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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE
INDONESIAN-DUTCH NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS
IDRUS NASIR DJAJADININGRAT
MONOGRAPH SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Price—$2.50
CM|P*- H
SEAP Publications
^Cile Cop»
Do not remove from room 213
640 Stewart AvenueTHE BEGINNINGS OF THE INDONESIAN-DUTCH NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS
IDRUS NASIR DJAJADININGRAT
MONOGRAPH SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1958© 1957 by Idrus Nasir Djajadiningratiii
PREFACE
This study by Mr. Idrus Nasir Djajadiningrat covers an import-
ant but hitherto virtually unchronicled aspect of modern Indonesia’s
history—the first period of negotiations between the revolutionary
Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. While a substantial
monograph by Dr. Alastair Taylor on the final stages of these nego-
tiations is soon to be published, as yet no serious scholarly study
has been written covering the two major previous phases, the ini-
tial period of contacts (late 1945 until mid-1946) and the inter-
mediate Linggadjati period (mid-1946 - mid-1947). It is the
earliest of these periods, that culminating in the heretofore
obscure Hoge Veluwe Conference, which Mr. Djajadiningrat has cover-
ed in this study. His research makes clear how important this
phase was in setting the stage for the negotiations which were to
follow. Indeed, Mr. Djajadiningrat has laid bare facts which
demons.trate that by early 1946 attitudes had already emerged which
were to influence critically the course of negotiations during the
next three years—attitudes which with little change were to endure
until early 1949, when successful Indonesian resistance and out-
side pressures combined to develop the substantially different
conditions which made the negotiations at the Round Table Confer-
ence of November 1949 successful.
Formerly a medical student at the University of Indonesia,
Mr. Djajadiningrat joined the government service of the Republic
of Indonesia immediately following its proclamation of independence
on August 17, 1945. After periods as press liaison officer and
as editor in charge of newscasts in English and Dutch for the
Republic's Ministry of Information, he served as interpreter-
translator of the Military Committee of the Republic’s secretariat
assigned to the United Nations’ Good Offices Committee in Indon-
esia. Thereafter, he was posted to the diplomatic staff of the
Indonesian delegation to the United Nations. He served in this
capacity until August, 1952, when he was put in charge of the
North American desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Djakarta.
In February, 1955, he was awarded a fellowship by the Cornell
Southeast Asia Program and subsequently has been undertaking
graduate studies in the Department of Government of Cornell Uni-
versity.
Ithaca, New York
January 15, 1958
George McT. Kahin
DirectorV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writer considers himself most fortunate in having
had the helpful encouragement, advice and criticism of
Professor Kahin in writing his monograph. For this he would
like to record his gratitude and indebtedness. His special
thanks are due to all those who graciously consented to have
him draw upon their valuable time to furnish him with inform-
ation regarding their personal views and experiences pertain-
ing to the period of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations
treated in this monograph.
To his fellow students, Ngo Ton Dat and Daniel S. Lev,
the writer tenders his grateful acknowledgements for their
interest and valuable suggestions. Thereby, he cannot omit
to offer his warm thanks to the latter for his generous
assistance in improving the language and the text of the
final draft.
To his sister, Roswitha Tanis, the writer is indebted
for patiently bearing with him while he was in the end stage
of writing the manuscript.vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION	ix
CHAPTER
I.	BACKGROUND .......................................     1
II.	PRELUDE TO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE
INDONESIAN PROBLEM .................................   7
III.	TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE BY FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES ..	17
IV.	THE HOGE VELUWE	TALKS ............................... 61
APPENDICES
A.	Government Nine Point Proposal .................... 107
B.	Text of Dutch Policy Statement..................... 108
C.	Indonesian Proposals in Answer to the Declaration
of Dutch Policy. . . ............................ 110
D.	Provisional Draft Agreement Submitted by Prime
Minister Sjahrir to Lieutenant Governor-General
Dr. van Mook on March 27, 1946................... 112
E.	Netherlands Draft Protocol Submitted to the
Indonesian Delegation on April 14, 1946.......... 114
F- Some Remarks on Differences Between: The van Mook
Proposal of March 25 as Amended by Prime Minister
Sjahrir and the Draft Protocol of the Dutch
Government of April 14 .......................... μθ
G. Composition of the States-General ................ 123
BIBLIOGRAPHY
125ix
INTRODUCTION
Although several excellent works on the history of the Indo-
nesian struggle for independence have been published, the earliest
diplomatic developments in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations have
had no more than a brief mention, or have been by-passed altogether
In the opinion of the writer, this inadequate coverage extends from
the time when the Southeast Asia Command assumed responsibility for
the Indonesian area until the United Nations concerned itself with
the Netherlands-Indonesian conflict.
In his research, the writer has attempted to fill in this
story up through the inconclusive talks between the Dutch and
Indonesian delegations in Holland, at Hoge Veluwe in the spring
of 1946. Before attempting to describe the confluence of military,
political and diplomatic conditions which led the parties concerned
to undertake negotiations, he has tried to find an answer to the
question of how the British became involved in the Indonesian-
Dutch controversy. Why was the Indonesian archipelago suddenly
transferred from the U.S. Southwest Pacific Area Command to the
British Southeast Asia Command? What were the factors underlying
this last minute switch, implemented on the day following the
Japanese surrender?
Within limitations imposed by the material available to him,
the writer has made an effort to set up a framework for further
and more comprehensive research in the period covered in this
monograph. He submits with emphasis that it is neither conclusive
nor exhaustive. This is true particularly of the Indonesian inter-
nal political developments influencing Republican policy in the
negotiations. More solid ground Jias been trodden in tracing the
military, diplomatic and internal political factors affecting the
Dutch.position at that time. From the records of the Dutch Parlia-
mentary debates valuable data have been gleaned pertaining to this
early period in the conflict, and some tentative insights have
been acquired into political trends and forces then operative in
the Netherlands. An account of the military and diplomatic posi-
tion of the.Dutch in Indonesia vis-a-vis the British, containing
material regarding the development of their opening gambits on the
diplomatic chessboard, has been secured by analyzing the official
report of a Dutch Parliamentary Commission charged with looking
into the policies of the Dutch Government during this period.
/The decision to carry out this official Dutch investigation was
takers on November 6, 1947, and those sections of the report con-
cerning Military Policy 1940-1945. ("Militair Beleid 1940-1945"),
and Return to the Netherlands Indies ("Terugkeer naar Nederlandsch-
IndiS") were concluded and published in 1956./ The publication
containing these sections were made available" to the writer by
Dr. Robert C. Bone, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Tulane University.X
In the writer's opinion the most significant data upon which
his study has drawn are those concerning the proceedings during
the Hoge Veluwe talks. The material for the survey of those dis-
cussions has been taken from a copy of the summary records of the
deliberations held by the Cornell University Library. The import-
ance of these records is that the Dutch proposals tabled on the
Hoge Veluwe were to be the basis on which the Netherlands Govern-
ment moved forward towards the Linggadjati Agreement. Elaboration
on this point, however, lies beyond the scope of this report.
To penetrate beyond the written account of the Hoge Veluwe
discussions, the writer has attempted to add depth to his analysis
by contacting the chief actors in the discussions. He was fortun-
ate enough to have personal interviews with Dr. H. J. van Mook,
former Lt. Governor-General. of the Indies, and Mr. A. K.
Pringgodigdo, until recently Director of the Cabinet of the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition he has correspond-
ed with Dr. Soedarsono, presently Indonesian Ambassador in Belgrade,
and received Mr. Soewandi's personal comments on several aspects
of the negotiations in Holland. These last three gentlemen con-
stituted the Republican Delegation to the Hoge Veluwe talks. The
writer wishes to record his gratitude to all of these persons for
their generous and most helpful cooperation. Where it has been
necessary to interpret the data supplied by them he has done so
entirely on his own responsibility.
It should be noted that quotations from Dutch and Indonesian
sources have been translated by the writer, except when otherwise
indicated.1
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
Immediately after the Netherlands Indies Government declared
war on Japan, early in December 1941, it became apparent what plans
the Japanese had for Indonesian nationalism in particular and for
anti-colonialism in Southeast Asia, in general. In the period be-
tween this declaration of war and the time that the Japanese forces
began to attack the Indies, any Indonesian who possessed a wireless
and cared to tune in on the powerful shortwave radiostation in
Tokyo, could listen to a beautiful recording of the ’’Indonesia
Raya". (1) Each night an Indonesian program began and concluded
with the rendition of this song. The period in between was devot-
ed to talks and commentaries in the Indonesian language. The
topic invariably concerned the misdeeds and crimes of the Dutch
as the colonial masters in Indonesia, the unselfish and gallant
fight of Nippon’s armed forces to free the Indonesians from the
yoke of Dutch enslavement, and the task of Indonesian nationalism
to go all out in assisting Japan in winning its war aimed at wip-
ing out all western domination in Asia.
Japanese propaganda received a mixed reception. It varied
between ready acceptance, doubt, and outright rejection. Many
among the lower echelons of the white-collar workers when asked
why they looked forward to a Japanese victory answered: "Whatever
happens after the Dutch experience, it can’t be worse. Anyway,
it will be a change." (2)
For the overwhelming majority of the population war was some-
thing vague and incomprehensible. So far as it caused inconven-
iences in their daily activities, the sooner war was over, the
better.
(1)	Mohammad Yamin, Sumpah Indonesia Raja, Djakarta, N. V. Nusantara,
n.d.,; pp. 15-16.' The Indonesia Raya, composed by R. W. Soeprat-
man, was first presented to the public on October 28, 1928 dur-
ing an Indonesian Youth Congress in Djakarta. Since then it
has become the rallying song for Indonesian nationalism. It
is at present the national anthem of the Republic of Indonesia.
At this congress also, an event occurred which in the history
of Indonesian nationalism is known as "the Oath of October 28,
1928," or, "the Oath for a Greater Indonesia." The Indonesian
youth gathered at the meeting solemnly declared that;
1.	they were of one nation, the Indonesian Nation;
2.	they served one country, the Indonesian Fatherland; and
3.	they accepted the Bahasa Indonesia as the National Language.
(2)	Cf. Sjahrazad, Indonesische Overpeinzingen, Amsterdam, De
Bezige Bij, 1945, p. 101.	“2
That fighting did end soon in the Indies, is a familiar story.
When in early 1942, the Japanese invasion came, the Dutch collapse
was even swifter and more complete than the debacle of the British
in Burma and in the Malay Peninsula. The highly successful campaign
of the Japanese forces left no doubt in the minds of the people as
to their formidable strength. This coupled with the crushing de-
feat which they had dealt the erstwhile Dutch masters made the
Japanese in the eyes of the Indonesian multitude conquerors who
should be welcomed as liberating heroes. Many Indonesian national-
ists flocked to the Japanese standard believing that the Japanese
had come to liberate the Indonesians after all. Some accepted at
face value the promise of "Asia for the Asians."
Japanese actions soon made clear, however, that their inten-
tion was to drain the country to feed the Japanese war machine.
Japanese rule proved to be heavy-handed and even more burdensome
in nationalists’ eyes than the Dutch rule that had preceded it.
Profound changes were, nevertheless, brought about by the conditions
of the Japanese occupation. Powerful anti-Western propaganda with
a strong racist tinge penetrated many remote areas. Indonesians
were brought into responsible government posts to a degree never
possible under Dutch rule; Indonesian military units were trained,
and eventually armed. (3)
Colonial nationalism as the mainspring of Indonesia's national
movement, since its inception in the early nineteen hundreds, was
in essence a passionate upsurge against the injustices of a colon-
ial system in all its aspects. Politically and psychologically,
it was the self-assertion of the people's right and responsibility
to live their own life and achieve nationhood. It was a deeply
felt resistance against foreign rule motivated by the urge for
self-determination. Economically it was a struggle for the improve-
ment of living conditions; a desire to gain a reasonable share of
the country's own wealth denied by the exploitation of the ruling
power. (4)
As mentioned earlier, Tokyo was clever enough to perceive the
political uses to which this Asian revolt against "colonial status”
might be put, but not clever enough, when her initial propaganda
had done its work, to refrain from exploitation. They compelled
forced sales of all exportable crops at fixed prices. They heed-
lessly brought on serious famine. Their heavy repressive hand
on the people forced them to conform rigidly to Japan’s concept of
its new role as master of Asia. The brutality and contempt with
which the Japanese "elder brothers" treated the "genjumin"—natives
(3)	Harold Isaacs, edit. New Cycle in Asia, New York, MacMillan
1947, p. 175.	------------------
(4)	Republic of Indonesia Office, History of Indonesia's National
Movement, New York, July 1, 1949, p. 1„3
—affected the Indonesians in practically all levels of society, (5)
Dutch rule had been replaced by another foreign domination that was
considerably worse. Moreover, this time the yoke was imposed by
fellow Asians who purported to be the saviors of Asia. Such con-
ditions led to a broader understanding among the Indonesian masses
that they would not be able to improve their lot so long as they
were not the masters of their own destiny. Most of the support
the Japanese had initially won was quickly dissipated, and concomi-
tant with it resentment against the foreign ruler deepened, nur-
turing Indonesian nationalism into the solid force that spontaneously
rallied behind its leaders when they, on behalf of the people, pro-
claimed Indonesia's independence.
While the war was in their favor the Japanese unequivocally
indicated that Indonesia's independence must wait until the end
of the war in the Pacific. (6) Instead of fostering genuine
national independence, the Japanese offered the nationalists only
puppet roles. The nationalists in the course of time mapped out
their program for the period of the Japanese occupation according-
ly. As ever, the ultimate goal remained emergence into full nation-
hood and continued movement for independence. In pursuit of these
objectives the movement eventually split into two sections. One
group was lead by Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin. These two
went underground and organized anti-Japanese movements. Sjarifuddin's
activities were detected and he was arrested in 1943. When the
Japanese sentenced him to death, Sukarno personally intervened to
have the sentence commuted to life imprisonment. He was released
soon after the Japanese surrendered in 1945.	(7)
The other faction of the nationalist movement, headed by
Sukarno and Hatta, played along with the Japanese, and tried to
gain the maximum benefits for the movement from the new political
structure of the Japanese framework. In so doing they had to
cooperate with the Japanese and make an outward pretense of col-
laboration. As to Hatta's position in this respect, it has been
clarified by Sutan Sjahrir who testifies in his book Out of Exile
that Hatta had never allied himself with those Indonesians who
worked with the Japanese for either material designs or political
sympathy. Hatta accepted this position at the behest of the
underground movement. (8) With respect to Sukarno's position
Sjahrir stated that he regarded the Japanese as fascist die-hards,
and that the nationalists would have to avail themselves of the
(5)	During the Dutch colonial period the term "native" had the
connotation of being inferior to the Netherlanders, or
Europeans in general.
(6)	Ronald S. Kain, "The Netherlands and Indonesia," Yale Review
XXXVI (December, 1946), pp. 285-302.
(7)	Republic of Indonesia Office, op. cit., p. 12.
(8)	Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile,, New York, The John Day Company,
1949, p. 242.	—4
most subtle methods to get around them, such as making an appearance
of collaboration. (9)
To enlist popular support for economic measures to bolster the
Japanese war effort propaganda campaigns were carried out which
apparently did not produce the desired results. For subsequently
the Japanese began to woo the nationalist leaders by holding out
a promise for self-government in the future. In line with this
new policy, on March 9, 1943, an all-inclusive organization, tak-
ing in all the former Indonesian political and non-political nation-
alist associations, was formed. It was called the "Pusat Tenaga
Rakjat" (’’Center of the People’s Power") and became known as the
PUTERA. This organization was limited to Java and Madura, which
constituted a territorial unit separate from the rest of Indonesia,
and administered by the Japanese 16th Army Headquarters in
Djakarta. (10) Because of its composition PUTERA became the first
formal organization which was nationalistically inclined.
When by the end of 1943 the Japanese came to the conclusion
that the PUTERA was more advantageous to the Indonesian national-
ist cause than to the Japanese war effort, it was dissolved. On
March 1, 1944, it was replaced by the "Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakjat"
("People's Loyalty Organization"). (1Γ) The leadership of this
organization stood under the direct control of the Japanese chief
military administrator. (12)
When the Japanese military situation in the South and South-
west Pacific area gradually worsened, and an attack on Indonesia
was likely to be the next phase in the Allied counter-offensive,
the Japanese began to make concessions progressively to Indonesian
Nationalism. After General MacArthur's offensive had gotten well
underway, the Koiso Government in Tokyo announced that Indonesia
would be given independence "in the near future." (13)
Early in 1945 the Japanese were soundly beaten in the Philip-
pines. By the end of April of the same year the Indonesians were
allowed to set up the Investigating Committee for the Preparation
of Independence (Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan).
(θ) George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 105; Sjahrir, op.
cit., p. 246.
00) Kahin, op. cit. , p. 106, footnote.
(U) Also known as Djawa Hokokai, its Japanese name.
(L2) Kahin, op. cit., p. 110.
03) Kain, op. cit.5
On August 6, 1945, the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiro-
shima and shortly afterwards Japan made her initial secret surrender
offer. (14) A second atom bomb was dropped on August 9, this time
on Nagasaki. On the same day Russia declared war on Japan.
Immediately following these, for Japan, disastrous develop-
ments, on August 7, Marshal Terauchi, Japanese supreme commander
in Southeast Asia (15) from his headquarters in Saigon granted
permission to set up a committee representing all of Indonesia
with the function to make preparations for the transfer of govern-
ment from the Japanese forces to the Indonesians. Two days later
Sukarno and Hatta accompanied by a third Indonesian leader were
flown to palat in Indochina for a conference with Marshal Terauchi.
In a meeting on August 12, Marshal Terauchi said: "It is up
to you when Indonesia will be independent." (16)
On their return trip Sukarno and Hatta, in Singapore, met
with three members of the Independence Preparatory Committee repre-
senting Sumatra. When discussing the situation it was ascertained
that the latter, too, had received information that Russia had
entered the war against Japan. After further consultations the
Indonesian leaders came to the conclusion that Japan's defeat was
no longer a matter of months but that it could happen within a few
weeks.
Back in Djakarta on August 14, in the afternoon of the same
day, Sjahrir informed Hatta that news had been received of Japan
having made a peace offer to the Allied nations, and inquired how
matters stood with the arrangements for Indonesian independence.
Sjahrir expressed the opinion that Indonesia's independence must
not be proclaimed by the Japanese-sponsored Independence Prepara-
tory Committee because the Allies then would consider a free
Indonesia as Japanese inspired. The proper thing to do would be
for Sukarno, as leader of the people, to proclaim independence in
the name of the Indonesian people. To reach the Indonesians in
all corners of the country, and also to inform the world at large,
this proclamation had tobebroadcast by wireless. However, Sukarno
did not agree. He felt that as chairman of the Independence Pre-
paratory Committee, he could not arbitrarily and without consult-
ing this body take such an important step. Furthermore, he first
wanted to get some information regarding Japan's surrender from the
Japanese Military Administration Headquarters. The next day it
was learned that Japan had indeed sued for peace. Moreover, the
Indonesian leaders were informed that because of their capitulation
(14)	Ibid.
(15)	The Japanese called it: Command for the Southern Regions.
(16)	Mohammad Hatta, "Legende en Realiteit rondom de Proclamatie
van 17 Augustus," Verspreide Geschriften, Djakarta, Amsterdam,
Surabaja, C. P. J. van der Peet, 1952, pp. 330-340.6
the Japanese forces had been informed that the Allies were holding
them responsible for the maintenance of the political status quo in
Indonesia. Upon ascertaining this information, Sukarno and Hatta
forthwith decided to convoke the Independence Preparatory Committee
on August 16. The intention was to resolve, together with this
body, that the moment had arrived for Indonesia to proclaim its
independence.
Younger and more militant nationalist elements in Djakarta,
however, changed the course of events as planned by the two Indo-
nesian leaders. In agreement with Sjahrir that the Japanese-
sponsored Independence Preparatory Committee must have no part in
the decision to declare Indonesia's freedom, they took matters in
their own hands. The upshot was that on August 17, 1945, Sukarno
and Hatta, without prior consultations within the Independence Pre-
paratory Committee, proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on
behalf of the people. (17)
(17) Ibid.; Kahin, op. cit., pp. 134-136. These references give
each a different version of the developments leading up to
the Proclamation of Independence. Cf. Sjahrir, op. cit.,
pp. 253-259.7
CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDONESIAN PROBLEM
After the Japanese advance through Burma towards the Indo-
Burmese border had been checked, the Allied High Command began to
make plans to mount a counter offensive. In particular the United
States Government "was determined to assist China by launching a
combined British-American-Chinese attack in Burma." (1) To that
end, the British and United States Governments, at a conference
in Washington, D. C. (Trident Conference), in May, 1943, decided
to pool the land and air forces of the British Commonwealth, the
United States Army and Air Forces, and the British Eastern Fleet,
operating in Southeast Asia. (2)
(1)	William D. Leahy, I Was There, New York, McGraw Hill, 1950, p„ 126
(2)	Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied
Commander South East-Asia 1943-1945, of Vice-Admiral the Earl
Mountbatten of Burma, New York, Philosophical Library, Inc.,
1951, p. 3 and Appendix A (This report will be subsequently
referred to as: Mountbatten’s Report); Enqueue Commissie
Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, Militair beleid 1940-1945. Terugkeer
naar Nederlandsch' IndiU, Deel 8 A en B, The Hague, Staatsdruk-
kerij-en Uitgeversbedrijf, 1956, p. 484.
This document is a report of a Committee set up by the Tweede
Kamer der Staten-Generaal ("Second Chamber of the States "
General") to inquire into the policies of the Dutch Government
in Exile covering the period 1940-1945. The Committee was
established by Resolution of the Second Chamber of November 6,
.1947. In its introduction the report among others reads:
The Committee has also devoted extensive consideration to
the events bearing on the change of the delimitation of the
command areas in the Far East. Although it involved vital
interests for the Netherlands, the Allies made the change
without duly informing the Netherlands of their decision.
The Committee has devoted a final and substantial chapter
to the developments in the Netherlands Indies in 1945. There-
by, it has had to focus its attention in particular on the
military aspects; however, whereas these aspects were inter-
twined with the political, the latter need be considered also,.
The Committee’s investigation in. these two areas of study
has provided the writer with material for part of his monograph.
The data gathered in the document derive from personal testi-
monies supplied by those who have been directly involved in the
v events investigated by the Committee.
Further reference to the Committee's report will be indicated
as follows: Enquete Commissie, page...., name of the person
testifying (IT in the context of the moriograph considered of
significance by this writer).8
At the next conference on Allied war strategy, held in Quebec,
Canada, in August of the same year, the commander of the British
Eastern Fleet, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, was given the task
of establishing the South-East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.). The command
area included Burma, Siam, Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra
and the adjoining smaller islands. This delineation left unchanged
a division for operational purposes of the Indonesian archipelago
into a British and an American sphere. The division was made effec-
tive shortly after the occupation of Java by the Japanese, in the
first half of 1942. (3) All Indonesian islands, east of a line
drawn from Singapore closely around the southern part of Sumatra,
were included in the South West Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.) Theatre of
War under the command of General MacArthur. The dividing line was
drawn so as to place the Sunda Straits under American control. (4)
Shortly after the S.E.A.C. was organized, the British hinted
that the command area of Admiral Mountbatten might be revised.
It was held that without controlling the Sunda Straits, it would
be difficult to recapture Singapore. For that matter, it was nec-
essary to include this sea passage in the S.E.A.C. area. However,
to dominate the Sunda Straits one must control the western part
of Java, Therefore, the boundaries of the S.E.A.C. should be al-
tered accordingly. (£j)
The importance which the British Government attached to re-
taking Singapore was revealed as early as May, 1943. At the
Washington Conference of the Allied High Command, the British Prime
Minister, Winston Churchill, recommended for immediate considera-
tion "a campaign against Sumatra Which he believed to be lightly
garrisoned by Japanese.” His plan involved the placing of "strong
air forces on Northern Sumatra from which location attacks could be
launched against Malaya, Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil
fields, and Japanese shipping in support of Burma." (6)
At the first Quebec Conference in August, 1943, the British
Prime Minister went further. He strongly advocated the adoption
of his Sumatra-plan rather than going ahead with the invasion of
Burma. However, the United States President, F. D. Roosevelt,
(3)	Enqu6te Commissie, p, 485.
(4)	Ibid., p. 500, statement of van Mook; ibid.. p. 502, statement
of Rear-Admiral L. G. L. van der Kun who then was deputy to
-the Dutch Commander Armed Forces in the East, Admiral C. E. L.
Helfrich. Admiral Helfrich had his headquarters attached to
that of the S.E.A.C. at Kandy, Ceylon, and was subordinate to
Mountbatten.
i
(5)	Ibid., p. 498, statement of N. S. Blom, Director of the Depart-
ment of Justice under Dr. van Mook.
(6)	Leahy, op. cit., pp. 159-162.9
opposed the British proposal. Supported by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (C.C.O.S.), he moved the conference to accept the United
States’ plan for a concerted British-American-Chinese counterattack
against the Japanese in Burma. "The Sumatra plan was dropped." (7)
At the second Quebec Conference in September, 1944, Prime
Minister Churchill again stressed the importance of recapturing
Singapore. He "said it was the desire of his government that
British ships and troops take part in the war against Japan in
order to do Britain’s part and share the credit. He said also that
it was considered necessary that Great Britain retake Singapore,
the ’impregnable’ naval base which fell early in the war as the
Japanese overran the Malay Peninsula." (8)
Next to regaining control over the tin- and rubber-rich
Malay Peninsula as soon as possible, the matter of rehabilitation
of British prestige, especially in the eyes of Asians, apparently
was also a compelling reason for the British Government to desire
an early reoccupation of strategically situated Singapore. (9)
Early in 1944, in London, Admiral Mountbatten intimated to
Dr. H. J. van Mook, than holding office of Minister of Colonies
of the Dutch Government in Exile, that the British in the Far East
desired a command area of the same significance as the S.W.P.A.
Van Mook, opposing a transfer of responsibility for Indonesia from
the S.W.P.A. to the S.E.A.C., informed the Netherlands Commissioner
to General MacArthur’s Headquarters, Dr. Ch.O. van der Plas of the
possibility that the British would attempt to have the territorial
extent of their operational area changed so as to include more
territory of the Indies. Van Mook was of the opinion that because
of shortage of personnel and equipment of the S.E.A.C., the Dutch
cause in Indonesia would be better served if the archipelago remain
ed part of the American command area under MacArthur’s Headquarters
which was provided with ample supply of material and men. Moreover
he felt that the existing Dutch relations with the Americans were
better than those with Mountbatten's command. (10)
Subsequently, by mid-July, 1944, General MacArthur informed
van der Plas that the major Allied thrust toward the Indies was
(7)	Ibid., p. 176.
(8)	Ibid., p. 260.
(9)	EnquSte Commissie, p. 515, statement of E.N. van Kieffens,
then Foreign Minister.
00) Ibid., p. 486, private letter of van Mook to Ch.O. van der Plas10
about to begin. With regard to the campaign against the Indonesian
islands the Australian military command persistently urged the Uni-
ted States commander to use Commonwealth ground and naval forces.
The. importance the Australians attached to participation in this
operation was such that, at first, they even refused the use of
Australian troops for the liberation of their own territory, e.g.
the Solomons, New Britain and New Ireland. According to MacArthur
the attitude of the Australians stemmed from designs of annexation
vis-a-vis the Indies fostered by a powerful group centered around
the Australian commander-in-chief, General Sir Thomas Blarney.
The Commonwealth Prime Minister, Curtin, on the other hand, had
assured MacArthur that he had informed London that his government
did not insist on a revision of the existing command areas. (11)
In August, 1944, in Honolulu, President Roosevelt conferred
with the United States field commanders of the Pacific area. Gen-
eral MacArthur attended the meeting. Upon his return to Australia,
MacArthur sent his secretary, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers to
van der Plas. General Fellers informed the Dutch representative
of a British proposal which had been discussed at the Honolulu
meeting. (12) The British contended that India was a poor base
for operations against the Indonesian islands. For that matter,
S.E.A.C. headquarters should be moved to Western Australia. The
Netherlands East-Indies, with.the exception of the north coast of
New Guinea, Morotai and the Sangihe Islands, according to the
British plan were to be dislodged from MacArthur^S command area and
to become part of Mountbatten's responsibility. The British then
would launch an attack through the Kei and Aru Islands to Amboina
and Ceram. The operation would continue via northern Celebes to
Tarakan, Balikpapan in East Borneo, and eventually to North Borneo
and Sarawak. (13)
President Roosevelt had as yet made no decision regarding the
matter. On the other hand, the United States Navy was partial to
the British proposal. If the Americans could be relieved of their
responsibility for the Indonesian islands, the campaign against
the Philippines could finish with the recapture of Mindanao. Oper-
ations which might have been contemplated to atthck the Japanese in
Luzon and Java could be abandoned. Consequently, MacArthur’s ground,
naval and air forces could be put at the disposal of Admiral Nimitz
for a direct attack on Formosa and the main islands of Japan. (14)
Til) Ibid., p.~487, report of van der Plas to the Dutch Minister
of Colonies.
(12)	Cf. Leahy, op. cit., pp. 251-252.
(13)	Enqu^te Commlssie, p. 488, notes of van der Plas on his con-
versations with Brigadier General Bonner Fellers and General
MacArthur.
(14)	Ibid.11
MacArthur had strongly opposed the suggestion to by-pass
Luzon and Java. He was of the opinion that to do so would result
in the isolation of the Japanese in these islands. The ensuing
situation would victimize not the enemy forces, but the Filipinos,
Indonesians and the people interned in the areas concerned. In a
letter to MacArthur, relating to the British proposal, Admiral
King referred to a British and Australian contention that the rich-
est of all Asian colonies in the hands of a nation as weak as the
Netherlands was tantamount to inviting another aggression in the
future. For that matter, it was felt necessary to have British-
Australian military bases in the Indies permanently for the ade-
quate protection of Singapore and Australia. (15)
General MacArthur considered the British plan an attempt to
exclude his command from practically any action in the Indies. It
was meant to thwart the American commander's projected operations
against the archipelago which were to begin in February, 1945.
This campaign would involve, first, the seizure of bridgeheads
and airfields along the Macassar Straits, both in Borneo (e.g.
Tarakan and Balikpapan) and in Celebes. Second, an attack to cap-
ture Java and possibly Bali so as to cut off the Japanese in the
Moluccas from the main body of Indonesian islands and, also, from
the main rice-producing areas. MacArthur's estimate was that by
the end of 1945, all of the Netherlands East-Indies under his com-
mand would have been cleared of Japanese resistance. The general
pointed out to President Roosevelt that, in making their proposal,
the British were after economic and political gains in the Indies.
Mr. Roosevelt assured MacArthur that the latter's objections were
well taken. However, Prime Minister Churchill had been most em-
phatic in expressing his desire that the British proposal be accept-
ed. Therefore, the President feared that eventually he would be
confronted with the choice of giving in, or risking a break with
Churchill. In that case there was no doubt in Mr. Roosevelt's
mind that he would have to leave the liberation of the Indies to
the British. The Dutch Government's opinion regarding a possible
transfer of responsibility for Indonesia from the United States
command to that of Mountbatten’s, was unknown to the President. (16)
It was General MacArthur’s intention to do everything within
his power to prevent a change in his operational command area. He
would even go to the extent of calling upon American public opin-
ion to decide the issue. He asserted, however, that his efforts
could hardly be expected to produce favorable results unless the
Netherlands Government would be prepared to express its confidence
in the S.W.P.A. command. For that matter, the Dutch should make
it clear that they failed to see the efficacy of making changes
in the operational boundaries while a successful Allied campaign
was progressing towards the liberation of the Indies. (17)
(15)	Ibid.
(16)	Ibid., p. 489.
(17)	Ibid., p. 490.12
After his interview with General Bonner Fellers, Mr. van der
Plas obtained permission from Dr. van Mook to come to London for
personal consultations with the Netherlands Government. This trip
was undertaken with the concurrence and in terms of transport facil-
ities, with full cooperation of General MacArthur. Before van dele
Plas left, the general explained President Roosevelt’s position in
the matter. If the Netherlands Government would oppose a change of
the S.W.P.A., involving the transfer of responsibility for the
Indies to the S.E.A.C., on the basis of practical problems, e.g. of
supplies, it would suffice to settle the issue in favor of the
Dutch. (IS)
However, information obtained by the Dutch Government in Lon-
don indicated that the British had shelved the question for the
time being. The existing delimitation was to be maintained. A
solution of the problem was envisaged whereby., in Allied operations
pertaining to the Indonesian archipelago, MacArthur as commander-
in-chief would be assisted by a British deputy. Consequently,
when van der Plas told the Netherlands Prime Minister, Professor
P, S. Gerbrandy, what he had heard about the matter at MacArthur’s
headquarters, the information he submitted received only little
attention. This apparently was partly caused by the fact that at
that time all attention of the Dutch Government in Exile was fo-
cussed on the impending Allied operations to liberate Holland.
In a subsequent meeting of the Dutch Commission of Ministers
for the Conduct of War, it was doubted whether the information
which Dr. van der Plas had to offer was correct. Minister of State,
Michiels van Verduynen, long-time Ambassador of the Netherlands at
the Court of St. James, submitted that Mr. Churchill had re-assured
him that "you will get the Indies back." (19)
It appears that some of the Dutch Cabinet members, like van
Mook and his colleague for Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. N. van Kieffens,
were in favor of having the Indies remain the responsibility of
MacArthur's command, while others were more inclined to have the
archipelago included in the S.E.A.C. The latter feared that the
effective return of Dutch authority through occupation of the
islands by United States troops might be greatly hampered by Amer-
ican public opinion, behind the slogan: "No restoration of colonial
empires by American soldiers." (20)
This possibility and the fact that the data on the matter,
obtained by the Netherlands Government from various quarters in
Britain, were contradictory made the Commission of Ministers for
the Conduct of War decide not to act on the information supplied
by Mr. van der Plas, The latter’s suggestion for the Dutch Govern-
ment to take up the matter with President Roosevelt was not accept-
(18)	Ibid., p. 493, statement of van der Plas.
(19)	Ibid.
(20)	Ibid., p. 515, statement of van Kleffens.13
ed. (21)
When in April, 1945, Rear-Admiral L. G. L. van der Run, repre-
sentative of the Netherlands Government to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (C.C.O.S.), informed his superiors in London that the issue
would be submitted for consideration and decision to the Allied
Chiefs of Staff, the Netherlands Government still did not deem it
necessary to take any action. (22)
On April 10, 1945, General MacArthur received instructions,
presumably from the C.C.O.S., forbidding him to carry out operations
against Java. Although the general insisted he could complete a
campaign to recapture the bulk of the Indonesian islands, lying
within his operational area, without delaying the subsequent major
attack against Japan, the C.C.O.S. refused to give the American
commander their permission for such action. Since by that time pre-
parations to seize Tarakan and Balikpapan, in East Borneo, had
reached an advanced stage the operations involved were carried out
according to MacArthur’s plans. (23)
In the second half of June, 1945, Dr. van Mook warned his
government in London that a decision regarding changes in the de-
lineation of the S.E.A.C. and the S.W.P.A. was impending. (24)
(21)	Ibid., ρξ 494, statement of van der Plas.
(22)	Ibid., p. 522.
(23)	Ibid., pp. 498-499, statement of van Mook.
(24)	When in March, 1942, the total collapse of the Allied defenses
in Java was imminent, the Dutch Government in Exile, in London,
decided that a few chosen highranking Netherlands Indies ad-
ministrative officials be sent to England to fortify the Dutch
Government machine there. Dr. van Mook was among those select-
ed. In London, he was appointed Minister of Colonies on the
understanding that immediately after the end of the war he
would return to Indonesia and resume his pre-war duties as
Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies.
Early in 1944, the counter-attack of General MacArthur was
gaining momentum. Reoccupation of Japanese-held Netherlands
Indies territory was likely to occur at any moment. Van Mook
felt that it was urgently necessary to restore the Netherlands
Indies Government which could take over the civil administra-
tion in the recaptured areas of Indonesia from the Allied
military authorities as soon as possible. On September 14,
1944, Dr. van Mook was again charged with the functions of
Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies next to his holding
office as Minister of Colonies. In October, 1944, he set up
a Netherlands Indies Government in Exile at Brisbane, Austra-
lia. In February, 1946, the Dutch Government relieved him of
his duties as Minister of Colonies so that he could devote all
his attention to his task as Lieutenant Governor-General. H.J.
van Mook, Indonesie, Nederland en de Wereld, Amsterdam, De
Bezige Bij~ 1949, pp. 34, 48, 49; cf. Ρ.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia
London, New York, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1950, p. 130.14
At MacArthur's Headquarters arrangements were made accordingly.
Upon receiving van Mook's information the Netherlands Government
apparently remained unconcerned about the matter. (25)
On June 24, 1945, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was formed
after all of the Netherlands had been liberated. With regard to
the information supplied by van Mook the new government was of the
opinion that the data supplied by the Lieutenant Governor-General
were as yet based on hearsay only. Therefore, it had no adequate
basis on which to take action. (26) Moreover, the Cabinet held
that the inclusion of the East Indies;.ih the S.E.A.C., for political
reasons, was not unfavorable. Great Britain was a colonial power,
and as such more likely to have a better understanding of the
problems which would confront the Dutch in Indonesia after the war.
On the other hand, the Americans had clearly shown that they were
quite ignorant about such matters. (27) Nevertheless, the Nether-
lands Government made every effort to obtain reliable information
regarding a possible transfer of the Indies from the United States
command to Mountbatten's command. However, these attempts were
without success. The Dutch also tried to send a representative to
Potsdam while the Big Powers Conference was in session, but facili-
ties to do so were refused.
When it was certain that the decision had been made to include
practically all of Indonesia in the S.E.A.C. area, the Netherlands
Government accepted it. By that time it was clear that the United
States wanted to be relieved of the responsibility for the archi-
pelago while the British desired it. (28)
In the first half of June, 1945, Admiral Mountbatten inquired
of the C.C.O.S·. whether he could safely start planning operations
for the period after Singapore had been retaken, on the assumption
that the boundaries of his command area would remain unaltered.
He needed the information because the impending attack to recap-
ture the island fortress would require the full employment of all
S.E.A.C.'s sea, land, and air forces. Therefore, if Mountbatten's
task was to be enlarged with additional operations, the admiral
deemed it impossible to carry them out rapidly; particularly so,
if it involved an extension of his operational area. However, the
C.C.O.S. were unable to give a conclusive answer to the question
whether the S.E.A.C. area would remain unchanged. Deliberations
regarding the matter were still going on both in London and Wash-
ington. (29)
T25) This was the transitional Cabinet of Professor P.S. Gerbrandy.
The first post-war Cabinet (Schermerhorn-Drees) was next to
be in power.
(26)	Enqu&te Commissie, p. 519, statement of Professor W. Schermer-
horn.
(27)	Ibid., p. 517, statement of Dr. J. H. Logemann.
(28)	Ibid.
(29)	Mountbatten's Report, Section B, paragraph 623, paragraph 626,
P~..180.15
About raid-July, 1945, Mountbatten conferred with General Mac-
Arthur on forthcoming Allied operations in Southeast Asia. The
United States commander, at that time, had returned to Manila after
a successful campaign in the Philippines. The general suggested:
...that as he would now be preoccupied with preparations
for the assault on Kyushu which was to begin in November,
and for the final assault on Honshu, scheduled for the
spring of 1946, I (Mountbatten) should take over all of
the SWPA south of the Philippines...
However, Mountbatten "was not prepared to assume full responsibi-
lity" until he had succeeded "in making Singapore his main base."
The "logistical, shipping, and minesweeping difficulties, which
this new commitment would entail, would be insuperable so long
as" S.E.A.C. was "still entirely dependent on bases in India, Ceylon,
and southern Burma." He would accept the task, "if asked to do so
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; on condition that General MacArthur’s
appropriate intelligence files, as well as those members of his in-
telligence staff who had specialised in the areas he would be turn-
ing over," were put at his disposal in ample time. (30)
On July 23, .1945, Prime Minister Churchill ordered Admiral
Mountbatten to come to Potsdam. Here, the C.C.O.S. informed him
that an agreement had been reached on enlarging the area of res-
ponsibility of the British Commonwealth command, involving a
transfer of the greater part of the S.W.P.A. to the S.E.A.C. (31)
(30)	Ibid., paragraph 628, p. 181.
(31)	Ibid., paragraph 629, p. 181; cf. Leahy, op. cit., p. 410.
The decision of the C.C.O.S. was fully supported by the
United States State Department’s Bureau for South East Asia
affairs. This backing was based on the fact that transferring
Indonesia to Mountbatten's command would free the United
States of a possible embroilment in foreseeable, postwar colo-
nial troubles in the archipelago (as stated to the writer by
Dr. Lauriston Sharp, Professor of Anthropology, Cornell Univ-
ersity, who during that period was attached to said Bureau
of the Department of State).
The hands-off attitude of the United States vis-a-vis the
Indonesian problem was strictly adhered to during the early
period of the conflict. Thus, when by the end of October 1945
the Dutch military command requested the United States Govern-
ment to arm 8,000 Dutch ex-prisoners of war, coming from Japan
and China and assembled in Manila, for duty in the Indies,
the request was not granted. The United States also refused
delivery of 30,000 carbines which the Dutch had ordered in
America and for which payment had allegedly already been made.
The Dutch needed them to equip other ex-prisoners of war.
EnqueUe Commissie, p. 610, General Schilling.16
General Marshall urged the admiral to take over responsibilities
for the territories concerned as soon as possible after August 15,
1945.
"On being assured by General Marshall that the US and Austral-
ian forces would remain in situ under 'his' orders for the time
being," Mountbatten submitted that on these conditions the commit-
ment he was asked to undertake "might be acceptable until such time
as he was able to take over effective control." He further mention
ed that he needed adequate intelligence about the area which was
to be added to his command. Mountbatten hesitated to accept the
proposed arrangement immediately. Therefore, he asked and received
permission to hold the matter under further consideration. (32)
During his stay at Potsdam, Admiral Mountbatten was informed
of the projected use of atomic bombs against Japan. Prime Minister
Churchill predicted that because of the new weapon the war in the
Pacific would be over by August 15, 1945. On the basis of this
supposition the admiral received permission to direct the S.E.A.C.
to make plans for the re-occupation of Singapore, which was ex-
pected to take place shortly after mid-August, 1945.
(32) Mountbatten's Report, paragraph 630, p. 181.17
CHAPTER III
TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE BY FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
The abrupt end of the war against Japan gave rise to great
problems for the Allied command in Southeast Asia. The Japanese
capitulated on August 14, 1945. On the same day Admiral Mount-
batten received orders to assume immediate responsibility for
Indochina (south of the sixteenth parallel north) and practically
the entire area of the Indies which up to that point had been part
of the S.W.P.A. (1) This addition to its operational area caught
the S.E.A.C. wholly unprepared for the tremendous task involved
in the new directive. All preparations prior to Mountbatten's
trip to Potsdam had been concentrated on operations against the
Malay Peninsula. Their main objective was to recapture Singapore.
To cover the right flank of this action some minor strikes had
been planned against Sumatra. Java, let alone the other islands
of the Indies, had not been included in any immediate plans of
strategy. No new operations were to be carried out until after
October, 1945.	(2) in order to be in a position to execute his
extended task as well as possible, the admiral requested and ob-
tained permission to establish first a forward headquarters of
operations in Singapore.
So far as the Netherlands Indies were concerned, S.E.A.C. was
greatly hampered by lack of reliable information regarding the
existing situation in the islands. At Potsdam, General Marshall
promised that pending the actual transfer of the Indies to the
S.E.A.C., Admiral Mountbatten would be provided with the necessary
intelligence in ample time. Despite the immediacy and the urg-
ency of his new responsibilities, the admiral never received the
data he had asked for. Neither was he provided with the pressing-
ly needed additional forces and sea-transport facilities which he
requested from the C.C.O.S. (3)
The Dutch Intelligence service, the N.E.F.I.S. (Netherlands
Forces Intelligence Service) which until August 15, 1945, was
attached to the General Headquarters of the S.W.P.A. in Austral-
ia, was very poorly informed with regard to the general situation
(1)	David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, London, Allen & Unwin,
1948, pp. 31-32. In the period under discussion, Mr. Wehl
was chief of the Intelligence Service at Admiral Mountbatten's
headquarters. Enqu&te Commissie, p. 605, Logemann.
(2)	Mountbatten*s Report, Section B, paragraph 635, p. 183.
(3)	Ibid.18
in Indonesia. As such it was of little help to the S.E.A.C. (4)
For lack of trained personnel, and the means to transport its agents
to the main islands of Indonesia, the knowledge of the N.E.F.I.S.,
especially regarding conditions in Java, was completely inadequate.
This island proved to be impenetrable for its operatives. The few
attempts made ended in failure. All information that could be had
was gleaned from radio broadcasts emanating from Java. (5)
Efforts of the Dutch armed forces contingent attached to the
S.E.A.C. headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon to obtain information re-
garding conditions in Sumatra, were equally unrewarding. (6) Al-
though sorties were made by commando units, these raids proved
unprofitable. The native population was uncooperative. Moreover,
the Japanese, soon aware of such activities, doubled their vigilance
As long as Sumatra was outside the line of operations of the
S.E.A.C., submarines to transport the commando units to the island
were released with the greatest reluctance. By the end of 1944 and
early 1945, all intelligence activities from Kandy directed toward
Sumatra were suspended. Only when the time to attack Singapore was
approaching did the S.E.A.C. develop more interest in getting in-
formation on conditions in the island. (7)
In the second half of June, 1945, Mountbatten's Headquarters
landed three intelligence parties in Sumatra, two by parachute and
one from a submarine. On the day of Japan's surrender a fourth group
was landed near Medan. Three of the parties were under Dutch com-
mand and one was headed by a British captain. All groups succeeded
in making radio contact forthwith with Headquarters at Kandy.
These agents continued operations until the end of the war. After
August 15, 1945, they were under the S.E.A.C.'s directives to re-
port to the Japanese commander of their respective localities as
R.A.P.W.I. (Relief and Aid for Prisoners of War and Internees)
units. (8)
(4)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 72. Because the Indonesian islands were
not in or near tKe line of MacArthur's counter-attack the .
N.E.F.I.S. was denied adequate use of transport facilities for
its agents to obtain information regarding the main islands
such as Java, Sumatra, etc. Even Dutch submarines and sea-
planes could not be utilized.
(5)	Enquete Commissie, p. 523, statement of van der Plas who was
in charge of Allied broadcasts from Australia directed toward
the Indies. His government had also instructed him to assist
in setting up and organizing the N.E.F.I.S.
(6)	Ibid., 562, statement of Admiral Helfrich.
(7)	Ibid., p. 553.
(8)	Ibid., pp. 561, 571.19
On September 1, 1945, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook
and Dr. van der Plas met with Admiral Mountbatten at Kandy. The
Dutch representatives strongly objected to the fact that the Japan-
ese in Java allowed the Republic of Indonesia to exist. It was
suggested that the admiral issue orders to Marshal Terauchi to res-
tore the status quo in Indonesia of August 15, 1945, the day of
the Japanese surrender. Van Mook and van der Plas asserted that
the developments in Java after this date would never be accepted
by the Netherlands Government In accordance with the suggestion
of the Dutch, Mountbatten cabled a directive to Terauchi in Sai-
gon. However, the latter submitted that he did not know what had
happened in Indonesia after August 15. He refused to assume res-
ponsibility for developments in Java which occurred after this
date. (9)
On September 12, 1945, in Singapore, Admiral Mountbatten
formally accepted the surrender of the Japanese Expeditionary
Forces of the Southern Regions. On the same day the Allied com-
mander informed Mr. van der Plas, who represented Holland at the
surrender ceremony, that S.E.A.C. forces for Java and Sumatra
would not be available until the second half of October. When van
der Plas urgently requested that arrangements be made for Allied
forces to be sent to these islands at an earlier date, the admiral
stated that he had been instructed by his government to send many
of "the boys" home for a well-earned rest. For that matter, there
was no possibility of changing the schedule of operations. (10)
Immediately after the Japanese surrender, Admiral Mountbatten,
Supreme Allied Commander (S.A.C.), assumed responsibility for
Sumatra, Java and Madura, Bali and Lombok. Inasmuch as the troops
at his disposal were quite inadequate to occupy all of Indonesia,
he requested the Australian commander-in-chief to share the Allied
task in the archipelago with him. The Australians agreed to ac-
cept the surrender of Japanese forces in the Indonesian islands
other than those earlier mentioned. (11)
The objectives of the Allied forces were; (12)
(a)	to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and en-
force the unconditional terms of surrender;
(b)	to succour and release the Allied prisoners of war and
internees;
(c)	to disarm and concentrate the Japanese, preparatory to
(9) Ibid.. , p, 575, statement of van der Plas.
(LO) Ibid. , p. 676, statement of van der Plas.
(LI) van Mook, op. cit. , p. 78.
(12) Wehl, op. cit., p. 32.20
their repatriation;
(d)	to establish and maintain peaceful conditions, prepara-
tory to handing over the territories to their respective
civil governments; (13)
(e)	to collect information about, and try, war criminals.
(13) The transfer of authority in territories of Indonesia from the
Allied Military Administration to the Netherlands Indies Civil
Administration (N.I.C.A.) was regulated by the Civil Affairs
agreement concluded between the British and Dutch governments
on August 24, 1945 in London.
The agreement contained "principles designed to provide a
practical solution of immediate problems and to facilitate as
far as possible the task of the Allied Commander in Chief and
of the Netherlands Government in the achievement of their com-
mon purpose." It was further stipulated that it "is understood
that these arrangements, being purely provisional in character,
in no way affect the sovereignty of the Netherlands Government."
In terms of the objective under (d) the most important pro-
visions, in the opinion of this writer, are:
1.	In areas where military operations are being carried
out it is necessary to consider an initial or military
phase during which the Allied Commander in Chief will,
to the extent necessitated by the military situation,
possess de facto authority to take all necessary measures.
During this first phase the Dutch Government will, in order
to assist the Allied Commander in Chief in the execution
of his authority, make available to accompany his armed
forces a sufficient number of Netherlands Indies Civil
Affairs Officers to take charge of the administration in
liberated Netherlands Indies territory under the general
supervision of the Military Commander Allied Forces in the
area concerned. In administrative matters pertaining to
the civilian population, including relative plans to ex-
ploit the resources in liberated Netherlands: Indies terri-
tory as warranted by military demands during the initial
phase, the services of the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs
Officers will be utilized as much as possible. It is under-
stood that the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officers
will be fully authorized to take all necessary measures.
The conscription of civilian workers, billeting and supplies,
the use of real estate, buildings, means of transportation
and other services which the Allied Commander in Chief may
deem necessary for the military requirements of his com-
mand, will wherever possible be carried out through the
intermediary of Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officer* 1 2 * * 5
and in accordance with Netherlands Indies Law.
2.	It is agreed that the Netherlands Indies Government will
resume as rapidly as practicable full responsibility for
the civil administration of Netherlands Indies territory.
The Allied Commander in Chief will, as rapidly and as ful-
ly as the military situation in his judgement permits, not-21
Under priorities fixed by the C.C.O.S., the S.E.A.C. was to
execute the Allied task in Indonesia as the last in its schedule
of operations. (14)
The first Allied representatives to enter Java after the pro-
clamation of Indonesia's independence were landed by parachute at
Djakarta's airport, Kemajoran, on September 8, 1945. As an ad-
vance party this Allied Mission was to report on the situation
pending the arrival of a major Allied group sent to Djakarta by
the S.E.A.C. to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in
Java. The Mission reported among other things: (15)
The bulk of the native population in Java are indif-
ferent to all political movements. The political
problem is principally one of the towns. It is most
acute in Batavia. The problem follows pre-war patterns.
Most Nationalist leaders draw their following from
the intellectuals and semi-educated, and of these
the intellectuals are the worst. They are very anti-
Japanese, most of them...
The Nationalists are undoubtedly organizing for recog-
nition.
On September 16, 1945, the first post-war Allied Military
Mission to enter Java arrived in Djakarta. It was headed by Rear-
Admiral Patterson, deputy to Admiral Mountbatten. Besides accept-
ing the surrender of the Japanese forces, his task was to make
arrangements for the implementation of the surrender terms. Mean-
while, Dr. van Mook had suggested to the S.E.A.C,, that it "have
one or more experienced Netherlands Indies political advisers
attached to every group that enters Java ahead of the arrival of
the occupation force and the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil
Administration)." Accordingly Mr. van der Plas represented the
Lieutenant Governor-General on Admiral Patterson's staff. (16)
The members of the mission found that the attitude of the
Indonesian nationalists was not unfriendly. In anticipation of
the arrival of the Allied, occupation forces the responsibility for
ify the Lieutenant Governor-General of the extent to which
such responsibility should be resumed.
-------Enquete Commissie, pp. 634-635, as quoted from
Indisch Sfaatsblad ("Indies Gazette"), 1946, No. Ill,
trans. by the writer.
(14)	Kain, op. cit.
(15)	Wehl, op. cit., p. 37. Cf.Enquete Commissie, p. 563; van Mook,
op. cit., p. 78.
(16)	W. H. van Helsdingen, Op weg naar een Nederlandsch-Indonesische
Unie, 's-Gravenhage, W. van Hoeve, 1947, p. 24, from a Note
of Dr. van Mook dated Kandy, 3 September 1945, to Admiral
Mountbatten.22
security remained in the hands of the Japanese troops upon orders
of the S.E.A.C. (17)
In the latter half of August, 1945, the Republic of Indonesia
began the task of "organizing for recognition." At that time the
only existing institution representative of Indonesia as a whole
was the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitia
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia). It was established by decree
of Marshal Terauchi, Supreme Commander, Japanese Expeditionary
Forces, Southern Regions, on August 7, 1945. The Committee was
constituted of twenty-one members "drawn from all parts of Indon-
esia on a basis of representation roughly proportional to popula-
tion." The representatives were designated "on nomination by the
local Japanese military commanders." Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta
were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. (18)
The day following the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence
the membership of the Committeewas strengthened with six additional
members. (19) In this composition the Committee,
(1)	considered and approved the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia;
(2)	elected Sukarno and Hatta, President and Vice-President
of the Republic;
(3)	resolved that the President, in the execution of his
duties, was to be assisted by a National Committee
for the time being.
Twelve ministries were set up. The territory of the Republic,
comprised of the area of the former Netherlands East Indies, was
divided into eight provinces each to be administered by a governor
appointed by the President. Further, the Independence Preparatory
Committee which, conforming to the new situation, was then called
the "Independence Committee,"
(1)	decided on the form and composition of local National
Committees to be set up all over Indonesia, and of the
Central National Committee which would reside in
Djakarta; the aims and objectives of these representa-
tive institutions were defined;
(2)	decided to establish the "Partai Nasional Indonesia"
(Indonesian Nationalist Pav’ty); its aim was the perpetua-
tion of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia based on
social justice, social welfare and the sovereignty of the
people;
(17)	Frederick E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java," Harper’
Magazine, Vol. 192 (March 1946), pp. 279-284.	“
(18)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 127; Willard H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in
Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-43^ Cambridge, Mass
Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 94-95.
(19)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 138.23
(3) approved the foundation of the "Badan Keamanan Rakjat,"
(People's Peace Corps) as a subsidiary of the "Badan
Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang" (Committee for aid to
Families of War Victims) which was the main organization
charged with the maintenance of public peace.
By the end of August, preparations for organizing the Indones-
ian Nationalist Party were temporarily suspended in order to
concentrate all activities on the setting up of local National
Committees.
On September 5, 1945, President Sukarno announced the com-
position of his Cabinet. The Central Indonesian National Committee
(Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat-—K-N.I.P.) which had been inaug-
urated on August 29, replacing the defunct Independence Committee,
was strengthened by broadening the basis of its membership. (20)
Sukarno, in collaboration with Hatta, appointed "135 members (in-
cluding those of the Independence Preparatory Committee), whom
they deemed to be outstanding Indonesian nationalists and the most
important leaders of the chief ethnic, religious, social and econ-
omic groups in Indonesia." (21)
In the meantime the functions of government in Djakarta had
passed quietly and without interruption to public utilities and
other services to the Republic of Indonesia. (22)
Van der Plas, observing the situation in Djakarta as a member
of Admiral Patterson's Mission, came to the conclusion that the
first task of the Allied occupation forces should be to "act against
the terrorism of the Sukarno-group aimed at all moderate national-
ists." Therefore, he felt that stronger efforts must be made to
expedite the despatch of S.E.A.C. troops to Java. Thus dismissing
the Indonesian Republic as a mere terror gang, van der Plas pro-
ceeded to make preparations for the N.I.C.A. to take over the
administration of the Indies from the Japanese military government. (23)
However, all departments of the civil government were already in
Republican hands. As such, the transfer of the administrative
machinery from the Japanese to the N.I.C.A., as envisaged by the
Indies Government in Exile was no longer possible. (24)
(20)	These developments in the Republican Government are recorded
in: Documenta Historica, collected by Osman Raliby, Djakarta,
Bulan-Bintang, 1953.
(21)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 140.
(22)	Crockett, op. cit.
(23)	Enqu^te Commissie, p. 653, report of van der Plas.
(24)	Crockett, op. cit.24
Subsequently, on the persistent urging of the Dutch, the
S.E.A.C. advanced the date of sending Allied troops to Java. On
September 23, 1945, Mountbatten informed Admiral Patterson that on
September 28 a company of Seaforth Highlanders would arrive in
Djakarta. In view of their small number of Allied Military Mission
was faced with the problem of safeguarding the Allied force against
a possible attack from the Indonesians. Van der Plas then persuaded
Admiral Patterson to order the responsible Japanese commander to
arrest and imprison all "terrorist leaders" in Java. Sukarno and
Hatta, by implication, were most likely included in the list of
persons to be apprehended. The order was to be carried out on the
day prior to the landing of the Allied troops.
On September 26, van der Plas received a cable from the Nether-
lands Minister of Colonies, Professor Dr. J. H. A. Logemann, in-
structing him to meet with Admiral Mountbatten at the S.E.A.C.
headquarters in Singapore. The main task of van der Plas was to: (25)
...try arrange meeting to qxplain political situation Java.
Stress fact that Japanese secretly support nationalist
movements, thus not... conforming orders s.a.c. (supreme
allied commander). Van Mook has numerous proofs. Try to
obtain from s.a.c. change of attitude re british non-
interference internal political affairs... (
This directive was conveyed through British forces communica-
tions facilities. For that matter, Admiral Patterson found out
what he had not known when he accepted van der Plas’ advice to
imprison Indonesian leaders; his government’s policy with regard
to the situation in Indonesia was one of non-interference in the
internal political affairs. Consequently, he immediately res-
cinded his order to have the Japanese arrest Indonesian nationalist
leaders.
The meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and Dr. van der Plas
was held on September 27 and 28. The discussions were partly
attended by Mr. J. J. Lawson, British Minister of War. It was
asserted that Mr. Lawson was in Singapore primarily to confer on
matters pertaining to developments in Indonesia. The Dutch repre-
(25) Enqu^te Commissie, p. 676, statement of van der Plas. The
gross misappreciation of the strength of the Indonesian nation-
alist movement of the Netherlands Indies Government in Exile
was demonstrated in a cabled report of Lieutenant Governor-
General van Mook to the Minister of Colonies, Logemann. Van
Mook at that time was still in Brisbane. He informed his
government in Holland that judging from recent reports of
Dutch observers in Djakarta—apparently among others also
van der Plas—
"...it is of the utmost importance to imprison the leader-
ship of the so-called Republic of Indonesia immediately,
because apprehension of the leading persons and a show of
force will strip the movement of its strength." -Ibid.,
p. 653, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Minister of Colonies.25
sentative was informed of the British Government’s decision that
not a single British soldier should be used to impose Dutch author-
ity on Indonesian nationalists. His Majesty's forces were to be
utilized exclusively to rescue Allied prisoners of war and intern-
ees, and for the occupation of limited perimeters around Djakarta
and Surabaya. No British soldier would be allowed to go beyond
the limits of such areas. It was up to the Dutch themselves to
reoccupy the rest of Java. (26)
Subsequently Mountbatten stated that he was prepared to
speed up the sending of more Allied troops to Java if the Nether-
lands Indies Government was willing to begin discussions with
Sukarno and his adherents immediately. The admiral reminded
van der Plas of the British Government's policy with regard to the
nationalist movement in Burma. Initially, General Aung San, the
Burmese nationalist leader, was hostile to the British. However,
he attacked the Japanese eventually. Moreover, Sukarno's group
was the only organized movement among the Indonesian national-
ists. (27)
Van der Plas submitted that his government would absolutely
refuse to negotiate with Sukarno. The Dutch representative said
that comparison of the Republic of Indonesia with the nationalists
in Burma was ill-chosen inasmuch as Sukarno had never turned
against the Japanese. Despite these assertions Admiral Mountbatten
stated that if the Netherlands East Indies Government refused to
begin discussions with the Indonesian nationalists, he would, first,
direct Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Christison, commander-desig-
nate of Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies (A.F.N.E.I.)
to open talks with the Republicans. Second, Mountbatten would
refuse the Dutch any assistance, if through their uncompromising
attitude they should meet with serious difficulties. It appears
that this statement made van der Plas realize that in view of the
British mood it was necessary for him to make a concession. There-
fore, he declared his willingness to ask Lieutenant Governor-
General van Mook’s permission and summon Indonesian leaders, not
excluding Sukarno, for talks on future Indonesian-Dutch rela-,
tions. (28)
Admiral Mountbatten began to appreciate the gravity of the
situation that confronted the Allied forces in the islands. After
consultation with, and obtaining permission from London the S.A.C.
had decided to limit Allied operations in Indonesia to occupying
large cities in Java and Sumatra. Mountbatten had also come to
the conclusion that in the execution of their task the Allied for-
ces had to take the existence of the Republic into account from the
(26)	Ibid., p. 677, statement of van der Plas.
(27)	Ibid., p. 655, written report of van der Plas.
(28)	Ibid., p. 655-656, written report of van der Plas.26
very beginning. (29)
Upon his return to Djakarta, van der Plas "convened on Sept-
ember 29 and 30 several meetings with police officials in Batavia
and with other Indonesians of moderate outlook,..." (30) He tried
to persuade them to abandon the Republic and join the Allied Mili-
tary Administration Civil Affairs Branch (A.M.A.C.A.B.). However,
these overtures were rebuffed by the Republican officials.
The unbending attitude of the Netherlands Government with
respect to the Indonesian Republic was adamantly maintained during
this period. Therefore, when information about the activities of
Dr. van der Plas reached The Hague he was immediately rebuked by
his government. (31)
On the eve of General Sir Philip Christison's arrival in
Djakarta, Radio S.E.A.C. in Singapore announced a statement said
to have been made by him. In addition to giving an enumeration
of the Allied objectives in Indonesia, it was asserted that the
A.F.N.E.I. command had no intention of interfering in matters of
domestic politics. On the other hand, General Christison would
request the leaders of all Indonesian groups with a substantial
following "to prepare the way, for issue by the Dutch, of an auth-
oritative inclusive statement on the future of the Netherlands
Indies." (32)
Aware of the formidable task ahead of him and of the inade-
quacy of the forces at his disposal, General Christison apparently
sought to allay further Indonesian suspicion as to the objective
of Allied forces in Indonesia. Immediately after he entered
Djakarta on September 29, 1945, he issued a proclamation contain-
ing a request to Indonesian leaders to support him in the exercise
of his task. Since only limited operations could be undertaken by
the Allied forces "the present Indonesian authorities (would remain)
responsible for the government in the areas under Republican con-
trol." (33) The British command appeared to fear an attack of the
Indonesian armed forces which at that time were estimated at
80,000 men. The Allied position was aggravated by the fact that
all public utilities were in Republican hands. Disruption of
such services could for public health reasons result in disastrous
consequences for the inhabitants of Djakarta, which had greatly
increased in number by thousands of former prisoners of war and
(29)	Wehl, op. cit., p. 46.
(30)	Ibid., ρό 45.
(31)	Merdeka, October 4, 1945, an Indonesian language newspaper
published in Djakarta; Enquete Commissie, p. 678, statement
of van der Plas.
(32)	Wehl, op. cit., p. 42.
(33)	C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaes tie,. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952,27
internees. Moreover, the main water reservoir supplying the city
and Djakarta's hydro-electric station were in Republican-held
territory. (34)
However, from the point of view of the Dutch the British
commander’s decision, conclusion and pronouncements, were highly
objectionable. They felt it implied recognition of the Indonesian
authorities and their Republic. Both the Dutch Government in The
Hague and public opinion in the Netherlands were strongly against
having anything to do with the Indonesian Republic, which they
considered as Japanese inspired and headed by a group of Japanese
collaborators. Official Dutch protests were lodged in Singapore
and London against the S.E.A.C.'s policy. (35)
The Indonesian leaders soon found out that small contingents
of Dutch troops had been landed in Java as part of the incoming
Allied forces. Sukarno and other nationalist leaders forthwith
protested against the presence of Netherlands forces. The British
were warned that if more Dutch soldiers entered Java, the Indon-
esian population would become openly hostile to all Allied forces.
The Indonesians were already distrustful of the Allied command's
intention since it became known that it had allowed N.I.C.A.
officers, like van der Plas, to come to Djakarta as members of
Admiral Patterson’s Mission. The Republican leaders feared that
further landing of Dutch troops under cover of the Allied forces
would result in armed clashes with the Indonesian people. Under
such circumstances there would be no doubt on the Indonesian side
that the British and Indian soldiers were hand in glove with the
Dutch in trying to destroy the Republic. The ensuing situation
would result in violent reaction against thousands of Dutch intern-
ees still in Republican-held territory. (36)
p: 56; New York Times, September 30, 1945. Cf. Enqufete
Commissie, p. 657.
(34)	Enqu€te Commissie, p. 606, statement by General Schilling.
(35)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 89; Gerbrandy, op. cit., p. 99; Enquete
Commissie, p. 700, statement of van Kieffens. It was submitted
that the S.E.A.C. with its policy violated the Civil Affairs
agreement of August 24, 1945.
(36)	Kahin, op. cit., pp. 142-143. This warning was given in a
statement of President Sukarno to General Christison to pro-
test against activities of N.I.C.A. officers and the landing
of Dutch troops - Merdeka, October 11, 1945.
The most influential Republican newspaper in Djakarta at
that time, Merdeka, asserted in an editorial entitled "Suara
Rakjat" ("The People's Voice") on October 10:
....although the facts indicate that our existence as a
sovereign and independent nation is threatened...our
government wishes us to restrain ourselves...
....the Republican Government urges the people to refrain
from any action against Dutch troops because.... it means28
The misgivings of the Indonesian leaders proved true. Fight-
ing broke out between Indonesians and the Allied forces. Develop-
ments followed which made it impossible for the British to fulfill
their military commitments "without touching on the thorny problems
of colonialism and imperialism among a sensitive people and in a
sensitive world." In other words, the Allied command found itself
in a position wherein for the successful execution of its task "a
policy of non-intervention in the Republican-Dutch political rela-
tions" could no longer be maintained. (37)
Subsequently, both Admiral Mountbatten and General Christison
began to impress, with more urgency, upon the Dutch as well as on
the Republicans, how important it was for the two parties to resolve
their conflict by peaceful means. It was asserted that the success-
ful execution of the Allied task was contingejit upon a rapid solu-
tion of the controversy. Therefore, the British commanders made it
abundantly clear that a settlement between the Dutch and the Indo-
nesians must be a peaceful one. (38) British Government spokesmen,
in language necessarily cautious in view of the Anglo-Dutch wartime
alliance, reiterated the same view. (3R)
A.n important determinant of the British policy of pressing
for Dutch-Indonesian talks was their unenviable position in Asia.
The Labour Government which had come into power shortly after the
German defeat, had to take the existing sentiment with respect to
Asian movements of independence, both at home and abroad, into
serious and careful consideration. In particular, such sentiments
as expressed by Labour back-benchers in Commons had to be reckoned
with. (40)
action against Allied forces. So far the people have in-
deed not undertaken any concrete steps against Dutch troops.
However, the government will surely understand that the
people cannot follow its orders in this respect forever.
It should be borne in mind that the patience of the people
is not limitless...
(37)	Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, New York, John Day,
1948, p. 18.	--------------------
(38)	Editorial, "The Awakening of Asia,” The New Statesman and
Nation, XXX, (December 29, 1945), p.' 433.------------------
(39)	Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, column
1152, Prime Minister Attlee's statement on October 17, 1945.
(40)	Such as: Tom Driberg, Harold Davies and Woodrow Wyatt, who
through Dorothy Woodman received on-the-spot accounts from
two Englishmen with the British forces in Djakarta, Peter
Humphries and Tom Atkinson.
- John Coast, Recruit to Revolution, London, Christophers,
1952, p. 19. Mr. Atkinson was an editor of the daily
for the personnel of the British division in Djakarta.29
Moreover, as an aftermath of the war, in the Middle East, in
Iran, India, Burma and Malaya, conditions had developed necessita-
ting the use of substantial numbers of British armed forces. The
new tasks which these troops had to shoulder were hardly popular.
Especially so because their objectives were felt to be outside
the immediate sphere of British interests. Further, the army per-
sonnel in general strongly desired to be demobilized and sent home.
Lastly, the forces made available for the Allied task in
Indonesia were mostly Indian troops. For that matter the develop-
ments in the archipelago could not escape being influenced by the
new relationship which was emerging in India between Great Britain
and the peoples of that subcontinent.
With emotions more and more aroused, the frequency of armed
clashes between Allied forces, in particular Dutch soldiers, and
Republicans increased. Meanwhile the Dutch Government remained
adamant in its attitude of refusing to talk with the "Japanese
collaborator" Sukarno. Under these circumstances Dr. van Mook
became convinced that persisting in such an attitude would make
it impossible to arrive at a solution to the conflict.
The first step in breaking the stalemate was a conference held
October 10-11, 1945 in Singapore. Attending the meeting were Ad-
miral Mountbatten, General Christison, Rear-Admiral Patterson,
Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook, Dr. van der Plas and Vice-
Admiral Helfrich, commander of the Netherlands forces in the Far
East. The S.A.C. explained that the British policy in Indonesia
was influenced by two major factors. First, the Labour Government
had the gravest misgivings vis-a-vis drastic actions of the British
forces in Indonesia lest such actions would result in a situation
which could be termed "a second Greece." When, immediately follow-
ing the conclusion of the war in Europe, the political confusion
in Greece created a big uproar in Britain, the Labour Party, as the
opposition, sharply criticized the Churchill Government's policy re-
lating to that country. The Labour Government insisted that in
carrying out the Allied task in the Indies the British forces must
avoid violence as much as possible. Second, the S.E.A.C. was
completely unprepared for the tasks assigned to it after the
sudden capitulation of Japan. The problem was mainly that of an
acute shortage of transport facilities. (41)
Mountbatten informed the Dutch that he had decided to speed
up the sending of additional Allied forces to Indonesia. Four
brigades, each of 4,000 to 5,000 men would be made available for
the occupation of Java and Sumatra. The British and Dutch repre-
sentatives further discussed principles of general policy which
they would submit to their respective governments for approval. It
was agreed that the Netherlands Indies Government was the only
legitimate authority in Indonesia. In accordance with Mountbatten's
viewpoint it was decided that all activities of the Allied forces
would be carried out as R.A.P.W.I. operations. The Admiral asserted
X41) Enqu£te Commissie, p. 658; cf. Wehl, op. cit., p. 45.30
that the sole purpose oi the British troops was to accept the Jap-
anese surrender and implement the Allied task. Therefore, all
military operations considered necessary to accomplish this were
the responsibility of the British and not of the Dutch. The con-
ference also agreed to hold a meeting in Djakarta which would be
announced as a deliberation on R.A.P.W.I. matters in general. it
was decided to step up measures for the release of Allied prisoners
of war and internees still quartered in internment camps on Repub-
lican territory. In return the British demanded that the Dutch
abandon their negative attitude toward political discussions with
the leaders of the Republic. Without this concession Mountbatten
feared that increased military operations by the British and Indian
forces to achieve the contemplated objective would meet with insur-
mountable difficulties emanating from London and India. (42) Des-
pite van Mook’s protests the S.A.C. insisted that the leaders of
all Indonesian groups should be invited to attend the meeting.
Sukarno must not be excluded.
Under such circumstances, van Mook could not but conclude that
talking with the Republican leaders was a conditio sine qua non for
more activity on the part of the British. He then submitted a pro-
posal to his government at The Hague to abandon its stubborn
attitude of refusing to hold discussions with the Indonesian lead-
ers. (43)
Realizing that the rigid policy of, first, complete submission
of the Republicans, and then, perhaps, taking up discussions with
the Indonesians, could no longer be maintained, the Netherlands
Government accepted van Mook's proposal. (44) However, it still
insisted that the Lieutenant Governor-General should only have
talks with "good" Indonesians. Persons like Sukarno, Hatta, and
"other Japanese collaborators" were absolutely unacceptable be-
cause discussions "with the Sukarno regime" would be "both undig-
nified and fruitless." (45) It was stipulated that the Dutch
basis for negotiations must be Queen Wilhelmina's speech of Decem-
ber 6, 1942.	(46)
"(42) Smit, op. cit., p. 63.
(43)	Enquete Commissie, p. 698, statement of van Mook.
(44)	Because of this decision Governor-General van Starkenborgh,
who was recuperating from privations suffered in a Japanese
internment camp, resigned in protest.
(45)	Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-General,
T945-1946, (Dutch parliamentary debates; further referred to
as HandeTingen) Tijdelijke Zitting, pp. 85-86. The quotations
are from a statement in the Second Chamber by the Minister of
Overseas Territories (formerly: Minister of Colonies) Logemann
on October 16, 1945.
(46)	Wolf, op. cit., pp. 31-32.31
On October 17, 1945, van Mook reported to his government
there was a possibility that Sukarno might lose power and "soon
disappear from the scene" if the Dutch continued to refuse any
dealings with him. The Lieutenant Governor-General had come to
that conclusion because the Republican leader was gradually losing
his popularity with both the extremists and the moderates. (47)
However, van Mook’s advice to his government soon proved to
be unworkable. Sukarno was the head of the Republican Government.
To refuse to have talks with him was tantamount to rejecting all
contact with the Republic. Persistence in this attitude would
give rise to difficulties with the British. The Dutch were in no
position to risk the loss of Britain’s goodwill. Therefore, van
Mook was forced to admit that it was impossible for him to follow
strictly the directives of his government. (48)
On October 23, General Christison arranged for him to meet
Indonesian leaders, among whom was President Sukarno. Van Mook
attended the gathering which was informal in character. Mount-
batten's Adviser for Political Affairs, Mr. Maberly E. Dening
was also present. This official of the British Foreign Office
had been sent to Djakarta to assist the Allied commander in his
attempts to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together. (49)
At this meeting Dening informed the Republican leaders of the fact
that the Allied command recognized the Netherlands Indies Govern-
ment as the legitimate authority in Indonesia. The information
provoked strong protests from the Indonesians.
Apparently in fear of possible repercussions from the Repub-
licans, the British may have felt it necessary to indicate that
their recognition of Dutch sovereignty did not mean supporting the
Dutch in their conflict with the Indonesian; nationalists. For
soon afterwards, the Allied command announced that further landings
of Dutch troops in Java and Sumatra had been suspended for the
time being. (50)
On October 25 the Republican Government issued a statement to
let the British and the Dutch know on what terms it was prepared
to negotiate. The communique asserted:
....that Indonesia's interests do not only concern the
development of a new world structure but also the achieve-
ment of a basis for lasting peace in the Pacific.
(47)	EnquS'ie Oommisgib , .p. .663 , cable of van; Mook to the Dutch
Government, dated October 17, 1945.
(48)	Ibid., p. 698.
(49)	Raliby, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
(50)	Enquete Commissie, p. 610, statement of General Schilling,
Royal Netherlands Indies Army, commander of the Dutch contin-
gent Allied Forces in Djakarta. The announcement was made
at A.F.N.E.I. headquarters in Djakarta on October 25, 1945.32
Based on this precept the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia is of the opinion that discussions to solve
the Indonesian problem can only succeed and guarantee
lasting peace if they are conducted before the world at
large.
For that matter preliminary and unofficial talks con-
cerning a conference to finalize matters, according to
the Government of the Republic .of Indonesia, need be
carried out between the two parties involved in the pre-
sence of a third party acting as a mediator.
The Indonesian Government wishes to make it clear that
it is prepared to have discussions with anyone provided
such discussions are based on the right of self-determina-
tion of the Indonesian people. (51)
Thus, the Republican Government conditioned its willingness to neg-
otiate upon "the presence of a third party as mediator." From
then on the Republic pursued this diplomatic policy until it achiev
ed international recognition. (52)
The second meeting between President Sukarno and Dr. van Mook
took place on October 31, 1945. When news about this meeting
reached the Netherlands it caused a great commotion. The adverse
reaction was so vehement that the Dutch Government deemed it nec-
essary to issue an official and sharp rebuff to van Mook's action
without awaiting an explanation from Djakarta. (53)	;
Undiscouraged by the reverberations that the Dutch-Indonesian
talks had caused in Holland, General Christison planned another
meeting for early November. However, Sukarno informed the Allied
commander that arrangements had been made for him to attend con-
ferences in the interior of Java. Therefore, he would not be
available for some time. (54)
It could be suggested that by this time Sukarno had begun to
doubt the efficacy of his participation in any further talks with
van Mook, so long as the Dutch Government allowed the Lieutenant
J51) Merdeka, October 27, 1945.
(52)	The talks on the Hoge Veluwe in April 1946 were held without
a "third party." However, so far as the Republicans were con-
cerned, these discussions were meant to finalize matters which
in their basic issues had been agreed upon in Djakarta. As
we shall see, this agreement was achieved through negotiations
in which a British diplomat, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, ren-
dered his assistance.
(53)	van Mook, op, cit., p. 105.
(54)	Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, column
1727.-------------------------33
Governor-General to hold discussions with "good" Indonesians only.
Also, possibly the Republican President was becoming sensitive to
Indonesian criticism of dealings with the Dutch prior to their
recognition of Indonesian independence. (55)
In the meantime a profound change had occurred in the set up
of the Republican Government. Dissatisfied with the pattern of
government which concentrated too much power in the hands of Sukarno
and his Cabinet, almost to the extent of a dictatorship, a group of
younger, more dynamic and militant nationalists spearheaded a
movement for radical change in the structure and powers of the
K.N.I.P. Several among them had had a hand also in preventing the
Independence Preparatory Committee from playing a role in the fin-
al developments of the events leading to the Proclamation of Indo-
nesian Independence. (56)
From a purely advisory body, the K.N.I.P. became an institu-
tion with real legislative power which was held jointly with the
President. In the Presidential Decree No. 10 of October, 1945,
promulgating the modifications, it was stipulated that the K.N.I.P.
would delegate its day-to-day task to a small representative body,
the Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja K.N.I.P.). It was responsible
to and composed of members designated from the parent body. (56a)
Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin were elected the first chairman
and vice-chairman. Both were known to be free of any stigma of
Japanese collaboration.
On October 17, 1945, the Plenary Session of the K.N.I.P. ap-
proved the changes in the structure of the Republican Government.
Vice-President Hatta commented on the occasion that with the form-
ation of the Working Committee, the fight for the recognition of
<55) By November 6, 1945, reporting on the general situation in
Indonesia, van Mook stated: "Sukarno's meeting with me has
hurt his position vis-a-vis the extremists." - Enqu&te Commiss-
ie, p. 664, van Mook's cable to the Dutch Government.
(56) Muhammad Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia, Djakarta,
Widjaya, 1951, p. 120. See also: Kahin, op. cit., p. 147.
For a comprehensive and detailed account of background and
developments resulting in the change from presidential to
parliamentary government, vide pp. 147-153.
(56a) An official Republican statement on the matter asserted that
the change served to strengthen the domestic as well as the
international position of the Republic. The Dutch accused the
Republic of being fascistic. This change would show the world
that the Dutch were wrong. It would prove that the Indonesians
were cherishing the principles of democracy. - Berita Repoe-
blik Indonesia (Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia), Tahoen
II, No. 2, December 1, 1945.34
Indonesia’s independence had entered a new phase. (57)
The same could be said for the developments
led to formal negotiations between the Dutch and
that subsequently
the Indonesians.
On November 1, 1945, the Indonesian Government issued a Poli-
tical Manifesto drafted by Sjahrir. This document was accepted by
the Working Committee as the official statement of government policy
The Manifesto stated among other things: (58)
...The tribulations felt by our people, physically as well
as spiritually, during these three and a half years /Japanese
occupation/, can be termed boundless. Our entire popula-
tion was forced to report and become subject to the mili-
tary orders of the Japanese. It is this stamp of Japanese
Militarism which the Japanese overlord has left on the minds
of our people and especially our youth. For this Dutch
Colonialism is responsible, in that it left our 70,000,000
people to the mercies of Japanese Militarism without any
means of protecting themselves since they had never been
entrusted with firearms and the education necessary to use
them in the turning point of history on March 9, 1942.
It was made clear that although the Indonesians wanted complete
independence they did not ask for an isolated or autarchic state.
They understood that without foreign aid they were doomed to remain
without wealth, technical development or the fruits of Western civil
ization. They wanted to develop both their agriculture and industry
and knew this meant loans, credits, foreign advice, technicians,
etc. They knew that to have these they must have law and order,
and that anti-foreign prejudices, then fostered by extremists,
must disappear. It was pointed out that owing to their tradition
and special knowledge of the Indies, the Dutch must inevitably have
a predominant place in Indonesia. However, this was possible only
if Dutch political domination ended.
At about the same time a booklet was published, written by
Sjahrir, entitled Perdjuangan Kita ("Our Struggle"). It was a
frank criticism of the extremist manifestations among the Indonesian
youths. He called upon them to act with responsibility commensur-
ate with their revolutionary importance. Sjahrir warned that the
continuance of murder and robbery of foreigners and other Indo-
nesians by nationalists invited military intervention which "equals
selfdestruction."
/57) Merdeka, October 19, 1945.
(58) Wolf, op, cit., Appendix, p. 172. For a complete translation
of the Political Manifesto see pp. 172-175.35
Striking at the regime of President Sukarno, Sjahrir charged
that the Government had failed to gain popular respect and accept-
ance because it was weak. Because it did not know better, its
methods of propaganda and agitation were copied and learned from
the Japanese and therefore fascistic.
Through the march of events which clearly showed confusion
among the Indonesians, and which could hardly be considered an
expression of a fight for freedom inasmuch as it was accompanied
with murder and brigandage, world opinion with regard to the Indo-
nesian revolution was changing. (59) Sjahrir deplored the express-
ions of racial hatred which he observed in his country. He felt
that as long as the people of one district could be incited against
that of another, it would be very difficult for international opin-
ion to recognize the existence of a solid feeling of Indonesian
nationalism.
Speaking of "nationalist groups, which have let themselves
be used as servants of fascism, whether Dutch-colonial, or Japan-
ese-military fascism," Sjahrir stated:
Thus all the collaborators referred to must be consider-
ed as our own fascists, as accomplices and tools of Jap-
anese fascism, who bear a heavy guilt and have committed
treason to our struggle and our people’s revolution.
This demand for a purge was part of Sjahrir's policy to try
to remove the taint of Japanese collaboration from the Republican
leadership. (60)
On October 25, 1945, the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade landed
at Surabaya. The operation proceeded smoothly and without opposi-
tion from the population. However, unknown to the commanding
officer, Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby, tension had been building up
in that city which by the time of the Allied forces' arrival had
reached a danger point. (61)
(59)	Soetan Sjahrir, Onze Strijd, Amsterdam, Uitgeverij "Vrij
Nederland,” 1946~ pp. 14-16.
(60)	The writer obtained this information from Dr. Soedarsono,
Sjahrir's close associate in underground activities during
the Japanese occupation. Dr. Soedarsono after the Proclama-
tion of Independence continued this relationship with Sjahrir
as fellow-members of the Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party).
Representing his party in the K.N.I.P., he was subsequently
elected to membership of the Working Committee. (B.P.K.N.I.P. -
Raliby, op. cit., p. 132) In March, 1946, he became Minister
for Home Affairs in the second Sjahrir Cabinet. He partici-
pated in the Djakarta negotiations which resulted in the Hoge
Veluwe Conference. Thereafter Dr. Soedarsono was appointed
member of the Republican Delegation to this conference.
(61)	Wehl, op. cit., p. 52.36
By the end of September, 1945, an Allied party, commanded by
Captain P. J. G. Huijer, Royal Netherlands Navy, arrived in Sura-
baya. Under directives of Admiral Patterson, it was to observe and
report on conditions in this port-city pending the landing of the
Allied occupation forces. After October 1, developments arose in-
volving an all-out attack by the Republicans on the Japanese army
and navy garrisons to seize arms and ammunition. Finally, the
events led Captain Huijer to assume responsibilities beyond the
instructions of the Allied command. He apparently decided to take
matters into his own hands, realizing that the activities of the
Indonesians were highly detrimental to Dutch interests in Indonesia.
The temper of the aroused population subsequently turned against
the Dutch naval officer and his Allied team, and they were arrested
and imprisoned by the Republican authorities. (62)
Immediately after his arrival in Surabaya, Brigadier Mallaby
had Huijer and his colleagues released. It appears that the com-
ing of the British-Indian brigade was unopposed thanks to its
commander’s statement issued shortly after he entered the city.
The British Commander asserted that he had no orders to disarm the
Republicans. However, on October 27, the R.A.F. dropped leaflets
over Surabaya containing an order of the A.F.N.E.I. command for all
Indonesians to disarm within 24 hours. This operation was alleged-
ly carried out without Mallaby's previous knowledge of the matter.
Afterwards, the Brigadier announced that he had obtained 4 days'
grace from Djakarta for the Indonesians to give up their arms. (63)
The Republicans ignored the order, and subsequent events push-
ed the situation from bad to worse. On the afternoon of October 28,
1945, the Indonesians launched a large-scale attack on the Allied
forces. Twenty-four hours after the battle had begun, the British-
Indian brigade stood in danger of annihilation. (64)
Under the circumstances the A.F.N.E.I. command had no other
choice but to turn to the Republican Government for assistance to
try to come to the rescue of Mallaby and his men. Through the
personal intervention of President Sukarno a temporary truce was
arranged between the Republican and the Allied forces, effective
shortly after the arrival of the Republican leader in Surabaya on
October 29. The terms were:
1. The agreement was concluded between President Sukarno
and Brigadier Mallaby to preserve peace in Surabaya.
(62)	Enquete Commissie, pp. 594-602, statement of Huijer.
(63)	Arthur D. Clegg, "Indonesia," The New Statesman and Nation
XXX (December 22, 1945), pp. 4Z5-426. A..."first-hand British
report." quoted by Clegg in a letter to the Editor. Cf. Wehl,
op. cit., p. 54.
(64)	Ibid., p. 56.37
2.	To achieve peace and order both parties would cease
hostilities.
3.	The safety of all persons including ex-internees
would be guaranteed by both parties.
4.	Conditions laid down in the leaflets signed by the
Allied commander in Java, General Hawthorn, and
dropped over the city would be a matter of discussion
between President Sukarno and Hawthorn on the following
day.
5.	On the night of October 29, both parties were allowed
freedom of movement.	j
6.	All military personnel were to be confined to their
barracks. All wounded persons were to be taken to
hospitals. The unhampered execution of this operation
would be guaranteed by both parties. (65)
The following day a meeting was held between President Sukarno,
Major-General D. C. Hawthorn representing Allied Headquarters in
Djakarta, and Brigadier Mallaby. An agreement was reached stipu-
lating: (66)
...that fighting should cease immediately, that a
"Contact Bureau" should meet for liaison work; that
all personal arms and equipment captured by both sides
should be restored immediately; that free movement by
road should be permitted by the Indonesians for bringing
APWI /Allied Prisoners-of-War and Internees/ refugees
to safety and taking supplies to the camps/ that the
British should be responsible for law and order in the
docks area and the camps; that a party of equal strength
from British and Indonesians should patrol the town; and
that any major differences that might arise should be
submitted to Batavia /Djakarta/ for decision to be arrived
at between General Hawthorn and Soekarno.
However, the truce was short-lived. The next day fighting broke
out again, resulting in the death of Brigadier Mallaby.
Discussing this incident in Commons on February 20, 1946,
the Labour Backbencher, Mr. T. E. N. Driberg stated: (67)
...some of the Press reports from Indonesia have not
(65)	~ Merdeka, October 30, 1945.
(66)	Wehl, op · cit., p. 58. Cf. Merdeka, November 1, 1945.
(67)	Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 419, columns
1213, 1214 and 1215. For a British account of the incident
claiming that Mallaby was shot to death by Indonesians, see;
Wehl, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
After a visit to Surabaya for a personal investigation into
Mallaby's death, the Republican Minister of Information, Amir
Sjarifuddin, stated to the press on November 7, 1945, there
was no evidence to show that the British officer had been killed
by the Indonesians. However, it had been established that the
car occupied by Mallaby had been damaged by an exploding shell.
Merdeka, November 8 and 14, 1945.38
been entirely responsible. In particular, I have learned
from officers who have recently returned that some of
the stories which have been told, not only in the news-
papers, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government Front
Bench in this House, have been very far from accurate and
have unnecessarily imported prejudice and blackened the
character of the Indonesians. One story in particular
concerns the lamented death of Brigadier Mallaby. That
was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted
it as such. I have learned from officers who were pre-
sent when it happened the exact details and it is perfect-
ly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was
honourably killed in action....
Turning to the details of the case Mr. Driberg said:
The incident was somewhat confused—as such incidents are—
but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya.
There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the
day. A large crowd of Indonesians—a mob, if you like—
had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited
state. About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side
of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communica-
tion and did not know about the truce. They were firing
sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from
the discussions walked straight into the crowd, with great
courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They
obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later the mob in the
square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a
certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to
open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren guns, and
the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke
out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when
Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the
truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty
minutes to half an hour after that, he was, most unfor-
tunately, killed in his car—although even now it is not
absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians
or by a grenade thrown by an Indian officer at some Indo-
nesians who were approaching his car, which exploded
simultaneously with the attack on him....
I do not think that /the circumstances in which Mallaby
was killed/ amount to a charge of foul murder... because
my information came absolutely at first-hand from a British
officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose
bona fides I have no reason to question....
On November 4, 1945, van Mook reported to his government that
"in the coming days the potential of the extremist armed forces"
was to be tested. Two days later he submitted that the British had
decided to take drastic action against the Republicans in Surabaya.
The Allied command was contemplating a "showdown" with the Repub-
lican leaders. It appears that the Allied defeat at Surabaya had
become a matter of prestige for the British command. In view of39
the situation the Dutch apparently nurtured the hope that after
Mallaby's death, which General Christison immediately labeled
"foul murder" committed by the Indonesians, (68) the British were
more inclined to support the Dutch position in the Indonesian con-
flict. This could serve to explain why van Mook decided on the
date of November 6, 1945, to announce a Statement of Dutch Policy
with regard to future political reforms for Indonesia. The "stra-
tegic moment" to do so had apparently arrived. (69)
Van Mook expressed grave concern about the fact that the Dutch
position was too dependent upon the British. If this state of af-
fairs were to continue for a long period of time, and if the Bri-
tish in their military operations to implement the Allied task
should meet with more serious set-backs, it was feared that they
would hesitate to resort further to such action. Consequently,
the Dutch position would be rendered more difficult. Thus, van
Mook considered it of the utmost urgency to expedite the sending
of Dutch forces to the archipelago. Chaos and resistance would
increase with every lost minute in having Netherlands troops avail-
able to take over from the British in Indonesia. (70)
The implication is clear. Whatever overt moves the Dutch
Government made to show their willingness to negotiate with the
Indonesian nationalists, it seems that their policy was aimed
at finding a rapid solution of the Indonesian problem by forceful
methods.
As a measure of the potential of Indonesian armed resistance,
the events in Surabaya left Dr. van Mook not unimpressed. He report
ed to his government that the resistance in Java had deeper roots
and was more wide-spread than could be surmised from the pre-war
situation. Nevertheless, it was as yet impossible to estimate the
fighting strength of the Indonesian armed organizations. "However,
it was certainly much greater than that of Javanese gangs in the
past." (71)
In the beginning of November, 1945, the Allied command resumed
operations to occupy Surabaya. On November 9, the 5th Indian Div-
ision was ready to disembark and enter the city. Prior to order-
ing his troops to land, the British commander, Major-General E. C.
Mansergh, issued an ultimatum to the population of Surabaya. The
main conditions were:
(68)	Wehl.,, op., ci.t. , p. 62.
(69)	Enquete Commissie, p. 705, letter of Logemann
(70)	Ibid., p. 663, cable of van Mook to the Dutch
November 4, 1945.
(71)	Ibid., p. 664, cable of van Mook to the Dutch
November 6 and 7, 1945.
Government,
Government,40
1.	for all Indonesian leaders to surrender themselves upon
which they would be taken into custody;
2.	for all Indonesian Irregulars to surrender their arms.
When no heed was given the ultimatum, the Allied division
launched its attack on the following day. Soon it became obvious
to General Mansergh that in face of the resistance encountered,
"infantry alone could not succeed, and naval, artillery, and air
support was ordered." (72)
The Allied operation to occupy Surabaya lasted until the end
of November before finally succeeding. Concerning the battle for
this city it has been said: (73)
Had similar risings taken place all over Java millions
would have died, and the Republic of Indonesia and the
Netherlands East Indies would alike have been drowned
in blood. This possibility lay always before the eyes
of the Allied commanders at that time, and considerably
influenced their policy, an influence not always apprec-
iated in Holland.
On the diplomatic scene, the British continued to press for
Dutch-Indonesian talks. The Dutch first insisted on a greater
measure of security around Djakarta so as to create an atmosphere
conducive to the holding of such talks. However, by the beginning
of November they realized that they could no longer refuse to start
the discussions. From the Republican side a move to reveal their
standpoint in the controversy had been made by the publication of
the November 1, Political Manifesto. The Dutch view was that they
could hope for a more satisfactory development in the situation
only after they had given the Indonesians an opportunity to take
note of the Dutch viewpoint. The reaction of the Republicans to
the wishes of the Netherlands Government could then be ascertain-
ed. (74)
By this time, shortly after Brigadier Mallaby's death, Brit-
ish feelings against the Indonesians were strong. General
Christison had intimated to the Dutch that the situation in Sura-
baya "could be a turning point" in British policy vis-a-vis the
Republic. The Allied commander appeared to be in favor of backing
(72)	Wehl, op. cit,, pp. 64-65.
(73)	Ibid., p. 67; cf.. Enquete Commissie, p. 632, statement of
Schermerhorn.
(74)	Handelingen, Bijlagen, Regeerings Nota, ("Appendices, Government
Note"), 11 December 1945, 123-2, p. 4.41
the Dutch. (75)
It seems that the circumstances were advantageous for the
Netherlands Government to disclose the basis upon which it was
willing to negotiate with the Republic. On November 6, 1945,
Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook obtained permission from his
government to publish a statement on the Netherlands policy and
its objectives with regard to Indonesia. These objectives were
based on principles of policy laid down in Queen Wilhelmina's speech
of December, 1942. The Queen's statement was interpreted to mean
that in the restored pre-war Volksraad (People's Council) the
Indonesians would be given a "substantial majority." Before the
Japanese invasion the Indonesians were allowed to hold 30 out of
a total of 61 seats. Van Mook expressed the opinion that there
would be no objection for the Indonesians to have even four-fifths
of the votes. (76) He was willing to go further. The directors
of departments would henceforth be "ministers." Ministries would
be created, but they would remain under the jurisdiction of the
Governor-General. This in effect meant that there would be no
ministerial responsibility. The "Volksraad" would remain a pseudo-
parliament, and the Governor-General the actual ruler in Indon-
esia. (77)
These were the maximum concessions which the Dutch were will-
ing to offer. The Dutch policy completely ignored the reality of
the Republic as the embodiment of the. will of the Indonesian people
to be independent. In point of fact the Dutch statement was an
invitation to return to the old colonial relationship.
Regarding van Mook's statement President Sukarno declared in
a press conference that he was not in the least impressed by it.
"It is only a going-over of the old familiar statement of the
Queen." For the Republican position he referred to the Political
Manifesto. (78)
As van Mook himself admits on p. 106 in his book Indonesie,
Nederland en de Wereld, the Netherlands proposal was handicapped
by its vagueness "in the cardinal points on the formation of an
Indonesian state."
(75)	Enqugte Commissie, p. 610, statement of General Schilling. In
a report to his government dated November 6-7, 1945, van Mook
stated that the British command was willing to force a "show-
down" with the Republic. This would be staged as soon as a
meeting could be held between the British, the Dutch and the
Indonesians. On that occasion the Dutch were expected to table
their proposals to the Republicans. The British would support
the position of the Netherlands Government. Ibid., p. 665.
(76)	J. de Kadt, De Indonesische Tragedie, Amsterdam, G. A. van
Oorschot, 1949, p. 113.	'
(77)	Ibid. For the Dutch proposals of November 6, 1945, see
Appendix I.
(78)	New York Times, November 7, 1945.42
The absolute rejection of the proposals contained in the
Dutch statement of November 6, was a foregone conclusion.
In taking stock of the military situation in Indonesia and
the Dutch position in this respect, van Mook, on November 6, 1945,
suggested to his government that it change its military policy,
which so far was aimed at concentrating as many of the available
Dutch forces as possible in Java. Contingent upon an early with-
drawal of the British troops, and, if by that time the available
Dutch forces would prove inadequate to control Java while no arrange-
ments had been made to re-establish Netherlands authority in the
Greater East, Borneo, Banka, Billiton and the Riouw islands, the
Dutch might find themselves holding no important area in the arch-
ipelago. Van Mook was confident that with about 8,000 troops at
his disposal he could regain authority over the above islands, Java
and Sumatra excepted, in two months. In doing so the Dutch could
get rid of the Australians who were then occupying the areas. It
was felt that the "pacification" of Sumatra would need more troops
as conditions in the island were "rapidly deteriorating." Van Mook's
suggested change in the Dutch military policy involved a complete
suspension of all troop concentration in Java. In this territory
the British would be requested to maintain their positions. He
submitted that for the execution of this strategy it was of vital
importance to be certain of twc^ factors:
1.	how big an army would the Netherlands be able to raise
for duties in Indonesia, and how soon could it be trained,
equipped and made available?;
2.	For how long were the British prepared to give active
support to the Dutch, and with how many forces? (79)
Prior to submitting these questions, the Lieutenant Governor-
General reported to his government that he and the Dutch military
commanders were agreed on the total number of forces necessary
firmly to re-establish Netherlands authority throughout the archi-
pelago. An estimated 75,000 men were urgently needed for immediate
operations in the islands. Postponement of drastic action would
give the Republic time to organize. Consequently, it would be
more difficult to break down the insurgent resistance. (80)
On November 12, 1945, upon examination of the possibilities of
complying with van Mook's request, the Dutch Government arrived at
a most unpleasant and startling discovery. After careful investi-
gation and consideration of technical factors supplied by the mili-
tary, it was ascertained that until October, 1946, no more than
(79) Enqu^te Commissie, p. 665.
(80) Ibid., p. 664.43
30,000 troops would be available for duty in the Indies. (81) On
December 31, 1945, the military strength of the Dutch in Indonesia
amounted to approximately 15,000 men of the Royal Netherlands
Indies Army and 5,000 of the Netherlands Navy. (82)
It appears that in the period under discussion the Dutch posi-
tion in Indonesia depended in great measure upon the goodwill of
the British. With vested interests in nearby Malaya and North Bor-
neo, and their problems in India and Burma as yet unsolved, the
British Government, possibly because of a feeling of sympathy with
other colonial powers thought themselves obliged to aid the Dutch.
Moreover, socialist affinity between the Labour Government in
London and the Socialist Cabinet in The Hague might have been an-
other factor beneficial to the Dutch cause in the Indies.
Van Mook's proposed military policy of leaving the responsibi-
lity for Java and Sumatra temporarily in British hands was apparent-
ly a matter of necessity. The A.F.N.E.I. continued to bar further
landings of Dutch troops in these islands. Therefore, it seems that
van Mook sought to employ the available Dutch forces for immediate
gains in the other islands of Indonesia. He hoped to achieve a
speedy economic rehabilitation of, and to start constructive re-
forms in, the Outer Islands as soon as Dutch control had been
returned to these territories. In contrast to the prevalent chaotic
situation in the archipelago, such achievements, as proof of the
efficacious influence of the Dutch Government’s policy, would be
highly important to hold before the eyes of the people in Java and
Sumatra. It would also be an effective show-case to present to
the public in Holland, and to the world in general. (83) However,
the Dutch military commanders in Indonesia opposed van Mook's sug-
gestion. On November 17, 1945, the Netherlands Government informed
the Lieutenant Governor-General, that the "Council for the General
Conduct of War of the Realm" (Raad voor Algemene Oorlogvoering van
het Koninkrijk) had decided: (84)
1. Java must not be abandoned, but must be occupied with
as many Dutch troops as possible. The occupation of
Riouw, Borneo and the Greater East should be implement-
ed as soon as possible, and in accordance with Dr. van
Mook's ideas on the matter. The necessary troops for
the operation could be recruited from among former
prisoners-of-war. Sumatra must be shelved for reconsid-
eration at a later stage.
(81)	Ibid., p7 706, statement of Schermerhorn. He further stated
that it was not merely a matter of the number of men but also
of equipment. "It should never be forgotten that the (Dutch)
Government must get everything, from the first trouserbutton
to the last bullet, from the British."
(82)	Ibid., p. 709, W. Drees, in a letter dated March 7, 1956.
(83)	Ibid., p. 668, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Government,
November 10, 1945.
(84)	Ibid., pp. 668-669, cable of Minister of Overseas Territories
Logemann to van Mook, November 17, 1945.44
2.	According to Foreign Minister van Kieffens there was as
yet no ground for the assumption that the British would
prematurely abandon their task of occupation. Meanwhile
the matter would be investigated. The limited possibil-
ities of the Dutch military establishment would be frankly
admitted to the British War Office. In so doing, the
Dutch Government hoped to arrive at a definite plan for
the closest cooperation with the British.
Within the Republic, a struggle for political power had devel-
oped. The contest resulted in another basic change in the Republic
an Government. The Presidential Cabinet was abolished. It was
replaced by a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament (K.N.
I.P.). The Working Committee was detained, (85)
On November 9, President Sukarno designated Sjahrir to form a
Cabinet. Five days later Sjahrir announced the composition of the
first Parliamentary Government of the Republic as approved by the
President. In the plenary sessions of the K.N.I.P. of November 25
to 27, the Working Committee's decisions that had brought about the
change from a presidential Cabinet to a parliamentary one, were
considered and approved. The Sjahrir Cabinet, by a vote of confi-
dence of 81 to 8, with 15 abstentions, was given the greenlight
to continue in office. (86)
Prior to these developments, the suspension of political
party formation was rescinded by Presidential Decree of November
3.	The decision was made in compliance with a proposal of the
Working Committee. This institution adopted a resolution stating
that "the time has arrived to organize the people politically."
Accordingly, the people were urged to form political parties. (87)
The Dutch received the reorganization in the Republican Govern
ment with some satisfaction. Sjahrir was considered a man with
whom they might be able to negotiate. This anticipation was sub-
stantiated when the Indonesian Prime Minister stated at a press
conference:	"The new government will be just as strongly nation-
alist as the old. But if we can find common ground between our-
selves and the Dutch in which we can mutually help solve the
Indonesian problem, I shall encourage our getting together." (88)
On November 17, General Christison arranged for the first
more or less formal meeting between van Mook and Sjahrir. The
(85)	For an account of developments resulting in this change see;
Kahin, op. cit., pp. 168-169.
(86)	Merdeka, November 28, 1945; Raliby, op. cit., p. 120.
(87)	Ibid., November 3, 1945. See also; Communique No. 3 of the
Working Committee, Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, I, No. 1
(November 17, 1945).'	‘	~
(88)	New York Times, November 14, 1945.45
Allied commander chaired the meeting, and was assisted by Mr. Μ. E.
Dening. Concerning this meeting the British had promised that in
case the Republican leaders proved uncooperative and unwilling to
discuss proposals tabled by the Netherlands representatives, the
Allied command was prepared to take more active measures to carry
out its assigned task. Mr. Dening, expressing a more positive
standpoint of the British Government, urged in the strongest terms
that the Republicans recognize the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
(89)	The talks did not go beyond an informal exchange of views.
In a statement before the Second Chamber on December 11, 1945, the
Minister of Overseas Territories, Dr. J. H. Logemann, commented on
the discussions that the members of the new Republican Government
could not be prevailed upon to give "any positive pronounce-
ment." (90)
The second meeting between Sjahrir and van Mook was scheduled
for November 22. However, the Republicans suspended the conference
when shortly before the day of talks bloody clashes occurred in
Djakarta between Dutch forces and Indonesians. A Republican Civil
Police barracks was attacked by Netherlands Indies troops. A con-
siderable number of policemen were killed. In the ensuing wave of
indiscriminate shooting, Netherlands Indies soldiers seriously
wounded one of the topleaders of the Masjumi Party, Mr. Mohammad
Rum. (91)
On November 27, the K.N.I.P. expressed its confidence in the
Sjahrir Cabinet.
With the following inactivity in the field of Dutch-Indonesian
talks, the Netherlands Government diverted the attention of an in-
quisitive parliament and public in Holland to what it called "the
gravest problem of the moment." In a government statement of
December 21 this problem was submitted for information to the Sec-
ond Chamber. It concerned the safety of Netherlands, Indies
Netherlands (Eurasian), and other minority groups' ex-internees
who had been released and were now domiciled in camps, or areas, in
cities not under complete control of the Allied forces. On Decem-
ber 6, Admiral Mountbatten, Dr. van Mook, and British and Dutch
military commanders conferred on the matter in Singapore. The
subject discussed was the military aspect of the problem. It was
decided that, within the scope of the Allied task, the British
would extend their perimeters of control for providing the greater
measure of security requested by the Dutch authorities. Wherever
necessary, military operations would be carried out to achieve the
objective. (92)
(89)	EnquSte Commlssie, p. 703, statement of Logemann.
(90)	Handelingen, Nota omtrent een aantal punten van regeeringsbeleid,
X"Note on several aspects of the policy of the Government"),
Bijlagen 123, p. 4.
(91)	Merdeka, November 23, 1945.
(92)	Handelingen, p. 138. From a statement of the Minister of
Overseas Territories before the Second Chamber on December
21, 1945.46
Concerning the conference a S.E.A.C. spokesman stated that
the British policy in Indonesia followed the lines stipulated by
the Labour Government in London.
On October 17, 1945, Mr. Noel-Baker, Minister of State, speak-
ing in the House of Commons stated: (93)
...His Majesty’s Government, of course, recognize no authority
but that of the Netherlands Government in all territories
which are under the sovereignty of our Dutch Allies.
On November 23, 1945, Mr. Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary,
declared: (94)
...Our military tasks were, first, to disarm and concen-
trate the Japanese forces; secondly, to rescue and bring
home our prisoners of war; and thirdly, to rescue the
thousands of internees in camps throughout the large is-
land. We had no intention of using any British forces
for any other purpose or against the inhabitants. Indeed,
our efforts to avoid the shedding of blood have resulted
in our being accused of weakness. ...It is essential for
the fulfilment of our military task to secure and maintain
law and order, and naturally General Christison has authority
to use his forces for that purpose.. . ...It must be remember-
ed however, that the Netherlands Government stood by us
when we were attacked by Japan.... It is therefore quite
clear that the British Government had a definite agreement
providing for the Netherlands East Indies Government to
assume as rapidly as practicable the full responsibility
for the administration of the Netherlands Indies territory...
., We have no intention of being involved in any constitu-
tional dispute between the Netherlands and the people of
the Netherlands East Indies....
...We began, however, to advise that negotiations should
be opened, and I do not propose to go into any controversy
about personalities--of this individual or the other. The
Netherlands Government refused to negotiate with Dr. Sukarno.
On the other hand, our generals met him and had a talk with
him.....The quicker the Indonesians stop fighting and begin
talking with the Dutch Government, aided by us, the better
it will be for the country....
It was felt that the British had a moral and military obliga-
tion which included the establishment of a condition of law and
order "in which discussions between the Dutch and the new Indones-
(93)	Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, p. 398.
(94)	The Times, London, November 24, 1945.47
ian Cabinet could take place without fear or violence." (95) In
other words, any expansion of territorial control of the Allied
forces would eventually be to the benefit of the Dutch as the recog-
nized sovereign in Indonesia.
Sjahrir's reaction to Mountbatten’s spokesman was immediate.
If the British would bring in more troops and use more force the
Indonesians would resist. On the political negotiations he assert-
ed that"as things stand now discussions are fruitless unless a
clear statement is made, approaching our standpoint." (96)
At the Singapore conference of December 6, the Supreme Allied
Commander also informed the Dutch representatives of his decision
to continue a policy of barring entrance into Java and Sumatra of
any additional Netherlands forces. Despite the strongest protests
of the Dutch military commanders, Mountbatten remained adamant on
this point. (97)
The Allied command’s persistent refusal seems to have decisive-
ly influenced the subsequent course of Dutch policy in Indonesia.
Until early December, 1945, the Netherlands Government contemplated
the use of military force against the Republic. However, afterwards
it was realized under the prevailing circumstances such a policy
had to be abandoned. Three factors determined the issue: (98)
1.	The Civil Affairs Agreement, signed between the British
and the Netherlands Governments in London, on August 24,
1945, provided that de facto authority would remain in
British hands so long as they were in Indonesia to carry
out the Allied task. This reduced to nought all factual
authority which the Dutch legally possessed in the
territories under the operational command of Admiral
Mountbatten. The practical consequence was that for
Java and Sumatra the authority rested with the British
until they would evacuate the islands. (99)
2.	Until February, 1946, the Dutch had no merchant fleet
available to transport troops from Holland to the
(95)	New York~~Times, December 9, 1945, statement of a S.E.A.C.
spokesman after the December 6, 1945 Conference in Singapore
between Mountbatten and van Mook.
(96)	Ibid., December 12, 1945.
(97)	Enquete Commissie, p. 623, statement of Admiral Helfrich;
statement of van Mook. p. 626.
(98)	Ibid., pp.	706-707, statement of Schermerhorn.
(99)	This did not take place until November 30, 1946.48
archipelago. (100)
3. The war years had left the Dutch economy completely ex-
hausted.
In Indonesia the British command was strictly limiting its
military operations to activities necessary for the execution of
the Allied tasks. In doing so the British were observing great
caution lest the Allied military movements should provoke another
"battle of Surabaya." Moreover, sharp criticism against the activ-
ities of British-Indian troops in Indonesia was voiced in the Bri-
tish Parliament, to a lesser degree in the United States Congress,
and by political leaders in India. (101)
It appears that there was reason to believe that the implemen-
tation of the Allied tasks would require much time. In terms of
van Mook's appreciation of the situation, this state of affairs
would provide the Republic with ample and valuable opportunity to
organize and consolidate its position. Thus it could fortify its
resistance considerably. Consequently, it could be conjectured
that in the Lieutenant Governor-General's calculation, the future
policy of the Dutch in regard to the Republic should have three
main objectives:
1. Begin negotiations with the Republic as soon as possible
and attempt to achieve an agreement rapidly;
(100)	Under an agreement with the Supreme Allied Command the Dutch
merchant fleet continued to be part of the Allied sea-
transport pool until February, 1946. During this period it
remained under orders of the C.C.O.S. - Enquete Commissie,
p. 706, statement of Schermerhorn.
(101)	In the House of Commons it was the Labour backbencher, Tom
Driberg. - Parliamentary Debates Commons, Vol. 417, pp. 300-
306.	--------------------------
In the United States Congress criticism against the British
policy in Indonesia was voiced by Representative Patterson
of California. - New York Times, December 12, 1945.
In India, Nehru stated:
"We have watched British intervention there (Indonesia and
Indochina) with growing anger, shame and helplessness that
Indian troops should thus be used for doing Britain's dirty
work against our friends who are fighting the same fight
as we." - New York Times, January 1, 1946.
In England, Mr. Harold Laski, chairman of the British Labour
Party Executive, addressing the Sussex Federation of Labour
Parties, stated;
"We must be careful not to become the agents of Dutch Im-
perialism in Indonesia or of that monarchical type of
reaction so dear to Mr. Churchill's heart in Greece." -
New York Times, January 16, 1946.49
2.	continue pressure on the British to lift the ban on land-
ing more Dutch troops in Java and Sumatra;
3.	make every effort to have the British remain in Indonesia
until the Dutch were ready to take over with their own
armed forces. (102)
In the second half of December, 1945, it must have been appar-
ent to Dr. van Mook that the initiative to break the deadlock in
the talks had to come from the Dutch. The statement of policy of
the Netherlands Government, published on November 6, was too equi-
vocal for the Indonesians to make "positive pronouncements." The
British were getting impatient. It had been made clear that the
S.E.A.C. had no intention of keeping British and Indian forces in
Indonesia a moment longer than was necessary for the fulfilment of
the Allied task. (103) Furthermore, by December 21, the A.F.N.E.I.
command, in Djakarta, began to explore the possibilities for the
Republican armed forces, the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat ("People's
Peace Preservation Army"), disarming and evacuating the Japanese
forces which were confined in camps, in isolation, on Republican-
held territory. (104)
It seems that these factors made the Dutch Government aware
of the necessity of formulating a positive program with regard to
the aspirations of the Indonesians for national independence. More-
over, the program would have to be sufficiently attractive for the
Republicans to make it the basis upon which to resume the discuss-
ions .
At this juncture van Mook decided to go to Holland for person-
al consultations with his government. Subsequently, a conference
was held between the British and the Netherlands Governments at
Chequers, the official country residence of the British Prime Minis-
ter, on December 25, 1945. Upon the conclusion of the meeting, a
joint communique was issued, stating inter alia: (105)
(102)	In a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary Inquiry
Committee, Logemann stated that it would take months before
the Dutch could build up their own machinery adequate to
enforce authority in Indonesia. Therefore it was necessary,
on the one hand, to secure whole-hearted British support for
the Dutch position in the Indies with sufficient troops,
while on the other hand a policy of political reforms needed
to be formulated in order to inspire confidence (with the
Indonesian nationalists) but which remained within limitations
to be observed by the Dutch Government. - Enquete Commissie,
p. 704.
(103)	New York Times, December 2, 1945.
(104)	Merdeka, December 22, 1945. Cf., van Mook, op. cit., p. 115.
(105)	van Helsdingen, op. cit., p. 69.50
The respective Governments were agreed that a solution of
the political problem should be considered as an essential
contribution to the successful implementation of the task
entrusted by the Supreme Allied command to Great Britain in
order to liquidate the Japanese occupation of these terri-
tories, and, so far as this is concerned, it is the joint
task of the British and the Netherlands Governments and
of the Indonesian people. The British and Netherlands
Governments are therefore agreed on the course of conduct
to promote that the leaders of the nationalist movement
will come to an agreement with the Netherlands authorities.
A few days before the publication of the Anglo-Dutch communique,
the United States State Department issued a statement urging all
parties in the Indonesian question to resume conversations, which
it seemed had been broken off, at an early date. The parties were
also urged to seek a peaceful solution of the problem in harmony
with the Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. (106)
In Holland, this statement was interpreted as a friendly but
not to be misjudged firm suggestion that the Dutch return to the
conference table, and with acceptable conditions for the Indonesian
nationalists. The British Government also urged a re-orientation
in the Dutch policy. (107) So far, the Netherlands Government had
offered nothing but vague promises.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the Minister of Overseas
Territories, J. H. Logemann, deemed it necessary to sound out the
Second Chamber. In a statement before Parliament on December 21,
he requested special attention for the international aspect of the
Indonesian problem. He submitted: (108)
For those who still hold that it is possible--whether proper
or desirabie--to postpone the contact with the Indonesian
leaders until after law and order have been restored, the
words expressed by Minister Noel-Baker in the British Parl-
iament and the recently published statement of the State
Department in Washington must certainly speak plain language.
The Anglo-Dutch accord reached at Chequers included consent
on the part of the Dutch Government to have a first-class British
diplomat assist the parties in the forthcoming Dutch-Indonesian
talks in Djakarta. This task fell to Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr
(later Lord Inverchapel). From his Ambassador's post in Moscow,
Sir Archibald had recently been transferred to replace Lord Halifax
in Washington. Before taking up his duties in the United States,
(106)	New York Times, December 20, 1945.
(107)	Handelingen, p. 282, from a speech of Mr. J. E. Stokvis, mem-
ber of the S.D.A.P. ("Social Democratic Labor Party") which
shortly afterwards merged into the newly established Partij
van de Arbeid ("Labor Party").
(108)	Ibid., p. 138.51
Clark-Kerr would lend his advice and assistance in the Dutch-
Indonesian negotiations in Djakarta.
When Dr. van Mook was on his way to Indonesia, developments
arose in the Dutch Parliament which compromised his position as
negotiator in the projected Dutch-Indonesian talks. Spearheaded
by a small group of arch-conservatives (members of the Anti Revol-
utionary Party, the Christian Historic Union, and the Liberal
Center) strong attacks had been leveled against the Dutch Govern-
ment for its policy in Indonesia. In particular, van Mook's role
in the implementation of that policy was severely criticized. Fol
lowing a two day debate, Mr. M. J. M. van Poll, member of the
Catholic Party, introduced a motion demanding that a Parliamentary
Inquiry Commission be sent to Indonesia for an on-the-spot inves-
tigation. The supporters of the motion were highly dissatisfied
with the information which the Government was able, or willing,
to submit relative to the situation in the Indies. Therefore, it
was felt necessary to send a parliamentary commission to collect
its own data in Indonesia. This would enable Parliament to form
an "independent" opinion with regard to the developments in the
archipelago. However, the strong implication was that the major-
ity of the Second Chamber desired a parliamentary inquiry into
the handling of the Indonesian problem by Lieutenant Governor-
General van Mook. The van Poll Motion was adopted by a vote of
50 to 29.	(109)
The motion was opposed by Minister of Overseas Territories
Logemann. It was not clear to him what purpose could be served
by sending an inquiry commission to the Indies at that juncture,
However, inasmuch as it did not express criticism of the Govern-
ment's policy the Minister was prepared to abide by the Second
Chamber's decision.
Apparently alarmed by the portent of the van Poll motion, the
Government then deemed it necessary to convene the States-General
in secret session on February 7, 1946. This joint-session of the
First and Second Chambers discussed the proposals which Dr. van
Mook would submit to the Sjahrir Government upon his return in
Djakarta. (110)
On February 10, 1946, the Dutch-Indonesian talks were resumed
At this meeting, attended by Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, van Mook
submitted to Sjahrir the proposals which he had brought with him
from The Hague. The heart of the proposals was the Dutch offer
(109)	Ibid., p7 134.
(110)	A. Stempels, De Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Indo-
nesische Vraagstuk, Amsterdam, N. V\ De Arbeiderspers, Γ950,
pT 31.-------------52
contained in the following provisions: (111)
1.	In consultation with authoritative representatives of
Indonesia, elected from a large variety of groups, a
political structure for the Kingdom and for Indonesia
would be drafted, based on democratic partnership.
2.	This structure would remain in force for a given period
of time during which it was believed that the conditions
could be fulfilled to enable the peoples of Indonesia
freely to decide on their political destiny.
3.	After that period, the partners would independently
decide upon the continuance of their relations on the
basis of a complete and voluntary partnership.
4.	Difference of opinion regarding the question whether
that period should be further extended, before a free
decision could be taken, would be submitted to a pro-
cedure of conciliation or, if necessary, of arbitration.
In an explanatory statement by the Netherlands Indies Government,
issued on February 26, the Dutch estimated the limit of the trans-
itional period to be "within the period of the working capacity of
the coming generation." (112)
The February 10 meeting was concluded on the promise of the
Sjahrir Government that it would study the Dutch proposals and
would submit its views and comments regarding them at the next
session.
Within the Republic, political trouble had been brewing since
the K.N.I.P.'s approval of doing away with the Presidential Cab-
inet. Some members of the ousted government, for reasons of person-
al ambition, were extremely bitter about the matter. They blamed
their political misfortune on Sjahrir. At the instigation of
these former members of the deposed Sukarno Cabinet, the Sjahrir
Government was under constant attack for its willingness to nego-
tiate with the Dutch. The political malcontents allied themselves
(111)	van Mook, op. cit,, p. 117. Cf. New York Times, February 11,
1945. See Appendix B.
(112)	Handelingen, Bijlagen (Appendices) 155-3, from an Explana-
tory Statement on the February 10, 1946 proposals of the
Dutch Government issued by the Netherlands Indies Govern-
ment on February 26, 1946.53
with Tan Malaka and his group. (113) In this combination they
based their agitation against Sjahrir’s policy on demands for a
"monolithic political solidarity during the struggle for freedom,
the abolishment of the recently established political parties,
and an end to all political division." Most effective in terms
of popular appeal was the opposition's demand "to negotiate upon
the basis of 100 per cent recognition, after foreign troops have
left the shores and the seas of Indonesia." Riding the crest of
popular emotions fired by the slogan, "Nothing short of 100% inde-
pendence," Tan Malaka and his associates managed to forge an
alliance of 141 organizations. The political parties, their af-
filiated groups, and armed, or other organizations which joined
the mass movement ranged from far left to the extreme right, as
represented by orthodox Moslems. The alliance was called the
Persatuan Perdjuangan ("United Front':'). (114a)
The majority of the members of the Sjahrir Cabinet were non-
party. One line of attack against the government was the demand
that it be dismissed and replaced by a coalition Cabinet "national"
in character. When criticism directed at his government’s policy
continued unabated, Sjahrir suddenly resigned on February 28. The
alliance which caused Sjahrir’s resignation was charged with the
formation of a new Cabinet, but it was not able to do so. Conse-
quently President Sukarno felt free to reappoint Sjahrir as forma-
teur of the succeeding government. The Second Sjahrir Cabinet
received a five-point mandate. One directive read:
To conduct discussions with the Dutch authorities based
on the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. (114)
The failure of the United Front to form a government, and subsequent
developments, resulted in a considerable strengthening of the
position of Sjahrir and his new cabinet. Fully supported by both
the K.N.I.P. and President Sukarno the Republican Government was
now ready to resume negotiations. (115)
(113)	In the early days of the Republic, Tan Malaka aspired after
the presidency. He tried to recruit Sjahrir to assist him
in reaching his objective. Sjahrir, however, flatly refused
to cooperate since he had ascertained that no Indonesian
nationalist leader could remotely equal Sukarno as the main-
stay for national solidarity thanks to his tremendous pop-
ularity with the masses. Tan Malaka's resentment because of
Sjahrir’s refusal apparently increased when the latter chose
to accept the office of prime minister from President Sukarno.
This information has been obtained from Dr. Soedarsono (per-
sonal letter).
(114a)For details, see: Kahin, op. cit., pp. 172-177.
(114)	Merdeka, March 6, 1946.
(115)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 177. See also; Kabinet Baroe (The New
Cabinet), Merdeka, March 12, 1946.54
The second. Sjahrir Government came into office on March 12,
1946. The next day, it submitted to van Mook a set of counter-
proposals in answer to the Dutch Statement of Policy of February
10.	(116) The Indonesians demanded recognition of the Republic as
vested with sovereign power over the entire former Netherlands East-
Indies. They rejected a transitional period under Dutch sovereign-
ty. As immediate recognition of the Republic's sovereignty was
completely unacceptable to the Dutch Government a deadlock in the
negotiations seemed unavoidable. (117)
By sheer coincidence, shortly afterwards a document was pub-
lished that provided the Dutch and Indonesians with a way out of
their impasse. The agreement concluded between France and Viet
Nam on March 6, 1946, was made public. In Indochina, a difficulty
similar to that which had occurred between the Indonesians and the
Dutch, had been apparently solved between the Vietnamese and the
French by determining that Viet Nam would be a Free State in the
Indochinese Federation.
On this episode in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations the
Minister of Overseas Territories, Logemann, stated before the Nether
lands parliament:
A way out of the threatening deadlock entangling the efforts
to arrive at an amicable settlement of the conflict seemed
to be afforded by the appreciation felt in Indonesian circles
of the way in which a similar problem in Indo-China has
been solved by France and the Viet Nam Republic, into
which the former Annam Empire had been transformed. The
Lieutenant Governor-General subsequently took the initia-
tive of approaching the problem along the same lines,
thereby stressing the point that he had no powers of going
beyond the limits of the declaration of February 10, 1946,
and that the only implication that might be derived from
his cooperation was that he wished, in a combined effort
with the Indonesians, to explore the way to a solution
which would help to avoid the risk of the discussions being
broken off. (118)
The statement seems to imply that the Indonesians were first to
allude to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement as a desirable example to
follow. This has been emphatically denied by former members of the
Republican delegation negotiating with the Dutch at that time. (119)
X116) See Appendix C.
(117)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 125.
(118)	Handelingen, p. 699, trans, Netherlands News Letter, New York
City, No. 4, May 10, 1946.
(119)	Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono (personal letter)
and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal interview).55
In his book, The Birth of Indonesia, on page 122, David Wehl writes
on this matter:
Van Mook had a translation of the Viet-Nam settlement
handed to the Indonesian representatives at the Clark-Kerr
talks, as a suggestion for a possible basis for negotia-
tions, ’stressing the point that he had no powers to go
beyond the limits of the declaration of the 10th of Feb-
ruary, 1946, and that the only implication that could
be drawn from his co-operation was that he wished in a
combined effort with the Indonesians to explore the way
to a solution which would help to avoid the risk of the
discussions under Clark-Kerr being broken off,' (Offic-
ial statement by the Minister for Overseas Territories
at The Hague.)
This approach by the Lieutenant Governor-General was
received by the Indonesians with appreciation and under-
standing, and the result was a draft preliminary agree-
ment of a somewhat more pliable nature than the previous
rigid and uncompromising insistence upon complete inde-
pendence of the Republic of Indonesia. Van Mook greeted
this new approach with pleasure and relief, and exclaimed
that at last there was something upon which both sides
could get together. This was the hopeful moment of light
that led van Mook to believe that the dawn was coming...
Dr. van Mook's own account of the situation reads: (120)
I was then of the opinion that on my part a step had to
be made thereby stressing the point, however, that it must
not be considered a Dutch proposal, but that it was mere-
ly designed to find a way out of the blind alley. With
the Viet Nam agreement as inspiration I formulated four
articles.....
The four articles were;
1.	The Republic, for Java, would be a partner in a fed-
erative Indonesian Free State;
2.	the Republic would agree to the landing of Netherlands
forces for the implementation of the Allied tasks;
3.	the Republic would agree to cease hostilities; and
4.	the Republic would join in the holding of general
consultations with representatives of all parts of
the Netherlands Indies, and of minority groups, to
deliberate on the political structure of the future
Indonesian State and its relations with the Nether-
lands Kingdom.
"(120) van Mook, op. cit., p. 126.56
For Dr. van Mook, reference to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement
was a purely fortuitous matter. The accord happened to be released
for publication at a time that the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations
had bogged down. It provided the Lieutenant Governor-General with
an opportunity to try to get the talks past the bottleneck. He
was impressed by the striking similarities in the circumstances
involved in the Indochinese and Indonesian problems. He therefore,
hoped that he could persuade his government to seek a solution
along the same lines as France had done in Indochina. He believed
that for both the Dutch Government and the Republic to follow a
precedent established in conditions similar to those in Indonesia,
would be more attractive than to accept a novel plan introduced by
either of the parties. Consequently, he took the initiative to
draft his four articles, and submitted them to Sjahrir without
prior consultations with his government. (121)
It seems that the possibility of a complete breakdown in the
negotiations with the Sjahrir Government deeply disturbed the
Lieutenant Governor-General. He was convinced that this government
represented that part of the Republic which genuinely believed in
the desirability and necessity of future cooperation between the
Indonesians and the Dutch without, however, abandoning the Repub-
lican standpoint. (122) Therefore, the best hope for the Dutch
of rapidly coming to terms with the Republic would be through neg-
otiations with the Sjahrir Government. The gravity of a possible
breakdown in the talks between Sjahrir and van Mook was stressed
before the Dutch Ρarliament on January 16, 1946. The Minister of
Overseas Territories emphasized that failure to reach an agreement
with the Sjahrir group would have serious consequences both nation-
ally and internationally. (123)
The Dutch proposals contained in the February 10 Statement of
policy appeared to receive international acclaim. It was contended
that "an almost worldwide recognition of the Dutch offer as a gen-
erous one" had resulted in "the greatest pressure for peace in
Java." (124) If the Dutch had submitted the proposals sooner,
much bloodshed would have been avoided and the British would have
been spared much embarrassment. (125)
Tl21) Information derived from an interview of the writer with
Dr„ van Mook.
(122)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 105.
(123)	Handelingen, p. 294.
(124)	New York Times, editorial, February 17, 1946.
(125)	Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1946.
Manchester Guardian, March 13, 1946. The Dutch proposals
were referred to as "promising."57
The Sjahrir Government noticed that the effect of these pro-
posals was to improve considerably the diplomatic position of the
Dutch in the Indonesian conflict. It seemed that world opinion
began to believe in the "honest" intentions of the Dutch; that in
the eyes of international public opinion, the Dutch were reasonable
after all. If the Indonesians would consider the Netherlands pro-
posals with an open mind, there was a good chance of settling the
controversy amicably. Internationally, a feeling of anticipation
had been created that a turn for the better was imminent in the
Indonesian situation. Confronted with these developments, the
Sjahrir Government thought it advisable not to contradict prevail-
ing world sentiment. If the Indonesians would persist in an un-
compromising attitude, it was believed that the Republic would
cause grave disappointment internationally, particularly in the
United States and Great Britian. At that time, the international
scene showed an increasing rivalry between the Western Democracies
and the Communist countries. Mainly designed as a political move
against Britain, the Soviet bloc had made an unsuccessful attempt
to have the Security Council of the United Nations intervene in
the Indonesian conflict. The elimination of this controversy
involving the Netherlands and Great Britain would be highly desir-
able to the Wes.tern Democracies. It would deprive the Soviet bloc
of the opportunity to try again to make capital out of a colonial
conflict situation in Asia.
After the "generous" offer of the Dutch, it would be risking
the loss of much international sympathy for Indonesia's fight for
independence, if the Republic refused to budge from its initial
stand of demanding immediate recognition. The Indonesians, there-
fore, sought to adjust their policy of negotiation to the require-
ments of the situation. (126) The Sjahrir Government was convinced
that the Dutch would never agree to immediate independence for
Indonesia. Thus, it appeared that a more conciliatory attitude
of the Republic must necessarily involve some retreat from its ori-
ginal demand of forthwith recognition of its sovereignty.
The propitious moment to make the adjustment apparently occurr
ed when Dr. van Mook submitted his 4-point plan. The Republican
Government made counter-proposals on March 27, 1946.	(127) The
Lieutenant Governor-General was rather surprised to find that the
Republican standpoint had undergone a radical change. From out-
(1^6) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono.
(127) See Appendix D.
By the end of 1945 the Sjahrir Government still hoped that
it could, organize the Republic also in territories outside
Java and Sumatra. To that end small parties of Republican
representatives were sent from Java to among others Borneo
and Celebes. Their efforts, however, could not stop the
developments which by March, 1946, resulted in a firm re-
establishment of Dutch authority in Borneo and the Greater
East. (Cf. Enquete Commissie, p. 577) Subsequently, the
Dutch started military operations to regain control in the58
right recognition of its sovereignty the Republic had altered its
demand to recognition of its de facto authority in Java-Madura and
Sumatra with the exception of areas under control of the Allied
Military Administration. By implication the Republican Government
was willing to accept the de jure sovereignty of the Dutch in Indo-
nesia.
The Republican counter-proposals were van Mook’s four articles
as amended by Sjahrir. (128) They contained in essence the follow-
ing :
1.	The Netherlands Government would recognize the Republic
as exercising de facto authority in Java-Madura and Suma-
tra, except in areas under Allied control. The Republic
would cooperate in the formation of an Indonesian federa-
tive Free State, composed of all parts of the Netherlands
East-Indies, as partner of the Netherlands, Surinam and
Curasao in a political union, and in concurrence with the
general principles of the Netherlands Government's State-
ment of Policy of February 10, 1946.
2.	The Republic would welcome in a friendly manner all Allied
and as such Netherlands forces in Java-Madura and Sumatra,
and would assist them in the implementation of the Allied
tasks.
Riouw Islands, Banka-Billiton and Bali-Lombok.
It was apparently in view of this situation that the Sjahrir
Government decided to take a realistic stand and limit its
demand to recognition of de facto Republican authority in Java
and Sumatra. Restricting its claim for recognition to these
islands would appear as a far-reaching concession of the Re-
public which previously had insisted on recognition for all
of Indonesia. Further, although the Republic's de facto re-
cognition would only be for Java and Sumatra, the fact of a
recognition would enhance its international status greatly,
(note: Dr. Soedarsono pointed out that the Republic's de
facto recognition—provided for in the Linggadjati agreement
—was invaluable when the Indonesians appealed to the United
Nations Security Council for intervention in the Indonesian
conflict, after the Dutch tried to impose their will on the
Republic by military force in the second half of 1947.)
Another factor underlying the acceptance of the Sjahrir
Government to have the de facto recognition of Republican
authority limited to Java and Sumatra was the need to allow
the Republic some "breathing spell" to intensify its process
of consolidation in the political, economic and military
fields. It was apparently felt that efforts to that effect
would be more rewarding if confined to the Java-Sumatra area.
(Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter).
(128) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.59
3.	The Republic would agree to cease hostilities immediately
after the agreement became effective.
4.	The Republic would undertake to uphold the rights of
minority groups.
The Sjahrir Government agreed to the main principle involved
in the political reforms projected in the Dutch Statement of Policy
of February 10, to wit, self-determination for Indonesia after an
interim period under Netherlands sovereignty. By the end of March,
a tentative agreement was reached. This accord was to be the basis
upon which the procedure to implement that principle would be nego-
tiated .
On March 31, 1946, the Indonesian Government issued a communi-
que stating: (129)
1.	a further exchange of views revealed that the viewpoints
of the Dutch and Indonesian delegations with respect to
the future status of Indonesia had approached each other
sufficiently to justify Dr. van Mook’s departure for the
Netherlands to consult with his government;
2.	to facilitate the discussions and to find ways for solv-
ing the remaining difficulties, Mr. Soewandi (Minister of
Justice), Dr. Soedarsono (Minister for Internal Affairs)
and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (Secretary of the Council of
Ministers) would also go to Holland.
The developments in the negotiations resulting in the March 27
counter-proposals of the Republic were in the opinion of Dr. van
Mook apparently of such significance that he did not think it ad-
visable to report them immediately to his government in The Hague.
He doubted the adequacy of wireless communications to convey the
unexpected changes in the Republican standpoint in all their ram-
ifications. Misunderstanding between him and his government at
the current stage of negotiations could lead to undesirable conse-
quences, even disruption, in the talks. Therefore, he decided to
wait to submit his report until the viewpoints of the parties had
approached one another to a degree where personal consultations
with The Hague were in order. When that juncture was reached,
on March 31, van Mook suggested to the Sjahrir Government that it
send a Republican delegation to Holland. This delegation would
join the Lieutenant Governor-General in clarifying to the Dutch
Government the point of view of the Republicans. (130)
At the final session of the negotiations in Djakarta Dr. van
(129) Merdeka,April 1, 1946.
(130) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.60
Mook asserted that there were still some "more or less" important
differences to be ironed out between the viewpoints of the Dutch
and the Indonesians. He also reiterated that the final decision
regarding the preliminary agreement rested with The Hague. (131)
Nevertheless, the parties to the Djakarta talks were rather opti-
mistic as to the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. Sir Arch-
ibald Clark-Kerr, the impartial mediator in the discussions, was
of the same sentiment. So presumably, was his government in Lon-
don .
The members of the Indonesian delegation were confident that
their mission in Holland would be successful. In this general
mood of optimism, the scene of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations
shifted from Djakarta to the "Hoge Veluwe." (132)
(131) van Mook, op. cit., p. 129.
(132) As asserted to the writer by Dr. Soedarsono (personal letter)
and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal interview).61
CHAPTER IV
THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS
The talks in the Netherlands were held at the St. Hubertus
Hunting Lodge on the "Hoge Veluwe,” near the City of Arnhem, Pro-
vince of Gelderland. The delegations met on April 14, 21, 22 and
24, 1946.	(1)
On the first day of the meeting the Netherlands was represented
by:
Prime Minister, Professor Ir. W. Schermerhorn, chief
delegate
Minister of Social Affairs W. Drees
Minister of Overseas Territories Professor Dr. J. H.
Logemann
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. J. H. van Royen
Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. H. J. van Mook,
The delegation of the Republic of Indonesia was composed of:
Minister of Justice Soewandi
Minister of Internal Affairs Dr. Soedarsono
Secretary of the Council of Ministers Mr. A. K.
Pringgodigdo
Immediately after opening the conference, Professor
Schermerhorn submitted a draft protocol to the Indonesian delega-
tion. (2) The Dutch chief delegate stated that the proposals
contained in the document had been drawn up as much as possible
U) The first part of this chapter is a survey of matters discussed
at the Hoge Veluwe conference. The writer’s main source on
this subject has been a copy of the Summary Records of the
sessions held at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge on the Hoge
Veluwe, and of the final session convened at The Hague. The
talks were recorded by the Dutch.
A copy of these records is held by the Cornell University
Library.
Where this study refers to issues as they were discussed at
the sessions of the Hoge Veluwe conference, only occasional
reference has been made to the Summary Records. (Where referred
to, they have been indicated as: Suirimary Records Η. V.)
(2) See Appendix E.62
in concurrence with those of the preliminary agreement arrived at
in Djakarta. However, upon examination of the draft protocol the
Indonesians quickly saw that the implication of its terms was such
as to render them unacceptable to the Sjahrir Government. "After
five minutes" of the first session of the Hoge Veluwe Conference,
it was clear to the Republican delegation that its mission was
doomed to failure. (3) The developments anticipated by the Repub-
lican and Dutch delegations in Djakarta did not materialize.
Despite Dutch assertions to the contrary, the Republicans in-
sisted that the proposals contained in the Djakarta preliminary
agreement were not originally submitted by the Indonesians. They
were based on the four articles drawn up by Dr. van Mook and pat-
terned after the Franco-Vietnamese agreement of March 6, 1946.
The Sjahrir Government had amended the van Mook articles, result-
ing in the Republican counter-proposals of March 27, 1946. Subse-
quently, the Indonesian draft was referred to a mixed Indonesian-
Dutch subcommittee. Through deliberations in this committee
agreement was reached on the above proposals. On the strength
of the fact that van Mook and his colleagues considered the
Djakarta draft acceptable, the Indonesian delegation anticipated
that the Dutch Government eventually would approve of it also.
The Dutch negotiators in Djakarta were optimistic regarding the
outcome of the talks in Holland, and this enhanced the Republican
expectation that the Netherlands Government would be willing to
accept the preliminary agreement.
The sequence of developments in Holland, as envisaged by the
negotiating parties in Djakarta, was, first, for van Mook to sub-
mit the preliminary agreement to his government. In case the
Dutch Government should desire further clarification of the Repub-
lican point of view vis-a-vis the proposals contained therein,
the three-man Republican delegation would be called upon to supply
the necessary information. If the proposals were then acceptable
to the Netherlands Government, it was to make an offer to the
Republic along the lines of the Djakarta draft. The acceptance
of this offer by the Republic, perhaps with a few minor negotiated
adjustments, would be immediate. (4)
Therefore, when at the beginning of the Hoge Veluwe Conference
the Netherlands delegation tabled its draft protocol, so far as
the Indonesians were concerned, the outcome of the discussions had
been prejudiced. The terms contained in the document differed from
those of the Djakarta draft to an extent which could not be en-
compassed by the mandate of the Indonesian delegation. The Sjahrir
Government had authorized its delegation to sign an agreement with
the Dutch. However, the mandate was conditioned upon developments
which had been anticipated in Djakarta. With regard to the basic
(3) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(4)	Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, personal
interview. Cf. , Summary Records Η. V. , first session, April 14,
1946.63
principles of the Djakarta proposals, Sjahrir's directive to the
Republican delegation was to stand firm and insist on the maxi-
mum .	( 5 )
Thus, from the very outset, the Hoge Veluwe talks never assum-
ed the character of negotiations aimed at achieving concrete results
All that came to pass between the Indonesian and Dutch delegations
was in the nature of discussions, exchange of views, clarifications
and exploratory talks.
In submitting their draft protocol the Dutch stated that the
most important difference between this document and the Djakarta
preliminary agreement was in their respective forms. The treaty
form of the latter, desired by the Republic, was unacceptable
to the Netherlands Government. If the Dutch were to conclude a
treaty with the Indonesian Government, it would be tantamount to
providing the opposition in the Dutch Parliament with ammunition
which it could readily use against the Government. The treaty form
of an agreement between the Dutch Government and the Republic was
unconstitutional, (6) and as such it would never be accepted by
the States-General. Therefore, the Dutch had drafted their pro-
posals in the form of a protocol.
Insisting that the Djakarta draft was based on Dr. van Mook's
four articles, the Republican delegation asserted that its treaty
form was modeled after the Franco-Vietnamese agreement. The form
of an international agreement was of essential importance to the
Sjahrir Government in that it was considered necessary to make the
status of the Republic, as a party to a settlement with the Nether-
lands, acceptable to the Indonesian people. For the Republicans
to accept the terms of the preliminary agreement a great measure
of persuasion was already necessary. If the treaty form of the
agreement were changed to that of a protocol, it was feared that
it would be impossible to make the accord acceptable to the Indo-
nesians. (7)
The Dutch delegation stated that the bilateral protocol form,
providing for the recognition of the Republic, had been decided
upon in order to make the draft attractive to the Republicans.
(5)	Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(6)	W. A. Engelbrecht, De Nederlandsch-Indische Wetboeken,
Engelbrecht, E. M. L·, ed., Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's Uitg.
Mij N. V., 1932, p. 9.
Article 58 (in 1953 amended to be Article 60) of the Dutch
Constitution states:
"The King shall conclude and ratify all treaties with
foreign Powers." Thus, according to Dutch law an
international instrument of agreement can only be con-
cluded with "foreign Powers."
(7)	Summary Records Η. V., first session, April 14, 1946,
statement of Soewandi.64
For many in Holland this decision already represented a revolution-
ary act since it involved the acceptance, as a party to an agree-
ment, of a government which after the war had been established by
revolutionary methods. The Dutch refused to recognize the validity
of the comparison between the Djakarta draft and the Franco-
Vietnamese agreement, inasmuch as the latter derived from an exist-
ing international agreement between France and the former Annam
Empire, the Republic of Vietnam being the successor of Annam.
In answer to this argument the Republican delegation reiter-
ated that reference to the Indochinese precedent had originated
with Dr. van Mook. Moreover, the Dutch negotiators in Djakarta
had expected that the preliminary agreement resulting from the
Lieutenant Governor-General’s ideas would be acceptable to their
government in The Hague.
A major condition underlying the Republican Government's
acceptance of the preliminary agreement was that the Republic of
Indonesia would be recognized as the de facto authority in Java-
Madura and Sumatra. In the draft protocol such recognition was
limited to the Java-Madura area. The Republican delegation em-
phasized the point that the Sjahrir Government considered its auth-
ority in Sumatra to be the only effective one over the island.
Regarding Sumatra, the Indonesian delegation had received a re-
stricted mandate. If the Sjahrir Government were to make concessions
on this matter, it would not survive the consequences.
Opposing the Indonesian viewpoint, the Dutch delegation main-
tained that the people of Sumatra must decide by democratic
procedure what its status in the new political structure of
Indonesia should be. The Dutch alleged that antagonistic forces
were active on the island. Therefore, the outcome of this contest
should not be prejudiced. Until the people concerned had clearly
indicated to the Dutch Government that they desired to join the
Republic, the Dutch objected to having Sumatra placed under the
jurisdiction of Java. (8)
It was understood by the Republican Government that an arbi-
tration clause was to be added to the terms of the Djakarta draft.
The draft protocol did not contain such a provision. The Indones-
ians considered it necessary to cover cases of conflict in inter-
pretation of the agreement which could not be settled by the
parties themselves. The Republican delegation visualized the
establishment of a permanent commission of arbitration consisting
of one member designated by the Republic, one by the Dutch, and
a third member to be elected by the representatives of the two
parties. Pending the admission of Indonesia to membership in the
(8) Ibid., second session, April 14, 1946, statements of
Schermerhorn and Logemann.65
United Nations Organization, the Sjahrir Government felt that the
Republic could not dispense with an arbitration clause.
In view of the Republican position in this matter, Minister
Drees pointed out that an arbitration clause would inevitably in-
volve international intervention. This was inconsistent with the
intention of the negotiating parties to come to a settlement with-
out the assistance of a third party. Furthermore, it was not
necessary to worry about possible difficulties in interpreting the
terms of an agreement. In case of a settlement, there would be
daily contact between the Republican and Dutch authorities regard-
ing the implementation of any policy stipulated in the accord. If
no cooperation were achieved, the result would be failure to solve
the conflict anyway. In that case, arbitration would be of no
use. (9)
With respect to controversies over interpretation of an agree-
ment, Prime Minister Schermerhorn could envisage the services of
a "contact body." Its activities, however, could never be called
"arbitration.” As the parties in the conflict would be the Govern-
ments of the Republic and of the Netherlands themselves, reference
of such cases to an arbitration commission would not be equal to
the standing of the parties. The deciding agency must be one of
a higher level, e g. the International Court of Justice. Minister
Logemann preferred to resort to a conciliation commission. Dr. van
Mook was of the same opinion.
The Indonesian delegation admitted that in terms of the draft
protocol an arbitration commission would be incongruous. That,
however, was not the case if considered within the framework of
the preliminary agreement. For it served to emphasize the fact
that the status of the Republic as proposed in the draft protocol
was an inferior one, if compared with the Republican position
projected in the Djakarta preliminary agreement.
The Indonesian delegation voiced its objection to the term
"commonwealth" in the draft protocol as the name of the future
political structure which would encompass the entire archipelago.
The Sjahrir Government had proposed to use the term "Indonesian
Federative Free State.” In Djakarta, a mixed Indonesian-Dutch
subcommittee had studied the matter, and subsequently it was
agreed to use the term "free State." Underlying this decision
was the intention to avoid using a term of restricted definition.
"Free State," as suggested by the Sjahrir Government, referred to
a political structure similar to that of the Orange Free State,
or of the Irish Free State,, In using this term the Republicans
sought to stress the element of independence, of the non-colonial
rather than the federative element represented therein. The
Indonesian delegation reminded its counterpart that what the
Indonesian people wanted was independence. Republican sentiment
to that effect would be better served by the name "Free State,"
’[ΤΓ5 Ibid „ , third session, April 14, 1946.66
or, ”free State” than by the term "Commonwealth." (10)
Minister Logemann submitted that the term "Commonwealth" under
scored the federative nature of the political structure envisaged
by the Netherlands Government. "Free State" in the framework of
constitutional law had no specific meaning, as contrasted with
"republic" or "autonomy," connoting "being part of a whole." (11)
Minister Drees observed that it might be preferable simply to use
the name "Indonesian Federation." Surinam and Curasao, for that
matter, had no further qualification either.
If the use of the term "Free State" was of particular import-
ance to the Republicans, Minister Logemann would not oppose it.
The translation of the word in the Indonesian language (Negara
Merdeka) would be acceptable. However, he would object if "Free
STate", were translated to mean "an independent State" (negara
jang merdeka) implying the severance of relations with the Dutch
Realm.
In Article 1 of the draft protocol, where it stated "and in
which Java (included Madura) as part of the Commonwealth, shall
constitute an autonomous republic,” the Indonesian delegation
noted a further difference between this document and the Djakarta
draft. Article 1 of the preliminary agreement stipulated that the
Indonesian Republic would be recognized as exercising de facto
authority in Java-Madura and Sumatra, without qualification of the
word "Republic." Moreover, it was definitely not proposed to re-
strict the Republic to Java-Madura.
Dr. van Mook admitted that in this respect the Indonesians
were right. The phrase referred to had been newly inserted and
it acted to define the future status of Java. Minister Drees
stated that the passage was meant to define and recognize the Re-
public for Java immediately. The Republican delegation then sub-
mitted that in that case its objection was nevertheless justified
inasmuch as the intention was to limit the Republic to Java.
Article 5 of the Djakarta preliminary agreement provided a
regulation, to be agreed upon by the contracting parties, for the
appointment of representatives of territories other than the Re-
public to the Conference of the Realm. The Indonesian delegation
remarked that the draft protocol provided only that the Republic
be informed of such a regulation and of the resulting appointments.
It was feared that if this procedure were applied, the designation
(10)	Ibid., second session, April 14, 1946, statement of
Pringgodigdo.
(11)	Apparently quoted in reference to Article 1 of the Dutch
draft protocol where Java is referred to as an "autonomous
republic." - See Appendix E.67
of the representatives in question would be dominated by the
Dutch local administrative officers.
Minister Logemann held that the territories concerned would
object to having appointment of their representatives regulated by
agreement between the Dutch and the Republic, and not between the
Netherlands Government and the areas themselves. The Dutch were
not demanding the right of say-so in the appointment. They desired
a voice in regulating the procedure of designation. Further, the
matter would be arranged between the Dutch Government and the several
territories. Local administrators would have no decisive position
in the affair. The fact that the Dutch Government would consult
the areas about the matter was sufficient guarantee for satisfac-
tory results. (12)
The Sjahrir Government was of the opinion that the main ob-
jective of the preliminary agreement was to create peaceful con-
ditions in Indonesia as soon as possible. Beyond establishing
the basis upon which this goal could be achieved, the negotiating
parties did not seek to include in their draft, provisions for
regulating relations between the Republic and the Dutch which
did not directly relate to the purported aim of the agreement.
These were to be the subject of subsequent negotiations. Some
provisions of the draft protocol impressed the Republican dele-
gation as going beyond the purpose of the Djakarta draft. They
were aimed at establishing regulatory arrangements for the adminis-
tration of Indonesia before an agreement had been reached on the
procedure of implementing projected political reforms for the
archipelago. The Indonesian delegation could undertake to discuss
such matters, but it was made clear that in doing so it would be
exceeding its mandate.
Prime Minister Schermerhorn declared that the draft protocol
too was meant to provide for difficulties of the moment. It was
preliminary in nature, and it represented the limit the Dutch
Government was authorized to go.
Article 8 of the draft protocol provided for such a regulatory
arrangement. It determined the general administration of the
Indies after the signing of the protocol, pending final agreement
on the implementation of future political reforms and on the de-
finite structure of the Commonwealth. Dr. van Mook asserted that
from the viewpoint of international economics this provision was
most important for Indonesia. In the interim period, the Dutch
Government and the Republic would cooperate in the central admin-
istration of the islands. The Dutch hoped that by this procedure
Republican demands for an adequate share in the Government of the
Netherlands East-Indies would be satisfied. The Council of De-
partment Chiefs (Raad van Departements Hoofden) would be consti-
tuted in cooperation with the Republic. The same proposition was
Π2) Summary Records Η. V., second session, April 14, 1946.68
envisaged for the establishment of a provisional parliament.
The Indonesian delegation submitted that according to Article
8 of the draft protocol the Republican Government in the interim
period would, in fact, be no more than a provincial administration
for Java. As for the general administration mentioned in the
article, Prime Minister Sjahrir discussed the matter with the Re-
publican delegation shortly before it left for Holland. Sjahrir
preferred an amalgamation of the Dutch East-Indies administrative
organization with that of the Republic to the setting up of a
superstructure. It was feared that the latter arrangement would
lead strong nationalist elements to isolate themselves, within the
Republic, from other groups in the Indonesian community. This
would result in the persistence of the antithesis: N.I.C.A. versus
the Republic.
In reviewing the general implications of the draft protocol,
the Indonesian delegation wondered what in actuality had been
achieved by the Indonesian people in its struggle for independence,
if the results were to be measured in terms of the provisions of
that document. The status of the Republic proposed in the draft
protocol was "tragically insignificant." (13) After the promise
made by the Queen of the Netherlands in her speech of December 6,
1942, the creation of an Indonesian Commonwealth had long ceased
to be an innovation in Dutch policy vis-a-vis the archipelago.
Minister Drees observed that the Republic had achieved a
substantial gain in the measure of independence it would receive
in the political structure projected by the draft protocol. If
developments had been different, the Indonesian people, with best
intentions, would never have reached the status attained at that
moment.
Prime Minister Schermerhorn expressed the opinion that the
achievements of the Republic could only be weighed by considering
the alternatives to success or failure in reaching a peaceful
settlement in the Indies. On the positive side, there was the
recognition of the Republican Government for Java-Madura, and pro-
vision of opportunity for other areas of the archipelago to join
the Republic if they wished to do so. Recognition of the Republic
also availed it of opportunities for international economic assist-
ance which Holland could arrange for Indonesia. Further, a settle-
ment rapidly accomplished would prevent international intervention
in the Indies. On the negative side loomed the inevitability, in
the absence of a settlement, of a military conflict with its dis-
astrous consequences of bitterness, rancor, and retrogression in
Indonesian-Dutch relations for perhaps decades to come. The Dutch,
it was said, would take the decision to resort to force with a
heavy heart. However, if it proved impossible to achieve a nego-
(13) As expressed by Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo. - Summary Records H.V.
first session April 14, 1946.	—69
tiated settlement, they would be compelled to use the military.
Another possibility would be international interposition, and as
was known to the Republicans, certain quarters were advocating
this course. (14)
The Indonesian chief delegate, Mr. Soewandi, stated that the
Republican Government was well aware of these alternatives. It
was, therefore, making an all-out effort to contribute to a peace-
ful solution of the conflict. It must be understood, however, that
in doing so the Sjahrir Government was bound by certain restric-
tions. The Republicans felt that in the Djakarta preliminary
agreement they had gone as far as their power permitted. In view
of the restricted mandate of the Indonesian delegation, the Re-
publicans could not go beyond the observations they had submitted
on various aspects of the draft protocol. They had taken note of
the ideas underlying the articles of that document, and also of
the motives which had led the Netherlands Government to substitute
its draft protocol for the Djakarta proposals.
As the last speaker of the day's meeting, Prime Minister
Schermerhorn informed the Republican delegation that he and his
colleagues would like to continue the discussions. The purpose
of further talks was to explore the possibilities for a Dutch
approach to the Indonesian position on the draft protocol. However,
the Dutch Government had to exercise caution in making concessions
lest it spoil the chance to make its policy acceptable to the Dutch
people. The Dutch Prime Minister expressed the opinion that there
was a striking similarity in the situations of the Republican and
Netherlands Governments. If the Netherlands Government were xo
accept proposals agreeable to the Republic but not to the Dutch
Parliament, it would have to resign. The Indonesians then would
likely be confronted with a new Dutch Government which would offer
no prospects for a solution satisfactory to the Republic. On the
other hand, if the Sjahir Government had to resign because it
agreed to Dutch proposals which proved objectionable to the Indo-
nesians, the succeeding Republican Cabinet would probably be unable
to come to a pacific settlement with the Dutch. In both cases
violence and chaos would ensue. (15)
On this note of warning, emphasizing the grave responsibility of
the negotiating governments, the meeting of April 14, 1946, was
concluded. The first day of talks on the Hoge Veluwe was also
to be the last one of a formal character held at this locality.
Subsequent discussions at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge were in-
formal affairs not originally scheduled. The final session of the
conference was convened at The Hague on April 24, 1946.
(14)	Prime Minister Schermerhorn apparently referred to the Soviet
bloc action in the London session of the United Nations
Security Council in February, 1946.
(15)	Summary Records Η. V., third session, April 14, 1946.70
After April 14, Prime Minister Schermerhorn and Minister
Logemann had private conversations with the members of the Republi-
can delegation. The talks resulted in "a better understanding" of
the difficulties experienced by the negotiating governments in
their attempts to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement.
"On many issues concurrence had been reached.” (16) Details about
the conversations were not given.
To facilitate study of the Dutch proposals, the Indonesian
delegation drew up a memorandum containing remarks on the differences
between the Republican proposals of March 13, the counter-proposals
of March 27 (which the Indonesians insisted were the amended van
Mook articles of March 25), and the draft protocol of the Dutch
Government. (17) When the Netherlands delegation was informed of
this memorandum, it requested that the document be submitted for
discussion. The Indonesians acquiesced. Their memorandum became
the point of departure for informal deliberations on April 21 and
22.
Indicative of the informal nature of these meetings were some
of the persons invited to join in the talks. Present were:
1.	Delegation of the Netherlands: Prime Minister Schermerhorn
MinistersLogemann and van
Royen
Dr. P. J. A. Idenburg,
Director of the Cabinet
of the Lieutenant
Governor-General
2.	Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia
3.	Messrs. Setyadjit, Maroeto, Daroesman and Saroso, Indonesians
who had been studying in Holland, and had remained in that
country throughout the war years. (18)
4.	Hamid Alkadrie II, Sultan of Pontianak, West Borneo. When
the Japanese invaded Indonesia, Mr. Alkadrie was an
officer in the Netherlands East-Indies Army. He was
made prisoner-of-war. After the war he succeeded his
father, who had been executed by the Japanese. It has
been said that Mr. Alkadrie "expressed himself in no
uncertain terms about the Republic. He declared that
he would sooner settle in the Netherlands in Europe than
be subjected to the rule of the Republic." (19)
(16)	Ibid., fourth session, April 21, 1946, statement of Schermerhorn
(17)	See Appendix F.
(18)	Mr. Setyadjit Soegondo, as an Indonesian, had been appointed
member of the Provisional Second Chamber. - Handelingen, p. 269.
(19)	Gerbrandy, op. cit., p. 78.71
Captain Tahya, Royal Netherlands Indies Army, of Amboina,
the Moluccas. During the Japanese occupation of the
archipelago, Captain Tahya was with the Dutch Indies
Army contingent in Australia.
Messrs. Alkadrie and Tahya collaborated with the Dutch.
Apparently, they had come to Holland to represent the
people of their respective areas, where the Dutch, backed
by adequate military force, had firmly re-established
their authority.
Referring to the private conversations with the Indonesian
representatives, Prime Minister Schermerhorn stated that he had
been convinced of the extreme importance the Republicans attach-
ed to the status envisaged for the Republic. In his opinion the
matter was one of those significant imponderables and intangible
factors dominant among the Indonesians. Minister Logemann sub-
mitted that in an eventual agreement there would be no objection
to having the existence of the Republic brought sharply into focus
However, this must be conditioned on a provision clearly defining
the place of the Republic within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Considered in the context of their relative definitions, the term
"Free State" (Vrijstaat) could be substituted for "Commonwealth."
But the term "Tree State" (vrije staat) was objectionable inasmuch
as it did not connote the type of political relationship between
the Indies and the Netherlands which the Dutch Government had in
mind.
As for the Sumatra issue, additional arguments supporting the
Dutch point of view that the island should not be placed immediate
ly under the de facto authority of the Republic were offered by
Foreign Minister van Royen. In his opinion, the Republic stood
to lose international prestige if it were to assume responsibility
for territory wherein it would prove unable to exercise its auth-
ority effectively. This might be an obstacle to the admission of
the proposed Free State to membership in the United Nations
Organization.
Considering- that many large groups of Sumatra's population
were unwilling to recognize Republican authority, Prime Minister
Schermerhorn felt it would be irresponsible for the Dutch to agree
to place the area under the jurisdiction of the Republic. There
was no intention on the part of the Netherlands Government to
construe its immediate recognition of the Republic's de facto auth
ority over Java-Madura, as automatically limiting the Republic to
this territory. Eventually, it would be decided by democratic
procedure whether the other territories of Indonesia, including
Sumatra, wanted to join the Republic or not.
During the discussion of the problem, the Sultan of Pontianak
and Captain Tahya, intervened in support of the Dutch viewpoint.
The former asserted that he and other like-minded Indonesians had72
no quarrel with the Republic as to the ultimate aim of its policy.
However, there was quite definitely a difference of opinion with
respect to the procedure of reaching the common goal. The people
of Borneo were afraid that their political destiny would be deter-
mined without their having a say in the matter. They were generally
not pro-Republic. Close ties with the Republic, established through
a political structure which would give the impression of being im-
posed by the Republic, would be unacceptable to them. They would
only agree to an amalgamation with the Republic, "conceived and
developed in freedom."
Captain Tahya submitted a similar point of view for the
Moluccas. He stated that the people of the islands were as yet
unwilling to accept the idea of immediately joining the Republic.
Apparently in reference to alleged discriminatory treatment of
people from Amboina, Timor and the Minahasa within Republican-
controlled territory, he asserted that the people of the Moluccas
doubted the competency of the Republican Government to implement
its announced policy of protection of minority rights. However,
the educated people of the area were convinced that close bonds
with the Republic were desirable. (20)
Prime Minister Schermerhorn interjected the statement that
recognition of the Republic of Java alone already involved the
Dutch Government in a test-of-strength with a bitter opposition.
The Indonesian chief delegate felt he should not fail to stress
emphatically that the Sjahrir Government had committed itself too
firmly to inclusion of Sumatra even to contemplate a concession in
the matter. A change of Republican policy in this respect would be
practically impossible. "Leakage” of the provision in the Djakarta
preliminary agreement limiting the de facto authority of the
Republic to Java-Madura and Sumatra had set in motion an Indonesian
propaganda campaign against the policy of the Sjahrir Govern-
ment. (21)
It seems that the Netherlands delegation realized that so far
as Sumatra was concerned, its inclusion in the Republic was a con-
(20)	For generations the inhabitants of the Moluccas (especially
of Amboina and adjacent islands, and Timor) had provided the
Dutch colonial army with recruits who made loyal Netherlands
Indies army personnel. They were mostly drawn from the less
educated part of the population.
In the Dutch army contingent which entered Djakarta under
the Allied flag many Moluccan soldiers were included. The
bloodiest clashes occurred between these soldiers and the
Republicans. The strong anti-Republican sentiments among
the Moluccan soldiers and their families apparently made
Captain Tahya draw the distinction between the "educated"
people of the Moluccas and the rest of the population of
these islands.
(21)	The government was being accused of having betrayed "the
Minahasa and the Moluccas." Merdeka, April 17 and 20, 1946.73
ditio sine qua non for Sjahrir’s willingness to come to terms with
the Dutch. Subsequently, the Dutch delegates began to make small
excursions beyond their original stand on the Sumatra issue.
Minister Logemann suggested a possible solution by providing that:
1.	The Netherlands Government would recognize the Republic
as exercising de facto authority in Java;
2.	The Netherlands Government would take note of the claim
that the Republic was also exercising de facto authority
in Sumatra; and
3.	As soon as possible, Sumatra and the other territories
of the archipelago would have the opportunity freely
to express whether or not they desired to join the
Republic.
It was asserted that by these means the Republic would not have to
"give up anything.”
However, the Indonesian delegation disagreed, since under
point 3 Sumatra was given the same status as the other territories.
The Republic would not represent the island at the Conference of
the Realm.
Minister Logemann said that in that case he was willing to go
a step further. He would have no objection if in regard to
Sumatra the regulations for appointing the island's representatives
to the Realm Conference were determined by agreement between the
Republic and the Dutch Government. However, similar regulations
for other territories were to be decided by the Dutch in consul-
tation with the areas concerned. In this respect the Republic
would only be informed of the rules agreed upon.
The Indonesians pointed out that the administrative machinery
currently effective in Sumatra was in Republican hands. The
Minister of Defense, Amir Sjarifuddin, and a staff of civil servants
had been dispatched to the island. Their task was to improve the
organization and efficiency of the Sumatra administration. The
question was submitted whether in the solution as suggested by
Minister Logemann it would be possible for the Republican admin-
istration to continue its functions.
The Minister of Overseas Territories stated that under the
existing circumstances there would be no objection to the Repub-
lican Government's continuing to function on the island. It must
be understood, however, that concomitant with the increase of the
Netherlands contingent in the Allied Military forces in Indonesia,
the international responsibility of the Dutch for developments in
the archipelago would also grow. Internationally, the Netherlands
would be responsible for law and order in the Indies. Therefore,
Republican activities must contribute to the restoration of peace-
ful conditions in the archipelago. Otherwise, it would be impossible74
for the Dutch to remain ’’the passive bystander." Concurring with
Prime Minister Schermerhorn in this respect, Professor Logemann
said that if Chinese and United States interests in Sumatra were,
or continued to be, damaged, these powers would blame the Nether-
lands exclusively for it. If the Republic wished to undertake to
restore law and order on the island, the Dutch would have no ob-
jection. However, the time given the Republic to carry out this
task satisfactorily could not be unlimited. If it should take
too long, the Dutch Government would be forced to intervene.
Taking up point III of the Republican memorandum, referred
to as "The Colijn partition," (22) Minister Logemann stated that
there was much misunderstanding in the Republic regarding two
aspects of the Netherlands Government's policy, to wit:
1.	the reason underlying the Dutch Government's decision
to advocate the federative structure for Indonesia, and
2.	the nature of the projected political structure.
The basis for the decision in point 1 was "the stark reality” that
several territories strenuously objected to being incorporated in
the Republic. Motivated by realization of this fact, the Dutch had
chosen the federative system as the future political structure of
the Indies. The choice had no connection whatsoever with the
divide-and-rule policy referred to in the Republican memorandum.
Financially, culturally, and in terms of its capacity to meet the
administrative requirements involved, the Netherlands East-Indies
could not afford the intensive decentralization program advocated
by the late Dr. Colijn. Minister Logemann personally had always
opposed it. He wished to emphasize that the principles of democ-
racy, good faith and the prevailing circumstances had impelled
the Netherlands Government to advocate the federative system. This
had been decided upon even though a unitary political structure
appeared to him and his colleagues the most attractive one for
Indonesia in the future. To advocate the federative structure in
the prevailing situation would provide the centrifugal forces
discernible within the community of Indonesian peoples with room
for relaxation. If such forces were to be curbed rigidly by the
imposition of a unitary Indonesian State, their reaction would be
to assert themselves to the fullest extent.
As to the nature of the political structure which the Dutch
proposed for the Indies, Minister Logemann denied that it still
contained elements of colonialism. He dismissed such allegations
by referring to the Netherlands Statement of Policy of February
10, 1946. Therein it was clearly stated that in the future Govern-
ment of Indonesia the Indonesians would have a "preponderant"
position.
Prime Minister Schermerhorn observed that in the private dis-
cussions, the Republicans made remarks to the effect that free
(22) See Appendix F.75
expression of the Indonesian people's will would be possible only
after all N.I.C.A. officers and Dutch forces had evacuated the
archipelago. He considered this distrust of the honest intentions
of the Dutch Government wholly unfounded. It must be understood
that the Netherlands could not shirk its responsibility for the
future development of Indonesia. Neither should the Republic
monopolize that responsibility. The duty to guide the destiny
of the islands must be a common task, shared by both the Dutch and
the Indonesians.
From Minister Logemann's statement the Indonesian delegation
inferred that the federative structure proposed for Indonesia was
not an essential condition in the Netherlands proposals. Neither
did it constitute a final objective in the political reforms pro-
jected by the Dutch. It was rather a means to attain a future
goal, i.e. an intermediate phase in the evolution of the archi-
pelago toward complete independence. For that matter, if at the
Conference of the Realm all of Indonesia expressed the desire to
be united in the Republic, the Dutch would not oppose it. (23)
The Netherlands delegation affirmed these conclusions of the
Indonesians and submitted that the form of a federation had been
proposed in order to prevent the possibility of coercive inclusion
of other territories in the Republic. Viewed in this context, the
federative structure referred to in the Netherlands proposals must
be considered a matter of principle, namely, a guarantee against
Republican encroachments in areas which did not wish to join the
Republic.
At the closing session on April 24 at The Hague, Prime Minis-
ter Schermerhorn, reviewing the talks, stated that so far as the
human aspects of the meetings were concerned he was of the opinion
that positive results had been achieved. A greater mutual under-
standing had been created between the negotiating parties. In
terms of concrete achievements, however, not much had been accomp-
lished. The preliminary agreement had been too readily accepted
as conclusive by the negotiating parties in Djakarta. Neither
was the Dutch draft protocol intended to commit the parties to
definite proposals. Its purpose was to provide guidance in the
discussions, which were aimed at finding a way out of the impasse
in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. Professor Schermerhorn
further stressed that the draft protocol must not be considered
a proposal of the Netherlands Government. It had not been sub-
mitted to the Council of Ministers for prior consideration and
approval. It contained several points of disagreement between
him and his colleagues. His government was in no position to
submit definite proposals. It had no mandate to do so. As soon
as possible the government would consult the States General on the
matter, and the Prime Minister hoped that his government then
would be able to formulate such proposals as were contained in the
(23) Summary Records Η. V., fourth session, April 21, 1946,
statement of Soewandi.76
draft protocol.
The Indonesian delegation submitted that the discussions had
provided it with significant information. They had revealed the
various factors which influenced the Dutch Government in its efforts
to find a solution to the Indonesian conflict. It was observed
that upon leaving for the Netherlands the Republicans had expected
too much. (24)
By comparing the Republican proposals of March 13 and the
counter-proposals of March 27, it can be seen that the achievement
of the preliminary agreement was made possible after the Sjahrir
Government had taken a long step forward to meet the Dutch view-
point in the Indonesian controversy. During the Djakarta talks
leading up to the decision to transfer the scene of negotiations
to Holland, the Indonesians had found reason to believe that the
Netherlands Government would be prepared to balance the substantial
Republican concessions by accepting the preliminary agreement. How-
ever, the developments on the Hoge Veluwe proved the case to be
otherwise. ·
At the conclusion of the Hoge Veluwe talks, the press reported
that they had ended in failure. It would be equally valid to state
that so far as the Indonesians were concerned the conference had
commenced with a failure. Republican expectations as to the out-
come of the discussions had been built on a faulty premise. Des-
pite van Mook's assertion that his four articles must not be
construed as representative of the view of his government, and
should be considered merely as an instrument to avoid an impending
deadlock, the Republican negotiators nevertheless believed that
the ideas of the Lieutenant Governor-General were yet within the
scope of the mandate he had received from his government. There-
fore, it was felt that the preliminary agreement, perhaps with a
few minor adjustments, would be acceptable to the Dutch Govern-
ment. (25) Moreover, the Netherlands negotiators themselves were
apparently quite confident that the Djakarta proposals would be
agreeable to their government. (26) The Republican delegation's
optimism as to the successful outcome of its mission was further
buttressed by information received from quarters close to Dr. van
Mook. Mr. Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, a highranking Indonesian
N.I.C.A. official and close associate of the Lieutenant Governor-
General, intimated to the Republican delegation that the develop-
ments in the Holland talks anticipated by the negotiating parties
(24)	Ibid., final session, April 24, 1946, statements of Soewandi
andSoedarsono.
(25)	Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, personal
interview.
(26)	On March 31, 1946, in a press interview, Dr. van Mook stated
that an agreement could possibly be achieved within a week
after he and the Indonesian Delegation had arrived in The
Hague. - Merdeka, April 1, 1946.77
in Djakarta, were practically certain. (27)
But the Indonesian delegation was keenly disappointed when
the Dutch submitted their draft protocol. The document, Prime
Minister Schermerhorn stated, was to be no more than the subject
for discussions with the Republicans.
Subsequently, the Netherlands ministers explained the position
they had taken with regard to the Hoge Veluwe Conference. Their
rejection of the preliminary agreement had not been for lack of
cooperation. They had attempted to make the Djakarta proposals
acceptable to the Netherlands people (in other words to the Dutch
Parliament). In this effort they had deemed it of the highest
importance to render the terms of the preliminary agreement in
harmony with Dutch constitutional procedure. Especially the mat-
ter of procedure had had first priority as a factor to be reckoned
with in making the adjustments. (28) The slightest deviation from
constitutional processes would have the Netherlands parliament,
acutely sensitive in this respect, up in arms immediately. In
fact, the sharpest criticism from the Second Chamber against the
Indonesia policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government had been in
view of its procedural aspect. (29)
The Netherlands delegation further seized upon the character
of the parliamentary opposition to explain Dr. van Mook’s error
in appraising the Djakarta agreement as likely to be acceptable
to the Dutch Government. It was claimed that the Dutch negotiators
in Indonesia had misjudged the depth of the feelings which the
people in Holland attached to conformance with their Constitution.
Clark-Kerr made the same mistake when he remarked that the Djakarta
proposals were not unreasonable. (30)
It appears that in weighing the pros and cons of accepting
the preliminary agreement the Netherlands ministers had been
mainly, if not exclusively, preoccupied with the problem of how
to reconcile its terms with the narrow, formalistic and legalistic
stand prevalent in the Dutch parliament with respect to handling
(27)	Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(28)	Summary Records Η, V., fourth session, April 21, 1946, and
final session, April 24, 1946, statements of Schermerhorn.
(29)	See Dutch parliamentary debates pertaining to the period under
discussion e.g. Handelingen, p. 143 and pp. 259-263, state-
ment of Meijerink (Anti Revolutionary Party). Ibid., pp. 256-
257, statement of van Poll (Catholic Party). ibid., pp. 266-
269, statement of van Kempen (Liberal), et passim.
(30)	Andrew Roth, "Holland’s Last Chance," The Nation, Vol. 163
(August 10, 1946), pp. 153-155.
"Lord Inverchapel...made it clear he felt 'the proposed
solution was a good one'."78
the Indonesia question. (31)
The Dutch chief negotiator in Indonesia, Dr. van Mook, on the
other hand, had evaluated the acceptability of the preliminary
agreement in terms quite different from those of his superiors in
The Hague. He preferred to consider the document as representing
the maximum in concessions which the Sjahrir Government could make
acceptable to the Indonesian Parliament. By setting aside the
various important legal and practical objections which the Dutch
might have against the preliminary agreement, they could fundamen-
tally change their diplomatic position, with respect to Indonesia
as well as to the rest of the world, by accepting the Djakarta pro-
posals. Thereby, the Dutch Government could also benefit from the
fact that it would have contributed to the success of Clark-Kerr’s
mission. This was important in view of the British attitude toward
the Dutch Government and its subsequent policies in the Indies. Of
greater significance, however, would be the enhancement of the
Dutch diplomatic position. If the Netherlands Government were to
accept the Djakarta agreement, a future breakdown in the Dutch-
Indonesian negotiations would then be considered against the back-
ground of an accord based on proposals of Republican origin. (32)
In Dr. van Mook's opinion, Dutch policy in Indonesia should
have been aimed at achieving an agreement between his government
and the Republic as soon as possible. He hoped that this object-
ive could be reached at the Hoge Veluwe. Subsequently, prepara-
tion to convoke the Conference of the Realm could be made. The
sooner this conference could start, the better. These develop-
•aents were uppermost in his mind when negotiations in Djakarta
had reached a stage where it was necessary for him to consult with
bis government in Holland. Van Mook felt that the Dutch Govern-
ment should be prepared to make a concession and agree to the
treaty form for the preliminary agreement as insisted upon by the
Republic. Accordingly, he thought that the Sumatra issue could
be worked out easily between the negotiating parties. (33)
The reason van Mook attached so much importance to a speedy
settlement in the Indonesian conflict appears to have been his
fear that a delayed solution would provide the Republic with time
further to organize and strengthen its administrative and military
apparatus. This would result in a more radical attitude on the
(31)	Over 60% of the Second Chamber. (The K.V.P., A.R.P., C.H.U.
and the Liberal Center.)
(32)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 130.
The Republican delegation at the Hoge Veluwe Conference
emphatically denied that the preliminary agreement was of
Indonesian origin. The Indonesians insisted that it was
based on the four articles of Dr. van Mook.
(33)	Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.79
part of the Republicans in their negotiating position.
By the end of 1945, most of the Government Offices of the
Republic had been moved from Djakarta to Jogjakarta in Central
Java. Early in January, 1946, this shift of the Republican poli-
tical center, deeper into Indonesian-held territory, was finalized
by the transfer of the residence of both President Sukarno and
Vice-President Hatta to Jogjakarta. (34) Dr. van Mook considered
the departure of the two top Republican leaders a deplorable event,
for it separated the Republican Government: Sukarno-Hatta and the
legislature (K.N.I.P.) in Central Java, and Prime Minister Sjahrir
in Djakarta. The Lieutenant Governor-General feared that this
situation would give rise to complications in the negotiating po-
licy of the Indonesians. (35) However, with respect to the nego-
(34) Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Deputy Minister of Information, stated
that this step had been taken because;
1.	in Djakarta the safety of the Republican leaders was in
jeopardy, and
2.	their presence in Jogjakarta would help to improve the
internal organization of the Republic. Merdeka,
January 5, 1945.	“
By that time indiscriminate acts of violence by Dutch
troops in Djakarta against Republicans in general and their
leaders in particular were increasing. On December 26, Prime
Minister Sjahrir's car, while he was on his way home from his
office, was stopped by a group of Eurasian and Surinam soldiers
of the Dutch army. Mr. Sjahrir was ordered out of his car.
After a brief exchange of words with his detainers, he escap-
ed death miraculously when the gun with which one of the sold-
iers suddenly tried to shoot him misfired. The timely arrival
of a British military patrol saved Mr. Sjahrir's life. -
Merdeka, December 27, 1945.
Dr. Soedarsono asserted that engineering the move—the
Republican leaders left Djakarta under great secrecy—to spare
Sukarno and Hatta from possible harm or capture by either the
British on the instigation of the Dutch, or by the Dutch them-
selves, was a major success of the Sjahrir Government, (person-
al letter). Deep within Republican territory Sukarno and Hatta
were safe to carry on as the "living symbols" of the Indonesian
Revolution.
Since the Sjahrir Government had assumed responsibility for
the negotiations, President Sukarno on a few occasions public-
ly and emphatically expressed complete confidence in his gc>v-
ernment's policy, (e.g. Merdeka, February 13 and 18, 1946,
press interviews in Jogjakarta). The stand taken by the Pres-
ident was apparently a very important factor in the general
expression of support by the people of the Republic for the
diplomatic policy of Sjahrir and his cabinet. There seemed
to exist a pattern of close cooperation between Sukarno in
Jogjakarta and Sjahrir in Djakarta. While the latter negotia-
ed with the Dutch, the former, by coming out squarely in favor
of his government’s policy, rallied the home front behind it.80
tiations resulting in the Hoge Veluwe Conference and the unexpected
developments in the talks in Holland, it appears that the situation
was exactly the reverse. It was not a lack of concurrence in the
Republican camp, but rather between the Netherlands Government at
The Hague and the Netherlands Indies Government in Djakarta which
caused unforeseen complications in the progress of the negotiations„
The center of gravity in the Indonesia policy of the Netherlands
Government was determined by Dutch parliamentary opinion. The
Indies Government's, i.e., van Mook's, policy, on the other hand,
was mainly influenced by the immediacy and sequence of changing
situations in the archipelago which the people in Holland could
only occasionally comprehend, if at all. (36) Because of this
polarity in the Dutch camp, it was possible for van Mook and his
colleagues in Djakarta to feel optimistic about the outcome of
the negotiations in Holland, while it subsequently developed that
so far as the Dutch Government was concerned, there was little
reason for such optimism.
It has been said that the Hoge Veluwe Conference could have
been of decisive influence on further developments in the Indones-
ian problem. However, all expectations regarding its outcome did
not materialize. This negative result has been blamed on the
attitude of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government. It was too cautious
and lacked the courage to assert its leadership in determining
Dutch policy vis-a-vis Indonesia. In this respect it did not
govern; it merely obeyed public opinion instead of guiding it. (37)
*rhis was another advantage of having Sukarno and Hatta move
to Jogjakarta.
The Republican legislature, too, fully supported the policy
of the Sjahrir Cabinet. - See: Communiques Nos. 20 and 23 of
the Working Committee, Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, II, No. 4
(January 1-15, 1946) and II, No. 8 (March 1, 1946),
(35) van Mook, op. cit., p. 106.				
(36)	Ibid., p.	107.		
(37)	Sal Tas,	"Hangende de	Overeenstemming," De Brug -	- Dj embata n,
(Amsterdam) I, No. 2, (Mei 1946) 7-8.
Sal Tas joined the left wing socialist, J. de Kadt, in pub-
lishing the monthly, De Nieuwe Kern ("The New Core"), for
"socialist intellectuals" which existed from 1936 to 1940.
After World War II, Tas was one of those socialists who con-
sidered the Nederlandse Volksbeweging (N.V.B.) as a transi-
tional phase toward the establishment of a new political
party, i.e. the Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party). - H.M.
Ruitenbeek, Het ontstaan van de Partij van de Arbeid, Amsterdam,
N.V. De Arbeiderspers, 1955, p. 34 (footnote) and p. 196.
Dr. van Mook expressed a similar opinion to this writer.
It was perhaps this cardinal point where there was a sig-
nificant difference between the Dutch and the Republican
Governments' procedures to reach common ground in the nego-
tiations. The Schermerhorn Cabinet was unable or unwilling81
The attitude of the Dutch Government has been attributed to the
character of this administration.
Shortly after the total liberation of Holland in June, 1945,
the Queen set a new precedent by consulting with prominent leaders
of the former resistance movement on the formation of an interim
Cabinet. She did not summon the political leaders who were her
advisers on such matters in pre-war days. The Queen’s talks result-
ed in the appointment of Mr. W. Drees and Professor Ir. W.
Schermerhorn. The purpose in designating two fbrmateurs was to
have the first represent the political parties as organized before
the war; the second was appointed as chief proponent of a trend
in Dutch politics which began just before World War II. During
the German occupation this movement grew strong in the underground.
It had emerged as the most powerful group in the resistance and was
organized in the "Netherlands People's Movement" (Nederlandse
Volksbeweging—N.V.B.). The appointees succeeded in forming a
Cabinet, "hailed as leftist, broadly based, and co-opted largely
from the underground." (38)
The States General was still suspended. Consequently, nor-
mal political activities, prohibited shortly after the Germans
occupied the country, had not yet resumed. Thus, the Schermerhorn-
Drees Cabinet was truly an extra-parliamentary affair. According
to Dutch constitutional law, it was a Royal Cabinet. When this
provisional government was formed, no one in Holland could possi-
bly foresee that within two months the war in the Pacific would
be over. The Queen's mandate to the first post-war Cabinet was
specifically for "rehabilitation and reconstruction" (herstel en
vernieuwing) of war-ravaged Holland. (39)
An important aspect of the government's task was to restore
normal parliamentary processes. The restoration of the national
legislature involved the setting up of a Parliamentary Purging
Committee. This committee investigated collaborationist charges
against members of the States General who had been elected in
the last general elections before the war, in 1937. Subsequently
to assume The task of guiding Dutch public opinion to suit a
policy which would be acceptable to the Indonesian Government.
Sjahrir and his colleagues, on the other hand, were prepared
to make substantial concessions to approach the Dutch viewpoint,
despite the fact that they knew quite well it would involve
a severe test of their political strength to make such con-
cessions acceptable to the Republicans. - Information obtained
from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(38)	Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Government and Politics in the Nether-
lands during Reconstruction," Change and Crisis in European
Government, James Kerr Pollock, ed. , New York, Rinehart &,
Company, Inc., 1947, p. 125.
(39)	G.J. Lammers, De Kroon en de Kabinetsformatie, IJmuiden,
Vermande Zonen~ 1952, p. 124.	—82
an approved list was issued, and, on September 25, 1945, the purged
Second Chamber was convened. About a month later, the First Chamber
resumed its activities.	(40)
This parliament (Twede Kamer, Tijdelijke Staten Generaal) was„
an emergency legislature. Its membership had been determined by
Royal Decree of August 2, 1945 (Staatsblad No. F 131). Its task
was limited to consideration and approval of a draft law concern-
ing Regulations for the Provisional States General (Voorlopige
Staten Generaal). This law was to establish an interim legislature.
Its members were the members of parliament elected in 1937. The
seats vacated by death or purging were filled through appointment
by Royal Decree. (41) The Provisional States General was meant
to be a legislature which could function with the least possible
deviation from normal constitutional procedure. It was provisional
in nature because, pending general elections, its parliamentary
powers were not completely restored. Underlying its establishment
was a national emergency. The Netherlands was in a political maze.
The mandate of the members of the Second Chamber elected in 1937
had expired in 1941. To hold general elections in the confused
situation immediately following the liberation of the country was
not possible. By setting up the Provisional States General the
Dutch Government attempted to provide for the emergency. (42)
The return of pre-war representatives to the national legisla-
ture restored the political pattern in the States General which
existed before the German invasion. (43) The distinction between
sectarian parties making up„th.e Right Wing and non-sectarian par-
ties forming the Left Wing, peculiar to Dutch domestic politics
since the second half of the 19th Century, was re-established. (44)
After decades of Cabinets dominated by Christian coalitions
^mainly the Anti-Revolutionary Party or A.R.P.} the Catholics
and the Christian Historical Union or C.H.U., from 1888 to 1939),
a milestone had been reached in Dutch parliamentary history in
1939	The first so-called "democratic coalition" was formed.		
rw	Eldersveld, op. cit.,	p. 129.,	
(41)	Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, pp. 13-14.		
	Provisional States	General:	elected	appointed
		(in 1937)	(post-war)
	Second Chamber	:	75	25
	First Chamber:	34	16
(42)	Ibid., p. 21.		
(43)	With the exception of	the Dutch fascist party.	(Nationaal
	Socialistische Bond).	See Appendix G.	
(44)	Lammers, op. cit., pp	. 72-101. To this day the	seats in both
Chambers of theStates General are still arranged in accord-
ance with this division.83
Under a C.H.U. Prime Minister a Cabinet was constituted of Catho-
lics, C.H.U., Liberal Democrats (Vrijzinnig Democraten), and Social
Democrats (Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij—S.D. A.P.). Con-
sequently, the A.R.P. went into opposition after a long period of
participation in the government. (45)
The "Cabinet for reconstruction" of Messrs. Schermerhorn and
Drees was presented as a national one. In the emergency legisla-
ture it soon appeared that the parties on the far Right had differ-
ent ideas about the matter. Mr. Drees was a prominent member of
the S.D.A.P., and the government was made up of persons "hailed as
leftist...." Therefore, the conservatives in general considered
the Cabinet as representative of the social democrats and leftist
political reformers. (46)
The first to criticize and oppose the government's policy was
the A.R.P. The occasion was also taken advantage of to introduce
the Indonesian problem in the parliamentary debates. The question
at issue was the procedure proposed by the Cabinet to restore nor-
mal parliamentary processes. At the second session of the post-
war legislature, on October 9, 1945, an A.R.P. spokesman made an
interpellation on the situation in Indonesia. He knew that in
doing so he was out of order, inasmuch as the sitting legislature
was not empowered to go bdyond discussing the item of Regulations
for the Provisional States General. He apparently wanted to in-
dicate the inadequacy of the government's policy. His action ex-
posed the fact that the Indonesian situation, a question so vital
to the nation, could not be discussed by what purported to be the
Netherlands Parliament. (47) The Chairman of the Second Chamber
declared the interpellation out of order. However, it resulted
in a chain reaction of references to developments in the archi-
pelago in the following speeches by representatives of other
parties. Under the prevailing circumstances the government could
legally ignore the wish of parliament for discussions of the
Indonesian question. But it apparently deemed it advisable to
make an immediate concession in this respect. Prime Minister
Schermerhorn promised that the government would seek a procedure
by Royal Decree permitting other issues to be submitted to the
emergency legislature for consideration. He would do so because
recent events had increased the need for consultations between
government and parliament, especially in view of developments
in Indonesia. (48)
(45)	Ibid., pp? 72-120.
(46)	Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 119, W. C. Wendelaar for
the Liberals; p. 308, Jan Schouten for the A.R.P.; p. 741,
H. W. Tilanus for the C.H.U.
(47)	Ibid., p. 13, J. A. de Wilde of the A.R.P.; Stempels, op. cit.
p~T.	-------
(48)	Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 57.84
In subsequent debates on Indonesia, the policy of the govern-
ment received the support of the S.D.A.P., the Liberal Democrats
and the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.). On February 9, 1946, these
parties merged with the Netherlands People's Movement, and dissi-
dent Catholic and Protestant groups, to form the Labor Party
(Partij van de Arbeid).	(49) The government could also count on
the Communist Party's (C.P.N.) support. So far as its policy on
Indonesia was concerned, the number of votes on which the Cabinet
could depend was approximately 35. In its search for a solution
of the Indonesian problem the Schermerhorn-Drees Government was
handicapped by the lack of a parliamentary majority.
Strong and consistent opposition to the government's policy
came from the A.R.P., the C.H.U. and the Liberal Center (Liberalen).
However, their combined strength, of about 29 votes, was not suff-
icient to challenge the position of the Cabinet.
The key position was occupied by the Catholics (Katholieke
Volkspartij—K.V.P.). Since 1918, they had been the strongest
party in parliament. (50) The last pre-war elections in 1937 show-
ed the Catholics still in their leading position. They received
31 seats in the Second Chamber. The significance of the Catholics'
position was demonstrated when the Van Poll Motion was adopted.
It was passed by a vote of 50 against 29 on January 17, 1946. On
this occasion the Catholics received the support of the A.R.P.,
the C.H.U. and the Liberal Center. Mr. M.J.M. van Poll, then the
leading spokesman of the K.V.P. and sponsor of the motion, asserted
that it must not be construed as an expression of no confidence in
the government's policy. Nevertheless, it obviously implied that
the K.V.P. was not completely satisfied with the Indonesia policy
of the Cabinet. Moreover, the motion was introduced despite the
fact that two prominent Catholics, Messrs. H. J. M. Beel and
H. A. M. F. Kolfschoten were holding Cabinet ranks in the government
the former as Minister of Home Affairs, the latter as Minister of
Justice. Mr. van Poll's action apparently served to emphasize the
independent position of the K.V.P. It has been said that in this
period the Catholics persisted in a noncommittal attitude. (51)
During the tenure of office of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet,
the K.V.P.'s position was further complicated by the extra-
parliamentary activity of Professor C. P. M„ Romme, a leading
member of the party. The importance of his influence in the K.V.P.,
already at that time, is evidenced by the fact that after the
general elections of May, 1946, Mr. Romme became the leader of
his party in parliament. As the political editor of the K.V.P.
(49)	Ruitenbeek, op. cit., pp. 274-275; Stempels, op. cit., p. 29.
(50)	Lammers, op. cit., p. 85. Before World War II the Catholic
party was called the (Roman) Catholic State Party (Rooms—
Katholieke Staatspartij).
(51)	Stempels, op. cit., p. 11.85
daily, De Volkskrant, he published editorials which were violent-
ly opposed to the Indonesia policy of the interim Cabinet. In
October 1945, he referred to the government's policy as "the cul-
mination of national betrayal" (rijksverraad in optima forma).	(52)
When the Hoge Veluwe Conference was in session, Professor Romme
expressed his views on the discussions in an article entitled:
"The Week of Humiliation" (De Week der Schande).	(53)
There is reason to believe that the Cabinet's decision to
reject the Djakarta preliminary agreement was partly influenced
by party politics. Because of its mandate for reconstruction
and rehabilitation, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was called
a national government. By the choice of its formateurs, the Cabi-
net's main political trend was socialist. However, it also in-
cluded two Catholics and a Protestant (Mr. J. Meynen, Minister of
War). (54)
In the parliamentary debates, it was soon apparent that the
policy of the Cabinet was considered to be that of the socialists.
By the time of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, the policies of the
Schermerhorn-Drees Government were identified with those of the
newly founded Labor Party. Therefore, in deciding its attitude
regarding the Djakarta proposals, an important consideration must
have been to what extent acceptance of the preliminary agreement
would influence the position of that party. An appraisal of the
matter is complicated by the fact that by the time of the Hoge
Veluwe talks the Labor Party was only two months old. It was
established on February 9, 1946. This event was hailed as a uni-
que and major event in the history of Dutch domestic politics. It
was the embodiment of the so-called "breakthrough" (doorbraak)
idea. (55) It was the realization of the desire for cooperation
on a single and broad political basis of persons divergent in
J52) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 101, statement of
Roestarn Effendi, an Indonesian, member of the Dutch Com-
munist Party (Communistische Partij Nederland).
(53)	Referred to by van Mook, op. cit., p. 123; de Kadt, op. cit.,
P 128.	-------
(54)	In the general elections of May 17, 1946, of the 16-man
Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet, 8 were elected on the Labor Party's
electoral list. Among them were Messrs. Schermerhorn, Drees
and Logemann. - Netherlands News Letter, New York City, No. 5,
June 1, 1946.
(55)	A comprehensive and detailed study of this matter can be
found in a monograph on the foundation of the Labor Party
(Partij van de Arbeid) by H.M. Ruitenbeek, op. cit.
This monograph was presented to the Faculty of Law,
Leiden University as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, on June 29, 1955.86
their philosophic outlook, but united in their political ideals.
For the last 50 years the system of Dutch political party form
ation had been dominated by the doctrine of the antithesis:
Christian sectarian versus non-sectarian. In this context, Profess
or P. S. Gerbrandy, member of the Calvinist Anti Revolutionary
Party, has asserted that: (56)
religion and party go hand in hand. The two are inseper-
able... Individuals support the Catholic or Protestant
Parties for the simple reason that they have been nurtured
in the Catholic or Protestant faiths. Socialists support
the Party of Labour as members of industrial organizations.
Liberals are Liberals because they are not dogmatic.
In those 50 years, several non-sectarian parties were estab-
lished. However, they did not claim thereby to initiate a reform
in the existing political party system. Instead, they accepted
it. If they had been willing to try to change the system, they
probably would have lacked the power to overcome the opposition
of the religious parties. When gradually it became clear that the
principle of Christian antithesis caused a stultification of
Dutch political life, the need to reform the party system was felt.
Before World War II, the idea of such a change was already gain-
ing ground within some sectarian parties. Among the Protestant
Christian groups, the Dialectical Theology of the Swiss theologian,
Karl Barth, paved the way for the reform idea to win adherents.
"No longer did Karl Barth's followers see the Christian Party as
a necessary consequence of a positive Christian faith." In these
groups, e.g. the C.H.U., recruits for the "breakthrough" movement
were found primarily among the younger elements. (57)
During the occupation, the underground organizations intense-
ly debated the question of post-war Dutch politics. It appeared
that a good part of the resistance movement was in favor of the
radical reform of the party system. A progressive national move-
ment was envisaged uniting people of different philosophies who
held the same political ideas. The strongest group to represent
this view was the Netherlands People's Movement (N.V.B. - Neder-
landse Volksbeweging). Influenced by French Personalism, its post-
war objective was the setting up of a national party based on
personalistic socialism. As to the question whether after the war
a Catholic party was necessary, a split developed in the Catholic
resistance groups. One section advocated a progressive reform of
the pre-war Catholic party. The other adhered to the principle
that political parties should be non-sectarian. (58)
(56)	Gerbrandy, op. cit., p. 81.
(57)	Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 274.
(58)	Ibid., p. 275.87
When immediately after the partial liberation of the Nether-
lands in May, 1945, the Nederlandse Volksbeweging presented itself
as the proponent of the reform idea, of a renovation in Dutch poli-
tical thinking, it received widespread and enthusiastic popular
support. However, the movement did not retain this backing. Par-
tially because it lacked efficient organization, and also because
it became involved in practical politics, its popularity soon be-
gan rapidly to decline. When Schermerhorn, the leader of the
N.V.B., agreed to form a cabinet along with Mr. Drees, a Social
Democrat, he could not help but involve the N.V.B. in everyday
Dutch politics. It was also known that some of the Cabinet members
co-opted from the underground were strong supporters of the N.V.B.’s
ideas. The dichotomy in the objectives of the movement did not
remain unnoticed. On the one hand, it aimed for a spiritual change
in Dutch political life, and on the other, it sought to achieve
the formation of a socialist people's party cutting through the
religious, social and cultural sections of society. Owing to this
dualism, the N.V.B. lost its bonafide status of a popular reform
movement, and with it, much of its public appeal. With the return
of the pre-war political parties, the N.V.B.'s position further
deteriorated. (59) Although Prime Minister Schermerhorn denied ;
that the former underground sought to become a factor in practical
politics, his position in the government apparently was taken to
prove the contrary. (60)
Eventually, the political objective gained the upper hand.
In October, 1945, the N.V.B. took the initiative in arranging for
consultations between the existing political parties and former
underground organizations. The meeting was arranged in order to
discuss the possibilities of forming the type of political party
envisaged by the movement. The S.D.A.P., the Liberal Democrats
(V.D.B.), who with their social-economic ideas stood politically
close to the Social Democrats, and the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.),
sectarian but advocating "modern-progressive social-economic
concepts," accepted the invitation. (61)
It appears that the S.D.A.P. had to overcome several difficult-
ies before it decided to merge into the new socialist party. Ini-
tially it refused to consider a fusion with the N.V.B. The
traditional Social Democratic leadership apparently was willing
to accept the amalgamation provided it would have a dominant
position in the new party. Another condition was that the S.D.A.P.
(59)	Ibid., pp. 184-185.
(60)	Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 55, statement of
Schermerhorn.
(61)	Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 275. The A.R.P. had indicated that
it opposed the reform idea. The C.H.U. did not react on the
invitation to attend the conference. The K.V.P. was prepared
to send observers only. However, the sponsors of the confer-
ence refused to admit observers.88
cadre must also have an important role in the new set-up. (62)
An additional difficult problem for the S.D.A.P. leaders was
the fact that a significant Protestant group of "new" democratic
socialists objected to joining the S.D.A.P. because of its anti-
clerical attitude in earlier days. They argued for the establish-
ment of a "Dutch Labor Party." Concerning this matter, it took
the Social Democrats some time to realize that to achieve a social-
ist party supported by people drawn from all sectors of society,
they had to sacrifice the S.D.A.P. (63)
There was also the problem of the working-class in general.
Strongly radicalized during the war, they might object to giving
up the S.D.A.P. for a new socialist party which in their opinion
would include too much of the middle-class element. Finally,
several prominent members of the S.D.A.P. were ardent advocates
of the N.V.B. ideas. They were strongly urging their party’s
leadership to solve the problem of the formation of a new social-
ist party as soon as possible. (64)
By the time of the merger, popular support for the N.V.B. had
dwindled to such a degree that the movement had become a "forgotten
and unimportant group." (65) The consequences of this for the
power position of the former S.D.A.P. within the new Labor Party
can be easily seen. Immediately after the liberation, popular
support for the N.V.B. was at its peak. This movement, advocating
socialist concepts on the broadest national basis possible, appar-
ently could become a threat to the position of the S.D.A.P., if no
agreement were achieved to combine their respective strengths. By
the time the new Labor Party was formed the position of the N.V.B.
had radically changed. It appears that at that juncture the S.D.A.P
was assured of its leading position within the new party.
For the reformers the realization of the "breakthrough" idea
appeared to have become wholly dependent upon the support of the
former S.D.A.P. In this respect three factors probably decided the
issue. First, the former S.D.A.P. had established itself as the
second strongest party in parliament since 1918; second, it had
mass support among the workers; and third, it possessed a politi-
cal organization with experience dating back to the turn of the
century. The significance of these assets for the implementation
of the reform idea in face of opposition from the re-entrenched
pre-war sectarian parties needs no elaboration. Relegated to a
(62)	Sal Tas, De Politieke Crisis van Nederland, Amsterdam, J. M.
Meu1enhoff, (1945?), pp. 19-20.
(63)	Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 200.
(64)	Ibid., p. 201.
(65)	Ibid., p, 185.89
position of insignificance politically, (66) Professor Schermerhorn
and his associates of the former underground apparently had no
choice but to tie themselves to the apronstrings of the tradition-
al leadership of the S.D.A.P. in order to save their "breakthrough"
attempt from total collapse.
As the embodiment of the "breakthrough" idea the Labor Party
brought together groups of different philosophic background. All
accepted the principles of socialism advocated by the party. Each
group based the justification for these principles upon its own
philosophy. Democratic socialism was the common guide for politi-
cal action. The party was an alliance of groups sharing the same
social and political objectives; and, in fact, the Labor Party
has been referred to as a "federalist" party. (67)
The role played by the S.D.A.P. in the foundation of the new
socialist party was made possible by historical developments in
its political ideology since its establishment in 1894. Original-
ly its main aim was the political emancipation of the working
class. At that time Dutch social democracy was strongly influenced
by its German counterpart, which stood close to Marxism. Although
the S.D.A.P. included in its principles the doctrines of historical
materialism and class-struggle, it was never typically Marxist.
Following the first World War, in particular after the defeat of
German social democracy in 1933, the S.D.A.P. broke away gradually
from Marxist influence. In 1937, this trend culminated in the
complete abandonment of historical materialism and the theory of
class-struggle. No longer bound by the idea of class distinction,
the S.D.A.P. thereafter sought to become a people's party, recruit-
ing its members from all strata of society. It started on a course
which eventually led to the complete acceptance of parliamentary
democracy as the only means to achieve the ideal of a socialist
State. (68)
In 1939, for the first time in its history, the S.D.A.P. join-
ed in the formation of a Cabinet. A "democratic coalition" was
constituted by the C.H.U. , the K.V.P., the V.D.B. and the Social
Democrats. (69) This government was immediately opposed by the
A.R.P. Its parliamentary leader, Mr. J. Schouten, refused to
Ί
Τ6Ό7 Supra~p.~87.
(67)	Ruitenbeek,	op. cit., p. 15.			
(68)	Ibid., pp. pp. 11-13.	23-41; cf. Tas, De	Politieke	Crisis	van Nederland,
(69)	In 1913 the	Liberal Democrats	(V.D.B.)	invited	the S.D.A.P.
to form a Left coalition Cabinet. The Social Democrats,
however, refused to cooperate because they felt that their
position, both within and outside parliament, was not strong
enough to dispel the bourgeois onus that would accompany
participation in such an alliance. - Lammers, op. cit., p. 83.90
believe that because of its participation in a Cabinet with parties
of the Right, the S.D.A.P. had abandoned its intention to achieve
its political and social objectives by revolutionary methods. To
stress his point he referred to a recent speech of Mr. Drees, in
which the Social Democratic leader asserted: (70)
The question whether social democracy should be revolu-
tionary or evolutionary is, actually, no longer a problem.
It is and will remain revolutionary in the sense that it
aims at a complete reform of society; however, the means
to achieve the objective are dependent upon the circum-
stances in which it is placed, and on the situation in the
country in which it fights for its ideal. In countries
where democracy does not exist, or, where evolution is
obstructed, social democracy must avail itself of revol-
utionary methods, but where evolutionary procedure is
possible, revolutionary means are useless, harmful, and
must be rejected.
Mr. Schouten concluded from this statement that the Social Democrats
had abandoned their revolutionary standpoint "purely for the sake
of expediency."
The Liberal Democrats (V.D.B.), however, interpreted Mr. Drees’
position as a rejection in principle of the use of revolutionary
methods in States with democratic institutions. (71) With this
shift in its political ideology from social democracy to democrat-
ic socialism the possibility had been created for the S.D.A.P. to
play its part in the foundation of the new Labor Party.
In the period under discussion the parliamentary situation
relative to the Indonesian question was highly complicated by the
interim nature of both the Cabinet and the legislature. In this
context, the Catholic Party's fence-sitting attitude presented
the government with a complicated problem. On its parliamentary
strength resulting from the 1937 general elections, the Catholic
Party commanded the deciding vote on the Indonesia policy of the
Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet. However, the political division in
the provisional parliament did not accurately reflect post-war
popular opinion in this respect. Of more importance, it seems,
was the fact that the strength of the new Labor Party was as yet
(70) ΪΓ	Oud, Het Jongste Verleden, Parlementaire Geschiedenis
van Nederland, VoI. VI, 1937-1940, Aan den Brink—Assen, Van
Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1951, p. 166.
(71)	Ibid., pp. 166-167. This Liberal Democrat view is that of
Mr. P. J. Oud. When the Labor Party was established, Mr. Oud
joined the new socialist party. However, on the eve of the
first post-war general elections, in May, 1946, he joined a
group of younger members of the Liberal Center, among them
Mr. D.U. Stikker, in setting up a new party, the Volkspartij
voor Vrijheid en Democratie. (V.V.D. = "Freedom Party"; pre-
sently known as the party of the Dutch industrialists.)91
an unknown quantity. Stability in the unsettled political situa-
tion could not be expected until general elections had been held.
When Dr. van Mook submitted the Djakarta proposals to his govern-
ment, the projected elections were only one month away.
Given the fluid, domestic political situation, with the first
post-war general elections not far off, it appears that the
Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet had ample reason to shun any conclusive
arrangements with the Sjahrir Government at that juncture. That
this was the position of the Dutch Government is indicated by a
remark made by Dr. L. J. M. Beel, Minister of Home Affairs, after
the Hoge Veluwe talks had been concluded. When a member of parl-
iament made reference to "the failure at St. Hubertus," Dr. Beel
observed that one could not speak of failure "because there was
as yet no intention to achieve concrete results." (72)
The same can be inferred from an assertion of the Dutch Prime
Minister at the final meeting of the Dutch-Indonesian talks held
in the Netherlands. Professor Schermerhorn stated that the draft
protocol had not been previously discussed in the Council of Minis-
ters . As such it could not be considered a proposal of the Dutch
Government. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s opinion regarding
several items in the protocol differed from those of his colleagues
Therefore, the Dutch proposals constituted merely a subject to be
discussed by the Netherlands and Indonesian delegations. The in-
formal character of the draft protocol and the pronouncements of
the Dutch Ministers referred to appear to indicate clearly that so
far as the Netherlands Government was concerned, its delegation
to the Hoge Veluwe Conference had no mandate whatsoever to arrive
at conclusive arrangements with the Republic. (73)
For the very reason of its interim nature, Dr. van Mook hoped
that his government would be prepared to accept the preliminary
agreement and attempt to force its acceptance on the provisional
legislature. The Lieutenant Governor-General felt that if the
(72)	Handelingen, p. 716.
(73)	At the final session of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, convoked
in The Hague, Prime Minister Schermerhorn on the other hand
implied that the discussions in Holland could not produce
concrete achievements because the Republican delegation was
not in a position to make decisions. He stated that definite
results could not be arrived at because the Indonesian dele-
gation had received no mandate whatsoever.
This assertion is incorrect. The Indonesians had been
authorized to sign an agreement with the Dutch Government.
However, it had been anticipated that the proposals which the
Dutch would submit to the Republicans would be in harmony
with the Djakarta proposals. This was not the case with the
draft protocol of the Netherlands delegation. Consequently,
the Republican delegation was confronted with a situation
not covered by the mandate received from the Sjahrir Govern-
ment „92
Labor.Party were willing to endorse the Djakarta proposals, the
contest for their passage through parliament could be ^chanced;
"the campaign to persuade the K.V.P. /Catholics/ could begin."
However, when he submitted the preliminary agreement to his govern-
ment, Minister Drees and "others conversant with the domestic
political situation" considered the objections to the terms of the
accord fundamental and, therefore, insurmountable. (74) Subsequent-
ly, Dr. van Mook himself arrived at the conclusion that the
Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet would not survive the acceptance of the
Djakarta proposals in their major points. (75)
The influence of Labor party politics on the Dutch Government's
decision to reject the Djakarta proposals appears to be a signifi-
cant one. Since the adoption of the van Poll Motion, the responsi-
bility for the Cabinet's policy had come to rest exclusively with
the socialists. Defeat of the government would be taken as a fail-
ure of the Labor Party, and this failure would be attributed to a
policy of wanting to give too many political concessions to the
Republic. Public opinion, antagonistic to the Indonesians, would
consequently turn against the Labor Party. As such the party's
position in the general elections could be greatly impaired. The
Labor Party was newly constituted. So far as general elections
were concerned, the groups that had merged in the party formed an
untried combination. The "federative" Labor Party had yet to prove
its cohesive strength. The possible disadvantages for the future
of their party apparently discouraged the socialists from risking
a showdown in the legislature.
Another compelling reason for the Labor Party leaders not to
force the issue seems to be the possible consequence for party align-
ment which would result from an adverse reaction of the Catholics to
the Cabinet's acceptance of the Djakarta proposals. If the Catholics
were pushed into opposition, the result would be the resignation of
the Schermerhorn-Drees Government. The succeeding Cabinet would
most probably be formed by the Catholic Party in combination with
the A.R.P., and the C.H.U. Participation of the Liberal Center
in this government would not be unlikely. (76) This alliance
would mean the return of the coalition of the Right and the
T74) information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.
(75)	van Mook, op. cit., p. 131.
(76)	L. N. Palar, "Indonesie" na de verkiezingen," (Indonesia after
the elections), De Brug—Djembatan, (Amsterdam), I, No. 3
-(Juni 1946), 5.
Mr. Palar, an Indonesian hailing from Menado, North Celebes,
living in Holland since the 1930's, remained there throughout
the German occupation. He joined the underground activities
of the S.D.A.P., of which he was a member. Before World War
II, he was secretary of the Colonial Commission of that party
and of the Federation of Netherlands Labor Unions (N.V.V.--
Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen). At the time of pub-
lication of the above article he was in charge of managing93
break-up of the democratic coalition. That the former Social
Democrats would strongly oppose a policy leading to this can easily
be imagined. For it was only after decades of isolation on the
Left that the S.D.A.P. finally succeeded in forging a democratic
coalition. (77) In addition, the "breakthrough" idea would, it
seems, sustain a serious set-back if the coalition of the Right
were to be revived.
Relevant to the Indonesian situation, the consequence of a
possible defeat of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government was mentioned
at the Hoge Veluwe Conference. The Dutch delegation asserted that
the Republic could "expect nothing" from the succeeding government.
"The result would be violence and chaos." (78)
The Netherlands delegation appeared to be convinced that with
a Right coalition government in power the Dutch policy in Indonesia
would be radical and forceful. If under the prevailing circumstances
such a government were to press for drastic action, apparently it
was feared that the consequences would likely be harmful to the
Dutch position in the conflict. So far as the writer can ascertain
from the available material, this fear did not stem from any aver-
sion to violence, but rather from the realization that the Dutch
did not then have adequate forces to make a military policy profit-
able. In military terms, the Dutch in the archipelago were still
Indonesian Affairs in the Bureau oi the Labor Party (Partij
van de Arbeid). He was then a member of the Second Chamber
for the Labor Party. In pre-World War II days he had already
been a member of Parliament for the S.D.A.P.
When the Dutch launched their first military campaign against
the Republic, Mr. Palar immediately resigned his membership
in the Labor Party. (This party supported the Dutch Govern-
ment's decision to use military force against the Indonesians.)
Subsequently he left for New York, where, upon appointment
by the Republican Government, he became Permanent Observer
of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. In Sept-
ember 1950, when Indonesia was admitted to membership in the
United Nations, he was designated Permanent Delegate of his
country to that organization. Mr. Palar is presently Indo-
nesian Ambassador to Canada.
Mr. Palar's article was published shortly after the first
post-World War II general elections in Holland in May, 1946
The Catholics (Katholieke Volkspartij), winning 32 seats out
of one hundred in the Second Chamber, had emerged as the
strongest party. Writing of a possible formation of a Right
Wing coalition led by the Catholics^, Mr. Palar did not doubt
that "a....Right Wing Cabinet in which the Anti Revolutionaries
and the Christian Historical Union (C.H.U.)—and probably also
the Liberals—will have a significant voice..." would fail to
find a solution to the Indonesian problem. "It will pursue a
policy which will provoke the Indonesians to the limit" and
would have consequences difficult to foresee. He was of the
opinion that such a development would not be tolerated by the
Big Powers. Therefore he believed that a Right Wing coalition
government would be short-lived. - Cf. infra.
(77) See supra, pp. 89-90.94
very much dependent upon British forces. (79) And, moreover, the
islands remained under de facto British authority. If the Dutch
were jto antagonize the British, the result might be the enhance-
ment of the Republican diplomatic position.
Moreover, it was possible that a deterioration of the situation
in Indonesia would bring world opinion around to supporting a plan
for international interposition. But the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabi-
net quite definitely did not want international intervention in the
Indonesian question. (80)
The Dutch Government's objection to the treaty form of the
Djakarta draft was based on its unconstitutionality,, Another
important factor leading to rejection of the treaty form seems to
be that it implied recognition of the Republic, which was estab-
lished by a revolution against the "legitimate authority." This
implication apparently was felt to be a fundamental objection with-
in the Labor Party itself. If the former Social Democrats had
been willing to make the concession, it would be tantamount on
their part to admitting that Dutch parliamentary democracy had
failed with regard to the Netherlands East-Indies; that it was ob-
structing the political evolution of the Indonesian people. Further,
it should be borne in mind that the S.D.A.P., since 1937, had re-
nounced the use of revolutionary methods and had committed itself
to uphold parliamentary democracy. It was for this reason that its
participation in the foundation of the Labor Party had been made
possible. A start had been made in realizing the "breakthrough"
idea. The long-standing desire of the former S.D.A.P. to become
a people's party was materializing.
During the Hoge Veluwe talks, Minister Logemann underscored
the revolutionary character of the Republic as the greatest ob-
stacle to arriving at peaceful conditions in Indonesia. In this
respect, the problem for the Dutch Government was how to liquid-
ate the revolutionary situation so as to make the Republic accept-
able to the Dutch people. (81)
J78) Summary Records H.V., third session, April 14, 1946, state-
ment of Prime Minister Schermerhorn.
(79) On April 13, 1946, Lieutenant General S.H. Spoor, Dutch army
commander in Indonesia, stated to a United Press correspondent
that Dutch troops would gradually replace the British forces.
However, the general said, with the forces then under his
command he would be unable to control Java. Therefore, he
did not wish the British to leave Indonesia too soon. -
Merdeka, April 15, 1946.
(30) Summary Records H.V., third session, April 14, 1946, state-
ment of Prime Minister Schermerhorn.
(81) Ibid., final meeting, April 24, 1946.95
Prime Minister Schermerhorn expressed a similar view when he
explained the purpose in having three Indonesians who had been in
Holland during the German occupation join the Republican delegation
on its way back to Djakarta. These Indonesians, Messrs. Setyadjit,
Maroeto Daroesman and Saroso Wirodihardjo, had participated in the
underground. Therefore, Professor Schermerhorn felt that they
were well qualified to explain to the Republican leaders in Indon-
esia the political situation and sentiments in Holland. Among
other things, they would explain the circumstances of a group unit-
ed by bonds which had developed historically and which had been
strengthened during the war years. For this group the revolution-
ary situation in Indonesia was "difficult to digest." (82) The
Dutch Prime Minister obviously referred to the newly established
Labor Party.
At the Hoge Veluwe Conference the dominance of Labor Party
politics was made manifest by the participation of Minister Drees
in the talks. Mr. Drees had been a member of the Second Chamber
for the S.D.A.P. since 1933. Highly respected in social democrat-
ic circles, he was top-ranking in his party long before World
War II. His position was equally prominent in the Labor Party. (83)
The significance of his presence as a member of the Dutch delega-
tion was made evident when Prime Minister Schermerhorn introduced
him to the Republicans as "our political mentor." (84) During
the discussions, Mr. Drees appeared to be opposed to any positive
pronouncements by the Dutch delegation regarding the negotiating
position of the Netherlands Government. (85)
The degree of importance of Dutch public opinion as a deter-
rent to the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet's taking decisive action
in the Indonesian situation can be illustrated with the following.
The revolution against what the Dutch generally considered an en-
lightened and beneficent colonial rule, public anxiety about the
fate of ex-internees still confined in Republican-controlled
territory, and reports of atrocities allegedly committed by Indo-
nesian nationalists, had given rise to a public feeling violently
opposed to any dealings with the Republic. Further impassioned
by extra-parliamentary agitation of colonial die-hards and arch
conservatives, the anti-Republican sentiment apparently deeply
(82)	Ibid. A perusal of the Dutch draft protocol will reveal that
in this document any implication of recognizing the Republic
as an established fact has been avoided.
(83)	This was confirmed by Mr. Setyadjit Soegondo. - Information
obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(84)	Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi and Dr. Soedarsono,
personal letters.
(85)	Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal
interview) and Mr. Soewandi (personal letter).96
impressed the Netherlands Government During the conference on
the Hoge Veluwe, the St, Hubertus Hunting Lodge was guarded by
police and soldiers in a way which Dr van Mook thought highly
exaggerated. The Dutch Government seemed to fear an outburst of
public violence while the talks were in progress (86)
The last series of public debates on Indonesia in the Dutch
Provisional Parliament before the Hoge Veluwe talks began, were
held on January 15, 16 and 17, 1946 During the discussions, the
A„R,P, „ the C, H. II. . the State Reformed Party and the Liberal Center
continued strongly to criticize the government’s policy. The con-
troversy did not concern the substance of the Cabinet's policy.
Rather, the opposition was mainly to the procedure for seeking to
realize the substantive objectives (87) In this respect two fact-
ors rendered the standpoint of the Right rigid and inflexible.
First, basing the legitimacy of Dutch authority on their religious
convictions, they insisted that any dealings with the Republic must
necessarily be conditioned upon recognition of that authority by
the Indonesians, Second, inasmuch as the Republic had been estab-
lished by a revolt against the legitimate authority, any action of
the Netherlands Government which could be construed as conferring
recognition upon the Republic must be rejected (88)
The Catholic Party’s position was explained by Mr, M.J.M. van
T86) Informalion obtained from Dr van Mook, personal interview.
While the Hoge Veluwe talks were in progress, Mr, Romme pub-
lished his editorial , ’’Week der Schande."
(87)	Handel ingen, p 305, statement by Mr Μ,,ί,Μ, van Poll,
(88)	Mr. M.J.M. van Poll (K.V.P,) stated;
”... all authority derives from God,,,therefore, Dutch authority
in the Netherlands East-indies is willed by Godcharged
with the mandate to serve the peoples of Indonesia this
authority is called upon to guide the development of the Indo-
nesian peoples toward complete self-government... The Dutch
cannot abandon this task under pressure of violence availed
of to defy their legitimate authorityMr, van Poll did
not deny that history was replete with events whereby people
revolted against the authority placed over them This occur-
red when the authority abused its power to serve, In that
case, the development leading to such an event was a matter
known by God only It was then no longer a matter of law
Handelingen, pp 304-305
Mr. 777j7W„A, Meijerink (A.R.P,) stated:
"To maintain God’s authority, the (Dutch) government may con-
sider itself in God’s servit.ude, ,. ,11 must not hesitate to
wield the sword, if necessary.” Ibid , Tijdelijke Zitting,
p , 97 .	----97
Poll. (89) The K.V.P. supported the government’s aim of autonomy
for Indonesia within the Dutch Realm. It also agreed to negotia-
tions with moderate nationalists. This was considered both a nec-
essity and a moral duty. It was necessary because the restoration
of Dutch authority and law and order by forceful action proved
unworkable under the existing circumstances, despite the fact that
"quite a few" were in favor of such a method. To try to negotiate
with moderate nationalists was a moral duty because the utmost had
to be done to avoid bloodshed, which could only result in aliena-
tion of the Dutch from the Indonesians. However, the Netherlands
authorities must not hold discussions with people who refuse to
recognize Dutch sovereignty in the archipelago. In this connection
the propriety of the talks between the Sjahrir Government and Dr.
van Mook was questioned. The Republican Prime Minister had stated
repeatedly that he was willing to negotiate if the Republic of
Indonesia were recognized as the de facto authority. So far, the
Catholic Party was dissatisfied with Dutch policy in the Indies.
The existence of the Dutch Empire was at stake. Therefore, it
must be made absolutely certain that the man charged with safe-
guarding Netherlands interests in Indonesia was the best available.
Mr. van Poll doubted whether Dr. van Mook was the right man. The
Catholics’ spokesman submitted that the reason for his criticism
was not so much that negotiations had been held with Sjahrir. The
views and ideas of the Republican Prime Minister as revealed in
his book Indonesische Overpeinzingen (English translation entitled
"Out of Exile") showed him "completely occidental" in his think-
ing. Besides, Sjahrir, as early as 1938, appeared to be convinced
that in view of the international situation Dutch-Indonesian coop-
eration was essential. (90) Mr. van Poll stated that "one could
reason with someone like Sjahrir." (91)
Speaking for the Anti-Revolutionary Party, Mr. J. Schouten
declared that "understanding must be shown for the aspirations
manifest in Indonesian nationalism." The ultimate objective
of Dutch policy should be complete independence of the Indies
in domestic affairs. To begin with, "an important measure of
(89)	For the percentage of membership in the Second Chamber of the
parties the attitudes of which are referred to here, see:
Appendix G.
(90)	Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p. 211. Mr. van Poll thought the
talks between van Mook and Sjahrir questionable apparently be-
cause of statements of the Republican Prime Minister like the
following;
"Sjahrir asserted the belief that no settlement was possible
’unless it is made by & joint agreement between the United
Nations and us’. By implication he refused recognition of
the Netherlands interest in Indonesia as being any way dif-
ferent from that of other nations. 'We are willing to con-
sider and welcome Dr. van Mook as the first envoy of a
foreign but well known country to discuss with us, we hope^
in the friendliest way, Dutch interests and the Dutch point
of view'." - New York Times, January 16, 1946.
(91)	Handelingen, pp. 256-257.98
further independence" in such matters must immediately be granted.
Plans to that effect should be worked out and implemented as soon
as possible. Concerning future political reforms for Indonesia,
all blueprints for their realization must be based on the principles
contained in the Queen’s speech of December 6, 1942. Subsequently,
proposals for reforms must be submitted for the consideration and
approval of the Dutch legislature.
For the Anti-Revolutionaries, recognition of the "so-called
Republic of Indonesia" would mean disintegration of the Kingdom
and abandonment of the plan for union within the Dutch Realm. Ne-
gotiations with Sjahrir were rejected because he was Sukarno's
"partisan." Distrust of the Cabinet’s policy was implied when Mr.
Schouten reproached the government for its refusal to disclose in-
formation regarding the Chequers Conference. The strong dissatis-
faction with the government’s policy led the A.R.P. to conclude
that it could not support this policy. Mr. Schouten vigorously
expressed his disapproval of Dr. van Mook's conduct of affairs in
Djakarta. It was stated that if the government would dismiss Dr.
van Mook, the Anti-Revolutionaries would be willing to construe
this measure as a revision in the trend of the Cabinet's policy.
The A.R.P. would consequently be much more inclined to consider
that policy favorable. (92)
The Christian Historical Union and the State Reformed Party
(Staatkundig Gereformeerden) took a stand similar to that of the
Anti-Revolutionary Party. (93)
The Liberal Center adamantly held that the Republicans were
nothing but Japanese puppets. The Dutch Government’s policy must
be aimed at returning law and order by fdrce. (94)
Eventually, the debates resulted in the adoption of the van
Poll Motion. As mentioned earlier, this situation apparently was
a factor in the Cabinet's decision to convene the States General
in secret session on February 7, 1946. The main topic of deliber-
ations was said to have been the Dutch Statement of Policy which
the Lieutenant Governor-General submitted to the Sjahrir Govern-
ment on February 10. These secret discussions, it seems, provided
the Dutch Government with guidance to judge how far parliament
would go to meet the negotiating position of the Republic.
It has been contended that with regard to its Indonesia policy
the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet should have defied the interim legis-
lature. However, the Netherlands Government did not have the cour-
age to do so. Instead it justified its indecision in terms of the
T92) Ibid~ 'pp. 282, 284, 285.
(93) Ibid., pp. 291-292.
(94) Ibid., pp. 266-267.99
parliamentary majority which was opposed to the Cabinet’s policy.
Its alibi was a hostile provisional legislature Which represented
an outdated political situation. Moreover, the emergency parlia-
ment had little public support, while the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabi-
net enjoyed popular confidence and prestige which in the early
period following its inception were almost limitless. (95)
However, to project this situation into the period under dis-
cussion would be incorrect. The Nederlandse Volksbeweging as a
source of popular support for the Cabinet had lost its significance
The extra parliamentary Schermerhorn-Drees Government had for all
practical purposes become a Labor Party Government. The position
of the new Socialist Party derived mainly from the pre-war status
of the Social Democrats, the leadership of which was dominant in
the new Labor Party. This appears to have been an important fac-
tor for the Labor Party, and as such for the Schermerhorn-Drees
Government, in being so much concerned with the opinion of a
legislature which obviously was not representative of contemporary
political conditions. Nevertheless, the former Social Democrats
apparently felt that this seemingly incongruent political situation
would not differ too much from what they expected after the general
elections. The Labor Party leaders did not anticipate a victory
in the elections. (96) These circumstances may help to explain
why the provisional parliament exerted such a dominant influence
on the Indonesia policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet.
The reappearance of party politics in the pre-war pattern had
become apparent even before parliamentary acitivities were restored
Developments which made this possible were as follows.
The first post-liberation representative institution was a
Council of Trustees organized by the underground. Originally it
was set up to advise the Dutch Government, which would return
from exile in London. The Council was composed of Catholics,
Social Democrats and Protestants. In May, 1945, it assumed its
functions. After the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was formed in the
following month, the Council was replaced by a National Advisory
Committee (Nationale Advies Commissie - N.A.C.) made up of 43
members drawn from among the pre-war political parties and the new
resistance leaders. This Committee was the second stage in the
restoration of the national legislature. (97) Developments in
this Committee apparently were of decisive influence in the trend
of Dutch post-war politics. The majority of the N.A.C. were mem-
bers of parliament elected before 1940. Although it resembled
somewhat the representative institution which had been the subject
of many discussions in the underground, it was not in the interest
of the pre-war parliamentary members to build up the N.A.C. into
(95)	de Kadt, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
(96)	Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.
(97)	Eldersveld, op, cit., p. 129.100
a powerful representative body. On the contrary, as members of
established political parties it would be to their benefit to play
down the significance of the Committee. They did so by voting
against public debates in the N.A.C. Consequently it appears that
whatever progressive thinking may have been developed by the lead-
ers of the former resistance in the Committee, it never reached
the public. In the meantime parliamentary activity was resumed.
The debates in the interim legislature, which were open to the pub-
lic, provided pre-war politics with the opportunity to re-assert
itself to the fullest extent. (98) In other words the responsible
politicians in Dutch post-war politics were those who had dominated
the scene since 1937. Therefore, it seems that these responsible
politicians in their view vis-a-vis the Indonesian situation orient-
ed themselves within the frame of reference which had guided Dutch
policy in the Indies before the war. So far as the Republic was
concerned, it appears that they considered its existence mainly
in terms of a revolt against the legitimate authority which was
sponsored by the Japanese and incited by a few extremist national-
ists. Dutch politicians were simply incapable of viewing the mat-
ter in its broader implications, namely as a facet of the post-war
upsurge of colonial peoples over all of Asia determined to regain
their freedom.
Apparently overwhelmed by the factors which in its opinion
militated against acceptance of the Djakarta proposals, the
Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet could consider the Hoge Veluwe Confer-
ence only as an opportunity to get first-hand information from the
visiting Republicans concerning views and sentiments in the Repub-
lic with respect to Indonesian aspirations for independence. (99)
As an immediate and concrete gain arising from the talks
Prime Minister Schermerhorn mentioned the fact that the Dutch
Government "is now in a better position to defend its policy with
more color and background" before parliament. This was done by
Minister Logemann on May 2, 1946. What the Minister of Overseas
"(98) Tas, De Politieke Crisis van Nederland, p. 7.
(99) That the Dutch thereby possibly employed a questionable method
may appear from the following.
The Republican delegation had been instructed to keep the
Sjahrir Government in Djakarta constantly informed about the
developments of the Hoge Veluwe Conference. The Indonesian
delegation sent several cabled reports through Dutch facili-
ties. However, these reports were never received by Sjahrir.
(Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.)
If the Republican Government had immediately been informed of
the Dutch draft protocol, it might have forthwith recalled
its delegation. The Dutch then would have had no opportunity
for further discussions with the Republican ministers.
During the writer's interview with Dr. van Mook, the latter
volunteered the information that "there was sqme difficulty
about communications" between the Indonesian delegation and
Sjahrir.101
Territories had to say about the Republic was now given substance
by information received directly from Republican leaders themselves.
The data submitted by the government to the Second Chamber could
no longer be considered as having first gone "through the filter"
of the mistrusted Dr. van Mook in Djakarta. (100)
Concerning the Hoge Veluwe Conference, Minister Logemann de-
clared that "the discussions have not led as yet to a complete
agreement... This means that the discussions are not over and that
they will have to be continued without delay." (101)
When the Republican delegation left for the Netherlands,
Sjahrir apparently did not share in his colleagues’ optimism about
the outcome of their mission. Prior to the Indonesian delegation’s
departure for Holland, the Republicans decided that while the Hoge
Veluwe talks were in progress Prime Minister Sjahrir and the re-
maining members of his Cabinet would try to prepare public opinion
in the Republic for acceptance of the preliminary agreement. (102)
However, efforts in that direction were never made. This is men-
tioned to show that Sjahrir did not believe the Dutch Government
would accept the Djakarta proposals. (103)
Upon its return to Djakarta the Indonesian delegation, in sub-
mitting its report to the Sjahrir Cabinet, confined itself to ex-
plaining the position of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government relative
to the Indonesian problem in general, and vis-a-vis the Djakarta pro
posals in particular. So far as the Republican Government was
concerned this report was the last to refer to the Hoge Veluwe
talks in its efforts to come to a settlement with the Dutch. For
the Republic, the next stage in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations
developed with practically no bearing whatsoever on what had come
to pass at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge. (104)
JlO0) Handelingen, p. 258, statement by Mr. M.J.M. van Poll.
(101)	Ibid., p. 698.
(102)	Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi, personal letter.
(103)	Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
To the press Sjahrir merely stated that negotiations thus
far had not gone beyond the stage of "comparison between the
Indonesian and the Dutch viewpoints.” This procedure was to
be continued by sending a Republican Delegation to Holland.
When asked to confirm a rumor that the tall$s in Djakarta
had resulted in a provisional agreement, Sjahrir dismissed
it as incorrect. - Merdeka, April 2 and 3, 1946.
(104)	Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi, personal letter. In
a public statement Mr. Soewandi declared that the Indonesian
Delegation "had clarified the standpoint of the Republic,
while the Dutch Government had explained their point of
view." - Merdeka, April 30, 1946.102
In the period immediately following the Hoge Veluwe talks,
the Sjahrir Government was quite uncertain about further develop-
ments in the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. The attitude of the Dutch
Government with respect to the preliminary agreement, however, had
made it clear to the Indonesians that their controversy with the
Netherlands most likely could not be solved by negotiations invol-
ving only the parties directly concerned. (105) It was apparently
this that made Sjahrir pursue with more vigor a policy aimed at
strengthening the Republic's diplomatic position through inter-
national contacts. The first step in that direction was to imple-
ment as soon as possible the Republic's offer, made in April, 1946,
to supply rice to India, which at that time was suffering from a
serious shortage of food. (106)
In his statement of May 2, 1946, before the Second Chamber (107)
reporting on the Hoge Veluwe Conference, Minister Logemann submitted
that the talks in Djakarta had "led to the conclusion that the Indo-
nesian Republic might be recognized as part of the Federal Common-
wealth" which the Dutch envisaged for Indonesia. Underlying this
viewpoint was the fact that the Indonesian nationalists considered
the Republic "as the realization of the eager desire for national
self-expression and independence, this view being held generally
in Javanese nationalist circles and also partly beyond the (island)."
For that matter, the "idea of abandoning the Republic surely may
be regarded as being one that could not be digested by any Java-
nese nationalist." Moreover, despite the fact that the Republicans
felt they had the support of the entire archipelago, they were
willing to admit that they had only a limited de facto authority.
This development appealed to the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet be-
cause it implied the end of the revolution. The Dutch Government
was of the opinion that the Republic, though not explicitly, had
expressed its willingness to recognize Netherlands sovereignty in
the Indies. It was also ready to accept the principles set forth
in the Dutch Government Declaration of February 10, 1946, as the
basis for the future political structure of Indonesia. On the
strength of this declaration the Dutch reserved the right to confer
upon the representative of the Crown, proposed to head the Common-
wealth of Indonesia, such special powers as it deemed necessary
"to assume final responsibility with respect to fundamental rights,
for proper administration and sound finances (applied) to the en-
tire Commonwealth of Indonesia and also to its constituent parts
(105)	Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.
(106)	van Mook, op, cit., p. 135; Raliby, op. cit., p. 290.
(107)	Shortly following Logemann's statement the Government of the
Republic issued a communique to the effect that this state-
ment was the responsibility of the Dutch Cabinet exclusively.
Thus, the Sjahrir Government apparently wished to indicate
that whatever declaration made by the Republican representa-
tives on the Hoge Veluwe, it felt itself free of any commit-
ment. - Rakjat, May 4, 1946, (Indonesian language newspaper
in Jogjakarta, Central Java).103
(separately)." The willingness of the Dutch Government to recog-
nize the Republic as a constituent part of the Commonwealth,
therefore, did not "imply that the Kingdom would abandon such
powers..." Logemann asserted that in "adhering to the views ex-
pressed in the February 10 Declaration, the only question that
may arise is whether for certain territory it might be regarded
as being the autonomous organization of one of the constituent
(parts) of the Commonwealth." The Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet felt
"that this concept may be acceptable indeed in so far as Java is
concerned." (108)
However, many objections still existed to the Republic in
its then current form. If it succeeded in eliminating "the
sinister elements playing a major part" in the Republic, it could
become "the materialization of the political desires of the entire
Indonesian population." When the Republicans, together with "true
nationalists," were willing to take a firm stand against the ex-
tremists, it "stands to reason that the armed forces of the King-
dom will then be charged with the maintenance of law and order
wherever the local authorities of the Commonwealth and its (Con-
stituent) parts prove unable to maintain them by normal means." (109)
In a cautious move apparently meant "to get approval of the
(legislature) for lifting the cover of the inverted commas from
the worths ’Republic of Indonesia',,μ (110) Logemann submitted that
the "Republic being the exponent of their national ambitions,"
it was understandable that the Indonesians stressed the term
"Republic." (Ill)
Further obstacles in the way of Dutch recognition of the
Republic as representative of Indonesian nationalism were, first,
that it must be purged of all Japanese influence still prevalent
in the Republic; second, the Dutch refused to make any commitment
before the "liberation and safety of (Dutch) internees who are
still in the non-occupied (Republican) area of Java," had been
secured. (112)
Despite the fact that the Government Statement, as far as can
be ascertained, reduced the Republic to one in name only which
amounted to no more than "administrative organization" in the
Commonwealth under complete control of the representative of the
Dutch Crown (as such, dominated by the Dutch parliament), it was
"(1.08) Handelingen , p . 699 .
(109)	Ibid., p. 700.
(110)	I. Chaudhry, The Indonesian Struggle, Lahore, Pakistan,
Feroz Sons , 1.950.
(111)	Handelingen, p. 700.
(112)	Ibid., p. 701.104
sharply criticized by the Right Wing parties such as the Anti-
Revolutionaries and the Christian Historical Union. The so-called
Liberal Center joined in the criticism. The opposition held that
the policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was a deviation from
the principles laid down in the Queen's speech of December, 1942.
It stubbornly contended that recognition of the Republic would
mean the disintegration of the Dutch Empire. (113)
The Catholics were of the opinion that although the Govern-
ment Statement was open to sharp criticism, they felt it advisable
to avoid extensive debates on the matter. Further deliberations on
the Cabinet's policy would lead the legislature to express an opin-
ion. After ten days the first post-World War II general elections
were to be held (May 17, 1946). A vote in parliament at that
juncture on the Indonesia policy of the government might prejudice
the position of the Cabinet to be formed after the elections. What-
ever the judgement pronounced on th|is policy, it must be admitted
that, (114)
(1)	it had not resulted in a situation which could not be
undone;
(2)	an advantage had been gained in that the Indonesian
representatives on the Hoge Veluwe had declared the
Republic was prepared to recognize Dutch sovereignty
in the Indies;
(3)	the government had given assurances that "as yet many
things are obstructing" the achievement of a favorable
outcome of the discussions with the Republicans, such
as Japanese influence on the Republic, etc.;
(4)	provision had been made for a Conference of the Realm
to have the final decision on an agreement reached
between the Dutch Government and the Republic.
From the above Mr. M.J.M. van Poll, the Catholic's spokesman,
failed to see the necessity of any hasty action of the legislature
on the Indonesia policy of the Government in power. In summing up
the issues concerning which virtual concurrence existed in the
Second Chamber, van Poll submitted that, (115)
(1) so far as could be ascertained there was no opposition
to giving a form of autonomous government to the Indies;
(113)	Ibid., p. 723, statement of Schouten (Anti-Revolutionary
Party); p. 739, statement of Tilanus (Christian Historical
Union).
(114)	Ibid., p. 751, statement of van Poll.
(115)	Ibid.105
(2)	both the Second Chamber and the government felt that
continued presence of Japanese troops in Indonesia
would perpetuate their undesirable influence on the
'’leadership” of the Republic;
(3)	as long as the Dutch ex-prisoners-of-war and internees,
still detained in camps on Indonesian-held territories,
were not set free, no sphere of mutual confidence
could be created between the Dutch and the Republic;
(4)	the legislature and the Cabinet shared the view that
the peoples of the islands outside of Java-Madura
must have a vote in deciding the future political
status of Indonesia as a whole; that, therefore, they
must be given the measure of independence due to them;
(5)	that to implement the above, the Conference of the
Realm should be convoked as soon as possible.
As to the problem whether the name "republic" could be given
to all or part of Indonesia, van Poll stated it did not apply to
the Republic with which discussions were being held, at least not
"in its present form." In exploring the question whether or not
part or all of an autonomous Indonesia could be named "republic"
the Catholics * spokesman referred to examples of republics which
constituted part of a larger political entity, to wit: "Eire,
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the German Federation among others
consisting of the Kingdom of Bavaria, Saxony and Wurtemberg, but
also of the Free Cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck...." (116)
Upon the basis of these observations van Poll introduced the
following Motion; (117)
The Chamber, on the basis of (deliberations) held today
/May 7, 19467 and previously, being of the opinion that an
autonomous Torm of administration should be granted to the
Netherlands Indies territory as a partner of the Kingdom
and considering -
That the discussions are in progress regarding the form
and the degree of this autonomy, for the entire territory
as well as for its parts;
That it must be deemed necessary to hold such discussions
also with representatives of the Outer Territories (islands
other than Java and Sumatra) and that meanwhile the estab-
lishment of autonomous organs for those territories should
be striven for energetically;
That, consequently, it is desirable to convoke as quickly
as possible the Conference of the Realm which has been in
preparation for a considerable time;
TTiey Ibid—PT 752.
(117) Ibid. Tr., Netherlands Information Bureau, Netherlands News
Letter, New York, June 1, 1946.	'106
That, in deciding the form of the aforementioned autonomy,
some kind of republican form for the internal organization
of the autonomous territory or one of its parts—provided
it is purged of Japanese influence—need not be excluded in
advance;
That, however, in continuing the discussions first of all
it should be determined that the liberation of Netherlands
subjects still detained in internment camps shall be brought
to its conclusion quickly and (in a well-regulated manner);
That, failure of this liberation to materialize would be
an obstacle to continuance of the discussions;
Resolves to request the Government most strongly to continue
the discussions now taking place in accordance with the
directives contained in the above considerations.
When, depending on whether the view was that of a party pro
or contra the Cabinet’s policy, it appeared that the Motion was
considered either as an expression of confidence or of no-
conf idepce, van Poll emphatically stated the purport of the Motion
to be: the maintenance of the existing status quo until a new
government would have been formed after the elections. (118)
The Schermerhorn-Drees Government considered the Motion a
listing of matters on which the majority of the Second Chamber
agreed with the Cabinet, and was therefore welcome. It did not,
however, view the Motion as a program binding on the Dutch Govern-
ment. Meanwhile, discussions with the Republic would be continued
on the basis of the February 10, 1946 Declaration. The debates
on the Motion were concluded with its acceptance by 45 votes to
25. In favor were the Catholics, the Labor Party and the Communists
The Anti-Revolutionaries, the Christian Historical Union and the
Liberals rejected it. (119)
After the general elections on May 17, 1946, the Schermerhorn-
Drees Cabinet, then a caretaker government, made the first move
beyond the Hoge Veluwe phase in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations.
In answer to the Republic's proposals of March 27, 1946, and as
the basis on which the Dutch proposed to continue negotiations,
Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook submitted the draft protocol
of the Netherlands Government to the Sjahrir Cabinet on May 19,
1946. Although actual negotiations did not begin until after the
formation of a new Dutch government, this was the initial step
that eventually led to the Linggadjati Agreement of November,
1946.	(120)
{118) Handelingen, p. 785.
(119) Ibid.
(120) van Mook, op. cit., pp. 138-139.107
APPENDIX A
DUTCH GOVERNMENT NINE POINT PROPOSAL
6 November 1945
(1)	A Central Indies Government consisting of a democratic repre-
sentative body with a substantial majority of Indonesian mem-
bers, and a Council of Ministers under a Governor-General as
a representative of the Netherlands Crown. That body will
govern internal affairs.
(2)	Indonesia is to become a full partner in the Commonwealth, and
the machinery for the Commonwealth is to be decided at a round
table conference to be held as soon as possible.
(3)	Suffrage will be a subject of consultation, but it will rest
on adequate representation of all groups.
(4)	An increase of Indonesian and other non-Netherlands citizens
in the general service of the Kingdom. Regulations based on
racial discrimination shall be abrogated, along with the
distinction between the Netherlands and Indonesian civil
service.
(5)	No separate penal laws.
(6)	A reform of the educational system to cut down illiteracy to
a minimum.
(7)	Recognition of the Indonesian language as official along with
the Dutch.
(8)	Encouragement of increased industrial effort by all racial
groups; increased production and improved distribution of in-
come .
(9)	A strong armed force built upon militia defense, with all
groups participating.
"The reconstruction of Indonesia will have to be quickly taken in
hand; otherwise the general impoverishment and lawlessness will
have grown to such an extent that recovery may be hardly possible,
the statement said.
New York Times, November 7, 1945108
APPENDIX B
TEXT OF DUTCH POLICY STATEMENT
10 February 1946
In their policy regarding Indonesia: the Netherlands Govern-
ment are inspired by the conviction expressed in the address deliv-
ered by Her Majesty the Queen on December 6, 1942, by the following
words:
"I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can
continue to exist which is not supported by the voluntary accept-
ance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry.”
The Netherlands Government consequently take the view that
the peoples of Indonesia should, after a given preparatory period,
be enabled freely to decide their political destiny. Therefore,
the Netherlands Government, deeply conscious of their responsibil-r
ity, consider it their duty to do everything in their power in
order to create and to fulfill as soon as possible the conditions
which will permit such a free decision to be taken and which will
assure its international recognition, thereby complying with
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.
Without derogating in any way from the above-mentioned princi-
ple, the Netherlands Government are furthermore convinced that the
true interests of the country and of the respective peoples of
Indonesia will thereafter find their best guarantee in the volun-
tary continuation, in the words of Her Majesty, of:
”A realm in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and
Curasao will participate with complete self-reliance and freedom
of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with
the readiness to render mutual assistance."
The Netherlands Government, therefore, intend, in consultation
with authoritative representatives of Indonesia elected from a
large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the Kingdom and
for Indonesia based upon democratic partnership. This structure
will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it
is believed that the conditions which will make possible the tak-
ing of the above-mentioned free decision will be fulfilled; after
that period the partners shall independently decide upon the con-
tinuance of their relations on the basis of a then complete and
voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the question
whether that period should be further extended before a free de-
cision can be taken shall be submitted to a procedure of concilia-
tion or, if necessary, arbitration.109
With respect to the structure mentioned in the foregoing
paragraph, discussions will be held in accordance with the follow-
ing main points:
(A)	There shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, a partner in the
Kingdom, composed of territories possessing different degrees
of autonomy.
(B)	There shall be established an Indonesian citizenship for all
born in Indonesia; Netherlands and Indonesian citizens shall
be entitled to exercise all civic rights in all parts of the
Kingdom.
(C)	The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth of Indonesia shall be
managed independently by the Commonwealth's own institutions;
for the Commonwealth as a whole the creation of a democratic
representative body containing, therefore, a substantial Indo-
nesian majority, is contemplated, and furthermore a Cabinet
formed in political harmony with the representative body, and
a representative of the Crown as the head of the Government's
executive.
(D)	To be enabled to fulfill the obligations incumbent upon the
Kingdom as a result of Article 73 of the Charter of the United
Nations, the representative of the Crown shall possess under
his responsibility to the Government of the Kingdom, special
powers to guarantee fundamental rights, an efficient adminis-
tration and sound financial management. These powers shall
be exercised only when these rights and interests are affected
(E)	The envisaged Constitution containing the above-mentioned
structure shall comprise guarantees for fundamental rights
such as freedom of worship, legal equality without discrimin-
ation as to creed or race, protection of person and property,
independence of the judiciary, protection of the rights of
minorities, freedom of education and freedom of opinion and
expression.
(F)	The central institutions functioning for the entire Kingdom
shall be composed of representatives of the constituent parts
of the Kingdom. The establishment of a Commonwealth Cabinet
composed of Ministers from the constituent parts of the King-
dom is contemplated, as also Commonwealth legislation requir-
ing the agreement of the Parliaments of the respective
constituent parts of the Kingdom.
(G)	After the entry into force of the above-mentioned Constitution
the Netherlands Government shall promote the early admission
of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of the United
Nations Organization.
Cf. Wehl, op. cit., pp. 110-111.110
APPENDIX C
INDONESIAN PROPOSALS IN ANSWER
TO THE DECLARATION OF DUTCH POLICY
13 March 1946
1.	The Republic of Indonesia shall be recognized as exercising
the sovereign authority in the: tqrritory of the former Nether-
lands Indies.
2.	The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall, if necessary,
be rendered in complete harmony with fundamental principles pre-
vailing in a democratic state; in so doing due consideration
shall be given to the protection of minorities.
3.	in accordance with these principles the requirements for citizen-
ship shall be determined on the most liberal basis possible; how-
ever, those among the non-Indonesians who prefer to remain
aliens shall not be prevented from doing so.
4.	On the premise to be guided by public welfare, the policy
followed with respect to admittance of aliens for domicile and
labor, as of investment and operation for foreign capital, shall
be the open door policy.
5.	Debts of the Netherlands Indies and of the autonomous territor-
ies incurred prior to March, 1942, shall for the remainder be
transferred to the Republic of Indonesia.
6.	Agreements shall be concluded with the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands to regulate Netherlands interests in matter of personnel,
finance, economy and others in an.equitable manner.
7.	For a defined period a federative union shall be constituted,
composed of the Netherlands and Indonesia, whereby the conduct
of foreign relations and of the defense of both countries shall
be entrusted to a federal institution comprised of Dutch and
Indonesian representatives.
8.	The federal institution has the additional task of assuring
that in both states the fundamental (human) rights shall be
respected, that an efficient administration and a sound finan-
cial management are guaranteed and the agreements referred to
under point 6 are adhered to.
9· Immediately after this agreement becomes effective the Nether-
lands forces shall be withdrawn from Indonesia. Wherever nec-
essary, they shall be replaced by the forces of the Republic.Ill
10.	Likewise, general amnesty shall be granted to persons convicted
or prosecuted because of political and related offenses.
11.	The Netherlands Government shall promote the admission of Indo-
nesia as a member of the UNO.
12.	Pending these discussions all military movements shall be
suspended and the Indonesian Government shall undertake to
devote special attention to the protection and evacuation of
Dutch and other internees.
Van Mook, op. cit., pp. 123-124, trans, by the writer112
APPENDIX D
PROVISIONAL DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY PRIME MINISTER SJAHRIR
TO LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR-GENERAL DR. VAN MOOK ON MARCH 27, 1946.
(The Amended van Mook Proposals of March 25, 1946).
The Netherlands Government represented by Dr. Hubertus van Mook,
Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Pres-
ident, Ir. Soekarno and Prime Minister, Soetan Sjahrir, have
agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority in Java and
Sumatra exclusive of areas under control of the ;Allie<i Military
Administration. It agrees to cooperate with the Government of the
Republic in the rapid formation of an Indonesian federative Free
State, composed of all parts of the Netherlands Indies, partner
in a political union with the Netherlands, Surinam and Curasao,
and in concurrence with the general principles of the Statement of
the Netherlands Government of February 10, 1946.
Article 2
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia undertakes to
welcome in a friendly manner the Allied Forces, inclusive of those
of the Netherlands, which are in or will enter Java and Sumatra,
and to assist them in the execution of their task of accepting
the surrender of and evacuating the Japanese forces, and of re-
leasing the former internees and prisoners of war. The procedure
to execute this task shall be a matter of subsequent consultation
between the parties.
Article 3
Immediately after the agreement becomes effective, the parties
shall cease hostilities and in so doing maintain their present
positions, except as provided for under Article 2. As soon as
possible there shall be consultations between the two parties on
the cooperation necessary for the factual implementation of this
provision.
Article 4
As soon as possible the Government of the Netherlands shall
begin negotiations with the Government of the Republic on the
structure of the Indonesian Free State referred to in Article 1,
its status in the Union, its relations with foreign powers, its113
cooperation with the Netherlands and the promotion of material
and cultural interests of the Dutch and aliens in Indonesia. The
negotiations may be held in Jogjakarta, Batavia or The Hague.
Article 5
Representatives of territories other than Java and Sumatra,
and of the most important non-Indonesian communities, shall be
admitted to participate in the negotiations mentioned in the pre-
ceding Article. The territories and communities which have been
considered for special representation are defined in the appendix
to this agreement. Regulations concerning the designation of
these representatives shall be stipulated in an agreement between
the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.
The territories and communities referred to in this Article shall
have the authority to delegate their right of representation to
the Republic.
Article 6
If a territory, through its representatives, expresses the
opinion that it provisionally objects to joining unconditionally
the Free State to be constituted, allowing for such objections
provisions shall be made for the territory concerned to have a
temporarily special status within the Free State and with respect
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. After a period of three years
a plebiscite shall be held to determine the future relationship.
Article 7
This agreement shall be drawn up in the Dutch and Indonesian
languages. In case of a difference of opinion regarding the mean-
ing of the text, the Dutch text shall prevail.
The agreement becomes effective upon signature.
Van Mook, op. cit., pp. 126-129, trans. by the.writer.114
APPENDIX E
NETHERLANDS DRAFT PROTOCOL SUBMITTED
TO THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION ON APRIL 14, 1946
Protocol
On March..., 1946, a Netherlands delegation and an Indonesian
delegation met in Batavia to discuss the current difficulties.
Subsequently, these discussions were continued until April....
1946, and, after consultations with the Netherlands Government in
Holland, led to the following conclusions.
(1)	The Netherlands Government shall promote that, in accordance
with constitutional procedure and as soon as possible, a feder-
ative Commonwealth of Indonesia shall be established, as a part
ner of the Netherlands, Surinam and Curasao in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, in which Java (Madura iriclpded) as component
part of the Commonwealth shall constitute an autonomous repub-
lic, and in concurrence with the principles of the Statement
of the Netherlands Government of February 10, 1946.
(2)	The Government of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed on Aug-
ust 17, 1945, shall on behalf of the Indonesian population of
Java take part in the formation of the Commonwealth and also
exert its influence for the realization of the structure de-
fined under (1).
Pending the legitimate formation of the Commonwealth, the
administration in Java, with the exception of the territories
occupied by the Allied military administration, shall be
carried out by the above-mentioned government which is respon-
sible for the restoration and the maintenance of order, and
the protection of life and property, inclusive of immediately
releasing and safeguarding persons presently interned, if
necessary in cooperation with the organs of the Netherlands
Government.
(3)	The other parts of the Netherlands Indies shall be given the
opportunity to freely express their wishes with respect to
their status within the Commonwealth.
(4)	In preparation of the Realm Conference the Netherlands Govern-
ment shall, as soon as possible, begin consultations with the
representatives of the several parts, and of the non-Indonesian
communities of Indonesia, on the structure of the Indonesian
Commonwealth and its status within the political union
(gemeenschappelijk staatsverband). Consultations shall take
place either in Indonesia, or in the Netherlands.115
(5)	The representatives of the several parts and of the non-
Indonesian communities of Indonesia shall freely be designated
by their own organizations.
(6)	The provisional government referred to under (2) shall welcome
in a friendly manner the Allied and Netherlands forces which
in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Allied Command
are in or will enter Java, and, shall assist them in the execu-
tion of their task of liberating the ex-internees and the ex-
prisoners of war, and of detaining and evacuating the Japanese
troops with their armament. The procedure and execution of
this task shall be subjected to subsequent regulation by the
authorities concerned.
(7)	Hostilities shall be suspended immediately, whereby both par-
ties, except as provided for under the preceding article, shall
maintain their present positions and their lines of communica-
tions. They shall, as soon as possible, have consultations on
the cooperation necessary for the implementation of this pro-
vision .
(8)	Pending the legitimate formation of the Indonesian Commonwealth,
and in order to render the general administration of the Nether-
lands Indies as much as possible in accordance with the above-
mentioned provisions, the Council of the Department Heads shall
again be constituted and a provisional People's Council
(Volksraad) shall be formed based on Royal Decree of December
23~, 1943,	(Stbl.D.66) and in cooperation with the provisional
government referred to under (2), and with representatives
of other parts of Indonesia.
(9)	This Protocol is drafted in Dutch and in the Indonesian
language. In case of a difference of opinion regarding the
meaning of the text, the Dutch text shall prevail.
Appendix Summary Records H.V., trans, by the writer.116
APPENDIX F
SOME REMARKS ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN:
THE VAN MOOK PROPOSAL OF MARCH 25 AS AMENDED BY PRIME MINISTER
SJAHRIR AND THE DRAFT PROTOCOL OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT
OF APRIL 14.
The remarks are made under the headings:
1.	the proposed status;
2.	Commonwealth, Free State, free State;
3.	partition of Indonesia as suggested by Colijn;
4.	the territory of the Republic at present.
These remarks will make it clear that the draft protocol means
a considerable retrogression, not only in form, but also in sub-
stance. This is a grave disappointment because for that reason
the protocol will probably not be acceptable to the Republican
Government despite the fact that it is aware of the possible al-
ternative of the use of force if the protocol is not accepted. On
the other hand it is felt that such an alternative will have a
boomerang-effect. Moreover, in Indonesia it is generally expected
that the amended van Mook proposal has been accepted here ; (in
Holland). This document in itself contains provisions which will
be very diffipult to make acceptable to the Republicans. It is
likely, therefore, that in order to prepare the public in Indonesia
for acceptance of the van Mook proposal, leakage to the press re-
garding some aspects of the proposal has already been allowed
(e.g. that the Republic shall be recognized for Java and Sumatra).
Lord Inverchapel who was fully informed of the developments lead-
ing to the result achieved on March 27, as based on the Vietnam
treaty, also thought that everything would be all right. For that
matter, the British Government would be disappointed too.
I. The Proposed Status.
The Indonesian delegation has noted the differences which
exist between:
(1)	the substance of the proposed status as can be derived
from the provisions of the draft proposals, and
(2)	its name which, to be sure, should not be too incongruous
with its substance, but which need not completely cover
the substance. Besides, the import of a term is not al-
ways clearly defined: thus the term self-determination,
so frequently referred to in international literature,
does not mean the right of complete self-determination.
In the counterproposals of the Republic of March 13, the in-
dependence of Indonesia was insisted on. The independence, however,117
was already very much limited by restrictions which had been sub-
sequently proposed (confederation, extreme authority of the con-
federation's institutions, excessive treaty provisions). This
curtailment was real and the independence unsubstantial. However,
the term (independence) was preferred because it conforms best to
the ideal; that would be the best way to make the settlement accept
able to the Indonesian people without thereby neglecting the nec-
essary caution vis-a-vis the matter of substance.
The discussions finally resulted in the fact that the term
independence was abandoned also. This was conditioned on giving
satisfaction to the nationalist sentiment by a frank, open and
direct recognition of the Republic (which would be in a political
union /s~taatsverband/ with the Netherlands) .
This satisfaction (although barely adequate) can be found in
the van Mook draft of March 25, based on the Vietnam treaty. On
the other hand, the so-called "recognition of the Republic" re-
ferred to in the draft protocol of April 14 is too rudimentary
to be satisfactory. The status of the Republic projected in the
Dutch proposal would put her on a lower level than France had done
with Vietnam. This standing is too inferior for any Republican
Government to agree to.
Recapitulation of the differences;
Republican proposal of March 13, 1946:
sovereignty, therefore complete equality with the Nether-
lands in a confederation (Art. 1, 6, and.7), although
with adequate limitation (Art. 6, 7 and 8) to guarantee
Dutch interests,etc.
Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:
recognition of the Republican Government as exercising
de facto authority in Java and Sumatra (Art. 1). From
the wording of the other articles it is clear that the
Republican Government is a party to the agreement
(Art. 2 and 4) even though it is evident that it is under
the suzerainty of the Netherlands (Art. 1). Reference
is frequently made to the "Republican Government." The
form of the agreement is such that the Indonesians can
still consider the solution as honorable.
Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:
Java as an autonomous republic (Art. 1) representing the
Indonesian part of the population of that island, may
take part in the formation of the Indonesian Commonwealth
(Art. 2). This government constitutes the "provisional
administration of Java," (Art. 2, 5, 6 and 8). Immediate-
ly following the signing of the document, an administra-
tive superstructure is to be set up (Art. 8). This
institution can relegate the position of the Java Repub-
lic to that of a provincial organization. In another
article the Republic is put on equal footing with the118
other territories (Art. 4) and with the non-Indonesian
communities... This "treatment" of the Republic cannot be
qualified as honorable. it is further underscored by the
fact that the form of the Dutch proposal is not that of
an international agreement but rather that of a protocol,
in which the Republican Government is not referred to as
such, but deliberately as a "provisional administration"
(Art.5,6 and 8).
II. Commonwealth, Free State, and free State.
Inasmuch as the term "Commonwealth" is considered undesirable
by Indonesian intellectuals because in stands for the federative
idea, and reminds one too much of the Colijn-partition idea (which
is identified with the divide-and-rule idea);
inasmuch as its meaning is indeterminate and does not offer
any guarantee against the return of a colonial structure;
inasmuch as it cannot be translated into the Indonesian lang-
uage, this term is probably unacceptable to the Republican Govern-
ment as the name for the political superstructure in Indonesia.
The term "Free State" can be translated (negara merdeka), it
holds a guarantee against colonialism and signifies a large measure
of independence.
The term "Free State" has been changed into "free State" in
the amended van Mook proposal (Art. 1, 4 and 6) to preserve the
possibility of calling the political superstructure a "republic."
This would be the case when the entire territory of Indonesia,
or almost all of it expresses the desire to join the Republic. A
separate name for the superstructure would then be senseless.
Further, it is deplorable that in the draft protocol the struc
ture of the Commonwealth and its status in the political union
(staatsverband) are only mentioned and every indication with res-
pect to its independence has been omitted (Art. 4).
Recapitulation of the differences:
Amended van Mook proposals of March 25:
"free State" (Art. 1, 4 and 6) can result in a "Republic"
or in a "Free State"; negotiations will be held with the
Republican Government regarding the structure of the free
State, its status in the political union, its relations
with foreign powers, and its cooperation with the Nether-
lands, etc. (Art. 4).
Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:
"Commonwealth" (Art. 1, 3, 4 and 8). The Dutch Govern-
ment will hold consultations with the several territories
concerning the structure of the Commonwealth and its
status in the political union (staatsverband) (Art. 4).119
III. The Colijn Partition of Indonesia.
Sometimes with the argument of fear of domination by Javanese,
and again with other arguments drawn from the arsenal of democracy,
the partition of Indonesia into separate areas is championed. At
first such efforts give rise to amazement for an Indonesia divided
into parts possessing provincial autonomy, and all under a single
superstructure, existed in the former Netherlands Indies and is
present in the Republican organization.'
A partition of Indonesia can, therefore, be viewed only as a
measure to prevent (at least reduce the chance to the minimum) that
the Republic, which is referred to as Javanese, will extend over all
territories: the intention is not tohavethe Republican Government
(strengthened by the Dutch), but the N.I.C.A. organization (forti-
fied with Indonesians) as the administrative superstructure.'.'
The Republic may continue to exist, but as an autonomous sub-
division in some form of provincial organization (Art. 8). If
that is not the intention, Indonesia in the immediate future would
have two Cabinets, two sets of government departments, etc. which
would involve a most expensive organization. Shortage of funds
and personnel and waste which would result from such a situation
is too obvious to make it acceptable. If it is indeed the inten-
tion to make a province out of the Republic it can never result
in a satisfactory settlement because the Indonesian people will
feel thoroughly deluded and peace achieved in this manner will
never bring contentment. Hence, the subordination of the Repub-
lic to an administrative superstructure is less recommendable.
What, then, is to be done?
According to Mr. Sjahrir the best policy would be to have the
Republic on a level of importance whereby its government can form
a constituent part of the proposed superstructure. It is thereby
understood that all parts of Indonesia shall have adequate repre-
sentation. In this respect sufficient guarantees shall be created
for the minority groups.
That in the meanwhile the Republic has already been recognized
as the most important organized part of the Indonesian people,
appears both from the van Mook proposal of March 25, and from the
draft protocol of the Dutch Government of April 14, although the
measure and the form of recognition reveal outstanding differences;
this will appear from the following.
Recapitulation of the areas of agreement and of difference:
Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:
the agreement is concluded with the Republic (as indicated
at the beginning); with the Republic an agreement is
made to set up an independent State which comprises the
whole of Indonesia (Art. 1); the other territories shall
be admitted to participate in the negotiations (Art. 5).
Regulations to designate representatives of the other120
territories shall be determined by agreement between the
Dutch and the Republican Governments,(Art. 5).
Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:
The protocol will be signed by representatives of the
Dutch and of the Republican Governments. However: the
Netherlands Government promotes the formation of an Indo-
nesian Commonwealth, and the Republican Government "takes
part in it" (Art. 2). No "negotiations" tjut "consultations"
will be held with the Indonesians. The Republic is there-
by placed on the same level with the other territories
(Art. 4). The Republic will only be informed of the
names of the representatives of the other territories
(Art. 5). It stands out clearly that the protocol does
not mention which territories and minorities shall be
represented, while the van Mook proposal of March 25 does
mention them (Art. 5).
IV. The Territory of the Republic (At Present).
There are two points of view regarding the matter based on
the following:
(1)	how far has the Republic penetrated into the hearts of the
people (Sjahrir's standpoint);
(2)	how much real authority (militarily and administratively)
does the Republic exercise (van Mook's standpoint).
If (1) is taken as the point of departure, then there is no
doubt whatsoever that not only Java and Sumatra but also Celebes,
Bali, Lombok and other islands will have to be considered as Repub-
lican territory; dispatches (letters, by couriers, etc.) have re-
vealed that the opinion of the people in those areas is
preponderantly Republican although this may seem only partially
true from the sporadic attacks on Dutch army patrols which apparent-
ly is due to the fact that the pfeople lack arms to put up large-
scale resistance. Basing one's conclusion on the viewpoint under
(2), then the non-Republican territory would be those areas where
Republican feelings cannot (or, can no longer) contribute to
Republican authority because of the penetration of Allied power.
For that matter, the greater part of Celebes should be added to
Java and Sumatra to comprise Republican territory.
Although the Republican Government is as a matter of course
given to base its standpoint on (1) (as is the case with its counter-
proposals of March 13) which is in harmony with the Indonesian
Constitution, the discussions in Djakarta eventually resulted in
its acceptance (vide: report of joint sub-committee of March 27)
of (2) as the starting point (factual authority). Consequently,
Mr. Sjahrir has agreed to having the territory of the Republic
limited to Java and Sumatra, while noting that on this basis the
greater part of Celebes should actually be under the jurisdiction
of the Republic.121
It should be noted that in taking (2) as the point of depart-
ure, which as a policy of the Sjahrir Government can be clearly
explained and be made acceptable to the Republicans, the problem
of "being able to accept all consequences" (viewpoint of
Schermerhorn) has, correctly so, never been brought up inasmuch
as this matter was provided for by a projected increase of Repub-
lican capacity to do so through assistance of the Dutch.
In conclusion it is noted that because of "leakage" to the
public the territorial delimitation "Java and Sumatra," has already
found acceptance with the Indonesian people. Thereby, considerable
alarm was apparent among the Menadonese and Amboinese communities.
They considered its acceptance as a betrayal of those parts of the
Indonesian people as represented by them.
From the above it can be concluded that the limitation of
Republican territory to Java alone, as proposed in the draft
protocol of the Dutch Government, will probably be unacceptable
to the Republican Government. It would result, either in a void of
authority, or, in a clash between Republican authority and the
authority to be newly introduced. The latter would likely be
vested in N.I.C.A. personnel. It should never be forgotten that
however weak Republican authority in Sumatra may be, it is the
only authority effective in the island, and, which if strengthened
can easily be perfected. Justice is administered on behalf of the
Republic, taxes are levied, and concessions granted in the name of
the Republic. In Sumatra the T.R.I. (Republican army) too, is the
only organized armed force. How could the Republican Government
give it all up without losing face?
Recapitulation of the differences:
Republican proposal of March 13, 1946:
all of Indonesia is to be Republican territory.
Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:
Java and Sumatra are to be under the jurisdiction of the
Republic; in the other territories after three years a
plebiscite will be held to decide whether these areas want
to join the Republic or not (Art. 1, 2 and 6).
Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14;
the Republic is limited to Java.
Appendix Summary Records H.V. , trans, by the writer.
Note on the "Colijn partition,” Arthur A. Schiller, The Formation
of Federal Indonesia, The Hague, Bandung, W. van Hoeve Ltd
T9"55, pp."15-16.---------
"A more serious proposal was outlined in 1917. This time the
plan came from Dr. Hendrik Colijn, a respected figure who was sub-
sequently several times Prime Minister of the Netherlands. The122
government had earlier proposed the establishment of a People's
Council (Volksraad) to act as an advisory body to the government
of the Netherlands Indies. The plan called for a council which
was representative of the entire Indies. The council was to be
partly elected and partly appointed. Colijn strongly advocated a
wholly different set-up. It was first necessary, he said, to
build autonomy and self-rule from the bottom up and thus to estab-
lish homogeneous ethnic groups which in the course of time could
be combined to form ’island’ provinces. These provinces were to
be charged with complete control of internal affairs, including
the local budget. Imperial and foreign affairs only remained under
the central government, the Netherlands Indies administration. The
time to consider the formation of a Provincial Council representing
the individual island governments would be when the 'island' pro-
vinces demonstrated their ability to govern themselves. Colijn
insisted that a People's Council of the type proposed would result
only in the control of the whole of Indonesia coming under the
largest ethnic group, the Javanese.»123
APPENDIX G
COMPOSITION OF THE STATES-GENERAL*
Political Parties	First (Upper) Chamber Second (Lower) Chamber
1937	1937
Roman Catholics (K.V.P.) 16 31
Anti-Revolutionaries (A.R.P.) 7 17
Christian Historic Union (C.H.U.) 6 8
State Reformed Party - 2
Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) - 2
Rightwing total 29 60
Liberals (Liberal Center) 3 4
Liberal Democrats 2 6
Social Democrats (S.D.A.P.) 12 23
Communists _ 3
Leftwing total	17	36
National Socialists	4	4
♦From: P.J. Oud, Het Jongste Verleden, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van
Nederland,Assen, Van Gorcum & Co. N.V., 1951, Vol. VI, Biilage II
p. 237.	’
RESULT OF FIRST POSTWAR GENERAL ELECTIONS OF MAY 17, 1946
FOR SECOND CHAMBER**
Catholic People’s Party (K.V.P.)	32 seats
Labor Party (Partij van
Anti-Revolutionary Party
Communist Party
Christian Historic Party
Freedom Party (V.V.D.)
State Reformed Party
e Arbeid)	29	seats
(A.R.P.)	13	seats
	10	seats
(C.H.U.)	8	seats
	6	seats
	2	seats
♦♦Netherlands News Letter, published by the Netherlands Information
Bureau, 1U Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, No 5, June 1,
1 θ 4 6.125
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