ya : Sy nots athe Bilhee Pa per seies ets Steet ornell University Librar “win lah eg Sasa MAJ. GEN. E. 8. OTIS, UNITED STATES ARMY, COMMANDING DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MILITARY GOVERNOR. September 1, 1899, to May 8, 1900. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1900. U. S. Transport Mrape, En route from Manila to San Francisco, May 14, 1900. The ApsuTANT-GENERAL U.S. Army, Washington, D. C. Sir: The annual report for the first year of the military operations of the Depa ne of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps and of affairs connected with the United States Military Governorship in the Philip- pines is dated August 31, 1899. All matters and incidents of impor- tance relating to the department and corps, and to the United States administration in those islands to that specific date, are presented in that report. I now have the honor to submit a recital of Government action, both civil and military in character, which has been taken or inaugurated during the poe of time from August 31 last to the 5th of the present month, when in response to my request I was relieved from command in the Philippines and took passage on the U. S. trans- port Meade for San Francisco. And in this recital I shall allude to the more important events which have transpired and comment briefly on causes and effects, but shall not enter into the particulars of mili- tary movements nor the details of civil supervision, leaving them to be presented by officers who have exercised special charge over such matters. But before proceeding with the rehearsal, I desire to correct an erroneous impression which appears to prevail to a moderate extent (whether drawn from my former report or an incorrect knowledge of the then existing conditions I know not) that war with the insurgents was initiated by the United States Government, or that the attitude or conduct of its troops in Manila was the cause of hostilities, unless pos- sibly it may be held that their failure to resent insult or punish hostile demonstration constantly recurring in their midst encouraged the already openly avowed enemy in the belief that it could easily slaughter them within the city which it had invested, and thereby incited him to action. War with the insurgents of the Philippines was forced upon us and was unavoidable. No nation but the United States would have permitted an unfriendly force of large numerical strength to throw up intrenchments and erect fortifications in the immediate proximity of its troops, as did the insurgents during several weeks preceding their attack on Manila, without considering it an act of war and adopt- ing measures to arrest it. By all law and approved precedent the United States would have been fully justified in arresting these insur- gent demonstrations. by demand, to be followed with the application of force if demand was insufficient; and had that course been adopted 3 4 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. no wrong could have been imputed to our Government. The subject, however, is no longer matter for argument, as the captured insurgent records have set the question at rest forever. They show that Agui- naldo, under the advice of the Hongkong junta, proceeded from that city to Manila Harbor with the intention of securing as much aid from the United States as possible, and then, when in his opinion he might find himself sufficiently strong, of driving out the Americans with the sword. His course throughout was consistent with this well-settled intention. His declaration of independence of June, 1898; his capture during the succeeding seven months of the slightly garrisoned Spanish posts throughout the islands, by which he obtained ae quantities of arms and ammunition; the elimination from his so-called government of his ablest advisers, who advocated United States supremacy; his declared dictatorship; the concentration of his troops around Manila; the public demonstrations and rejoicings at his capital of Malolos on the anticipated victory of his army shortly before hostilities com- menced—all following each other in well-timed succession—are suffi- cient in themselves to prove a predetermined definite plan of action to place the country under Tagalo rule. But independent of the proof attendant upon this concerted plan, absolutely convincing evidence of intention to attack the United Staten troops is found in Aguinaldo’s autographic instructions of January 9, 1899 (nearly four weeks before active hostilities were inaugurated), wherein he displays great simplicity in knowledge of military matters, but not that savage ferocity which characterized his instructions issued after the signal defeat of his troops on February 5, and which were set out on page 182 of my report of August 31 last. His duplicity at this time was marvelous, for he was professing friendship toward the United States, manifesting a great desire to restrain his people from committing hostile acts, and, upon the day his instructions bear date, he appointed a commission to confer with one to be appointed by myself ‘‘for the sake of peace,” as he expressed it. The instructions are in Tagalo, and the following is a translation: Matotos, 9th of January, 1899. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BRAVE SOLDIERS OF SANDATAHAN OF MANILA. ArtTIcLe 1. All Filipinos should observe our fellow countrymen in order to see whether they are American sympathizers. They shall take care to work with them in order to inspire them with confidence of the strength of the holy cause of their country. Whenever they are assured of the loyalty of the convert they shall instruct them to continue in the character of an American sympathizer in order that they may receive good pay, but without prejudicing the cause of our country. In this way they can serve themselves and at the same time serve the public by communicating to the ates of chiefs and officials of our army whatever news of importance they may ave. ArtictE 2. Allof the chiefs and Filipino brothers should be ready and courageous for the combat and should take advantage of the opportunity to shady, well the situa- tion of the American outposts and headquarters. Observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise the enemy. F ArtTICcLE 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretense of looking for the same officer for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the cies groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 5 ARTICLE 4. They should not prior to the attack look at the Americans in a threat- ening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and courage. Gne should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel the one should dress as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to assist in the general attack. ArvicLe 5, At the moment of the attack the Sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other. ARTICLE 6. The officers shall take care that on the top of the houses along the streets where the American forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil, and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the passing American troops. At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the Sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the the objects to be thrown down, a number of the Sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the eed column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all of the opposing orces. ArticLe 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy’s line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well. Articiz 8. All of our chiefs in the suburbs should prepare groups of the Sandatahan, who will attack with ferocity and decision the Americans within their lines, attempt- ing to surround each group of Americans or to break through their lines. This must be done if the nature of the ground occupied by the Americans will permit and if the Sandatahan have the proper amount of courage and resolution, and the more courage and intelligence that they show in the moment of the attack the surer will be the result and the fewer will be their own losses. ArricLE 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6 there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, molasses, and other liquids which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the Sandatahan who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children. : ARTICLE 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the San- datahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows with long and sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy. And these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh. ArRTIcLE 11. It can be taken for granted that, if the above instructions are observed, the enemy will not be able to use firearms because of the confusion in his ranks, as they would shoot one another. For this reason I have always thought the rifle useless in this kind of combat, for experience has taught me, my dear brothers, that when the Sandatahan make their attack with courage and decision, taking advan- tage of the confusion in the ranks of the enemy, the victory is sure,,and in that case the triumph is ours. ; ARTICLE 12. At last, if, as I expect, the result shall favor us in the taking of Manila and the conquering of the enemy, the chiefs are charged with seeing that the officers and soldiers respect the consulates, the banks, and commercial houses, and even the Spanish banks and commercial houses, taking care that they be not seduced by the hope of plunder. As if God sees this, He will reward us and the foreign nations will note the order and justice of our conduct. I charge that in the moment of combat, the officers, soldiers, and whatever patriots take part in the struggle will not forget our noble, sacred, and holy ideals, Liberty and Independence. Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we Fili- pinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel; but on the con- trary, that we are men of culture and patriotism, honorable and very humane. 6 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese; that you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the enemy who surrender. And that you be on the sharp look- out for those traitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory. Exniio AGUINALDO. Another erroneous impression, which, if it has not widely prevailed results from the failure of 2 few who have endeavored to create it. is that on the evening following the severe fighting on February 5, 1899, the insurgent authorities sought a conference with a view of terminat- ing hostilities. These false impressions may have arisen in part from a hastily prepared telegram sent from Manila on that date, stating in substance that the insurgents had asked for a temporary suspension of hostilities, but had received the reply that having commenced war, it must continue. No proposition of any kind came from the insurgent authorities. The facts are as follows: Judge Torres, the present attorney-general of the islands, who had recently arrived from Cebu, where he had filled a judicial position under the Spanish Government, immediately upon his arrival in Manila exerted himself for the maintenance of peace and offered his services to Aguinaldo to assist in bringing about friendly conditions. On January 9 Aguinaldo had appointed him senior member of what was termed his peace commission. He was at his home in Manila February 5 and visited me on the evening of that day, praving that I would pro- pose to the insurgent authorities the establishment of a neutral zone that terms for peace might be considered. He was informed that as war was the act of the insurgents we could not initiate proceedings. but that it must continue until they (the insurgents) were ready to submit propositions. He then asked that a fellow-member of his insurgent commission, Colonel Arguelles. who was in the city, might be permitted to pass through the lines in order to visit Malolos and confer with Aguinaldo and his principal advisers. This was granted, and Arguelles was taken by Colonel Kilbourne, of the Pay Department. to that portion of General MacArthur's line of battle opposite Caloocan. It being quite late in the evening when he arrived there he concluded to return to the city and recommence the -journey early the following morning, which he did. He was passed through the lines under flag of truce, was absent two or three days, when he returned and was properly received by a party, which was viciously fired on by the insurgents as soon as their flag of truce had withdrawn a short distance. The firing caused our party to retreat quickly, Arguelles leading it and anathematizing his countrymen. He reported that his mission had been unsuccessful and that his advice was not heeded. A few weeks ago he related his experience to me quite fully. He said that upon arriving at Aislolos he saw General Aguinaldo and Sefior Mabini and made known to them that General Otis would per- mit a suspension of hostilities upon the request of the former and received reply that a declaration of war had been made, copies of which were furnished him. Both Aguinaldo and Mabini made the statement that they had no objections to the suspension of hostilities, but beyond this general remark offered nothing and declined to discuss details. Arguelles said that he was directed to return to Manila and report simply that the insurgent authorities would not object to a sus- pension of hostilities if desired. Asked what further took place at REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 7 the conference, he answered, ‘‘Nothing;” that he merely told Agui- naldo and Mabini what I had said, which was to the effect that they had commenced the war and it must continue since they had chosen that course of action, but that I would listen to propositions if they wished tosubmit'them. Asked if he endeavored to induce General Aguinaldo to submit a proposition, he replied in the negative, saying that he feared to do so as he might, in the then excited condition of the Fili- oe people, be charged with cowardice; that prior to the outbreak of ostilities he had stated to the insurgent government his belief that the Filipinos could not successfully resist the United States, and had thereby incurred the enmity of General Luna which relentlessly fol- lowed him. The insurgents did not desire peace at this time. They sent word to their friends in Manila soon after their defeat of Febru- ary 5 that they were not in the least discouraged; that the battle had united their people in sentiment, and that they were strong in men and war material. Not until they were driven beyond Calumpit and Baliuag did they make any attempt to secure a conference with the United States authorities, and then only for the purpose of gaining sufficient time to reassemble their scattered forces. On August 31 last the army in the Philippines numbered 30,963 officers and enlisted men, of whom, excluding volunteers awaiting shipment to the United States and the present sick, there were nearly 24,000 for duty. Of these 4,000 were in the southern islands. We occupied the islands of the Jolo Archipelago with stations at Jolo, Siassi, and Bongao; Negros, with small garrisons at many points in that island; the cities of Cebu and Iloilo, and the country adjacent thereto within a circumscribed radius of a few miles. In Luzon our northern line extended from San Fernando of Pampanga to Baliuag, province of Bulacan, with a strong outpost at Angeles, and covered all country to the south and beyond Manila to the towns of Bacoor and Taguig, Cavite province, lying, respectively, on the Bay of Manila and the Laguna de Bay, with troops at Imus, a few miles south of Bacoor, and at Calamba and Los Bajios on the south shore of the Laguna. The enemy had been driven previously northward beyond San Isidro, province of Nueva Ecija, eastward from a portion of Morong, and southward from the Manila Bay country, but our lines had been shortened to permit the withdrawal of the volunteer organ- izations, which had been in progress since the early days of June, and to prepare for subsisting the army at practicable points during the rainy season. All of these movements are fully explained in my former report. The temper of the insurgent troops at this time was confident and aggressive, as we had not made any forward movement since the latter part of June, and the more daar appeared to believe that our resources were about exhausted. Among the better class of Filipinos, however, impressions were far different, as fully appears from corre- spondence which has recently come to hand. I cite the following communication of a leading Filipino, of July 7, and the response of Aguinaldo, dated September 14, 1899, to show the divergent views which then prevailed: Manin, July 7, 1899. Sr. Don Emitio AGUINALDO. My Drar Don Emizio: Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only 8 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the outbreak of hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them. We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish—for I remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, how- ever, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, drag- ing after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, leath, and desolation. We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer, it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack. As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country. . Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and errone- ously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal compaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us? What could we ask for? We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in the minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from the American antiimperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world, and with its assent. : The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings. In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for vour policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day, then, I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say, ‘‘ Peace is an imperative necessity. Nothing can prevent the triumph of America. Do not struggle against the inevitable. Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world and the gratitude of his coun- try. Bethat man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have mer- ited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace maker, that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say, ‘Enough of conflict. We have seen that our ideals can not be realized by this means; let us make peace, and letus work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.’’ This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that vou will never repent it. There is no other remedy—no other path open. Do not forget that many Fili- pinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible; that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to the American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me. Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time; a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination. I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 9 or coercion of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desires of his people. I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant, B. Lecarpa. [Personal.] REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Tarlac, September 14, 1899, Sr. Beniro Legarpa, Manila. My DisrincuisHED Frigenp: Your two kind letters have reached my hands, and I have informed myself of all you sayin them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that some time elapsed before they reached me. I believe what you tell me as to the reinforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need. In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken—that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights. ‘We are not alarmed by the numerous arms or the valor of the enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? Itisa pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their coun- try. lLlrepeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for inde- pendence; death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to assure the happi- ness of the people and of future generations. We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowl- edge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenseless forts contrary to the pre- cepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destruc- tion. Resistance and the firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose. For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest. I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies, having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government. : Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army? ‘One should never repent of a just determination.” Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends. Command at will your most affectionate friend, E. AGUINALDO. 10 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The letter from Aguinaldo, dated from his capital at Tarlac, expresses highly oy wig sentiments and displays the sublimity of individual patriotic devotion. It also displays that cunning and shrewdness by which he has been enabled to hold together members of a lately dis- cordant cabinet striving with each other for individual prestige, and deceitfully intensifies the desire of the Filipino people to continue in armed opposition to United States authority. On the latter point, a Tarlac letter written by an insurgent Filipino, the 14th of July, toa Tagalo friend in Manila will throw some light, and it likewise shows the character of the government Aguinaldo was maintaining. It is, in part, as follows: My DistineuisHEeD Frienp: For some days I have been trying to get into your city and to leave this band of thieves, but with my numerous family it is impossible to travel off the road, and they watch us here so closely that it is impossible to get away, which I very much regret. However, I believe this will all end up some way or other, and a great many of the people here long for the American troops to advance, for everyone is desperate with so much savagery committed by our army. Quiet citizens are never left in peace, nor anyone in fact who has as much as a grain of rice put aside. * * * J will not go into details as to occurrences here, or this letter will be too long. The bearer will give you and other friends any information you may desire. I do not sign this letter or put down the address, as to do so might bring disagreeable consequences. Yours, truly, This letter expressed the opinion of the men of property who were forced to contribute largely of their goods and money and to pur- chase insurgent government bonds, of which an issue amounting to $500,000 had recently been made. It did not voice the sentiments of the army officers, who were enjoying a license of action never antici- pated before its realization, and of the ignorant masses who composed the enlisted strength of that army and preferred to gain subsistence through exaction rather than by the severe manual labors of former days. The army offered an excellent tield of operations for the ladrones in which to practice their congenial pursuits. They had been gath- ered from all portions of Luzon, and were of great service in recruiting diminished insurgent ranks by enforced drafts on the people. There were, however, large masses, especially in the sections not yet visited by United States troops, who believed the American was the cruel barbarian depicted by the insurgent press and that their salvation depended upon their ability to drive him from the islands. Hence, at the end of August rebellion still presented a bold and defiant front, and the former successes of our arms, while they had taught the insur- ent forces to fear contact with our troops, had not diminished, but fad increased rather the efforts of insurgent leaders. The ist of September found us with a total force in the Philippines of 30,963 officers and men, of whom 26,829 were effective and per- forming duty of some character. During the month the Kansas, Washington, Iowa, and Nevada Volunteers, the volunteer signal organization, and many discharged men from the regular establishment were sent to the United States, to be followed by the Tennessee regi- ment on October 8. This completed the work of shipment of all volunteers and of all men who were entitled to discharge under the provisions of War Department General Orders, No. 40, of 1898. No new organizations were received during September, but 2,601 officers, casuals, and recruits for the regular regiments arrived. Our strength on October 1 was 442 officers and men Jess than for the 1st of the pre- REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 11 vious month, but our effective force was about the same, as there had been a decrease in the sick report. Only minor military operations were attempted in September, since, as in August, the troops were busily engaged in relieving those directed to depart from the islands, there being two volunteer regiments in Panay, Negros, and Cebu which had to be withdrawn, and also a few organizations on the outer Luzon lines which were to be replaced. This exchange was effected as rapidly as vessels could be secured to transport men and supplies. Necessary repairs to the railway and rolling stock in our possession were vigorously prosecuted. Disposi- tions were being constantly effected to commence the execution of a well-determined plan of operation in northern Luzon as soon as an available force would justify it, and continued caution was exercised to neutralize the enemy’s aggressive movements and to severely pun- ish him for the temerity he was expected to display. Since the early portion of July he had gradually become more bold because of our apparent quiet, and was inclined to take the initiative wherever he might consider an opportunity offered. . His troops attacked various portions of General MacArthur’s lines at the north, made various attempts to cripple the railway between Manila and San Fernando, the continued working of which was essential for the forwarding of troops and supplies required in the contemplated northern operations and the forwarding of subsistence to the men holding that section of country. They threatened the lines about the city of Manila, concentrating at Mariquina, San Mateo, Montalban, and vicinity, in the provinces of Manila and Bulacan, and to the eastward in the province of Morong. They gathered and attacked Calamba on the Laguna de Bay, also the strong outpost at Imus, province of Cavite, and in fact the retired line which General Lawton maintained along the bay front from Pasay to Bacoor. The insurgents of the city of Manila again became some- what confident and ane a chief, an influential Tagalo appointed to the position by Aguinaldo in July (whose letter of appointment has been secured), actively engaged in supplying the insurgent troops with contraband of war and in plotting for another uprising within the city’s most densely populated sections. These agents of Aguinaldo worked with great dexterity. To relieve the condition of the inhabitants within our lines we had permitted trade to be carried on by water transportation from Orani on the north shore of Manila Bay to Bacoor on its southern shore and along the Pasig River, and although it was carefully supervised we discovered that Manila was supplying insurgent troops to the north and south of the city with subsistence, clothing, and articles for the manufacture of ammunition in quite large amounts. Therefore trade was limited to an exchange of certain particularized merchandise and products. Still the illicit traffic continued to be prosecuted to a considerable extent, but the danger to be apprehended therefrom was slight in comparison with the necessity for relieving the needs of the inhabitants, and no additional vigorous restraining measures were adopted. An amusing illustration of restored confidence among insurgent leaders during September is found in a letter of Gen. Pio del Pilar to an acquaintance in Manila, and it especially shows the estimate Pilar then had of the prowess of his troops. He wrote that by January at the farthest he would capture the city and take into captivity the archbishop and the American commander, but that for $1,000,000 he 12 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. would hand over to the American authorities Aguinaldo and his entire government. Preparations for extended movements of troops to the northward of Luzon, where the bulk of the insurgents confronted us, were com- menced in August. The enemy held the towns to the west and north of San Fernando, extending from the Guagua and Porac road through Angeles, and thence east to Arayat. with outposts in the near vicinity of San Fernando. They had removed more than one-half of the rail- way track between San Fernando and Angeles, a distance of 10 miles, and had destroyed a portion of the roadbed. It was necessary, there- fore, to secure Angeles, the intersecting point of many divergent roads and a good strategic position, also to reconstruct the railway as rapidly as possible preparatory to an advance on the flank of the enemy by the San Isidro and Cabanatuan route. General MacArthur was called upon to seize Angeles, and, driving the enemy from the vicinity of Santa Rita and Guagua, he threw a column of troops, of which Gen- eral Wheaton took command, consisting of two guns of Taylor's Bat- tery under Lieutenant Kenly and the Twelfth Regiment of Infantry under Lieut. Col. Jacob H. Smith, into Angeles and thrust the enemy back to Magalang and Mabalacat. Holding this position, he subse- quently, in September, drove the enemy beyond the Porac and Florida Blanca road, thus holding a much stronger advanced line than the one he formerly maintained. These movements were attended with very little loss to us compared with the casualties the enemy suffered in men and war material. Work on the 10 miles of railway between San Fernandoand Angeles was immediately commenced hy the Quartermaster’s Department under the supervision of Major Devol and was soon prosecuted to completion, the first train passing over that portion of the road on September 20. In the meantime, and especially during the latter portion of Septem- ber, rations and forage were pushed through by rail to Calumpit, a point on the Rio Grande Pampanga River, where they were to be taken by boat and forwarded up the stream as far as the volume of water would permit. For this river service river gunboats, launches, and cascoes were sent to Calumpit from Manila and advantage was taken of the rainy season in order to secure the best river navigation of the year. These supplies were to consist of 650,000 rations and half forage for several months for the horses of a regiment of cavalry and 200 draft animals. It was thought they might be pushed through as far as San Isidro, where the Spaniards had established a small military post which offered good storage.. Only a few of the troops to comprise the column which it was intended to send north on the line of this river and on the flank of the main body of the enemy had yet arrived, but were en route and soon expected. Brigadier-General Young, who had reported the latter part of July and been assigned to the command of the Third Brigade, First Division (Lawton’s), was sent north with a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry and the Twenty-fourth Infantry to San Fernando (General MacArthur having removed his headquarters to Angeles) to form a provisional brigade to be attached to General Lawton’s division. Upon arrival he took charge of that section of country, and assisted General Mac- Arthur in holding partialiy vacated positions while the troops of the Second Division were moving to the north and westward of Porac and clearing up the country south of that place. General Young placed REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 138 the wagon road by way of San Fernando, Mexico, and Santa Ana to Arayat in condition for the passage of army wheeled transporta- tion, which was being forwarded by rail to the first-named place for use of the column destined to take that route. He had several engage- ments with the enemy’s detachments, which he drove back from Mexico and Santa Ana on the Magalang road, resulting in slight casualties to himself, but which were somewhat serious and quite demoralizing to the enemy. He awaited at San Fernando the arrival of General Law- ton, who had been directed to take personal supervision of the column when all the troops constituting it could be gathered, General Young to command the cavalry of the column, which was to consist of head- quarters and two squadrons of the Third Cavalry, and headquarters and six troops of the Fourth Cavalry, with such additional mounted troops as could be secured. In the meantime ladrones and insurgent soldiers were operating extensively in the swamps and esteros which fringe Manila Bay from the mouth of the Rio Grande eastwardly to the city of Bula- can—even to the northern limits of Malabon. This section of country has always been infested with thieves and robbers who subsisted on the fruits of their piracies in the bay and from the results of their robberies of the inhabitants dwelling along its coast. Our troops could not contend successfully with these independent bands, hidden as they were in the dense growth of nipa which covers that lowland, and our attention was called to the practicability of employing, organizing, and arming for that work the Macabebes of that country. This peo- ple had been true to the last to the Spanish interests, had suffered great cruelties from the insurgents, and desired to take service against their hereditary enemy, the Tagalo. The wisdom of employing them had been considered shortly after our troops captured Malolos, and General MacArthur (within whose division lines they resided) and I concluded that they might commit many offenses against the Tagalo inhabitants if furnished with arms and allowed any freedom of move- ment. We therefore concluded to defer further consideration of the sub- ject until a future time. But now that their services would prove essen- tially valuable in the swampy jungles in the inimediate proximity of their home, and as they were supplied with many small boats with which travel therein is only practicable, and as General Lawton especially desired a small force of them to act as guides and scouts for his contemplated northern column, it was determined to raise two companies, each 128 strong, place them under charge of competent officers, to be carefully selected for that duty, and test their efficiency. This was done. Lieutenant Batson of the Fourth Cavalry was placed in charge of the battalion, and several officers were detailed to assist him. The Macabebe boat exercises through theswamps destroyed or drove inland from their hiding places the robbers and insurgents who dwelt there and who lost through capture many of their guns. Though the Macabebes were prone to rob and abuse the inhabitants and treat with cruelty their captives unless closely watched and restrained, still their successes influenced us to organize an additional company for service in that section, as those already employed there were intended for use with the troops of General Lawton. They performed efficient service, not only as guides and scouts, but also as detectives, were fearlessly led by our officers, and in the advance through Northern Luzon in the 14 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. pursuit of armed insurgents who had escaped through the San Jose, Tayug, and San Fabian lines, kept pace with the pursuing cavalry. They were, however, greatly feared by the inhabitants of all sections of country through which they advanced. Many of them had been Spanish soldiers and were acquainted only with Spanish methods of dealing with rebellious subjects, or with natives from whom they wished to extract information, and those methods were in most instances attended with inexcusable harshness. Later, when a detachment of 60 were employed as scouts in the extreme south of Luzon, particularly in the province of Tayabas, it was found expedient to withdraw them and send them back to their homes in the city of Macabebe, that the fleeing inhabitants, who feared them but had the utmost confidence in the humanity of the American troops, might be persuaded to leave their concealments in the hills and mountains and return to their towns. They have since continued to patrol the southern shore of Manila Bay, the province of Bataan, and southern Zambales, but being constantly under close observation have not committed extravagant excesses. In October the new volunteer organizations began to arrive. The three regiments organized in the Philippines (the Eleventh Cavalry, the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Infantry) were in service, and during the month headquarters and two squadrons of the Third Cav- alry, all of the Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty- third, and Thirty-fourth regiments of infantry, with portions of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-second and casuals for other crganizations, numbering, all told, 312 officers and 8,154 enlisted men, reported. The Twenty-sixth Infantry was immediately sent to Panay and the other troops retained in Luzon. These were followed in November by the remainder of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-second Infantry and all of the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-fifth Infantry regiments, which, with recruits and casuals who accompanied them, numbered in their entirety 214 commissioned officers and 5,448 en- listed men. All of these troops excepting the Thirty-first Infantry, which was sent to Mindanao, were retained for service in Luzon. In December there arrived 459 officers and 12,201 enlisted men, con- sisting of the Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, Forty-second, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Forty-fifth, Forty-sixth, and Forty-seventh regiments of infantry entire and two batteries of the Sixth Artillery, with recruits and casuals for present organizations. The Forty-fourth Infantry was forwarded at once to Panay and Negros and all of the other organizations disembarked at Manila. In January there arrived the Forty-first, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth regiments of infantry, which, with recruits and casuals, numbered 266 officers and 5,279 enlisted men. The above designated troops comprised all the addi- tional force the authorities intended to forward to the Philippines. Our total effective strength in the islands in commissioned officers. and enlisted men (sick only excluded from the computation) was, at the termination of the several months heretofore mentioned, as fol- lows: At the end of August it was 26,820; October, 35,683; Novem- ber, 40,833; December, 51,167; January, 54,803, and for February and March the returns show 55,333 and 55,882, respectively. The figures are in all probability the highest that will be reached, as the volunteer organizations must gradually diminish in numerical strength. The sick of thisarmy decreased from August to January, during which period it experienced the most trying service and the severest climatic REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 15 exposures. For August it was 134 per cent of its total number; for September, October, November, and December it was 11.6, 10.3, 10.6, and 8.7, respectively. It increased again in January to 11, which per cent it maintained throughout February, and fell to 10.9 in March. It is now slightly under that figure. These sick lists include the names of all men incapacitated by reason of wounds, bruises, and ailments of every character, and must be considered remarkably low for a tropical climate in a season of marked active military operations. Could sol- diers be induced to obey the ordinary rules of health and compelled to take those precautionary measures necessary in hot climates, the sick list would not probably exceed a per cent of 6, for the experience of the troops in the Philippines shows that the climate is not unhealth- ful, though enervating because of excessive continued heat. It also shows that troops liberally subsisted retain their powers of endurance, and after a short acclimatization can surpass the poorly fed natives in overcoming the difficulties to be met with in campaigning amid swamps or jungles and over mountains. These new volunteer regiments had been provided with excellent field officers, who had taken advantage of their opportunities to make them proficient, and upon landing in the Philippines they proved to be in fair condition to take the field. There also arrived within these months Brigadier-Generals Wheeler, Young, Schwan, and Grant. General Wheeler was assigned to the command of a brigade in the Second Division; General Young to a brigade in the First Division, as has already been stated; General Schwan was appointed chief of staff of the department and corps, and General Grant was assigned to the command of a brigade in General Lawton’s First Division. Late in September Brigadier-General Bates reported for duty at corps head- uarters in Manila, he having completed the duties assigned him in the olo archipelago. The approximate time of the arrival of the volunteers could be determined with comparative accuracy, as information of their depar- ture from the United States was promptly cabled from Washington. We therefore knew for a month at least in advance the strength of the force we could depend upon when about to initiate an aggressive movement against the enemy. It was known that the enemy at the north, where was concentrated the insurgent government and a majority of its army, which was re- ceiving accessions from the southeastern provinces of Luzon, intended, if worsted in the lowlands and on the plains, to retire to the mountains to the north and east, where it asserted it could prolong the war indefi- nitely. It was also believed from the secret information obtained from scouts and other sources that the insurgent armed force in the north did not possess more than 25,000 rifles, of which 2,000 or 3,000 were in the hands of troops maintained in the extreme northern sections of the island. Could the forces along the line of the railway from Ange- les to Dagupan and throughout the provinces of Tarlac, Pangasinan, and portions of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, where the majority of the insurgent troops were then operating, be held there until we could close the northern and eastern roads of egress to the mountains, we had no doubt of our ability to capture or scatter them, take possession of the railroad, and pursue successfully any of their retreating col- umns or detachments. Such were, in brief, the conclusions reached early in August, and to the development of an appropriate plan of 16 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. operations all other military movements in Luzon were made subser- vient. Preparations by the initiatory movements of troops com- menced in August by General MacArthur’s capture of Angeles, whose objective would thereafter become the insurgent troops along the line of the railway. General Lawton was to proceed up the Rio Grande from Calumpit and San Fernando, prepared to swing to the left should occasion require, and another force was to proceed by sea to San Fabian, on the west coast of Luzon, a few miles east of north from Dagupan. The plan was ultimately fully executed and was only delayed by the necessity of awaiting the arrival of sufficient additional troops whose assistance was required to insure success. These were to arrive in Uctonet, and the advance could be taken up by the middle of that month. 2 The forwarding of cavalry, infantry, and wagon transportation to San Fernando, which began September 20, the construction of flat boats, and the gathering of cascoes in the Rio Grande at the Calumpit railway crossing, and the accumulation of supplies at the last-named point, either alarmed the insurgent authorities or induced them to believe that the time had arrived for putting to the test their fre- quently expressed intention of falling upon our soldiers in large num- bers as soon as they should become scattered in small bodies over an extended field of operations, for their troops manifested renewed activity. They attacked our force at Angeles, made demonstrations against the towns of Guagua, Santa Rita, Mexico, Santa Ana, and Baliuag, on the northern line, annoyed our detachments guarding the railroad and the organizations placed for defense on the outskirts of Manila. Those authorities gave instructions for moreaggressive action to their troops south of Manila, and through their emissaries endeay- ored to incite the inhabitants of the eity, directing uprising and assas- sination. On the 1st of October a plan to attack the arsenal in the walled portion of the city with a force of 700 men, mostly armed with bolos, and at the same time to concentrate a force of a thousand or more in its northern section, there to apply the torch and work such destruction to life and property as they might be able, was fully deter- mined upon. It failed to materialize, as the extra watchfulness of the provost guard, police, and detachments occupying the various barrack buildings prevented those meditating hostilities from taking the initia- tive. Throughout the Cavite province, where comparative quiet had revailed for some time, renewed activity was noticeable. Along the acoor and Imus roads the insurgents gathered in large numbers. They invested Imus and boldly attacked our troops there, confident of success. General Grant was commanding in that section, but had not sufficient force to insure the safety of the various points which his brigade occupied. General Lawton proceeded to Bacoor to ascertain the true situation, and wired on October 3 as follows: I have just arrived. Find enemy still occupying west side of Imus River. Am crossing force here to other side river, oe two companies, Fourteenth Infan- try, and 130 marines from Navy. Have ordered troops from Parafiaque, Las Pifias, and Zapote, including McGrath’s troop, cavalry, from Pasay to this place. They are to be relieved, or their places to be taken by three companies of the Thirteenth Infan- try from Pasay. Colonel Daggett will command troops crossing here to west side river. General Bisbee will take charge of everything up to and including Bacoor. General Grant will go to Imus and will command in person there. He will take one battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, and move down west bank Imus River to meet column from this side. By this means I hope to clear out enemy and reestablish REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 17 communication with Imus permanently. I think troops of Thirteenth can return this p. m., if not, the Pasay line may need looking after. Will wire any important information as it is received. And later in the day he telegraphed: Enemy driven from vicinity of Imus and Imus River. Casualties: Lieutenant Bur- gess, artillery, severely wounded, leg. Several insurgents killed and several wounded, and others captured. General Grant will continue in pursuit of enemy for short time longer and then return to Imus for the night. I will return immediately to Manila. At Calamba General Kline, who exercised command there, tele- graphed on October 4 the result of an attack made on his troops at that point, and added that the ‘* most conservative estimates from the outside place the number of insurgents killed yesterday at about sixty. It therefore became necessary to attack and severely punish these Cavite insurgents before prosecuting operations in the north, as our present strength did not allow the retention of many men on our southern line while the general northern advance was in progress. General Lawton was instructed to form at Bacoor a column of troops from those available in Manila and south of the city, drive off the insurgents in the vicinity of Imus, and, proceeding from Bacoor west- ward along the shore of Manila Bay, attack their strong positions at Cavite Viejo and Novaleta, and thence, proceeding in the direction of the seacoast to Rosario, situated near that coast, turn and attack San Francisco de Malabon, the headquarters of General Trias, who commanded all the insurgent forces of Southern Luzon. Thereafter he was to be guided by circumstances and such instructions as he might receive. He was instructed to pursue the armed insurgents, paying no attention to the apparently peaceably disposed citizens except to give them temporary protection while troops were passing, to leave behind no guard, but to push on with the entire command to the sea- coast, where supplies would be found awaiting the arrival of the troops. General Schwan was assigned to the immediate command of this column, which, upon complete organization, numbered 46 officers and 1,728 enlisted men. It consisted of the Thirteenth Infantry entire,, Colonel Bisbee commanding; four companies Fourteenth Infantry. commanded by Captain Taylor; Captain McGrath’s dismounted troop Fourth Cavalry, and Captain Tate’s mounted troop of the Third Cav- alry; two platoons Light Battery F, Fourth Artillery, under Captain Reilly; an engineer company, commanded by Captain Sibert; an Hos- pital and Signal Corps detachment, with Surgeon Keefer and Lieuten- ant Clarke in charge, and 63 scouts (white and Tagalo in equal proportions), commanded by Lieutenant Castner of the Fourth Infan- try. General Schwan’s temporary improvised staff consisted of my aid, Lieutenant Sladen, acting adjutant-general; Captain Biddle, Fourteenth Infantry, as chief quartermaster; and Lieutenant Bash, Thirteenth Infantry, as brigade commissary. He was attended by his own personal staff, and accompanying him were Captain Taylor, Fourth Artillery, and Major and Surgeon G. F. Shiels. Upon the assembling of the troops at Bacoor the Fourth Infantry, which had defended Imus and guarded the Imus and Bacoor roads, was concentrated at Imus. On the evening of October 7 the col- umn proceeded westward and crossed the Imus River near its mouth. I had requested the commander in chief of the naval forces on this 4495 2 18 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Asiatic station to cause the marines stationed at the Cavite naval sta- tion to occupy the attention of the insurgents at Novaleta, which wax situated at the base of the narrow neck of ground which connects the inainland with that station, while General Schwan should engage those in the vicinity of the town of Old Cavite. A battalion of marines under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott moved out promptly on the morning of the Sth and engaged the enemy, whose outposts were concealed in the dense brush on the connecting strip of land, to which they tenaciously held. They were driven back on Novaleta with con- siderable loss, the casualties among the marines being 2 officers and 9 men wounded. The fighting of Schwan’s troops near Cavite Viejo was severe. The enemy was soon dislodged, however, leaving on the field a number of dead, a few rifles, and two pieces of artillery. The col- umn then moved quickly to Novaleta, where it struck in flank the formidable insurgent intrenchments’ which had been erected there, quickly drove out the enemy, who, greatly dispirited, retreated rap- idly on the Rosario and Malabon roads and through the dense brush to the vicinity of their homes, where, with arms concealed, they would be able to present themselves to any passing American troops as the most consistent of ‘‘amigos.” The column rationed at Rosario advanced on San Francisco de Malabon, driving out the enemy, who made slight resistance, to the southward. General Schwan was then directed to croxs over to the Imus and Dasmariiias road and march on Dasmarifias. “The time was the middle of the rainy season, and all roads were well nigh impassable for artil- lery and wagon transportation. He had experienced great difficulties thus far on his advance from this cause, and it would be impossible to take even pack transportation across the rice swamps intervening between Malabon and the designated road to Dasmarifias. He there- fore returned his artillery and small quartermaster’s train by way of Old Cavite escorted by cayalry, and proceeded to Dasmariiias with his foot troops, they carrying on their persons their ammunition and rations. He encountered only a few fleeing insurgent detachments. and upon arrival at the designated point he was recalled to Bacoor, ‘whence the troops comprising the column were sent to occupy the positions from which they had been drawn. The result of the expedi- tion was a temporary thorough demoralization of the insurgents of the Cavite province, the capture of insurgent supplies and money. and the destruction of much contraband of war. Many prisoners were taken, but all were released except the more important officers. On October 13 General Schwan telegraphed from Bacoor the following: If the amount of damage a campaign inflicts upon the enemy be true test of its success, I can claim a larger share for mine than is indicated in my previous official dispatches. or the facts appear to be that not less than 100 Filipinos, including large proportion of officers, were killed in the practically continuous engagements from the time we left Cavite Viejo until our entrance into Rosario, and in our combat on the Buena Vista road, in which Captain Geary was mortally wounded. The padre at Imus, a man of intelligence and concededly truthful, has informed the officers there that about 100 Filipinos, killed in the actions referred to, were buried in Rosario and other places near by, and General Grant now tells me that the burial party he sent to Butulan interred twenty odd bodies. Ihave it from several sources, each entitled to full credit, that the insurgents’ military authorities have, within the past few days, sent 400 of their wounded south for treatment in the mountains. It is notorious that the enemy’s losses are frequently overestimated, hence I determined to report actually ascertained facts only; but justice to my command compels me to communicate to you the reports of the gentlemen mentioned, whose correctness can hardly be challenged. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. . 19 General Schwan’s casualties in commissioned officers were Captains Geary and Saffold, Thirteenth Infantry, killed; Captain McGrath, Fourth Cavalry, wounded, and who subsequently died from the wound received; Lieutenant Fenton, Fifth Cavalry, slightly wounded. Twenty-two enlisted men were wounded, none seriously. We were now assured that the insurgents south would maintain respectful distances from our outposts, and attention was given to the contemplated northern advance. General Wheaton had been ordered in from General MacArthur’s front at Angeles to take command of the expedition which was to proceed by sea to San Fabian on the north coast of the island, and had been replaced by General Bates. On October 9 the following instructions were sent out: ; Mania, October 9, 1899. General MacArtuur, Angeles : A portion of General Lawton’s command, General Young with battalion Twenty- fourth Infantry and squadron Fourth Cavalry, move at once. Watch well country to your right and send down to San Fernando for service there and eastward that place the battalion Twenty-second Infantry now at Angeles. Barry. Mania, October 9, 1899. General MacArruur, Angeles: General Young will move north with a small force, leaving half of Lawton’s troops in San Fernando. It would be well to send General Bates there to take temporary command of that whole section. General Schwan’s movements in Cavite province will keep out troops intended for north for three or four days. Barry, A. G. And General MacArthur replied: ANGELES, October 9, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Malacafian : In pursuance of telegraphic instructions just received from your office, I have pre- pared an order temporarily establishing the headquarters Second Brigade of this division at San Fernando, and directing the brigade commander, General Bates, to proceed to that place and take temporary command of that whole section, which General Bates instructed includes Mexico, San Fernando, Bacolor, Santa Rita, and Guagua, and all troops stationed thereat. Does this order conform to the wishes of the department commander? MacAnrruour. General Bates relieved General Young at San Fernando, and the latter, to whom the mounted and artillery companies of the Thirty- seventh Infantry and the two battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry had been ordered to report, advanced with the Twenty-fourth Infantry, the two companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, and a portion of the ‘Fourth Cavalry on Arayat, which he captured with the loss of only one man (a private of the Twenty-fourth Infantry severely wounded), and drove the enemy back on the Magalang road, who, before retreat- ing, fired the town, which was partially destroyed. Here the gunboat Florida and Ballance’s Battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry joined the column; here the crossing of the troops and wagon transportation to the east bank of the river was to be effected, and for this purpose the flat boats had been constructed at Calumpit. The gunboats Oeste, Florida, and Laguna de Bay had been sent to Calumpit, the first two to tow the loaded cascoes up the river from that point and the latter for patrol duty. The first consignment of supplies left Calumpit for Arayat on October 13. 20 . REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Upon the previous day extended reconnoissances had been made by the troops on the north Manila line and from the Pasig River. Major Cheatham with a battalion of his regiment (the Thirty-seventh Infan- try) had proceeded from San Pedro Macati down the east shore of the Laguna de Bay to Muntinlupa. He drove out the enemy, which, assembling in force on the outskirts, awaited an opportunity to ambush his troops. Under the direction of a guide, a had offered his services gratuitously, a detachment of Cheatham’s men were led into the brush, fired upon by a concealed enemy and 3 killed, the remainder escaping into the town. Major Cheatham had encountered much opposition on his advance and had about consumed his ammuni- tion and rations. He succeeded in forwarding information of his con dition into Pasig by the lake, from which the requisite supplies were immediately sent him. The next morning he brushed away the enemy from his front, proceeded westward, following trails unknown to him, and after marching a few miles turned to the right and entered Bacoor that evening. There was no more difficulty in that section of Cavite Province for several weeks, and the Spaniards who had taken service with the insurgents were ready to abandon the enterprise and accept transportation to Spain at the expense of the United States. On October 15 the commanding officer at Pasig telegraphed: There is at present detained here First Lieut. Diego Morenillo y Pecon, who was an. artificer af artillery in the Spanish army. Was captured in Santa Cruz by the Filipinos September 1, 1898. He was kept prisoner until forced by cireumstances into the Filipino service, together with other Spaniards. He is now stationed at Santa Rosa, on the lake, and appears here as a delegate from Maj. Manuel Ruiz, in charge of artillery, who with other Spaniards desire to quit their present service and leave the country. He proposes to aid in the capture of Bifiang, Santa Rosa, and Cabuyao, promising to arrange guns so that they will fire wild of American troops, and that the latter shall not fire at them. There are about 15 pieces of artillery of various kinds, including one Krupp 8-centimeter, rapid fire,and machine guns. His detailed proposition is ae below. The reference to sentenced prisoners refers to Ruiz, who was confined for stabbing affray in September by American authorities. Pecon says four companies in cascoes with a launch could take the three places mentioned. He says they are important places for the insurgents, who are supplied from there with provisions and money. He thinks early action should be taken or the pieces may be withdrawn to the hills. The insurgents have an arsenal at Lipa, where ammunition is prépared. He says they are well supplied. Will visit Tagui this afternoon, returning by 4, where orders may meet me. Receiving none, chal return to San Pedro. Pecon is accompanied by three Filipinos, who desire also, he states, to desert and return to Manila. The proposition is as follows: General Ot1s, Manila: We believe the prosecution of the present war between the Filipinos and the United States to be unhumanitarian and prejudicial for both countries. 1. Speaking for these men who are under my orders, I come to make you the fol- lowing proposition: Par. 1. As soon as we come to a mutual understanding we will permit the free entry of American troops without resistance or bloodshed. Par. 2. We desire an indemnification for each man, including the soldiers, accord- ing to his grade and appointment. Par. 3. We desire documents from you that will guarantee our personal safety. Par. 4. We desire documentary statement from the American Government to the effect that our past connection with the revolution is forgotten and condoned, and in ease one of our party should be sentenced for a past offense, committed under the American régime, that this sentence shall be condoned. Par. 5. Allow us free transportation, or the amount thereof, on account of the Gov- ernment of the United States, to such foreign parts as we may select. Par. 6. Hand to us checks, or promises to pay, for the amounts that you, in accord with the Government, decide to pay us for indemnification; these checks to be REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 41 handed us before leaving Santa Rosa and considered as reward for delivering the pieces of artillery. And in case we do not come to an understanding, and we are obliged to defend ourselves because of the nonacceptance of this proposition, we state we are not responsible for any disasters which may consequently occur. The guar- anties and explications which you may need in proof of this proposition can be obtained from the delegate, the bearer of this letter, who is authorized by us to close this proposition as soon as you and he reach an understanding. Santa Rosa, 14th of October, 1899. Tue Cnrer or ARTILLERY, & Spaniard. No heed was given to this dispatch, and later in the day a telegram was received which indicated that the time to take action on the prop- osition had passed, even if we desired to entertain it. The informa- tion it contained was not true, for some, if not all, of the men reported to have been slaughtered have since arrived in Manila. The telegram is as follows: CaLaMBa, October 15, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL First Division: While cruising down the lake at 8.30 overhauled a casco with two Spaniards, one a second lieutenant and one a sergeant in the insurgent army. They surrendered and asked that the casco be sent down to Santa Rosa to receive the rest of the gar- rison, which wished to surrender, with their arms and 6 field pieces. I towed the casco down to Santa Rosa, but everything looked deserted. I did not go closer than one-half mile from shore, fearing trap. One of the prisoners went in alone in a small boat to get natives to pole the casco in. I soon saw him return in hot haste. He reported that the insurgents had come up from Bifiang and murdered the seven remaining Spanish officers. No shots were fired, and I returned to Calamba, turning the two prisoners and one Remington over to the Twenty-first Infantry. Larson, Commanding Napindan. General Lawton left Manila for San Fernando on October 15 with instructions to push his advance on to San Isidro, leaving sufficient force along the river from Arayat north to protect his supplies, which were being transported by boat. His force was to consist of 3,500 men, to be attended by 40 escort wagons and such additional cart transportation as he might require, the same to be secured from the inhabitants. . He was directed to seize upon Aliaga and Cabanatuan, both important strategic points, as soon as possible after he had secured possession of the Spanish post of San Isidro (a walled inclosure sup- plied with quarters, barracks, and storehouses), to reconnoiter the immediately surrounding country, and await instructions to govern any extended advance until information concerning the movements of the enemy could be obtained. On October 17 he telegraphed from Arayat that the ferry had been completed, that troops were crossing to the east bank of the river, and that an advance on Cabiao would be made that night. In the meantime the insurgents were active in General MacArthur's sphere of operations. On October 15 the General telegraphed informa- tion which he had just received from Baliuag, where six companies of the Third Infantry, a troop of the Fourth Cavalry, and two pieces of artillery were stationed. The telegram was as follows: ANGELES, October 15, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE Paciric: Following received from commanding officer, Baliuag: ‘‘Outpost on east and north and west flank successively attacked at 9.30, 11.30, and 1.30 last night. No casualties on our side. Careful investigation by scouts and spies shows about 2,000 insurgents and four field guns in the vicinity of Baliuag; 1,200 more are expected, when a siege is promised.” Upon inquiry for further information in the premises, following was received from the commanding officer, Baliuag: 22 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. “T have no doubt about the accuracy of the information sent you to-day. It has been verified in several ways. The guns and carriages have been minutely described. Pio del Pilar has been seen in the vicinity. Total number reported to me was about 4,000, but all not being armed. I have not reported the unarmed. The natives are evacuating all around.” MacArtHur. And later in the day the commanding officer at Baliuag reported that he had a sufficient number of troops to hold his position. His estimate of numbers was greatly exaggerated, as at that time there could not have been more than 500 insurgents in front of or in the vicinity of Baliuag. On the following day he telegraphed that the insurgents in his front were disappearing and that part of Pilar’s forces in the neighborhood of San Rafael bad fallen back toward Maasin. On October 16 the following information was received from General MacArthur: ANGELES, October 16, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Manila: At 2 o’clock this morning an extensive demonstration was commenced by insur- gents against this place.. They appeared in detached bodies on the entire front, extending from the Porac road on the left around nearly to the railroad on the right— that is to say, on the arc of a circle about 225 degrees. They opened with artillery which they used freely in the early stages of the demonstration, and for the first time in this division injured men with projectiles, 3 men being thus hit. The sub- sistence storehouse was struck seven or eight times by cannon shot and shell. Frag- ments of projectiles recovered indicate that insurgents have, among others, a small gun using American-made ammunition exactly like that supplied our Hotchkiss revolving cannon. Part of a brass shell taken frpm a wounded man shows that it was made in Connecticut and compares exactly with Hotchkiss revolving ammuni- tion which we have for the service of our gun. Is it possible a Hotchkiss revolving cannon was captured at Orani from the naval launch lost there? The insurgents withdrew before daylight, thus preventing any offensive action on our part. The affair was prearranged undoubtedly, and elaborately prepared, and its general fea- tures much like the event of June 16 at San Fernando. Our casualties were 1 enlisted man mortally wounded who died on the field; Acting-Surgeon Stafford and 8 soldiers wounded, 2 of the latter severely. As the entire transaction was in the dark, it is impossible to estimate the enemy’s force and loss. Our fire discipline was good, however, and there must have been some corresponding result. The force employed by the insurgents must have been considerable, as the demonstration was to a great extent simultaneous, and extended over a front of several miles. While these things were going on at Angeles, a very feeble demonstration was made against the battalion at Calulut. I attach no special significance to the trans- action, and suppose similar affairs will occur from time to time until we are prepared to make a general advance. ‘ MacAnrrHur. On October 17 the General telegraphed from Angeles: Following received from General Bates: ‘‘Colonel Bell, leaving small garrison at Bacolor, Santa Rita, and Guagua, moved out about 8 p. m. yesterday with balance of regiment, about 600 strong, attempted surprise of insurgents at Porac and vicinity. They got wind of his coming and fled. At 4 this morning, with part of his force, he struck two companies of insurgents, killing 2, capturing 13 prisoners and 15 guns. Bell’s casualties were, killed, Private Willard Winters, Company H; wounded, Pri- vate Samuel Williams, Company M. Williams and body of Winters have been for- warded to Manila on afternoon train. The officersand men of the Thirty-sixth appear to have shown great gallantry. Captain Smiley and Lietenant Cowen of my staff were with Colonel Bell. Colonel Bell appears to have been back at Bacolor about 6 p. m. to-day.” On the 22d the following was received: ANGELES, October 22, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PaciFic: A successful scout, made by Lieutenant Ferguson, Thirty-sixth Infantry Volunteers, is reported as follows: ‘‘Went to Lubao by way of Sesmoan. Very bad road. Had to use bancas to cross two streams, swimming horses at junction of Florida Blanca, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 23 and here, on Hermosa road, in exactly same place as fight of other day, met about 75 insurgents. Killed 2, captured 3,5 guns. Returned on main road. At Santo Tomas, half mile this side Lubao, near road leading to San Roque, insurgents attempted tu ambush us. We killed 4, captured 5; captured 5 guns. Home in safety at 6.30 p. m. Total for to-day, 8 prisoners, 10 guns, 7 single-shot Mausers or Amberg, 3 Remingtons; 6 insurgents killed. No casualties on our side.’’ Lieutenant Ferguson had 20 men in his detachment. , MacArruur. Lawton’s column had now taken up the advance north from Arayat. It had been joined by the two squadrons of the Third Cavalry and two companies Macabebe scouts. The Thirty-fourth Infantry and an additional troop of the Fourth Cavalry would soon be en route to join. The advance was conducted by General Young in person, and on October 18 General Lawton telegraphed as follows: Arayat, October 18, 1899. General Scuwan, Manila: The following just received from General Young: ‘‘Batson with his scouts left here (Arayat) at 12 o’clock last night. Struck two companies of insurgents in trenches at San Mateo at daylight this a.m. Attacked in front and flank. He drove the enemy from the trenches, pursued them vigorously until they were thoroughly dis- persed and demoralized. Several of the enemy killed; 25 prisoners, including cap- tain and lieutenant; captured afew arms. My loss, 1 man killed. Prisoners say no soldiers at Cabiao. About 400 at San Isidro. Captain Ballance with his battalion is well up in support of Batson.”’ I will arrive at Cabiao with most of my force to-morrow a.m, - Lawton. CaBiao, October 19, 1899. General ScHWAN: . The following received from General Young: ‘‘Command marched from Cabiao at 8.30 a.m. Encountered the heaviest resistance at stream near San Fernando, where the enemy had torn up the bridge. Arrived San Isidro about 1.30 p.m. Casual- ties, 1 killed, 8 wounded, all of Twenty-second Infantry. Can not get names until Ballance returns from Gapan. General Pio del Pilar commanded the troops, coming in from San Miguel last night. The larger force of enemy retreated up river with Pilar. One Spanish pfisoner and 15 insurrectos captured to-day. Do not know enemy’s loss. The people in this town seem to be very friendly.’’ Lawton, Mujor-General. On October 22 inquiry was made of General Lawton for the par- ticulars of the situation, informing him that the entire Thirty-fourth Infantry, and sufficient mules and wagons to increase the number of his escort wagons to 40, would be sent him on or before the 25th instant. The following telegraphic correspondence extending over a period of several days is probably the best presentation of the opera- tions of this northern column during the period which can be given. It is quite lengthy, but furnishes very full information of occurrences. The telegrams are herein recorded in order of dates. CaBiao, October 22, 1899. General Scuwan, Chief of Statf, Manila: Yours of to-day just received. The situation is simply one of transportation. The river is dead low. About the same as when I was here in May and the prospect ix that there will be no more high water, at least only temporary rises. The launches drawing 4 feet or less will give me all I require, otherwise I must have 100 or more bull teams to haul from below Cabiao to San Isidro. Jam sure that the launches and something that can float and tow a casco can be had. I will send my chief quartermaster to Manila to secure them. Even the small launches from the trans- ports might do, but the large launches can work only on the lower river. There is Pf REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. no enemy of consequence in this vicinity. I shall not break down and wear out my mule transportation hauling my supplies up river. I will need them to follow and supply column. As soon as I have ten days’ supplies ahead at San Isidro, I shall occupy Aliaga and Cabanatuan simultaneously. Lawton. : Maniia, October 22, 1899. General Lawton, Cabiau: ‘ Hire all necessary bull and other teams which you may be able to obtain to assist transporting your supplies. Laguna de Bay, now at Calumpit, has turned launch and coal casvoes over to Major Brooke. Franklin has been directed to meet any demonstration enemy may make on river between Calumpit and Arayat, and he has been informed that he can assist you in towing cascoes to vicinity of last-named place. Inquiry being made here for very light draft launches, as vet without success. Scuway, Chief of Staff. San Isipro, October 22, 1899. General ScHWAN: Following from Cabiao: ‘“‘Following note just received by courier: ‘Sergeant Harris, in charge of Oceania, was fired upon at mouth of Rio Chico. Major Howard killed outright, W. P. Chambers wounded right arm, J. W. Dean shot through body. (Signed) Dorrington, Lieutenant, Thirty-fourth Infantry.’ Have sent ambulance with surgeon and detail of 20 men to place where boat landed, about 2 miles below the lower landing. Courier reports Lieutenant Lincoln, with Company