GOLKAR AND THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS OF 1971 by MASASHI NISHIHARA MONOGRAPH SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1972 No. 56 SEAP Publications Price: $3.50 Do not remove from room 213 640 Stewart AvenueTOLKAR AND THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS OF 1971 t>y Masashi Nishlhari MONOGRAPH SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1972 No. 56TABLE OP CONTENTS Page Introduction.............................................. 1 I. The Making of the Election Laws, 1966-1969...... 4 II. Preparations for Administering the Elections, 1970................................. 11 III. Golkar, A Party Built from Above................ 17 IV. Screening of Candidates, January-April 1971.... 24 V. The Official Campaign, April 27 to June 25...... 32 VI. Electoral Results................................ 40 VII. Pemilu in a Larger Context....................... 51 Tables I-XIII............................................. 57INTRODUCTION* Golkar, which might be described as a recently estab- lished party of the government,1 won an impressive victory in the long-awaited (pemilihan umum-general elections) of July 3, 1971. The newly composed rfouse of Representatives, known as the DPR,2 has 460 seats, of which 360 were contested in the * The writer expresses his deep appreciation to the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, for a re- search fellowship which made possible his stay in Djakarta at the time of the elections. All the views expressed herein are solely his and in no way represent those of the Center. His thanks also go to Mrs. Molly Bondan for her critical reading of the original manuscript as well as her assistance in improving its style. It should also be noted that the writer is fully aware that there are many statements made herein which require more crit- ical documentation and further elaboration. Hopefully, this will be done at a later date since it is feared that such attempt here might blur this paper*s focus on the subject of the elections. 1. Golkar is an acronym of Golongan Karya, which is usually translated as "Functional Group." It is essentially a loose confederation of occupational groups of all kinds, ranging from civil servants to betjak (tricycle-taxi) drivers. Since the ill-fated Communist coup of 1965 Golkar has grown fast mainly as a result of strong sup- port from the Departments of Defense and Security and of Home Affairs. Golkar is also referred to as Sekber Golkar since its coordinating body is called Sekber, an acronym of Sekretariat Bersama or Joint Secretariat. Thus in this paper Golkar and Sekber Golkar are used interchange- ably unless otherwise specified. The Suharto government and Golkar claim that Golkar is a political group and not a political party: however, in actual practice, it has functioned as a party. For this reason Golkar is treated here as a party except where it is necessary to dis- tinguish it from the other parties as the government does. For further details, see Chapter III. 2. This DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat)replaced the previous legislative body, named the DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat—Gotong-Rojong), which was installed by President Sukarno in I960 after he dissolved the DPR created by the 1955 general elections. The 1971 elections were also conducted for local legislative councils called 12 elections. In 25 provinces, where 351 seats were contested in direct elections, Golkar won 227; in the twenty-sixth prov- ince, West Irian, whose seats were contested by an indirect method, Golkar won all 9. Furthermore, in line with the 1969 election law the remaining 100 seats have been allotted to Golkar by appointment. The emergence of a party with such a clear parliamentary majority (336 out of 460 members or 73 percent) is unprece- dented in Indonesian legislative history. Since it was only the second general election held in the twenty-six years since the nation became independent and since it was conducted in a most orderly manner, this election attests convincingly to President Suharto's grip on national power and to his admini- strative competence. Certainly, Golkar's electoral success was in part a popular endorsement of Suharto's effective halt to inflation and his relatively successful economic rehabilitation pro- grams. Yet it would be perhaps naive to conclude that Golkar's 63 percent of the vote reflected overwhelming voluntary sup- port of the Suharto regime. The high voting rate of 94 per- cent, in addition to the triumph of the military-controlled government party demand that close attention be paid to the government's electoral strategy. At the outset it must be borne in mind that analyses of the 1971 Indonesian elections inevitably suffer from methodo- logical limitations. Public opinion surveys are far from feasible in contemporary Indonesia where many people fear that any record made of their criticisms of the Suharto government may serve to identify them as opponents.3 Students of Indo- nesian elections are deprived of behavioral studies which DPRD (DPR Daerah), which exist at two administrative levels: first-level (province), and second-level (kota- madya/kabupaten —municipal/regency) monograph. This deals primarily with the national-level parliamentary elections. 3. Two opinion surveys conducted in December 1970 support this point. One of them, undertaken by the Press and Public Opinion Institute of the Department of Informa- tion, is reported in Antara Warta Berita, April 20, 1971 (evening editionH The other study, executed by a private group, P. T. Inscore Indonesia, asked the respondents only general political questions, such as on the relative importance of general elections, poli- tical parties, foreign aid, etc. Neither study sought critical views on the ruling group of Indonesia.relate voting decisions to voters' age, sex, education, re- ligion, occupation, political awareness, political affilia- tions, and so forth, which are possible in other places where there is greater freedom of expression. A comparison of these elections with those of 1955, the only other national elections held in Indonesia, would not prove very meaningful, since the two elections were held under very different circumstances. The 1955 elections saw some forty political parties and groups freely campaigning for legislative seats, while in 1971 the participating groups were limited to ten parties including the government's Golkar The Communist Party (PKI), generally regarded as the largest party by late 1957, has been banned since 1966. The youngest voter in 1955, who would then have been 18 years old, was 34 years old in 1971, and voters between 17 and 33 years old in 1971 cast ballots for the first time in their lives. Thus, in studying the 1971 elections, it is appropriate to emphasize the means by which the Suharto government tried to organize its electoral victory rather than the manner in which the Indonesian voter responded to the election campaign The official campaign period was set for sixty days from April 27 through June 25, 1971. Djakarta newspapers carried some reports of violence during the campaign, and there were constant complaints and protests by the parties over the "unfair" nature of the campaign, particularly by the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). What happened during this campaign period, however, seems to have been of less significance for the elections than government efforts prior to the official campaign. President Suharto and his closest military associates had worked so strenuously at an electoral strategy which mobi- lized virtually all the offices of the government—civilian and military, national and local—for support of Golkar, that, by the time the formal campaign period began, Golkar had finished its essential electioneering effort. Indisputably this was a formidable operation for Suharto and his military colleagues, for they sought thereby to legitimize the socio-political role of the Armed Forces (ABRI). The difficulty involved in attaining this objec- tive was amply demonstrated by the fact that, in the period of 1966 to 1971, ABRI had to shift its strategy drastically with regard to Golkar and other political parties. Up to the end of 1969, the Suharto group did not seem to have a clear idea of how best to seek a popular mandate to es- tablish their own legitimacy. During this period they evi- dently had little confidence in the efficacy of Golkar and tended instead to "court" as possible partners such4 political parties as the PNI and the new Moslem party, Parmusi Indeed, one of the most interesting points of ABRI's success story lies in the fact that ABRI first wooed the political par ties, then switched to Golkar, and in the process, "tamed" and eventually "deserted" the political parties. The three periods of courting, taming, and deserting the political parties seem to coincide with three stages of the government’s administrative preparedness for the general elec- tions which may he seen as: (1) the making of the election laws (1966-1969); (2) the technical preparations for the elections (1970); and (3) the administration of the elections (first half of 1971). These periods were by no means clear- cut; nevertheless, the general correspondence of timing be- tween the government’s plan for electoral preparations and ABRI's relations with political parties is indicative of the government's sophisticated efforts in synchronizing the two matters effectively. I. The Making of the Election Laws, 1966-1969 Restoring political stability was a paramount task for General Suharto when he obtained the now-famous March 11, 1966 order, which transferred power to him from President Sukarno. At that time Moslem and other anti-communist groups were assisting the military in hunting down PKI members, while civil servants were being screened for security clearances. Many mass organizations affiliated with the PNI and the out- lawed PKI were being subjected to military pressure for their dissolution, while student groups such as KAMI and KAPPI were demanding the public trial of President Sukarno for his al- leged complicity in the Gestapu/PKI affair. The NU, quickly gathering political support for its anti-PKI stand, urged that general elections be held immediately. In session from June 20 through July 5. 1966, the Provi- sional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS)4 passed a 4. The People's Consultative Assembly or MPR (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) is a constitutional organ that functions as a medium for the exercise of the people's sovereignty, determining the broad lines of national policy and electing a President and a Vice-President. The MPR consists of the members of the DPR, delegates from the regions, and representatives of other groups. A provisional form of this body, MPRS, which had been installed by President Sukarno in 1959, functioned until the 1971 elections produced an MPR.5 resolution which required that general elections he held by July 5, 1968. The resolution (No. ll/MPRS/1966) also stated that the new DPR, DPRD, and MPR were to be composed of "Golongan Politik dan Karya" (political parties and functional groups).5 In this way the government and the parties agreed to limits on the number of electoral competitors and the scope of competition. The resolution further stipulated that all election laws be passed within six months after July 5, 1966. But in fact parliamentary debates did not begin until November 24, 1966, when the President sent the necessary bills to the DPR-GR. The prevailing political turmoil prevented intelligent deliberations on these proposals, and debate was finally suspended for an indefinite period on November 27, 1967. ® Nevertheless, the fact that parliamentary debate had at least begun satisfied the political groups demanding general elections, and thus contributed to the restoration of political order. In January 1968, Suharto, by then Acting President, de- clared that the lack of technical preparations would make it impossible for elections to be conducted by the existing deadline of July 5, 1968.7 The fifth session of the MPRS, which met from March 20-27 that year, adopted a resolution „ (No. 42/MPRS/1968), setting a new deadline of July 5, 1971. The administration of national elections, it was argued, would impose a huge financial burden on the government. All technical preparations would have to be made from scratch; for example, the previous registration of voters, used six- teen years before, and the last census in 1961 would be of no use. Election costs were estimated at Rp. 10 billion, or some US $40 million, equivalent to about five percent of Indonesia's total expenditures for 1968, or over 28 percent of the country's development expenditures.9 Another 5. The full text of this resolution appears, for instance, in the General Elections Institute's manual for the 1971 general elections, Bekal Pemilu 1971 (Djakarta: State Printing Office, 1976), pp. 24^-251. 6. Ichtisar Tahunan 1967 (Antara news digest, 1967), p. 101. 7. Ichtisar Tahunan 1968. p. 3. 8. For the full text of the resolution, see Bekal Pemilu 1971. pp. 299-302. 9. Angkatan Bersendjata. March 1, 1968. Government expen- ditures for 1968 were Rp. 185,283 million, of which de- velopment expenditures were Rp. 35,537 million. (See Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics,6 deterrent to the holding of elections in 1968 was the belief that sufficient security for orderly elections was still lacking. It is probable that yet another important reason for delaying the elections was Suharto*s desire to keep political tensions to a minimum. The postponement of Pemilu would serve this purpose. The new Indonesian leader’s strategy was to depoliticize the prevailing tense political atmosphere by giving all-out emphasis to economic rehabilitation. Sukarno had made fiery political speeches and had diverted popular attention from the nation’s economic difficulties by creating intermittent external political and military threats. General Suharto wanted to do just the contrary. He began im- plementation of the Repelita, or Five-Year Development Plan, in April 1969. If there was to be a choice between Repelita and Pemilu, it was easy for him to choose. Swift rehabilita- tion and its subsequent contribution to political order would lead to firmer popular support than could be expected from general elections without concomitant economic reconstruction. After the MPRS had decided to postpone the elections, a special parliamentary commission resumed debates on the elec- tion bills. Deliberations dragged on until November 22, 1969 when the bills were finally adopted. What were called the "crucial points" of disagreement over the election laws con- cerned: (1) the numerical balance between political parties and functional groups in the MPR; (2) the numerical balance between military and non-military members of functional groups in the MPR, DPR. and DPRD; (3) the number of appointed members in the DPRD; (4) who would have the right to nominate non- military members of functional groups for the MPR, DPR, and DPRD; (5) the number of regional delegates in the MPR; (6) the December 1970. p. 66.) The exchange rate for the period December 19o7-December 1968 was US $1 = Rp. 250. (Ibid.. p. 128). In the 1968 budget Rp. 10 billion was appro- priated for election purposes, but evidently it was not expended. So far as is known the actual cost of the election turned out to be: Rp. 2,762 million or $8.49 million for 1969-1970 ($1 = Rp. 325); Rp. 10,958 million or $28.98 million for 1970-1971 ($1 = Rp. 378); and Rp. 4,250 million or $11.22 million for the first six months of fiscal year 1971-1972 ($1 = Rp. 378). This totals to Rp. 18,420 million or about $49.69 million. Rupiah figures are taken from Indonesian Financial Statistics. May 1972. pp. 76-7TT According to SuTuh Marhaen. June 3. 1971. the total cost of the elections, including security costs, would be approximately Rp. 20 billion.7 replacement of members of the MPR and DPR; and (7) the status of those central government officials—military or non-mili- tary—who would become members of the MPR, DPR, and DRPD.10 This monograph cannot go into the details of each of these points; but it is clear that the parliamentary delibera- tions were protracted because of the battle over the alloca- tion of seats in the MPR, DPR, and DPRD. In a sense, then, the electoral campaign began as early as November 1966 when the bills were first presented. This initial phase of the campaign ended with a government victory. Suharto secured a strong position for functional groups by obtaining ap- pointed quotas in parliamentary bodies at all levels: one- third of the 920-member MPR (307 seats), 22 percent of the 460-member DPR (100 seats), and 22 percent of the membership of local representative bodies both at the provincial and the kabupatdn/kotamadya levels. When legislative discussion of the election bills be- came protracted, there was talk in some quarters that the Suharto regime had intentionally delayed their passage in order to buy time to build up a strong, competitive Golkar. This allegation may not be accurate, but the fact cannot be ignored that, once the MPRS session of 1968 had postponed general elections until 1971, Suharto and his associates took the greatest possible advantage of the situation. It was apparent, however, that Suharto did not intend to put off the general elections too long, since he also wished to es- tablish his own political legitimacy. Already in September 1969, before the election laws were passed, the Minister for Home Affairs, General Amir Machmud, declared that the govern- ment would begin to prepare for general elections anyway.H The long parliamentary battle between the ABRI-domi- nated functional groups and the political parties from 1966 to 1969 reflected uncertainty on the part of ABRI concerning the electoral popularity of Golkar. It was because of this lack of confidence that the authorities initially considered partnership with either the PNI, Parmusi, or both, while persistently demanding legislation that would secure a sub- stantial number of appointive seats for Golkar. Prom 1965 through 1967 the authorities also made efforts to strengthen Golkar, and Golkar's share of the seats in the DPR-GR slowly increased during this period, that is, from 53.8 percent (161 seats) in pre-Gestapu 1965, to 54.9 percent (133 seats) in 1966, to 55.5 percent (194 seats) in 1967. However, in 1968 the proportion of Golkar seats decreased to 40.4 10. Bekal Pemllu 1971. pp. 8-9. 11. Sinar Harapan. September 8, 19698 percent (167 seats) and the conventional parties took 59.6 percent or 247 seats, an increase of 99 seats from 1967 (see Table I). The government permitted this since it hoped to gain advantages by drawing the major parties to its side in case Golkar failed to demonstrate real strength. ABRI's policy toward the PNI and Parmusi should be seen in this context. In December 1967, Suharto gave strong en- couragement to the formation of a new PNI out of the Gestapu- shattered PNI and some of its affiliated organizations.12 He issued instructions to all government employees—both civil and military—to give the PNI a chance to "consolidate and crystallize the spirit of the New Order" by its own methods. The acting president also appealed to all parties, mass or- ganizations, and occupational groups not to disturb any PNI efforts to that end. In August 1966, the Muhammadijah leadership was re- portedly considering the formation of a new Islamic party, in- tegrating "all Islamic forces" in the country. About a year later, in September 1967, nine Moslem organizations, headed by the Muhammadijah, agreed to the idea of a new Moslem party. On the basis of a presidential decree (No. 70, of February 20, 1968), the Indonesian Moslem Party (PMI), later known as Parmusi, was then established under the chairmanship of Djamawi Hadikusumo.13 The new party was immediately given 18 seats in the DPR-GR. Suharto and the military thereby pro- vided a political outlet for those Moslem forces that were not attracted to the existing Islamic political parties such as the conservative NU. 12. Ichtisar Tahunan 1967. p. 107. Talk about the formation of a new party on the basis of PNI elements started in August 1966, but it received no encouragement from President Sukarno. See Ichtisar Tahunan 1966. p. 114. 13. Ichtisar Tahunan 1968. p. 8. The other eight component organizations were: (1) Al-Diamiatul Waslijah; (2) Gas- biindo; (3) Persatuan Islam; (4) Nahdatul Wathan; (5) Mathalaul Anwar; (6) Sarekat Nelajan Islam Indo- nesia; (7) Kesatuan Buruh Indonesia Muslimin; and (8) Persatuan Ummat Islam. See DPR-GR, Secretariat, Sepe- rempat AbadDewan Perwakilan Rakiat Republik Indonesia (Djakarta, l97l), p.583. For discussions of the forma- tion of the PMI, see Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indo- nesian Politics," Asian Survey, VIII, no. 12 (December 1968), pp. 1001-1017; and K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1970).9 The integration of the nine Moslem groups also consti- tuted a move toward simplification of the political struc- ture, a step that the authorities favored. Suharto, however, did not want the new party to fall under the control of the former leaders of Masjumi;14 accordingly, when Parrausi's first national congress, which opened in Malang, East Java, on November 6, 1968, elected Mohammad Rum, an ex-Masjumi leader as chairman, Suharto made his disapproval known, saying that Parmusi should not simply be a rehabilitation of Masjumi. But despite presidential disapproval, more ex-Masjumi mem- bers, including prominent personalities such as Mohammad Natsir and Kasman Singodimedjo, joined the party. To contain their influence, the government pressed for inclusion in the 1969 election law of a stipulation that all persons involved in the 1958 rebellion be disqualified from becoming candidates. (Thus the former Masjumi leaders were permitted a role in Parmusi only in the very early stages.) Attention should also be called to efforts made from late 1968 by some of those in power, especially by Major- General H. R. Dharsono,l5 to promote a sort of two-party sys- tem. This was referred to as the "two-group" system, since, according to New Order ideology, Golkar was not to be thought of as a political party. The system was seen as one way of containing the activities of the political parties and drawing them into the framework of the government’s emphasis on policy, rather than ideological, debates. The Catholic Party expressed its support for political restructuring and even stated that it would be willing to dissolve itself for the sake of a new system of political groupings.16 The independent newspaper Indonesia Raya urged that the political structure be reformed before the general elections; it pointed out that the government would face great difficulties in carrying out its programs if the ongoing system continued and the government had constantly to work on a coalition basis.17 However, Duta Masjarakat. 14. Masjumi had been one of the "big four" parties of the 1955 general elections, but it was banned in I960 be- cause a number of its leaders were involved in the PRRI regional rebellion that broke out in February 1958. 15. Dharsono was then panglima of the Siliwangi Division and territorial commander for West Java. He was known as an outspoken critic of Sukarno and the PKI. 16. Berita Yudha. December 12, 1968. 17. Indonesia Raya. November 11, 1968.10 the official organ of the NU, argued against this view, saying that an artificial system would he too risky.18 The military leadership apparently felt that such ideas should he tried out at the local level before being implemented nationally. In January 1969» a two-group system was intro- duced, at Dharsono's instructions, in the regional represen- tative council (DPRD-GR), of Tjiamis, a kabupat&n in Vest Java.19 The central government kept its distance, however, merely stating, in May, that what was being tried out in Vest Java was not an overhaul of the political structure but rather a new method of working, in which a "development group" (the government) and a "guidance group" (for correction) worked to- gether. 20 The T^iamis experiment ended inconclusively; its relevance was undermined by a report in February 1970 that President Suharto was entertaining the idea of a three-group system, composed of a "material development" (nationalist) group, a "spiritual development" (religious) group, and Golkar.2! But, even in early 1969, Dharsono and other "liberal" generals associated with him were reportedly out of favor with Suharto, and this may account for the two-group system's demise.22 An important element common to both Dharsono's and Suharto's ideas, nonetheless, was the special status assigned 18. Duta Mae.1 arakat. December 10, 1968. 19. Kompas. January 9, 1969. 20. Kompas. May 28, 1969. 21. Parenthetically, this idea of Suharto's was realized after the 1971 elections in the revised form of a four- fraction system for the DPR: a "Development Democracy (Demokrasi Pembangunan)" fraction; a "Development Unity (Persatuan Pembangunan)" fraction; a "Functional Group (Golongan Karya)" fraction; and an Armed Services (Golongan ABRI) fraction. See Antara Varta Berita. October 29, 1971 (morning edition). however, since the last fraction did not participate in the elections and currently works closely with the Golkar fraction, the four-fraction system is in actual practice a three- group system—particularly in the eyes of the elec- torate . 22. Robert Shaplen, Time out of Hand (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. lSl. Dharsono himself was soon displaced as Vest Java commander and was posted as ambassador to Thailand in September 1969.11 to Golkar. It signified that both expected to use Golkar al though they evidently did not yet place great confidence in its parliamentary and electoral competence. Yet it is true that at the same time that the military leadership was con- sidering partnership with the FNI and Parmusi, it was also gradually placing greater hopes on Golkar.23 II. Preparations for Administering the Elections, 1970 With the enactment of the two election laws in December 1969, the Suharto government moved quickly to issue the im- plementing ordinances and presidential decrees, and to build up a structure to administer the elections. Both the imple- menting regulations and the administrative structure became vital factors contributing to the government party’s eventual election victory. The two election laws of 1969 were respec- tively Law No. 15/1969, which concerned the general election of members of representative bodies, and Law No. 16/1969, which dealt with the composition and position of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD.24 The first of these laws laid out the basic framework for the organization and scope of the general elections. By its terms, all Indonesian nationals who were over 17 years old, or who were married, had the right to vote (Article 9), while those over 21 years of age were eligible as candidates for election (Article 16). Two important exceptions were made to these provisions: members of the former PKI and other banned organizations (Articles 2 and 16), and members of ABRI were deprived of the right to vote and the right to stand for election (Articles 11 and 14).25 These provisions of the law provoked a public controversy over whether former members of Masjumi and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party— banned along with Masjumi in I960) possessed electoral rights. On February 4, 1970, Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud 23. Debate on this kind of structural reform died down when the government and the political parties became ab- sorbed in developing and implementing their respective electioneering strategies. 24. The texts of these laws are given in Bekal Pemilu 1971. pp. 313-332, and 353-375 respectively. 25. Civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense and Security, however, were not covered by these articles.12 clarified this point, stating that they might vote, hut that former leaders of these parties could not run for election.26 Those former members of banned communist organizations who had once been arrested in connection with the Gestapu affair but who had since been released were also given voting rights.27 In addition, all candidates had to be nominated by legal or- ganizations (Article 17). The law approved the participation only of political and functional groups already represented in the DPR-GR at the time of the elections (Article 34) • In ef- fect, then, severe limits were set on electoral participation. Both the election of independent candidates and of candidates of new political organizations were legally ruled out. The same law prescribed an organizational framework for administering the elections which proved very favorable to Golkar. The General Elections Institute (LPU), an autonomous body placed administratively within the Ministry of Home Af- fairs, was to be directly responsible for the whole electoral administration. The Minister of Home Affairs would serve ex officio as chairman of the Institute, chairman of its execu- tive board, and chairman of the National Elections Committee (see below). The Institute's functions were primarily to supervise and guide the work of national and local election committees which would handle day-to-day tasks (Article 8). In Djakarta a National Elections Committee (PPI) was to be set up under the Home Affairs Minister. The Committee was to "plan and supervise" elections for the DPR and the first- level and second-level DPRD, and to "administer" the elec- tions for the DPR (Article 8). To assist this national com- mittee, in each provincial capital there was to be a first- level local elections committee (PPD-I), chaired by the governor (the chief provincial executive), and in each kabupatdn capital and kotamadya there was to be a second- level local elections committee (PPD-II), chaired by the bu- pati or mayor (chief executive of second-level local govern— ment). Under these local committees, in the capital of each ket.1ama.tan (third-level of local government) there was to be a polling committee (PPS), headed by the tlamat (chief offi- cial of the ketjamatan), and in each desa (village—fourth and lowest level of local government) there was to be an electors' registration committee (PPP), headed by the lurah 26. Angkatan Bersendlata. February 6, 1970. 27. The total number of those deprived of voting rights for various reasons was eventually recorded officially as 2,123,747. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, "Dafter W.N.R.I. jang tidak berhak memilih, Tiap Daerah Tingkat-I di Seluruh Indonesia" (mimeo.), July 29, 1971.13 (village chief) (Article 8). There were thus to he 26 first- level local elections committees, 281 second-level local elec tions committees, 3,184 polling committees, and 48,471 elec- tors’ registration committees.28 The vertical lines of Indo- nesia's local government organization under the Home Affairs Department were thus utilized in setting up the administra- tive organization for the elections. While it ensured ad- ministrative efficiency, this structure no less certainly guaranteed effective governmental intervention and control, since local government chief executives were ex officio the chairmen of local election committees, and the members of these committees were "appointed and discharged" by the chief executives of the next higher levels of government. Specifically, members of the National Elections Committee were appointed and discharged by the President; members of first-level and second-level local elections committees by the Minister of Home Affairs on the advice of the governors; and members of polling committees and electors' registra- tion committees bv the bupati or mayors on the advice of the tjamat (Article 8;. In effect, the General Elections Insti- tute assumed the character of a military command with local chief executives as local commanders and election committees as their staffs. The executive board of the General Elections Institute was composed of the Ministers of Home Affairs (Lieutenant- General Amir Machmud), Justice (Prof. Umar Senoadji), Infor- mation (Air Vice-Marshal Budiardjo), Finance (Prof. All Wardhana), Defense and Security (President Suharto, repre- sented by General Panggabean, Deputy Commander of the Armed Services with the then status of minister), Communications (Frans Seda), and Foreign Affairs (Adam Malik) (Article 5, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970). The 20-member National Elections Committee was composed of all the executive board members of the Institute plus the members of the Institute's other committee, the Appeals Committee, which was intended to deal with any complaints about administrative procedures in the elections (Article 5, Supplement, Presidential Decree No. 3/January 15, 1970). Military officers were to be found buttressing this civilian bureaucratic organization from within and without. Within, of 26 first-level and 281 second-level local elec- tions committee chairmen (53 mayors and 228 bupati), for example, 20 first-level and 142 second-level chairmen (26 mayors and 116 bupati) held military ranks.29 Without, 28. Lembaga Pemilihan Uraum, Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 9 (March 8, 1971), p. 4. 29. Sinar Harapan. February 1, 1971.14 j there was the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin), headed by Major-General Sutopo Juwono. Bakin not only col- lected intelligence on national security but constantly as- sessed the popularity of Golkar. Cabinet Secretary Brigadier- General Sudharmono also appeared to play an active role in i the electoral administration. Working closely with Bakin and the General Elections Institute was the whole body of ABRI, comprising some six- hundred thousand men, under the leadership of the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam).30 This ministry headed by Suharto himself, had the task of maintaining public order. In addition, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) led by General Panggabean and Lieutenant-General Sumitro, had responsibility for screening the qualifications of voters and candidates (Articles 23 and 49, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970), while continuing to search for remaining Gestapu elements. Major-General Yoga Sugomo, head of Hankam's G-I (intelligence) section, and Lieu- tenant-General Darjatmo, head of G-III (personnel) assisted these efforts. Further, the Civil Defense Corps (Hansip) and the People's Resistance Corps (Wanra) in all desa were as- signed to maintain public order at the polling stations. Com- prising some two million people, Hansip and Wanra function as auxiliary forces to ABRI; while not part of the Armed Ser- vices, they act under ABRI's command. Similar to the home guard units created by the Japanese occupation authorities during World War II, they work as security forces at the desa level under Hankam territorial commanders. A very important role in organizing the elections was also played by Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo. Since his ap- pointment in June 1968 as the President's personal assistant for special political operations (Operasi Chusus, commonly abbreviated as Opsus), Ali Murtopo's chief task had been to collect political intelligence at home and abroad, to ad- vise the President thereon, and sometimes to undertake covert operations. Soon after the 1969 election laws were enacted, the President issued Decree No. 4 of January 15, 1970,51 in which he authorized the creation of a Logistics and Supplies 30. In his Independence Day speech on August 16, 1968, Presi- dent Suharto gave the figure of 597,540 as the extent of ABRI membership. Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia Pienderal Soeharto didepan Sidang !DPR-GR 16 Augustus 1968 (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), p. 3&. The text of the decree is contained in Bekal Pemilu 1971. pp. 583-592. 31.15 Board within the General Elections Institute, the personnel of which were to he recruited from the civil service or the mili- tary (Article 4). Furthermore, by another presidential decree (No. 8/M/1970), which was issued on the same day, he appointed Ali Murtopo as head of this board.32 His responsibility for the procurement and allocation of such election materials as motor transport, ships, typewriters, and the transportation of election forms and documents gave Ali Murtopo a strong posi- tion in the electoral administration, which was consolidated by his supervisory role in relation to Golkar's General Elec- tions Board (Bapilu), a role which will be discussed later. No provision was made in the 1969 election laws for the im- portant Logistics and Supplies Board. The President simply made use of Paragraph 4, Article 4 of Government Ordinance No. 1 of January 13, 1970, which authorized the President, or the Chairman of the General Elections Institute with presi- dential approval, to establish other organs within the Insti- tute in order to ensure smooth operations of the general elections. The General Elections Institute and the National Elec- tions Committee were formed on January 17, 1970, and their common leader, Amir Machmud, then worked out detailed and energetic work schedules through the end of 1973.” Informa- tion and "coaching" activities were among his most important responsibilities as the supervisor of Pemilu. He prepared three phases of informational activities: dissemination of the idea of Pantja Sila democracy (January to May 1970); dissemination of the five principles of public order called Pantja Krida (July to September 1970); and explanations of technical aspects of the general elections (October 1970 to March 1971). Explanations were to be given down to the desa level. Coaching activities were to be conducted at national, kabupaten, and ketjamatan levels between February 15, 1970 and June 10, 1971, and were intended primarily to train elec- tion officials. A Pemilu song was also composed and broad- cast on every radio news program from late June, 1970 on- ward . 34 32. Ibid., pp. 615-616. 33. Ibid.. pp. 72-77. Even after the elections were over, ike General Elections Institute was to be responsible for making preparations for establishing the member- ship of the MPR (due to assemble in March 1973) and for collecting all the available election data and infor- mation for analysis in preparation for the next general elections, scheduled for 1976. 34. Berita Yudha. June 24, 1970.16 For a month after July 5, 1970, Electors Registration Com- mittees throughout the Republic conducted house-to-house sur- veys to produce lists of eligible voters. These surveys re- corded a total of 114,972,428 Indonesian citizens, of whom 7C- 57,750,615, or some 50.2 percent were registered as eligible. , On May 23, 1970, all nine political parties together with i the functional groups represented in the DPR-GR were pronounced I eligible for participation in the elections (Presidential De- / cree No. 43/1970, based on Article 34 of Law No. 15/1969).36 In this decree it was also recognized that the functional groups might participate as one body, namely, the Joint Secre- tariat of Functional Groups, or Sekber-Golkar (Article 3). This indeed occurred, and emblems for the (now ten) organizations con- testing the elections were officially approved by the General Elections Institute on August 21.37 By law, no organization could use Indonesia's national coat of arms, flag, and the like as its electoral emblem (Article 18, Law No. 15/1960). However, Golkar adopted an electoral emblem containing two of the five symbols of the Pantja Sila principles used in the national coat of arms. In the center of the Golkar emblem there was a banyan tree (waringin). symbolizing national con- sciousness; below, on either side, were the sheaves of rice and cotton which, in the national coat of arms, represent social justice. The whole emblem was enclosed in a pentagon, which, according to one Golkar official, signified the Pantja Sila. Despite this obvious copying, the Golkar emblem was still legal, since it contained symbols of only two of the five Pantja Sila principles and omitted a major element in the national coat of arms, the Garuda bird. It is note- worthy, too, that the banyan tree is a common element in the coats of arms of such powerful government bodies as the De- partments of Home Affairs and Justice, while the pentagon is featured in that of the Department of Defense and Security. In fact, the Golkar emblem was clearly a selective combina- tion of Hankarn and Home Affairs Department symbols. The electorate was thus given the distinct impression that Golkar was the official electoral contender, to be accepted by all Indonesian citizens. 35. Lembaga Pemilihan Uraum, Djumlah Penduduk dan Pemilih Warga Negara Indonesia Berdasarkan Hast! Pendaftaran IPenauduk Jang flilakukan Mulai ffanggal 5 3).~juli 19?0 s/d janggal 5 Agustus 1970 Diperlntjl per Ifropinsi dan 1 ffabupatgn/Kot^adya (mimeo: n.d.), p. 1. These figures were later slightly revised. 36. Merdeka, June 4, 1970. 37. Ibid.. August 22, 1970.17 On September 23, the official listing order (serial order) of the ten contenders was determined by lot^ resulting in the following sequence: (1) Catholic Party; (2) PSII; (3) NU; (4) Parmusi; (5) Golkar; (6) Parkindo; (7) Murba; (8) PNI; (9) Perti; and (10) IPKI.38 on this and other such occasions, Golkar officials always urged that, in any elec- tion materials, Golkar be placed apart from the other nine organizations since it was not a party. Although this demand was not met, it helped to further the idea that Golkar should be distinguished as a government group, separate from the parties, and thus especially deserving of popular support in this period of the "development-oriented" New Order. III. Golkar, A Party Built from Above Historically, the functional groups (golongan karya) have long enjoyed the Indonesian Army's favor. The military had supported the idea of parliamentary representation of occupational groups as early as 1957, regarding them as a potential counterforce to the fast-growing PKI. They had welcomed Sukarno's decision in 1960 to grant functional groups seats in the DPR-GR on the basis of Article 2 of the 1945 Con- stitution which refers to go^ngan-golongan (groups) and their representation in the MPR.38 Through such groups, the Army intended to exert influence on the mass organizations 38. Ibid.. September 24, 1970. 39. Sukarno was known to favor representation of functional groups in the Indonesian parliament ever since his 1956 visit to the CPR where he had observed the role of such groups in the Chinese political structure. He evi- dently hoped thereby to weaken the power of the poli- tical parties and increase his own. An Indonesian scholar has inform the writer that as early as 1959 the Army had begun to study the role of functional groups in the Yugoslav parliament. Non-geographical repre- sentation was not unprecedented in Indonesian legisla- tive history. Ethnic groups were represented ln_ the Volksraad of the Dutch colonial era and the Chu4S"I! . Djakarta Times, October 28, 1970. 4822 Indonesian Doctors' Association (IDI) met from October 13 to 19, 1970, and "decided" to continue its affiliation with Sekber-Golkar. The Indonesian Lawyers' Association (Persahi) followed suit. A very conspicuous Opsus operation was also launched against Parmusi. When first established with Presidential en- dorsement in February 1968, the party had been expected to inherit the Islamic reformist and anti-Communist stances of the defunct Masjumi. The government saw it as a means of en- suring the cooperation of the old Masjumi constituency.49 Its first chairman and secretary-general, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun, were both endorsed by Acting President Suharto. By 1970, however, this leadership had evidently be- come less acceptable to the military than hitherto. The party split and on October 17, 1970, John Naro and Ali Imran Kadir, both of whom were supporters of the Army's socio-political role, announced a new executive board for Parmusi. They then visited Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud and Hankam per- sonnel chief Darjatmo, apparently to obtain recognition.50 The rival executives blamed each other for the crisis, the Djarnawi-Lukman group also blaming government intervention. The confusion lasted until November 20, when Mintaredja, a prominent member of Muhammadijah and Minister for Liaison be- tween the Government and the Representative Organs of the State, who had been called in by Suharto to lead the party from November 14, announced a new executive board and gained official endorsement by Presidential Decree No. 77.51 it was said that Opsus operatives were responsible for the scenario of the Parmusi leadership crisis; and it was widely commented on that, although the Djarnawi executive had been approved by the President in 1968, it had subsequently opposed or resisted the electioneering strategy of the military.52 Thus, the government had itself taken over the leadership of one of the 49. Some ex-Masjumi leaders, such as Mohammad Natsir and Mohammad Rum, had indeed initially been encouraged by the Suharto group to help build up the party. But their out- spoken remarks about the military authorities and their organizing skills soon appeared as challenging to the Suharto regime as they had once been to Sukarno's. As we have seen, the military responded by insisting on their exclusion from leadership positions in Parmusi. 50. Djakarta Times and Kompas, October 24, 1970. 51. Djakarta Times, November 23, 1970. The Presidential Decree was dated November 20. 52. Rusadi, "Situasi Mendjelang Pemilu."23 country's two largest Islamic parties and had inserted as party chairman a minister on active duty in the cabinet. To avoid such governmental interference, the NU leader- ship postponed the party's national congress, originally scheduled for December 1970. Yet it found itself nonetheless being undermined by government intervention. Guppi (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam—Islamic Education Improve- ment Federation), founded in Sukabumi in 1952 and long a relatively unimportant Islamic organization, was reactivated at the initiative of presidential special assistant Brigadier- General Sudjono Humardani in about November 1970. The or- ganization, composed primarily of Islamic teachers, was then headed by H. Sjarifuddin, Director-General for Religious Education in the Department of Religious Affairs and an NU leader. On January 23, a newspaper sympathetic to Parmusi reported that Sjarifuddin was already inviting heads of local Religious Education offices to represent Guppi.53 Some NU leaders, such as H. Tubagus, complained that their names ap- peared on the list of Guppi's executive committee without their agreement. On January 27, Abadi carried an editorial expressing concern that "the UN [wasj being destroyed by Golkar." Guppi was reported as claiming it had the teachers of some 3,000 pesantren (religious boarding-schools for Moslems) in its ranks. At its national conference the organi- zation adopted an ambiguous policy statement to the effect that since it adhered to Islamic teachings within the realm of the spirit of the Pantja Sila and the 1945 Constitution, it had decided to join Sekber-Golkar.54 On January 28, 1971, after the conference, Guppi representatives received the blessing of the President himself at a meeting in the presi- dential palace attended also by many of Suharto's top aides including Ali Murtopo, Sudjono Humardani, Adam Malik and Budiardjo.55 In short, there are sufficient grounds to suspect that Opsus workers were attempting to "divide and rule" the par- ties and professional organizations in order to keep them at the disposal of the authorities. This constituted an obvious shift in electioneering strategy since 1969, when the govern- ment had been willing to maintain cooperative contacts with the parties. That Sekber-Golkar was concurrently being strenuously built up from the top by high-ranking military figures with sophisticated political engineering skills was equally apparent. 53. Abadi, January 23, 1971. 54. Ibid., January 27 and 29, 1971. 55. Ibid.. January 29, 197124 IV. Screening of Candidates, January-April 1971 Although everyone knew that election day would fall on or just before July 5, 1971* it was not until March 30 that Saturday, July 3, was formally fixed as polling day.56 The official campaign period began on April 27. Prom January through April 26* the government apparatus, especially the departments of Home Affairs, Defense and Security, and In- formation, made final preparations for the administration of the elections. The major concern of the government seemed to be with internal security. On January 27 the Home Affairs Minister convened in Djakarta a meeting of all the governors, mayors, and bupati for a final ’'coaching’' on electoral admini- stration. After the conference was over, rumors arose that local government heads at all levels down to the village had been told that they must achieve a quota of 30 percent of the vote for Golkar on polling day.57 Hansip and Wanra, both im- portant—though unofficial—wings of the Defense and Security Department as well as of Sekber-Golkar, were assigned to work as "capable and talented instruments for making a success of the 1971 general elections."58 The 1971 Armed Services Com- manders' Call was convened on February 22 in order to tackle possible emergencies. The local leadership councils known as Muspida (Musjawarah Pimpinan Daerah), consisting of the heads of local government, police, prosecution, and Army, also func- tioned to help maintain local electoral security. Thus, a security system was established at the lowest administrative level, coordinated by Hansip, Wanra, and Muspida, and ulti- mately supervised by the Hankam and the Home Affairs depart- ments, headed by Suharto and Amir Machnrud. 56. The Home Affairs Minister had announced this date on March 10, but it was not until the cabinet meeting of March 30 that it was officially settled. See Antara Warta Berita. March 30, 1971 (evening edition)*! Tor the text of the minister's decision (No. 31/1971), see Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), p. 4. 57. To the writer's knowledge, this rumor has never been proved; but if it were true, it would have meant a theo- retical guarantee of Golkar majorities in all local assemblies, since by the 1969 election law (No. 16) all local legislative bodies had to reserve one-fifth of their seats for functional groups by appointment, and this one-fifth plus one-third of the remaining (elected) four-fifths of the seats would make almost 50 percent. 58. Berita Yudha. January 15, 1971.25 Candidates Screened A far more important task assumed by the government in the first four months of 1971 was the screening and endorse- ment of candidates nominated by the ten electoral contenders. Responsibility for screening candidates fell upon Lieutenant- General Sumitro, deputy commander of Kopkamtib (Article 49, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970 and Article 12 [3], Govern- ment Ordinance No. 2/1970). But in practice, others besides Sumitro were actively involved in the selection of candi- dates, the most notable of whom were Amir Machmud, Ali Mur- topo, Major-General Yoga Sugomo, Major-General Sunandar (Sec- retary of the National Elections Committee), and Brigadier- General Wang Suwandi (chief of the special affairs section of the Home Affairs Department).59 Between January 13 and February 13, 1971 the ten parti- cipating organizations submitted their respective lists of candidates for 25 provinces, i.e., the 25 ordinary constitu- encies for the DPR. (In the province of West Irian different arrangements were followed.) An initial table of 3,789 can- didates, broken down by party and constituency but without the names of the candidates, was given in the January 18 issue of Merdeka.60 After screening by Kopkamtib between February 14 and 28, the initial list of January 18 was pared to a total of 3,105 candidates, and announced to the public on March 13 as the Provisional List.61 After further screening, an Official List of 3,021 candidates was made public on April 20.62 Thus 768 candidates were disqualified between the initial and Official lists. The initial, Provisional, and Official lists (compared in Table II), show the two-stage selection of candidates: 684 candidates from the initial list, and an additional 84 from the Provisional List were deleted. Because the authori- ties did not make the initial list public, it is difficult to 59. Sinar Harapan. March 4, 1971. 60. Merdeka, January 15, 1971, and Indonesia Raya. January 16>, 1971, reported a total figure of1 5,797, but the figures given in a table in Merdeka. January 18, 1971, add up to 3,789. Sinar Harapan. March 4, 1971, gave the number of candidates initially nominated as 3,840. 61. Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 10 (March 17, 1971), pp. 3-4. 62. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Tjalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun l97l dari Orpol/ Solkar (rnirneo.. 1971).26 identify just who had been deleted from the initial list. How ever, judging from the statement given by Amir Machmud to the effect that most of those deleted from the Provisional List were those who failed to complete the necessary documents,63 a more substantial screening must have been made at the first stage of elimination. The criteria for screening were involvement in Gestapu, lack of positive support for development, and lack of support for Pantja Sila democracy and the 1945 Constitution.°4 The last criterion referred to rebellious activities against the central government in the past, including the 1958 Sumatra and Sulawesi rebellions, the Free Papua Movement, Moluccan seces- sionist movements, and so forth. The elimination of candidates once nominated meant more than just depriving them of the right to be elected. It meant prohibiting them from taking part in the electoral campaign (Article 54 of Government Ordinance No. 1/1970). In October 1970, it was stipulated that disqualified candidates could not engage in electoral campaigns nor attend or be introduced "in a conspicuous manner (setjara menjolok)" to public campaign rallies (Article 4, Presidential 6rder No. 68/October 27, 1970). Thus, the screening of candidates had an indirect but decisive role in inhibiting party activities. According to Sinar Harapan. 13 Golkar candidates likely to be disqualified were ex-PRRI members from Djambi, South Sumatra, and North Sumatra.65 According to this report, most of the PNI candidates who might meet negative judgment were government officials and "ex-collaborators with the Dutch." Some 30 Parkindo candidates too were likely to lose the right of candidacy because of their past connections with Permesta. Candidates of Parmusi identified with the leadership of Mas- jumi or the PRRI, or both, were also eliminated in the screening, including Natsir, Rum and Kasman Singodimedjo. By comparing the initial with the Official List (see Table III), it can be seen that, while only eleven Golkar candidates were disqualified, PNI and Parmusi lost respec- tively 164 and 131 candidates, the largest number of deletions They were followed by the PSII and IPKI, which lost 112 and 63. Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), pp. 64. Statement of Major-General Yoga Sugomo, Hankam intelli- gence chief, reported in Sinar Harapan. March 4, 1971, and Merdeka. March 5, 1971. 65. Sinar Harapan. March 3, 1971.27 111 candidates respectively. The large losses of PNI and Parmusi candidates reinforced the popular view that they were the main targets of Kopkamtib's activities. It is important to note in this regard that the NU had the smallest loss, only 18*—far less than the other two parties of the "big three." Perhaps this signifies that Kopkamtib had little hostility to the candidates of this conservative Moslem party, even though it might have wished to weaken the party as a whole by other means. That the Indonesian military did intend to keep close watch over PNI and Parmusi is further confirmed by examining the disqualified candidates of these parties in terms of their electoral constituency. The PNI was most tightly screened in Java, especially in its strongholds, Central and East Java. In these two constituencies alone, the PNI lost 76 candidates (out of 164); similarly, Parmusi lost 51 (out of 151) candidates in Java. The Suharto regime's fears of the PNI in Central and East Java were also manifested in another interesting fact: while in most provinces Golkar put up almost as many candi- dates as the maximum number permitted by the regulations for each particular province, Central and East Java were excep- tions (see Table IV). In these provinces, Golkar nominated 53 and 59 candidates, respectively, where 114 and 126 persons might run for the DPR. This can be regarded as indicative of a lack of confidence on the part of Sekber-Golkar in these areas, where the candidates of both the NU and the PNI out- numbered Golkar's by impressive margins. In Central Java, the NU had 63 and the PNI 111 candidates; in East Java, the NU had 84 candidates and the PNI 125. The severe cut of PNI and Parmusi candidates in Central and East Java may thus be explained by the need to compensate for the limited self- confidence on the part of ABRI and Sekber-Golkar in these provinces. More generally, however, ABRI leaders were growing increasingly confident of Golkar's success, and were even beginning to denigrate in public the idea of partner- ship with the parties (the idea had in practice, of course, been abandoned for some time.) In mid-January, PNI Chairman Hadisubeno, who had been installed by the Opsus-manipulated party congress of the pre- vious year, declared that Marhaenism (the party's official ideology) stood for the teachings of Bung Kamo and was the basis of the PNI line of thought. If the teachings of Sukarno were to be banned, he challenged President Suharto to dis- solve the PNI as well. He was immediately reprimanded for this statement by Lieutenant-General Surono, the Java-Madura Territorial Defense Commander. To ease tensions with the military, the PNI leadership then began to accentuate a28 66 PNI-Golkar partnership, which Surono again denounced. With- in the Parmusi, Suharto-picked Mintaredja also played up to the military. In early March, he renewed the intra-party con- troversy by publicly criticising the entry of ex-Masjumi mem- bers into the new Moslem party.®7 Although by mid-April, Parmusi was reported to have succeeded in integrating itself again,®® Mintaredja never appeared to have a grip upon the party machinery. Inside the organization he spoke for the Suharto regime, not for the party.®9 The NU as well seemed cowed and began to emphasize its denial that the party's ulti- mate purpose was to build an Islamic state.70 By this time the parties were clearly fighting more to survive than to win the elections. When Ali Murtopo and Amir Machmud remarked that there would have to be a change in the political structure after Pemilu, their remarks caused serious concern among party leaders, some of whom interpreted them to mean that the government would actually dissolve the parties. There were continued reports about a ''PNI exodus to Golkar," as many local government employees, who had, for the most part, been PNI members, were apparently forced to switph to Kokarmendagri, the employees' association of the Home Affairs Department. There were also reports that 30,000 NU members joined Kokarmendagri in early April and that Hassan, a promi- nent Islamic leader in West Java, had led his 850,000 fol- lowers into Golkar in late May.71 Political parties protested against the "Golkar offensive," and criticized Amir Machmud for being a "bulldozer," crushing political parties and culti- vating the rough political soil for Golkar's easy growth. In mid-April there was even a short-lived anti-Amir Machmud move- ment (Gemud—from Gerakan Anti-Amir Machmud) in Wonogiri, Central Java, to protest the minister's pressure tactics, 66. Harlan Kami. January 28, 1971. 67. Abadi, March 5, 1971. 68. Indonesia Raya. April 13, 1971. 69. In early May, Mintaredja stated during a local Parmusi meeting that, no matter what happened to Parmusi in the elections. Suharto must be kept as President. Kompas, May 11, 1971. 70. Indonesia Raya. April 5, 1971. 71. Antara Warta Berlta. April 13, 1971 (morning edition) and May 29, 1971 (evening edition).29 72 but it bore no fruit. All these protests, however, seemed to have little, if any, effect. Party Images Shown by Candidate Lists Under the proportional representation system, the Indo- nesian voter casts his ballot for an entire party list and has no way of expressing preferences among the party*s can- didates. This means that it pays the party to include well- known and popular figures on its lists, since these figures will help ensure the election of more obscure party candi- dates. 73 The political logic of this system was well under- stood by the campaign strategists of all the parties contesting the 1971 elections. Sekber-Golkar strategists, for instance, attempted to put up well-known personalities such as Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX for the province of Central Java, Foreign Minister Adam Malik for North Sumatra, his wife for West Java, Mrs. Ali Sadikin (wife of the popular Governor of Djakarta) for Dja- karta, and so forth.74 Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, chair- man of the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), Professor Ali Wardhana, Minister of Finance, and Professor Sumantri Brodjonegoro, Minister of Mines, were also nominated, although they withdrew their candidacies when President Suharto indicated his disapproval to them.75 Sekber-Golkar also made conscious efforts to find candidates with pres- tigious academic degrees. 72. Reports on Gemud originally appeared in Antara on April 13. It was suspended very quickly. On April 14, General Surono remarked that Gemud was not a movement, but consisted of the activities of only eight persons. The Central Java Territorial Commander, Major-General Widodo, stated that Gemud was detected "before it be- came significant." Abadi, April 15, 1971. 73. Such well-known figures do not necessarily end up with legislative seats, even if the party is successful in the elections. Though it is understood that their popularity may have helped the party, the ballots, of course, show no preferences for particular party can- didates. When the party learns the number of seats it is entitled to on the basis of its proportion of the total vote, it fills these seats according to the choice of the party executive. 74. Merdeka, January 15, 1971. 75. Sinar Harapan. March 16, 1971.30 These features illustrate the nature and scope of Golkar's nomination policy and the kind of image that the government party wished to convey to the electorate. With so many of the nation's prominent personalities listed as candidates, it hoped to give the impression that the party enjoyed the support of the nation's elite. Similarly, in nominating technocrats, Golkar strategists must have hoped to impress the voters with the seriousness of Golkar's commitment to development. Given the nature of the available data, there is no way of knowing how effective Golkar's policy was among the elec- torate. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to compare the profiles of Golkar candidates with those of other parties, on the basis of the official published data on the 3,021 candi- dates in the Official List of April 20.76 in the first place, Golkar was the most adept at procuring local candidates in the provinces. As shown in Table V, 94 percent of Golkar's 538 candidates were put up in the province where they resided, whereas the other nine parties found only 72 to 89 percent of their candidates in their home provinces, and had to depend upon Djakarta as a source of candidate recruitment for the rest. Murba showed itself the least able to procure "home- grown" provincial candidates (72.4 percent); 50 of its 147 candidates (24.6 percent) were recruited in Djakarta. In fact, Murba did not contest the elections at all in the provinces of Bengkulu, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, and East Nusateng- gara. The Big Three—the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi—showed a relatively high ability to recruit provincial candidates in the regions. Together with Golkar, they pictured themselves as national parties. When the number of candidates is examined by constitu- ency, it is apparent that in most constituencies Golkar was able to put up almost as many candidates as the maximum number of nominees permitted (see Table IV). Initially, the Big Three also had comparable numbers of candidates; the PNI had 669, the NU had 415, and Parmusi had 458 candidates (compared to Golkar's 549). But, as was mentioned earlier, the PNI and Parmusi were handicapped by Kopkamtib's activities, and as a result were not able to run as energetic and serious a cam- paign as they had wished. 76. The writer is fully aware that since 768 candidates were screened out of the initial list, it is not very fair to proceed with this part of the analysis only on the basis of the Official List. He is very grateful to his research assistant Mr. Padjar Suryono for under- taking the tiring work of computing the information on all the Official List candidates contained in the Daftar Tjalon Tetap cited above.31 Out of a total of 156 had.11 candidates, 84 were nomi- nated by the NU, comprising about 20 percent of the NU's total of 397 candidates.77 Among these hadji 35 were k jai) heads of traditional Moslem schools) (see Table V). The EigK propor- tion of hadji among NU candidates is not surprising in the light of the nature of the party's organization, but it is interesting to observe that Golkar also nominated 17 hadji among its candidates, a larger number than that put up by Parmusi. Out of the total 3,021 candidates, those with some sort of academic degree numbered 781; of these the largest portion belonged to Golkar, which nominated 201 degree-holders, or 37.3 percent of its 538 nominees (see Table V).78 Twelve Golkar candidates had professorial titles; 18 Golkar nominees had titles of Doctor or Ph.D. Of the 781 degree-holding can- dates, 531, or 67.6 percent had the Indonesian degrees of Insinjur (natural science), Doktorandus (or Doktoranda in the case of females—mainly social science), Sard;)ana Hukum (law), and Sard;)ana Theologi (theology), all roughly equiva- lent to the American degrees of masters of arts and sciences. Of these degree-holders 150 were nominated by Golkar. The proportions of technocrat candidates among PNI, NU, and Par- musi candidates were 23.5 percent, 20 percent and 33.6 per- cent respectively. Academic degrees are not the sole cri- teria for determining which candidates were technocrats, but if the parties wished to demonstrate their seriousness about national development, selecting candidates on the basis of their technical and academic skills would obviously be an effective way to impress the electorate. In this light, several parties, such as the PSII, Murba, and Perti, ap- peared highly unqualified. With regard to sex, Golkar put up the largest number of women candidates: 44 out of the total of 121 women contes- tants, or 36.3 percent of all women nominated by the ten 77. The figure of 156 is based on those names in the Offi- cial List that have a clear indication of titles such as "Hadji," "Kjai Hadji," or "K.H." Those candidates with merely an "H." before their names are not included, since the letter might stand for a personal name, e.g., Hassan. Thus, the real number of hadji candidates is probably somewhat higher than 156. 78. Another study gives different figures, although the total number of degree-holders cited (780) is almost the same as the total given here. See Zaibidin Jacub, "Factor Kesardjanaan Dalam Tjalon2 Pemilu 1971," Sinar Harapan, May 18, 1971.32 parties in the Official list. In terms of male-female ratios, however, Parkindo did better than the other parties: 15 women or 8.2 percent of its 182 candidates, which was slightly higher than Golkar’s 44 women, or 8.1 percent of its 538 nomi- nees . The Big Three had only a negligible number of female nominees: 17 of the PNI's 505, 7 of the NU's 397, and 11 of Parmusi's 327.79 It is difficult to evaluate the meaning of the relatively large number of female candidates. It may In- dicate that Golkar was attempting to display the concern of women about national development, or that since most women's organizations joined Golkar, the other parties lost their own sources of female recruitment. Once again, though it is difficult to make up party pro- files on the limited data available, what has been discerned so far suggests the superior quality of Golkar's candidates. To say the least, Golkar was the most national party, re- cruiting the highest number of candidates, as close as pos- sible to the legal maximum number in most constituencies, and in addition, recruiting the largest percentage of college graduates. The other parties failed to present a forward- looking and energetic image to the electorate. Perhaps this was the result of less competent leadership in the remaining parties, but there can be no doubt that in large part it was also due to the "bandwagon" effect created by the Golkar drive. V. The Official Campaign, April 27 to June 25 With their official candidates approved and announced on April 20, the ten organizations readied themselves for their electoral campaigns. The government apparatus made "final check-ups" on their preparations. On April 25, two days before the election campaign commenced, Amir Machraud made a television speech in which he appealed for the cam- paigns to be conducted within the framework of the Pantja Sila and for all organizations to struggle for the sake of promoting 79. It may be of interest to note that of the 121 female candidates of all ten parties, a little over half, namely 62, were selected from Java, 22 from Sumatra, 24 from Sulawesi, 8 from Kalimantan, 2 from Nusatenggara, and 3 from Maluku. These figures may reflect the varying social status that women enjoy in different parts of contemporary Indonesia.33 80 national, not partisan, interests. On the same day, General Panggabean, commander of Kopkamtib, also spoke on television and instructed the members of the Armed Forces to fulfill their duties; he appealed especially to the Civil Defense Corps and the People's Resistance Corps to guard polling stations against possible disturbances on the election day.81 On the following day, April 26, some 20,000 heads of neighborhood communities throughout Djakarta were summoned to the Senajan sports stadium and given instructions by Amir Machmud, Ali Murtopo, and others. On the same day, all re- gional police chiefs gathered in Djakarta to discuss the security measures to be taken in conjunction with campaign tensions. Also on that day, Ali Murtopo recalled that Presi- dent Suharto had once proposed the idea of a "three-group system," a system with one "material" development (nation- alist) group, one "spiritual" development (religious) group, and one functional group. While this idea would not neces- sarily involve the dissolution of the political parties and so, in that sense, it gave some guarantee of their continuing existence, it is uncertain why Ali Murtopo brought up the idea of a tri-party system at that time. It is likely, how- ever, that, anticipating a smashing electoral victory for Golkar and the elimination of some minor parties from Indo- nesian politics, he wished to keep the subject of post-Pemilu political restructuring alive during the campaign period. In any case, this was the actual outcome of his comment. The official campaign finally began on April 27. It was clear from the beginning that there was no balance in campaign funds between Golkar and the other parties.82 Golkar pins 80. The text of his speech appears in Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), pp. 1-2. 81. The text of his speech is reproduced in Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 15 (May 17, 1971), pp. 1-3. 82. It would be a formidable task to work out the size of Golkar's campaign fund, since the fund was closely tied in with money from the Home Affairs Department and the General Elections Institute appropriated for electoral administration, as well as with the Defense and Security Department's security maintenance ex- penses. Informed sources in Djakarta regarded the "private contribution" of Lieutenant-General Ibnu Sutowo, president-director of the state oil company Pertamina, as a major source of Golkar funds. Other34 and posters soon flooded Djakarta streets. Betjak drivers were given free supplies of shirts with the Golkar symbol printed on them. On the other hand, the rest of the parties made only modest starts. Besides limited campaign funds, the strict restrictions on campaign activities seem to have affected their postures. Government Ordinance No. 1 of January 1970 prohibited any election campaigning that might discredit the Pantja Sila and the 1943 Constitution (Article 55), or that made contemptuous and discourteous remarks about the Indonesian government and its officials as well as foreign nations and groups (Article 56). These restrictions were certainly enough to discourage all parties from criticizing or even evaluating the Suharto- government's policies and from discussing Indonesia's interna- tional relations. The ordinance also stipulated that any or- ganizations involved in sponsoring a campaign rally had to obtain in advance a permit from the authorities, who retained the power to decide upon the time and place for such rallies, giving due consideration to security conditions (Article 58). Furthermore, the ordinance provided that all posters, leaf- lets, slides, slogans, brochures, and other materials to be used for campaigns had to be submitted in advance to the authorities (Article 59). This last article did not say that such campaign material had to be "approved," but the implica- tions were clear. This ordinance was further clarified by Presidential Decree No. 68 of October 27, 1970, and by the Home Affairs Minister's Order No. 39 of April 22, 1971. The latter for instance, prohibited "partisan use" of the name of the former President [Sukarno] as the Proclaimer of Indepen- dence of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (Article 3). This seriously hampered the PNI campaign in particular. On April 21, the Direct Security Command (Komando Keamanan Lang- sung, or Kokamsung) of the Djakarta Metropolitan Police issued sources told the writer that Golkar asked foreign com- panies operating in Indonesia for contributions. On at least one occasion, Golkar collected money by an American-style fund-raising dinner at which each guest donated Rp. 200,000 (some $530). See Sinar Harapan. June 15, 1971. According to Marzuki Arifin, "0rang2 Indonesia di Djepang," Harlan Kami. April 18, 1967, as early as 1967 some parties were seeking funds in Tokyo, New York and Bonn because their domestic resources were so slim. The Indonesian government officially provided each party with Rp. 10 million plus two jeeps and other minor materiel for use in the election cam- faign. See Antara Warta Berita, April 29, 1971 evening edition).35 a list of thirteen prohibited actions and their penalties, which included five-year jail sentences for forging or de- stroying ballot papers, three-year jail sentences for bribery and trickery, and Rp. 1000 fines for delinquency by election officials. Golkar put forward a five-point program in its organ Suara Karra of May 1, 1971.84 It summed up what Ali Murtopo and Amir Machmud had previously been advocating: (1) to prac- tice Pantja Sila democracy; (2; to build a new political structure without conflicts of ideology but with the aim of executing the development programs; (3) to administer an honest, competent government, with public servants who feel a single loyalty; (4) to continue to fight for these causes through five future general elections; and (5) to ensure that the outcome of these struggles benefits the whole people. The third point supported the idea being pushed by the mili- tary leaders that all government officials should join Golkar and avoid any "party” affiliations. The fourth point repre- sented Golkar's 25-year strategy for "acceleration of moderni- zation." Like Golkar, the other parties made radio and television campaign speeches, but they were obviously censored in ad- vance and only prepared texts were read.85 Presenting no 83. Merdeka. April 22, 1971. 84. A more comprehensive version of Golkar's program de- scribing its positions on spiritual, financial, poli- tical, economic, social and cultural questions in Indo- nesia, had appeared earlier. See Sinar Harapan. March 18, 1971. 85. The full texts of the radio speeches given by the ten parties can be found in the following issues of Antara Varta Berita: the Catholic Party, April 29, 197i I evening edition}, pp. 15-17; the PSII, April 30, 1971 evening edition), pp. 13-16; the NU, April 30, 1971 evening edition), pp. 17-19; Parmusi, May 1, 1971 morning edition), pp. 23-25; Golkar, May 2, 1971 morning edition), pp. 15-19; Parkindo, May 3, 1971 morning edition), pp. 16-17; Murba, May 4, 1971 morning edition), pp. 14-16; the PNI, May 5, 1971 morning edition), pp. 17-20; Perti, May 6, 1971 morning edition), pp. 18-21; and IPKI, May 7, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 11-13. The texts were examined by the General Elections Institute under Article 7 of the Information Minister's Decision No. 5/1971 (January 11, 1971). See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 8 (February 15, 1971), pp. 3=T.36 alternative programs, the parties merely expressed support for General Suharto as President, Pantja Sila democracy, the 1945 Constitution, and development programs. The military authorities meanwhile tightened their se- curity measures. In early May, naval ships conducted exer- cises off Semarang "in order to safeguard the general elec- tions. "86 In mid-May General Panggabean inspected air force activities to "face possible trouble spots in connection with the general elections." In the capital, an annual Djakarta Pair, which usually takes place in June, was postponed until two weeks after the elections to avoid possible disturbances. The military also appeared to be employing the tactic of "discrediting" the Big Three in Java. In Central Java, there were reports in mid-May about arms smuggled into the area from the outside; on May 18 a Kopkamtib team conducted a simul- taneous raid throughout the province. The following day, the Central Java chairman of Parmusi was arrested on a charge of arms smuggling, and his arrest was supported by Parmusi Chair- man Mintaredja. On May 23, the homes of a number of PNI leaders in Wonogiri, Central Java, were suddenly searched on similar charges. In late May, the secretary of Achmad Sjaichu, Chairman of the DPR-GR and a prominent NU leader, was arrested for alleged involvement in the 1965 communist upheaval. Nu- merous complaints came from the NU, the PNI, and Parmusi, as well as from minor parties, pointing to the obstruction of party campaign rallies by Golkar and military men through such means as blocking roads and destroying bridges leading to rally sites. On June 6, PNI campaigns by Sukarno's son, Guntur, and daughter, Rachmawati, were prohibited in Central Java "because of their agitation for Sukamoism." Centered in Djakarta, students and young intellectuals attempted courageous but unsuccessful moves to make an effec- tive protest against the "intimidation" they alleged was being practiced by Golkar and the authorities. On May 31, they formed a Committee to Establish Popular Sovereignty, but it was banned the following day. On June 3, a similar group of liberal youths organized a movement which was called "Golput," an acronym of Golongan Putih (white group) that played on the name of Golkar. The young people appealed to people critical of the government to punch not a symbol but a blank space on their ballots as an expression of protest. Their "symbol"— necessarily unofficial—was a pentagon just like Golkar's, except that there was no banyan tree, but a blank, inside the pentagon. On the campus of the University of Indonesia stu- dents were seen wearing Golput buttons. But Golput posters in the streets were quickly taken down by officials. 86. Merdeka, May 10, 1971.37 In the meantime, Golkar's organization was being further reinforced. Many organizations, including Chinese and Moslem groups, made public their switch to Golkar. This news occu- pied considerable space in pro-Golkar newspapers; Merdeka of May 10, for instance, reported that an Association of Indo- nesian Citizens of Chinese Origin (MKWI), claiming a member- ship of two and a half million people, had joined Golkar. There were continuing pressures upon all government depart- ments, both at the national and the local level, to follow the example of the Home Affairs Department in organizing a departmental association of employees (Kokar) affiliated with Golkar. By the end of the campaign period, practically all departments had organized such associations. The one notable exception was the NU-dominated Department of Religious Affairs. But the atmosphere was such that the epartment issued a de- fensive statement on May 30 maintaining that it had had an employees' association called Ikdam (Ikatan Karyawan De- partemen Agama) since 1968 with even a separate wing for fe- male employees and male officials' wives.°7 But the depart- ment evidently did nothing to promote the Golkar cause. In an effort to create a bandwagon effect, the "Golkar Safari" was organized, representing a strange, un-Indonesian campaign tactic. Between May 10 and June 20 thirteen teams of young pop singers and other entertainers, recruited in the Djakarta area, were sent out to 272 constituencies, that is, all the constituencies except for the nine in West Irian.8° The Java teams moved around by car, and the Outer Island teams by a private plane supplied by Brigadier-General Sofjar's Mandala Airline Company. Foreign correspondents were also invited to accompany this political safari. Offi- cials of the Golkar Safari had set East and Central Java as their main target areas.But while these officials boasted about the success of their Safari, this writer learned during a journey to the region, that the rural population in East and Central Java responded poorly to it. Teams of pop singers, clad in hotpants and mini-skirts, playing steel guitars and cymbals in Djakarta fashion, looked so odd in the quiet and slow-paced rural setting that village communities did not find them acceptable, it was explained. Asked to comment on the Safari, most of the local party leaders that this writer met invariably smiled first and then remarked cuttingly, "That is a Djakarta-centered idea!" 87. Abadi. June 1, 1971. 88. Interview with a "Safari" official, Djakarta, June 14, 1971. 89. Ibid.38 A more effective electioneering maneuver, undertaken by Amir Machmud, was the laying down of a requirement that govern- ment and company employees cast their ballots in their offices rather than in their areas of residence. This circular was issued on April 14 and a further explanatory circular followed on May 3.°® The reasoning was, that, since July 3 was Satur- day, and therefore still a workday, government and company workers should be able to vote at their places of employment, so they could go back to work right after polling without wasting much time. These circulars immediately stirred public controversy, because many people felt that such a procedure would intimidate voters, who otherwise might not wish to vote for Golkar, into succumbing to group pressure from their of- fice associates. In fact, one of the most impressive aspects of the govern- ment's campaign in general was the sophisticated and subtle use by the government of group pressure upon individual voters. Each polling place, whether in offices or in residential areas, was to handle only 200 to 300 eligible voters, "so that pol- ling canpbe completed by two o'clock in the afternoon on July 3."yi Since voters were grouped as voting units according to residential districts or offices, it was feared that the outcome of polling done in such small units would easily en- able the members of each polling unit to tell generally who voted for which party. There was even talk that non-Golkar voters, if later identified, might lose their jobs and that all ballot papers would be secretly numbered for later identi- fication. Whether or not such rumors were well founded is beside the point. What mattered was the fear itself, which would have been enough to influence at least some, and pos- sibly many, voting decisions. In a large number of localities eligible voters were summoned by a voting committee to be p? briefed on voting procedures and even to conduct mock voting. ^ In some areas this mock voting helped local authorities to assess the popularity of Golkar and to exert communal pres- sures on anti-Golkar residents. Toward the end of the campaign period, government de- partments in Djakarta, as well as the Bank of Indonesia, held 90. Ordinances of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 56/22 (April 14, 1971) and No. 211/11 (May 5, 1971); the latter is reprinted in Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), p. 8. 91. Article 2 of Ordinance of the Minister of Home Affairs/ Chairman of the General Elections Institute No. 211/11/1971 cited above. 92. See, for instance, Merdeka. May 10, 1971.39 pep rallies in support of Golkar. The parties also sponsored parades and public rallies in towns and villages "for a show of force," as an NU officer told this writer in Semarang. But people predicted a Golkar victory with understandable confidence. Seasoned observers commented that Golkar should win, because, if it did not, the military might go wild to make up for their electoral loss. But it was also hoped that Golkar would not win by too large a margin, for then the military might become dictatorial. Before and during the official campaign period, Presi- dent Suharto and his cabinet ministers were supposed to stay aloof from campaign politics,93 but, in actual practice, they intensified their campaign efforts as election day approached. They often combined their campaigning with official duties. Prom April 12 to 17, Suharto visited Maluku, Flores, West Irian, and Sulawesi. On April 26, Adam Malik went off to Nusatenggara for a week and Ali Murtopo toured Tegal and its environs in West and Central Java. On May 12, the President flew to Sumatra, touring even such remote areas as Bangka and the Riau archipelago. On May 16, Ali Murtopo flew to Medan and Atjeh. On June 7, a Presidential party left for Semarang, Solo, and Tjilatjap in Central Java. On June 16, Adam Malik and Ali Murtopo went to Menado. The Foreign Minister and Amir Machmud visited Surabaja on June 25, the last day of the campaign. Everywhere they inspected and inaugurated develop- ment projects, attended Moslem functions, and contributed public and private funds to local activities. The campaign period was followed by a week of "calming down."94 During this time no campaigning was allowed and all posters within 300 meters of any polling booth had to be taken down. Government authorities, however, took advantage of this period and continued to campaign for Golkar by "ful- filling official duties" and attending ceremonial functions. 93. Sinar Harapan. April 22, 1971. 94. To set such a long period between the end of the cam- paign and the opening of the polls is probably a rare experiment in the electoral history of any country. In the elections of 1955, Indonesians went to the polls two days after the last day of the csunpaign. (See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 [Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, l9$7j, p. 48. He reports high tensions in the last few days before the polling day of September 29, 1955). How far the "calming-down week" of 1971 accomplished its pur- pose is difficult to judge due to the lack of compar- able cases.40 Amir Machmud and Ali Murtopo went to West Sumatra and Bengkulu to attend inauguration ceremonies for new governors. A few days before election day, eligible voters had to be on hand at their respective voting committees (KPPS), so they might receive voting permits by showing their residential identity card (kartu penduduk) (Article 63, Government Ordi- nance No. 1/1970). All eligible voters had thus to return home to be able to vote. Djakarta saw a massive exodus of betjak drivers and domestic servants to the countryside.95 in many localities, during the cooling-off week, voting com- mittees continued their Mcoaching" activities. On the eve of election day, President Suharto made a solemn radio and television speech, appealing to the people to exercise their constitutional right to free and secret bal- loting in an orderly manner and to reinforce the basis of the New Order.96 VI. Electoral Results 97 The morning of election day, Djakarta experienced its quietest and cleanest day ever, with no public transportation running. Particularly striking was the temporary disappear- ance of betjak from the streets. Practically all stores were closed. Polling stations became the scene of a sort of "com- munity gathering," with a mixed flavor of solemnity and fes- tivity. The Civil Defense Corps worked as special guards at polling stations. Police were out and all military stations were on the alert for possible mishaps. In Djakarta, as in 95. This indicates not only their migrant origins but also the fact that they had not taken the trouble to have their addresses changed to allow them to vote in Dja- karta. 96. The text of the speech is printed in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 18 (July 5, 1971), pp. 1 and 3. 97. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data in this section are drawn from Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Eewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 Ternerint.1 i untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Pen.1ebara.nnja Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingfcat II (mimeo., August l§7i).41 many other places throughout the country, all government em- ployees were instructed to report to their offices by half past seven in the morning. There they heard the taped speech of the President made the previous night as well as the pol- ling instructions. At most of the polling places voting be- gan soon after eight o'clock and the ballot boxes were closed by noon. The ballot-counting committees, with party men participating as witnesses, opened each ballot paper from the boxes and announced the name of the party punched therein by loud speaker so that ordinary electors around the station could hear. The official outcome of the 1971 elections was not re- leased to the public by the General Elections Institute until August 7.98 But the victory of Golkar was generally recog- nized as early as July 5, two days after election day, when President Suharto received reports on the elections by all the "commanders'' of the elections, including Generals Ali Murtopo, Amir Machmud, Sumitro, Darjatmo. Yoga Sugomo, Wang Suwandi, Sutopo Juwono, and Sudharmono.99 The General Chair- man of Golkar remarked on July 6 that Golkar won "because people love development," and government leaders carried the line that "Golkar's victory is the people's victory." Par- musi's Chairman Mintaredja went so far as to state that "Golkar's victory is Parmusi's victory."100 On election day, the vote was taken at 235, 983 places^'*’ to elect 351 representatives for the new national parliament 98. A tentative list of newly elected DPR members was an- nounced on August 14, just before Independence Day. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 20/21 (August 14, 1971), pp. 3-6. However, the list was later revised, and the final list, including the 100 appointed members, and the 9 representatives from West Irian, was announced on October 13, 1971. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 23 (September 29, 1971), p. 3, and no. 24 (October 27, 1971), pp. 2-4. According to a report by the Secretary to the Cabinet, the number of DPR-GR members who re- tained their seats in the new DPR was 114. Their break- down by party was: Catholic Party 2, PSII 7, NU 20, Parmusi 2, Golkar 67, Parkindo 1, PNI 14, and Perti 1. 99. Antara Warta Berita. July 4, 1971 (evening edition). 100. Ibid.. July 6, 1971 (evening edition). 101. Lembaga Pemilihan Uraum, Daftar Djumlah Penduduk/Pemilih dan Temnat Pemungutan Suara Pemilihan Umum 197x (mimeo., June 17, TS7T7.. She £35,963 polling stations consisted of 232,045 ordinary stations, 3,443 office stations, and 497 mobile stations.42 (DPR), 884 representatives for 25 provincial legislative councils (first-level DPJp), and 6,432 representatives for 272 kotamadya or kabupaten councils (second-level DPRD).102 Where the elections for the national parliament were con- cerned, 54,699,509 valid votes were cast. No figure on in- valid votes has so far been announced, and there is no way of knowing the exact rate of voting turnout. But the valid votes constituted 94.02 percent of the eligible voters, that is, 58,179,245 people. This was over six percent higher than the voting rate in the 1955 parliamentary elections, which was 87.6 percent. In 1971, of all the provinces, Djakarta showed the lowest level of participation, as it did in 1955; but this was still as high as 87.99 percent (see Table VI). Golkar attracted over 34 million votes, or 62.80 percent of the total valid vote; the NU, 10.2 million votes or 18.67 percent; the PNI, 3.8 million votes, or 6.94 percent; and Par- rausi, 2.9 million votes or 5.36 percent. The balance, 6.21 percent, was divided among the remaining six parties. The distribution of the 351 seats was: Golkar 227; NU 58; Parmusi 24; PNI 20; PSII 10; Parkindo 7; Catholic Party 3; and Perti 2. Murba and IPKI suffered total failure (see Table VII). Thus, Golkar won a land-slide victory, while the once major parties—the NU, the PNI, and Parmusi—were demoted, and minor parties came even to doubt their own survival. Ali Mur- topo's pre-election prediction that there would be a new poli- tical structure after the general elections which would not result in the dissolution of the parties, indeed came true. Golkar*s total parliamentary strength is now 336, combining 227 by election, 100 by appointment, plus 9 more by indirect election in West Irian.10* it occupies 73 percent of the total 460 seats (see Table VIII). The parties* pre-election estimates of their future par- liamentary strength had been: the PNI, 80 to 100 seats; the NU, 65 seats; Parmusi, 50 to 79 seats; Parkindo, 35 seats; 102. As stated earlier, indirect elections were held in West Irian from July 3 to July 26, 1971. The province has 9 representatives in the DPR, 32 in its first-level DPRD, and 144 in its 9 second-level DPRD. The number of ap- pointed members for Indonesia's three levels of legis- lative body are: 100 members for the DPR; 229 members for 25 first-level DPRD; and 1,640 members for 272 second-level DPRD. Thus, altogether, throughout the Republic, there are supposed to be 460 members for the DPR; 1,145 for 26 first-level DPRD; and 8,216 members for 281 second-level DPRD. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 18 (July 5, 1971), p. 4. . Lembaga Pemilihan Umum press release of August 19, 1971. 10343 Murba, 20 seats. Of all the parties, the NU made the most accurate assessment of its own electoral strength. Golkar's estimate had varied since 1969. It began with a modest esti- mate of some 35 seats, at a time when it had little self- confidence and considered partnership with other parties. After early 1970, it talked about controlling one-third of the elective parliamentary seats, namely, 120 to 130 seats; this target was based on the calculation that 130 elected seats, combined with the 100 appointed seats, would give it a majority of 230 in the new 4o0-member DPR. In early May 1971, after the electoral campaign started, Golkar boasted about having every chance of surpassing the original 30 per- cent to 35 percent target. 10-> On election eve, however, Liem Bian Koen, a member of Golkar's General Elections Board (Bapilu) predicted no more than 35 percent of the vote would go to Golkar.10® Since Golkar won 63 percent of the vote the next day, the question arises as to whether Golkar genuinely underestimated its own strength, or merely lowered its public estimates to solicit greater public sympathy. Neither specu- lation has thus far been confirmed.107 104. These figures are taken from newspapers: the PNI's from Sinar Harapan. March 3 and May 4, 1971; the NU's from Sinar Harapan. May 18, 1971; Parrausi's from Antara Warta teerita. April 29, 1971 (evening edition), and Sinar Harapan. May 18, 1971; Parkindo's from Djakarta times. May 1, 1971; and Murba's from Sinar flarapan. May 12. 1971. 105. At about the same time, former PNI chairman Hardi ex- pressed the view that Golkar, together with ABRI, would control about 235 seats in the new parliament—a fore- cast close to Golkar's own public pre-campaign esti- mate. See Sinar Harapan. May 6, 1971. 106. Sinar Harapan. July 2, 1971. 107. A certain classified Djakarta report of mid-1970 that came to the writer's attention said that the State In- telligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) made the optimistic estimate in mid-1970 that Golkar might win some two- thirds of the elective seats, i.e., about 240 seats. Since this estimate subsequently proved to be accurate, it suggests that Golkar was in reality confident of a big victory, but for tactical reasons did not wish to reveal this confidence publicly. On the other hand, Sinar Harapan (July 1, 1971) reported that on June 29 Bakin had given the President its electoral estimate that 65 percent of the vote would be shared by the "big four"—the PNI, the NU, Golkar and Parmusi— with respective percentages of 21, 19, 15, and 10. The44 High Voting Turnout The high level of voting participation and Golkar’s huge victory raised suspicions with regard to the fairness of the election. In the immediate post-election days, NU, PNI, and Parmusi leaders made charges that the election was invalid, although later they were forced by the authorities to with- draw such allegations. While the parties criticized the electoral outcome as the product of military and governmental intimidation, which could hardly be denied, Indonesia's high voting turnout should not be interpreted as stemming primarily from intimidation. The first Indonesian elections of 1955, which, under Government Ordinance No. 47 of 1954, had pro- hibited military intervention in the electoral campaign, pro- duced a similarly high voting turnout of some 91.5 percent, calculated by adding the estimated invalid votes to the valid voting rate of 87.6 percent.This situation suggests that there is a need to look for reasons for the high turnout other than government intimidation. The organizing of polling places mainly a community basis, with each polling place receiving some 300 to 1,000 eligible voters, was a feature common to both the 1955 and the 1971 elections in Indonesia. Under this arrangement, ordinary voters would go to the polls because of their sense of com- munal obligation, or to avoid a subsequent feeling of embar- rassment for not having voted; both these motives must have been reinforced by pressure exerted through village heads. Added to this communal obligation, there was some fear of sub- sequent retaliation by local authorities for not voting, pos- sibly in the form of dismissal from a Job, of difficulties put in the way of having a residential identity card renewed, and the like.109 This type of communal pressure usually works more effec- tively in rural than urban areas, for in the latter communal ties often suffer erosion and dilution. As Table IX shows, in all of the four sampled constituencies of Djakarta, authenticity of this report, particularly with regard to the figure of 15 percent for Golkar, remains ques- tionable. It was refuted the next day by Golkar's Liem Bian Koen. 108. Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. p. 51. 109. Some observers of both elections seem to agree that this fear was distinctly lacking in 1955. Yet they also stress that in both elections voters had a sense of pride in choosing their representatives.45 Jogjakarta. South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan, urban areas (kotamadya) had lower voting rates than rural ones (kabu- patdn), with the exceptions of the kotamadya of Pangkal Pinang and the kabupatdn of Bangka in the province of South Sumatra. The table shows that all kabupaten had a minimum voting rate of 90 percent, except for Bangka, whereas the large metropolitan areas of Djakarta and Jogjakarta had the lowest voting rates among the kotamadya. This urban-rural difference in voting accords turnout with voting behavior in many other political systems.HO Another factor promoting a high degree of electoral par- ticipation in Indonesia may have been the continuing rela- tionship between village leaders and the local population based on traditional authoritarian concepts. Most telling was a Western journalist’s report of a peasant in Central 110. In the British general elections of 1966 many metropoli- tan electoral districts had low voting turnouts—no higher than 60 percent, which was several percent below the national average. See Nishihira Shigeki, Senkyo no kokusai hikaku [international Comparison of ElectionsJ (¥okyo: ITIEon Hyoronsha, 1969), p. 5. In the 1965 West German elections, the four districts with the low- est turnout (between 70 and 80 percent) were one dis- trict in Cologne City, and three in Munich City. See ibid., pp. 39-40. In the August 29, 1971 South Vietna- mese elections for the lower house, the Saigon turnout was only 59.4 percent compared to the national average of 78.5 percent. See Asahi Shinbun. August 30, 1971. The South Korean presidential elections of 1971 wit- nessed a national average turnout of 79.9 percent, but Seoul’s voting rate was only 71.2 percent. See C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," Asian Survey. XII, 3 (March 1972), p. 217. The Japanese electoral ex- perience also confirms this pattern. In the general elections of 1969, the national turnout was 68.5 per- cent, but the rate of voting in urban districts was only 64.9 percent, while that in rural districts was 77.4 percent. Tokyo's turnout was 56.5 percent, the lowest in the country. See Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1970. pp. 598 and 600. The American experience seems rather exceptional, in that the metropolitan voting rate is slightly higher than the non-metropolitan rate: 68.0 percent vs. 67.3 percent in the 1968 presidential elections, and 55.3 percent vs. 53.2 percent in the 1970 congressional elec- tions. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1971. p. 365.46 Java who said, "We are all going to vote for Golkar, because the headman has told us we must. ... We are told by the headman when we should harvest the rice and when we should pay our taxes. We are used to doing what the headman tells us, so I do not understand why I should object to him telling us how to vote."HI Under such circumstances as these, it is hardly possible to draw the line between official pressure and volun- tary support. Golkar Votes in Urban-Rural Dimensions Golkar's vote was positively correlated with high voting participation. Table IX shows the relative voting rate for Golkar in urban and rural districts in contrast to the total vote. Areas of high voting rates, mainly kabupat&n, tend also to be areas with a high vote percentage for Golkar. This is also true of the five kotamadya listed. The two cities (Jogjakarta and Djakarta) which had the lowest voting rates, 86.8 percent and 87.9 percent respectively, also had the lowest vote for Golkar, 45.1 percent and 46.6 percent respec- tively; kotamadya in South Sumatra and West Kalimantan, which had voting rates of over 90 percent, had higher Golkar votes than the two large cities of Java. Table X, which provides a national picture of Golkar's relative success in urban-rural dimensions, generally supports the above proposition. Excep- tional constituencies were Atjeh, Central Java, East Java, and East Kalimantan, where urban districts showed a higher Golkar vote than their rural counterparts. Further inquiry into local political conditions would be necessary to explain what happened in these areas. Djakarta's comparatively low Golkar vote (46.6 percent) invites a comment on the effect of office voting. During the campaign period, the Home Affairs Minister's announcement that office workers would vote in ballot boxes installed in their offices, was strongly criticized as a tactic to coerce civil servants to support Golkar. Virtually all major departments of the Indonesian government did in fact vote strongly for Golkar: for example, Defense and Security (civilian employees only), 95 percent; Home Affairs, 80 percent; Information,75 percent; Finance, 80 percent; and Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI), 66 percent. (A notable exception was the Department of Religious Affairs, which gave only 25 percent of its ballots to Golkar, and understandably supported the NU and Parmusi with votes of 37.4 percent and 23.9 percent, respectively).112 It is 111. Tony Clifton, "A Peasant's life in Java," Newsweek. July 12, 1971, p. 12. 112. Not all departmental results were announced. Results for the Departments of Religious Affairs, Information,47 nonetheless interesting to note that the core government agencies responsible for the general elections, namely, the Departments of Home Affairs and Information, still had some 20 to 25 percent of their votes cast against Golkar. Since the voting percentage for Golkar in the entire Djakarta area was 47 percent, office voting, producing an es- timated average of 75 to 80 percent voting rate for Golkar, probably did have some effect in persuading or "coercing" government employees. However, since 664 of the total of 3,268 polling stations installed in offices throughout the country were set up in Djakarta, and since each polling sta- tion handled some 300 eligible voters, Djakarta*s office voters can be estimated to have been approximately 199,200 persons, assuming that all eligible voters actually cast their ballots. This figure constitutes less than one-tenth of Djakarta's total of 2.2 million votes cast. Assuming that as many as 25 to 33 percent of these office voters may have voted for the government party against their wish, they still would have constituted only 2.5 to 3 percent of Djakarta's total vote. This is admittedly a highly crude estimate of the possible effect of alleged government coercion through office voting, but the point of the argument here is only to make it plain that office voting could have had little in- fluence on the overall outcome of the elections in Djakarta. The 1971 elections for the DPR were conducted with pro- vinces used as electoral constituencies. The parties' shares of the DPR representatives from each constituency, however, were determined on the basis of the extent of the vote they scored in the kotamadya and kabupaten, with final adjust- ments under the proportional representation system in the reallocation of votes. Consequently, although Golkar occu- pied first place in 50 out of 54 kotamadya, and in 197 out of 218 kabupaten throughout the country, its resultant 227 repre- sentatives consisted of 199 members determined on a kabupaten basis and 28 members from kotamadya. In the process of vote- reallocation adjustments, Golkar gave away many of its kota- madya votes to other parties, in exchange for kabupaten victories (Table XI). and Finance, as well as for the RRI, appeared in Antara Varta Berita. July 4, 1971 (morning edition); those for the Departments of Agriculture and Social Affairs in ibid., July 6, 1971 (morning edition); and for the Department of Defense and Security in ibid., July 6, 1971 (evening edition). The results for the Depart- ment of Home Affairs were given to the writer orally by an official.48 A close examination of electoral statistics shows further that, out of the 4 kotamadya and 21 kabupaten where Golkar failed £o win, it was the runner-up in all, except for one kabupaten (see Table XII). In other words, Golkar finished first in 247 out of 272 sub-provincial electoral districts, second in 24 districts, and third in the 1 remaining district. All these findings simply reinforce the point that Golkar ran successfully in both rural and urban districts. Golkar in Ambon and Central and East Java Among the 25 constituencies, the province of Maluku made the least contribution to Golkar's victory. Though the voting rate there was as high as 95.6 percent (see Table VI), Golkar gained onlyN32.2 percent in the kotamadya and 46.9 percent in the kabupaten areas (see Table X). Further, Ambon was the only provincial capital where Golkar did not win; Parkindo won a majority (see Table XII). On August 5, a month after the general elections, the mayor of Ambon, M. H. Manuffy, related that Golkar's defeat was due to the lack of direction from Bapilu.113 He also said that there had been no active cam- paign there, except for that by the local branch of the Em- ployees' Association of the Home Affairs Department (Kokar- mendagri) and its female partner (Pertiwi), and that the can- didates, who were mostly selected from outside the province, had very little familiarity with local conditions. The mayor mentioned further that Parkindo's success was achieved by vigorous and well-coordinated campaigns, penetrating to the lowest levels. The mayor's reasons for Golkar's failure in the capital of Maluku provides a valuable insight into how Golkar fought and won in other districts. East Nusatenggara was another constituency that failed to provide a full Golkar victory, although the party did win 8 out of the 12 DPR seats allocated to this province. The Catholic Party and Parkindo finished firstsin 5 out of 12 kabupaten, with their vote in some kabupaten, such as Alor and Sikka. having a wide margin over that for Golkar (see Table XII). The most challenging regions for Golkar were Central and East Java, where the PHI, the NU, and Parmusi claimed major strength. These two provinces reportedly felt the strongest military pressure against the parties; and compared with West Java and Djakarta, they witnessed more intensive campaign activities by Golkar, the PHI, the NU, and Parmusi, as the writer himself observed on a tour during the campaign 113. Ibid.. August 5, 1971 (evening edition)49 period. The electoral strength claimed by the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi, however, was seriously overestimated. Golkar took 50.3 percent of the Central and 54.9 percent of the East Java vote, with a wide margin over the runner-up, the NU, which had 23.1 percent and 35.1 percent of the votes, respec- tively. In these two provinces, Golkar obtained 64 seats,or 28.1 percent of its total elected parliamentary members (see Table XIII). In Central Java, a Golkar official told the writer that Golkar might win in the cities but perhaps would not in rural areas; he admitted that Golkar was a new political group, while the parties had traditional footholds, better organi- zers, and more effective speech-makers. It turned out that he was somewhat too modest. Golkar not only won in all major cities of Central and East Java, including Jogjakarta, Semarang, Surakarta, Magelang, Surabaja, Malang, Madiun, and Kediri, even carrying Sukarno's birthplace, Blitar; it also got the highest number of votes in 23 out of the 29 Central Java kabupat&n and 19 out of the 27 East Java kabupaten. Nevertheless, Golkar did not do as well in these pro- vinces as it did in some other constituencies. Its percen- age votes in Central and East Java kotamadya were 55.1 per- cent and 57.8 percent respectively, and, in the kabupaten, 49.9 percent and 54.6 percent. Kabupaten support for Golkar was much lower than the national kabupaten average of 64.1 percent (see Table X). In Central Java, Golkar lost to the PNI in five kabupaten and to the NU in one kabupaten and one kotamadya; in East Java, Golkar lost to the NU in eight kabu- paten and one kotamadya (see Table XII). Golkar's difficul- ties in Central and East Java are evident from the fact that, out of the 25 subprovincial electoral districts throughout the country where it failed to win, 16 were in Central and East Java. The NU demonstrated considerable strength in Central and East Java, taking 23.1 percent of the Central Java and 35.1 percent of the East Java vote. The NU's vote in Central and East Java together made up 66.2 percent of the party's national voting strength and provided 35 out of its total of 58 seats in the DPR (see Table XIII). The PNI area of greatest strength was Central Java, where the party earned 52.8 percent of its total votes. The PNI's Central Java vote brought the party 11 seats, over half of its total parliamentary representation. However, in the over-all national picture, the PNI gained much less than its original target of 80 to 100 seats. It had hoped to obtain some 75 seats from Java and at least one seat from every Outer Island constituency. But in fact it gained only 17 seats from Java, 2 from Sumatra, and 1 from Nusatenggara (see Table VII).50 On July 19, some two weeks after the polling, a deputy chair- man of the PNI, Prof. Sunawar Sukowati, attributed the PNI's failure to the shortage of time to recover from the impact of the 1965 communist upheaval and to the loss of support of local civil servants.114 The party also suffered from the un- timely death of Chairman Hadisubeno on April 24, just prior to the commencement of the electoral campaign. An additional factor in the PNI's failure to achieve its goals in Central Java may have been the nomination by Golkar of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as its pre-eminent candidate. The PNI had also planned to make use of the Sultan's name and had intended to nominate him as the PNI candidate for Vice-President, but this never materialized. Parmusi made a surprisingly poor showing except in the kabupat&n of Pidi& in Atjeh, where it finished first (see Table XII). Since its formation in February 1968 the party had suffered from constant leadership crises and organiza- tional weakness. When some 700 NU leaders met in Djombang, East Java, from April 15-18, and issued a fatwa (binding re- ligious opinion) that it was obligatory for Moslems to vote for an Islamic party in the elections, Mintaredja, the Suharto-picked chairman of Parmusi, disagreed.115 in late April, he demoralized and divided his party further by stating in public that a number of former Masjumi leaders, such as Natsir, Rum and Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, were Mfailures."116 Since these men were still revered by large sections of Par- musi 's membership, Mintaredja's remarks aroused considerable intra-party bitterness, and left many uncertain of what the party now really stood for. In addition, the ex-Masjumi leaders could do little to bolster Parmusi's electioneering drive since, by Article 4 of Presidential Decision No. 68 of 1970, those who lost the right to be elected were prohibited from actively participating in campaigns and even from at- tending campaigns "in a conspicuous manner (setjara men- jolok)."117 As a result of all this, Parmusi was not able to recover more than a part of Masjumi's former electoral strength. 114. Ibid., July 19, 1971 (morning edition). 115. Suluh Marhaen. April 22, 1971. Guppi, now within the GrOlkar fold, also disagreed with the Djombang fatwa. maintaining that the Holy Koran had no connection with political parties. See Suara Karya, April 23. 1971. 116. Djakarta Times. April 28, 1971. 117. The text of this Decision appears in Siaran Pemilihan IJmum. no. 8 (February 15, 1971), p. 21 Article 451 VII. Pemilu in a Larger Context The national picture of Golkar’s electoral success can be drawn from an examination of the election statistics avail- able to date. A more detailed study, dealing with the fuller implications of Indonesian voting behavior in 1971, must await the release of additional local data. Yet it should be borne in mind that Golkar's success story can only in part be told by the analysis of election statistics. As the writer has attempted to demonstrate, Golkar's electioneering, or more accurately, the military's electioneering, began as early as 1966, when General Suharto's government first pre- sented election bills to the DPR-GR, and the military fin- ished its essential preparations for an electoral victory through the instrument of Golkar before the official campaign even began in late April 1971. In effect, Golkar was a party based on the organizational support of the government bureau- cracy, particularly of the Departments of Home Affairs and of Defense and Security. At the beginning, the military had considered partnership with the major existing parties, but then moved to weaken them and finally to discredit them, as Golkar steadily gained strength. This process of governmental preparation prior to the election campaign is essential for an understanding of Golkar's victory. The emergence of a pro-government majority party in the Indonesian parliament is unprecedented. It is indeed impres- sive for such a majority to be produced under a system of proportional representation. Most Indonesians do not favor "50 percent plus 1M Western-style democracy, for that does not accord with the Indonesian spirit of musjawarah. or the reaching of consensus by mutual consultation; they prefer to have "50 percent plus 1 plus x11 as a decision-making formula closer to that of mus jawarah—so Ali Murtopo argued in pre- election days. Indeed, Sukarno had earlier made a similar contention in establishing Guided Democracy and the Nasakom system, as will be discussed below. Yet the significance of the 1971 general elections did not lie just in the creation of a majority party, but rather specifies that "those who were not given the right to be elected according to the Laws concerned, or those whose right to be elected was denied by Court decisions and not yet regained, or those effected by Kopkamtib decisions," were prohibited from conducting election campaigns. Ex-Masjumi leaders who had wished to be- come candidates but who had been screened out by Kop- kamtib continued to be watched by Kopkamtib during the campaign period.52 in the fact that, through this party, the military has entered into the central arena of parliamentary politics. As the real power-holders in contemporary Indonesia, they have nonethe- less sought some popular sanction for their control. This is the most important aspect of the election. In 1955, the mili- tary stayed out of the parliamentary electoral process. As a result, parliament was never stable and never functioned pro- ductively, since the military exerted its influence over the parliament from outside. That a military-dominated govern- ment party now controls parliament increases the chance for greater legislative productivity, and in this sense, the func- tioning of the Indonesian parliament may be improved after this election. The smooth execution of the elections was an impressive political accomplishment. Not a single major incident was re- ported on election day. The successful maintenance of order for elections in an archipelago as large as Indonesia, where communications are a major obstacle to national development, provided promising signs of a growing governmental efficiency, which had appeared so doubtful during the last days of Sukarno’s presidency. Statistical data from the elections reveal that Golkar is a national party in a geographical sense, not a Djakarta- centered one nor a regional one. Golkar was "supported” in practically all constituencies of Indonesia, even more strongly by the rural than by the urban electorate. At least on the surface, this is also a new and healthy portent for Indonesia’s development as a nation, since the country is still predominantly agricultural. In this sense, the Suharto regime has established its political legitimacy and enhanced its prestige abroad. In spite of its electoral success, Golkar nevertheless faces many intractable problems in the future. One major question is whether it can become a national party not only in a geographical, but also in a political sense. Created by the military authorities and expanded by the Home Affairs Minister's instructions, Golkar is a party built from above as a vote-getting instrument. But is it to activate itself only once every five years when general elections are held, serving as a legislative rubber-stamp for government pro- grams in between, or can it transform itself into a party that can meet the needs of the people? As soon as the general elections were over, Sekber- Golkar underwent significant organizational change. On July 17, three weeks before the official results of the elec- tions were announced on August 7, it was renamed Golongan Karya Pusat (Central Golongan Karya), as opposed to local53 Golkar offices. According to Its own statement, Golkar was being reorganized "in order to increase its organizational efficiency."118 The seven parental bodies (Kino), under which some 250 occupational groups had been clustered, were replaced by 13 coordinating bodies; these, in turn, were grouped under five secretariats, responsible, respectively, for civil service and labor affairs, cultural and spiritual affairs, economic and production affairs, Hankam affairs, and youth, women's and intellectuals' affairs. The organization is now run by a national council of five members headed by Lieutenant-General Sokowati, and a 17-member advisory board which includes the Sultan, Adam Malik, Amir Machmud, All Murtopo, Panggabean, and other influential personages of the present regime. The five secretariats and the thirteen coordinating bodies have yet to be tested for their capacity to absorb the occupational and regional interests articulated in the Indo- nesian political system and to translate them into govern- mental outputs. They need to recruit specialists in party policy research and to train leaders who can communicate with the people. In this regard, Golkar made a most encouraging start at the time of the elections by nominating the largest number of college graduates as its candidates. No less important than Golkar's problematic prospects as a party may be an organizational dilemma that it faces. Aiming at crushing the existing political parties, Golkar has claimed that it is not a political party but an aggregate of functional groups concerned with development. But the defi- nition of "functional group" (golongan karya) is so diffuse that it even includes groups of housewives and artists. If this organizational logic were carried too far, Golkar could include every Indonesian group under the rubric "functional group" and in the process lose its organizational identity. While its organizational boundaries are diffuse, Golkar has so far operated as a kind of military hierarchy in which orders come only from the top. The organizational change 118. Golkar Decision No. KEP-10l/VIl/Golongan Karya/1971, issued July 17, 1971, announced July 20. See Antara Warta Berita. July 20 (evening edition) and 21 (morning edition), 1971. According to Antara Warta Berita. July 21, 1971 (morning edition), this "con- solidation" of Golkar was based on the "mandate" given by member organizations to the General Chair- man, and would remain effective until the Golkar national congress (nrus.jawarah nasional), scheduled to be held some time before the coming MPR session of March 1973.54 of July 17 mentioned above was no exception: there was no public debate prior to the announcement of the change. This aspect of Golkar, if further reinforced, may come to resemble the centralist character of a communist party. Still in an embryonic stage, Golkar's organization is marked by ambiva- lence: a diffuse membership is coupled with a strict command system. This contradiction will have to be dealt with eventually. The 1971 elections have created a situation in which a one-party system could emerge. If the present electoral sys- tem of proportional representation is replaced by a single- member constituency system, such as the Suharto government first favored in 1967, Golkar's success may be even more de- cisive in the 1976 general elections them in 1971. Indeed, in 1971, Golkar would have won 247 out of 272 constituencies if the 54 kotamadya and 218 kabupatfen had been treated as electoral units (see Table XI). Whatever the case, Golkar's ambivalent character should still receive particular atten- tion. If its "command system" aspects are reinforced, it may grow into a monolithic party, which would do little to encour- age the initiative and creativity of its membership, and might even become a dictatorial party under a one-party system. On the other hand, if its "diffuse membership" aspects persist in the future, Golkar may find difficulty in sustaining internal unity and organizational loyalty. The current organizational structure of Golkar is such that it appears to be both a party organization and an affiliation of separate organizations, with the national council and five secretariats of Golkar today resembling the former, and the thirteen coordinating bodies and their respective groups the latter. The maintenance of a dif- fuse membership could either generate factional strife, or could bring about a split within Golkar, leading to a new party with its affiliated mass organizations, as was the case when past Indonesian political parties found their internal disagreements insurmountable. Further, the Golkar leadership cannot avoid the highly sensitive problem of civil-military relationships within the organization. Civilian control over the military is a remote prospect in contemporary Indonesia, where the latter claim a dual role in politics and defense. Golkar today simply mirrors this situation. Civil-military relationships in the Indonesian political system can hardly be understood without some knowledge of the historical background of the post-1945 years. In the sense that the present relationships have been established through a long series of political events, the Suharto regime cannot sever itself from the past. Indeed, the rise of civilian control may well be preceded by a trans- formation of the military into a civilian bureaucracy, just as the Japanese samurai class came to assume administrative functions in the Tokugawa period.55 The fact is that there are more points of resemblance than of difference between the Suharto and Sukarno presiden- cies. While there is a contrast in the style of leadership between that of the flamboyant Sukarno and that of the "Smiling General," both appeal to the same state ideologies of the 1945 Constitution and Pantja Sila. Although the Suharto group maintains that the Sukarno leadership "de- viated" from such state doctrines, the similarities persist. Just as the nation*s first president increased his political power in 1959 by calling for a "return to the 1945 Constitu- tion," so did the second president rise to power after 1965 by calling for a "return to the 1945 Constitution in all its purity." Suharto consigned his predecessor’s "Guided Democ- racy" to the grave, yet he himself advocates Pantja Sila Democracy; by providing an official and indisputable inter- pretation of what Pantja Sila Democracy is, the Suharto leadership is, in a sense, defining a new form of "Guided Democracy." The New Order leaders buried the Nasakom system of co- operation between nationalist (Nas), religious (A), and com- munist (Kom) groups by outlawing the PKI. However, they had maintained the Nasakom spirit of reaching decisions by con- sultation among major contending political groups. When President Suharto proposed the idea of a three-group system in February 1970 and when, %fter Pemilu, he clustered the eight surviving parties and the ABRI group within the DPR into four "fractions," this system closely resembled its pre- decessor. The PNI, Parkindo, and the Catholic Party were grouped as the Democracy Development fraction; and the Islamic parties namely, the NU, Parmusi, the PSII, and Perti, were grouped as the Unity Development fraction. Golkar and ABRI were the two other fractions, but both actually operate under the same Suharto leadership. Earlier, they were referred to as the "materialist development group," the "spiritual devel- opment group," and the "functional group." Thus, in reality, Nasakom has been resurrected since Pemilu as what might be called "Nasagolab," although Gol (Golkar) and AB (ABRI) have much greater weight than NASA. Just as Nasakom was a system of support for President Sukarno, so "Nasagolab" is for Suharto: all parties that participated in the 1971 elections 119. The four-group system, however, functions in effect as a three-group system (see above, note 21). Further- more, President Suharto stated on October 28, 1971, when all the new DPR members were officially installed, that there would be only three organizational emblems in the 1976 general elections, i.e., the emblems of Golkar, the Development Democracy Group, and the Development Unity Group. See Antara Warta Berita, October 29, 1971 (morning edition).56 pledged their support to Suharto as President and to his de- velopment programs• While Suharto and his military associates engineered Golkar's electoral victory and sought to create a strong majority party within the Indonesian parliament, they tried to practice musjawarah outside the DPR-GR. Between 1966 and 1971, Suharto often met with party leaders and discussed the future political structure and other current political issues. (Here again there is a similarity between the Suharto and Sukarno leaderships, except that the former tends to give more form than substance to musjawarah in his meetings; prob- ably reflecting his character as a military leader, he appears to be more authoritarian than Sukarno in practicing his ver- sion of "guided democracy.") The newly revised Golkar or- ganization also claims to maintain the spirit of musjawarah, since it calls its general congress a "National Musjawarah," although the exact function and composition of this body lacks clarity at present. What makes the New Order distinctive from the Old Order is the new regime's intense concern for political order and national consensus. Sukarno and the political parties of the past failed to develop a national consensus on the pri- ority of goals and the use of scarce resources. The military authorities have such a sense of urgency for building a national consensus that they have determined what it should be for themselves, and then pressed the rest of society to conform to it. The military pressure and intimidation that reportedly occurred during the 1971 elections can best be understood in this light and can be viewed with sympathy. And the efforts have borne fruit in the form of a victory for Golkar.TABLE I. CHANGES IN SIZE AND GROUP REPRESENTATION OP INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTS, 1949-1971 OTP TJPRS DPR DPR"-GR DPR-GR DPR-GR DPR^GR DPR-GR “DPR 1949 1950 1956 I960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1971 1. Political Parties PNI 45 42 57 44 44 44 47 78 20 Murba 12 4 2 1 1 X 4 4 — Partindo X X X 1 1 2 2 X X IPKI X X 4 X 2 2 9 11 - PKI 32 17 39 30 30 X X X X WJ _ 8 45 36 36 36 46 75 58 Masjumi 60 43 57 X X X X X X Parmusi X X X X X X X 18 24 PSII 12 4 8 5 5 5 12 20 10 Perti - 1 - 2 2 2 6 9 2 Catholic 12 9 6 5 5 5 11 15 3 Parkindo 12 5 8 6 6 6 11 17 7 Others 178 102 31 — _ X Subtotal 262(67.3#) 222(100#) 252(94.4#) 130(46.2#) 122(44.1#) 102(42.1#) M8(42.2#) 247(59.6^^ 124(26.9#) 2. Functional Groups Military - - - 37(24.6#) 39(13.0#) 39(16.1#) 43(12.2#) 75(18.1#) 75(16.3#) Religious - — — 31 31 31 42 Grp A 32 Material Dev. 78 - - 55 59 36 51 Grp B 32 261(56.7#) Spiritual Dev. — — — 27 32 27 58 Grp C 28 Subtotal 78(14.4#) "* 150(53.3#) 161(53.8#) 133(54.9#) 194(55.4#) 167(40.4#) 336(73.0#) 3. Ethnic Groups Europeans 1 6 Chinese 6 — 6 — — — .. _ 1 Arabs 3 - — _ — _ Subtotal 10.(1.8#) 12 (4.4#) - - 4. Regional Groups 88(16.3#) 2 da#) Subtotal — 1 (0.5#) 6 (2.1#) 7 (3.0#) 8 (2.4#) - TOTAL 539(100^1 235(100#) 272(100#) 281(100#) 299(100#) 242(100#) 350(100#) 414(100#) 460(100#) Source: based on DPR-GR Secretariat, comp., Seperempat Abad Dewan Perwakllan Rak.jat Republik Indonesia (1970) Notes: x - nonexistent, banned, suspended temporarily, etc. - = no seats obtained.TABLE II. INITIAL, PROVISIONAL, AND OFFICIAL LISTS OF PARTY CANDIDATES FOR 1971 DPR ELECTIONS Initial" ' List (Jan. 18) Net _ reduction Provisional List (Mar. 13) Net reduction Official' List (April 20) 1. Catholic 145 -26 119 -4 115 2. PSII 421 -99 322 -13 309 3. NU 415 -12 403 -6 397 4. Parrausi 458 -125 333 -6 327 5. Golkar 549 -10 539 -1 538 6. Parkindo 233 -47 186 -4 182 7. Murba 290 -83 207 -4 203 8. PNI 669 -143 526 -21 505 9. Perti 203 -47 156 -6 150 10. IPKI 406 -92 314 -19 295 TOTAL 3,789 -684 3,105 -84 3,021 Sources: "Initial List" adopted from Merdeka, January 18, 1971; Provisional List published in Siaran Pemilihan Umum. no. 10 (March 17, 1971), pp. 3-4; and Official List printed as Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Tjalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rak.jat Tahun 1971 dari Orpol/Golkar (mimeo., April 20, l97l). * Notes: figures of net reduction are given here since there were some additions of candidates by respective parties in the process of screening candidates. These additions were, however, negli- gible, as is indicated in Table III.TABLE III. REDUCTION AND ADDITION OF PARTY CANDIDATES BETWEEN INITIAL AND OFFICIAL LISTS BY CONSTITUENCY Total Total NEf Catholic PSII NU Parmusi Golkar Parkindo Murba PNI Perti IPKI reduc. addit. CHANGE 1. Atjeh — — 3 - 1 - 2 1 - 1 -2 - 2 - 8 4 - 4 2. N. Sumatra -1 - 9 -1 -14 — - 3 — -11 -1 10 - 40 10 - 30 3. W. Sumatra - - 9 -3 - 5 — - 2 3 — -8 5 - 27 8 - 19 4. Rlau - - 3 — - 5 - — - 1 - 5 -3 - 1 - 18 — - 18 3. S. Sumatra -4 - 5 -2 - 6 — - 1 3 - 2 — -13 - 33 3 - 30 6. Djambi -1 - 7 4 - 3 - — 1 - 3 -3 - 3 - 20 5 - 15 7. Bengkulu - - 1 - - 3 -1 — - 3 - 3 -3 - - 14 - - 14 8. Lampung -1 - 5 - - 5 - - 2 - - - - 4 - 17 - - 17 9. W. Java -1 - 1 -3 -13 -1 _ -19 -18 -2 -20 - 78 _ - 78 10. Djakarta -4 - -1 4 -1 - 1 - 6 — -4 - 5 - 22 4 - 18 11. Central Java -1 -35 -4 -11 -1 1 -16 -43 -5 -12 -128 1 -127 12. Jogjakarta -1 - — -10 -1 — - 4 - 2 -1 - 3 - 22 — - 22 13. East Java -1 - 5 -1 -13 -1 - 4 -27 -33 -2 - 6 - 93 - - 93 14. W. Kalimantan -3 — -1 - 4 — - 2 - 2 - 2 - 6 - 20 — - 20 15. Central K'tan — - 1 -1 - 4 -1 - 4 - 3 - 6 - -10 - 30 — . - 30 16. S. K'tan — - 2 — - 3 — — - 6 - 3 -4 - 2 - 20 — - 20 17. E. K'tan - - 5 - - 5 -1 - 3 3 - 1 -4 -10 - 29 3 - 26 18. N. Sulawesi _ - 1 -4 - 4 — - 1 - 2 - 1 -1 - 1 - 15 — - 15 19. C. Sulawesi -1 - 2 1 — -1 - 2 - 1 - 1 -1 - 5 - 14 1 - 13 20. Southeast S. 1 - 3 -1 - 3 — - 2 - 5 - 3 — - 1 - 18 1 - 17 21. S. Sulawesi -6 -10 -3 - 6 -1 -15 - 1 -13 -1 -19 - 75 - - 75 22. Bali — mm - 3 - 5 - 8 - 8 23. W. Nusateng. -1 - 2 -1 - 8 -1 — - 3 - 3 -5 - 2 - 26 — - 26 24. E. Nusateng. -5 - 3 - - 3 - - 8 - - 5 -2 - - 26 - - 26 25. Maluku - - 3 - - 3 - - 1 - -1 - 1 - 8 1 - 7 Total reduction -31 -112 -26 -135 -11 -52 -99 -164 -53 -126 -809 Total addition 1 - 8 4 - 1 12 - - 15 41 NET CHANGE -30 -112 -18 -131 -11 -51 -87 -164 -53 -111 -768 Sources: Same as those for Table IITABLE IV. INITIAL, PROVISIONAL, AND OFFICIAL CANDIDATES OF GOLKAR, NU, PARMUSI, FNI, AND TOTAL TEN PARTIES BY CONSTITUENCY AS COMPARED WITH NUMBER OF DPR MEMBERS TO BE ELECTED AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CANDIDATES PERMITTED —mt Maximum Ten Constituency Member Candidates GOLKAR NU PARMUSI FNI Parties Ia Pb 0C I P 0 I P 0 I P 0 I P 0 1. Atjeh 9 18 IB 18 18 5 8 8 18 17 17 18 17 17 ll2 107 108 2. N. Sumatra 17 34 32 32 32 18 18 17 34 19 20 34 21 23 209 178 179 3. W. Sumatra 14 28 25 25 25 13 10 10 23 18 18 20 18 20 168 150 149 4. Riau 6 12 12 12 12 6 6 6 12 7 7 12 10 7 81 66 63 5 • S. Sumatra 10 20 20 20 20 14 12 12 20 14 14 20 18 18 140 110 110 6. Djambi 6 12 12 12 12 6 10 10 12 9 9 8 6 5 73 60 58 7. Bengkulu 4 8 7 6 6 8 8 8 8 5 5 8 4 5 61 47 47 8. Lampung 7 14 11 12 11 8 8 8 14 9 9 14 14 14 98 83 81 9. West Java 46 92 92 91 91 53 50 50 53 43 40 88 74 70 501 433 423 10. Djakarta 9 18 18 17 17 12 11 11 8 13 12 17 17 17 145 132 127 11. Central Java 57 114 53 52 52 63 62 59 42 31 31 111 85 68 458 358 331 12. Jogjakarta 7 14 13 12 12 4 4 4 15 5 5 14 13 12 98 78 76 13. East Java 63 126 59 58 58 84 84 83 38 26 25 125 98 92 437 359 344 14. W. Kalimantan 7 14 14 14 14 8 7 7 14 11 10 14 13 12 100 87 80 15. Central K'tan 6 12 9 8 8 8 7 7 12 8 8 12 6 6 77 46 47 16. S. Kalimantan 10 20 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 18 17 14 10 11 124 106 104 17. E. Kalimantan 6 12 13 12 12 4 4 4 12 7 7 11 10 10 83 63 57 18. N. Sulawesi 6 12 12 12 12 10 6 6 12 8 8 11 11 10 93 80 78 19. Central S'si 4 8 8 7 7 2 3 3 8 8 8 8 6 7 54 42 41 20. Southeast S. 4 8 8 8 8 7 6 6 8 5 5 8 5 5 56 39 39 21. South S'si 23 46 39 38 38 40 37 37 41 35 35 46 27 33 305 231 230 22. Bali 8 16 13 13 13 2 2 2 6 3 3 16 12 11 59 52 51 23. W. Nusatenggara 6 12 12 11 11 10 10 9 12 4 4 11 8 8 85 58 59 24. E. Nusatenggara 12 24 23 23 23 4 4 4 8 5 5 21 15 16 114 90 88 25. Maluku 4 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 8 5 5 8 8 8 58 50 51 TOTAL 351 702 549 539 538 415 403 397 458 333 327 669 526 505 3789 3105 3021 Sources: same as those for Table II. Notes: aInitial candidates; ^Provisional candidates; cOfficial candidates.TABLE V. REGULAR RESIDENCE, MOSLEM STATUS, ACADEMIC DEGREES, AND SEX OP OFFICIAL CANDIDATES (APRIL 20) Catholic PSII NU Parmusi Golkar Parkindo Murba PNI Perti IPKI TOTAL TOTAL CANDIDATES 115 309 397 327 538 182 203 505 150 295 3021 (a) Residence same consti. 91 275 353 281 506 161 147 440 123 238 2615 outside con. 24 34 44 46 32 21 56 65 27 57 406 (in Djakarta) (21) (30) (41) (41) (30) (17) (50) (60) (25) (55) (370) In percentage same consti. 7956 8956 89* 86* 94* 88* 72* 87* 82* 81* 87* outside 2156 11* 11* 14* 6* 12* 28* 13* 18* 19* 13* (in Djakarta) (18*) (1056) (10*) (13*) (5*) (9*) (25*) (12*) (17*) (19*) (12*) (b) Moslem status Total hadjl — 18 84 15 17 9 7 6 156 (Kjai had.il) - (12) (35) (11) (3) (-) (-) (-) (4) (-) (65) Regional dlstr Sumatra Java Kalimantan Sulawesi The rest 6(3) 11(3) 6(5) 37(23) 3(2) 13(1) 3(2) 20(7) 3(1) 9(6) 4(2) 6(5) 3(1) 7(-) 34(16) 5(-) 63(35) 21(3) 25(10) 1 13(1) (c) Academic degrees Total degr. 37 53 80 110 201 53 30 119 26 72 Prof. 1 12 1 3 — 2 Dr.(Ph.D.) 2 2 2 18 7 1 11 1 5 M.A. 1 1 - 3 4 — _ - — Ir. — 2 1 4 22 3 1 5 — 2 Drs. Dra. 15 24 31 51 80 23 10 55 8 22 S.H. 11 3 13 32 48 6 9 20 8 20 S.Th. — — — — 2 — — — B.A. 10 21 33 17 17 11 9 25 9 21 (d) Sex “Hale candid. 111 295 390 316 494 167 198 488 150 291 Female 4 14 7 11 44 15 5 17 - 4 781(10056) 19( 2.456) 49( 6.256) 9( I.I56) 40( 5.I56) 319(40.856) 170(21.756) 2( O.O56) 173(22.556) 2900 121 Source: based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. Daftar T.lalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perw<*v^ 1 an RaJciat Tahun 1971 Petri Orpol/Golkar (mimeo., April 20,197l).TABLE VI. THE 1971 ELECTIONS COMPARED WITH 1955 IN ELIGIBLE VOTERS, VALID VOTES, VOTING RATE, AND DPR MEMBERS BY CONSTITUENCY tHE 1955 GENERAL ELECTIONS —(USE 1971 GENEMlTELfiOllONS Constituency of 1971 Eligible Voters(a) Total Votes (b) Voting Rate(b/a) —mr~ Members Population Eligible Voters(c) Total votes lg.1. . Voting Rate(c/d) mr~ Members AtJeH N. Sumatra 2,474,305 T,T34,517— ' 867BS 15— 1,969,4lV 6.247.898 1,031,602 2.725,843 971,834 2.546,564 94.21J6 93.42 9 17 W. Sumatra Riau Djambi 1,906,727 1,571,133 82.3 11 2,719,028 1,477,155 979.613 i:312,I89 718,104 490,949 1)203,995 671,914 462.900 9l.?5 93.57 94.29 14 16 6 S. Sumatra Bengkulu Lampung 1,731,332 1,457,112 84.1 10 3,239,659^ 506,720 2.664.491 1,534:290 235,666 1.265.502 1,414)446 223,501 1.211,124 9l)o0 94.84 95.70 10 4 7 West Java 7.868.286 6,969.536 5875 41 20.965.775 lo: 487 T20 10:Ol7)?08 95.52 45 Djakarta 951.130 80.6 6 2.221.755 " 1)935)010 ' §7-88 T~ Central Java Jogjakarta 10,101,816 9,000,573 89.0 57 21,326,413 2.437.273 11,019,628 1.247.970 10)283)307 1.162.654 93752 93.16 57 7 East Java TO,961.181 ”5.■875.598— 9070 —55 24.808,152 13.285.676 12)462)917 93751 63“ W. Kalimantan 554.701 466,663 8471 4 1:736:535” 880:612 829)333 94.18 7 Central KHan S. Kalimantan 901,699 792,576 87.8 6 702^703 1,655,701 345,395 854.776 331,24? 796,620 95790 93.20 6 10 E. Kalimantan 194.162 174.572— 89.9 3— 686:429 359)422 328)898 91750 6 North Sulawesi Central S’wesi 831,160 756,130 90.9 6 1,659,780 907,226 808:951 442.241 778,939 424.836 95729 96.06 6 4 Southeast S’si South Sulawesi 1,630,963 1,116,158 68.4 14 707,651 4,980,822_ 345,802 2.614.235 342,202 2.514.648 905 96.19 4 23 Sail W. Nusatenggara 1,424,470 1,250,251 87.7 8 2,061,l60 2,152,380 1)105,552 1.114.777 1)049)864 1.055,217 94795 94.66 8 6 E. Nusatenggara "1.203.867 ”1,123.152 5572 g— 2 242 2377 1.17?I043 1.149.176 97755 i2 Maluku 5681575 532!174 90 .T 3— l!05?!255^ 534,168 5lo)645 95.60 4_ TOTAL 43,104,374 37,787,569 87.6 56 257 114,190,163 58,179,245 54,699,509 94.0256 351 Note : The 1955 elections were conducted for 15 provincial constituencies, which were subdivided into 25 in 1971; the corresponding constituencies are grouped by lines. Source: Lembaga Pemilihan Unrum, Daftar Pembaglan Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 Terperint.li Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagj Tiap Daerah Pemllinan Serta Pen,1 ebarann.1 a Imtuk iriap Daerah icingkat II (Djakarta. 1971): and National Election Committee (PPl). InAonesiaMemlllh (Djakarta. 1958).TABLE VII. PARTY VOTES AND SEATS IN NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE BY REGION Parties Total Votes Percentage Java Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi Nusa- tenggaraa Maluku TOTAL Catholic 603,740 1.10 33.6# 13.0# 10.7# 4.5# 35.3# 2.7# 100.0# PSII 1,308,237 2.39 47.1 24.8 2.2 19.5 5.0 1.1 100.0# NU 10,213,650 18.67 84.8 6.1 3.9 2.9 1.7 0.3 100.0# Parmusi 2,930,746 5.36 50.0 33.8 4.7 6.4 2.2 2.5 100.0# Golkar 34,348,673 62.80 61.9 17.1 4.4 8.9 6.7 0.7 100.0# Parkindo 733,359 1.34 28.0 19.2 4.0 13.4 21.8 13.4 100.0# Murba 48,126 0.09 59.4 21.4 0.9 2.5 3.2 4.1 100.0# PNI 3,793,266 6.94 82.9 8.1 1.2 1.5 5.6 0.5 100.0# Perti 381,309 0.70 25.9 68.0 0.7 2.4 2.2 0.6 100.0# IPKI 338,403 0.62 46.6 19.5 12.5 11.3 9.4 0.4 100.0# TOTAL 54,699,509 100.00 65.6# 15.9# 4.1# 7.4# 5.9# Nusa- 0.9# 100.0# Parties Total Seats Percentage Java Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi tenggara Maluku Catholic 3 0.8 1 2 «■* PSII 10 2.8 4 3 — 3 — NU 58 16.5 44 6 5 2 1 Parmusi 24 6.8 9 9 2 2 1 1 Golkar 227 64.6 107 50 20 29 19 2 Parkindo 7 1.9 1 1 1 1 2 1 Murba — — — _ _ _ PNI 20 5.6 17 2 — — 1 — Perti 2 0.5 — 2 — — — — IPKI - - - - - - - - TOTAL 35! 100.0 182 73 29 37 26 4 Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Dafter Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwadcilan Rakiat Tatum 1971 Terperlnt.1i tfntuk Maslng-Maslng Organisasl Bagl Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Pen.1ebarann.1a Untuk Tlap Daerah fllngkat ii (Djakarta. 1971). aincludes East and Vest Nusatenggara and Bali. Note:TABLE VIII. PARTY CANDIDATES AND SEATS IN NEW DPR Candidates (Official List from 25 prov- inces) (1) _ _ DPS members elected from 25 prov. (2) DPR members indirectly elected from ¥. Irian (3) DPR members appointed by 1969 law (41 Total DPR members (S+5+TL Per- cent Golkar 538 227 9 100* 336 73.0 NU 397 58 mm - 58 12.6 Parmusi 327 24 - - 24 5.2 PNI 505 20 - - 20 4.3 PSII 309 10 - - 10 2.1 Parkindo 182 7 - - 7 1.5 Catholic 115 3 - - 3 0.6 Perti 150 2 - - 2 0.4 Murba 203 - - - - - IPKI 295 - - - — — TOTAL 3,021 351 9 100 460 100.0 Consists of 75 members from the Armed Forces and 25 from non-military Golkar.TABLE IX. URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES OF VOTING RATE AND PERCENT- AGE GOLKAR VOTE AS SEEN AT KOTAMADYA/KABUPATliN LEVEL OF DJAKARTA, JOGJAKARTA, SOUTH SUMATRA, AND WEST KALIMANTAN8, Constituencies Eligible voters Voting rate percent Golkar vote in percent DJAKARTA^ 2,221,732 87.9 46.6 JOGJAKARTA0 1,260,810 92.2 63.3 Kotamadya Jogjakarta 175,976 86.8 45.1 Kabupaten Sleman 305,196 92.5 62.6 Gunung Kidul 290,634 95.0 79.8 Bantul 296,556 92.6 62.6 Kulon Progo 192,448 91.5 65.4 SOUTH SUMATRA*3, 1,554,290 91.0 62.6 Kotamadya UPalembang 247,771 90.7 52.2 Pangkal Pinang 21,730 92.6 52.1 Kabupaten iahat 172,038 94.1 67.5 Belitung 53,478 92.7 78.9 OKU 255,702 93.4 63.0 LIOT 167,477 92.7 67.1 Bangka 107,935 88.5 62.0 Musi Rawas 112,880 95.2 77.4 WEST KALIMANTAN® 873,658 94.3 67.1 Kotamadya fcontianak 82,282 92.0 60.8 Kabupaten Ponilan'ak 204,032 94.2 53.5 Sambas 202,149 93.0 59.5 Sanggau 130,299 97.2 81.5 Sintang 104,617 97.6 79.6 Kapuas Hulu 55,542 97.2 68.9 Ketapang 94,737 95.3 77.3 Notes: ^otamadya and Kabupaten are subprovincial adminis- trative districts, referring to urban and rural areas, respectively. ^Djakarta consists of five kotamadya. but no sepa- rate electoral data are available. cAntara Warta Berlta. July 6, 1971 (morning edition) dIbid., July 8, 1971 (morning edition). eIbid.. July 17» 1971 (evening edition).TABLE X. COMPARISON OF GOLKAR VOTE BETWEEN KOTAMADYA AND KABUPATEN BY CONSTITUENCY AND REGION C onstituencies wmmyi umwm Total votes Golkar vote in percent Total votes Golkar vote in percent At jeh 30,651 52.4 941,183 49.6 North Sumatra 327,905 56.0 2,218,659 72.2 West Sumatra 155,314 48.4 1,048,681 65.4 Riau 50,079 48.7 621,835 78.9 South Sumatra 244,867 52.2 1,169,579 64.8 Djambi 55,138 70.9 407,762 90.5 Bengkulu 12,120 70.6 211,304 83.4 Lampung 79,402 53.7 1,131,722 73.0 West Java 702,388 63.0 9,315,320 77.1 Djakarta 1,955,010 46.6 — — Central Java 649,465 55.1 9,633,842 49.9 Jogjakarta 152,787 45.1 1,009,867 66.0 East Java 1,153,798 57.8 11,309,114 54.6 W. Kalimantan 75,711 60.8 753,622 67.2 Central K’tan 12,765 75.9 318,384 81.6 S. Kalimantan 118,619 39.2 678,011 69.3 E. Kalimantan 117,578 55.2 211,320 54.5 North Sulawesi 115,879 44.5 663,060 63.5 Central S'wesi «... — 424,777 76.8 Southeast S'si — 341,759 92.4 South Sulawesi 203,048 28.0 2,311,600 82.7 Bali .... 1,048,090 82.9 West Nusatenggara — — 1,055,217 69.8 East Nusatenggara — -- 1,149,176 61.4 Maluku 35,961 32.2 474,684 46.9 Regions SUMATRA 955,476 54.1 7,750,725 69.3 JAVA 4,613,448 53.0 31,268,143 60.2 KALIMANTAN 324,673 51.5 1,961,337 68.9 SULAWESI 318,927 34.0 3,741,196 79.5 NUSATENGGARA — 3,252,483 71.1 MALUKU 35,961 32.2 474,684 46.9 TOTAL 6,248,485 52.0 48,448,568 64.1 Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemillhan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 (frerperint.il Untuk Maslng-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Seria Pen.1ebarann.1a Untulc Tiap Kaer^ (Pingkat Tri^arla;' 1971).------------TABLE XI. GOLKAR MEMBERS IN DPR AT KOTAMADYA/KABUPATEN LEVEL BY NUMBER OP DPR MEMBERS ALLOCATED, NUMBER OP GOLKAR MEMBERS ELECTED, AND NUMBER OP DISTRICTS WON BY GOLKAR WITH HIGHEST VOTE, ACCORDING TO REGION .................................................."T0T1MADYA .......... " 'MTOftC' Regions Total no. of kodya/ kabupt. DPR mem- bers allo- cated Golkar members elected Total no. of kodya/ kbt. Golkar won first No. of kodya No. of DPR members allo- cated No. of Golkar mem- bers No. of Golkar kodya No. of kabpt. Hoi "of DPR members allo- cated To:— of Golkar mem- bers Ho. of Golkar kabpt. SUMATRA 70 73 50 69 20 20 4 20 50 53 46 49 JAVA 106 182 107 90 24 33 21 22 82 149 86 68 KALIMANTAN 29 29 20 27 5 5 2 4 24 24 18 23 SULAWESI 37 37 29 37 4 4 1 4 33 33 28 33 NUSATENGGARA 26 26 19 21 - - - - 26 26 19 21 MALUKU 4 4 2 3 1 1 - - 3 3 2 3 TOTAL 272 351 227 247 54 63 28 50 218 288 199 197 Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursl Hasil Pemllihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakllan Rak.lat Tahun 1971 Terperintii Untuk Masing-Mas ing Organlsasi Bagl Tiap Daerah Pemllihan Serta Pen.le- barann.ja Untuk Tlap Daerah Tlngkat ll (Djakarta. 1971).TABLE XII. 25 KOTAMADYA AND KABUPATEN WHERE GOLKAR FAILED TO WIN FIRST AND PERCENTAGE VOTE OF WINNER AND RUNNER-UP Constituencies Kodya/Kabpt Total votes Winner i<> vote Runner-up io vote Central Java Kotamadya Pekalongan 52,164 NU 34.6 Golkar 31.4 East Java Pasuruan 34,614 NU 50.2 Golkar 39.8 S. Kalimantan Bandjarmasin 118,619 NU 43.1 Golkar 39.2 Maluku Ambon Kabupaten 35,961 Parkindo 34.3 Golkar 32.2 Atjeh Pidie 151,168 Parmusi 31.8 Golkar 28.4 Central Java Tegal 410,843 NU 40.9 PNI 29.6 Purbolinggo 295,636 PNI 34.5 Golkar 29.6 Band j arnegara 293,199 PNI 39.7 Golkar 25.0 Magelang 412,623 NU 43.3 Golkar 41.9 Sragen 307,461 PNI 57.0 Golkar 26.9 Karanganjar 238,428 PNI 47.3 Golkar 44.0 East Java Surabaja 277,588 NU 54.6 Golkar 36.5 Pasuruan 433,187 NU 58.1 Golkar 37.4 Bondowoso 321,373 NU 55.4 Golkar 33.9 Panarukan 276,453 NU 55.4 Golkar 36.4 Pamekasan 233,067 NU 48.6 Golkar 28.7 Bangkalan 302,978 NU 75.9 Golkar 21.1 Sampang 260,289 NU 73.5 Golkar 18.8 Sumenep 433,225 NU 65.5 Golkar 27.4 S. Kalimantan Bandjar 128,418 NU 47.7 Golkar 44.2 E. Nusatenggara Timor Tengah Utara 58,628 Catholic 49.1 Golkar 48.7 Alor 56,005 Parkindo 55.6 Golkar 15.3 Sikka 98,921 Catholic 86.8 Golkar 8.1 Sumba Timur 59,271 Parkindo 49.3 Golkar 23.0 Sumba Barat 92,636 Parkindo 39.3 Golkar 26.4 Source Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Uraum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rak.1 at TaKun 1971 Terperint ji tfntuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Pen.1ebarann.1a Untuk Tiap Daerah ringk'at (IfrakSHa. 1971).-------------- -----------11-------d-------------K-------TABLE XIII. GOLKAR'S ELECTORAL POSITION IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA AS COMPARED TO OTHER PARTIES Parties Total votes CENTRAL In $> JAVA DPR seats # of national votes i> of national seats Golkar 5,174,182 50.3 29 15.0 12.7 PNI 2,003,177 19.4 11 52.8 55.0 NU 2,382,462 23.1 13 23.3 22.4 Parmusi 468,753 4.5 3 15.9 12.5 PSII 90,466 0.8 1 6.9 10.0 IPKI 36,053 0.3 — 9.4 .mmm- Others 128,214 1.2 7.4 “ Total 10,283,307 100.0 57 18.7 16.2 Parties Total votes EAST JAVA DPR In $> seats % of national votes % of national seats Golkar 6,843,977 54.9 35 19.9 15.4 PNI 622,746 4.9 3 16.4 15.0 NU 4,382,607 35.1 22 42.9 37.9 Parmusi 339,919 2.7 2 11.5 8.3 PSII 154,707 1.2 1 11.8 10.0 IPKI 31,691 0.2 — 8.3 — Others 87,270 0.8 — 4.7 —— Total 12,462,917 99.6 63 22.7 17.9 Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Haail Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rak.jat £alhun 1971 Terperini.li untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tian Daerah Pemilihan Serta Pen.le- TSarannla ttntuk Tian ffaerah Tlngkat 11 (Djakarta? 1971).