9.

Gazette de St.
Pétersbourg, in
Mr. Plunkett's,
Sept. 10, 1879.
Golos. Extract in
Mr. Plunkett’s,
Sept. 18.

Tbid., Sept. 24.

38

of Major Cavagnari’s death: “ should England
take possession of Cabul and Candahar, then
Herat should be ceded to Persia, and our fron-
tier on the Attrek must be rectified so as to
ensure a basis of operations in the direction
of Merv.”

The “moment of England’s embarrass-
ment,” added that paper in another issue, ‘may
be the most propitious for a contest with
England in Central Asia’; but ‘the Asiatic
policy of Russia being based altogether on
future considerations, if an advance into
Central Asia must be effected, let it rather
take the direction of Herat than that of the
barren waste of the Turkoman steppe.”

This: advice received a practical answer
even before it was given, for on the oth of
September the sanguinary engagement of
Geok Tepé had advanced the Russian lines
375 miles towards Herat from the Caspian at
Beurma, and while the Russian press called
the advance ‘an expedition for the purpose
of pacifying the Turkoman steppe of Akhal
39

Teké, and for the defence of the commercial
route between Krasnovodsk and Khiva,” a
telegram from General Llamakin declared
“that for six hours the twelve Russian guns
never ceased firing on the fortified enclosure
of Denghil Tepé, where close on 20,000 indi-
viduals, women and children, nearly all the
population of Teké, were assembled. The
action of the artillery was terrible ; Turkoman
prisoners declare that many thousands of
their countrymen perished.”

According to a Russian military authority,
the Tekés ‘are divided into two sections,
those of the Akhal, at the foot of the Kouren-

Sournal de St.
Pétersbourg, in
Mr. Plunkett’s,
Oct. 4.

Ibid.

dagh, and those of Merv, in the oasis of that .

J

name,” and the Geok Tepé massacre having
disposed of the Akhal Tekés, Russia was
now in presence only of the Tekés of Merv,
though the Geok Tepé encounter made Russia
retreat for awhile, and devote her energies to
the plans for constructing a line of railway
from the Caspian to Kizil Arvat, a Central
Asia line from Khiva to Merv, and the explo-

ration of the Oxus.”

In Mr. Plunkett's:
of Oct. 17, 1879.

Ibid., Dec. 16,
1879.
Lord Dufferin
to Lord Gran-
ville, April 14,
1881,

Mr. Gosselin to
Lord Granville,
April 20, 1681.

40

Indeed, the Geok Tepé affair had proved so
disastrous, that General Skobeleff was en-
trusted with the further prosecution of the
task of “pacifying the Teké tribes,” and in
the spring of 1881, being in possession of
Askabad, he received the submission of the
tribes in the person of their chief. ‘‘Ovez
Mourad Tykma Serdar has sworn to serve
faithfully His Majesty the Emperor, and his
arrival puts an end to the Akhal Teké expe-
dition.”

The Russian press, delighting in this result,
somewhat incautiously expressed “a fervent
hope that the Caucasian and trans-Caspian

_ authorities will refrain for the future from

creating those conditions, owing to which
Russia, through the force of events, is from
time to time involved in expeditions.”

With the end of the expedition, however,
coincided the beginning of negotiations with
Persia as to the boundaries of that country
on the borders of Khorassan; and while an

Imperial ukase decreed in general terms “the
Al

annexation to the Empire of the Turkoman
Teké territory,” the Russian Minister at
Teheran insisted on the possession of Gavers,
‘as it lies on the direct line of march from
Akhal to the Atek of Khelat and the
Tejjen,” it “ being well known that the route
along the Attrek to Herat and Candahar is
the best, if not the sole one, in the event of
an expedition against East India.”

When requested by Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment to “define the boundaries of the lately
incorporated Teké country,’ M. de Giers
‘could not take any engagement beforehand
as to making them known,” remarking “that
he was not aware that when the English an-
nexed territories they were asked what their
frontiers were,” but adding, “that the moment
was favourable for a rectification of the
Russian and Persian frontiers,” and that
Askabad was the “most south-eastern town
of the Teké oasis.”

In an article written, however, by General
Annenkoff, the boundaries of the new Russian

In Mr. Wynd-
ham’s, May 25,
1881.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
April 5, 1887.

Novoe Vremyia
extract in Mr,
Wyndham’s,
May 30, 188z,

Lord Granville
to Mr. Wynd-
ham, June 13.

Mr. Wyndham
to Lord Gran-
ville, June 22.

Lbid., June 29.
Mr. Wyndham
to Lord Gran-
ville, July 20.

Ibid.

Lbid., July 27,
1881

42

province were given as commencing at Kizil
Arvat to Bami, and extending thence by
Askabad to Sarakhs.

On Mr. Wyndham asking Baron Jomini
whether the Teké oasis really extended to
Sarakhs, His Excellency replied that “he
believed the oasis extended as far as Askabad ;
that there was only one town called Sarakhs,
and that it was a disputed point as to whether
it was a Persian town or not.”

On being pressed upon the question of
boundaries, Baron Jomini informed Mr.
Wyndham “that their farthest point now was
Askabad, but that General Scobeleff had
discovered some very fertile country further
south, where a complete state of disorder
existed; that there was Sarakhs also to be
considered, and whether it was Persian or not
remained to be verified; but if it was not Per-
sian, that it would be necessary to establish
some form of government there as else-
where.”

As to Merv, the press appeared to be
43

instructed to say that “the Russian Govern-
ment has never entered into any engagements
with respect to Merv”; that the annexation of
or ‘“‘ Protectorate over Merv will be a matter
only concerning Russia and the Turkomans,
and will be announced to the world as a fad?
accompl:”; and while one paper announced
that “in view of the dangerous proximity of
Merv, and in order to follow the movements
of the Tekés, a large fort had been con-
structed at Askabad,’
the ‘completion of the military trans-Caspian

another announced

railway to Kizil Arvat.”

Meanwhile, the question of Sarakhs caused
anxiety in Persia, and Mr. Thomson, com-
menting on the doubts thrown out by Baron
Jomini as to its being Persian or not, wrote
that “there cannot be the slightest doubt
that it belongs to Persia, as much as Khelat or
Kuchan, or any other frontier town governed
by Persian officials, and held by Persian
troops.

“Tt has been built by them and has been

Fournal de St.
Pétersbourg, in
Mr. Wyndham’s,
Aug. 10, 1881.

St. Petersburg
Herald, in Mr.
Wyndham’s,

Aug. 10, 1882.

Novoe Vremyia,
in Mr. Wynd-
ham’s, Aug. 17,
1881.

SFournal de St.
Pétersbourg, in
Mr. Wyndham’s,
Aug. 18, 1881.
Mr. Thomson
to Lord Gran-
ville, Sept. 1,

1881,

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville.

Official Gazette,
in Sir E. Thorn-
ton’s, Feb. 7,
1882.

Lord Granville
to Mr. Thomson
Feb, 11, 1882,

44

garrisoned by them for the last twenty-five
years.”

In December the line of frontier agreed
upon between Persia and Russia was de-
scribed as “following the course of the Attrek
river from the Caspian to Chat, thence to
Khojeh Kala on the Sombar river, thus
placing Kari Kala in the possession of
Russia, then carried along the hills, passing
about twenty miles south of Geok Tepé
and seven miles south of Askabad to
Baba Dormuz, twenty miles east of Gavers.”
“Then the frontier runs northwards, intersects
the road leading from Gavers to Kuftabad,
and then becomes lost in the sandy desert,
leaving Attrek beyond Russian limits.”

This latter remark led the press to specu-
late at will as to the exact distance of Sarakhs
from the frontier, the Golos alarming Lord
Granville by stating that “the new Rus-
sian-Persian frontier is traced sixteen versts
only short of Sarakhs”; but according to
Persian authorities, ‘‘the Russian frontier is
45

nearly one hundred and fifty miles short of
Sarakhs,” which M. Lessar, Government
Engineer, informed the Russian Geogra-
phical Society in St. Petersburg, “was a
large Persian fortress occupied by a batta-
lion of infantry numbering about 700 men
with six guns in very bad condition.”

But as on the whole “the friendly relations
between England and Russia had rarely, if
ever, been on a better footing,” Lord
Granville suggested to Prince Lobanow
that “some agreement might be come to
as regards the policy and position of the two
Powers in Asia which should remove
the jealousy with which public opinion in
England was inclined to view the success
and progress of the Russian arms in those
regions,” and which “would materially con-
tribute to the tranquillity and civilisation of
the Asiatic States and populations,” ‘‘seeing
that the two Governments were acting har-
moniously”; and he suggested that “an
agreement should be come to between Eng-

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Feb. 13, 1882.

In Sir E. Thorn-
ton’s, Feb. 17,
1882,

Lord Granville
to Sir E. Thorn-
ton, Feb. 2, 1882.
Lord Granville
to Sir E. Thorn-

ton, Feb, 2, 1882.

Ibid.

Ibid, Feb. 22,
1882,

46

land, Russia, and Persia for the settlement
of the frontier now left undefined between
Persia and the Turkoman country, from Baba
Dormuz to the point where the Persian
frontier meets that of Afghanistan, in the
neighbourhood of the Heri Rud, and for its
subsequent demarcation by English, Russian,
and Persian officers.”

Prince Lobanow was of opinion that “if
in the future it became necessary to define
further the boundary between Russia and
Persia, it was a matter to be settled between
the two conterminous States”; but he was
subsequently instructed that his Government
“acknowledged the continued validity of the
agreement formerly entered into by Prince
Gortchakow (with Lord Clarendon), by which
Afghanistan was admitted to be beyond the
sphere of Russian influence,” and that they
were ready to come to “a settlement of the
frontier of Afghanistan from the point where
it had been left undefined (viz., Khoja Saleh)
as far as Sarakhs.”
47

Lord Granville remonstrated that as “the
desire of Her Majesty’s Government was to
make an arrangement which should prevent
any occasion or opportunity for a further
advance of Russia towards Afghanistan,” it
appeared to him that “if the possession of
Sarakhs were at any time aimed at by Russia,
it could not be for the purposes which have
hitherto been stated by them as their object”;
and at an interview, at which Lord Harting-
ton was present, it was represented on behalf
of Her Majesty's Government that ‘“as
Turkomans of Merv were now the only
tribes from whom Russia could apprehend
acts of aggression, and that these tribes could
only reach the Russian frontier by one route,
that which descends from Merv to Sarakhs,
and then turns to the north-west, it seemed
possible to prevent sudden incursions by an
arrangement between Russia and England to
determine the limits of Persia towards the
Steppe”; but the Russian Ambassador re-
plied that his Government was of his opinion,

4

Lord Granville
to Sir E. Thorn-
ton, March 14,
1882,
Lord Granville to
Sir E. Thornton,
March 22, 1882.

Ibid.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Feb. 13, 1882.

Ibid., April 12,
1882,

48

that sucha “‘ matter concerned Russia and the
Shah exclusively.”

To this Lord Granville found no objection
“if the agreement between them was in the
sense of Lord Hartington’s proposal,” even
though he could not admit that England had
no interest ‘in the settlement of frontier
questions regarding Persia.”

On the 27th March, Lord Granville re-
ceived word that “the Persian Government
had decided to abstain from all interference
with Merv and the Tejjen districts occupied
by Teké Turkomans,” and Mr. Thomson
believed that ‘at no distant date the Turko-
mans of Merv will offer their submission to
Russia, or place themselves under her protec-
tion”; and while he telegraphed “the advance
of 140 Russians to Karibend on the Tejend
river,” M. de Giers requested Prince
Lobanow to express “the Emperor’s strong
desire, and his own, to be on the best terms
with England, and their anxiety to meet the
views of Her Majesty's Government with
49

\

regard to Central Asia as much as possible”;
and to Sir Edward Thornton he said that
‘‘ Persia had no right whatever to the country
from Sarakhs to Baba Dormuz,” and that
‘His Imperial Majesty was very averse to
making any engagements with another Power
which the force of circumstances might here-
after render it impossible for the Russian
authorities to keep.”

“The Russian Government,” said M. de
Giers, “have no particular objection to Can-
dahar being occupied by British forces,” but
‘with a view to prevent disturbances on the
borders of Afghanistan, the boundary of that
country, from Khoja Saleh to the Persian
frontier near Sarakhs, should be formally and
definitely laid down.”

And as a criticism of the Imperial remarks
came the announcement, received on July 25,
that ‘on the 28th of October 1881, Colonel
Grotekilm had concluded a convention with
the Elders of Merv preparatory to their sub-
mission to Russia, though on the 18th of June

E

Lord Granville to
Sir E. Thornton
April 22,

Sir E. Thornton
to Lord Gran-
ville, April 29,
1882,
Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
July 25, 1882.

Sir E. Thornton
to Lord Gran-
ville, June 1,
1882.

Lbid., April 20,
1882,

Golos. Extracts in
Sir E.Thornton’s,
Oct. 26, 1882.

50

1881, M. de Giers and Baron Jomini had
both declared to Mr. Wyndham that there was
no question of negotiating a treaty with the
Merv Turkomans.”

By way of confirming the peaceful assur-
ances of the Russian authorities, General
Tchernaieff was “ gazetted Governor-General
of Turkestan,” though a month before M. de
Giers had informed our Ambassador “that he
believed General Tchernaieff would not re-
ceive that appointment’: and M. Lessar
explored the country ‘from Askabad to
Herat,” informing the world “that the best
road from Sarakhs southward ran between
the Murghab and the Heri Rud, and not
through Persian territory,” and ‘compared
with other roads traversed by him, it was the
best between Sarakhs and Khosan (‘the first
Afghan settlement on the banks of the Heri
Rud’), and consequently between Askabad
and Herat,” while “the road from Merv to
Herat by Ak Rabat and along the Kulik
River to Djenevida and the Islim-Chilimé
spring avozds the Perepamisus range.”
51

Early in January 1883, ‘“‘some Merv raiders
near Chacha, in Atek of Khelat, killed two
Russians,” and, ‘“‘a body of Russian cavalry and
infantry with two guns entered the Persian
territory of Atek,” while “the Russian author-
ities at Askabad demanded from the Khan of
Merv the surrender of the guilty persons,” a
demand which was at once “complied with,”
though it would seem the Russians had not left
Chacha in Persian territory on the 16th of
February, since Mr. Condie Stephen, second
Secretary to Her Majesty’s Legation at
Teheran, who was on an official mission
through Khorassan, was “rudely stopped at
Chacha by a Russian, who threatened to use
force.”

The matter was referred to St. Petersburg
for explanations, when M. de Giers promised
to see to it, though from no department had
he received any information whatever relative
to this incident, ‘but he would seize the
opportunity to inform Her Majesty’s Go-
vernment” that the Imperial Cabinet ‘ consi-

E 2

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Jan. 1883.

Novoe Vremyia.
Extract in Sir E.
Thornton’s, Jan.
17.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Feb. 6, 1883.

Lbid., Feb. 19.
Inclosure in Sir
Ed. Thornton’s to
Lord Granville,
Feb. 26.

Inclosure in Sir
L. Mallet’s to
Mr. Currie,
April.

52

dered it quite impossible to admit that the
Atek could be looked upon as an integral part
of Persia.”

On the 22nd February the Viceroy of
India assured Ameer Abdul Rahman Khan
that “many vague rumours are doubtless
afloat, but they are for the most part without
foundation, and need cause His Highness no
uneasiness, more especially as under the en-
gagements of 1880, should any foreign Power
attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and should
such interference lead to unprovoked aggres-
sion on his dominions, in that event the
British Government would be prepared to
aid His Highness to such extent and in
such manner as may appear to the British
Government necessary in repelling it, pro-
vided His Highness follows unreservedly the
advice of the British Government in regard
to his external relations.”

Among the “rumours afloat” was one to
the effect that a preliminary convention be-
tween Russia and Persia ‘extended the
53

Russian frontier midway between Sarakhs
and Merv,” but Mr. Thomson called it “ pre-
mature”; and on the Ameer of Afghanistan
inquiring of the Viceroy of India what his own
boundaries were to the north and west, Lord
Ripon advised him “ that they had been
settled by the British Government with Russia
in 1873, when the Afghan territory between
the Oxus and the Heri Rud was defined as
containing Akcha, Siripool, Maimena, Shiber-
ghan, and Andkhoi, the latter of which would
be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to
the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to
independent tribes of Turkomans”; but it was
at the same time acknowledged that “this
boundary has never been laid down accurately
on any map, and the country has not been
examined on the spot with that view.”

About the same time the Russian Minister
at Teheran was urging on our Minister there
the necessity ‘of removing an important
element of discord, by having the demarcation

of the Afghan line of frontier from Khojah

Lord Granville
to Mr. Thomson,
July 17.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
July x9.

Inclosure in Sir
L. Mallet’s to
Mr. Currie,
Aug. 17.

Ibid,
Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Aug. 4, 1883.

Memo. by Mr.
Stephen, Sept.
5, 1883.

Mr. Kennedy to
Lord Granville,
Sept. 27, 1883.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Granville,
Nov. 22.

34

Saleh to the Heri Rud agreed upon and
speedily effected,” and Mr. Condie Stephen
was cleverly pointing out inexactitudes of
latitudes of places marked on the latest
Russian maps, which placed towns such
as Sarakhs so much more to the north as to
make it more difficult for Persia to claim them
in the delimitation commission then pro-
ceeding.

Mr. Stephen’s remark about Sarakhs
elicited from M. Zinovieff at St. Petersburg,
who had been Russian Minister in Persia, the
statement that ‘Sarakhs, being a Persian
fortress, would always lie outside of any
Russian line of frontier’; but special attention
on Sarakhs and Merv was now being called
to the fore, sometimes in’ the despatches to
and from Teheran, where Eyoub Khan
resided as refugee, and who, since the arrival
of the Russian Boundary Commissioners,
insisted on ‘going to Bokhara, by Sarakhs
and Merv,” and was not allowed to proceed

by the Shah, as “this would be regarded by
39

Her Majesty's Government as a very un-
friendly act”; at others by the complaints
of M. Lessar from Merv as to the “en-
couragement of marauders by the presence
of Mr. O'Donovan in Merv”; and again by
statements of the inability of the Persians to
cope with the Turkoman raiders in Khoras-
san, the Shah “having earnestly begged the
Russian authorities to take vigorous measures
for the prevention of future raids.” This re-
quest was at once met by “instructions given
to the Commander of the forces at Askabad
to do his best to meet the wishes of the
Persian Government,” and these instructions
no doubt accounted for the presence of “a
Russian force in the Atek of Dereghey on
the way to the Tejend.”

The significance of this force was soon
apparent in the report whch reached the
Foreign Office, “that the Merv chiefs had
submitted to Russian rule,” and the con-
firmation of the news in Sir Edward
Thornton's telegram, ‘“‘ His Imperial Majesty

Lord Granville
to Mr. Thomson,
Nov. 24.

Inclosure in Sir
E. Thornton’s,
Nov. 21, 1883.

Sir Ed. Thorn-
ton to Lord
Granville,

Oct. 24.

Lbid., Jan. 2,
1884.

Lord Granville
to Mr. Thomson,
Feb. 9.
Sir E. Thornton
to Lord Gran-
ville, Feb. 15.

56

has determined to accept the allegiance
which the representatives of the Merv Turko-
mans had sworn at Askabad, and to send an
officer to administer the Government of that
region.”

Here ends the last published Blue-book on
Central Asia, but Sarakhs is Russian now, as
is indeed much of the convenient road to
Herat pointed out by M. Lessar, that pioneer
of Russia’s ever-progressive, if not aggressive,
advance towards India.

WHITING AND CO., LIMITED,
30 AND 32, SARDINIA STREET, LINCOLN’S INN FIELDS, W.C.
 

 

 

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