Mf-T. npjif
THE WILOPO CABINET, 1952-1953;
A TURNING POINT
IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA
HERBERT FEITH
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1958
distributed in cooperation with
The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
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I
THE VILOPO CABINET, 1952-1953’
A TURNING POINT
•	IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA
Herbert Feith
1
I
*
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
i	Ithaca5 New York
L	1958
J	distributed in cooperation with
*	The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
Price $3„50I
© 1958 by Herbert Feith
i
Je
k.
*Ill
PREFACE
The Wilopo Cabinet was something of a watershed in post-revolutionary
'	Indonesian politics. During its fourteen months of existence basically
important changes developed in the constellation of political power among
the major political parties, the President, and the army. And within one
of the major parties there occurred a shift in the relative strength of
leadership groups of such importance as to bring about significant
changes in the party’s political posttire and in its relationship with
several of the other parties. It was during this period that cabinet
government was seriously undermined and parliament lost much of its
prestige and power; and it was during these fourteen months that were
set in train many of the developments which have dominated Indonesian
political life in the last few years.
The key political events of this period are complex and confusing
and have generally been but imperfectly understood outside of Indonesia.
Yet failure to understand them can result in more than inability to
understand the period itself. It will also make difficult any full and
sound comprehension of the important developments of the past few years.
Herbert Feith, in my judgment, has probed much further into the events
of this period than any other non-Indonesian scholar. He has searched
out a great deal of significant new data which he has analyzed with
i,	tools sharpened by long residence and research in Indonesia, interviews
with many knowledgeable Indonesians and a full mastery of the Indonesian
language. I believe he has presented as clear a picture of an important
s	period of Indonesian history and of its shaping of subsequent events
as is likely to emerge for some time.
Formerly at the University of Melbourne, Mr. Feith is currently
Research Fellow in the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University.
Ithaca, New York
August 1, 1958
George McT. Kahin
Directori
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	Page
I. BACKGROUND: POST REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA......------------- 1
The Round Table Conference Agreement
The Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman Cabinets
Major Problems in the Fields of Administration,
Internal Security and the Economy
Political Tasks
The Situation on the Eve of the Fall
of the Sukiman Cabinet
II. BACKGROUND: PARTY POLITICS................................ 19
Intellectuals and Mass Leaders in the Political Elite
The Newspaper Reading Public and its Main Component Elements
The Non-Newspaper Reading Public or Mass
Extra-ParT iamentary Power Groups and the General Context
of Party Politics
The Organization of Parties
The Indonesian Socialist Party
The Indonesian Communist Party and the Partai Murba
The Masjumi and P.S.I.I.
The P.N.I., the Minor Nationalist Parties
and the Christian PartiesVI
CHAPTER	PaSe
<
III. THE FAIL OF THE SUKIMAN CABINET AND THE FORMATION
OF THE CABINET OF WILOPO.................................. 57
The Issue of Mutual Security Administration Aid
The Independent Foreign Policy in Indonesian
Political Thinking
The Fall of the Cabinet
The Struggles and Issues of Cabinet Formation
The Wilopo Cabinet, Its Members
and their Political Orientation
The Cabinet’s Policy Statements
IV. COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM............................... &3
The Changing Relationship of the Communist Party
to Other Parties
Reasons for the Mid-1952 Changes in P.K.I. Attitudes	<
to Nationalism, the P.N.I. and President Soekarno
Reasons for P.N.I. Preparedness to Cooperate
with the Communist Party
V. THE STORM IN THE ARMY................................... 103
The Post Korea War Financial Crisis
Government Plans for Soldier Demobilization
Grievances and Divisions inside the Army
The Bambang Supeno Case and the Parliamentary Debates
on Army Affairs
October 17, 1952
The Regional Military Coups of October-November 1952
Government Policy with regard to the October 17 Affair
The Effects of the October 17 Affair on the Pattern
of Political AlignmentsVll
CHAPTER	Page
VI» TOWARDS ELECTIONSoο ο ο ο ο ο ο οο ο ο οο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο οο ο ο ο ο ο οooο ο οooocοo	l4l
Causes of Earlier Delays in Moving towards Elections
The Impetus Provided "by the October 17 Affair
Attempts to Delay the Government’s Elections Bill
The Debates on the Bill
Party Attitudes and Party Alignments
in the Elections Question
The Issue of the Islamic State
VII. THE FALL OF THE CABINETooodoooooooooooooooooooaooeoooooooooo 165
The Economic Situation in Early 1953
The Security Situation
Political Ferments Eegionalisms Anti-Foreign Feeling
The Question of Diplomatic Relations with the U«,SoSeRe
A New Phase of the Army Crisis
Criticism of the Government’s Financial and
Economic Policies
Foreign Capital and Peasant Squatting
The PoNoIo’s Role in Causing the Fall of the Cabinet
Broader Changes in Political Relationships
VIII e CONCLUSIONS* οοοοοβοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοβοοοοοββοβοοββοβοοβ^οο·»®»
The Cabinet’s Achievements
The Cabinet’s Failures
Limitations Imposed by Changes in Party Alignments
Limitations Imposed by the General Political Framework
The Wilopo Cabinet as a Turning Point in the Politics
of Post-Revolutionary Indonesia4ix
FOEEWAED
Most of the material for this monograph was collected while I was
employed hy the Indonesian Ministry of Information between July 1951 and
August 1953 and again between August 195^ and August 1956. I wish here
to express my gratitude to the heads of the Ministry for the generous
interest which they took in my studies and the opportunities they gave
me to meet politically active persons both in Djakarta and in a number
of other parts of Indonesia.
I am equally grateful to the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
which has supported me financially since my return from Indonesia to
Australia in August 1956. The assistance of the Project made it possible
for me to work and travel in Indonesia between May and August 1957 and
subsequently to come to Ithaca. Finally I would like to record my thanks
to all the many individual persons who have given of their time to help
me come closer to an understanding of Indonesia’s problems. I am, of
course, myself solely responsible for all opinions expressed.
The point of departure for this study was an M.A. thesis on ’’Political
Developments in Indonesia in the Period of the Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953"
submitted to the University of Melbourne in July 195^» The present
monograph discusses the same period on the basis of additional material
collected in the course of subsequent research in Indonesia. It under-
takes to look at the period more analytically and in the context of the
eight and a half years of the post-revolutionary period. My aim has
been to write a case study of the general political framework of the
post-independence period and to show the Wilopo cabinet as a focal point
in the country’s political development in this period.
Although I have been particularly fortunate in the amount of material
to which I was given access by the Ministry of Information and in the
range of associations which my work there enabled me to obtain, also in
the wealth of library material which is available to me thanks to being
at Cornell, I have nevertheless found many types of information important
to this study to be outside my reach. Partly for this reason, partly
because so little study has been done of Indonesian politics, and partly
also because of the nature of research on current political developments
anywhere, I have found time and again that my evidence is incomplete or
not wholly reliable. Where this was the case I have, for the sake of
the completeness of the monograph, included my own conjectures with an
indication of the degree to which they may be relied, upon.
Herbert Feith
Ithaca, New York
August 1, 195841
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND: POST-REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA
On December 27, 1949, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia
was formed, on the basis of the results of the two-month Round Table
Conference at the Hague. Considering its background—more than four years
of intermittent warfare—it was a remarkable achievement of compromise.
Men from both sides will continue to debate whether it was primarily
American pressure or primarily the military strength of the Indonesian
Republic which finally convinced Holland that she had to accept a pre-
dominantly Republican Indonesia. However that may be, it was this reali-
zation on Holland’s part, and the strength of the moderate leadership of
the Indonesian Republic, which made the Round Table Conference Agreement
possible. At this point there came an end to the similarity in political
paths between Indonesia and Indo-China.
Indonesia was independent—and yet not in the way she had wanted to
be. The new state was in many ways predominantly Republican and yet its
very structure reflected the Dutch policy of "divide and rule." The
Republic of the United States of Indonesia included the old Republic of
Indonesia in a definitely leading position, but also the 15 other states
and territories, which had been established by the Dutch in the areas
under their control between 1946 and 1949.
Of greatest concern both to the men of the revolutionary Republic
of Indonesia and to the representatives of the Dutch-sponsored federal
states were two other aspects of the Agreement. Firstly it placed a
heavy national debt on the new federation’s shoulders. The R.U.S.I. had
to accept 4.3 billion guilders (nearly $1.13 billion) of the Netherlands
Indies state debt, a large part of it the costs of the campaign to re-
impose colonial rule. And, significantly for future Indonesian-Dutch
relations, the status quo was to be maintained in Irian or West New
Guinea, which had until then been regarded as part of the Netherlands
fndies, "with the stipulation that within a year from the date of trans-
fer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the
question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through
negotiations" between the two parties, (l)
(1) See Round Table Conference Results, Secretariat-General of the Round
Table Conference, The Hague, 19^9? Perdjuangan di Konrerensi Media
Bundar (The Struggle at the Round Table Conference), Kementerian
Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1949» George McT.
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University2
On December 20, 1949, Drs. Mohammad Hatta, who had been, and in a
formal sense remained, Vice-President of the "Republic of Indonesia,"
was installed as Prime Minister of R.U.S.I., with a cabinet consisting
of eleven leaders from the Republic of Indonesia and five from the
federal states. This cabinet was most strongly supported by the two
largest political parties, the Moslem party Masjumi and the Indonesian
Nationalist party P.N.I., the two parties which had given fullest support
to the last pre-R.U.S.I. cabinet of the Republic to secure ratification
of the Round Table Conference Agreement. It contained members from these
two and two smaller parties. None of the ministers however were candi-
dates of their parties. For this was not a coalition cabinet, but a
"national business cabinet," formed on the basis of a largely uncontro-
versial short-term program. (2) Parliament was unable to overthrow it. (3)
The situation facing this cabinet at its formation was one of
triumph and chaos, a victory and yet in the eyes of many who had fought
for it most passionately, a Pyrrhic one. Dr. H„ J. van Mook, Lieutenant
Governor-General of Indonesia till 1948, wrote of the situation in these
terms: "The new government is, at its installation, faced by the terri-
fying task of governing a country without an administration that is in
running condition, with only few organized sources of income, with an in-
flation that increases daily, and, worst of all, with an uncertain but
large number of armed groups and individuals who will obey its order only
in part." (4)
As the fire of the successful revolution spread from its centers in
the mountains of Java and Sumatra to every part of the archipelago, the
” Press. Ithaca. 1952. on. 433-445: and C. Smit. De Indonesische
Quaestie, Brill, Leiden, 1952, pp. 224-282. For a semi-official
Indonesian analysis of the results of the conference see Kementerian
Penerangan (Roeslan Abdulgani), Tindjauan Politik dan Ekonomi kita
pada Dewasa ini (A Review of Our Political and Economic Situation at
the Present Time), Publication Penra No. 5, Djakarta, 1951.
(2)	The "business cabinet" (zaken-kabinet) established in Dutch consti-
tutional procedure, enables persons of special ability, both party
and non-party men, to receive portfolios, and makes it possible for
a multi-party cabinet to be selected with a view to maximum possi-
bilities of teamwork.
(3)	This was not because it was a business cabinet. The 1949 constitu-
tion of the R.U.S.I. was written on the assumption that this would
be a short-lived cabinet, holding office only until a Constituent
Assembly had been elected and had prepared a constitution. It was
expected that Constituent Assembly elections would be held in the
course of 1950.
(4)	The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia, Allen and Unwin, London,
1950, p. 252.3
country indeed breathed hope and resolution» But the tasks were enormous.
A unity had to he created from two governments and two bureaucracies of
the Republic and the federal states» The Butch and Netherlands Indies
armies had to be replaced by the army of the Republic—and the Netherlands
Indies army in part absorbed into the latter. The fiery idealism of
Jogjakarta and the days of guerrilla fighting had to be accommodated in
the Batch-established structure of Bjakarta. Bevastated by eight years
of war and hunger, and saddled by the Hague agreement with an enormous
national debt, Indonesia had to be able to afford the radical changes
which alone, it seemed, would keep its old nationalist fighters from re-
turning to violence.
The achievements of the Hatta cabinet in its eight months of office
were considerable. It succeeded in unifying the currency and
checked the dangerous inflation by the forced loan it exacted by bank-
note cutting in March 1950» and in the same month it greatly stimulated
exports by a kind of partial devaluation with the introduction of the
system of foreign exchange certificates. (5) Already before the outbreak
of the Korean war the position of Indonesia’s export industry had im-
proved considerably, despite a very large number of strikes, and with
the Korean war boom in raw materials prices the situation showed further
great improvement. Much of the Hatta cabinet’s attention was able to be
devoted to the urgent tasks of restoring industries and means of communi-
cation which had been damaged or destroyed. For the rest it was concerned
with the smoothing of the huge changes which had to be made, particularly
as a result of the urgent need for demobilization and Of the turmoil
existing in the government service.
Whereas the Hatta cabinet was little hampered by parliamentary
opposition or internal political strife, it was prevented from devoting
its attention fully to the social and economic tasks it had set itself,
by military challenges to its authority. Many Republican irregulars
were unprepared to be demobilized, and established themselves in mountain
areas in many parts of the archipelago to defy the government, at least
until it would demobilize them on better terms.
But of greater danger to the state were the old Netherlands Indies
Army soldiers. Broups of these allowed themselves to be used by colonial-
ist and separatist elements in three important ''affairs»” The first of
these was the Westerling revolt in West Java in January 1950, planned,
as was later discovered, as part of a design of the federalist Sultan
Hamid of West Borneo to seize control of the army; the second, in April,
(5) Under this system foreign exchange was available to importers only
if, as well as paying the official rupiah equivalent, /they had bought
"foreign exchange certificates” for an additional 200% of the value
they required. Exporters were given foreign exchange certificates
to the value of 100% of the values they sold abroad, as well as re-
ceiving rupiah currency at the official rate.4
was the short-lived Abdul Aziz affair, the seizure of Makassar to prevent
the landing of ex-Eepublican R.U.S.I. troops there; and the third and
most troublesome was the one of the "Republic of the South Moluccas"
which caused a small-scale but bitter military campaign on the islands
of Ambon and Ceram lasting from July to November. (6)
It was the Hatta cabinet which saw the creation of a unitary state.
The federal states which with the Republic of Indonesia composed the
R.U.S.I. were mostly unnatural units, and all had lacked real independence
from the time of their inception. Most important of all, from the point
of view of the tremendous nationalist feeling which was abroad, they
were Dutch creations. (7) When once it was clear that the central govern-
ment was predominantly Republican, most of the groups which had hitherto
supported these states for their own interests, began to change their
loyalties. And so within five months of December 27, all of the states
had dissolved themselves into the Republic of Indonesia, or had agreed
to join with the R.U.S.I. in the creation of a new unitary state. (8)
On May 19 the R.U.S.I. and the Republic of Indonesia agreed "to
implement in cooperation the formation of a Unitary State as a materiali-
zation of the concept of the Republic of Indonesia aimed at in the
proclamation of August 17, 1945·" (9) Then in the two months which
followed, representatives of the two states completed a new interim
draft constitution, which was finally approved by the two houses of the
(6)	See Kahin. op. cit., pp. 454-460; Persadja, Persatuan Djaksa-djaksa
seluruh Ind one s ia (All-Indonesian Public Prosecutors* Association)
ed. Proces Peristiwa Sultan Hamid II (Court Proceedings in the Affair
of Sultan Hamid II), Fasco, Djakarta, 1955? J° Leimena, The Ambon
Question, 1950·
(7)	It was this fact which led to their collapse, rather than any feeling
against federalism as such. In the words of Moh. Hatta, "Although
a federal system is in fact suitable for such a far-flung archipelago
as Indonesia and might be expected to strengthen the feeling of
unity, the manner and timing of the move by the Netherlands Indies
Government had aroused such antipathy towards ideas of federation
that it was found necessary to make the change from a federal to a
unitary state before a constituent assembly could be formed to draw
up a definitive constitution.” "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign
Affairs, April 1953·
(8)	Only in the case of the states of East Indonesia and East Sumatra
was there sizeable opposition to this course of events and even there
popular feeling was strongly against the federal system.
(9)	Charter of Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of the
United States of Indonesia and the Republic of Indonesia. See Kahin,
op. cit., p. 461.5
R.U.S.I. and the Working Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia, and
adopted on August 15, 195θ°
Under this constitution a new unicameral provisional parliament was
established, consisting of the members of the R.U.S.I. House of Represen-
tatives, (l48 members) and Senate (29), of the "Working Parliament" of
the Republic of Indonesia (46) and its Supreme Advisory Council (13).
Further, the constitution laid it down that a Constituent Assembly should
be elected as soon as possible on the basis of one member for every
150,000 residents. (10)
On August 17, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the original procla-
mation of independence, the new unitary Republic of Indonesia was
formally inaugurated. The Hatta cabinet thereupon resigned and a new
period in Indonesian political history began.
The cabinet of Mohammad Natsir of the Masjumi, formed on October 6,
1950, was the first to be able to give its attention primarily to the
long-term problems which had so long been put aside as a result of the
priority given to military and political issues demanding immediate
decisions. It was a cabinet based principally on the Masjumi (four
seats), the Socialist Party (two seats), and the P.I.R.,Greater Indo-
nesia Union (two seats), with single representatives from the Democratic
Fraction, the P.S.I.I. (Islamic Association Party), Parindra (Greater
Indonesia Party), and the two Christian parties (the Protestant Parkindo
and the Catholic P.K.R.I.), and also contained five prominent non-party
men in leading positions. A united cabinet—regarded by some parties as
a "business cabinet"—it was, however, handicapped by its lack of a
reliable parliamentary majority.
In its seven and a half months of office, the Natsir cabinet was
able with its "Sumitro Plan" for co-operatives, small industries and
activization of the peasant section of the economy, to make a beginning
with the basic central policies which were to be pursued in the economic
sphere in the following years. Seeing the economic problem as central,
(10) The new constitution was a revision of the R.U.S.I. one, with a
number of "ideological" clauses from the Republican constitution of
1945 incorporated. These latter include equality before the law
and the right to work and to a reasonable standard of living. Also,
"The state shall be based upon the belief in the one God" and
"shall guarantee the freedom of the people to profess and exercise
their own religion," and "The economy shall be organized co-opera-
tively." The relation of the organs of government to one another
was left largely as under the R.U.S.I. Constitution, but the possi-
bility of a presidential cabinet was eliminated. It had been
arranged under the R.U.S.I.-R.I. Agreement that Soekarno should
be President of the new state, and that, subject to ministerial
discretion, the laws and regulations of the states were to remain
in force pending the introduction of new legislation.6
it pursued a strong policy directed towards the elimination of armed
hands, and in its foreign policy sought to bring about the sort of rela-
tions with foreign countries, particularly Holland and the United
States, which would make economic co-operation in Indonesia’s interest
more easily possible,, At the same time it endeavored to bring the
seriousness of the country’s difficulties squarely before the public»
Its weakness vis-a-vis Parliament, due in the first place to the
fact that the large PoN.I. was ranged in opposition to it, was accentuated
by its stringent financial measures, such as the heavy Turnover Tax of
November 1950» and by its inability to persuade Holland to surrender her
de facto authority in Irian (West New Guinea) by December 27, 1950» It
was finally forced to resign on March 20, 1951» as a result of the impasse
created when Parliament upheld its strong stand on the motion of Hadikusumo
of the P.N.I.passed two months earlier» This motion called for dissolu-
tion of the interim regional councils established in Java and Sumatra on
the basis of Government Regulation 39, 1950 (of the former member state,
Republic of Indonesia), which in practice worked to favor the Masjumi.
It was widely thought at the time that only with a cabinet including
both the P.N.I. and the Masjumi could Indonesia have stability of govern-
ment» However the big differences existing between thes6 two powerful
parties made the task of forming such a cabinet most difficult. One
attempt, that of Mr. Sartono of the P.N.Ifailed; the other of Dr»
Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (Masjumi) and Sidik Djojosukarto (P.N.I.) succeeded
only as a result of considerable and widely criticized personal inter-
vention by President Soekarno. P.IoR» (Greater Indonesia Union) obtained
three seats in this new cabinet. Five smaller parties, Parindra, Labor,.,
the Democratic Fraction and the two Christian parties,were given one
seat each, and there were two non-party members.
By contrast with its predecessor, this Sukiman cabinet, which was
officially termed a coalition cabinet, was strong in parliamentary support.
It was strong also because it was better able to work in co-operation
with President Soekarno, but on the other hand it was weak because of the
disunity in its ranks. This latter was evident, in the early months of
its period in office, in a series of policy zigzags on the freezing of
the already established regional councils, the freeing of political
prisoners held under Martial Law regulations, and the United Nations
embargo on the export of strategic materials to China. Its effects were
to be seen also in the patronage which the government felt it necessary
to dispense, for instance its very large delegations to overseas confer-
ences.
Stating that it accepted the general outlines of the Natsir cabinet’s
economic policy, this Sukiman cabinet was however less clear and careful
in its budget planning and this earned it a reputation of wastefulness.
With its anti-Communist raid of August 1951» (11) its strong policy against
strikes, and its readiness to yield further to United States pressures7
in the field of foreign policy, it based its economic policy to a con-
siderable extent on the hope of increased external assistance. At the
same time there were very considerable similarities in policy between
this cabinet and that of Natsir.
High rice prices and the government’s lack of success in solving
the security problem, prepared the situation for the Sukiman cabinet’s
fall. This was eventually to be precipitated by an issue of foreign
policy, which again brought the internal divisions in the Masjumi and
P.N.I. to the fore.
These were the main political developments of the period of the
first two cabinets of the unitary state. But what were the most important
problems facing the governments of the period? How did the Natsir
and Sukiman governments tackle these problems and what were the central
features of the situation they bequeathed to their successor, the Wilopo
cabinet? (12)
Some of the most important problems were those being faced in the
administrative apparatus. The Hatta cabinet had dealt with the difficult
beginnings of the problem of welding two administrations into one, but
the Natsir cabinet and its successors were left the task of creating
efficiency where the immediate past had left open political wounds. The
feeling between "nons" and "cos”—between those with an unblemished record
of work for the Republic and those who for reasons of conviction, ex-
pediency or necessity, had co-operated in one of the Dutch-sponsored
administrations—provided a basis for the clique systems which were to
continue to be one of the main problems of the administration.
With the rapid exodus of large numbers of Dutch and Indo-European
civil servants, the problem of lack of trained technical and administra-
tive personnel became increasingly serious. (13) When it is realized
(11)	This raid followed a series of violent incidents in West and East
Java and was described by government spokesmen as an attempt to
forestall a Communist revolt. 15,000 or more persons, including 16
members of parliament, a majority of them Communists or Communist
suspects, were arrested in the three weeks following August 16,
mainly in Java and North Sumatra. A large number were released
within a few months of their arrest, following the government’s
inability to document its case for the existence of a plot.
(12)	See G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesia’s Strengths and Weaknesses," Ear
Eastern Survey, September 26, 1951»
(13)	Under the Round Table Conference agreement Dutch citizens were
guaranteed their 19^9 salaries for a period of two years. By the
end of this time the great majority had left Indonesia. Those
remaining consisted of a small category of persons who accepted8
that the prewar Dutch policy of denying education and training to Indo-
nesians was carried to such lengths that in 1940 only 37 Indonesians
graduated from university colleges in the country, it is not surprising
that personnel in the higher ranges of skill were in extremely great
demand.
At the same time the government faced a real problem in retaining
highly skilled persons in its service. The egalitarianism of the Revolu-
tion had in radical manner leveled the very steep ratio of high to low
wages which had characterized the prewar Dutch administration, (14) and
the effect of this was to make government wages for persons in the higher
ranges of skill considerably lower than wages obtainable in outside em-
ployment. Whereas the attraction of the considerable power and the
prestige, both traditional and nationalist, of work in the government
service,militated against the tendency for trained men to leave, there
can be no doubt that a considerable depletion of skilled personnel did
occur, particularly from among the ranks of the "cos." The lack of
strong financial incentives in government work also produced a considerable
discipline problem; for the assumption of many officials in the middle
as well as the upper ranges of skill, that their presence in the govern-
ment service was a favor conferred upon it, made the pursuit of fair and
consistent personnel policies extremely difficult. The low salaries of
responsible officials also contributed to an increase in corruption,
which, although not yet as widespread as in most other Southeast Asian
countries, nevertheless constituted a serious problem. Not unrelated to
these evils was the growth of political party nepotism.
If lack of trained personnel was one central problem of the govern-
ment service, superfluity of untrained staff was certainly another. Faced
with the task of rewarding·the fighters to whom it owed its victory, and
of preventing these from becoming a source of political instability, the
revolutionary government accepted large numbers of these into its service.
The Hatta government of 1950 had contemplated a radical reduction of its
employees but this proved politically impossible, and so by early 1952
the number was 571,243 as compared with 144,974 in the Netherlands Indies
regular Indonesian salary scales and a larger number given expert
or semi-expert status and salaries. In early 1952 the total number
of government servants of foreign nationality, of whom the majority
were Dutch, or Eurasians who had retained Dutch nationality, was 7111»
Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (The
Government’s Statement of the Policy of the Wilopo Cabinet and Its
Replies to Parliamentary Criticism), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry
of Information), Djakarta, 1952, p. 178.
(14) The ratio between lowest and highest government salaries which had
been 1:112^ in 1938, was 1:8 in 1951· See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,
Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan (Indonesia at the Crossroads),
Penerbit Harian Abadi, Djakarta, 1951, P· 17»3
government service of 1930» (15) There were grounds for the charge that
the government service was a charitable institution! (16) A very similar
situation existed in the 200,000-strong heterogeneous army»
These shortcomings were of particular importance because Indonesia’s
situation and the social ideals of its leaders demanded that the govern-
ment should play a major role in the economic and social rebuilding to
be done»
One particular shortcoming, with administrative as well as political
effects, was the lack of any real regional autonomy,. For all this
period the situation was in this respect a very confused one, with a
high degree of centralized power in Djakarta and relations with the 12
provinces, the 149 regencies and regency-level municipalities, and the
laiiger number of districts and sub-districts, based on a series of ad hoc
and temporary measures,, This led to considerable jurisdictional con-
flicts and many delays, and there can be no doubt that resentment was
felt at the lack of real power, and particularly of the right of initia-
tive on financial matters, of the various governing and legislative
councils of the regions,, The situation was further complicated by the
fact that some of the newly established provincial boundaries were
strongly resented by the leadership of such regional and ethnic groups
as the Achinese of North Sumatra who sought separate province status,
and by the further fact that approximately 300 petty principalities,
almost all of them outside Java and Sumatra, continued intact.
The Natsir and Sukiman cabinets were obliged to give a great deal
of attention to problems of security. The South Moluccas revolt had
been broken by November 1950» "but it was not until early 1952 that most
of its leaders, who had fled to the interior of Ceram, were taken. Even
then several bands continued to be active on this island, but they were
of little military importance. With the defeat of the "Republic of the
South Moluccas" the challenge to security of old soldiers of the Nether-
lands Indies Army was virtually over—although in West Java some of
Westerling’s men remained active.
The problem of old Republican soldiers took a longer time to solve.
Despite the strenuous efforts of governments to provide adequate civilian
employment for these men—with rehabilitation centers and with resettle-
ment projects to take large numbers from Java to South Sumatra and South
Sulawesi—considerable discontent remained among them. So it was that
(15)	Eeterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo.
n. 178; Indisch Verslag 1933 (Netherlands Indies Report 1933).
pp. 347-363. Both figures include police personnel. The 1930
figure does not include the category of "public functionaries paid
according to special regulations" of whom there were 55,494 in 1926.
(16)	E.g. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, op. cit.. p. 29. The situation is10
an important minority of the group, consisting largely of men uprooted
from village life "but without training for any outside occupation,
returned to the life of shooting. Many of their hands, in parts of North
Sumatra, South Kalimantan (Borneo), North and South Sulawesi and a number
of parts of Java, were based not on particular political convictions, but
merely on general dissatisfaction with the government. Some in West
Java and parts of Central Java joined the radically Moslem Darul Islam
bands and others there came under the leadership of men of the national-
communist Partai Murba, who had played a prominent part in the fighting
against the Dutch in these areas. Many in East and Central Java were
bands of the Indonesian Communist Party, P.K.I. (1?)
Some success was achieved by the Natsir government in November 1950
as a result of its arms round-up and its call to members of armed bands
to surrender and receive clemency and employment. Its subsequent measures
were stronger, as were those of the Sukiman government. Consequently by
mid-1951 the bands had been virtually eliminated in all parts of the
country except West Java.
However, in the second half of 1951, there were new outbursts of
anti-government military activity. One of these occurred in South Sulawesi
on August 17, 1951, when the old guerrilla leader Kahar Muzakar, who was
negotiating with Bepublican authorities for the incorporation of his
units into the National Reserve Corps of the regular army, fled the con-
ference table for the mountains, taking with him his ^,000 men and the
more than two million rupiah cash and military equipment which had just
been turned over to him. The other outbreak which began on December 7,
1951, resulted from the defection of Battalion B26 of the Army, stationed
in the Magelang area of Central Java, to Darul Islam. This was a less
serious affair but, involving approximately 1,000 men, it also attracted
considerable attention.
But it was in fact in West Java that the security problem was most
acute. It is in this province that irregulars of the non-political type
and ordinary robber bands were best able to maintain themselves. Here,
too, the "People's Army" and "Bamboo Spear" organizations, regarded as
the illegal arm of the Partai Murba, held considerable stretches of
mountain territory. But of greatest importance, in terms both of numbers
and activity, was the Darul Islam movement of S. M„ Kartosuwirjo, a move-
ment working for, and actually claiming to be, an Islamic State. (18)
wittily satirized in Pak Prijana Winduwinata, Μ. Μ. M. dan lain-lain
tjerita binatang moderen (Μ. Μ. M. and Other Modern Animal Stories),
Kementerian P’.PZ & K. (Education Ministry), 195^, Second impression.
(17)	See G. McT. Kahin in W. L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and
the West, Macmillan, New York, 1953, PP· 150-15^· Also generally
regarding the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets.
(18)	Cf. C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuize, "The Darul Islam Movement in West
Java," Pacific Affairs, June 1950.11
This "state" operated in rugged mountain areas in southern and
central West Java, where reactionary and anti-dirban Islam had long teen
strong» A number of old arms dumps, Japanese, Republican and Dutch,were
at its disposal; and with large sums of money from estate robberies, and
access to parts of the coastline, it was able to deal with international
smugglers»
Every government appreciated the seriousness of the country’s
security problems and their effects on production, morale, and political
stability» As early hopes of negotiated settlement declined, with the
failure of the Wall Alfatah Mission to the Darul Islam in December 1950
and the double-dealing of Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi eight months
later, the government came increasingly to emphasize the military aspects
of a settlement» Despite the restraining influence exercised by Masjumi
cabinet ministers, the Sukiman government pursued a fairly active policy
against the Darul Islam, carrying out attacks on Darul Islam-held areas
and arresting a number of members of legal Moslem organizations in West
Java who were suspected of co-operation with the rebel movement» It also
established a network of army "forts" in the villages of the troubled
area» But its lack of well-trained and disciplined soldiers, and the
need to have these stationed in a great many other parts of the country
as well, made its task most difficult» In the first quarter of 195θ the
situation in West Java was still a very serious one, 428 persons were
known to have been killed by irregulars in this period, and 3,052 homes
to have been burnt» The total direct material losses, according to the
minimal statistics of the government, amounted to R 9»981,OOO» (19) In-
security in the growing number of areas of South Sulawesi controlled by
Kahar Muzakar’s men presented the government with a second serious
challenge»
The problems which the post-revolutionary cabinets faced in the
fields of administration and the maintenance of security are in fact
part of their central economic problem» How could Indonesia raise her
productive capacity and achieve the economic well-being for which her
leaders said the Revolution had been fought? How could the inertia of
traditional methods of production be overcome, and economic activity
stimulated, particularly in the deflationary peasant sector of the
economy, so that unemployment and under-employment might be relieved,
and the whole economic wheel be made to move faster? How could the coun-
try's economy be changed from a colonial one, based largely on raw
materials exports and acutely sensitive to fluctuations in world market
(19) Antara Hews Bulletin, June 7, 1952» These official figures are of
bandit attacks about which reports were made to government authori-
ties, and so do not include those in areas where communication with
government offices was difficult or where the rebels were in control»
The total number of bandits in West Java, as officially estimated
some months later, was 10,000» (Sultan Hamengku Buwono to New York
Times» September 18, 1952»)12
prices, to one based on a wider home market and with an industrial sector
capable of supplying a large part of this market? Finally, how could
Indonesians be brought to occupy the positions of leadership in economic
life which had been and remained the province of the Dutch and Chinese?
The immediate task when rehabilitation had once been got under way,
was to expand production in the existing enterprises. In the case of
the export industries, the rubber, tea, copra and quinine,grown both in
plantations and by small holders, and the tin, oil and bauxite mines, on
whose earnings Indonesia’s whole economy and government are so dependent,
considerable success was achieved in the years 1950 and 1951· (20) At
the same time it appeared to be extremely difficult to raise the overall
output of this sector even to the pre-war lfevel. This was palely
because of insecurity but more particularly because of welfare state-like
labor legislation and the strength of the newly flourishing trade unions,
their frequent strike activities and the government’s propensity to favor
their claims, which together produced a rise in labor co§it7 a shortening
of the working week, and regulations designed to make dismissals of
workers difficult.
Towards the end of 1951, when the Korean war boom was over, the
problem of the competition of synthetics again began to assume serious
proportions in the case of a number of these industries. With the future
of the plantation crops regarded as uncertain, there were numerous estate
closings and relatively little new planting was being done. In the case
of the mineral industries little was being done to discover new re-
sources to be tapped when the present ones were no longer economically
workable.
In the field of peasant agriculture the task was conceived as prin-
cipally one of doing better what was already being done. The government’s
activity was limited largely to information campaigns about seed selec-
tion, fertilizers, animal husbandry and fishing methods, and to the pro-
vision of more village credit. The former village credit banks were in
many areas converted into co-operatives. Credit went in particular to
rice co-operatives—for elimination of the need for rice imports was an
important policy objective—and to co-operatives for tobacco, sugar,
kapok, copra and other types of export production. Some progress was
made with experimental farms and with various pilot projects in the
fields of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries.
Agricultural mechanization was not regarded as possible on any
large scale for some time. To promote economic activity in rural areas
the government embarked upon its two-year "Sumitro Plan," named after
the Natsir government’s Minister for Commerce and Industry. Under this
(20) See Report of the Java Bank 1951-2. Djakarta, 1952, pp. 135~1θ3·13
plan, attention was concentrated on small industries and cottage in-
dustries. (21)
A number of industrial ’’centers" equipped with light machinery were
established in rural areas to promote the village production of such
items as ironware, leather goods, ceramics, batik textiles and parasols,
and these did something to offset the severe handicaps being suffered by
those industries as a result of the competition of imports.
In addition the government promoted the establishment of a number
of printing works, and textile and desiccated coconut factories, as well
as a number of smaller experimental undertakings with ex-soldier manage-
ment and labor in the fields of brick and tile making, lime manufacture,
saw-milling, and so on. In the establishment of these enterprises great
emphasis was placed by government agencies on the co-operative form. (22)
With the small industries program and extended rural credit facili-
ties, the various inter-insular migration schemes, the land reclamation
projects in islands outside Java and the many and varied training schemes
all these coming on top of the large salaries bill, the large military
budget and the various forms of patronage for which governments felt
obliged to pay—some budget deficits were unavoidable. In fact the
problem of government finance and the prevention of inflation was one of
the most serious problems facing the country at this time, despite the
high export revenues and the credits which had been made available by
Holland and the Export-Import Bank. (23)
Two basic shortages with which Indonesia was faced are of capital
and skills. It was estimated that to attain a 3$ annual increase in
overall production it would be necessary to invest at least 20$ of
Indonesia’s national income every year. Yet at the period under dis-
cussion only an estimated 7-8$ was being invested—despite the very
(21)	Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Our Way Out," Economic Review, Djakarta,
March 1951.
(22)	By December 1951 the total number of co-operatives was 5s820 as com-
pared with 1,154 in the previous year and 521 in 1938°	ls577 of
these were directly classified as producer’s co-operatives, 1,37θ
as village co-operatives, 1,272 as consumer’s co-operatives and 978
as credit co-operatives. Large numbers existed in the fields of
textile production, small holders rubber, coconut growing and
of Information, Djakarta, September 1952, p. 39°
(23)	The Export-Import Bank loan for $100 million was approved by par-
liament November 3s 1950. A Dutch loan of 280 million guilders
(approximately $73 million) was contracted on January 26, 1951°14
favorable conditions created by the Korea boom» (24) Overseas economic
aid obtained in this period was of only relatively small amounts, tiny
in comparison with what other Asian countries were receiving» Loans
were for more substantial amounts but still inadequate to finance any
effective program of economic development» Even more important, the
country’s administrative system was such that she could only slowly absorb
the capital which her government was able to import» As far as private
foreign capital is concerned, there was some of this newly invested but
far too little, and there was in fact some withdrawal of capital» Partly
this is to be explained in terms of the disturbed security conditions and
increased labor costs, and in part it sprang from the inability of govern-
ments to enunciate a clear policy on investment conditions—possibili-
ties of profit remission and repatriation of capital, security against
early nationalization, and so on.
The achievements on the side of skills or training were considerably
greater» Every government agency expanded its training facilities rapid-
ly» Every firm, foreign as well as Indonesian, was obliged to train
Indonesians in management and technical skills, Remarkable success was
achieved in the many schemes for technical and vocational education, and
as a result the numbers of persons receiving such training rose steep-
ly. (25) The training schemes for co-operative administrators produced
4,750 trained persons in their first year of operation. And very large
numbers of older as well as younger persons were able to receive training
overseas either at Indonesian government expense or under one or other
of the overseas fellowship programs sponsored by the United States, the
United Nations or the Colombo Plan.
At the root of a great many of the economic difficulties which the
governments of the immediate post-revolutionary period had to face were
political factors.
The owners of capital being overwhelmingly foreigners and so poli-
tically weak, governments were under disproportionately strong pressure
from the new and active trade unions. This fact coming on top of the
strong egalitarian ideas and practices of the Revolution, contributed
considerably to the great difficulties of labor productivity» Govern-
ments had to face vociferous opposition when they decided on strong action
(24·) Drs. A. Oudt, adviser to Ministry of Finance, Antara News Bulletin,
January 4, 1952. See also S. Daniel Neumark, "The National Income
of Indonesia, 1951-1952," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (Economics
and Finance in Indonesia), June 195^»
(25) The number of secondary school level technical and vocational
schools in 1951-2 was 257 and these had 35,982 pupils. Comparable
figures for 1939-40 are 74 and 10,947- Appendix to Presidential
Message, August 17, 1952, in Hope and Facts, Ministry of Information,
Djakarta, 1952, p. 25.15
against strikes,, (26)
On the whole the governments found it extremely difficult to pursue
firm policies of the sort which would retain the foreign capital invested
in the country and attract more investment to it, partly because the
dominant hold of nationalist ideologies made it difficult for them to take
the side of the foreign employers, and partly because they were them-
selves in large measure committed to socialist principles» Also the fact
that strong elements in the government parties had a political interest
in emphasizing radical nationalist claims,, partly in order to be better
able to compete with the communist groups, made it more difficult for
the government to impart a realistic understanding of the demands of the
economic situation» The "demonstration effect" which resulted from the
many overseas trips, the large numbers of foreign and especially American
films and the luxury items which the Sukiman cabinet in particular allowed
into the country, aided the inflationary tendency for quick consumption»
By the same token it strengthened the political forces which demanded
the immediate attainment of Western-scale prosperity»
Increasingly too, the involvement of members of the Indonesian
elite in capitalist enterprise made consistent economic planning diffi-
cult» The policy of giving Indonesians the opportunity to attain
positions of leadership in the economy, tended as a result of political
pressures to become a policy of wasteful subsidies to Indonesian and
Indonesian-Chinese, "Ali Baba," firms»(2?) The great political power
of the new Indonesian importers, especially those favored by membership
of the "Benteng group," produced a considerable drain on government
finance. Commercial cliques developed as offshoots of political groups»
The increasing association of Indonesian nationalist leaders with Chinese
capital helps to explain why so little political light was shed on the
big problem of peasant indebtedness. (28)
(26)	A government military regulation of February 13, 1951» outlawed
strikes and lockouts in "vital enterprises"—transport, the oil
industry, gas, electricity, water supply, hospitals, etc. An emer-
gency law of September 17, 1951» replacing this regulation, laid it
down that strikes in any industry were illegal, unless 3 week prior
notice had been given to a government conciliation commission. The
total number of strikes in 1951 was 541, they involved 319»53θ
persons and caused the loss of 3»719»9l4 working days. This was a
considerable improvement on 1950 when the figures were 7,784,271 and
144,490,539» Report of the Java Bank 1951-2, Djakarta, 1952, p. 128.
(27)	These are firms under Indonesian titular management and de facto
Chinese control. With a large number of Chinese being officially
classed as Indonesian citizens as from December 27, 1951» government
policy favored not "Indonesians" as distinct from "Chinese," but
the "economically weak" as distinct from the "economically strong."
(28)	This was suggested by the Wilopo cabinet’s Minister for Agriculture,
Moh. Sardjan. Antara News Bulletin, May 31» 1953°16
The great achievements of the governments of this period lay largely
in non-political fields such as education,, (29) Where important politi-
cal factors came to be involved, it frequently happened that a bottleneck
situation was created. Partly this resulted from the extreme slowness of
parliamentary procedure. (30) Of perhaps greater importance however was
the fact that politically contentious issues frequently forced cabinets
to inaction,, the alternative being to risk falling as a result of parlia-
mentary opposition or internal division. The multiplicity of parties
and the fact that governments were unable to count on the full backing
of all the groups which officially supported them, goes far to explain
why no firm policies were being pursued on such issues as the structure
of the regional legislative councils, relations between central and
provincial governments and conditions of foreign investment. What
appeared as the one solution in sight to this situation of near-deadlock
was nation-wide elections—but the elections question itself was one on
which no firm policy could be pursued for these same reasons.
A further factor adding to the instability of politics was the wide-
spread ’’oppositionism*'—unrealistic hostility to all activities of
governments. This was partly a legacy from the colonial period when
Indonesians were denied responsibility and so became permanently ’’against.”
Particularly was such an attitude in evidence among groups of ex-
guerrillas and others who had been fully involved in the Revolution but
were later left without responsibility to adequate employment because of
their lack of formal training.
Finally something should be said of the general climate of thought
in the country at the time when the Wilopo government assumed office.
There can be no doubt that considerable disillusionment with the fruits
(29)	Numbers in primary schools were 55812,000 in I950-i3 as compared
with 2,283,136 in 1939-40. Numbers in junior high schools (general
courses) were 65,7077 in 1952 as compared with 8,778 in 1939-40 and
in senior high schools, 18,381 θ-s compared with	Teachers
college figures for the end of 1952 and 1939-40 were 38,979 and
1,229, and University figures for the same period, 12,909 (not in-
cluding the larger numbers at private tertiary institutions) and
1,246. Statement of Dr. Bahder Djohan, Education Minister in the
Wilopo cabinet, April 20, 1953, Pewarta P.PoK. (Education Ministry
News), Kementerian P° P. dan K. (Education”Ministry), June 1953»
(30)	Of the 117 bills submitted to parliament by the Hatta, Natsir and
Sukiman governments, 83 had not been dealt with when the Sukiman
government fell. Further, 28 emergency laws had yet to be debated
in parliament. Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, director of the President’s
cabinet, March 20, 1952, in Roeslan Abdulgani, Funksi Penerangan di
Indonesia (The Function of Information Work in Indonesia)” Kementerian
Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1953s P° 81» Dutch
legalism or a perfectionist nationalist conception of democracy?17
of the Revolution had set in. There had been economic improvement, hut
it was small compared with what was expected. On the other hand the
moral tension and sense of purpose which had made the material sufferings
of the revolutionary period hearable, was now fast disappearing. Dis-
appointment was felt at the laziness and irresponsibility in the govern-
ment service and the patronage that the government disposed. Resentment
was expressed at the luxuries which the new elite of Indonesians could
afford, and at the growing gulf between this group and the masses to
whom they had been brought so much closer by the Revolution. (31)
The tasks of state administration were as disuniting as they were
complicated. Inevitably honor and position were distributed in ways not
according with the values of the Revolution. And inevitably too, the
incentives of the Revolution were losing their effectiveness. The
frequent appeals of political leader’s did little to arrest this develop-
ment.
It would be quite wrong to conclude from this that the general
framework established by the nationalist Revolution was no longer gener-
ally accepted. The extremes of political disillusionment were felt only
in the bigger cities and particularly in Djakarta. Whereas considerable
inchoate discontent with economic conditions existed in the village
population, this did not endanger rural stability in any serious way,
partly because comparisons were made with the period of Japanese occupa-
tion, when living standards were considerably lower. The new egalitarian
tendencies in rural social relations, and the wide educational opportuni-
ties that had been created, militated against social instability. In
city and village alike, the breadth of opportunities for personal ad-
vancement—educational and thus occupational and social—was providing
the Republic with a vitally important source of strength. The commonly
held and binding ideals for the upbuilding and development of Indonesia,
strong particularly among young people, were an appreciable factor
pulling in the same direction. There can be no doubt however that within
the group of politically conscious people, there was a strong feeling of
disappointment—In the cabinet, in parliament, in the government machinery
and in the progress of the country generally. The word ’’crisis’’ was in
frequent use. Among many groups of people there was a sense of antici-
pation—-of something which could set a new course.
(31) E.g. the articles of Sugardo in the Djakarta weekly Mimbar Indonesia
and the cartoons of Soebantardjo in the Jogjakarta students’ monthly
Gadjah Mada. For some views of artists on the situation and its
cultural manifestations see Indonesia, Madjallah Kebudajaan (Indo-
nesia, a Cultural Magazine), January-March 1952 (issue on Second
Cultural Congress) or Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in Mimbar Indonesia,
March 15, 1952. Also Symposion tentang Kesulitan-kesulitan Zaman-
Peralihan Sekarang (Symposium on the Difficulties of the Present
Period of Transition), April 26-27, 1952, Balai Pustaka, 1953»19
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUNDS PARTY POLITICS
It has Been said, that power in present-day Indonesia is primarily
in the hands of intellectuals» The assertion is striking and it contains
a great deal of the truth. The Indonesian intellectuals—we shall use
the term in a specific form of its common Indonesian meaning, to refer
to persons of Western university or senior secondary education—have
"been a central component of the country's political elite throughout
the post-revolutionary period. This is clear from a biographical invest-
igation made by Soelaeman Soemardi of the 146 persons who had been cab-
inet ministers between 1945 and 1954, the 234 persons who were
members of parliament in 1954 and the 6l highest-level civil servants
of that time. Soelaeman found that 83$ of the cabinet ministers, 59$
of the parliamentarians and 100$ of the senior civil servants had obtain-
ed either a University or a senior high school education. He also found t
that 94$ of the ministers (irrespective of their level of education), 91/°
of the parliamentarians and all of the civil servants had been educated
in Western, as distinct from Islamic, schools and Universities, (l)
Indonesia’s national revolution was led by such intellectuals, men
who had appropriated much of Western liberalism and radicalism, and who,
more than any other group, possessed the technical ability to take charge
of a modern state, the necessary knowledge of Western languages and West-
ern-type legal and administrative procedures. Many of these persons had
been able to obtain their Western education because of the wealth or high
social position of their families. But, as members of the revolutionary
elite, their power and prestige depended much more on their educational
attainments (and nationalist political record) than on the position, of
their parents, usually members of one of the small Indonesian business
groups or one of the vestigial (and in most cases bureaucratized) aris-
tocracies. The intellectuals had come to exercise power as an independ-
ent group, not, or only to a lesser extent, as spokesmen for the older
groups from which their members had emerged. (2)
(1) Soelaeman Soemardi, "Some Aspects of the Social Origins of the Indon-
esian Political Decision-Makers." Transactions of the Third World
(2) See G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 27-365
W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition. vanHoeve. The Hague
Bandung, 1956, pp. 140-152; H. J. Benda,’’^The Intellectual as Makers
of History in South East Asia," unpublished paper read before 10th
Convention, Association for Asian Studies, New York, April 3» 1958·20
But at no point have the intellectuals had a monopoly of social control,
even at the level of the political elite. If our definition is to "be in
terms of formal educational background—-and this has not only heuristic
justification but also a basis in the thinking of the group itself—then
one must point immediately to another group with which the intellectuals
have had to share power within this elite. These are (by definition)
the persons without Western University or senior secondary education.
Their power rests not on understanding of the functioning of a modern
state but rather on narrowly political skills, on an ability to act as
mediators and organizers in relation to the politically organizable mass,
and to exercise influence over the lower-level leaders of parties and
mass organizations. This role has been played in the main by persons of
junior secondary or primary Western education (many of them persons who
might have had higher training had their parents not been too poor or of
insufficient social standing to make this possible).(3) In some cases it
has fallen to people of Islamic secondary education, and in a number of
cases to those whose most important educational experience was afforded
by the military or political-organizational training given by the Japan-
ese in their period of occupation. Most of the men of this group of mass
leaders came to prominence only through the Japanese occupation or the
revolution—for indeed mass organization had been virtually impossible
under the prewar Butch regime, except for bodies established on a reli-
gious or regional, but not primarily political,basis. (4) Having had less
(3)	The division at the line between junior and senior secondary school-
ing is arbitrary. A case might be made for its being drawn at another
point. Moreover if the level of education is regarded as a measure of
the extent and impact of formal Western training, one must consider
also the differences between types of Western training available to
Indonesians. One relevant factor which would have to be taken into
account in a further development of this concept of the Indonesian
intellectuals is whether prewar education was obtained wholly in Indo-
nesia or partly also in Holland. And, in the case of education ob-
tained in Indonesia, the type of school attended should properly be
taken into account. For major differences existed in the prewar
educational system, differences of curriculum as well as of socio-
political orientation, between the schools intended primarily for In-
donesians (H.I.S., M.U.L.O., A.MoSo, etc.) and those established for
Butch pupils but admitting a minority of Indonesians (E.L.S., HoB.S. etc.)
(4)	The Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) was a mass movement in the
early 1920’s, and this may perhaps be said also of the Communist-
led Sarekat Rakjat (People’s Associations) of the time. But after the
suppression of the Communist-led revolts of 1926 and 192? Communism
had only a shadowy underground existence and political Islam came
to be divested of its mass character as the colonial authorities
denied its leaders access to the peasantry. The later attempts of
Soekarno and other secular nationalists to establish mass political
organization had only very short-lived success. See Kahin, op. cit.
pp. 6^-100.21
or different formal training and a different type of experience of the
West, having come to power in very different times, "being mostly young-
er and owing their power to a completely different political role de-
manding a different type of competence and outlook, the mass leaders in
the political elite stand ih strong contrast to the intellectual members
of this elite. Their role being more directly political than government-
al, it is not surprising that SoelaemaA Soemardi, in his investigation
of three categories of political decision-makers, found the proportion
of mass leaders (as compared with Intellectuals) to be greatest among
parliamentarians, second-greatest hmongst cabinet Ministers and least
among highest-level government servants.
One may then view the political elite of post-revolutionary Indonesia
in terms of the association of two main categories of leaders, corres-
ponding roughly to two main political functions? the intellectuals on
the one hand, the mass leaders on the other. The categories are anything
but clearly delineated, and the overlappings are many. Many intellectuals,
in the sense of persons of Western university or senior secondary train-
ing, are highly effective mass leaders. On the other hand a number of
men without such training are in fact shouldering highly
complex governmental responsibilities. Nevertheless the dichotomy is
useful for an understanding of the dynamics of conflict within the poli-
tical elite. As we shall see, it is useful also in throwing light on
divisions inside particular parties.
The Indonesian political elite we shall define as those persons who
contribute actively to the decision-making which produces political
crises or the consensus which ends them. But the breadth of the member-
ship of this group is extremely difficult to delineate. It includes the
effective leaders of various social power centers—the army (or sections
of it), veterans organizations, trade unions, regional groupings and
some religious ones, as well as political parties and the various sections
of the bureaucracy—and also a number of powerful individuals, some news-
paper editors, some business men, mainly of the new "bureaucratic capital-
ism", and a handful of political leaders of great prestige not dependent
on any party function. But how many leaders of each of these types have
fitted our definition at any one time in the post-revolutionary period
is extremely difficult to determine. The figure has probably never been
lower than 200 or higher than 500. (5) Of these an overwhelming major-
ity have been Djakarta residents.
The concept of the political elite is not to be confused with that
of the social elite. But a comparison of the two categories suggests
a significant relatioriship: whereas the intellectuals have had to share
(5) Mysbergh speaks of the group as having "a hard core of probably not
more than two hundred". James H. Mysbergh, "The Indonesian Elite,"
Far Eastern Survey, March 1957.22
political decision-making with the group we have called mass leaders, they
have not had to share social leadership. Social status has "been deter-
mined mainly by the criteria established by them. Djakarta high society
in our period has been virtually closed to persons without Western uni-
versity or higher secondary education; it has excluded those without
formal ’Western schooling virtually regardless of their political power.
At least among older persons a mastery of idiomatic Dutch has been almost
an absolute condition of entry. And, significantly, the intellectuals*
terms for social status have been accepted by those who do not comply
with them. Thus one finds the mass leaders particularly concerned that
their children should obtain a Western type education; no Islamic mass
leader, however strong his opposition to the "godless" government high
schools, has been prepared to deny his children the opportunity to attend
them. In this important social sense the post-revolutionary regime has
been a regime of the intellectuals.
Indeed the intellectuals have been the main beneficiaries of the
post-revolutionary regime. They have had an immediate interest in it
and their representatives have had primary governmental responsibility.
Whatever efforts individuals of the group may have made to use their
governmental positions for private gain, the group as a whole has been
motivated by a far-sighted concern for the viability of the regime. But
they have had much less power than responsibility. The mass leaders on
the other hand have had a great deal of influence over government, but
relatively little responsibility for it. It is true that as individuals
a number of them had come to have a heavy stake in the regime; just as
many of the intellectuals in the political elite had come to have busi-
ness interests so had many of the mass leaders. But the basis of the mass
leaders* strength has been in particular collective power centers, and
so they have been bound to represent the interests and attitudes of
segments of the politically articulate public, the activists of particu-
lar political parties, sections of the army, regions, religious groups
and trade union groups. Unlike the intellectuals the mass leaders have
had no basis of common interests. Therefore they have been in no posi-
tion, as a group, to present alternative policies. Major incompatibi-
lities have existed between policies advocated by different sections of
the mass leaders.
With the end of the revolution the independent role of intellectuals
within political organizations declined, as these developed responsibility
to particular centers of social power. But power did not, as after some
revolutions, pass to traditional groups with an interest in restraining
the pace of social change. Such groups were weak, either for political
reasons—as in the case of the European and Chinese owners of capital
and the various aristocratic groups which had worked with the Dutch against
the revolutionary Bepublic—or for economic reasons—as in the case of
the small Indonesian business and land-owning groups. Therefore power
passed in large part to mass organizations representing particular poli-
tically articulate segments of the population, which were demanding23
further social change in a variety of directions» (6) Thus was created
the situation where power was shared between intellectuals on the one
hand and mass leaders on the other with tension between the two groups
underlying many political divisions.
But to understand the relative strength of intellectuals and mass
leaders at the level of the political elite one must look at the levels
of political effectiveness outside this elite. For whereas enormous
power is concentrated in this very small top group, the group must act
on many matters within limits set by much wider sections of the popula-
tion. Political effectiveness is indeed a relative thing; there is a
continuum of gradations of it stretching from the political elite to
the most isolated village. But for our purposes one may fruitfully
draw a line at one point in the continuum and speak of two main levels
of political effectiveness, that of the relatively powerful newspaper-
reading public and the relatively powerless non-newspaper-reading pub-
lic or mass.
At the end of 1951 the total circulation of daily newspapers was
515,700. Thus probably between a million and a million and a half
people were then reading newspapers regularly or semi-regularly. (7)
Most of the members of the newspaper-reading group were city or town
dwellers, but some village leaders were among them. The registered mem-
bership of political parties was (until the later development of mass
election campaigning) composed almost entirely of members of the group.
In one sense the newspaper-reading group may be regarded as "public
opinion," at least as far as the day-to-day and month-to-month politics
of the capital are concerned. Its members have been in a position to
press, through a variety of organizations, for particular sectional inter-
ests. At the same time their feelings on political issues have been
important in keeping government action within the limits of common
nationalist consensus.
It is at the level of the newspaper-reading public that the national
revolution wrought the changes which became characteristic of the Indo-
nesian political process. For it created an uprooted generation of poli-
(6)	For a discussion of the growing power of collective entities and
their leaders see Wertheim, op. cit., pp. 164-166.
(7)	The circulation of Indenesian language newspapers, as distinct from
ones published in Dutch or Chinese was then 372,800. Almanak Pers
Indonesia, 195^1-55 (Indonesian Press Almanac, 195^55), Lembaga Pers
dan Pend'apat Umum (Press and Public Opinion Institute), Djakarta,1955,
p. 196. On the estimate that Indonesian language newspapers were read
by an average number of three citizens per copy, and that the average
issue of a Dutch or Chinese language daily found one reader who was
an Indonesian citizen, the number of citizens reading newspapers with
a high degree of regularity may be reckoned to have been 1,202,300.2^
Levels of Political Effectiveness
and Categories of Political Participation
Levels of Political Effectiveness
1	= The level of the political elite
2	= The newspaper-reading public
3	= The non-newspaper reading public
Categories of Political Participation
la = Intellectual elite members
lb = Mass leaders within the elite
2a - Non-revolutionaries
2b = Ex-revolutionaries
3a = Traditional village areas
2b = Detraditionalized areasZ5
tically articulate persons. As a result of the revolution, and the
Japanese occupation which preceded it, at least half a million young
men were torn out of civilian life in cities, towns, and villages,
particularly in Java and Sumatra. (8) These men, then the soldiers,
propagandists and organizers or the revolution, have consistently been
the most dynamic section of the newspaper-reading public in the post-
revolutionary period, for they have been equipped with political train-
ing enabling them to provide leadership at the level of the mass or the
non-newspaper-reading public. In particular,they have been in a position
to speak for the many millions of workers and peasants who are adversely
affected by the continuing social change of the present period. Their
role within the group of the newspaper-reading public has been a dominant
one in the parts of the country heavily affected by the revolutionary
upheaval.
Diverse as the composition of this ex-revolutionary group has been—
as regards social origins, educational background, and adjustment to
post-revolutionary society—one may speak of it as the bearer of a par-
ticular political mood, the mood of messianic revolutionary nationalism.
Substantially ambivalent in its reaction to the impact of the West, this
mood is characterized both by egalitarian political idealism and by auth-
oritarian collectivism, both by assertions of faith in the people and
by an emphasis on the necessity of their being given leadership. It is
a radical mood, rooted in a strong belief in the efficacy of political
action and propaganda. Yet its characteristic political expression is
"oppositionism,’’ a negative attitude toward governments arising from an
impatience of compromise and a refusal to acknowledge the practical
difficulties facing the country. The flavor of this mood is contained in
such words as liberation, revolutionary, dynamic, movement and struggle.
Its symbols, such as the Pantja Sila (Five -Principles: Faith in the One
God, Nationality, Humanity, People’s Sovereignty and Social Justice),
gotong rojong (mutual community assistance),anti-imperialism, anti-
capitalism, building a new society and the return of West Irian, consti-
tute a framework within which all governments of the post-revolutionary
period have had to work. (9) Extreme forms of this mood have been
(8)	500,000 is given as a minimal figure by the two prominent military
leaders and writers, Major-Generals T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution.
See Simatupang, Pelopor dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai (A Pioneer
in War and Peace), Jajasan Pustaka Militer, 1955s Ρ· °5» and Nasution,
Tjatatan mengenai Politik Militer Indonesia (Notes on Indonesian
Military Policy), Pembimbing, Djakarta, 1955» Ρ·3Π. A more recent
statement of a spokesman of the Ministry for Veterans Affairs gives
the number of registered veterans as approximately 800,000. Antara
News Bulletin (New York edition) March 27, 1958.
(9)	Fo.r a discussion of this mood in sociological categories, see J«M.
van der Kroef. Indonesia in the Modern World, Masa Baru, Bandung,
Vol. I. (1954) pp. 9Vl32,.Vol. II (1956),’ pp. 244-252.2 6
prevalent throughout the period since 19^9 among that section of the ex-
revolutionaries for which the regime has failed to find suitable employ-
ment,. It is from this unaccommodated sector that the massleaders at the
political elite level have obtained their most positive support. But the
mass leaders have obtained support also from many relatively well-
accommodated members of the ex-revolutionary group—though usually not
from those of higher Western education.
The non-revolutionaries who have formed the counter-piece to the ex-
revolutionaries within the newspaper-reading public are a very hetero-
geneous group. They have included a small minority of persons who were
actively opposed to the national revolution—some members of aristocratic
groups, some Christians, mainly in East Indonesia, and large sections of
the Chinese and Indo-European minorities. But the majority of the group
has consisted of persons who were at least partly sympathetic to the
revolutionaries, but were not drawn into an active role in their ranks,
either because they were too old (or too young), because they had busi-
ness interests to pursue, because they were city dwellers with families
to provide for, or simply because there was no effective revolutionary
resistance to the Dutch in their area.
There are few common aspects to the role of this group in the post-
revolutionary period. Sections of it lave had high political effectiveness
by virtue of property interests or traditional social position; other
sections, lacking such qualifications, have been politically weak. In
general however one may say that the group has stood at a disadvantage
in post-revolutionary politics because it has lacked access both to the
symbols of revolutionary nationalism and to the techniques of mass or-
ganization. The intellectuals of the political elite have drawn their
support mainly and increasingly from this group; but they have obtained
considerable backing also from the more highly educated of the ex-
revolutionary group.
The lowest level of political effectiveness, the level of the non-
newspaper- reading public or the mass may be characterized in terms of a
division between areas of traditional village society and "detraditional-
ized" areas. The line of cleavage here is not a sharp one; but its na-
ture is readily perceived when one compares cities, towns, plantation
and mine areas and export-producing areas generally, with areas where
traditional social structure has as yet suffered no major blows at the
hands of economic change. For most of the post-revolutionary period—
in fact at all times except during campaigning for the 1955 elections—
it has been only in such detraditionalized communities as exist in cities,
or in oil, rubber, copra or sugar areas that the non-newspaper-reading
person has had any significant degree of national-level political effect-
iveness. It is in these areas that political parties and their affil-
iated mass organizations could easily establish themselves; they
concentrated on these areas partly for organizational reasons and partly27
because detraditionalized communities provided them with an important
role to play as agents of social reintegration on a new basis» (10)
Inasmuch as parties and mass organizations have been phenomena of
detraditionalized areas, one may speak of a rough correspondence be-
tween the traditional-detraditionalized division at the mass level and
the ex-revolutionary-non-revolutionary dichotomy at the level of the
newspaper-dreading public» (See the chart on page 24.)
With this framework in mind let us proceed to an examination of
functioning political units» In the immediate post-revolutionary situ-
ation political parties existed in great profusion. The personal ambi-
tion which had been dammed up by colonialism and surged forth with the
outbreak and victory of the revolution, was expressing itself first and
foremost in politics» Nineteen parties had representation in the tem-
porary parliament, perhaps as many as 30 wielded significant power
either nationally or at a provincial level, and many more were able to
achieve public recognition, and sometimes a measure of patronage, by
means of bluffing techniques.
Prewar Indonesian nationalism had been characterized by a multiplicity
of parties. (11) The Japanese occupation abolished parties as previous-
ly existent, but established statist mass organizations on the basis
both of Islam and of secular nationalism. For nine days in the first
two weeks after the proclamation of independence, government policy aimed
at the creation of a one-party regime (12) But thereafter a multi-
(10)	See van der Kroef, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 121-125.
(11)	See Kahin, op. cit». pp. 64-100. Also J. Th. Petrus Blumberger,
De Nationalist!sche Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Nationalist
Movement in the Netherlands Indies), Tjeenk ^ll'link,, Haarlem, 19315
J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Gommunistische Beweging in"Nederlandsch-
Indie (The Communist Movement in the Netherlands Indies)", Tjeenk
Willink, Haarlem, 1935; A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sed.jarah Pergerakan .
Bakjafc 'Indonesia (A History Of the Indonesian People’s Movement),
Pustaka Eakjat, Djakarta, 1950J D.M.G. Koch, Qm< de Vri.iheld.De
Nationalist!sche Beweging in Indonesie (Towards Freedom, The Nation-
alist Movement in Indonesia), Pembangunan, Djakarta, 1950; L.M.
Sitorus, Sed.jarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (A History of the
Indonesian "Nationalist Movement), Pustaka Eakjat, Djakarta, 1951;
J.M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische
Beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (A Survey of the
Development of the Nationalist Movement in Indonesia between 1930
and 1942), van Hoeve, s’Sravenhage, 1953»
(12)	See Roeslan Abdulgani, "Partai dan Parlemen (Parties and Parliament),"
in Funksi. Penerangan di Indonesia. Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry
of Information), Djakarta, 1953s PP· 115-121.28
party system was officially called into existence and quickly came into
reality. The revolutionary KNIP (Central National Committee or Outer
Parliament) was constituted and reconstituted on a system whereby Pres-
ident Soekarno, in consultation with Vice-President Hatta and the cabi-
net, estimated party strengths and asked party leaders to name
representatives up to the number he named. This aimed at giving repre-
sentation to all significant groups in Indonesian society--as under a
Proportional Representation voting system—'and so created a multiplicity
of parties (and a strong position for the party councils of the various
parties). Probably influenced in some degree by the model of Holland,
government leaders encouraged the existence of a mul|t-party system,
rather than for instance a two-party system. In the post-revolutionary
period the multiplicity of parties was recognized and further encouraged
by the composition of parliamentary committees and other committees es-
tablished by the government on a representational basis; for a large
number of these consisted of one representative from each of a large
number of parties, more or less regardless of their size and importance,
A similar method was used when regional legislative councils were estab-
lished in 1950 and 1951» on the basis of the controversial Government
Regulation. No. 39 of 1950,
With a multi-party system officially sanctioned, and with party
strengths unable to be measured in anything like an objective manner,
tiny parties could arise and maintain a claim to have popular support
merely on the basis of political bluff. Political bluff indeed became
the order of the day. Extravagant claims of party membership and organ-
ization were placed in news bulletins and, where possible, in government
publications. So for instance, the P,R,N, (National People’s Party), an
organization with only a shadowy existence outside Djakarta, wrote in
a publication of the Ministry of Information that it had a membership
of 2,000,000 persons. (13) At yearly or two-yearly conferences parties
sought to have attendance from delegates from as large as possible a
number of branches, which in many cases existed merely on paper.
The situation was further complicated by the great power of indivi-
duals, many of them outside parties or little bound by their loyalties to
them. Writing in 195^ Robert C„ Bone Jr. compared political life to a
"kind of poker game played by a few thousand people, all of whom have
known each other much too long and too well." (14) The general pattern
of party alignments was so confused by regional feelings, family loyal-
ties, bapakist (literally father-like) teacher-disciple and leader-
follower relationships, and the personal likes and dislikes nurtured
through the hectic social and political changes of the previous fifteen
(13)	Kepartaian di Indonesia (Parties in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan
(Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 19519 P° 19^°
(14)	Robert C. Bone Jr., ’’The Future of Political Parties in Indonesia,"
Par Eastern Survey, February 1952)·»29
years, that it was tremendously difficult in any situation to discern
the centers of power»
Furthermore government through parliament and parties was something
new» Its implications had not yet been fully explored even by its chief
actors» One central problem, as they saw it, was whether the new system
would be able to accommodate such important centers of extra-parliamen-
tary power as the army, and particular sections of it, and President
Soekarno.
Both the army leadership and President Soekarno had great power
and revolutionary prestige» A large part of the army, both officers and
men, were highly political in outlook, regarding themselves as the van-
guard of the revolution, and therefore the rightful ultimate custodian
of its goals» They had exercised wide political powers and numerous
administrative functions in the period of armed struggle, and were sub-
sequently extremely loath to abjure their political role» Highly
heterogeneous in composition, and divided by its susceptibility to
local and party political pressures, the army had nevertheless a certain
cohesion of outlook as well as interests, which made it possible for
it to wield power at the Djakarta level.
President Soekarno's prestige and power is rooted both in his role
as the foremost leader of the struggle for Independence and in his
extraordinary oratory and charismatic powers. Soekarno symbolizes
Indonesia’s independence and "national struggle" in a unique way and
his popularity and influence over mass audiences in any part of the
country is unmatched. In a sense, therefore, he has been too bi& for
his constitutional functions as a figure-head President, and under
constant temptation to exert power beyond the limits of these functions.
The same is in some senses true of Vice-President Hatta, who had long
worked with Soekarno in a political partnership almost equivalent to a
co-presidency. In this partnership, heralded as the dwitunggal (duumvir-
ate), Soekarno was seen as representing Java and Hatta as representing
the rest of Indonesia. Also Hatta had played the central role in ex-
ecutive policy-making for much of the period of the revolution. But his
power was much less than Soekarno*s in the post-revolutionary situation
because he lacked Soekarno’s oratorical skill and popular appeal. (15)
Constitutionalism thus operated in a fluid situation where both the
army and the President (and in lesser measure the Vice-President) had
numerous opportunities to continue to wield political power. Would the
prestige of constitutionalism be strong enough to prevent them from
(l5) See A.K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of the President as Defined in
the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Modern Indonesia
Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957»30
doing this, or at least to persuade them to do so only to the extent that
it was possible through parties and parliament? To this question there
was as yet no answers But the question was a dominant aspect of political
life. Parties operated in a context of uncertainty as to where the limits
of their own power lay.
Political decision-making being heavily Djakarta-centered, parties
were chiefly concerned to exert power at the level of the capital. In
the words of Roeslan Abdulgani in 1952, "Political parties at this time
are still concentrating mainly on parliamentary and cabinet struggles,
paying scant attention to efforts in society". (16) A number of parties
had functioned extensively at the village level in the period of the
revolution, and were to do so again in the one to two years of campaign-
ing which preceded the elections of 1955» But in 1952 they were general-
ly in a period of hiatus as far as village-level activity was concerned.
Inasmuch as they operated outside the capital, they concentrated their
efforts on areas of high national-level political effectiveness, on
such detraditionalized areas as cities, residency and kabupaten (regency)
towns and areas of capital-intensive export production.
There were indeed parts of the country, including many areas in East
and Central Java, where significant party activity existed at the village
level in 1952. In these areas party-associated religious, social and
educational organizations flourished and many local power conflicts were
seen in generalized ideological terms. But this was largely autonomous
activity, for the organization binding parties as between Djakarta and
the villages was extremely loose even in these areas. The national
party offices were little concerned with village activity, for there
were few ways in which it could be made to bear directly on developments
at the level of the capital.
The central executives of most parties had only a very general idea
of the size of their own membership. Thus in 1951 it *as possible for
Mr. Jusuf Wibisono of the Masjumi to write, "Based on the number of its
branches, the membership of the Masjumi is estimated at 13 million, but
only 600,000 persons are registered with the Secretariat of the Party
Executive Council, and only 400,000 have been given membership cards." (1?)
The situation was similar in the case of most of the other parties. Dues,
though stipulated in the constitution of virtually all parties, were
rarely collected except in the higher echelons—though an exception should
be made here in the case of the Communist Party. There was probably no
party whose financing was based mainly on membership dues. Such funds
(16) Funksi Penerangan di Indonesia, p. 10?.
(l?) Jusuf Wibisono, "Masjumi di Masa Datang (The Future of the Masjumi)"
in Indonesia dalam Pembangunan (Indonesia in Development), Panitia
Muktamar Masjumi ke-5 (Committee for the Fifth Convention of the
Masjumi), Alvaco, Djakarta, 1951» p.22.31
as were required for congresses, party periodical organs or the salaries
of the full-time party workers were raised mainly from a small number
of large personal contributions, made in many cases from funds obtained
as a result of bureaucratic power» In general, and again excepting
the Communists, party organization was simple and loose. At the same
time most parties were lacking in strict discipline. Intra-party divi-
sions were of great importance and were openly admitted in the case of
most parties—not however in the case of the Communist Party or the
Socialist Party. In fact much of the energy of the leaders of most
parties was spent in internal political struggle.
Weak organization, lack of mass membership and lack of internal co-
hesion, combined with the relatively important part played by parliament-
ary representatives, establishes most of the Indonesian parties of this
period as similar to what Duverger has called nineteenth century type
caucus parties, parties of weak articulation. (18) But at the same
time parties and party-linked organizations were already playing an
important role in many small towns and villages, contributing to the pro-
cess of transforming local and traditional loyalties into national and
ideological ones, and acting as agents of upward social mobility. (19)
It required only the long campaign which preceded the 1955 elections to
establish an organizational relationship between this village-level
activity and the activity of parties at the level of national politics—
and thus to make the parties into something far more like the mass
parties of the twentieth century West.
We may now proceed to look at certain of the more important of the
Indonesian parties, to examine the situation in which they found them-
selves at the time when the Sukiman cabinet was about to fall and to be
replaced by the cabinet of Wilopo. (20) We shall begin by discussing
the Socialist and Communist Parties, for these two parties set many of
the issues on which political competition centered. At the same time it
should be said that these two were untypical of Indonesian parties of
the time, in that they were cohesive and fairly well-disciplines, and
had developed clear policy viewpoints.
(18)	Maurice itaverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Acti-
vity in the Modern State, Methuen, London. 1954, pp. 1-3. ff·
(19)	See for instance Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of Economic
Change. An Indonesian Case Study. Center for Internalonal Studies,
M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass." 1956, pp. 135 ff·
(20)	For the development of parties in the revolutionary period see
Kahin, op. cit.. passim. For a survey of the parties covering the
period until 1952, see G. McT. Kahin, ‘’Indonesian Politics and
Nationalism," in W.L. Holland (ed) Asian Nationalism and the West,
Macmillan, New York, 1953s PP· 73-110» 134-1^.	————32
The Indonesian Socialist Party»
The Partai Sosialis Indonesia or P°S»I» headed by the former Prime
Minister Sjahrir, was a smhll party dominated by its Western-thinking
leaders., More than any other party it was led by the type of persons we
have defined as intellectuals» It had 15 representatives in the temporary
parliament» However, it exercised an influence on Indonesian politics
quite disproportionate to its size» This was partly because of the cal-
iber of its leadership and pafctly because its ideas received wide support
in other parties and from persons without partv,allegiances» It had
played an important governmental role in the Natsir cabinet but was not
included in the cabinet of Sukiman»
The party’s policy emphasized economic development and reorganization»
Its Marxism, conceived as a method of social analysis rather than a guide
to planning, was of relatively little importance here» The tenor of the
party’s thinking, with its emphasis on rational organization of admini·?·
stration and the economy, was rather a Fabian one» It believed that for-
eign capital would be needed for a considerable period, though it condemned
large-scale reliance on overseas economic aid. Socialism was seen as a
long-term goal and an attractive political symbol»
With the emphasis on economic development and planning went oppo-
sition to extreme nationalism and anti-foreign feeling» Undue emphasis
on the claim for West Irian (West New Guinea) was publicly condemned
by the party’s leaders as scapegoatism» Faith in radical slogans was
castigated as a legacy of Japanese rule, (21)
In foreign policy, the party was influential in giving specific
content to the generally accepted ’’independent foreign policy»*1 Sophis-
ticated anti-Gommunists, its leaders were sympathetic to association
with Western Europe and the countries of the British Commonwealth» But
their main attention was focused on the development and extension of the
India-Burma-Indonesia group of states as a balance factor in the world
struggle» After Sjahrir’s trip through Europe and Asia in the middle
of 1951, the party was particularly active in international work» (22)
It played a major part in the preparations for the first Asian Socialist
Conference held at rangoon in January 1953° Pan-Asian ideas did not,
however, play any part in the party’s thinking» Its members were, in
(21)	See for instance S„ (Sjahrir?) in Sjkap (party weekly), Djakarta,
September 29, 1952»
(22)	See» L» Μ» Sitoroes, "Laporan Organisasi dari Pebruari 1950 sampai
12 Pebruari 1952” (Beport on Organization, February 1952 to February
12, 1952) in Suara Sosialis (party periodical), Djakarta, April 15,
1952»33
Sjahrir’s words, "internationalists with a correct understanding of
nationalism,," (23)
Ever since 195θ» the P,S,I. had been a strong advocate of early
elections, and it pressed its demands for these in the last months of
the Sukiman cabinet, (24) Advocating that governments recognize the
existence of divisions between ethnic groups, the party favored the
establishment of an Upper House to represent such groups of the popula-
tion, and asked that the election law should provide for a large number
of electorates, to be established with these groups in view.
The party stressed strict interpretation of the 1950 constitution
as far as the powers of the President are concerned. Hence it opposed
all claims that the President has special rights and powers over and
above those of a constitutional head of state. It was in fact more
critical of President Soekarno than any other party. Important as both
a cause and an effect of this was the three-year-old breach in personal
relations between Soekarno and Sjahrir.
Organizationally the P,S,I, had some features of a militant party.
Abjuring mass propaganda techniques, it sought to be a small party of
well-trained and well-disciplined political workers. (25) In 1952 it
was freer than most other parties from publicly evident internal division.
Sjahrir’s position was unchallenged, although there were a number of
other men of great ability in the party’s top leadership, such as
DjohanSjahroezal) party theorist, Subadio Sastrosatomo, parliamentary
spokesman, and Dr« Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, economics professor and for-
mer Minister for Trade and Industry,
A heavily city-centered party, the P.Sal. had the support of a
sizeable group of ex-revolutionary students and other persons of higher
education. In addition it was backed by a section of persons of higher
Western education from what we have called the non-revolutionary sector
of the newspaper-reading public, including some influential members of
the Chinese and Indo-European minorities.
(23)	Nationalism and ■Internationalism, (Address to the first Asian
Socialist Conference), Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon,
January 1953·
(24)	See for example the statements of Sjahrir, Antara, January 22, 1952,
and Subadio Sastrosatomo, Antara, January 24/ 19^2.
(25)	In this respect it may be considered an heir of the prewar Club
Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Club for National Indonesian Educa-
tion or New P.N.I.) of Hatta and Sjahrir, which stood out from the
Ρ,ΝοΙο of Soekarno chiefly because of this approach to campaigning
and organization.
Its influence on the press was probably greater than that of any
other party. It also had a large number of members and supporters in
very high government posts, particularly in the capital; its influence
at the level of departmental and divisional heads was second only to
that of the Ρ,Ν.Ι, Within the top leadership of the army it could count
on more sympathy than any other party. Most important of all it acquired
power by fulfilling a brains trust function in relation to other parties.
Its policies found general support among large sections of other parties,
in particular the Masjumi and to a lesser extent the Ρ,Ν,Ι, On the other
hand strong enmity towards it existed in certain sections of these and
other parties, partly still in consequence of the vociferous attacks
which Sjahrir had made in the early months of the revolution on all who
had worked with the Japanese authorities during the occupation, (26)
The party’s mass level support or potential support was almost
negligible. In the parliamentary elections of 1955 it was to emerge as
the eighth strongest party, with a mere five seats.
The Communist Party and the Partai Murba
The Ρ,Κ,Ι,, Partai Komunis Indonesia, the other of the two parties
characterized by internal cohesion and clearly formulated policies,
stood in sharp contrast to the Socialist Party as regards the social
function of its leadership and the groups to which it appealed. Its
leadership came from what we have called mass leaders rather than from
intellectuals and its appeal was directed towards the former revolution-
aries at the level of the newspaper-reading public and the detradition-
alized areas at the level of the mass. It would be possible to regard
it as constituting the prototype of the party led by mass leaders, if
it were not for the fact that its role was affected in crucial ways by
the fact that it was an orthodox member of the international Communist
movement, (27)
The beginning of 1952 found the P0K,I, a fairly weak party far
(26)	SeeHfeihin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp, 164-172,
(27)	Although the Ρ,Κ,Ι. was and is in every sense a party growing out
of the Indonesian environment, its role cannot be explained without
reference to its foreign borrowing of ideology, organizational
principles and potential support, or its commitment to strategies
laid down outside the country. Thus it has not always pursued a
political course of a type to appeal to mass organizations or active
revolutionaries; in the first two years of the revolution it sup-
ported the cabinets of Sjahrir in their policies of negotiating with
Holland, policies which did violence to radical nationalist feeling.35
removed from the center of governmental power, hut vigorously and im-
aginatively led. For much of 19^9 and 1950 it had been largely ineffect·
ive, partly because of internal divisions and theoretical disagreement,
and partly because of the blows which had been delivered to both its
organization and its nationalist pfestige by the crushing of the
"Madiun Affair,” the Communist revolt of September 19^8. In January
1951» however, a crucial change in party leadership provided the basis
for a new internal cohesion» Power now passed intp the hands of a new
Politburo of young mens D.N. Aidit and M.H. Lukman (both recently return
ed from China and Vietnam), Njoto, Sudisnian and Alimin; of these all
except the veteran Alimin were men under 31 years of age» All the five,
with the possible exception of the theorist Njoto, were "mass leaders"
in terms both of their educational attainments and the skills to which,
they owed their position.
Once in power the new leaders bent all their efforts towards re-
organizing the party, emphasizing that it should be a single party,
small, disciplined and theory conscious, and that it should concentrate
on political work among the masses rather than on parliamentary poli-
tics. (28) By early 1952 they had succeeded in eliminating publicly
evident dissension within the party to the extent that it was possible
in March to begin a large ;membership expansion; in addition they had
reorganized a number of its front organizations to be more effective
agencies of its policies. On the other hand the beginning of this
year found the party still hampered by disabilities resulting from the
Sukiman cabinet’s raid of August 1951s with some of its leaders, still
in gaol or hiding.
The party’s stand on national issues centered on its opposition to
the Round Table Conference Agreement, which had, the PoK.I. argued, left
Indonesia in a semi-colonial state. Pointing to the difficulties and
disappointments of the situation immediately after the transfer of sover
eignty, the party declared that only the abrogation of the Round Table
Conference Agreement could provide a way out. (29)
The party opposed the governments of Hatta, Natsir, and Sukiman on
almost every issue of constitutional, financial and labor policy. It
attacked their foreign policy, inasmuch as this included partial approx-
(28)	See "Membolsewikkan P.E.I. (Bolshevizing the P.K.I»)," Blntang
Merah, Vol. Vll, No. 5, March 1, 1951? also "Tentang Tan Ling Djie-
isme (On Tan Ling Djie-ism)," Bintang Merah, Vol. Σ, No. 2-3,
February-March 195^»
(29)	Statement of Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, Sin Po, December 14, 19^9°
For the text of the P.K.I. motion for the abrogation of the Round
Table Conference Agreement aee; Fedoman, October 7, 1950.%
imation to the U.S.-led "bloc of states, calling at the same time for the
condemnation of U.S. aggression in Korea, the withdrawal of all foreign
armies in Asia, the freedom of Vietnam, French North Africa and so on,.
and the banning of the atom bomb. Prior to the Sukiman government’s
August 1951 raid the party had also effected a strategy destructive to
the economy, by political strikes, by sabotage and cargo-pilfering in
ports, and by the organization of ex-guerrillas aid local criminal elements
for terror raids on tobacco and sugar plantations in East Java.
Furthermore the P.K.I. was frequently prepared to attack national
and nationalist symbols. It denounced Soekarno and Hatta, not only for
the role they had played during the "Provocation of Madiun” but also
for collaborating with the Japanese between 19^-2 and 19^5· It branded
the independent foreign policy as a sham. At a number of public meet-
ings of the party the National Anthem was sung half-heartedly, often
with a leader singing solo and the rest of the meeting silent. The P.K.I.
was making little or no attempt to find a basis which its own anti-
imperialist ideology could share with the nationalism of the Indonesian
revolution.
The party’s greatest strength lay in the trade union movement. The
American Federation of Labor’s Free Trade Union Committee representative
in Indonesia, writing in June 1952, stated that the P.K.I.-led trade
union federation S.O.B.S.I. (Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization)
had between 800,000 and 850,000 members, including a little over 350,000
in SARBUPEI (Association of Plantation Workers)—out of an estimated
2,000,000 organized, and 3,000,000 organizable workers. (30) But
S.O.B.S.I. was stronger than these figures suggest. This was partly
because it had a dominant position in strategic sections of the economy—
transport, oil, waterside workers— and in politically crucial parts of
the country—Djakarta, Surabaja and the East Sumatra area around Medan.
More particularly it resulted from its relationship to its several rivals.
These were still very weak at this time, S.O.B.S.I. having gained an
early lead in the rapid unionization which developed after December 19^9·
S.O.B.S.I. organization and financing was much superior to that of any
of its many rival unions and trade union federations. S.O.B.S.I. gained
from the divisions between these bodies, many of them merely the crea-
tions of rival political parties established to strengthen these parties.
(30) Harry Goldberg, Gerakan Buruh di Indonesia (The Labor Movement in
Indonesia), Djakarta, 1952, p. 15, 19· Goldberg warns that these
are rough approximations. See also H.J. Wijnmalen, "Aantekeningen
betreffende het ontstaan, de ontwickeling en het optreden van de
vakbeweging in Indonesie na de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van
17 Agustus 1945” (Comments on the Origins, Development and Be-
havior of the Trade Union Movement in Indonesia after the Proclam-
ation of Independence of August 17, 19^5), Indonesie (s’Gravenhage),
1951-52, pp. 434-^61, 539-563.37
Furthermore^, most of SoQ»B»SoIo9s rivals were forced9 "because of the
inexperiehce of their leadership and their lack of an appealing program9
to take a defensive attitude towards S»O°B»S»I» or merely echo S»OoB»S»I»
demands» Though "by early 1952 the strength of S»OoB»S»I» was less than
it had Been a year before because of the mass arrests of August 1951s
it remained greater than that of any or all of its rivals,.
The party”s position among the peasantry was considerably weaker»
It could count on a sizeable group of potential supporters in many
areas where it had built up a strength between 1945 and the Madiun
Rebellion of 1948s and indeed In a number of districts where it had
been powerful before the abortive revolts of 1926 and 1927° Furthermore
it enjoyed the sympathy of groups of former guerrilla fighters^ particu-
larly in Java9 who had returned to their villages and failed to make a
satisfactory adjustment to village economic and social conditions» In
some areas it was strongly backed by groups of squatters on estate
lands» And it had the nucleus of a Yenan-like territorial base among
peasants in a small mountain area of Central Java» But the overall
picture was one with which the party was understandably dissatisfied»
The Communists had as yet no peasant organization over which they could
exercise undisputed control» Even as late as October 1953s, after a
very large membership expansion9 "as yet only about 7$ of the peasantry
(were) organized under the leadership of the Party»" (31) Δ great deal
of grassroots political work had still to be done before the party could
obtain l6»4$ of the national vote and 39 seats in the parliamentary
elections of September 1955° (32)
In 1952 there were few intellectuals or persons of tertiary or
completed secondary education in the party5 it also found little support
among students» There is a pointer here to a significant strength of
the nationalist regime in the immediate post-revolutionary period9 the
fact that it readily offered power and position to everyoneB young or
old9 who had education or training»
Among the 29500s000 Chinese in the country^ proud of the successes
of the Peking regime9 and resentful of the discrimination they were
suffering in Indonesia^, were manys particularly intellectuals and urban
workerss, who were susceptible to Communist influence» In addition the
heavily-staffed Embassy of the Chinese People°s Republic was so active
(3D Π» Nt Aiditg "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia/' Bintang
Me rah» September-October 1953s P° 462»
(32) In the temporary parliament the P»K»I» had 16 representatives (in
1952)» In addition it could generally rely on some twelve votes
from two small fractionsj, Golongan Buruh (Labor Group) and Fraksi
Kedaulatan Rakjat (People’s Sovereignty Fraction) and individual
Ρ0Κ0Ι0 sympathizers who belonged to no fraction»38
in this period in giving assistance to the PJ.L in the form both of
money and literature, that the government was under strong pressure to
take steps to limit the freedom of movement of its staff. (33)
Finally something should be said of a general tolerance towards
Communist ideas in Indonesia, which was undoubtedly a strong factor in
the P.K.I.'s favor. The Madiun Affair notwithstanding, only very few
groups in Indonesia regarded the Communist Party as a party radically
different from all others in the way in which it is widely regarded in
the West. Thus, although in 1951 Indonesia had a relatively strongly
anti-Communist government, it rarely occurred that the national Indonesian
press contained attacks on Communism or Soviet or Chinese policies. (3^)
Denunciation of Dutch and U.S. imperialism on the other hand, were very
frequently published. The mood of Indonesian politics at this time was
such that only a few could run the political risk of being branded as
reactionary and pro-imperialist, by publicly taking a strongly anti-
Communist stand.
The national-communist Partai Murba (Proletarian Party), considerably
weaker than the P.K.I. in 1952 and yet an important rival of it, may be
regarded as the prototype of the party led by mass leaders, as the PoS.I.
is the prototype of the intellectual-led party. Its leadership of 1952
was dominated by men without higher education, who had come into promi-
nence as leaders of mass organizations and military formations in the
Japanese occupation and the revolution, and its appeals were directed
particularly to unaccommodated ex-guerrillas and wage laborers. As a
party of extreme nationalism and messianic social radicalism (whose in-
choateness was only mildly tempered by the Marxist and Leninist theory
to which it laid claim), it was a citadel of "oppositionism," the poli-
tics of refusing to recognize the practical difficulties of governments;
indeed it had never taken part in any government of the revolutionary or
post-revolutionary period. Thus, in terms of our spectrum of leadership
and the direction of appeals, the Partai Murba occupies the position
which might have been occupied by the P.K.I. if the latter had not at
the same time had a peculiar relationship to the world Communist movement.
(33)	See the press statements of Mr. A.M. Tambunan and Mr. M. Yamin, Oct-
ober 15, 1951» which were strongly supported by a wide section of
the press. The government was at this same time facing considerable
difficulties, both diplomatic and practical, in combatting the
open propagation of Communist teaching in Chinese schools. See
also Ruth T. McVey, The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party
and its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s
Republic, Center for International Studies, Μ.Ι.Τ», Cambridge,
195^, PP· 66-71, 87-95.
«
(34)	Anti-Communist views were spread among Indonesians by the Dutch-
owned (Dutch-language) press and certain of the Chinese-owned,
Indonesian-language papers.39
The Murha leaders, followers of the former P.K.I and Comintern
leader, Tan Malaka, had enjoyed great influence in the Republic in the
early days of the revolution because of their strong opposition to all
negotiations with the Netherlands□ Rut their strength was declining
from 1950 or 1951 onwards» Weaker organizationally, financially and
in terms of the cohesion of its leadership, Murba had only one advantage
over the PJOIM its greater appeal to nationalism» By 1952 its rela-
tive position vis-a-vis the P»K»I» had declined considerably» However,
its influence was still much greater than suggested by its four seats
in parliament» (35) This was partly because it had numerous sympath-
izers in other parties and among independent members of parliament,
partly because of its close association with the "People’s Army,"
"Bamboo Spear" and other small bands of old revolutionaries in the
mountains of West Java, and partly because of the continuing possibility
that it would at some stage be recognized by either Moscow or Peking» (36)
The Masjumi and P.S»I»I.
The Masjumi, a heterogeneous party, generally considered the country’s
largest in 1952, illustrates better than the PoS»I», the P»K»I» or even
the Partai Murba, the organizational features described in the first
section of this chapter as characteristic of Indonesian political parties
of this period» A loosely knit organization, whose membership was in
practice not clearly defined, it exacted little discipline of its mem-
bers» It was different from other Indonesian parties in that it was
a "party of indirect structure", having not only individual members,
but also "corporate members", namely eleven Moslem religious, social and
educational organizations, the most important of these being the modern-
ist Muhammadijah and the more traditional Nahdatul Ulama» (37)
As the party which had provided' the first two Prime Ministers of
the post-1950 unitary state, the Masjumi played a major political and
governmental role» But this was widely considered to be less than was
merited by its potential power as a party claiming to be the only party
for Moslems, in a country approximately 85% of whose citizens are at
least nominally Islamic» In a parliament of 222 active members it had
only ^-8 representatives (with other specifically Islamic political groups
(35)	A considerable decline in its relative strength in the years
between 1952 and 1955 accounts for the fact that it obtained
only two seats in the country’s first parliamentary elections»
(36)	This possibility was sometimes discussed in relation to the
possibility of a breach between Moscow and Peking»
(373 Cf. Maurice Duverger, op» cit. pp» 6-17o A comparison may be drawn
with the British Labor Party, and the representation which it accords
to trade unions, cooperative societies and Socialist societies.^0
holding seven seats). In the middle and upper levels of the civil ser·^·
vice the number of its supporters was small. This'situation may he
traced hack to the period of armed struggle; for within the revolutionary
leadership, both in its intellectual and its mass leader sectors, the
group of devoted practicing Moslems, or santri,, such as would he likely
to give active support to a specifically Islamic party, was considerably
under-represented as compared with the merely nominal adherents of
Islam. (38) The consequence was underrepresentation of Moslem parties
in the political constellation of Djakarta in the post-revolutionary
period. Both supporters of the Masjumi and its opponents believed that
an important discrepancy existed between the Masjumi*s actual strength
as produced by the revolution and its potential strength as would be
shown in elections, and this belief was of great importance in the poli-
tics of our period.
In Islam the Masjumi had the basis of a political ideology, but it
lacked a specific political program to which all groups in it were fully
committed. It was in fact a deeply divided organization, so much so that
its policies are most easily discussed in terms not of the party itself
but of its constituent factions. In discussing these--we shall take the
normally accepted lines of cleavage along firstly religious and secondly
political lines, examining them in the light of a third line, namely that
between groups led by intellectuals and ones led by mass leaders.
The most important religious group within the Masjumi was that of
what we may call the religious liberals, those seeking a return to the
Koran and Hadith and emphasizing the necessity of interpreting these
in the light of the requirements of the modern world. The backbone of
this group was the most influential of the Masjumi’s constituent organ-
izations, the Muhammadijah. This religious, social and educational
body of forty years’standing had played a central role, particularly in
the prewar period, in confronting the Moslem community of Indonesia
with the challenge of the modernist reform doctrines of the Abduh move-
ment in Egypt. In the early 195O’s it was continuing to fight the battle
for a purer Islam devoid of the many traditional Moslem practices—both
imported and of Indonesian pre-Islamic origin—which it considered ir-
T38) This remains as yet largely unexplained. It is partly related to the
fact that a great part of the revolutionary fighting took place in
East and Central Java, areas where santri Islam has always been rela-
tively weak and where it has found a strong challenge in the rival
tradition of agama Djawa, the "Javanese religion" in which Hindu and
pre-Hindu animistic influences predominate. It may be related also
to the role of many santri leaders as traders, which disposed them
against an active role as full-time revolutionaries. As far as the
party’s numerical weakness among the intellectual members of the
revolutionary elite is concerned, this may be explained largely in
terms of the fact that relatively few santri had enjoyed higher
Western education, many of them having gone to Islamic schools.to
rational or unkoranic, (39)
The Muhammadijah and smaller organizations of the same type stressed
the necessity for Moslems to adapt to the new situations created by
the impact of the West, and particularly the necessity to master science
and technology» Thus these organizations provided the basis of the very
strong positions which persons of higher Western training occupied
within the Masjumi leadership. The Masjumi was indeed dominated hy its
small number of intellectuals. Virtually all the top leaders of the
party, including both Dr<> Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, the1chairman of the
party legislative council in 1952 and Mohammad Natsir, the chairman
of its executive council, were intellectuals of the group of religious
liberals. This may be explained in part in terms of the major role
played by intellectuals generally in this period, a role of much great-
er independent power than they later came to play. In particular it
has much to do with the importance of intellectuals to a government
party which was supported by social groups with an interest in such
governing as would restrain the pace of social change; the Masjumi pro-
fessed the aim of "continuing to be a stabilizing and consolidating
factor", (to)
Rivaling the religious liberals within the party was a second group,
led predominantly by persons we are designating as mass leaders. This
was the conservative group of the Nahdatul Ulama (Religious Scholars
Association), led by Kiai Hadji Wachid Hasjim, who had held the Religious
Affairs portfolio in the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. The Nahdatul
Ulama, a constituent member of the Masjumi, had been established as a
religious organization in 1926 (by Wachid Hasjim’s father, Κ,Η, Hasjim
Asjari), constituting a conservative counter to the growing strength of
the modernist Muhammadijah, Its religious viewpoint was essentially
defensive. It stood opposed at once to anaccommodation of Moslem social
regulation to the demands of modern life and to the attacks of the
Muhammadijah reformers on what the latter regarded as accretions to
basic and pure Moslem doctrine and practice. At the same time it acted
as a spokesman for what was the mainstream of Javanese Islam, a tradition
which had evolved in the course of four centuries as a result of the
(39) See Leslie H, Palmier, "Modern Islam in Indonesia? The Muhammadijah
after Independence," Pacific Affairs, September 195to Also Harry
J, Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, van Iloeve, the Hague,
1958, pp, to-50» For a discussion of the Muhammadijah*s role
in relation to the development of an indigenous Indonesian capital-
ism see Clifford Geertz, Another World to Live In? A Study of
Islam in Indonesia, unpublished monograph. Harvard University,
January 1952,	■
(to)) Kepartaian di Indonesia (The Party System in Indonesia), Kementerian
Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 195ls P° ItoA2
fusion of Moslem beliefs and practices with those of Hindu and pre-Hindu
Java. Of the leaders of this group some, like Zainul Arifin, owed their
position to their role as leaders of Moslem guerrilla troops in the revo-
lution. A larger number, men like Wachid Hasjim and the old and widely
revered K.H. Abdulwahab Chasbullah, had come to prominence as leaders of
the prewar Nahdatul Ulama.
In addition one can distinguish a third religious group, although
far less clearly than the other two. This one may call the group of
radical fundamentalists. Having its origins in the anti-traditionalist
"Protestant” movement (4l) of which the Muhammadijah was the main channel,
this group represented another, more illiberal and anti-secularist cur-
rent. Perhaps the chief mentor of this group was Kiai Ahmad Hassan of
the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association) centered in Bandung, but not
all of Hassan’s followers can be classified as belonging to the group.
One important political representative of the group was the militantly
anti-secularist and anti-Commdnist chairman of the Masjumi of West Java,
Kiai Isa Anshary.
Of these three religious groups only one, that of the Nahdatul Ulama,
functioned as a single political force. In the case of the religious
group of the radical fundamentalists the correspondence with a particular
political entity is only partial. Isa Anshary did indeed come to play an
independent role as the head of a faction within the party, a faction
led by men of predominantly Moslem rather than Western education, men
whose role was rooted principally in their power oyer mass organizations.
But he was never in a position to command the loyalty of the radical
fundamentalist religious group as a whole.
The situation is considerably more complicated with regard to the
dominant intellectual-led group of the religious liberals. The group
was divided into two highly independent political factions, the faction
of the associates of Natsir, whose politics largely parallelled those of
the Socialist Party, and the one of the associates of the more conser-
vative Dr. Sukiman. This division between the followers of each of the
two most prominent leaders of the party had been commented on frequently
during the Revolution (A2), and assumed increased importance in the
years immediately after the transfer of sovereignty. Though not always
sharply delineated, it was nevertheless very real. In matters of day-
(Al) The term "Protestants of Islam” is used by some leaders of this
movement in explaining their position e.g. discussion of the author
with Kiai A. Hassan, Bangil, East Java, May 19, 1955» Dike Pro-
testantism, the Indonesian reform movement is divided as between a
liberal (though not necessarily heterodox) wing and a fundamental-
ist one.
(A2) Kahin speaks of the division between ’’religious socialists” (Natsir
and his followers) and those outside this group. Nationalism and
Revolution in Indonesia, p. 157.43
to-day politics it overshadowed the religious divisions, with the
Nahdatul Ulama leaders supporting Dr. Sukiman (and wielding relatively
little power themselves) and the radical fundamentalists frequently
ranged with the followers of Natsir.
At the time under discussion the interesting position existed
that the Natsir and Sukiman groups each exercised power in a separate
and competing organ of the party. Under the existing provisions—
changed in August 1952—the party was ruled Toy a 12-man leadership or
Executive Council chosen by the party conference and a 6l-man Party
Council with powers to review the Executive Council’s decisions,
chosen on the basis of composite representation. It was impossible to
be a member of both councils. On actual political issues the two
councils not rarely took opposing stands. This was the case for instance
on the important issue of Indonesia’s signature of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty with Japan, when the Executive Council backed its chairman,
Natsir,in opposing ratification, and the leaders of the Legislative
Council its chairman, Sukiman, in supporting it.
The extent of the division may be seen from the fact that when the
Natsir cabinet fell, its successor, quite differently composed and pur-
suing distinctly different policies on a number of issues, was the cabi-
net led by Dr. Sukiman. Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, a prominent member of the
Sukiman group, had been one of those who called for the resignation of
the Natsir cabinet. Furthermore it was by disregarding the views of
the Executive Council of the Masjumi that Dr. Sukiman was finally suc-
cessful in forming his cabinet, and in this no members of the Natsir
group of the party accepted seats. The Japanese Peace Treaty issue
again brought this division to the attention of the public, but, despite
rumors, these was no open breach. (43)
While the followers of Natsir pursued policies similar to those of
the P.S.I. and cooperated with this party, the Sukiman supporters, re-
jecting these policies and averse to working with the Socialist Party,
preferred cooperation with the anti-P.S.I. elements in the P.N.I. and
other smaller parties, elements both conservative and radically nation-
alist. In economic policy the two groups had a number of ideas in
common. Both were against any major nationalization moves in the
immediate future; spokesmen of both advocated a return from the seven-
hour to the eight-hour day and firmer government policy towards trade
union claims; and both were emphatic that steps should be taken to pro-
tect existing foreign enterprises and attract larger amounts of foreign
(43) On August 23, 1951 Mr. Moh. Roem, a prominent member of the Natsir
group stated that it was no longer a secret that there were two
schools of thought in the Masjumi. On September 1, 1951 Mr. Kasman
Singodimedjo, a leader of the Sukiman group,made a statement deny-
ing that the Masjumi was splitting and a "Masjumi Merdeka" (Free
Masjumi) being formed.44
investment.
On the important issue of the President’s powers and his right to a
say in cabinet affairs, the division was abundantly clear. The Natsir
group took the narrow view of his prerogative and the Sukiman group was
prepared to justify his playing a political role and to cooperate with
him in this. While Natsir’s cabinet had been publicly in conflict with
the head of state, that of Sukiman was strongly supported by him.
But of all the issues between the two groups the one most discussed
was in the field of foreign policy. The Natsir group here followed almost
completely the P.S.I. formulations of the "independent foreign policy",
while the Sukiman group favored considerably greater alignment with the
U.S.A., both for the economic benefits which would accrue from it and
for assistance against Communism.
The role of the Nahdatul Ulama in the Masjumi attracted little out-
side comment until the time of the formation of the Wilopo cabinet, when
it was brought to a head by the Masjumi’s refusal to reendorse K.H.
Wachid Hasjim for the Religious Affairs portfolio. Several months later
on July 31, 1952 the Nahdatul Ulama was to renounce its membership of the
Masjumi and establish itself as a separate political party. (44) The
great importance of this severance was seen only much later, when the
1955 elections showed the N.U. to be a party only slightly less powerful
in voting appeal than the (rump) Masjumi. (45)
However the issue goes back a good deal further. Tensions between
Muhammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama had been acute in a number of areas of
Indonesia before the war, and it was only during the Japanese occupation
that the two were able to be brought into a single all-Islamic organiza-
tion. (46) In the post-war period Nahdatul Ulama separatism was stimu-
(44)	' On "this date-eight members of the Masjumi parliamentary fraction
resigned to establish a fraction of the Nahdatul Ulama. Un August
30, 1952 the Nahdatul Ulama joined with the P.S.I.I. (Partai Sarekat
Islam Indonesia, Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) and the Perti
(Tergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah, Islamic Educational Association),
a smaller Islamic party established in Sumatra, to form a consulta-
tive body called Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Moslem League).
(45)	The Nahdatul Ulama obtained 45 seats as compared with the Masjumi*s
57. (The specifically Islamic parties together obtained 115 of the
257 seats contested.)
(46)	See Mohammad Rasjidi, L’Evolution de 1'Islam en Indonesie (Java),
doctoral dissertation, Sorbonne, "Paris," 1956, pp. 130—177- Also
Harry J. Benda, op. cit., pp. 150 ff. et passim.^5
lated not only be the dominance of Muhammadijah members and sympathizers
in the Masjumi leadership, but also by the minor role to which the
Western-educated governmental leaders within the party relegated its
religious leaders»
This situation was particularly strongly resented at a time when
the prospect of elections was much discussed» For the Nahdatul Ulama
leaders were conscious of the great political strength at the grass-
roots level of the religious leaders who supported them. Personal
antagonisms between K.H. Wachid llasjim on the one hand and men like
Mohammad Natsir and Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara on the other, brought
these religious and political issues to a head»
As the Nahdatul Ulama emerged as a separate political entity it
was impossible to know what stand it would take on political issues
other than ones of a religious kind. The importance of the political
role it could play, once independent, was not widely appreciated.
The emergence of the Isa Anshary group as an independent political
force had barely begun by early 1952, although K.H. Isa Anshary himself
was already then chairman of the Masjumi of-West Java. This second, less
formidable, revolt of mass leaders of Moslem education against intellect-
ual leaders of Western education took anti-Communism as a key part of
its political armory.
In the case of the Masjumi, as of the PoN.I., the relevance of our
analytical categories of "intellectuals" and "mass leaders" is lessened
by the fact that these parties did represent social classes with an
interest in the status quo. Kahin, writing of the period of 1945-49
states that the Masjumi attracted "most of the vestigial Indonesian
commercial and industrial middle class (in Java, Madura and Sumatra,
and)...the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners." (47) This is
to be explained in terms of the historic connection, increasingly close
in the last two centuries, between the devotedly Islamic santri communi-
ty and entrepreneurial activity. (48) But in speaking of the post-
revolutionary period a distinction should be made between the older
capitalist groups which were largely Masjumi-oriented and the small new
bourgeoisie of the larger cities, largely an outcrop of the bureaucracy
and developing rapidly as a result of government support, whose loyalties
went primarily to the Ρ.Ν.Ι»
WF on. cit., p. 157·
(48) See for instance Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese
Economy; A Socio-Cultural Approach, Center for International
Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, April 1954, especially pp. 99-104.
Also Robert R. Jay. Santri and Abangan, Religious Schism in Rural .
Central Java, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1957-46
The Masjumi’s support came in part from the cities hut more particu-
larly from the towns and villages. In Java Masjumi supporters were prom-
inent in all the older sectors of capitalist enterprise where Indonesians
had been able to hold their own against Chinese, particularly in such
fields as the production and trading of batik cloth and cloves cigarettes,
but also to some extent in other distributive trade. Supporters of the
party were also numerous in the group of the landowners of Java, a power-
ful group in certain areas such as West Java, though very weak in Indo-
nesia generally in comparison with other Asian countries. In the outer
islands too the party was the main political representative of the
indigenous trading groups, which here had not generally suffered as near-
complete a demise in the colonial period as in Java. And here, particu-
larly in Sumatra and Kalimantan, it was supported by the important
quasi-capitalist group of growers of small-holders’ rubber. In virtually
all areas it was supported by the local religious leaders, professional
and semi-professional, the ulamas and kiais (religious teachers or
scholars), had.jis (returned Mecca pilgrims), mosque officials, and
religious functionaries of the village councils. (49)
To the extent that these groups were both important to the Masjumi
and concerned that it should take political action on their behalf, one
mdst regard the Masjumi leaders, as acting as spokesmen for these inter-
est groups, rather than as either mass leaders or representatives of an
independent social force of intellectuals. But .the-leaders’ freedom of
movement should not be underrated. The interest· groups have certainly
been important in determining the general pattern of the Masjumi’s
political action. But their power to influence the party’s actions from
day to day and month to month, and to affect the relative strength of
various factions within it, was limited, particularly in the period we
are discussing, by the relatively low level of political effectiveness
of the country areas as fcompared with the cities, and especially by
the great power of Djakarta in the country’s system of political arti-
culation.
The Masjumi’s greatest potential source of strength was among the
peasants. It benefited greatly from the burgeoning of organizational
activity at the village and small town level which characterized the
revolution and the immediate post-revolutionary period. Thus “when the
*
(49) In the 1955 elections when the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama were
strong rivals there was a tendency for the Masjumi to attract votes
in urban areas and areas of greater capitalist development, and the
Nahdatul Ulama in remoter areas less affected by. recent social change
However the lines of division were in large measure regional. The
Nahdatul Ulama, strong.in East and Central Java and South Kalimantan
had the support of a majority of local religious leaders in these
areas, and of a sizeable group of santri traders and landlords
there, and the Masjumi' similarly in the other Moslem parts of the
country.47
Natsir government in 1950 and 1951 created province and regency level
legislative councils on the "basis of giving equal representation on
electoral colleges to every established organizations, it secured Masjumi
domination of the councils that were created,, Although the process of
establishing these councils came to an abrupt end with the passing of
the contentious Hadikusumo motion against them in January 19519 and
some existing councils were actually frozens enough were still function-
ing to: make the Masjumi the dominant force in regional party politics
in Java and Sumatra. (50)
Apart from the many denominational-type social and educational
organizations of Moslems whose task it was to give the Masjumi general
support, there existed a number of specifically political organizations
of the party. These were the Islamic Youth Movement of
Indonesia, G.P.I.I.,the Women’s organization, Muslimat, and the small
SoBoIoI. (Islamic Labor Association) and S.T.I.Io (Islamic Peasants’
Association).
One further factor adding to the Masjumi’s strength was the Minis-
try of Religious Affairs. This Ministry’s task has been defined as "to
consolidate and develop sound religious denominations", (51) in line
with the Pantja Sila concept of "Faith in One God" as a part of the basis
of the state. Until July 1952 when the Nahdatul Ulama left the Masjumi
it could be said that this Ministry was dominated by Masjumi members on
all levels. The fact that religion is officially recognized and sponsored,
and that the body through which this sponsorship is expressed was domi-
nated by a single party, naturally gave this party tremendous prestige.
To a small extent the Masjumi was in this way put in the position of a
state party. There is no doubt that the status which it thereby obtained
and the attraction of the posts over which it disposed were important
factors adding to its political strength. (52)
Ϊ50) The Councils of the West and Central Java provinces were functioning.
Regency Councils established on the basis of Government Regulation
39 were functioning in the three provinces of Java and parts of
the provinces of North and Central Sumatra.
(51)	See "Religious Observances in Indonesia", Indonesian Affairs
(Ministry of Information, Djakarta), April-May 1953° Also C.A.Oo
van IJieuwenhui jze, Mens en Yrijheid in Indonesie (Man and Freedom
in Indonesia), van Hoeve, s’GraVenhage, 19^99 PP° 40-84, and J.M.
van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia," Far
Eastern Survey, September 1953°
(52)	The important political role of the Ministry’s employees is seen in
the fact that 37 of them were among the 257 persons elected to parl-
iament in 1955. Of these 21 were Nahdatul Ulama members, 15 repre-
sentatives of the Masjumi and one a P.N.I. representative. Statement
by R. Mohammad Kafrawi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Religion,
Abadi (Djakarta), April 3s 1956.48
The P.S.I.I. (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Association
Party of Indonesia) had split off from the Masjumi in April 1947, pro-
claiming itself as the same party which, as Sarekat Islam and later as
P.S.I.I., had been the most prominent of the prewar Moslem political
organizations. The leaders of this party, ’’mass leaders” both of the
prewar period and the periods of Japanese occupation and revolution, were
not united by a common position on outstanding religious issues. They
had left the Masjumi because they resented the ascendancy within it of
rival political groups, particularly the group of intellectual leaders
around Natsir. Since the split the P.S.I.I. had consistently failed to
cooperate with the Masjumi, despite the frequent statements of leaders
of both parties that the differences between the two were minor. (53)
Whereas its national strength did not at any time grow to be comparable
with that of the Masjumi, it did obtain the loyalty of local religious
leaders in certain of the areas where its prewar forerunner had been
strong. It had four representatives in the temporary parliament and was
to have eight, elected principally from West Java, South Sumatra and
Sulawesi, in the parliament elected in 1955·
The P.N.I., the Minor Nationalist Parties and the Christian Parties
The P.N.I., the second-largest party in the country according to
the common estimates of 1952, stands in strong contrast to the Masjumi
in a number of respects. It was predominantly a city party in its power
base as the Masjumi was predominantly a party of the towns and rural
areas. Its leaders had arisen from out of the vestigial aristocracies;
virtually none came from a commercial background. Unlike the Masjumi it
was a party strong in the bureaucracy; such links as it had with capital-
ism were with the bureaucratic capitalism nurtured by post-revolutionary
governments. Finally the P.N.I., unlike the Masjumi, was a party favored
by the political balance of the revolution. It included more of the pro-
minent leaders of both the prewar nationalist movement and the revolution
than any other party; it was the main beneficiary of the patronage distri-
buted when independence was finally achieved in 1949; and it could exert
greater power in the Djakarta politics of the immediate post-revolutionary
period than was consonant with its grassroots potential. (54) As a party
it stood to lose from such stabilization as lessened the relevance of
the symbols of the revolution.
But there were also considerable similarities between these two
major parties. The P.N.I. too was a loosely organized body. It too
(53) The party entered electoral agreements with the P.N.I. in the
Minahasa elections of June 1951 and with a Communist-led coalition
of parties in the Jogjakarta elections of August-October of the
same year.
(54) Its parliamentary strength in 1952 was 36. In 1955 it was to ob-
tain 57 seats.

lacked effective party discipline» It too was handicapped by serious
internal divisions» Like the Masjumi it was bound together by a set of
ideological orientations whose cohesive power was inadequate in the face
of the cleavages which resulted from interest conflicts brought to the
fore by the day to day processes of government»
P.Nolo ideology is centered in the revolution» It is the formula-
tion par excellence of the mood of nationalist political messianism
which we have described as characteristic of the old revolutionary
fighters» This formulation, which is yet to be given its final form,
is "Marhaenism" (usually translated "proletarian nationalism") or
"Socio-Nationalist Democracy"» (55) It is a political creed stressing
national unity and national culture and socialist or collectivist econ-
omics» It upholds democratic rights and opposes dictatorship, but con-
demns liberalism and individualism» Based on an eclectic selection from
Western socialism, Japanese nationalism and traditional Indonesian social
thinking, Marhaenism reflects both the P»N»I»’s attachment to the symbols
of the nationalist revolution and the difficulties which the party faced
in establishing a highest common factor of ideological orientations» ($6)
In cultural and religious orientation the P»N»I», more than any
other party, represents "Javanism?; Most of its leaders were Javanese,
and members of the social group of the prijaji, the vestigial Javanese
aristocracy which had in large part remained little affected by Islam»
Combining a nominal adherence to Islam with contempt for Islamic ortho-
doxy, these Javanese aristocrats.held syncretistic mystical beliefs
which owe more to Hinduism than to any branch of Islam» Proud of tra-
ditional Javanese culture, they saw this as the basis for a new Indonesian
civilization and looked to it to provide an alternative to cosmopolitan
culture» (57)
In the period immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the
Ρ.Ν·Ιο was the most strongly nationalistic of the major parties» It
(55)	For the formulation officially accepted in 195^ see Kepartaian dan
Parlementaria di Indonesia (The Party System and Parliamentary
Affairs in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Informa-
tion), Djakarta, 195^9 PP° 26-^2»
(56)	The most significant contributions to the work of creating a co-
hesive P»N»I» political ideology are contained in the speeches of
President Soekarno and Boeslan Abdulgani, then Secretary-General
of the Ministry of Information, in the articles of Sajuti Melik
(particularly in Pesat, Jogjakarta) and Asmara Had! (particularly
in Pikiran Bakjat, Bandung), and in the books of the Taman Siswa
educator, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro»
(57)	See for instance Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, The Philosophical and
Cultural Foundation of our Education System, Djakarta, 19^5 (?)50
played a major role in the movement for a unitary state. It strongly urged
the quick withdrawal of all Dutch troops remaining in Indonesia. More
than any other party it took the side of the men from Jogjakarta as they
came to take over and he fitted into the administrative structure of the
federal states. More than any other, it emphasized the importance of the
national claim to West Irian.
Its policies in the field of foreign affairs reflected the divisions
in the party. One group, roughly the "older intellectuals", appeared
to favor a relatively close relationship with the United States. But a
majority of the party leadership supported a more strictly neutralist
policy. (58) The party did not at this time identify itself with efforts
such as the Socialist Party pursued for the establishment of a "third
force” by association with India and Burma. In the words of its chairman
Sidik Djojosukarto the party’s foreign policy "does not follow the Moscow
policy, nor the (American) dollar policy, nor the (British) third force,
but is based upon the national potential". (59)
For a major party which (except in the Natsir cabinet period) was
strongly represented in the government, the P.N.I. did little to urge
consistent economic and social policies or to promote wider understand-
ing in the reading public of the difficulties which the country faced.
It confined itself in the main to appeals for national unity and for the
spirit of self-sacrifice which had existed in the days of revolution. A
number of observers remarked upon the sharply contradictory attitudes
which characterized P.N.I. leaders in office and P.N.I. leaders in oppo-
sition.
Divisions inside the P.N.I. were less clearly delineated than those
in the Masjumi. Some observers spoke of the existence of two main groups in
the P.N.I., others thought there were three, and others again gave the
number as four. In no case is it possible to establish clear identifi-
cations between a party faction and a particular social group which
supported the party. However one can speak of the existence of three
main power centers within the party and hazard generalizations about
the sources of their support within the party, as long as it is borne in
mind that the situation was both fluid and extremely difficult to dis-
cern. Indeed one must discuss the role of factions if the party’s po-
litical behavior is to be intelligible.
The first main power center was one of a group of older leaders of
great prestige who had been prominent in the prewar P.N.I. founded by
Τ5δΓτΚΓ issue had been brought to a head by the question of whether
Indonesia was to sign the Japanese peace treaty. The P.N.I. party
council decided to oppose the signing of the treaty, but not to with-
draw its ministers from the cabinet over the issue.
(.59) Antara, September 13, 1951»51
Soekarno in 192?» This was an intellectual group, including a number
of lawyers, men such as the chairman of parliament Mr» Sartono, the
(then) Ambassador to the United States, Mr» Ali Sastroamidjojo, and the
Sukiman cabinet’s minister for the interior, Mr» Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo„
These men and those associated with them had refused to be government
servants under the prewar colonial regime, but agreed to accept fairly
prominent positions under the Japanese and rose to higher political and
administrative posts in the revolution» In the immediately post-
revolutionary period the group furnished a number of P«HoIo cabinet
ministers and high civil servants» It could cooperate with President
Soekarno and the Sukiman group of the Masjumi in the moderate, socially
conservatives mildly pro-American and anti-Communist policies which
characterized the Sukiman cabinet--so long as these policies were asso-
ciated with appeals to nationalist symbols» Its conservatism gained
for it the support of older aristocratic elements from which it had pre-
viously been sharply separated» In particular it acquired the support
of many higher officials of the quasi-aristocratic pamong pradja corps,
(the general civil administration), from residents» regentsTbupati)»
and district heads (wedana)» who had been ambivalent in their attitude
to nationalism in the prew'ar period and non-party (or supporters of the
small PoIoR» or Greater Indonesia Union Party) in the period of revolu-
tion»
A second main center of power was a group of younger intellectuals,
many of them also lawyers, such as Mr» Wilopo, the former Finance Minis-
ter Mr» Lukman Hakim, and . Mukarto Notowidigdo, who was to be Foreign
Minister in the Wilopo cabinet» This group had no long-standing politi-
cal record, having first appeared as an entity in the revolutionary
period» In 1951-52 it was probably the weakest of the three P»HoI»
power centers» Its power in the P»HoI» was exercised mainly through
the more highly educated of the party’s younger members, but beyond that
it is by no means clear where its social base lay» The political
outlook of the group parallelled that of the Socialist Partys thus it
was opposed to extreme nationalism and emphasized planned economic
development» Its relationship to the older intellectual-led group of
Mr» Sartono and Mr» Ali Sastroamidjojo was somewhat parallel to the
relationship which the Natsir group in the Masjumi had to the Sukiman
group (except that there was a major difference in the internal power
relationship as between the two parties, the Natsir group being much
stronger in the Masjumi than the Wilopo group in the PoN»I»)0Whereas
the older intellectual group sought to work in cooperation with President
Soekarno, supporting somewhat conservative policies which were popular-
ized by appeals to radical nationalism, the younger group sought to
limit the President’s role, emphasizing the symbols of reconstruction
rather than those of the revolution just past»
The third group, which we may designate as that of the radical
nationalists, was not one led by intellectuals» Its leaders, men like52
the party’s chairman, Sidik Bjojosukarto and its secretary-general Manai
Sophian, were mass leaders, men without higher Western education who had
come to political prominence in the Japanese occupation and revolution,
frequently through their leadership of mass organizations, some of them
military or quasi-military. These leaders many of whom were deeply in-
fluenced by the ideology and methods of the Japanese military authorities,
were extreme in both their nationalist and their socialist demands and
strongly ’’oppositionist*’ in their attitude to governments in much, the
same way as were the leaders af the Partai Murba. Unlike the Murba
leaders however, the radical nationalists in the P°N.I. wielded consid-
erable power over the operations of governments. By virtue of their
close relationship with many former revolutionaries,the men of this
group were very influential in the party. Thus they could dictate
policy to cabinets, on several issues although they themselves did not
accept cabinet portfolios. In general this group of mass leaders was
not the dominant power center in the party in this period. But there
can be no doubt that the power of mass leaders vis-a-vis intellectuals
was already considerable, much greater than in the Masjumi. The mass
leaders’ role in the P.N.I. was decisive as regards the formulations of
the ideology of the party. In intra-party struggles the radical nation-
alist leaders most frequently qopperated with the older intellectuals
around Sartono and Ali Sastroamidjojo, to whom they were linked by a
common interest in the symbols of the revolution. But this was not the
case in early 1952 when oppositionist feeling was running high against
the Sukiman cabinet (in which the P.N.I. portfolios were held mainly
by men of the Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo wing), because of this cabinet’s
anti-Communist and pro-American policies. Again it must be stressed that
these three groups did not have well-organized bodies of supporters,
that factors such as common regional origin, family relationships and
purely personal associations frequently affected relationships inside
the leadership of the party.
The main basis of the P.N.I. support lay in the lower rungs of the
Indonesian aristocracies, particularly the aristocracy of East and
Central Java with its own particular prijaji. religious and cultural
orientation. This is the group which provided the greatest numbers of
pupils of Butch secondary schools before the war and the greatest num-
ber of civil servants. Thus the party had considerable support, and·
greater potential support, among many groups and most ranks of govern-
ment employees. Initially it offered more attraction to the employees
of specialized departments of the government service—teachers, health
and agricultural extension workers, information officers and so on—
than it did to the regents and district and sub-district officers of the
pamong pradja corps who were frequently of higher aristocratic origin.
But by 1952 it had secured at least the passive loyalty of a sizeable
section of the pamong pradja as well, and this not only in Java but also
in a number of other areas. In the cities its support came not only from
a high proportion of the large number of civil servants, but also from
many white collar workers in private employment. Its youth organization53
was active iBicities and fownSs, aid it could and did exercise consider-
able influence through several major women’s organizations,. Finally its
urban strength was greatly enhanced by the support of the new bureau-
cratic capitalists,, particularly importers,, who had entered business .after
the transfer of sovereignty,, as a result of the government’s policy of
encouraging the growth of Indonesian-run enterprise,, (60) Though still
small in 19529 this group was very important to the party and able to
exercise great influence in it„
To very many Indonesians in small towns and villages the P»NoI» was
eminently the party of the revolution and of independence„ It had the
support of many of those who9 while lacking strong political ambition
and having no definite views on political issues,, nevertheless sought
to gain prestige as patriots and responsible citizens by joining a
political party,, It had had considerable success in rural Indonesia in
establishing itself as the heir of the prewar nationalist movement„ in
all except its specifically Islamic sections,. Thus the local leaders
not only of many of the short-lived political parties of the 193θ°8 but
also of the progressive nationalist Taman Siswa schools and of the
prewar nationalist scout organizations were drawn mainly to the PoNolo
In many areas the party continued to be regarded as the leading cham-
pion of educational advancement and social progress despite its consid-
erable ties to the status quoo In addition it attracted support in
Hindu Bali and in the predominantly Christian areas outside of Java
(particularly Tapanuli in North Sumatra and Minahasa in North Sulawesi)
because of its opposition to links between Islam and the state»
Finally the PoNolo was strengthened by two associations which gave
it some characteristics of a state party» In the first place its members
occupied a very strong position within the Information Ministry» Whereas
it could not exert the virtually undisputed control over this Ministry
which the Masjumi had over the Ministry of fieligion before mid-1952,,
it was in a position to exercise strong influence over both the ways in
which statements of government ideology were formulated at:the Center
and the ways in which such ideological formulations were presented to
village Indonesians» The Ministry’s offices extended to the sub-district
level and a large number of its employees were regularly sent into the
villages to expound and explain the ideology of the government„
In the second place the PoNolo was strengthened by the peculiar
relationship which obtained between it and President Soekarnoo Soekarno
had been chairman of the prewar party of the same name9 and9 although
he had not been a member of any party since the outbreak of the fievolu-
Uo) See No Amstutzs The Development of Indigenous Importers in Indo-
nesia» 1950-55o unpublished PhoD» dissertation^, Fletcher School9
1958» Also the forthcoming Cornell PhoDo dissertation of John 0o
Sutter9 Indonesian!sagi0 A Historical Survey of the Role of Politics
in a Changing Economy from the Second World War to the General
Elections,' 1940-1955»54
tion, his name had been used time and again by certain of the P.N.I.’s
leaders. A number of the President’s oldest and,closest associates were
members and leaders of the P.N.I., and particularly of its Sartono-Ali
Sastroamidjojo wing. The P.N.I leaders, especially of this older intel-
lectual group and of the radical nationalist section, were the foremost
protagonists of the view that President Soekarno was entitled to powers
as a leader of the people, over and above his powers as a constitutional
head of state, because of his own personality and record. (6l) By impli-
cation the P.N.I. laid claim to a special relationship to the Pantja Sila
or Five Principles of State which Soekarno had formulated in 19455 Faith
in the One God, Nationality, Humanity, People’s Sovereignty or Democracy,
and Social Justice.
The minor nationalist parties were generally similar to the P.N.I.
in ideological orientation, but most of them lacked the support of any
strong Interest group. Commanding,only the most perfunctory organization,
they were little more than parliamentary groups, owing their existence
to the tendencies for party fragmentation described in the early part’of
this chapter. But although considered to have few long-term prospects,
they were able in our period to play a role of considerable importance,
not only in parliament but also in cabinets. Intellectuals controlled
the leadership of most of these parties, but they had to share power
with men of the mass leader type in one or two of them.
Partai P.I.S. (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia
Union Party), considered the largest of the minor nationalist parties,
was somewhat untypical of this group in that it did command the partial
support of a significant social group. Formed in Jogjakarta in 1948, it
had the backing of a number of older pamong pradja aristocrats, both in
Java (prijajis antagonized by the radical nationalism of the P.N.I.) and
outside of Java (persons who had worked in one of the Dutch-sponsored
federal governments). Nevertheless it had little organization. Whereas
it had 18 seats in parliament in 1952 it was due to have only two after
the 1955 elections. Led by intellectuals, it had a policy of conserva-
tism in rural social relations, of seeking to reestablish governmental
and social stability by a strengthening of the pamong pradja system of
administration. It sought to work in cooperation with some of the more
conservative regional groups such as Park! (Nationalist Party of Indo-
nesia) of West Java, and the Democratic Fraction, an eleven-man parlia-
mentary group of former federalists, mainly from East Indonesia;. In the
Sukiman cabinet P.I.E. held three ministerial posts (and the Democratic
Fraction one).
w For presentations of this view see the editorial articles in Merdeka
(Djakarta), February 21, 1952, and Pesat (Jogjakarta, weekly),
December 27, 1952.55
Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raja» Greater Indonesia Party) was a
splinter party formed in November 1949 by R» Ρ» Soeroso9 who had been a
leader in the larger prewar party of the same name» It was led by men
of the same aristocratic background as P»I»R» but had no general support»
In stated policy it stood somewhere between P»IoR» and P°NoIo But its
record suggests that its policy viewpoint was less important than the
personal interests of two or three of its top leaderso The 1955 elec-
tions were to cost it all of its five seatso
PoRoNo (Partai Rakjat National9 National People’s Party) also
appears to have had personal factors as its principal raison d’etre»
Formed in July 1950 as a result of a split in the ranks of the PoNoI»,
it was branded by PoNoI» leaders as right-wing and capitalistic,, But
the political course it subsequently pursued was characterized chiefly
by oppositionism» It had never been accorded a cabinet post» Of its
eight seats in parliament it was to lose all but two in 1955»
SoKolo (Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia^,Indonesian People’s Associa-
tion) was established in South Kalimantan in 19^6» Its stated policy
resembled that of the PoNdo and the political orientation of its three
parliamentary representatives was generally oppositionistc It also had
never participated in a cabinet» It had three representatives in the
temporary parliament9 but was to win no seats in the elections of 1955»
The Partai Buruh or Labor Party was a rather more significant
organizations, because of a certain amount of support from organized
labor and considerable influence within the Ministry of Labor» Formally
espousing Marxisms it was nevertheless primarily a nationalist party»
Within the party there appeared to be considerable conflict between those
supporting "oppositionist" P»N»I» and Murba policies on the one hand and
Socialist Party-sympathizing intellectuals on the other» The Labor
Party had one representative in the Sukiman cabinet» It had six seats
in the parliament of 1952 and was to save two of these in the 1955 elec-
tions»
Finally something should be said of the two Christian political
parties» Parklndo (Indonesian Christian Party) and Partai Katholik
(Catholic Party of the Republic of Indonesia)» These were minor parties
of a different type? there were "permanent minority parties9" rather
than "personality parties" as the minor nationalist parties were» (62)
With a reliable basis of mass support9 there clearly had a more certain
political future than the minor nationalist parties» (63) Although
(62) See Μ» Duverger;, Political Parties» pp» 290 ff»
(63) The Catholic Party had eight members in the existing temporary
parliament and Parkindo five9 whereas in the elections of 195556
there were only three million Protestants in Indonesia and approxiamtely
one million Catholics, the influence of the two parties was considerable.
This was partly because of the disproportionately large number of Chris-
tians in the civil service and in business enterprise, and partly because
of the individual prestige of leaders such as Dr. J. Leimena and Mr. A.M.
Tambunan of Parkindo, and I.J. Kasimo of Partai Katolik. The main poli-
cies of these parties were directed towards the maintenance of the groups’
sectional interests and of religious liberty. Both parties were dominated
by intellectuals and were moderate in their approach to nationalism and
the economic tasks facing governments, Parkindo standing somewhat closer
to the nationalist parties than the Catholic Party.
the two parties were to receive six and eight seats respectively.
A sizeable number of Protestants sat in the temporary parliament
and sit in the present one as representatives of parties other than
Parkindo. The link between the political party and the religious
community is a closer one in the case of the Catholics.57
CHAPTEH III
THE FALL OF THE SUKIMAN CABINET
AND THE FOEMATION OF THE CABINET OF WILOPO
By early 1952, as we have seen9 a number of circumstances existed
which weakened the position of the Sukiman cabinet» Furthermore the
political forces with an interest in a change of cabinet had gained con-
siderable public support»
The story of the actual fall of the cabinet—over acceptance of the
terms of American Mutual Security Agreement aid to Indonesia—deserves
our detailed attention» Although the fall of the cabinet was a real and
present possibility in the earlier situation, the occasion of its fall
was in itself a major political crisis» It was the most serious conflict
on a foreign policy issue to have arisen since the transfer of sovereignty,
and played a significant role in marshalling the forces which were to
come together in the cabinet to succeed that of Sukiman.
By the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951» responsibility
for all military, economic, and technical assistance was vested in a
single person, the Director for Mutual Security» In President Truman’s
words "the change in emphasis of the economic aid program—from recovery
to defense support—intensified the need for co-ordination between the
Economic Co-operation Administration and the Department of Defense." (l)
The Director of Mutual Security was charged with co-ordinating the work
of the following agenciess
1» The Department of Defense, administering military assistance
programs ;
2» The Mutual Security Agency, to be engaged "primarily in ad-
ministering the defense support programs and certain other economic
assistance programs”; ·
3» The Technical Co-operation Administration of the Department of
State which would administer programs of technical co-operation
with under-developed nations, except in South-East Asia. South
East Asian countries would have so-called MoSJL· SoToEolM-s
(Special Technical and Economic Missions) to replace E.C.A. or
T.CoAo missions, because it was thought necessary that "technical
flT First
Act of 1951.58
assistance and the economic support programs (should he) more
directly related to a defense build-up there.” (2)
This reorganization would not, in Indonesia’s care, involve major
changes of staff, hut it was expected to have effects on the extent of
Indonesian obligations to the U.S.
The Mutual Security Act required that all nations wishing to con-
tinue to receive any sort of assistance should declare themselves committed
to certain agreements, somewhat different from those they had already
entered. Economic and technical aid would he given to a state under
Section 511b of the Act if the giving of this aid would "strengthen the
security of the United States and further world security, provided that
the receiving State has committed itself to co-operate in the furthering
of international understanding and goodwill and the promotion of world
security and to take steps as agreed upon for the abolition of interna-
tional tensions." (3) If on the other hand a state wished to receive
military as well as economic and technical assistance it was obliged,
under Section 51la of the Act to commit itself to the followings
”1. To take joint steps to further international understanding,
goodwill and world security;
2.	To take steps as agreed upon for the abolition of international
tensions;
3.	Fulfill the military obligations which it has already accepted
in bilateral or multilateral treaties of which the United States
is a partner;
4.	Make a full contribution, consistent with its political and eco-
nomic capacity, its population, natural resources, facilities
and general economic situation,:to the development and maintenance
of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free
world;
5.	Take the necessary steps to develop its own defensive strength;
6.	Take reasonable measures to ensure the most effective use of the
economic and military aid provided by the United States."
In a note to U.S. Ambassador Merle Cochran the Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Mr. Subardjo, on January 5» 1952, committed Indonesia to ac-
ceptance of Mutual Security aid on the basis of Section 511a of the Act,
it being made clear that his note had the force of an international
agreement. He did however, or so it appears, insist on two modifications
(2)	I bid”	*”
(3)	Mutual Security Act, November 10, 1951·59
of the conditions laid down in the act. (4) The third of the points in
Section 511a fell away entirely—not a very significant change—and the
words ’’and military” were omitted from point 6. Significantly, this
important step was taken without any cabinet discussion. Ambassador
Cochran’s note of January 4 asked for a reply by January 8, thus provid-
ing sufficient time for a cabinet meeting to be called for the purpose.
But this was not done. Prime Minister Sukiman was informed of Subardjo’s
decision, as were several other cabinet members. It is probable that
President Soekarno knew of it. Certainly however the Minister of Defense,
Sewaka, was not informed. And, still more important politically, neither
were any members of the Armed Forces high command.
It was not until a month later that the agreement became public
knowledge. On February 4, the Ministers of P.IoRo (Greater Indonesian
Union), roused by the report of Defense Minister Sewaka on approaches
made to him on the matter by United States officials-, asked for a cabinet
discussion. But no immediate step was taken. The following day the
news came out in the Djakarta daily Abadi, the voice of the Batsir group
of Masjumi. On February 7, Indonesia Raya, often called the paper of
the army command, headlined a rumor that the defense section of parlia-
ment would bring in an interpellation on the matter. Public interest
was mounting rapidly.
On the following day, the 8th, the issue was for the first time dis-
cussed in cabinet. Objection was taken particularly to the conditions
laid down in point 4 of Section 511a of the Mutual Security Act, and
Mr. Subardjo was instructed to do his best to persuade the U.S. Ambassador
to accept a post facto change on this point. He was to try to have the
point omitted altogether, or, if this proved impossible, to have the
words "and the defensive strength of the free world" left out, or if
this was also unacceptable, to obtain a statement that the U.S. accepted
Indonesia’s interpretation of the words "free world."
It was eleven days before the U.S. ambassador’s reply to these re-
quests would come to hand, and these days were critical for the Sukiman
cabinet. On the 11th, Moh. Sadak, deputy leader of the parliamentary
fraction of P.I.R., announced that the Party Council and parliamentary
fraction of his party had decided at a conference with the party’s three
Ministers two days before, to demand Subardjo’s resignation. This state-
ment was a day later described as "too rushed" by Ρ.Ι.Β. Education
Minister, Wongsonegoro; and the P.I.E. Party Council declared the same
day that its objection was to the procedure that Subardjo had adopted
and not to the government’s foreign policy generally. Nevertheless what
(4) Opposition critics suggested that these changes were in fact not
made in the original note of January 5s bnt included in a subsequent
backdated copy of this note, written after the outburst of public
criticism of the agreement in February. The writer is not in a posi-
tion to confirm or deny this suggestion.60
Sadak had said had aroused the reading public to see Subardjo’s step as
a matter for serious concern.
Those sections of the press which had long been attacking the cabinet
now said it was about to collapse, urging that it be replaced by a
"business cabinet" to carry on till general elections were held. »(5) The
reasons why their case against Subardjo and the Sukiman cabinet met with
so ready a response are worthy of detailed consideration.
The immediate circumstances of the case were the most obvious basis
of resentment. The rapid passing on the February 14th of a parliamentary
motion of Mr. Sunarjo (P.N.I.),to the effect that all foreign treaties
signed by any sovereign Indonesian government required to be ratified by
parliament, reflected the state of feeling against "secret diplomacy." (6)
Neither Subardjo nor Cochran were personally popular in Indonesia. (?)
Thus the fact that they had seen fit to conceal their agreement and had
for so long succeeded in this, combined with the lack of a clear public
explanation of the matter even when it had become a crucial political
issue, together produced the strongest of suspicions. (8)
(5)	Pedoman, February 11, 1952. Pedoman had close links with the Social-
ist Party. Also Indonesia Raya, Abadi.
(6)	This motion, sponsored by the Foreign Affairs section of parliament
called for the strict interpretation of article?. 120 and 121 of the
(interim) constitution. The government accepted the interpretation
as set forth by Mr. Sunarjo.
(7)	Mr. Achmad Subardjo had become a member of Masjumi only at the time
of the formation of the Sukiman cabinet. His background is chequered
in the extreme. Be was chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indo-
nesian Association) in Holland in the middle 1920’s, subsequently
spending a period of something over a year in Moscow. During the
Japanese occupation period he emerged as Chief of the Counselling
Office on Political Affairs of the Japanese Navy in Java. In 1945
he emerged as Indonesia’s first Foreign Minister, and later became
involved with the national-communist Tan Malaka in the "3rd July
affair" of 1946. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,
pp. 115, 135.
H. Merle Cochran, a career diplomat, had played an extremely im-
portant role in Indonesian developments ever since his appointment
as the United States representative on the. United Nations Good
Offices Commission in the second part of 1948. In the early post-
revolutionary period sections of the Indonesian press voiced the
charge that he was entrenching himself in Indonesian politics.
(8)	According to the New York Times of February 25 the State Department’s
communication to Cochran had suggested that an economic agreement
under Section 511b of the Act would suffice for Indonesia, but the6l
But more important in explaining the resentment which was felt,
is the general Indonesian attitude towards the United States and particu-
larly towards American attempts to bring her into fuller alignment with
the UoSo-led bloc of states» It is a question of the whole basis of
Indonesia’s "independent foreign policy»* The "politik bebas" or inde-
pendent policy had been one of the cardinal doctrines and symbols of the
Indonesian Republic virtually since its birth» (9)
In one sense the "independent policy" is less than a policy—merely
the agglomenation of the ideas of all groups of the nationalist movement
about foreign policy generally» For such is the prestige value of the
term "independent policy" that, like "democracy" or "progress/’ it has
been applied by all groups to their own varying concepts of policy»
It was certainly given a variety of meahings» For some groups it
meant an isolationist independence of the two world blocs, while others
emphasized that independence was necessarily a relative thing not to be
considered except in relation to Indonesia’s concrete national interests»
For some it meant a commitment to neutrality in the event of war, while
others merely emphasized not being committed in advance to either side,
Ambassador had asked the State Department to reconsider this advice,
undertaking instead to induce Subardjo to accept the terms of Section
511a» This same source has it also that Cochran refused to allow
the chief of the M»S»A» mission in Indonesia to participate in draft-
ing the agreement, even declining to see him for a period of three
weeks» See Kahin, in Asian Rationalism and the West» p» 193»
(9) For general discussions of the policy, see Moh» Hatta, "Indonesia’s
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs» April 1953» Kahin in ¥» L» Holland,
Asian Nationalism and the West» op» 169-178» Also Mohammad Roem,
Politik Indonesia 19^2(Indonesian Policy, 1952), Penjiaran Ilmu,
Djakarta, 1952; Tindjauan Politik dan Ekonomi kita pada dewasa ini
(A Review of Our Politics and Economics at the Present Time,
Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1951>
and "The Historical and Philosophical Background of Our Independent
Policy," Indonesian Affairs» Ministry of Information, Djakarta, Vol» I,
No» 7, July 1951» More recent contributions to discussion of the
policy are found in the contributions of Roeslan Abdulgani, Suwito
Kusumowidagdo and Soedjatmoko to the "Symposion tentang Politik Luar
Negeri Indonesia" (Symposium on Indonesian Foreign Policy), Vivat
(monthly publication of the Student Senate of the Foreign Service
Academy), Djakarta, December 1955» The military rationale of.the in-
dependent foreign policy is discussed in a number of the writings of
Τ» B. Simatupang, then Armed Forces Chief of Staff, for instance,
Soal-soal Politik Militer di Indonesia (Problems of Military Policy
in IndonesiaTT Caya Raya, Djakarta, 195^, PP° 64-81» See also Α» Η»
Nasution, T jatatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Notes on
Indonesian Military Policy), Pembimbing, Djakarta, 1955s ΡΡ» 182-196»62
preferring to defer all mention of what would happen in this event» Ad-
vocates of closer alignment with America, found it useful to use the term9
arguing that an independent policy was one which took Indonesia’s internal
requirements seriously., Communists used the term to mean the same as an
’’anti-imperialist*' policy,, Ko one was against the independent policy,,
not at any rate in public., It was aptly said that it was assort of ideo-
logical prism through which all practical policies had to he refracted,.
Nevertheless there was9 at least within the main body of the nation-
alist movement,, a commonly accepted core of meanings, which gave the term
a certain precision and made it more than a mere prestige word,, Prac-
tically all nationalists agreed that it was a policy of optimum indepen-
dence of outside countries9 that it was based on Indonesia’s national
interests9 which included world peace9 and on the desire for maximum
opportunity for Indonesians to 'shape their society as they themselves
wanted to9 to prevent Indonesia from becoming an ideological battlefield,,
A considerable majority of these nationalists agreed that this involved
working for a degree of independence of the two power blocs which per-
mitted good relations with both and established a position from which
third party moves to promote conciliation would be possible» They added
that such a degree of independence would eliminate the possibility of
either bloc having to fear that Indonesia would be used aggressively
against it by the other» For quite a number of them the policy involved
working for an independent Asian or Asian-Arab bloc which could ultimately
perhaps hold a balance of power in world politics»
It is in the light of this type of thinking that the resentment of
the Subardjo-Cochran agreement is to be understood» It is not clear how
far Indonesia would have been committed, to U»S» policies by the agreement
if it had not been subsequently superseded» But the very language of it9
the insistence that Indonesia should make a formal ideological surrender
by putting its .signature to a statement of the ideas of the U»S» Congress
about the nature of the world struggle—this was certainly irksome»
The supporters of the agreement argued that it was merely an execu-
tive steps not involving a policy change» (10) They pointed to the fact
that since the little publicized Constabulary Agreement of August 1950
Indonesia, had been receivings, as well as economic and technical aid9
small amounts of military equipment—vehicle s9 radio sets^, small arms9
and so on—for its police force9 appropriated under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of October 69 1949»(ll) And they went on,to argue that
the present agreement was an organizational arrangement for continuation
of this9 not a political step towards greater dependence on America»
Others argued that it was necessary for Indonesia to accept aid under
(10)	Keng Po (Djakarta)» February 12 9 1952»
(11)	See Third Semi-Annual Report to Congress on the ΜοΡ.Α.Ρο» House
Document No. 1?99 June 259 1951°63
Section 511a of the act9 rather than 511b 9 because this would enable
her to buy arms and equipment which had been unprocurable in the U.S.A.
or Europe except in exchange for political guarantees» (12) All these
groups held that Indonesia’s need for U.S. military supplies was greater
than that of countries like India,, Pakistan or Burma which had. accepted
aid under Section 511b only, because they were either receiving military
equipment through the Commonwealth or had arms factories of their own.
As against these groups9 the great majority who opposed the agree-
ment recalled the fact that the Natsir government had refused the terms
on which the Melby mission of the UoS» Departments of State and Defense
had offered military aid when it was in Indonesia in October 1950» (13)
They drew attention to the note which Ambassador Cochran had sent to the
government on January 22s 1952, asking for a guarantees, which the cabinet
did not give, that controls would be placed on Indonesian exports to
countries of the Soviet bloc. They argued that for internal security
and political stability it was better to do without overseas equipment
if the cost of obtaining it was a further strengthening of those groups
in Indonesia who alleged that the revolution had been betrayed, by com-
promise with foreign powers» National unity required that the cold war
be kept out» If Indonesia was to continue to yield to America’s endeavors
to include her in an anti-Soviet bloc, there would soon9 it was insisted,,
come a point of no-return as far as any independent policy was concerned.
On February 12 came a major blow to the cabinet. The Executive
Council of the Masjumi, the party on which the cabinet had hitherto
relied most strongly, decided that "the Masjumi is unable to be respon-
sible for the signing of the agreement concerning Mutual Security Agency
aid which has taken place." (l4) This was followed four days later by
a decision of the Ρ.Ν.Ι» L executive — that "the cabinet should return
its mandate to the President in order to overcome the present difficul-
(12)	E.g. Jusuf Wibisono in Mlmbar Indonesia (Djakarta)9 April 19, 1952»
According to Kahin (Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 193) Indonesia
desired some help in purchasing additional small arms during 1952»
This was to be done outside M.S.A. or other U.S. government agencies
but would have required some help in obtaining priorities.
(13)	Under these terms Indonesia would have had to provide to the U.S.
information on the size of its armed forces and equipment and on
plans for military development.
(14)	Jusuf Wibisono in Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, Djakarta)s April 19s
1952. He stated that the decision of the Executive Council (under
the predominant influence of Moh. Natsir) was not the Masjumi’s
final decision as it still had to be approved by the Legislative
Council (headed by the Prime Minister, Dr»' Sukiman). However,, as
no meeting of the Legislative Council was held to review the Execu-
tive’s decision, the latter was binding on the Masjumi ministers.64
ties»" (15) There was however no indication, of when the P»N»I» would
want the mandate to he returned, and this was interpreted in the light
of earlier statements by P»N»I» leaders to the effect that a cabinet
crisis should be avoided while negotiations were going on, as they then
were, with the Netherlands about the future of Irian and the Netherlands-
Indonesian Union»
For some days the issue was held in abeyance» The parties were
known to be at variance on whether cabinet should take a decision to up-
hold or repudiate the Subardjo-Cochran agreement» The small parties
wanted a cabinet vote on the issue, but both the Masjumi and the P»N»I»
were against this, partly because of fear that this would further add to
their own internal divisions and partly because they feared that such a
vote might make the task of forming a new cabinet more difficult»
On February 19 came Ambassador Cochran’s reply to the requests
cabinet had made of his government at its meeting of the 8th» The State
Department, it read, was not prepared to agree to a post facto omission
of the fourth point of the agreement which Subardjo had signed» But it
had agreed that this point should be interpreted as follows:
Make a full contribution, consistent with its political and
economic capacity, as determined by the Indonesian government
and with its population, natural resources, facilities and
general economic situation, to the development and maintenance
of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free
and sovereign countries»
The answer did slightly strengthen the position of the supporters
of the cabinet» But it had come too late» It was clear that feeling
against the government was too strong» On February 21 cabinet passed a
motion disapproving Subardjo·s handling of the matter, whereupon the
Foreign Minister, in accordance with his letter to cabinet of February 11,
resigned» Even this however was not enough» Prime Minister Sukiman had
certainly shared responsibility-with Subardjo for the agreement, and so
had several other cabinet members; therefore the sacking of Subardjo
alone was regarded as unprincipled» (16) In any case it was clear that
the cabinet could not execute policy having a bearing on Mutual Security
aid» It faced the prospect of having to give a full explanation of its
actions in reply to a parliamentary interpellation on the matter, which
was to be debated on February 25» (l?)
(15)	Antara. February 17, 1952»
(16)	Abadi, February 13» Statement of Mr» Djody Gondokusumo in Indonesia
Baya, February 23»
(17)	This interpellation was initiated by Mr» Djody Gondokusumo (P»B»N»)
and signed by So Μ» Abidin (Labor), Α» Α» Achsien (Masjumi),
0» Bondonuwu (People’s Sovereignty), Ahem Erningpradja (Labor Group)
and Ζ» Baharuddin (Independent)»65
There seemed only one way out of the situation» On February 23
cabinet decided unanimously to return its mandate to the President» It
did so9 it stated^ "to improve the political atmosphere so that the
difficulties which have arisen from the signing of the Mutual Security
Agreement may be able to be overcome»" It had not taken any attitude
or decision on the agreement itself» A government broadcast of the same
day stated that "the resignation of the cabinet should not be construed
as meaning that the State would shirk its obligations arising from an
agreement with a foreign country»" (18)
What can be said in retrospect of the causes of the fall of this
cabinet? And which are the groups which were most directly responsible?
The Mutual Security Agreement issue was certainly a major cause of
the fall» So also were a number of other issues9 including deadlocks
between the two major parties over ratification of the San Francisco
treaty and the proposed new regulation to replace Regulation 39 on the
interim composition of the regional councils;, disagreements on the hand-
ling of the Irian issue and relations with Holland generally9 and con-
flicts on import and budgetary policies»
The groups which had been working most actively for the downfall of
the cabinet were two» On the one hand the Socialist Party was working
to convince sections of the Masjumi and the P°N»Io and of several smaller
parties that their own interests could be best served along the lines of
the Socialist Party’s suggestion that Indonesia could be governed through
a "business cabinet" until elections had been jheld» On the other hand
the B»PoPo (Political Parties’ Consultative Council) stood in outright
opposition to some of the most basic policies not only of the Sukiman
cabinet9 but also of the Natsir and Hatta ones which had preceded it9
and insisted on radical demands along ΡοΚοΓ» and Murba lines» This group
hoped that a "national coalition cabinet" might be formed on the basis
of all parties except the Masjumi» (19)
In the first three weeks of February9 which decided the fate of the
Sukiman cabinet9 it was the first group which took the offensive with
the second group lending its vociferous support only a little while
after the first had launched the attack and9 as it seemed9 rather un-
willingly» The Socialist Party itself remained largely in the background.
But it worked actively in co-operation with the Masjumi and Ρ.Κ.Ι»
groups which had long been critical of the government’s policy9 particu-
larly with the younger intellectual leaders of these two parties9 the
men of the Natsir and tfilopo groups.
(18)	Indonesian Affairs, Vol. II9 No. 19 February-March9 1952ο
(19)	See statements of Β.Ρ.Ρο and P.KoI»9 Indonesia Haya, February 26,
1952.66
The line of division within the P.NJ. was difficult to trace. For
this party, concerned always to carry radical nationalist sentiment with
it, had "been careful not to appear to assume responsibility for the
cabinet’s foreign policy. (20) In the case of the Masjumi on the other
hand, it was very clear. Jusuf Vibisono’s statement on February 19 to
the effect that the decision of the party’s Executive Council was not
its final decision, as it still had to be approved by its Legislative
Council, made it even clearer than had previously been the case, that as
between the groups controlling these two councils, there existed an all
but open breach. The Natsir-Eoem group stood strongly opposed to the
Sukiman-Wibisono group. The small Isa Anshary group backed Natsir.
The influence of the Socialist Party was exercised most strongly
through the press, in particular the Djakarta press. Pedoman, reflecting
PoSoIo policy fairly closely, and Indonesia Raya, also politically akin,
were its strongest supporters. The widely read Abadi, generally con-
sidered a spokesman for the Natsir group of the Masjumi, was an influential
ally, as were a large number of other papers b«fch in the capital and out-
side. Of the country’s most important dailies only the liberal Chinese
Keng Po and the radically nationalist Merdeka (whose proprietor is a
relative and political supporter of Subardj'o) stood out against the
attack, and even these two papers did not put up a strong defense. On
February'25 Abadi stated that? "Directly or indirectly, the press
helped to throw out the old cabinetA Pedoman cartoon of the same day
was headed "A Victory for the Press."
It is impossible to do more than speculate on the role which
President Soekarno played in these changes. The Sukiman cabinet, to
whose formation the President had contributed so much, had co-operated
considerably more closely with him than had its predecessor, the Natsir
cabinet, with its more narrowly legal view of his powers. The influence
he exercised in matters of day-to-day government policies was probably
greater in the period of Sukiman' than it had been since the Soekarno
presidential cabinet of August-November 19^5° In addition it is probable
that Soekarno believed in the necessity of considerable amounts of U.S.
assistance for Indonesian development. These factors point to the like-
lihood of his having taken Subardjo’s side. On the other hand there is
no evidence of a concerted effort by the President to prevent the fall
of the cabinet. Concerned to retain his position as the central focus of
nationalist feeling, he was presumably unwilling to defend the cabinet
with all the weapons at his disposal, when it had become clear that the
Subardjo-Cochran agreement had outraged the newspaper-reading public to
the extent that both the P.N.Io and the Masjumi were obliged to repudiate it
. ·
Τ20ΤΤΓΓ i s clear however that the party’s decision to return its mandate
was a blow to the conservative Ali-Sartono group, and that it was
made as a result of a coming together of many members of the radically
nationalist faction of Sidik Djojosukarto with the Socialist-sympa-
thizing faction of Wilopo. This had been the division at the time
of the party’s decision not to support the signing of the Japanese
peace treaty.67
However one should not exaggerate the role of public opinion—even
in the limited sense of the politically effective public, roughly the
equivalent of the newspaper-reading group. Although the evidence is
meager, there is reason to believe that the army leadership, representing
an enormous center of political power, played a role of Importance in
ousting the cabinet.
It is clear that the top leadership of the army and the Defense
Ministry were frequently at odds with the Sukiman cabinet and its
Defense Minister, R. T. A. Sewaka. They were impatient of the restric-
tions placed upon them in their work of reorganizing the army and resent-
ful of the political limitations which they felt made it impossible for
them to pursue a consistent policy against the Darul Islam and other
rebel-bandit groups. (21) The army leadership had co-operated fairly
closely with the cabinets of Hatta and Natsir, but the Sukiman cabinet
period saw numerous frictions. In June 1951 Ike army leaders had in-
sisted on re-arresting a number of Murba-sympathizing leaders of mountain
rebel groups released by the Sukiman cabinet’s Justice Minister, thus
bringing about his resignation. They had also refused to co-operate in
the use of the extraordinary legal provisions of the State of War and
Siege regulation against persons arrested in the anti-Communist raid of
August 1951. (22) Although it is unlikely that their role was active.or
corordinated, we may assume that their known feelings towards the Sukiman
cabinet were used effectively by political leaders attempting to persuade
their parties to disavow the cabinet and that this played an important
role in persuading the leaders of the cabinet to resign. (23)
There followed a 35-day period of cabinet crisis. Five days after
the cabinet’s resignation had been received, the President began his
series of hearings with party leaders. Significantly, he called only
representatives from the parties which had held seats in the Sukiman
cabinet. The justification given for this by Vice-President Hatta was
that the Sukiman cabinet had returned its mandate at its own initiative,
and not because of parliamentary opposition. In their meetings with the
President—and in some cases also the Vice-President—the party leaders
gave their views on what type of cabinet should be formed, and who
should, in their opinion, be charged with the task of forming it. (24)
(21)	A. H. Hasution, op. cit., p. 180.
(22)	Ibid., pp. 16O-I63, 168-172.
(23)	Interesting comparisons may be drawn between the role of the army
here and its more active, co-ordinated and overt role in bringing
about the resignation of another cabinet which relied heavily on
the support of President Soekarno, the first cabinet of Mr. Ali
Sastroamidjojo (July 1953 - July 1955)» J. R. W. Smail, The
27th June Affair, unpublished paper, Modern Indonesia
Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957»68
On March 19 President Soekarno announced the appointment of two
formateurSj Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Sidik Djojosukarto9 the nominees
of the Masjumi and ΡοΗοΙ» respectively» He did not specify that the
cabinet should he either coalition or business but defined the formateurs’
task simply as the formation of "a strong cabinet with sufficient parlia-
mentary backing»” These two men together appeared at first to be able
to form a cabinet which would meet both President Soekarno°s specifica-
tions and the demands of the two parties whom they represented» But after
nineteen days they admitted defeat and returned their mandate to the
President» On the same day9 March 199 the President appointed Mr» Wilopo
of the PoHoIo as formateur» In this case the appointment was not on
the semination of any party9 but made by the President on the basis of
what he had observed of developments during the earlier attempt at
formation» (25) By the 28th of the month Wilopo had handed a list of
cabinet post candidates to the President9 and three days later these
were approved and the Wilopo cabinet took office»
These were the principal developments of the 35 days» But what
struggles lay behind them? What were the political factors which made
agreement so difficult to obtain?
The question of the President’s prerogative in the appointment of
formateursp and of the -freedom with which this might be exercised,,
had for some time been a controversial one» Some resentment had
been felt9 particularly by the political groups with a narrow,,
strictly legal view of the President’s powers9 at what was thought
to be a tendency on President Soekarno’s part to prefer coalition
cabinets before business cabinets and to favor PoHoI» men,, and men
from the Sukiman group of the Masjumi,, as formateurs»
Again the parties which had at the time of the formation of the
Sukiman cabinets formed the Communist-led Badan Permus.iawaratan
Partai-Partai (Political Parties’ C6fisul-TatiVe~66uncil)7~w®re"'con-
cerned to be considered for the formateurship» This group9 through
its spokesmans the Communist Μ» Ρ» Hutomo Supardan9 moved a motion
in Parliament to, the effect that in the appointment of formateurss
preference should not be given to parties whose policy in the pre-
vious cabinet had been opposed by either parliament or the rest of
eabineis if the opposition parties were capable of forming a new
cabinet» This »otloa9 supported by the'PoK7I»9 Murba9 Labor Front9
Peasant Front,, Progressive Fraction and PoS»I»I»9 was defeated 81§3θ
on February 29» See Α» Κ» Pringgodigl®9 The Office of President in
Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitntioas» in Theory and
Practice» Translation Series^ Modern Indonesia Project 9 Cornell
University,, Ithaea9 1957s, PP° 26-279 439 57»
(z5) According to press accounts Wilopo had been considered for the post
of Prime Minister by Sidik and Pr.awoto9 and had then been found to
be acceptable to both major parties» Although not a nominee of his
party for the formateurship9 Wilopo was given the P»NoIo executive’s
approval for his work»
It was not the question of agreement on a stated program which made
the formateurs’ task as difficult as it was. Seven days passed before
Sidik and Prawoto were in a position to publish their statement, but
subsequently the points of this were not criticized, and indeed they
were taken over by Wilopo as a basis for his attempt at a formation, and
so finally accepted as the basis of the Wilopo cabinet. The six points
were very similar to those of the Natsir cabinet’s program and not very
different from those of the Sukiman cabinet, differing from them only in
particular emphases. They are as follows:
"1. Organization of the State
a.	To realize general elections for the Constituent Assembly and
the Regional Councils.
b.	To finalize the implementation of, and to give content to,
regional autonomy.
c.	To simplify the organization of the central government.
2.	Prosperity
a.	To raise the living standard of the population by means of
increasing national production, particularly of primary
foodstuffs.
b.	To continue agrarian reforms.
3.	Security
To seek to overcome the security problem with all means available
to a juridical state, to improve the organization of the instruments
of power of the state, and to develop the powers within society
for the maintenance of security and order.
4.	Labour
To complete labour legislation with a view to increasing the labour
level so as to safeguard the process of national production.
$. Education
To speed up the endeavors to make improvements aimed at the reform
(renewal) of education and training.
6. Foreign Affairs
a. To give content to the independent foreign policy through
activities towards world peace which conform to Indonesia’s
responsibilities within the family of nations and to the
national interests.70
b.	To complete the conversion of the Indonesian-Netherlands rela-
tions which are "based on the Union Statute, into relations
based on ordinary international treaties, with the elimination
of parts of the Bound Table Conference agreements that are
detrimental to the country and the people.
c.	To continue efforts to include West Irian into the territory
of Indonesia in the shortest possible time.” (26)
Of much greater importance than the rather general points of this
program were several current political issues on which any strong cabinet
would have to be able to take a united stand. The first and most ob-
vious of these was the complicated M.S.A. issue. It seemed improbable
that any cabinet could function unless it was based on a commonly
accepted conception of how Indonesia could find her way out of the im-
passe which the events of February had created as far as U.S. aid and
the whole question of relations with the U.S. was concerned. Perhaps
more difficult still was the question of ratification of Indonesia’s
signature of the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan. Here the Masjumi
and the P.N.I. stood committed to diametrically opposed policies, the
Masjumi supporting and the P.N.I. opposing ratification, and it was
difficult to imagine a cabinet being able to weather the storms that this
matter—and the closely related one of Japanese trade and reparations--
would raise, unless it had initially found a modus vivendi on it.
To vex the situation further the regional councils issue had raised
its head. With the P.N.I. pressing for a new regulation to replace the
controversial Regulation 39, and the Masjumi insisting that early regional
elections were the only solution it would accept, the situation was one
of deadlock. Yet, without a solution on this issue there could be no
fundamental assault on the very important problems of decentralization
and regional autonomy. Already too the question of nation-wide elections,
and when and how they should be held, was an important issue in behind-
the-scenes negotiations. The Socialist Party for instance made a large
number of electoral districts one of its conditions for participation in
a cabinet.
There was a source of party division also in the issue of the
negotiations with Holland which had been carried on in Holland by the
mission led by Prof. Supomo and had come to an abrupt end with the fall
of the Sukiman cabinet. (27) Whereas the Masjumi was principally concerned
(26)	Pedoman, March 7, 1952. This translation is taken from Indonesian
Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1, February-March, 1952.
(27)	Agreement had been reached on a number of points related to the
replacement of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union by a series of
normal international agreements. But on the Irian issue the situa-
tion had remained one of deadlock. See Supomo statement, Pedoman,71
to have the Netherlands-Indonesian Union replaced hy a series of normal
international treaties, the P.N.I.,with its greater emphasis on the
claim for Irian, opposed any solution of the Union question which was
not at the same time a solution of the question of Indonesian sovereignty
in Irian. Again particular politically contentious demands like that of
P.I.R. for the abolition of the Ministries of Religion and Information
created difficulties for the formateurs. Finally there were serious
differences of policy between the main parties on financial questions,
army questions, and the question of how to restore security in the dis-
turbed parts of the country.
It is not surprising when one considers all these divisions between
the main parties (and with them the fact that a considerable number of
parties would have to be represented ih a cabinet if it was to be able
to maintain a parliamentary majority), that wide support existed for the
idea of a business cabinet. Such a cabinet, it was argued, would minimize
the effects of bitterness between parties, and prevent the tension from
becoming worse. It would have internal unity, xirgently necessary in view
of the many contentious issues to be decided, which no cabinet whose
members could always be easily withdrawn by their parties could have.
These were the arguments of Socialist Party supporters, and of a
considerable number of non-party persons like the former chairman of
parliament, Mr. Assaat. But they were seriously contested by a number
of other groups, most strongly, significantly, by those who had defended
the outgoing cabinet and its Subardjo-Cochran agreement. Mr. Jusuf
Wibisono, of the Sukiman group of the Masjumi, opposed the idea of a
business cabinet as extra-parliamentary and unworkable. Dr. Sukiman
Wirjosandjojo stated that he thought a coalition cabinet better able to
ensure political stability, and the P.N.I. chairman, Sidik Djojosukar.to,
who had been co-formateur of Dr. Sukiman*s coalition cabinet, took the
same stand. (28) The arguments of these men gained strength when it
appeared during the President’s "hearings'* that practically none of the
parties was prepared to limit its own power by foregoing the right to
exercise control over any ministers it might have in a cabinet. (29)
In the early stages of the cabinet crisis the issue between a coali-
tion and a business cabinet was presented as one of principle. Neverthe-
~ March 6, 1952. The "way-out" proposal of the Supomo mission for
joint responsibility over the area as a temporary measure was in-
formally known to be unacceptable to Holland.
(28)	Merdeka, February 2, 1952; Abadi, February 25, 1952.
(29)	See statements in favor of a coalition cabinet, from P.I.R.
(February 25), Parkindo (February 25), Parindra (February 26),
Fraksi Demokrat (February 26), B.P.P. (February 26), Partai Katolik
(February 28).72
less the two types were clearly more important as political symbols than
as legal categories» The call for a business cabinet was made by groups
which wanted the formation of a cabinet with the political emphasis of
that of Natsir (which had sometimes been officially described as a
business cabinet). Those who were against a business cabinet, affirming
the desirability or necessity of a coalition, were primarily concerned
for a cabinet politically similar to that of Sukiman. The argument for
internal cohesion and technical competence was a political argument of
the P.S.I. and P.S.I.-paralleling parties and party factions; the counter-
argument for responsibility to parliament was that of their Soekarno-
allied opponents, conservatives and some "oppositionists.” The business
cabinet was an attractive political symbol, rationalizing the interests
of the "younger generation" of persons of higher Western education who
looked to Natsir, Wilopo and Sjahrir for political leadership; for these
men stood to gain from every emphasis on technical as against political
qualifications.
Later, when the President had left the question of coalition or
business open, and so for formateurs and parties to work out, it became
clear that the whole matter was one of degree. For a formateur it was a
matter not of any particular legally-defined relationship between parties
and the cabinet, but rather of obtaining maximum cabinet unity and con-
vincing the parties to be content with making suggestions to be taken up
by their ministers, rather than absolute demands of the sort that force
a cabinet to choose between inaction and internal collapse. The political
difference was one of the extent to which a formateur was prepared to go
to attain internal cabinet unity, where the cost of this was the danger
of not being able to maintain the full support of the government parties.
This difference came out most clearly in the "statement warfare"
which Sidik Djojosukarto and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, the first formateurs,
conducted after their attempt at formation had met with failure. Prawoto,
whose associations were primarily with the Natsir group of the Masjumi,
although he had close relations also with the Sukiman group, stated that
the failure had resulted from differences in interpretation of the meaning
of "strong cabinet," adding that the central difficulty in selecting
persons for ministerial posts had been to place individuals in line with
a "specified composition." On the other hand Sidik, representing the two
sections of the Ρ.Ν.Ι» which were most strongly opposed to the ideas of
the Socialist Party and of Natsir, emphasized not any specified composi-
tion but rather party and parliamentary support. Eefusing to accept
Masjumi ministers who were representative of the Natsir group only, he
stated that "no cabinet which did not include a compact Masjumi could
fulfill the conditions set by the President."
In this respect it is clear that Wilopo’s policy as a formateur was
much closer to that of Prawoto that to that of his party colleague, Sidik.
Whereas Sidik had encountered opposition from the leaders of the army,
Wilopo immediately gained their confidence by accepting their candidate
for Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta, and73
co-operating closely with him in the further work of forming the cabinet»
For the purposes of his task Wilopo stated that he did not see what were
called the Natsir and Sukiman groups of the Masjumi. At the same time
he emphasized what he called his "conception" of a cabinet» The fact
that Wilopo was prepared to run the risk of uncertain party and parlia-
mentary support rather than sacrifice the "conception" which would provide
unity and teamwork in his cabinet, is central to an understanding of the
whole period of the cabinet which he came to lead»
The formateurs’ tasks were difficult also for reasons of small
party, personal and sectional politics, reasons only barely relevant to
major party issues» Prawoto gave the following reasons § "There was one
candidate for a certain ministry who was made an absolute condition.
Then there was a candidate of the same kind whose inclusion would have
brought about internal discord within the cabinet itself and insufficient
backing from parliament. There was one party which did not like to
accept a different party, not for reasons or difference in policy, but
because it felt fed up. There was a party which formed a bloc with
another in order to be able to strengthen its absolute demands. There
was also a party which would only state whether it would participate or
not when it already knew what was the last placing for the complete
cabinet." (30)
An interesting aspect of the behind-the-scenes bargaining and
juggling was the light it threw on the parties’ conceptions of the rela-
tive importance of particular portfolios. One of the central problems
which Sidik and Prawoto had to face was the one of the Prime Minister-
ship, which was at that time demanded by both of the major parties.
Political commentators pointed to the importance of the agencies over
which a Prime Minister could exercise authority, in particular the Public
Prosecutor’s Department and the police force. Yet the Interior portfolio
was at least as highly bidden for as the Prime Ministership. (31) This
must be seen in the light of the P.N.I.’s determination to maintain the
strong position of its supporters in leading positions in the pamong
pradja corps (hierarchical general civil administration) and the Masjumi’s
aim to change this situation. (32) It probably reflects also the belief
(30)	For the series of statements of the two leaders see Pedoman,
March 19 and 20, 1952.
(31)	See the tentative cabinet lists published in Sin Po of February lh
and Pedoman of February 15» These two papers are of very different
political directions.
(32)	This factor had gained new significance in the period of the Sukiman
cabinet because Mr. Iskap Tjokrohadisurjo as the P.N.I. Minister of
the Interior had named P.II.I» men as governors in two provinces
previously headed by men of other parties. West Java and Sulawesi,
thus creating a situation where five out of the twelve regional
governors were avowed P.N.I. members and a sixth a P.N.I. sympathizer.7^
that the long-promised nation-wide elections (in which control of the
Ministry of the Interior and its governorships would he a crucial politi-
cal factor) would he organized in the life of this cabinet. The most
important portfolios after these appeared to he Defense and Finance; and
the fact that these two went to the Socialist Party and Sultan Hamengku
Buwono IX (who had associated himself with the party during the formation
struggle) suggests that the P.S.I.’s position in the Wilopo cabinet was
a very important one.
In this period again new light was shed on divisions in the MasjUmi
and P.N.I. In the Masjumi the strongest indications of disunity came
from the Nahdatul Ulama. It had become clear early in the period of
cabinet crisis that the party was not prepared to re-endorse the N.U.
leader Wachid Hasjim for the Religious Affairs portfolio which he had
held in the last three cabinets. So he seized the initiative by
announcing that he would not participate in the new cabinet, because of
the "unharmonious situation” in the Masjumi. In what was clearly a
threat of secession he said that "if the Nahdatul Ulama joins in the
political bickering, its character of a religious movement will disap-
pear.” (33) At the same time feeling between the Natsir and Sukiman
groups of the leadership was so strong that it was widely thought that
if and when the Nahdatul Ulama seceded from the Masjumi a large group
of Sukiman supporters might follow it out. (34)
In the P.N.I. itself the signs of division were much fewer. The
considerable differences between Sidik and Wilopo in their policies as
formateurs were commented on, and there was discussion of ’’groups” in
the party. But there was no airing of dirty linen in public as in the
case of the Masjumi. In fact only when the Wilopo cabinet was formed and
the P.N.I. Party Council was slow to give it its backing, did it become
possible to foresee the fierce internal conflicts of the party which
were to be of such importance to this cabinet.
(33)	Antara, March 18, 1952.
(34)	Dr. Sukiman and the top members of his group were not members of
Nahdatul Ulama. In fact most of them belonged td the N.U.’s main
Moslem opponent, the modernist religious organization Muhammadijah.
However N.U. leaders hoped that some of them would join the N.U.
political party in preference to remaining within the rump Masjumi,
where their power vis-a-vis the Natsir group would be considerably
reduced. The Nahdatul Ulama wanted Sukiman to return as Prime
Minister. See statements of K. H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, Antara,
March ?, 1952, and Sin Po (Djakarta), April 24, 1952, and of H.
Mohammad Dahlan, Antara, April 5> 1952. With the Sumatran Isa
Anshary supporting the Sumatran Natsir and the predominantly Javanese
Nahdatul Ulama leadership backing the Javanese Sukiman, the divi-
sion appeared as in part a regional one. However Dr. Sukiman and
the great majority of his followers remained in the Masjumi.75
Finally, a word should he said about the acceptance of Wilopo’s
cabinet list by President Soekarno. Wilopo submitted the list on March 30,
a list of Ministers from the P.N.I. and Masjumi (four seats each, and
representing in the main the Wilopo and Natsir groups), the P.S.I. (two
seats), the P.S.I.I., Labor Party, Parindra and two Christian parties
(one seat each), and three non-party men. But the President did not
immediately accept this list, stating that he would not come to a deci-
sion until he had discussed the matter with Vice-President Hatta who was
then out of Djakarta. This step, unprecedented in Indonesia’s constitu-
tional history, led to considerable protests. Mr. A. M. Tamburian of the
Christian Party and first Vice-Chairman of Parliament, argued strongly
that it was unconstitutional, and papers like the pro-Socialist Pedoman
did the same. On the other hand men like Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, and the
widely-read commentator Sajuti Melik, defended the President's action.
Not only did they point to the possible weaknesses of the cabinet that
Wilopo had formed—the opposition of P.I.R. and the Democratic Fraction,
the ambiguous position of Nahdatui Ulama, and the doubtfulness of P.N.I.
support, and to personal factors subh as the President’s opposition to
Wilopo’s Foreign Affairs candidate Mukarto Notowidigdo (3$)—but in
addition they argued that it was not nebessary for Indonesia to follow
Western constitutional precedents mechanically. Sajuti Melik strengthened
his case by pointing to a statement of the President made several days
earlier: "Our people's sovereignty (of the Pantja Sila) is not merely
parliamentary democracy as in the West; that must be coupled with leader-
ship.’’ (36) Here again it appears that the political alignment was
roughly between the forces grouped around the President and those grouped
around the Socialists. The issue did not assume large proportions,
however, because after two days the President had approved Wilopo’s list.
The cabinet as announced bn April 4, when the swearing-in Ceremony
took place, was as follows:
Prime Minister	Mr. Wilopo (P.NoI.)
Deputy Prime Minister	Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Masjumi)
Interior	Mr. Mohammad Roem (Masjumi)
Foreign Affairs	Mukarto Notowidigdo (P.NoI.)
(35)	Mukarto, then Deputy Representative to the United Nations, was
objected to in a number of circles, particularly in the Foreign
Ministry, because of his youth and relatively low diplomatic status.
(36)	Sajuti Melik in Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, Djakarta), April 5S 1952.
Quoting from an address of the President to the students of a staff
training course of the Information Ministry. Sajuti Melik had been
a member of the Central National Committee, or outer parliament,
during the Revolution, representing the Murba Party. In 1954 he
was Chief Editor of the P.N.I. daily Suluh Indonesia. It is not
clear whether he was a P.N.I. member in our period. He was a close
associate of President Soekarno.76
Defense
Justice
Information
Finance
Agriculture-
Economic Affairs
Communications
Public Works
Labor
Social Affairs
Education
Religion
Health
Personnel Affairs
Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (Independent)
Mr. Lukman Wiriadinata (P.S.I.)
Arnold Mononutu (P.N.I.)
Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (P.S.I.)
Mohammad Sard jan (Masjumi)
Mr. Sumanang (P.N.I.)
Ir. Djuanda (Independent)
Ir. Suwarto (Catholic Party)
I. Tedjasukmana (Labor Party)
Anwar Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.)
Dr. Bahder Djohan (Independent)
Fakih Usman (Masjumi)
Dr. J. Leimena (Christian Party)
R. P. Suroso (Parindra) (37)
The reactions at the time of the announcement of the cabinet were
certainly positive, more positive than they had been in the case of either of
the other two cabinets of the unitary state. The Information Ministry’s
Indonesian Affairs commented that the cabinet "gives the impression (of
being) of the ’younger’ elements in Indonesian political life" adding
that "for that reason many people feel that there is a hope of a ’new
atmosphere* in political affairs." (38) Particularly from students and
the younger section of groups of people of higher Western education, did
the cabinet receive acclamation, and from many groups outside political
parties who had hoped for a government above the petty bickerings of the
parties. In addition the reaction of Indonesians overseas was very
favorable.
Not only was it stressed that this appeared to be a cabinet of
people who could work together, but the caliber of its individual members
drew very favorable comments. Not a few observers thought that in terms
of their ability and integrity, the ministers of the Wilopo cabinet were
the equals of those of any other Cabinet of the Republic. (39)
(37)	Indonesian Affairs, February-March, 1952. Mukarto’s name had not
been on the list announced on April 1, which included Mr. Wilopo as
Foreign Minister ad interim. A day later it was announced that his
inclusion had been approved by the President. Wilopo passed over
his Foreign Affairs responsibilities to him as soon as he had re-
turned from New York.
(38)	Ibid.
(39)	Dr. J. Leimena, who had been a member of every cabinet of the
Republic since early 1946 and had consistently stressed the impor-
tance of personal factors in the work of the cabinets, commented
later that the Wilopo cabinet was in these ways the best in which
he had worked. Discussion with the writer, July 7, 1953·77
Mr. Wilopo, a forty-three year old law graduate and former teacher
in "Taman Siswa" schools, (40) had been Secretary-General and then
Minister of Labor, and later Minister of Economic Affairs in the Sukiman
cabinet. He had won for himself a reputation for political and admini-
strative ability, careful work, fair mindedness and sympathy for the
working class. At the same time he was known as a man for whom party
loyalties were relatively unimportant and who could therefore work well
with men from other parties. His calm, cautious and unspectacular ways
of working and his independence of mind were to leave their mark on the
developments of the next 1^ months.
Mr. Mohammad Roem, a man of similar age and training, was better
known, and in his work, first as Minister of the Interior, then as one
of the chief architects of the Sound Table Conference Agreement, and
later as Foreign Minister in the Hatsir cabinet, had made a number of
political enemies. He was known as a strong political figure and at the
same time eminently reasonable.
Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta, a man of forty who had
spent almost ten years of his life in Holland, was perhaps the most
striking of the men of the cabinet. A descendant of the rulers of the
Mataram Kingdom, he is nevertheless a man of democratic inclinations.
During the Japanese occupation and the revolution he had won enormous
prestige and popular affection. He was perhaps the only man in Indonesia
with charismatic authority approaching that of President Soekarno.
Active in military affairs during the revolution, he enjoyed wide respect
in the army. He had been Defense Minister in the Hatta Cabinet of the
Republic of the United States of Indonesia and Deputy Prime Minister in
the cabinet of Natsir. Though a non-party man, he stood with the
Socialists on many issues.
Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Finance Minister, was the youngest
and most intellectually distinguished of the team. At thirty-four he
had been Chargd d’Affaires in Washington, Minister of Trade and Industry
(in the Natsir Cabinet) and first Dean of the Faculty of Economics at
the University of Indonesia. He had been a strong critic of the Sukiman
government’s financial policy, and had resigned from his position as its
adviser in protest against it. (4l)
(40)	These are private, nationalist schools existing since 1922 when the
movement for them was begun by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Their educa-
tional methods are liberal and their cultural orientation "Javanist."
See Taman Siswa 30 Tahun (Thirty Years of Taman Siswa), Taman Siswa,
Jogjakarta, 1956·	.
(41)	Most of Prof. Sumitro’s many writings of this period are collected
in Persoalan Ekonomi di Indonesia (The Economic Problem in Indonesia),
Indira, Djakarta, 1951·78
Other men who appeared to he both personally readily accepted and
technically well-suited to their portfolios were Dr. Bahder Djohan, the
Education Minister, Ir. Djuanda, the "veteran” Minister for Communica-
tions, who was to become Prime Minister in 1957» θ-nd Dr. Leimena, who
was again given the Health portfolio.
But if the general reactions to the cabinet were favorable, there
were less favorable reactions from the leaders of a number of the politi-
cal parties. Thus doubts arose about the government’s likely strength
in parliament. Having gained the parliamentary support of the P.S.Io
and P.S.I.I. but lost that of P.I.R. and the Democratic Fraction, it had
twelve less votes in parliament than the Sukiman cabinet. The likely
secession of Nahdatul Ulama from Masjumi could cause it the loss of eight
more, which would mean it had a majority of only 18. And more important
than any other augury of weakness was the rather grudging acceptance
which characterized the attitude of the P.N.I. ..executive - to the
cabinet. It appeared that as a cabinet which was internally strong,
"something between a business and a coalition cabinet, but rather more
like the former," (4-2) it would have to pay in terms of parliamentary
opposition to it. This danger appeared greater for the fact that the
cabinet was not in a position to base itself publicly from the outset on
particular policies on the outstanding issues, like the regional councils
and the San Francisco treaty, on which important differences existed
between the main parties.
But for all the dangers that were visible on the horizon, it is
clear that the atmosphere at the time when the Wilopo cabinet began its
work was one of confidence and hope. At least, it seemed, there was a
chance that a positive: economic program would be pursued, that solutions
would be found to some of the problems of administration, that nation-
wide elections would be held before long, and that in this way new hope
would be born and ah end put to the "moral crisis." The next fourteen
months were to show how far these hopes were justified.
It was clear however from the time of the cabinet’s assumption of
office that it did not wish to engender any hopes which were false. This
attitude underlies the statements of policy which Mr. Wilopo made to
parliament, first in introducing his cabinet on May 9 and then in replying
to the questions and criticisms of the parliamentarians on June 3 and 19.
As there Was little that was new in the program of Wilopo as formateur,
so also in his statements as Prime Minister the policies outlined were
old ones—a fact which disappointed a number of persons who expected
radical changes from a cabinet of "the younger generation" of politicians.
The same policies had been enunciated, and to a greater or lesser degree
followed, by all of the cabinets of the period. The differences were
ones of stress—and here Wilopo’s statements paralleled closely those of
Natsir as Prime Minister in October 1950.
(42) Sajuti Melik, Mimbar Indonesia, April 5, 1952.79
It is most important here to consider those policies and emphases
of policy which have direct bearing on political party activity» The
cabinet’s policy for elections was certainly one of these» On this
matter the statements of Wilopo made it clear that action was intended.
This had been indicated by the fact that elections for a Constituent
Assembly and the regional legislative councils had been placed first in
the cabinet’s program, and, as we have seen, it found a reflection in
the political struggles of cabinet formation. Wilopo stated that the
government had made enough preparatory investigations—through its dele-
gations to Australia and India and in its regional council elections in
Mihahasa, Jogjakarta and Makassar—to enable it to establish an elections
system suitable for Indonesia. It was now therefore preparing an elec-
tions bill. Before submitting this however it would submit a simple bill
for the registration of voters, which would enable an important prelimi-
nary of elections to be begun very soon.
On this issue too, however, Wilopo did not give specific information
where politically contentious aspects were involved. He stated that the
government ’’tended to favor" direct over indirect elections. He said
that the regional councils functioning would continue to do so until
new ones were elected and that no new ones would be formed until then.
However he did not say whether elections for the Constituent Assembly
would be held before elections for the regional councils, nor did he set
any dateline, or reply to the parliamentarians who asked about the type
of electoral bill he would initiate.
Foreign policy, while of very great importance in terms of its
impact on party political divisions, was placed last among the points
of the cabinet’s program, and given little time in the statements of the
Prime Minister. Emphasis was placed on maintenance of an active inde-
pendent policy and on linking foreign policy with the requirements of the
internal situation. The government stated that it would reopen negotia-
tions with the United States with a view to replacing the Subardjo-Cochran
agreement with "another agreement with conditions which do not deviate
from the framework of international cooperation in general and the
spirit of the United Nations Charter in particular." (43) It would re-
ceive only economic and technical, not military,’assistance. With
reference to relations with Japan the Prime Minister said no more than
that the government was giving detailed attention to these, and that it
would establish only consular, not diplomatic, relations with Japan. He
opposed suggestions of unilateral abrogation of the Union with the
Netherlands but said the government intended to resume the negotiations
with Holland on this and related questions, which were broken off in
February. He announced that it would exchange diplomatic envoys with
(43) Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (The
Government’s Statement of the Policy of the Wilopo Cabinet and its
Replies to Parliamentary Criticism), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry
of Information), Djakarta, 1952, p. 186»80
Mexico, Brazil and Argentine, but had not yet taken decisions as regards
the placing of the diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia, Spain, or the
U.S.S.R. This was significant in view of the fact that Mukarto had stated,
before leaving New York to be the cabinet’s Foreign Minister, that he
would initiate the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow. (44)
In this further area of P.N.I.-Masjumi disagreement Masjumi pressure had
been effective.
There was little detailed information given on the government’s
stand in the question of policy to eliminate internal insecurity. How-
ever Wilopo made clear his stand on the related question of civil-military
relations. He stated that the greater part of the country had reached
a stage where security could be maintained by the civil authorities.
Therefore, he said, the government intended to begin lifting the State
of Siege imposed under the 1939 State of War and Siege (Martial Law)
regulations. By the time of his second statement of June 3 this had been
done for South Sumatra, and it was to be done for the rest of the country
in July—with the provision that the milder State of War regulations
(which give military authorities a smaller range of emergency powers)
would be effective in certain insecure areas. Further, Wilopo stated,
the government would within a short time have released approximately 70%
of the .20,000 persons, rebel-bandit suspects and quasi-political prisoners,
held at the time of its assumption of office under the State of War and
Siege provisions. (45)
The heavy emphasis of Wilopo*s statements however was on the economic
situation and the situation of the government's finances. With grim
realism Wilopo outlined the situation of the country’s economy, which he
described as being in "a decline of which one cannot yet see the end." (46)
He pointed in particular to the disastrous falls in export earnings due
to the raw materials slump which followed the Korea war boom--to falls
in the prices of raw materials such as rubber, tin and copra, and to the
difficulties being encountered in facing the competition of other raw-
material-producing countries. Explaining that 75% of Indonesia’s state
revenue came from indirect taxation and 65% from duties and excises, he
estimated that revenues in the year 1952 were likely to fall short of
those of 1951 by E 2,610 million. With previous commitments amounting
to E 3,800 million, the government would be likely to face a deficit of
R 4,000 million, with revenues totaling less than E 9,000 million. (47)
(44)	Antara. March 30, 1952.
(45)	See Daniel S. Lev, Aspects of the Regulation on the State of War
and Siege, unpublished paper, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell
University, Ithaca, 1957·
(46)	Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo, P. 16.
(47)	Op. cit., pp. 58-65. The earlier commitments, which led to deliver-
ies in the"second half of 1952 and in 1953» were the result of an
over-generous planning of expenditures, which was prompted by the
desire to start urgently needed schemes of rehabilitation and devel-81
A balanced budget was an impossibility under these circumstances, but
drastic cuts in government expenditure and strict avoidance of waste
were necessities', As far as possible the cuts would not affect productive
enterprises stimulated by the government.
Economic policy was on the whole to follow the lines laid down by
previous cabinets. There were to be no new schemes, for Indonesia was
already "overplanned. " However there would be a concern with long-term
economic planning. Immediate policy would be based on conceptions similar
to the ones of the Sumitro Plan and would concern itself with relieving
the bad condition of the domestic textile industry, encouraging entre-
preneurial activity in the provinces—with emphasis first on Sumatra and
the Moluccas—and stimulating rice production to eliminate the need for
expensive rice imports. The government would take steps to decrease ex-
penditure for consumption purposes. With the financial situation as it
was, Wilopo said it "certainly could not draw up any ambitious economic
program." He stated that it would draw up a statement on conditions for
foreign investment in the country.
The manner in which the new government would attempt to meet the
situation created by the decline'in export prices was to be its
sternest test. The decline in the country’s earnings presented it with
a problem whose political implications were all too direct. In view of
this it' is interesting to note the retrenchment which it introduced
immediately upon assumption of office. Wilopo stated to parliament that
whereas his cabinet would not reverse the policy of the Sukiman cabinet
of raising the basic salaries of civil servants by 20$ as from May 1, it
would discontinue the recently introduced scheme of rice distribution
for civil servants and would not give bonuses for the Moslem festival
of Lebaran in June. A number of demonstrative decisions such as the
one not to implement the increases in salaries and allowances of ministers
and departmental heads, which had been decided on by the Sukiman cabinet,
set the tone for a new austerity and severe retrenchments in government
spending.
Having put forward his policy Wilopo, on June 19, told parliament
that "the government will continue in its work—unless parliament thinks
differently." Thus he did not ask directly for a vote of confidence.
A motion giving the cabinet,"an opportunity to work" was passed on the
same day by 125 votes to 5» (48)
opment and by the optimism created by the buoyancy~of"revenue at
the time of the Korea boom. See Economic Report of Asia and the
Far East 1953, ECAFE, Bangkok, 1954 9 P° 76.
(48) Only the Partai Murba and S.KoI. were opposed but the Progressive
Fraction, P.R.H., P.I.R., the Democratic Fraction, a. number of in-
dependents and several individual members of Masjumi abstained from
voting. See Sajuti Melik, Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), June 28, 1952.
A Progressive-Murba motion asking that a vote should be taken on
the issue of confidence had been defeated immediately before.83
CHAPTER IV
COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM
One of the most significant political changes of the Wilopo Cabinet
period was the change in relationships between the Communist Party and
nationalist parties. It was in this period that the P.K.I. came to with-
hold emphasis from the more radical aspects of its program, gave support
to the government and succeeded in drawing the P.N.I. and other nation-
alist parties into alliance with itself.
The Communist Party had stood in outright opposition to the Hatta,
Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. It had strongly and consistently attacked
every one of these as reactionary governments and instruments of imperi-
alism, and sometimes as fascist. At the same time it had made little
attempt to associate itself with the symbols of the nationalist revolu-
tion. It is unlikely that it overestimated its strength so greatly as
to have been preparing for an early uprising against the nationalist
regime—as the Sukiman government alleged at the time of its mass arrest
of Communists and others in August 1951· But the emphasis of its work
was on weakening the economy and intensifying anti-government feeling.
It did not at this stage attempt the other strategy open to it, that of
appealing to commonly shared nationalist symbols, according the govern-
ment limited support and working with some government parties to divide
these from the other more positively anti-Communist parties of the
government group.
In terms of the P.K.I.’s own writing of this period of history the
fundamental change in its strategy came at the January 1951 meeting of
the party’s Central Committee at which the Aidit group captured the
leadership of the party. P.K.I. statements of the subsequent period
stress that it was then that the party began to implement the National
Unity Front policy—a policy which had been accepted in August 19^8,
after the return of the veteran P.K.I. leader Muso from Moscow, but
betrayed by the Tan Ling Djie leadership in the period after Muso’s death
in the Madiun uprising.
Indeed a number of crucial changes date back to January 1951· It
was within three months of the change of P.K.I. leadership that the first
indications appeared of the possibility of coopieration with the P.N.I.
against the Masjumi. The P.K.I. gave vociferous support to the attempts
of the P.N.I. to overthrow the Masjumi-led cabinet of Mohammad Natsir.
When the Natsir cabinet fell on February 20, 1951» the Communist Party
took immediate steps to create the basis for a new cabinet excluding the
Masjumi.8^
Thus on February 27 the inaugural meeting was held of what was soon
to become the B.P.P. (Badan Permusjawaratan Partai-Partai, Consultative
Body of Political Parties), a loose association of parties established
on the basis of a Common Program,, and for a short time it seemed that
this would form the basis for Communist cooperation not only with such
organizations as the splinter Moslem party hS.IJ. and national-communist
Murba Party but also with the P.N.I. This hope was dashed when the P.N.I.
refused to join the B.P.P., and, with the establishment of the Masjumi-
P.N.I. cabinet of Sukiman, the B.P.P. became largely inactive, (l) But
the P.K.I. continued to emphasize the B.P.P. Common Program adopted on
March 31 as its basis for cooperation with other parties in an anti-
fascist National Unity Front. This program consisted mainly of policies
of a broadly nationalist type—policies for a "truly independent foreign
policy," freedom from the Bound Table Conference agreement, a hastening
of the"return of West Irian to Indonesia, the lifting of the State of War
and Siege and of limitations on freedom to strike, faster freeing of poli-
tical prisoners, elections, nationalization of vital industries, industri-
alization, a "just distribution of land to the peasants," etc. (2)
In the following year the P.K.I.’s relations with the Murba Party
improved considerably, and it gained the cooperation of the Socialist
Party in parliamentary opposition to the Sukiman cabinet’s mass arrests
of August"1951.	no government party cooperated with it. Throughout
this period the theoretical statements of the party bore the strong im-
print of Mao Tse Tung's concept of four-class unity as between the work-
ers, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie,
emphasizing particularly the common anti-imperialist interests which the
fl) The eleven members of this body at its inauguration on March 31» 1951»
were the small Moslem parties P.S.I.I. and Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islam-
ijah)9 the Labor Party, the national-communist Partai Murba, the
minor left-wing groups Permai (Association of the Proletarian People
of Indonesia) and Partai Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants Party),
the Communist Party and four nationalist parties, Partai Bakjat
Nasional (National People's Party), Parindra (Greater Indonesia Party),
Partai Bakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Party) and Parti Indo
Nasional (Indo-Europeans' Nationalist Party). See Bintang Merah
(Red Star), P.K.I., Djakarta, Vol. 7» No. 6-7» March 15 - April 1,
1951, p. 168. See this also for the B.P.P.’s Manifesto of Common
Agreement and a Communist account of its formation.
(2) Ibid., pp. 170-171. The P.K.I.’s own Program for a National Coali-
tion Government, issued on March 28, was somewhat similar in tone,
but contained more points of a more specifically Communist nature
with regard particularly to American activities in Asia and the atom
bomb, nationalization and implementation of the policy of "land for
those who work it." Ibid., p. 166.85
national bourgeoisie shared with the proletariat. (3) But the emphasis
remained, as with Mao Tse Tung and Muso, on the hegemony of the Communists
within the National Front.
After the mass raids of August 1951 the party withdrew its support
of terrorist activity going on in mountain areas of East and Central
Java. Its new Agrarian Program dated December 1951 was moderate and
cautious in tone, no longer including demands for land distribution. (4)
But other changes were still to come, changes of less significance in
Ρ.Κ.Ι. theory, but greater practical importance.
To trace the development of the new policy one must begin by looking
at Ρ.Κ.Ι. reactions to the onset of the new crisis caused by the fall of
the Sukiman cabinet on February 23, 1952. Three days after the cabinet’s
fall the Ρ.Κ.Ι. repeated the demand it had made eleven months earlier
for a cabinet without the Masjumi. Its statement called for a "progressive
anti-fascist National Coalition Government," and urged that the parties
who had opposed the Sukiman cabinet should be Considered for the formateur-
ship. The same statement attacked the Masjumi for its alleged associa-
tions with the Darul Islam. This was a new charge which reflected the
P.K.I.’s emphasis on its loyalty to the nationalist regime. On March 10
the party stated that it did not insist on People’s Democracy immediately,
but wanted "a cabinet based on the ΒοΡ.Ρ., P.S.I. and P.NoI. with a
concrete and bold program."
Throughout the cabinet formation period the Communist Party was
active in demanding that the B.P.P. should be included in the new cabinet,
and, more vehemently, that the Masjumi should be excluded. But when it
became clear that Mr0 Wilopo would form a cabinet of the type which did
emerge, based on the P.N.I. and Masjumi and including, from the B.P.P.
parties, only three men, all little amenable to Communist pressure, the
party’s Central Committee made an offer without precedent. It stated
that it would support Wilopo’s cabinet as long as it was "progressive
and national," even if the Ρ.Κ.Ι. was not included in it. In particular
it stressed two demands relating to its own freedom of movement. One
was for the freeing of all political prisoners, including those of the
August raid, the other for the lifting of the State of War and Siege. (5)
The terms on which it was now prepared to support a cabinet were clearly
more minimal than in March 1951°
(3)	Ruth T. McVey, The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and
its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Bepublic,
Center for International Studies, Μ.Ϊ.Τ., Cambridge, 1954, p° 75·
(4)	See Bjntang Merah, Vol. 7, No. l6, December 1951°
(5)	Harian Bakjat. March 26, 1952.86
When the Wilopo cabinet had been formed the party’s stated attitude
was one of "wait and see." Ir. Sakirman, the party’s parliamentary leader,
gave it as his view that there were in the cabinet a number of individual
men known as honest and sincere. From the point of view of the cabinet’s
program, he said, the P.K.I. was unable to support it. But it had the
opportunity to prove itself on other scores, and so his party would watch
the practical steps of the government to judge whether it was honest and
capable.
In practice however the party’s attitude was already more positive.
Immediately after the cabinet’s formation it began to instruct its follow-
ers in the requirements of the new situation. The party daily of April 8
reports the establishment of cadre courses whose task it was to "combat
apathy and left deviation, by training cadres to an understanding of the
Indonesian situation...of the role of the state...and of the program and
methods of the National Front." (6) At the same time the party appears
to have sought to assure the government of the conciliatoriness of its
attitude. On April 29 it deputized the chairman of the Public Works
Workers Union (and parliamentary leader of the P.K.I.), Ir. Sakirman, to
go to Central Java to persuade his union members there to accept diffi-
cult terms in order to end a current strike against the autonomous
agencies of this province. (7) Six days later the S.O.B.S.I.-affiliated
oil workers union, Perbum, called off a threatened strike of 30,000 oil
workers against two large oil companies.
There were signs in the cabinet’s first month of office to suggest
that the Communists’ immediate demands would indeed be met. One such was
the decision, announced on April 21, that the State of War and Siege
would be gradually lifted. Another was that a number of prominent Communists
would be released from gaol. Furthermore it was known that the govern-
ment intended very soon to release large numbers of those detained under
the State of War and Siege relations.
Another aspect of a shift in P.K.I. policy came to the fore first
on May 20, National Awakening Day. This day was to commemorate the
establishment of the first modern nationalist organization, Budi Utomo
(6)	Harian Rakjat, April 8. I am indebted to Miss Ruth T. McVey for
drawing my attention to this report, as well as to a number of other
aspects of the P.K.I.*s policy changes of this period.
(7)	Sin Po (Djakarta), April 29, 1952; Keng Po (Djakarta), May 3, 1952.
The Sin Po report of April 29 referred to a S.O.B.S.I. order to stop
all strikes in accordance with the new policy of supporting the cabi-
net, but the truth of this report was denied by S.O.B.S.I. on April
30. Some government persons believed this to have been a case of a
deliberate "leak" to the press, intended to evince a higher degree
of permissiveness on the part of the government with regard to P.K.I.
May Day rallies.87
(High Endeavor) in 1908, and was regarded, like all nationalist festival
days, as the occasion for appeals for national unity. Significantly the
Communist Party was able to secure an important place on the National
Awakening Day committee and, probably, to influence the text of the
"Joint Statement" which this committee urged all parties to sign. (8)
This gained the support of 69 parties and organizations but not of the
Masjumi, the P.S.I.i., the two Christian parties or the Socialists.
Here was the first real success of the National Unity Front policy.
The Communist Party leadership explained a number of its policies
at the celebration of the party’s 32nd anniversary several days later.
Speaking on this occasion, the Secretary-General of the party, D. N.
Aidit, declared that it was the P.K.I.’s duty to "urge other parties—
any who are prepared to and honest—to cooperate with the P.K.I. to
support a national unity front, and unity fronts amongst various groups,
workers, peasants, intellectuals, artists, women, young people, entre-
preneurs and so on." (9) This was not radically new in itself, particu-
larly as it was followed by a statement stressing the continued necessity,
as under the old "united front from below" policy, to distinguish between,
on the one hand the democratic and progressive members and lower func-
tionaries of other parties, and on the other hand the higher leadership
of these parties. But it was significant that the P.N.I. was not listed
among the parties whose members and lower functionaries would have to be
apprised of the shortcomings of their leaders. (10)
(8)	The 69 organizations agreed to:
"1. Continue and perfect the efforts to forge unity of attitude,
program and action, which were begun on May 20, 19^8, also in facing
the danger of a possible outbreak of a world war, which threatens
the people and the state of Indonesia and which may lead to destruc-
tion, poverty, misery, and the annihilation of mankind;
"2. Express preparedness to work for the speedy realization of
this aim, in order to
a.	implement democracy in all fields,
b.	achieve the people’s welfare and social justice,
c.	annul all treaties with other countries which are detrimental
to the people and state,
d.	bring West Irian back into the Republic of Indonesia;
"3. Express preparedness to work for the reconstruction of the
nation forthwith, in the sense of fostering closest relations between
the Army, the Police, and other apparatus of the state and the people,
in order to overcome difficulties arising from within or without."
Indonesian Affairs, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, April-May 1952.
(9)	Menempuh Djalan Rakjat (Walking the Road of the People), Pembaruah,
Djakarta, 1952, p. 9·
(10)	The parties named were the P.S.I., Labor Party and Murba Party, and,
in the third edition of the pamphlet published1in August 1952, also
the Masjumi. Op. cit., p. l4. Third edition, p. 22.88
In the same speech Aidit placed great stress on cooperation with
the national entrepreneurs and the middle peasantry. The national entre-
preneurs, he said, like the proletariat, were suffering under imperialism.
The P.K.I. was absolutely against their liquidation or nationalization
of their capital, and set itself to defend their right of individual
property. (11) Similarly the party sought the abolition of large land-
lordism in order to create a free peasants’ community, a community of
the middle peasantry, as an important condition for the development of a
modern national economy.
At the same time the P.K.I. leader set a new tone for party state-
ments about the earlier government by referring to it as the "Sukiman-
Wibisono-Subardjo government,” thereby emphasizing the Masjumi’s strength
in this cabinet and leaving unstated the fact that the P.N.I., the party
of the national entrepreneurs by clear implication, shared responsibility
in equal measure for its policies.
In subsequent statements of Aidit and others the National Unity Front
was given a basis in terms of the history of the nationalist movement.
Aidit quoted Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, ”We have always won when we have been
united,” taking as examples various prewar and postwar federations of
political parties which achieved success. (12)
At the same time the party came to be much more positive in its
attitude to the cabinet. On July 28 Aidit stated that it supported the
Wilopo cabinet, adding that this was because it gave it a better chance
for political activities than other cabinets.
(11)	This emphasis is foreshadowed, but less specific^in the Central
Committee resolution of March 1, 1952. Kewadjiban Front Persatuan
Buruh (The Duties of the Labor Unity Front), Pembaruan, Djakarta,
1952o
A Harian Bakjat editorial of April 7 went as far as to justify
the existence of a differentiation in wage demands as between
workers in modern foreign-owned industries and those in small Indo-
nesian-owned ones, on the grounds that the former can afford to pay
more.
It is not clear in any of this discussion of the national entre-
preneurs whether the term includes Chinese employers of labor. In
Indonesia as in other parts of South East Asia, Communist class
analysis virtually ignores the peculiar position of the Chinese
minority. See T. H. Eigby, The Soviet View of South East Asia,
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1952.
(12)	Statement of the Central Committee of the P.K.I., Sin Po, August 16,
1952. Also D. N. Aidit, "Benarkah Front Persatuan Nasional ’taktik
Moskow'?” (Is it true that the National Unity Front is a Moscow
Tactic?). Pembela (The Defender), S.O.B.S.I., Djakarta, August 17,
1952.89
Under the new policy none of the earlier slogans were entirely put
aside. Communist-led unions continued their strike activities in a
number of places. (13) hut the emphasis in all of the party’s work and
the work of its unions was on nationalist symbols and slogans. Even
such government slogans as "national upbuilding" were accepted. The
official party attitude towards President Soekarno changed entirely.
No longer was he termed a collaborator with the Japanese. No longer was
he classified with Hatta, Sjahrir and Tan Malaka as a "false Marxist."
No longer was his name associated with the policies of the Hatta, Natsir
and Sukiman cabinets. (l4) Communists and their sympathizers ceased
their condemnations of the pomp of his palace and the large number of
his cars. At meetings and rallies of the party his pecture was displayed
with those of Marx and Lenin. By contrast, there was no change in the
attitude of the party to Vice-President Hatta.
More vehemently than ever before the party emphasized the national
claim to Irian. Similarly it exploited every situation which could be
used to intensify hostility towards Holland—such as the attempt made on
May 21 by three followers of the Dutch adventurer Westerling to assassin-
ate the Indonesian military attache in the Hague, Lieutenant-Colonel
Harjono. Also from its newly assumed vantage point of identificatidn
with the symbols of the nationalist regime it could campaign effectively
against the U.S.A. on the occasion of the visit of President Quirino of
the Philippines in July; for a wide section of the Indonesian press re-
garded this visit as an attempt to influence Indonesia towards entering
a Pacific equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the
same time P.K.I. statements were placing much less emphasis on anti-
American slogans of the type laid down by the Stockholm Peace Conference
(and in many cases of little relevance to Indonesia).
The measure of the P.K.I.’s success in establishing its nationalist
respectability could be seen from the fact that on August 17, the seventh
anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, the P.K.I. had positions
of great influence in celebration committees throughout the archipelago.
Just twelve months earlier the P.K.I. leaders had been arrested on the
grounds that they were planning to overthrow the state!
(13) One of the more serious of the strikes was that of the S.B.G.,
Sugar Workers Union, in July. The union went on strike against the
decision of the Central Conciliation Commission to reject its claim
for bonuses for the Lebaran festival.
(lA) For two examples of such charges in the preceding year see Njoto,
"Pemalsuan Marxisme" (The Falsification of Marxism), Bintang Merah,
Vol. 7, No. 1-2, p. 16, and "Bahaja Fasisme dan Kerdjasama dengan
Partai-Partai" (The Fascist Danger and Cooperation with Other
Parties), op. cit., Vol. 7, No. 11, p. 293·90
The Communist Party had set off on an entirely new course in three
important respects. Faced with a cabinet whose Prime Minister had in-
cluded its arch-enemy, the Masjumi, as co-leader of his team, and refused
to include Communists or Communist-supported persons in it, the party
nevertheless decided to give this cabinet its support—and this involved
not merely public proclamations but also the imposition of some degree
of restraint on its supporting labor organizations. In addition it
actively wooed the P.N.I., thus creating a National Unity Front alliance
of a type which involved no insistence on Communist hegemony; similarly
it sought to gain support from President Soekarno. Finally it infused a
new type of nationalism into its propaganda, namely the nationalism of
the existing regime.
The implications of this three-fold change were to become clear as
the new policy worked itself out in the course of the next few years.
However it may be fruitful to examine the causes of the change here,
even if to do so entails arguing from evidence of a later period.
In the first place the Communist Party of early 1952 was very much
concerned for its own freedom of movement. The arrests of August 1951
had apparently crippled much its organization. Its statements suggest
that it was most anxious to emerge from the position of semi-illegality
under which it had been placed by the Sukiman cabinet. Similarly it
must have been concerned to minimize the possibility of a further wave
of repression.
At the same time the party had been made conscious of its weakness.
It was a very small party—with only 7,910 members in March 1952 according
to the statistics it published later—and, according to its own statements,
had little support among the peasantry. In the terms of Aidit’s account
of this period, given in October 1953> the P.K.I. needed to gain time in
order to expand its membership, and had therefore to concentrate on coop-
eration with the national bourgeoisie, even to the extent of neglecting
its work among the peasantry. (15)
In the second place the party hoped by the new policy to use and
widen the existing divisions between the Masjumi on the one hand and, the
P.N.I. on the other. For it had become clear on the one hand that the
policy of direct opposition to both of the main parties of the nationalist
regime had brought disappointing results, and on the other hand that a
new Left tendency, more specifically a new tendency towards cooperation
with the P.K.I. rather than the Masjumi, existed in the P.N.I. (16)
Wilopo himself, though shown by his formateurship not to be a representa-
(15) "Djalan ke Demokrasi Eakjat bagi Indonesia" (The fioad to People’s
Democracy for Indonesia), Bintang Merah, Vol. 9, No. 9-10, pp. 460-
6l, A6^—65»91
tive of this tendency, had earned some Communist sympathy by his policies
as Secretary-General of the Labor Ministry and was frequently praised in
Communist publications as young and progressive. (17)
Later party theory described the change as resulting from a decline
in the strength of the forces of reaction, which had created a balance
favorable to the forces of democracy. Its success is ascribed in part
to the implementation of the P.K.I.’s strategy decided upon as early as
January 1951, of drawing the national bourgeoisie away from the comprador
bourgeoisie and bringing the former back into the ranks of the anti-
imperialist front, where it had stood in the years 1945-48. (18) However
this is a case of back-dating the significant change, for the National
Unity Front policy of : 1952 was different from the oolicy of 1951»
certainly in practice, but probably also in (Communist) theory. For there
seems to have been no deviation before March 1952 from the Mao Tse-tung -
Muso insistence that Communist hegemony must be maintained within the
National Front. (19)
A third factor was the party’s good name. To regain this had been
of vital importance in the party's thinking since its abortive revolt at
Madiun in 1948, when it had exposed itself to the charge of betraying
the Republic’s unity in the face of a probable imminent Dutch attack.
The Aidit-Lukiman-Njoto group of the party had fought the Tan Ling Djie-
(16)	It is not clear when the Communist leadership first recognized the
possibility of gaining major support from a large section of the
P.N.I., or how sudden or gradual the recognition was. Personal and
family links may well have provided the machinery. Some Indonesian
observers have pointed in this connection to Ir. Sakirman, chairman
of the P.K.I.’s parliamentary fraction, who is a brother-in-law of,
the P.N.I. leader Mr. Sartono and had been a close associate of
Soekarno and a number of men later to be prominent in the P.N.I.
in the colonial and Japanese periods. Sakirman was to be promoted
to membership of the P.K.I. Politbureau in October 1953» in ^hat
has been the only change in this body’s membership since January
1951.
(17)	E.g. Harian Rakjat, April 4, 1952; Pembela, July 15, 1952.
(18)	"Djalan ke Demokrasi Eakjat bagi Indonesia,” loc. cit>, p. 464.
(19)	It is in fact not clear whether the Aidit leadership of the party
had always been prepared to cooperate in a National Unity Front
which the P.K.I. could not dominate (and had not done so earlier
because neither the P.N.I1. nor any other important party was pre-
pared for such cooperation and because the Sukiman cabinet was
actively hostile to it), or whether on the contrary there was a
change in theoretical orientation at some point between January 1951
and April-July 1952.92
Alimin group on the issue of "liquidationism," that is on the latter
group’s demand that the party should work within other parties to over-
come the stigma of Madiun. The liquidationist group had keen defeated
in January 1951, "but the victorious Aidit group was left with the task
of finding an answer to the problem. The new nationalist tactic was an
attempt to achieve just this. Whereas the older foreign-trained leaders
of the Tan Ling Djie-Alimin group had keen concerned to prove the party’s
loyalty to democratic and parliamentary processes, the group of Aidit,
Lukman and Njoto emphasized rather its loyalty to nationalism. All of
them children of the Indonesian revolution, the new young leaders realized
the power not only of nationalist symbols as such, but of the symbols of
the nationalist revolution and the existing nationalist regime which was
its heir. (20)
Finally there is some reason to believe that the Communist leaders
saw their switch also in terms of a long-range policy of infiltrating
the government. They could certainly hope to gain a degree of influence
over it. This could conceivably become an effective weapon with which
to prevent the execution by the existing regime of effective policies of
economic development. Certainly it would increase American hostility to
Indonesia. And it would lessen the likelihood of Indonesia, being drawn
into the U.S. military system. In the long run the P.K.I. could perhaps
force an entry into cabinet.
Certainly the new policy involved risks. If too much emphasis came
to be placed on good relations with the P.N.I. and other nationalist
parties there was a danger that the distinctiveness of the party and its
strict theoretical orientation would become submerged. Thus it could
conceivably lose its position as the major focus of the forces of social
radicalism. There were to be warnings later of the danger of ’’rightist
deviationism which exaggerates the importance of the national bourgeoisie
and underestimates the importance of leadership of the working class and
the worker-peasant alliance," the danger of "the party losing its inde-
pendence. .. (and) dissolving itself in the bourgeoisie." (21) Again there
was the danger that the nationalists would achieve such strength as would
enable them to turn against the Communists. But all of these risks
seemed to be worth taking.
The fact that they were taken appears to find sufficient explanation
in the four factors outlined above.. It seems most unlikely that they
were taken on the basis of Soviet directives. They certainly represent
a change in National Front strategy, for which there was no basis in
(20)	Officially there has been great loathness to admit the change in
the party’s attitude to nationalism. The important and striking
change in the party’s attitude to President Soekarno has never been
admitted or explained.
(21)	"Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia," op. cit.. pp. 464-5.93
contemporary Communist theory elsewhere» They pre-date the later Soviet
tendency to woo Asian neutralism» There was no comparable change in the
policy of any other South or South East Asian Communist Party at the
same time» (22) And furthermore Soviet comment on Indonesia made at the
time suggests that the ΡΧΙ» was leading Moscow rather than following»
Soviet comment was moving in the direction of greater appreciation of
the force of Asian nationalism and of the possibility that neutralism
could work to its advantage,, but this was not incorporated as a major
part of its approach to Asian problems until some time, in 1953° (23)
The indications are that the party’s new policy was the product of an
empirical assessment of the domestic political situation made by a group
of party leaders who were confident of having Russian trust and confident
also, perhaps on the basis of communication, of being able to maintain
it with the adoption of the new policy»
But—and this is the more important and probably the more difficult
question—why did the PoN»I» agree to cooperation with the Communists?
How did it happen that a party which was a main beneficiary, perhaps the
main beneficiary, of the regime established by the nationalist revolution,
agreed to cooperate with a.party pledged to the supplanting of this
regime?
It was in fact some time before P»H»Io~Po£oI» cooperation became
full-fledged» Throughout the period of the Wilopo cabinet it was only
one section of the P»N.I» nationalists which pursued policies paralleling
and supporting those of the Communists» Neither this section nor its
strategy in relation to the Communists achieved clear dominance in the
party till the period of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet» Moreover the
change in the PoN.Io’s policies came gradually» It is much more diffi-
cult to date than the change in Communist policy°} for certain indications
of the new PoN.I» strategy were evident in the party’s actions as early
as the end of 195Os and some manifestations of the old strategy could be
seen as late as the beginning of 1955°
But a change there undoubtedly was, and a great part of its unfolding
came in the fourteen months of the Wilopo cabinet» Indeed it was central
to the change in political alignments which evolved in the period of
this cabinet; and it had a role of primary importance in bringing about
the political turbulence which frustrated and ultimately toppled the
cabinet.
(22)	Keng Po of November 7, 1952, drew a comparison with the policy of
the Iranian party towards the government of Mossadeq, but this
would appear to have been a case where immediate Russian interests
were of much more importance, as compared with general revolutionary
strategy, than in Indonesia»
(23)	Here I am indebted entirely to Miss McVey and the thorough study
she has made of tKe Soviet and international Communist press in
this period.94
The manifestations of the change were only beginning to be visible
in the first few months of the Wilopo cabinet’s existence» They came at
various nationalist celebrations when the PoN»I» and ΡΧΙ» worked to-
gether on a basis which excluded such parties as the Masjumi and the
PoSolo socialists» The change was seen in parallel statements made by
PoNolo and Communist spokesmen urging strong action against the Darul
Islam<,vigilance in the face of foreign subversive activities and deter-
mined retaliation against Dutch insults» The evidence was to become
much stronger later, in the stands assumed by the two parties in the
army crisis of October 1952, in a number of questions relating to the
forthcoming elections, and, finally, on the issue of the continued
existence of the Wilopo cabinet» Already from some time in mid-1952
however it was clear that a major and increasingly powerful section of
the P»HoIo disapproved of the Wilopo cabinet’s policies, opposed the type
of compromise with the Masjumi (and P»S»Io) on which this cabinet was
based, and moved in the direction of cooperation with the Communists
against the Masjumi» How is this fact to be explained?
The simplest explanation given is in terms of Communist infiltra-
tion of the PoNolo Indeed there were some Communist sympathizers in the
PoNdo leadership, men like Saleh Umar of the North Sumatra branch of the
party, who was active in Peace Movement activities, and Ahen Erningpradja
who was a leader of the trade union federation S»O»B»S»I» In addition
it is conceivable that some Ρ«Ν»Ι» leaders, holding the then widespread
view that the P»NoI» had no political future, had turned to the Communist
Party and been directed to be its agents in the party in which they were
prominent» But there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the in-
fluence of such men could have been of decisive importance» No party of
the size of the PoN»I» could have been directed into a course which could
not be justified in terms of its own. interests» In fact infiltration is
more difficult in a country whose political elite is as small as Indo-
nesia’s»
Much more important is the fact that P»NOI» cooperation with the
Masjumi and PoS»I» as expressed in the policies of the Wilopo cabinet
was not advancing the interests of the P»NoI» as a party» This was
particularly clear as regards the army» For, as will become clear in
the following chapter, the Wilopo cabinet pursued or sanctioned a vigor-
ous policy of army reorganization confirming and strengthening the posi-
tion of the top leaders of the army and the Defense Ministry, men who
had frequently exercised power at the cabinet level and many of whom had
PoSolo sympathies and sought to restrict and counterbalance the political
influence of President Soekarno» This caused a definite power shift
away from the PoNoIoj the promotions and transfers implemented by Sultan
Hamengku Buwono as Defense Minister in the Wilopo cabinet weakened the
influence of P»N»IO sympathizers in the officer corps, and the demobiliza
tion policy which the Sultan proposed would probably have had a similar
effect at lower levels had it been implemented by him»95
Wilopo’s policies threatened P.N.I. interests also inasmuch as they
incorporated a fairly determined approach in the matter of the early
holding of the long-promised nation-wide elections.» Not only did the
tfilopo cabinet act more quickly in this matter than had its predecessors—
one of its first legislative actions was to introduce a bill for the
registration of voters in July—but in addition the press and politically
effective public opinion was more strongly in favor of early elections
than it had been in the period of the Sukiman cabinet.
But most P.Nil. leaders believed that elections would lessen their
power, unless it would have been possible to increase their party’s vote-
getting strength before they were held. Ever since Japanese occupation
policy had effecthd a massive consolidation of the organized power of
Islam in the villages of Indonesia, (24) non-religious nationalist
leaders had been afraid of any contest with Moslem parties at the grass-
roots level. Their fear at this time may be explained in part by refer-
ence to the results obtained by P.N.I. candidates in earlier local and
regional elections. In regional elections held in a number of parts of
Java in 1946, and in the closely watched 1951 elections in Jogjakarta, the
P.N.I. had fared badly as compared with the Masjumi. (25) Only in the
1951 elections in the Christian and socially untypical areas of Minahasa
and Sangihe-Talaud in Sulawesi had the P.N.I. emerged as the leading
party. (26) For whatever reason, it is a fact that in 1952 P.N.I. leaders,
like the leaders of most other political parties, believed that early
elections would result in a Masjumi victory. Hence they favored a post-
(24)	See Η. J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation
1942-45," Pacific Affairs, December 1955»
(25)	For instance the Masjumi had won 43 of the 80 elected seats on the
Kediri residency council (July 11, 1946) and 104 of the 125 elected
seats on the kabupaten councils in the residency of Solo (December
10, 1946). Neither of these two areas had been traditionally a
center of Islamic influence. See Satu Tahun Badan Pembaharuan
Susunan Komite Nasional Pusat, Djuli 19^> - Djuli 1947 (A Year’s
Activities of the Council to Renew the Composition of the Central
National Committee, July 1946 - July 1947), Badan Pembaharuan
Susunan, Jogjakarta, 1947.
In the Jogjakarta regional elections of August-October 1951 the
Masjumi had gained 18 seats out of the 40 and the P.N.I. 4 seats.
See Sekitar Pemilihan Umum di Djokjakarta (Concerning the Elections
in Jogjakarta), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information),
1952, and Herbert Feith, "Elections in Jogjakarta," Australia’s
Neighbours (Australian Institute of International Affairs), November
1, 1951.
(26)	The party had obtained 11 of the 15 seats in the Sangir-Talaud
regional elections of May 15, and 13 of the 25 seats in the elec-
tions for the Minahasa regional council of July 14.%
ponement. Thus it was that until the Wilopo cabinet5s formation the
P.N.I. had continued to press for regional legislative councils to he
established on an interim appointive basis (but different from that of
the ill-fated Regulation 39 of 1950 over which the Natsir cabinet had
fallen), whereas the Masjumi was advocating regional elections,. There
is no public statement from a P.N.I. spokesman suggesting that the party-
favored postponement of parliamentary elections—-as there is from a
spokesman of P.I.R. (2?)—but the point is nevertheless clear. To those
PoNolo leaders whose principal concern was the power of the party there
can have been little virtue in a cabinet which worked for early elections
at the same time as affording no opportunities to the party for any
rapid enhancement of its grassroots vote-getting strength.
A somewhat similar picture, will emerge when we examine the Wilopo
cabinet’s economic policies. Faced with the highly adverse balance of
payments situation which resulted from the post-Korea slump in world
prices for raw materials, the cabinet had to initiate sharp retrenchments
in spending. It decided to do this by means of budget, credit and import
policies which placed the burden principally on the social groups most
closely associated with the P.N.I., on the new group of native Indonesian
importers and bankers, on civil servants and, generally, on the people
of the cities.
To many P.N.I. leaders therefore, the Wilopo cabinet appeared to be
a cabinet established on the terms of the Masjumi (and the P.S.I.). As
dissatisfaction with the cabinet grew, so also did the inclination to
abandon cooperation with the Masjumi, or at least to make use of the
possibility of cooperation with other parties, and particularly the P.K.I.,
as leverage to achieve better terms in the relationship with the Masjumi.
For any party, and certainly for the P.N.I., led largely by men with
a love of the political game for its own sake, there is great importance
in the mechanics of its power position. In relation to the Masjumi and
the Communists, the P.N.I. occupied a balance position. The terms of its
cooperation with either of these parties would be favorable to the extent
that it left the possibility open that it would cooperate -with the other
instead. It was in fact not new for the P.N.I. to use its position in
such a way that the Masjumi had reason to fear that it would, work with
the PoKoI. In the cabinet crisis which followed the fall of the Natsir
government, the party had associated itself with the initial Communist-
sponsored moves to establish the B.P.P. (Consultative Council of Political
Parties), thereby strengthening its position in the bargaining with the
Masjumi which determined the political basis and composition of the
Sukiman cabinet. Similarly when the Sukiman cabinet fell, the P.N.I.
(27) A. R. Djokoprawiro, deputy leader of P.I.R. in parliament, said that
his party would work for the postponement of elections until the
situation of the supporters of the Pantja Sila was stronger. Sin Po
(Djakarta), April 19, 1952.97
chairman, Sidik, had stated that the P.N.I. was prepared to form a
cabinet without the Masjumi. (28)
It would appear however that in 1952 the Sidik group of the party
decided on a much more thorough exploration of the possibilities of
cooperation with the Communists,, It is not clear whether any of the
main leaders of the party actually determined at this stage to work
towards a situation such as they achieved ip the period of the Ali Sastro-
pmidjpjoicabinet, yhere a BoN,ollied government was able to govern, despite
Masjumi opposition, partly because of Communist support» But, granted
that the P.N.I. was always ip a position to force the Wilopo cabinet to
resign, and came close to doing so in the height of the army crisis in
October, one must assume that this possibility was at least seriously
considered. In any event it is clear that a section of the P.N.I. leader-
ship was henceforth prepared to assist in a strengthening of the P.K.I.’s
position, and in particular to help the party regain nationalist respect-
ability. Bor these men the P.E.I. represented no immediate threat to
the P.N.I.; from its own actions and statements it was clearly weak.
The Masjumi on the other hand was both strbng and an immediate danger.
To strengthen the P.K.I. and‘weaken the Masjumi was demanded by the very
mechanics of the P.N.l.’s power position.
In this connection it is necessary to understand the strength of
P.Kd. fears of the Masjumi. Many P.N.I. leaders, viewing the political
situation as it existed in mid-1952, were overawed by the power of
Islam. The results of the 1955 elections suggest that they probably
exaggerated its grassroots strength. They certainly had no realization
at this time of the significance of the Nahdatul Vlama’s secession from
the Masjumi which had just occurred,; But they were correct in assessing
that the Mhsjumi had incomparably greater grassroots organization and
power than they did.
Demagogic appeals to Islamic mass feeling—such as were made with
great frequency in the second half of the Wilopo cabinet period by the
Masjumi leader, Kiai Isa Anshary—were particularly abhorrent to the
P.N.I. leaders, and appeared to them to be almost as dangerous to their
class position as Communist social radicalism. And they were alarmed by
the continued strength and confidence of the Darul Islam, in their eyes
the illegal wing of the Masjumi. (29) So they believed Islam to be a
(28)	Quoted by Harian Bakjat, March 13, 1952.
(29)	One sign of this was the fact which became known in May 19£2 that
Kahar Muzakar, the hitherto reputedly Murba-sympathizing leader of
the rebels in South Sulawesi, had seed fit three months earlier to
have himself appointed a regional commander of the Darul Islam army
under Kartosuwirjo (and actually persecuted Christians in areas
under his control, thereby causing the defection of many of the
Christians among his own followers). A similar sign was the series98
major challenge to their power. As they saw it they had led the national-
ist revolution; now they were to he supplaced from the places of privilege
which this leadership had secured them.
Nor was this an issue merely between two political parties. It had
its roots in socio-religious cleavage. The PoN.1. was and is predominantly
a party of the Javanese. Most of its leaders are members of the ethnic
group of Javanese9 of East and Central Java, and the party was to obtain
65.5>® of its national vote from these two provinces in the parliamentary
elections, of 1955» In East and Central Java9 the social division between
the aristocracy and indigenous traders has long· been deep. The effect of
economic and social change in the last 125 years has been to sharpen the
division, cast it in religious terms and project it deeply into village
society. Thus there has developed a situation of vertical social and
religious cleavage, running from city to village, as between the santri,
serious and orthodox Moslem, and the abangan and prijaji,, nominal
Moslems., who however hold strict Islam in contempt, and whose real beliefs
and religious practices are those of the Islam-tinged predominantly
Hindu and animist "Javanese religion." (30)
Thip cleavage was an important aspect of the politics of the nation-
alist movement in the prewar period. It was given particularly clear
organizational expression in the period of the Japanese occupation, when
mass political organizations were established separately on Islamic and
(secular) nationalist lines. Finally, with the rapid efflorescence of
political activity in the years of revolution., bitter struggles took
place at the village level between santri and abangan parties. The in-
tense violence which characterized both sides in the abortive Communist
revolt at Madiun in 19^8 was in large part an expression of inter-village
and intra-village hatreds built up over a long period on the basis of the
santrl-abangan cleavage. (31)
of approaches to foreign embassies in Djakarta which" Darul Islam
envoys made in September 1952. It was widely believed that Darul
Islam expected to receive U.S. backing in the event of the outbreak
of World War II. See "Gangguan Keamanan di Indonesia" (Security
Disturbances in Indonesia) in Mimbar Penerangan (Information Forum),
Ministry of Information, May-June 1953»
(30)	The term **p.rijaji"denotes aristocracy, the term' "abangan" commoners.
The antithesis is brilliantly characterized by Clifford Geertz in
"Religious Belief and Economic Behaviour in a Central Javanese Towns
Some Preliminary Considerations," Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 13^-158. See also Robert R. Jay, Santri
and Abangan. Religious Schism in Rural Central Java, unpub1ished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1957»
(31)	Jay, op. cit.. pp. 201-203, 204 ff.99
Thus the Javanese leaders of the P.N.I. were afraid of Islam for
reasons which were religious and social as well as political. Thus they
were particularly afraid of the radically reformist Islam of the
Muhammadijah, the organization whose religious and cultural orientation
was least capable of compromise with the abangan-uri.ia.ii tradition, and
which was increasingly powerful inside the Masjumi with the rise of
Natsir in the party. (32) For the same reasons they were not, altogether
hostile to Communism. As representatives of a vestigial aristocracy they
certainly had reason to fear a movement which could stimulate and, organize
village social radicalism. The horizontal cleavages of Javanese society
spoke strongly against a P.N.I—Communist alliance. But there was also
the factor of the vertical cleavage between santri and prijaji-abangan.
Javanese Communism is essentially an abangan phenomenon.' '(33) To the
extent that the Javanese P.N.I. leaders thought and felt in terms of the
socio-religious antithesis between santri and abangan they were prepared
to cooperate with the Communists.
At another level the P.N.I.’s change to cooperation with the
Communists may be seen in terms of the increasing necessity for the
party to speak the language of nationalist (and quasi-socialist) radical-
ism. This indeed had always been the language of an important section
of the party. A particularly radical formulation of the party’s goals
had been adopted by its congress of May 1950, and this continued to be
formally binding on its leadership. (34) Indeed the P.N.I. leaders had
an interest in constantly restimulating revolutionary nationalist senti-
ment; every shift away from the symbols of the revolution was for them a
political loss.
But there was in fact little movement away from revolutionary
nationalism. Political radicalism was called forth by the socio-economic
situation—insecurity, lack of rapid economic progress and particularly
(32)	The Natsir group’s primacy of power in the Masjumi, furthered by the
secession of the Nahdatul Ulama, was confirmed by the Masjumi con-
gress of August 1952· This congress adopted an organization change
which involved the abolition of the system of legislative and execu-
tive councils, and in the one "executive council" established, Moh.
Natsir was elected chairman and Dr. Sukiman first vice-chairman.
The Natsir group was subsequently able to secure a majority on the
council on most issues.
(33)	Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, An Indonesian
Case Study, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1956, pp. 13^ ff. Also Herbert Felth. The Indonesian
Elections of 1955. Modern Indonesia Project,' Cornell University,’
1957, PP- 31-33, 82-87.
(3^) Among the decisions of this conference, held at Jogjakarta, was the
demand for the creation of an Anti-Capitalist Bloc.100
the existence of a great number of revolutionary fighters who were still
jobless—and it continued to find expression mainly through nationalist
channels. One contributory factor here was the fact that Holland was
assuming a more and more strongly anti-Indonesian position at this time,
and specifically inaugurating a new policy of refusing to negotiate on
the question fo sovereignty over West Irian. There was then pressure on
every party to speak and act in the terms of radical nationalism. For
the P.N.I. this took the form of pressure against the moderate politics
of the Socialist-sympathizing Wilopo group and the more conservative
Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo group, and in favor of the radically national-
ist "oppositionist" group of Sidik Djojosukarto, which was the forerunner
in the move to closer association with the Communists.
Finally one must consider the important factor of the role of
President Soekarno. The President’s political viewpoint appears to have
changed in 1952 in a manner almost exactly paralleling the change in the
stand of the P.N.I. Thus there are clear signs of his opposition to the
Wilopo cabinet, beginning at the time of its installation and growing,
and becoming increasingly public, with the onset of the army crisis.
Whereas his speeches in the period of the Sukiman cabinet had emphasized
the necessity of the people working hard, there was little of this in
what he said in the Wilopo period. Instead he now placed added stress
on the nped to complete the national revolution. On November 10, 1952,
he attacked "those who act as if the national revolution were completed.,
who don’t mention the words ’national revolution* any more." At the
same time he called for a tougher stand in the struggle for West Irian:
"Let the history of our as yet incomplete national revolution speak its
own language." (35) And on the Communist issue itself the change was
specific. As late as May 20 the President had urged caution as regards
the Communists* role as advocates of national unity, "lest one party not
be sincere in its concern for national unity and cause another Madiun
affair." (36) but this emphasis was not continued.
The President had certain personal reasons to feel antagonistic
towards the Wilopo cabinet. The cabinet contained a number of the men
with whom he had come into conflict in the period of the Natsir cabinet,
and it indicated as soon as it had taken office that it would insist as
the Natsir cabinet had (and the Sukiman cabinet had not) on a sharp
limitation of the President’s prerogatives. The matter came to the fore
at the very beginning of the Wilopo cabinet’s period of office when the
cabinet obliged the President to cancel arrangements made by him, and the
05) Text of Speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on
Heroes Day, November 10, 1952, at Surabaja, Ministry of Information,
Djakarta, 1952.
(36) Quoted in Sajuti Melik, "Sekitar Pernjataan Bersama" (Concerning
the Joint Statement), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), Djakarta, May 31»
1952.101
ex-Foreign Minister, Mr. Subardjo, for a presidential visit to Italy.
The cabinet was to remain consistent in its attitude towards presidential
powers. It limited the number of occasions on which the President was
able to deliver speeches and reduced the budget allocations made for the
Cabinet (Office) of the President. (37)
President Soekarno had long been hostile to the Socialist Party and
to the politically allied ’’younger generation" groups in other parties.
The Wilopo cabinet represented these very groups, and, as a team it was
both internally united and impatient to get ahead with the implementation
of its policies. Furthermore a number of these policies were in diametri-
cal opposition to the President’s own interests as an independent center
of political power. This was particularly true of the changes which the
cabinet was making inside the army. But it applied also to its policy
for early elections; these would be a threat to Soekarno’s position
inasmuch as they resulted in a victory for the Masjumi, now dominated
by Natsir.
In considerable measure then the President’s interests ran parallel
to those of the Sidik group of the P.N.I. To the extent that the Sukiman
group no longer wielded major power in the Masjumi, the President’s
political associations were more and more heavily concentrated in the
P.N.I. Also it was to this party that he was closest in terms of cultural
and religious orientations. He was and is, culturally, a prijaji. And
it was with the P.N.I. leaders that he had his closest personal associa-
tions—particularly with the men of what we have called the Sartono-
Ali Sastroamidjojo group but also with some of those of the Sidik group
of leaders of the party.
One can do little more than speculate as to the effect on the P.N.I.
of President Soekarno*s changing orientation. The President and the
P.N.I. had always been mutually inter-dependent and they were so in
greater measure now. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to know
whether this change was the cause or the effect of the change in the
P.N.I. Very possibly it was both. Some observers, both Indonesian and
foreign, who maintain that President Soekarno has played a deus ex
machina role throughout the post-revolutionary period, have argued that
Soekarno was the initiator of the change. He may have been, if any one
man was. It may be that his personal intervention brought the men of
the Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo group of the P.N.I. leadership to accept
the standpoint of the Sidik group on the new strategy. But certainly
the change could not have been implemented had it not accorded with the
interests of the party, or for that matter of the Sartono group of the
party. Probably the greatest importance of President Soekarno lay in
the confidence which he gave the P.N.I. leaders that they could always
hold the balance against the Communist Party, even if it had become much
(37) See "Pengeluaran untuk Presidenan” (Expenses for the Presidency),
Waktu (weekly), Medan, December 20, 195^·102
expanded. They could out-maneuver the Communists, the P.N»I« leaders
believed, as long as the President stood with them—and they had no doubt
that he would side with them in any showdown with the Communists.
The P.N.I. leaders were aware that they were taking risks in support-
ing the growth of P.K.I. strength. They had not forgotten the Communists’
attempt to seize power at Madiun four years earlier—although indeed their
resentment of this was modified by the abangan-nri,ia.ii identification
which focused their attention on the cruelties which Masjumi supporters
had inflicted on the revolters at that time, and by the Masjumi's success
in making political capital out of the affair. There is no doubt that
they saw the danger of the P.K.I. to their interests, as a party of the
vestigial aristocracy and of a nascent bureaucratic capitalism. (38) Yet
they entered the association. First a minority and later a majority of
the leaders of the party came to see its certain and immediate advantages
as outweighing its possible dangers. To most of them it was a short-term
tactic, to last for only a few months, or only until the elections.
Naivete, an underestimation of the differences between the Communists
and other parties, a faith in Indonesia as somehow unique, and a tendency
to exaggerate the importance of nationalist and religious sentiments as
forces making her immune to Communist overthrow—these factors were
operative among some of the party’s leaders. For the rest the associa-
tion was a calculated risk.
(38) Communist rule naturally appears a less frightening possibility to
groups like these, closely related to the bureaucracy, than it does
to independent business groups, such as tended to give support to
the Masjumi.103
CHAPTER V
THE STORM IK TIIE ARMY
The "October 17 Affair" which climaxed three months of deepening
political crisis, was the most momentous development of the Wilopo
cabinet period. It was of crucial importance for the cabinet’s power
to effect its policy goals. It sharply accentuated the incipient ten-
dencies for change in political alignments. It occupies a place of key
importance in the history of parliamentary institutions in Indonesia and
the attempt to confine political struggle to them. Finally it illumi-
nates a number of the key problems involved in the effort to create and
maintain a unified structure of government in the context of archipelago
geography and revolutionary history.
But if we are to understand the October 17 affair we must look first
at certain background factors, particularly ones having their roots in
the country’s economic situation. "By the middle of 1952," Professor
Higgins has written, "it was clear to the fiscal authorities in Indonesia
that the country was facing a first-class financial crisis." (1) The
first major series of price falls for her exports occurred in the second
quarter of 1952. The price of Indonesia's main export product, rubber,
which had been 2,60 Straits dollars per pound in February 1951» had
fallen to 73 Straits dollar cents by the end of September 1952,./(2) The
level of physical exports was fairly well maintained in 1952, but the
receipts which accrued from them were alarmingly low. The country’s
general terms of trade index fell in 1952 to ?7/j of what it had been in
1951 (approximately 76/6 of what it had been in 1938). (3) To make mat-
ters worse the rice crop was disappointingly low; there had to be an
increase in the already large expenditures on imported rice. The conse-
ouences of all this were a dangerously large unfavorable balance of
payments, a rapid drain on gold and foreign exchange reserves and sharp
falls in government revenues.
(1)	Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia’s Economic Stabilization and Develop-
ment, I.P.E., New York, 1957, P· 2.
(2)	Report of the Java Bank 1952-3, Djakarta, 1953, p. 160. These
figures are for Ko. 1 ribbPd smoked sheets.
(2) Monetary Research Section, Ministry of Finance, "Economic Review of
1952 and Outlook for 1953," in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia.
(Economics a.nd Finance in Indonesia). May 1953; Report of the java
Bank 1952-3, p. 105.104
Here then was a fiscal and economic problem with immediate political
implications. (4) The Korean war boom had tided the country over many
of the difficulties of the immediate post-independence situation. Al-
though the period between the middle of 1950 and the beginning of 1952
had provided no general rise in levels of living, it had made revenues
buoyant in a number of sectors of the economy. It had made it possible
for the government to meet rehabilitation expenses and initiate a number
of development plans, to dispense patronage fairly generously (among
other ways by a generous policy of admissions to the civil service), to
finance the entry of a number of members of the political elite into bus-
iness, particularly importing, and still to maintain a budget surplus in 1951
of El.Million. Henceforth this would be impossible. The slump made
it necessary for the government to make painful choices between alter-
native ways of allocating its truncated resources. What was to be its
system of priorities? Was developmental investment to be the chief
victim of retrenchments? Was financing to be from large budget deficits,
at the expense of a rapid inflation which would make havoc of all devel-
opmental planning? Or would the economies be at the expense of patronage?
Would they come in the form of a rationalization of the bureaucracy?
Would the burden be passed on to the new bureaucratic capitalists, with
a deemphasis of the policy of Indonesianization of business?
The economics-minded cabinet of Wilopo decided that development
would not be allowed to suffer. Work would go ahead on the scale
planned in the developmental enterprises which the government had under-
taken to support. Again inflation financing would not be permitted.
A small budget deficit was allowable in the view of the Finance Minister,
Dr. Sumitro Bjojohadikusumo, but a serious effort had to be made to
balance the budget as early as possible.
To bring about an improvement in the balance of payments situation,
the cabinet concentrated on stimulating exports. Soon after its accession
to office it decided to lower export duties and to cheapen and finally
abolish the "dollar exchange certificates" which its predecessor had
introduced as a device to raise revenue at the expense of export goods
whose market position was strong. To stimulate domestic production the
Wilopo cabinet introduced tax reductions, particularly for the lower
income brackets, and raised the ceilings for property values free from
property tax.
But these measures merely aggravated the problem of the budget.
And they were not adequate in themselves to solving the balance of pay-
Ί7Π For a>full and highly stimulating discussion of this1 problem in a
wider economic and political context see the forthcoming Ph.D. dis-
sertation of the University of California (Berkeley) by Hans 0.
Schmi11, The Economics of Social Conflict in Indonesia. 1950-57»105
ments crisis. Other far less popular measures were required, in parti-
cular import restrictions. Thus the government introduced a system of
surcharges and advance payments for importers. By the regulations of
August 12, surcharges of 100% were placed on such items as watches,
linen, drill, men’s and women’s clothing, shoes, stationery, cheese,
etc. and surcharges of 200% on such items as ice-chests, car radios,
and various jewelry items and toys. The aim was to reduce the demand
for relatively non-essential imports, and secondarily to raise revenue
for the government. The total economic impact of these measures was
limited, as 86% of the value of imports remained on the free list. But
its political impact must have Been considerable as suggested hy the
considerable rise in the cost of living for the high and middle income
groups, much of which is directly traceable to these regulations. (5)
As for the importers themselves they were hit particularly hard by
the requirement introduced on August 28, that they should submit a 40/o
prepayment of the total value of their imports at the time of receiving
an import license. They were affected adversely too by the allocation
system for imports introduced on September 1, whereby direct control
was established over total expenditure of foreign currency for imports.
Naturally it was the small, less well-established and financially
weaker import enterprises which suffered most from this series of regu-
lations, and among these were many if not most of the national Indonesian
firms who had recently entered the field on the basis of government assist
ance. Thus the cabinet had placed the main burden of retrenchments on
middle and upper income city-dwellers and importers, particularly nation-
al importers. This fact had significant political consequences.
But, equally important, the burden of the slump was to be borne
by the government service. The Wilopo cabinet's policy called for an
elimination of many forms of patronage, for strict budget planning and
careful supervision of all spending by government departments, and,
most controversial of all, for rationalization of military, and later
perhaps civil, personnel. Something has been said already of the aus-
terity measures taken by the Wilopo government in its first months of
office. These were followed by a number of similar steps, each imple-
mented in such a way as to educate the newspaper reading (and radio-
listening) public to the gravity of the country’s position. Thus, after
a solemn radio address by the Finance Minister on September 10, the
TJ) The Java Bank’s cost of living index for Djakarta shows that where-
as the cost of living for office workers on low incomes remained
practically stationary in 1952—largely as a result of government
policies of stabilizing foodstuffs prices—the figure for workers
of the middle and high income group showed a rise of between 6% and
9%,. the greatest part of which occurred directly after the import
regulations of August. See Report of the Java Bank, 1952-53, P. 12/106
government enacted a regulation radically restricting the use of motor
vehicles by government officials, and making it impossible for them to
be used outside office hours,, (6) Government expenditure abroad, on
delegations to international conferences and on foreign missions, was
subjected to severe economies,. The number of those who went from Indo-
nesia to the 1952 meeting of the U.N. General Assembly was four, compared
with the 21 who had left the country for the meeting of 1951°
With the various ministries operating almost as independent busi-
ness enterprises and the implications of the slump as yet only dimly
appreciated, it was difficult to establish systematic limitations op
government spending immediately,, However a "freeze" was imposed on the
spending of various ministries and a new system was introduced whereby
expenditures above a certain minimum would require the approval of the
budgetary control section of the Ministry of Finance. (7) At the same
time every effort was made to construct a budget for 1953 which would
minimize deficit spending,, In November the government presented the
1953 budget to parliament, along with the 1952 one, in what was the first
(and at the time of writing the last) time that an Indonesian budget
was presented to parliament before it came into effect» Allowing the
existence of a deficit of R. 1.8 billion, the 1953 budget nevertheless
called for a reduction in government outlays from R» 17°6 billion to
R. 13.2 billion.
If government spending was not to be reduced at the point of capital
outlays—roadbuilding machinery, schools, military equipment, etc.—
the reduction would have to come, in part at least, from the very large
salaries bill. (8) Accordingly the Finance Minister urged, as those
responsible for economic policy had in the period of the previous two
cabinets, for a reduction of military and bureaucratic personnel. Accord
ing to Professor Higgins, who acted as a U.No adviser to the Ministry
of Finance at the time, it was expected in this Ministry that the re-
(6)	For an English text of the radio address see Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,
Facing the Situation, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, 1952» The
words "For Public Use" were painted on the cars of all except
ministers and department heads. Roeslan Abdulgani, Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Information estimated on March 3, 1953s
that the result of the regulations in their first year, in Djakarta
alone, would be a saving of Rp„ 131.8 million. Funksi Penerangan
di Indonesia, ρ» l40.
(7)	Higgins, op. cit., p„ 6»
(8)	As it was public service salaries amounted to $2% of total govern-
ment revenues in 1953° See Herbert Feith, "Some Problems of
Government Administration in Indonesia," Australia’s Neighbours
(Melbourne), November 195^°107
trenchments of the 1953 budget would require the retirement of 60,000
civil servants, 60,000 soldiers and 30»000 policemen. (9) With regard
to civil service personnel no action wastaken—except for the issuing of
a strongly worded instruction forbidding the acceptance of new employees
other than ones with special qualifications. But the government did act
speedily to begin the retirement of soldiers, and in implementing its
policy in this field it soon found itself confronted with the formidable
power of the groups its policies had defied. The challenge to its mili-
tary policies was in an important sense a challenge to all its policies,
and in particular to the policies it adopted in the face of the balance
of payments crisis.
But the challenge to the Wilopo cabinet's military policies was
not merely the result of its plans for demobilization. These acquired
crucial importance only in the context of already existing dissatisfactions
and cleavages inside the army.
The army of the immediate post-revolutionary period was extremely
heterogenous in composition. It contained a very small number of pre-
war soldiers of the K.II.I.L. (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) who had
espoused the revolutionary cause, and in some cases become high officers
of the national army. It also contained some 23,000 men who had served
in the K.II.I.L. and K.N.I.L.-linked forces in the revolutionary period
and been selected for acceptance into the national army after December
19^9. A much larger number were men who had been given elementary
military training in the auxiliary army of Indonesians established
by the Japanese, the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Father-
land), a force which had attained a strength of 120,000 men before the
Japanese surrender. Finally a very large and highly heterogeneous
group came into·.the revolutionary army directly. Most of these had had
experience in one of the numerous types of mass organizations established
by the Japanese in Java and Sumatra. Some were members of local bands
gathered around a religious or dacoit-type leader of charismatic quali-
ties, bands which were then incorporated into the army. On the other
hand many were young University and secondary school students who
joined the army in 19^5 and quickly came to assume positions of leader-
ship. During the revolution the army had been anything but a unified,
disciplined force. Local commanders had been able to follow their own
political and tactical ideas largely without interference from the cen-
tral command, and the distinction between the army and independent
guerrilla units had in practice been highly blurred. This is especially
true of the more distant areas, particularly outside Java, where commun-
ications with the revolutionary capital of Jogjakarta were difficult.
For two and a half years the government had wrestled with the task
of making this heterogeneous body into the unified army of a modern
national state. It had had considerable success, thanks in part to the
(9) Higgins', op. cit.'. p. 10.108
vigorouss coordinated and highly capable leadership of the Armed Forces
Chief of Staff9 Colonel (later Major-General) Τ» B. Simatupang, the Army
Chief of Staff Colonel A. H. Nasution and the Secretary-General of the
Defense Ministry Mr» Ali Budiardjo. In 1952 the army was smaller and
very much better integrated and disciplined than in 1950, end a variety
of training schemes had been set in motion, some using personnel from
the Netherlands Military Mission» The central army command still occa-
sionally met obstruction when it sought to investigate the expenditures
of divisional and regimental commanders9 but its power to impose its
will on them was incomparably greater than it had been»
But the reorganization had been highly unpopular in many sections of
the army» - Many bapakist (literally "father-ist") local leaders, who
had been given high rank in the revolution in order to bring about the
incorporation of their units in the army, were now demoted» (10) Others
had been transferred from areas where their influence was established»
Others again had been separated from their troops, their anak buah
("children”) and so deprived of their source of power» The new military
techniques placed Japanese-trained officers at a disadvantage» The new
training schemes penalized those without basic formal education»
Semangat» the dynamic ardor which the Japanese had fomented and which
had stood the Republic in such good stead in the revolution, was now
accorded less and less value» Bapakism and local political influence
were henceforth as much a liability as an asset» Charisma was ceding
ground to bureaucracy» The intellectuals were gaining at the expense
of the mass leaders»
Now this process was to be carried considerably further» It had
the full support of Sultan Hamengku Buwono, who indeed had been one of
its principal initiators in his period as Defense Minister in 1950» And
it was to be combined with large-scale demobilization» Since late in
1951 government policy had called for the eventual institution of com-
pulsory military service» To make this possible, it was argueds it would
be necessary to transform the existing army into a highly trained "core"
army» (ll) But now the budgetary situation of the country necessitated
(10)	Bapakism» a key word in Indonesian political vocabulary9 denotes a
relationship of intense mutual loyalty between a leader and his
followers. The bapak (father) is assured of the support of his
anak buah (childrenT”for whatever political action he may take; at
the same time he has far-reaching responsibilities for their wel-
fare and accords them protection against all parties, including,
if need be, the law.
(11)	This was a policy which had been approved by the Sukiman cabinet.
See letter of Defense Minister Sewaka to Colonel Nasution, Decem-
ber 22, 19519 in Risalah Perundingan D.P.R» (Parliamentary Records),
October 1, 1952.109
that this he done immediately.
In 1952 the army had received a budget allocation of Rp. 2,625
million, and the navy and air force together Rp. 1,075 million. Alto-
gether this represented 28$ of the budget. Seventy five percent of it
was being spent on wages and welfare services, leaving only 25$ for the
purchase of supplies and the cost of operations. Even so the amount
per head for soldiers was considerably less than for members of the
police force and very much less than had been spent in KoN.IoL. (Royal
Netherlands Indies Army). (12) And the 1953 budget, it was estimated,
would give the army only approximately Rp. 1900 million. The army
leaders would have to act quickly if budget cuts were not to force them
to do without new supplies entirely so they decided that by the end of
the year a beginning would be made with the gradual demobilization of
80,000 of the army’s 200,000 men. Approximately ΑΟ,ΟΟΟ of these would
be soldiers asking to leave or ready to be pensioned off, but another
AO,000—an earlier government figure had been 60,000—would be those
unable to fulfill physical and health requirements, and those of whom
it could be proved that they possessed "unsoldierly characteristics." (13)
This was certainly disquieting for those who expected to be dis-
charged, despite the government’s plans for generous financial assist-
ance to such persons 5 for, not only did military work bear high
prestige, but, in addition, it would be extremely difficult for many
old soldiers to find alternative employment. As far as the army itself
was concerned the scheme would undoubtedly result in a further improve-
ment in the position of those with technical and administrative skills
and a further decline in the position of the bapakist revolutionary
and their followers. The officers with prewar Dutch training and a
revolutionary record—both Major-General Simatupang and Colonel Nasution
belonged to this group—stood to gain. So did those who had entered
the army as University and secondary school students. So also did some
of the former K.N.I.L. troops who had been taken into the army after
1950. But rationalization would mean a further decline in the status
and influence of many former officers and soldiers of the Japanese-
sponsored PETA, and of others who had entered the revolutionary army
directly and had little or no formal education.
But the bapakist revolutionary leaders and their followers—they
were frequently spoken of as the PETA group (lA)—had considerable
(12)	See Statement of the Minister of Defense, Risalah Perundingan D°PoRo
(Parliamentary Records), October 1, 1952.
(13)	Ibid. Also A. H. Nasution, Tjatatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia
(Notes on Indonesian Military Policy), pp.' 203 ff., 262-2957 316 ff.
(lA) This Is in fact a somewhat misleading term, in view of the fact that
many former PETA men did adjust to the requirements of the reorgan-
ization and became its beneficiaries. However the group of those
who could not adjust did justify their position in terms of the ide-
ology of PETA. Many of them had been strongly imbued with the
Japanese "Young Officer Group" view of the army as the soul of the
nation.110
political resources. They had close personal and political connections
with the P.N.I. (particularly its Sidik group) and several smaller
oppositionist parties. Some of them had equally close links with
President Soekarno. It was through these associations that the internal
conflict in the army was projected into the political community at
large.
President Soekarno had long "been critical of the policies being
pursued in the army. Many of the personnel changes which the army
leaders had effected in 1951 and the first half of 1952 had clearly
lessened his influence within the army. On at least one occasion in
1952 he had intervened against the army leaders’ personnel policy hy
refusing to sign a decree. This was in the case of the transfer to East
Java of the North Sumatra territorial commander, Col. M. Simbolon. The
man whom Simbolon was to replace, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, a senior
officer closely associated with the President, was to be "exiled” to a
military attacheship overseas. The President resented particularly
the army leaders’ decision to close down the Chandradimuka Military
academy at Bandung, a sort of ideological refresher school for army
officers, where a number of his personal associates, men of the PETA
group, occupied positions of leadership.
Por some time before July 1952 the former head of the Chandradimuka
Academy, Col Bambang Supeno, an old PETA officer from East Java and a
distant relative of President Soekarno, had urged that Col. Nasution, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, be replaced. He had approached the President
to discuss this matter with him and had subsequently travelled in several
parts of Indonesia collecting signatures of officers supporting Nasution’s
removal. To counteract this development the Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff
Major-General Simatupang called a meeting of territorial commanders and
other high officers at his home on July 12. At this meeting, at which
Col.Nasution was not present, Major-General Simatupang asked Col. Bambang
Supeno to give an account of his activities. Tempers were aroused and
before long Col. Supeno walked out.
On the following day Col. Bambang Supeno wrote a letter to the
Defense Minister, the Prime Minister and the Defense Section of Parlia-
ment, declaring he no longer had faith in his superiors because these
had swerved from the original goals of the revolutionary struggle. In
addition he criticized a number of aspects of military policy, particular-
ly personnel policy, educational policy, and the policy being pursued
in relation to domestic insecurity.·’ Four days later he was suspended
from all duties by the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Nasution.
• At the same time the Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono, with
Major-General Simatupang and Col.. Nasution, went personally to the Pres-
ident to discuss the issues with him. As a result of references to the
President’s own role in the Bambang Supeno affair the conversation becameIll
heated, particularly between Soekarno and Simatupang, and the meeting
finally ended without any agreement being reached. Subsequently
Simatupang wrote a letter to cabinet explaining the position of the
army leadership in terms of the violation of military discipline
involved in Bambang Supeno’s actions.
Meanwhile'however the matter had been taken up by the defense
Section of Parliament and its chairman, the non-party member and strong-
critic of the leadership of the army, Zainul Baharuddin. As a result
of the defense Section’s concern, a series of four plenary sessions
were- held—in secret—beginning duly 28, to discuss "Questions arising
from the letter of Col. Bambang Supeno". Whatever was discussed in
those sessions, it is clear that very great tension was created. The
four secret sessions were followed by no less than 17 public ones. In
the ten weeks before October 16 parliament gave a great part of its time
and almost all of its attention to a debate which was the occasion for
criticism of virtually every aspect, major and trivial, of the policies
pursued by the army leaders and Wilopo’s Minister of defense.
One main target for the parliamentarians* attack was rationali-
zation. A few days before 'the opening of the debate the Minister of
Defense had submitted four bills to parliament which together represented
the government’s request for a mandate for its rationalization policy. (15)
Parliament decided to defer debating these formally, but they were fully
discussed in the context of the general debate. The critics of the
army leadership argued that Indonesia could not in the near future fight
anything but a guerrilla war. Therefore she needed an army close to
the people. It was revolutionary morale and close association with the
people which had given the army its victory over the Dutch; yet these
were -the ver^ Qualities which were being sacrificed as a result of the
"westernizingp and "internationalizing·" orientation of the army leaders.
In addition demobilization was dangerous. If the discharged men were
not given treatment commensurate with their revolutionary services, as
the parliamentary critics feared, this might well drive them into
association with rebel and bandit groups.
The same opposition to remodelling of the army on the basis of
international military standards, expressed itself in many other ways.
(15) These were bills to lay down a basis for the recruitment of new
volunteers, to regulate the legal position of members of the armed
forces, to oblige temporary members of the armed forces to remain
in them, and to establish a basis for,retirement from the armed
forces of members unable to renew their service contracts. The
Defense Minister had described them as urgent, partly in view of
the forthcoming expiry,at the end of 195?, of the three-year con-
tracts on the basis of which a great number of soldiers were em-
ployed.112
It expressed itself in resentment of the Ministry’s demands for certain
scholastic qualifications in new recruits» It expressed itself in con-
demnations of the changes made by the army leaders in such matters as
saluting, uniforms and the way of marching, changes away from the Japan-
ese forms which the revolutionary army had used» It expressed itself in
strong attacks on the way in which troop units had been shifted about
and split and on the army leaders’ attempts to establish a network of
territorial commanders with a fundamentally similar approach to army
organizations» (16) Case after case was cited of celebrated revolution-
ary commanders whose services had been spurned» Strong feelings were
stirred by attacks on the 900-man Netherlands Military Mission, which
was said to have hoodwinked the army leaders and sabotaged the fight
against the Darul Islam» (17) Similar appeals to sentiment were made
in connection with the charge that old K»N»IoLo soldiers were being pre-
ferred to men who had served in the revolutionary T»N»I» (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army)»
With regard to the case of Col» Bambang Supeno himself, the parlia
mentary critics argued that his suspension was illegal, not having been
given the approval of the President» Giving President Soekarno’s own
interpretation of the ambiguous provisions of the 195θ constitution with
regard to his powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, they argued
that no officer of Supeno’s rank could be suspended without the President’s
specific endorsement» (18) Again they demanded that the composition of
the Military Court which was to be instituted to hear Supeno’s appeal
against his suspension should be determined by an act of parliament,
and, further, that the President should sit on this court»
Finally the parliamentary critics charged that the army was being
fashioned as a stronghold of the Socialist Party» (19) A number of high
(16)	In the words of Zainul Baharuddin "the Army Chief of Staff has about
him only men of his own opinions,” Bisalah Perundingan Ρ»ΡοΒ»,
October 1, 1952»
(17)	The initials N»M»M» were commonly said to stand for Nederlandsche
Mata Mata (Dutch spies)! Considerable evidence existed of the in-
volvement of Dutch persons in Darul Islam activities» See Subver-
sive Activities in Indonesia^ The Jungschlager and Schmidt Affair,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,~Sepublic of Indonesia, 1957? especially
pp- 75 ff-
dS) See Α» Ko Pringgodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined
in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Translation Series,
Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957s PP- 27-29»
(19) See Ichtisar Parlemen» September 23, 1952, the speeches of Kobarsjih
and Ir» Sakirman and October 14, the speech of Zainul Baharuddin» (113
army officers and Defense Ministry officials were branded as P.S.I.
members or sympathizers» The Socialist press was said to be favored
in bulk orders of newspapers for soldiers» Political articles written
by Major-General Simatupang were pointed to as suggesting Socialist
partisanship in the Armed Forces Chief of Staff» A number of cases were
adduced of actions taken by army leaders at times of cabinet crisis,
actions which favored the Socialist Party’s interests» Almost all of
the many charges of corruption which were made were directed at members
or sympathizers of the P.S.I. All other charges culminated in the
accusation that the whole policy of rationalization, reorganization and
training of the army was being pursued to enable the P.S.I. to strength-
en its hold, so that it would be in a position to use the army in stag-
ing a coup d’etat.
The parliamentarians who contributed most actively to criticism of
the army leaders' policies were from "mass leader" and "oppositionist"
groups. In fact a listing of them is virtually a listing of the "mass
leader" elements in Indonesian political life. The most prominent
critic was Zainul Baharuddin, the non-party chairman of the Defense
Section of parliament, who was a relative and close associate of the
head of one of the army's intelligence agencies, Lieut. Col. Zulkifli
Lubis. Among the others were leaders of the national-communist Partai
Murba, of the Communist Party, and of the newly formed Progressive
Fraction, which included supporters Of both Murba and the Communist
Party. (20) Also prominent wete such Moslem "mass leaders" as Arudji
Kartawinata of the P.S.I,I„? Zainul Arifin of the new political party
of the Nahdatul Ulama, and Isa Anshary of the Masjumi, And support
came too from several minor nationalist parties, particularly P.fi.N.
(the National People’s Party), and, more importantly, from' the Sidik
group of the P.N.I. In the Djakarta press the group had its strongest
support—and this amounted to a strong and sustained campaign—from the
Merdeka of B.M. Diah (which had been the strongest supporter of the
Sukiman cabinet in the M.S.A. crisis) and the Mimbar Indonesia (daily)
of the Murba-sympathizing non-party parliamentarian Mr. Mohammad Yamin.
It is difficult to say how far the multifarious charges were just-
ified. There can be no doubt that the grievances which the members of
the Defense Section of parliament discovered on their tours of the
provinces were real ones. When they pointed to the complaints of
various neglected army units, when they listed the numbers of officers
and men who wanted to resign from dissatisfaction with their conditions
and the atmosphere of their work, when they marshalled evidence of a
(20) Formed on February 29, 1952, this new nine-man fraction or parlia-
mentary caucus of the former Golongan Buruh (Labor Group) and
Fraksi Kedaulatan Bakjat (People’s Sovereignty Fraction) and
several persons who had previously had no tie to any party or
fraction.114
thousand and one cases of injustice, due to rivalry between cliques, or
to sheer inefficiency, when they alleged that a gulf had developed be-
tween the army and the people in many areas—then their criticisms were
valid. Indeed Sultan Hamengku Buwono himself acknowledged many of them.
But if there was factual evidence for many of the charges of the
parliamentarians, other charges were made largely for their appeal to
political feeling. Many of the charges and insinuations were sensation-
al but vague and barely substantiated. The use of anonymous letters
and threats and of terms like "a certain colonel” and "a certain party",
contributed to create an atmosphere "like when someone at a market shouts
’pickpocket”'. (21) This reached a boomeranging degree of absurdity on
October 6 when the P.R.N. leader Bebasa Daeng Lalo called the Sultan
a-national and pro-Dutch. But in general it was effective political
tactics. In such an atmosphere it was difficult to defend the use of a
military mission of Dutchmen, and almost as difficult to make out a case
for a military pattern different from that of the Republic in the period
of revolution. Government speakers appealed time and again for object-
ivity and a business-like approach, and condemned the use of a "scape-
goat". But largely in vain. Bor this was not an argument about policies;
it was a struggle between groups for political power. With such great
interests at stake the parliamentary critics were not prepared to aban-
don their weapons. The content of their charges must be viewed in the
light of this fact.
The most difficult question in this regard was that of the role of
the P.S.I. Was the army indeed being made into a stronghold of this
party? That it was was suggested by the fact that the trend in the army
was towards a decline of the influence of men inimical to this party.
The men of the so-called PETA group,, who supported the actions of Bambang
Supeno and sought to have the President as their patron, were vociferous
enemies of the Socialist Party. A similar conclusion is suggested by a
number of the actions taken by the leadership of the army and the Ministry
of Defense in cabinet-level politics. The picture here is not quite clear;
for when political pressure was applied by the army in the 1950-52
period it was usually with regard to matters directly related to the army’s
own interests, for instance in the selection of a Minister of Defense.
But it cannot be denied that the effect of such pressure was a major
strengthening of the P.S.I. The army leaders did not press for Social-
ist Party members for the Defense portfolio, or even for Socialist Party
sympathizers as such. They sought to have as their political head a
man of prestige who shared their own outlook in army affairs. But in.
practice the candidates whom they said to be acceptable to the army, in
the first place the Sultan of Jogjakarta, were men of a fundamentally
(2l) S.. Sikap. October 6, 1952.Π5
similar outlook to that of the Socialists» In the same way the Social-
ist Party gained from the army leaders’ effective exertion of influence
against the attempts of the Sukiman cabinet to replace Mr. Ali Budiardjo
However the army leadership was not dominated by the P.S.I. in such
a way as would make it possible for PoSolo interests to prevail over
army interests at any point» Mr. Ali Budiardjo, not a member of any
party, was nevertheless a man who had had close associations with the
Sjahrir group. The same is true in lesser degree of Major-General
Simatupang, who was Ali Budiardjo’s brother-in-law. Both men may be
regarded as P.S.I. sympathizers, though each*one had considerable in-
dependence of mind and neither was in any way dependent on the Social-
ist Party. Colonel Nasution on the other hand had the army as the
center of his political orientation. A comparison of his writings with
those of Simatupang shows clearly that he is a man of very different,
more authoritarian and militaristic, outlook. He had no ties with the
P.S.I., but on the contrary some enmity towards it. Close cooperation
was possible between Nasution on the one hand and Simatupang and Ali
Budiardjo on the other because they could agree on an approach to the
building up of a unified and powerful army. It would have been impos-
sible to achieve such cooperation on a basis which involved control of
the army by an outside political group. For indeed there were many
more persons of Nasution’s political outlook than Simatupang’s at every
level of the service. Although there were many high and middle-ranking
officers who harbored generalized sympathies for the ideas of the party
and supported its stand on a number of then topical issues, there were
very few who could be counted on to act for the party in a crisis sit-
uation. There can be little doubt that the P.S.I. was making endeavors
to build up a position of power in the army. But the similarity between
its political stand and that of the army leadership at this time was
much less the product of success in such P.S.I. endeavors than it was
the result of a limited parallelity of interests between these two
centers of power. Of this we shall see more as we come to examine what
happened on October 17.
But, whereas the initial target of the parliamentary attack was
the P.S.I.’s influence in the army, it became clear in the latter part
of September that many supporters of the offensive meant it also to
bring the whole Wilopo cabinet to fall. The general stand of the
’’oppositionist** groups was to deny that this was their aim. But Merdeka
and Mimbar Indonesia were specific in their suggestions that a cabinet
crisis was not altogether undesirable. (22) And there was evidence a
(22) Merdeka, September 18, 1952. Indonesia Raya (attacking Merdeka).
September 19, 1952. Also Merdeka, October 4, 1952.116
little later that important leaders of both the PNI and the Masjumi held
the same view.
The issue came to a head as a result of a series of motions. The
"oppositionist" motion of Zainul Baharuddin (signed also by members of
Murba, the Labor Party, and the P.R.N. and another independent as co-
signatories) was submitted on September 23° In its original form it
was a statement of "no-confidence in the policy adopted by the Defense
Minister to end the conflicts within the armed forces" and a call for a
state defense law and other laws. Subsequently on October 10 the spon-
sors agreed to incorporate considerable modifications as suggested by
the P.K.I. parliamentary leader Ir. Sakirman. So modified, in what
appeared to be an attempt to bring the P.N.I. to its support, the motion
called for "reformation and reorganization of the leadership of the
Ministry of Defense and the Armed Porces", for a national defense law
and for "the establishment of a special parliamentary commission to in-
vestigate administrative and financial fraud in the Ministry of Defense
and Armed Forces". (23)
Although this motion was not specifically directed against the
Minister of Defense, and was said by its proposers to be primarily against
the "big three", Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang, and Nasution, the Minister
insisted that he would treat it as one of non-confidence in himself. It
soon appeared that the	the Christian Party, And possibly also
the Catholic Party, would maintain solidarity'with the Minister of
Defense and withdraw their own ministers if Sultan Hamengku Buwono re-
signed. As it was hardly conceivable that the cabinet should be able to
survive the resignation of four or five of its ministers, it was thought
highly probable that the passing of the Baharuddin motion would mean the
fall of the cabinet. This fact worked in the Defense Minister’s favor.
With the cabinet fighting for its very life the issue appeared more and
more as one between cabinet and parliament. A number of prominent
supporters of the cabinet made statements denying the right of the legis-
lature to make decisions in such matters as personnel policy and charges
of corruption. (2ll·) The Socialist Party was no longer politically isola-
ted.
(23) Ichtisar Parlemen, October 14, 1952.
(2^-) A lawyers’ battle raged on this point. Mr. Sunarjo (P.N.I.), Mr.
Daljono (Masjumi), Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri (Progressive) and Mr. Moh.
Yamin (Independent), upheld the rights of parliament, arguing that
it was parliament’s task to secure full discussion of all matters,
administrative as well as legislative. Mr. A.M. Tambunan (Christian
Party), and Mr. Assaat, a non-party sympathizer of the P.S.I., denied
this, stating that any evidence of corruption should have been given
to the Attorney-General and that for parliament to take decisions
on personnel policy was the thin edge of the wedge to delivering
all government servants to the mercy of parliament.117
Within major sections of the army this later stage of the debate
saw the development of very strong feeling against "politicians" and
their parliament. Feeling of this kind was no new phenomenon, for the
army had a political tradition of its own, As a revolutionary army
it had attracted men of strong political impulse, and in the course of
the struggle against the Dutch it had exercised wide political and
administrative powers. Subsequently it never renounced the right to
play a major political role. Independence had cost too much soldier’s
blood, so ran the argument, to be now left entirely to civilian poli-
ticians. Thus Colonel Nasution has written of "the historic competition,
dating back to the Jogja period, between parties and the army, a com-
petition which is never spoken about but is present in every action". (25)
Now, with the parliamentary debate on the army approaching a climax,
anti-politician feeling was stirred. Many army men who were not other-
wise supporters of Simatupang or Nasution grew strongly resentful of
the way in which army "dirty linen" was aired in the parliamentary public.
They were particularly angered by Zainul Baharuddin’s use of parliamen-
tary privilege to read out classified documents of the army.
In late September and early October the Socialist Party made a
bid to associate itself with this anti-politician feeling in the army.
For some years the party had taken pains to gain and maintain a repu-
tation as a party of principle unsullied by political horse-trading,
a party which could be supported by persons who felt fed up with parties
as such. In the period of the army debate the Socialist and Socialist-
sympathizing press had made frequent attacks on parliament. It had
stressed the major numerical strength in it of men who had supported
the Dutch-sponsored federal states. It had castigated the M.P.’s for
luxurious living, irresponsibility, and wasting time. In particular it
had condemned their loathness to make an elections law, and their moves
to make elections less urgent by filling the vacancies in the existing
parliament. (26) Now, however, the party’s tone became stronger. On
September 26, Sjahrir was reported as saying that "if parliament is once
(25)	Op. cit., p. 173. Nasution has himself contributed some of the
most important formulations of the anti-politician ideology. See
op. cit., pp. 63 ff., 105, and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The
Indonesian National Army), Vol. 1, Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta,
1956 passim. For an important later formulation of this type of
army ideology see the Orders of the Day of Acting Chief of Staff
of the Army, Col. Zulkifli Lubis, of July 8 and July 17, 1955 in
Gadjah Mada (organ of the Military Police Corps) Vol. 6, No. 2.
August 1955, pp. 13-U, 19-20, quoted in J.E.W. Smail, The June
27th Affair, unpublished paper. Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell
University, 19570
(26)	See for instance Sbs, "Parliamentary Politics" in Sikap (the offi-
cial Socialist Party weekly) August 11, 1952. Also Sindo, "Where is
this ‘Temporary’ Parliament going?", Sikap, September 29, 1952.118
swept clean it will be difficuL t to establish it in its position again."
From that time on the Socialist papers attacked the "temporary parlia-
ment" constantly. Pointing to the current debates as a disgrace to
Indonesian parliamentarianism. the pro-Socialist Pedoman argued that the
irresponsible attitude of the parliamentarians was making the people
lose faith in democracy. Subadio Sastrosatomo, the party’s parliamentary
leaders warned that the danger of a cabinet crisis was relatively small
compared with the threat to the whole democratic structure. (2?)
At this state the government initiated what it hoped would be a
concerted move of the parties supporting it to ensure that the Baharuddin
motion would be defeated. This took the form of a counter-motion spon-
sored by I. J. Kasimo of the Catholic Party,, which was introduced on
October 13» Representatives of Masjumi, the Labor Party9 the Christian
Party and Parindra, were co-signatories of the motion with Kasimo, but
the P.N.I. party council decided after some hesitation that none of its
members could sign. The motion was worded to the effect that the govern-
ment should Immediately establish a State Commission representing both
parliament and the government, but with a majority of parliamentary
representatives, to examine carefully and objectively all questions
raised in the parliamentary debatess and within three months to present
to the government concrete suggestions concerning "the possibility of
improvements in the structure of the Defense Ministry and Army Forces."
Further it called for a "hastening of the end of the Netherlands Mili-
tary Mission’s work," and asked that the State Commission be charged
with reporting to the government within two months as regards concrete
steps towards this end. Only after a hard struggle within the Masjumi
had the Natsir group succeeded in bringing the party to support a motion
like this, which was aimed at avoiding the risk of a fall of the cab-
inet.. The decision was finally taken on the 9th, reportedly by a 7?5
majority in the party’s Executive Council. This was reported as the re-
versal of an earlier decision taken by a vote of 8ϊ4 to introduce a mo-
tion calling for the replacement of Mr. Ali Budiardjo and Major-General
Simatupang. (28)
Inside the P.N.I. the support for a "strong" motion was greater.
Here too there was evidently a wide internal division. Here too the
group most strongly supporting the cabinet was in difficulty because
of the commitments which members of the opposite group had made in the
party’s name in the course of the parliamentary debate. Sidik had stated
on the 9th that the P.N.I. was "certainly not afraid of facing a cabinet
crisis over this matter." An official statement of the party council
(27TSee Pedoman, October 9, 1952. Also S. "The Home Situation." Sikap,
October 13, 1952, for a discussion of the sociological problems in-
volved in the operation of democracy in Indonesia.
(28) Pemandangan, October., 1952. Major-General Simatupang is a Chris-
tian.119
a day later was milder in tone, but emphasized that it wanted the repat-
riation of the Netherlands Military Mission by the end of the year and
wanted any State Commission to be specifically charged with investi-
gating the possibility of changes in the leadership of the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces. It was clearly very difficult then for
the Wilopo group to bring a majority of the party to support the Kasimo
motion. On the l^th the P.N.I. itself submitted a third motion, strong-
er than the one of Kasimo. Sponsored by the P.N.I. Secretary-General,
Manai Sophian, this motion was signed also by representatives of the
P.S.I.I. and Nahdatul Ulama. It was identical with the Kasimo motion
except that it included among the tasks of the State Commission that of
reporting on "the possibility of improvements in the leadership and
organization of the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces”.
The last few days before the voting on the three motions were ones
of intense political activity. On the 8th a meeting was held of all
Secretary-Generals of Ministries, reportedly to consider the threat
to Mr. Ali Budiardjo’s position. On the 10th a large meeting of colo-
nels and lieutenant-colonels was held in an effort to close the divisions
inside the army in the face of what were thought of as insults and
threats from outside. The 11th saw an extraordinary meeting in Djakarta
of all the seven territorial (divisional) commanders. Furthermore
these territorial commanders remained in Djakarta pending further
developments. There were rumors of very great restiveness in the army
units in and near Djakarta. From the 14th on Parliament was heavily
posted with military guards. Party councils .,ere conferring frequently.
Pessimistic members of the "oppositionist” groups spoke of their fears
that the army leaders might use force against parliament. (29) Opti-
mists among them were broadcasting the names of their candidates to
replace Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang, and Nasution. (30)
By the evening of October 15th,when the Defense Minister was to
give his final reply to the criticisms made of him, tension was very
high. Voting on the three motions was to take place that evening,
immediately after the Defense Minister’s reply. The Kasimo motion
was accepted by the government at the last minute. The Baharuddin
motion would, it was predicted, be defeated; no government party would
support it. The crucial question was whether the Manai Sophian motion
would win support. Hearing the Minister’s speech of reply, parliamen-
tarians were surprised to note that there was no reference in it to the
(29)	Zainul Baharuddin spoke on October 1^· of the dangers of a military
coup, citing recent happenings in Egypt and Thailand. Nadjib-
nadjiban ("doing a Naguib") had become part of Djakarta’s political
vocabulary.
(30)	Mr. Moh. Yamin suggested th&t the choice should be from ex-Major-
General Sudarsono, Col. Dr. Mustopo, Col. Bambang Sugeng, ex-Major-
General Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo and ex-Major-General Abdul Kadir.120
Sophlan motion. They later found the explanations at a meeting of the
P.N.I. Council in the late afternoon Vilopo had succeeded in getting
majority support for the proposal that the motion he withdrawn. This
the Prime Minister had told to the Sultan, who then gave his speech anti-
cipating that Manai Sophian would announce the withdrawal immediately
afterwards.
But Sophian did not withdraw his motion. Instead the P.N.I. parlia-
mentary leader Hadikusumo asked that the vote he postponed until the next
morning. A further reversal of P.N.I. policy was in the making. Great
as were the contradictory pulls to which the party was subjected, its
behaviour was incomprehensible to most of the members of parliament.
Only later did it become known that President Soekarno had called Mr.
Iskaq and Mr. Sunarjo to the palace on the evening of the 15th and
applied pressure on these P.N.I. leaders of the older Ali-Sartono wing
in support of Manai Sophian’s motion. In a tightly balanced situation
the President’s voice had been decisive.
The voting took place on the morning of October 16. The Baharuddin
motion was put to the vote first, and defeated by 80 votes to 39. Then
the Manai Sophian motion was put, and accepted, 91*5^. The Masjumi,
P.S.I., Parindra, and the two Christian parties opposed it, while the
Democratic Fraction and most members of the Labor Party abstained. All
other parties and fractions, including the P.N.I., supported the motion.
The situation was one of impasse. The Minister of Defense was al-
most committed to resigning. He had made it clear that he would not
accept any motion which was a priori in character, and that he regarded
attacks on the leadership of his Ministry as attacks on himself. And
the Sultan was known as a stubborn man. But clearly the problem was
•one in which the cabinet as a whole was involved. Yet a resignation
of the government was impossible; the situation was far too tense. For
it was unlikely that the army leaders would remain silent. Mohammad
Natsir voiced a fear of untoward developments, which was widespread in
and near the political elite: "I don’t know what will happen now."
But before going on to an account of the subsequent developments,
let us examine the alignments in the army debate a little more closely.
One may say that the main protagonists in the debate were the Defense
Minister and his supporters and the "oppositionists" and theirs. Ranged
with the Defense Minister were, most prominently, the Socialists, also
a majority group of the Masjumi led by Natsir, a minority group of the
P.N.I., led by Wilopo, the two Christian parties, and majority sections
of the Labor Party and Parindra. In the oppositionist group were Murba,
the Progressive Fraction, a number of radically nationalist independent
M.P.’s and the Sidik faction of the P.N.I., and this group attracted the121
support of the Communist Party. (31) But, most significantly, it re-
ceived some support also from groups which are neither "oppositionist"
in their attitudes to governments in general nor led by what we have
called mass leaders. These groups,·the Ali-Sartono group of the P.N.I.,
the Sukiman faction of the Masjumi and the aristocratic PoI.E», all led
by intellectuals with hostility towards the Socialists, may be loosely
termed "conservatives"„ They had wielded major power in the period of
the Sukiman cabinet, working in close association with President Soekarno.
Finally the "oppositionists" drew support from such smaller groups as
Nahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I., the Isa Anshary group of the Masjumi, and
the minor nationalist P.H.N., S.K.I., all groups with a less clearly
defined political position, but which may be seen as standing between
the "oppositionists" and the "conservatives".
The chart on page 122 shows this division in relation to our
earlier dichotomy between the intellectual and mass leader elements
in Indonesian political life. Forcing the evidence somewhat we
may speak of the existence in 1952 of two main groups of intellectual-
led political forces, the "Socialist-sympathizers" and the anti-
Socialist "conservatives". In the general heading of groups led by
mass leaders one may distinguish two main functional units, the "opposit-
ionists" and the Indonesian Communist Party (which is "oppositionist"
but in a peculiar way), and in addition a group of smaller Moslem and
nationalist groups with ephemeral ties to both the "conservative" and
the "oppositionist" groups.
The relevance of these categories emerges as one compares this set
of alignments with the one existing at the time of the M.S.A. crisis.
In both cases the crucial divisions virtually by-passed' party lines.
In the army debates the P.K.I. and the "oppositionist" groups were again
ranged against the government. But the other two main groups, Socialist-
(31) It is difficult to establish the exact role of the Communist Party
in the debates. The party’s spokesmen were as radically national-
ist as any who spoke in the debates, and in fact the most heated
exchanges were between Ir. Sakirman the floor leader of the Com-
munists, and Subadio Sastrosatomo, the P.S.I.’s leader in parlia-
ment. But on the other hand it was Sakirman who introduced the
important modifications of the Baharuddin motion, and, more
significantly, the Communist members did not support even this
modified version of the motion with their votes, but abstained,
and supported only the motion of Manai Sophian. It would appear
that the party's main aims were to remain close to the P.N.I. and
to strengthen the Sidik group within that party. The P.K.I.
certainly saw the army leadership as its enemy and a very important
one too. But it arrears to have been concerned that its efforts to
weaken or supplant this leadership should not result in the cabi-
net's fall, or at least not in its fall in such circumstances as
might lead to the emergence of the *tew Sukiman government" which
a number of political observers, wer.e predicting.122
A SCHEMATIC VIEW OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE 1952 ARMY DEBATES
o
PoSoI
Sympathizers
Political Groups led
by Intellectuals
i
PoNoL·, Wilopo group
Christian parties
Conservatives
!“
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
j_	----
Masjumi, Sukiman group
PoNolo, Ali-Sartono group
P.I.R.
^Minor nationalist parties
i	(P .R .N	S.K.I., etc.)
lilahdatul :Ulama
|P.S.I.I.
jMasjumi, Isa Anshary group
Political Groups led
by Mass Leaders
x-line denotes the
Oppositionists
P.K.I
line of cleavage
P.N.I., Sidik group
Progressive Fraction
Partai Murba
PoKolo
in debates
o
sympathizers (Socialists, the Natsir group of the Masjumi, the Wilopo
group of. the P.N.I., and the two Christian parties) on the one hand, and
"conservatives” (the Sukiman Masjumi, the Ali-Sartono P.N.I., and P.I.R.)
on the other, were fighting one another from diametrically opposed sit-
uations. Whereas at the time of the M.S.A. crisis the Sukiman government123
faced the opposition of the Socialist-sympathizers (as well as that of
the ’’oppositionists" and Communists), the Wilopo government in October
faced opposition from the "conservative" factions and parties (as well
as of the "oppositionists" and Communists). One of the two main groups
of intellectual leaders had replaced the other, with a consequent trans-
position of roles. (32)
But there is significance in the fact that when the crucial vote
on the army issue was taken on October 16, the Masjumi and the Ρ·Ν.Ι.
were on opposite sides, with party discipline obeyed by almost all of
their respective parliamentarians. The Natsir group had achieved dom-
inance in the Masjumi on the issue and the Sidik group, winning the
support of the group of Ali and Sartono, had succeeded in imposing its
will on the P.N.I. Although both parties remained internally sharply
divided, it is significant that they did vote against one another on
this occasion^ the Masjumi with the Socialists and the P.N.I. with the
Communists and oppositionists. Here was the beginning of a process
of realignment whereby the issue between Socialist-sympathizing groups
and conservative groups came to be eclipsed by the issue between the
Masjumi (and the Socialists)on the one hand and P.N.I. (and the Communists)
on the other.
(32) Interesting parallels could be drawn also with the situation at
the time of the "July 3 Affair" of 19^6. In 1946 the government
was headed by Sjahrir and conducting a highly unpopular policy of
negotiations with Holland. The opposition front, Persatuan
Perdjuangan (United Struggle), which based its appeal on extreme
nationalism, was led by Tan Malaka, Mr. Yamin, Mr. Subardjo, Major-
General Sudarsono, Sukarni, and Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri. Within
the already large Masjumi and P.N.I. there was a bitter struggle
between pro-Sjahrir and pro-Tan Malaka groups and the alignment
between the two groups within each of these and some of the other
parties were closely parallel to those in October 1952. But in
1946, unlike 1952, the Communists were fully supporting the govern-
ment, and so was President Soekarno. The July 3 affair itself
was an attempt to force President Soekarno to replace the Sjahrir
government by one of Persatuan Perdjuangan supporters—as the first
step towards the ultimate replacement of Soekarno by Tan Malaka.
See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 147-195·
Also Putusan Mahkamah Tentara Agung Renublik Indonesia di Djog-
jakarta'"tgi. 27 Mei 1948 (Decision of the Military Supreme Court
of the Republic of Indonesia at Jogjakarta, May 27, 1948),· van
Dorp, Djakarta (?), 1949, and Mr. Mohammad Yamin, Sapta Dharma,
Patriotisme Indonesia (The Seven Duties, Indonesian Patriotism),
Medan, 1950·124
On the morning of October 1? a surprise demonstration appeared in the
streets of Djakarta. By eight o’clock a crowd of approximately 5000 mens
city and country laborers, had gathered outside parliament. There was
no indication on its many well-painted banners and placards of who had
organized the demonstration. But the demonstrators’ demands were clear?
"Dissolve Parliament," "Parliament isn’t a Coffee Shop," "Parliament for
the sake of Democracy, not Democracy for Parliament’s sake," "The People
Must Judge," "Purge the Corruptors," "Elections Immediately," Use Section
84 of the Constitution," (33) and so on. They soon broke into parliament,
broke some chairs and, ironically, smashed up the parliamentary cafeteria!
From there the crowd moved on around the city, attracting larger
numbers, mainly of the curious, to themselves. After presenting a peti-
tion to Vice-President Hatta and after some minor incidents in which
several Dutch flags were pulled off their masts and torn up, the crowd,
by now perhaps 3θίθθθ strong, arrived in front of the Presidency. After
some time the President came out and walked,among general cheering,to the
fence where the demonstrators were standing. Then, in a masterly speech
from the Presidency steps,he both rebuked and soothed them. There would
be elections as soon as possible, he said. But meanwhile he could not
simply dissolve parliament. To ask him to do so was to ask him to become
a dictator, to bring to naught what the people had fought so long and.hard
to win...... So Soekarno sent the demonstrators home. The cheered him
and went. He had once more demonstrated his power. (34)
No special precautionary measures were taken by the army or police
until some time after the demo nstration was first seen. But then a
sudden burst of army activity appeared as the President was beginning
his speech to the demonstrators. Then he could see before him two tanks,
several armored cars and four cannons with some of the cannons and some
of the machine guns on the armored cars trained on the Presidency. One
army unit was inside the Presidency and many more outside. At 10?15 and
10:30, immediately after the President had concluded his address, two
groups of senior officers, 17 altogether, and including five of the seven
territorial commanders, arrived to see him. (35) Some of these men had
Ϊ33) This is the dissolution clause. It reads "The President shall have
the right to dissolve Parliament. The President’s declaration of
dissolution shall at the same time be an order for the election of
a new Parliament within 3θ days."
(34)	This account is based on the reports of the Aneta and Antara news
agencies, on the description by Adinegoro, Pemilihan Umum dan D.iiwa
Masjarakat di Indonesia (Elections and the Spirit of the Community
•in Indonesia), Bulan Bintang, Djakarta, 1953, on the government state
ment of November 22, 1952, and on the writer’s personal observations.
(35)	Those present were the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major-General
T. B. Simatupang, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Col. A, II. Nasution125
spoken to the President before the demonstrators had arrived at the
palace. The group had first called at the office of the Prime Minister,
where they had obtained the approval of the Prime Minister and Minister
of Defense for their action of going to talk directly with the President.
Then for an hour and a half they conferred with the President, who called
the Vice-President, the Secretary of the President’s cabinet, Mr. A. K.
Pringgodigdo, Prime Minister Wilopo and the Acting Chairman of Parliament,
Mr. A. M. TambUnan,to be present at the meeting.
What transpired at this historic meeting was not immediately made
public officially, and so was reported in a great variety of forms by
different interested persons. In fact it became the subject of vehement
controversy, not only between newspapers and political parties but even
between different official spokesmen for the armed forces. Thus it was
and is difficult to know precisely what happened. But the general pattern
is clear.
The officers’ main aim was to have the President dissolve parliament.
Their main spokesman. Deputy Chief of Staff Lieut. Col. Sutoko, told
Soekarno that the group felt that the existing unrepresentative parliament
was the root of the country's political instability, which had meant
that none of the recent cabinets had been able to live long enough to
implement its. program. Col. Maludin Simbolon, the Worth Sumatra commander,
spoke of the dangers of direct political interference in the placement
policies of the army. And Col. A. E. Kawilarang of the crucial command of
West Java, of which Djakarta was a part, spoke of the explosive state of
feelings among his soldiers and of the consequent danger of catastrophic
consequences if the questions agitating them were not settled, or if there
were further provocation of any kind. (36) All this, it was said, was
evidence of the necessity for the President to break the deadlock by
dissolving parliament. Thus Lieut. Col. Sutoko presented the President
with a statement which the officers had drawn up after their meetings of
October 16 and the early morning of October 17, which decided "to urge
the Head of the State to dissolve the present temporary parliament and
form a new parliament in the shortest possible time in a manner which
takes the wishes of the people into consideration.” (37)
the North Sumatra territorial commander, Cjl. M. Simbolon, the acting
commander in South Sumatra, Lieut. Col. Kosasih, Col. A. E. Kawilarang
of West Java, Lieut. Col. Bachrum of Central Java, Lieut. Col.
Dr. Suwondho of East Java, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Lieut. Col.
Sutoko and Lieut.Col.Dr.AzizSaleh, Military Police Head, Lieut. Col.
S. Parman, Co-’. G. P. H. ujatikusumo and Lieut. Cols. Suprapto,
A. Gani, Sukania, Askari, S. Sudarso and Sumantri. See the circular
letter of the Biro Penerangan Staf Umum Angkatan Darat (Information
Bureau of the General Staff of the Army), Pedoman, December 6, 1952.
(36) Ibid. See also the press interview of Lieut. Col. Sutoko, Antara,
October 31, 1952, and Indonesia Raya, October 31, 1952.126
But the officers meant to go further than this» Their statement
urged also the "retiring of the elements in. the present Parliament with
tendencies such as described above"--spreading secrets of the armed forces,
intentionally interpreting them destructively, etc»—and "the taking of
steps against functionaries of the armed forces who have violated their
duty to keep armed forces secrets»" (38) This, however, was not officially
admitted, the text of the statement appearing publicly only as the result
of a "leak" to the newspaper Merdeka made more than a month later» Thus
there were also many false rumors to the effect that the officers had
asked the President to assume dictatorial powers, that they had asked for
the existing cabinet to be replaced by a triumvirate of Soekarno, Hatta
and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, that they had threatened the President,
and so on. (39) In any event it is clear that the President did not
yield to the demands which were made of him» He would not endorse the
army leaders’ statement, nor would he commit himself on the question of
the dissolution of parliament» This he said he would have to discuss
with the cabinet» So he sent the officers away» When they had left the
Presidency, Soekarno, Hatta and Wilopo, in consultation with the acting
chairman of parliament, Mr» Tambunan, urged the Consultative Committee
of Parliament to declare for a prolonged recess® This the Committee did
forthwith.
Meanwhile however army activity was increasing outside the Presidency.
More and more soldiers came out onto the streets of Djakarta. At eleven
o’clock telephone and telegraph communications, both internal and over-
seas, were stopped. Ship and airplane departures from Djakarta were
delayed, and an eight to five curfew was imposed. All meetings of more
than five persons were banned by order of the Djakarta city command.
Six M.P.’S'—Dr. Sukiman and Mr. Kasman of Masjumi, Bebasa Daeng Lalo of
P.E.N, Α.Β.Μ» Jusuf of the Labor Party, and Mr. Yamin and Sjamsuddin
Sutan Makiiur, independents—were placed under arrest. Two dailies,
Merdeka and Berita Indonesia, and two weeklies, Mimbar Indonesia and
Mingguan Merdeka, were banned. The atmosphere was highly tense and
remained so throughout the 18th, with meetings of top army officers
continuing.
But within three days almost all of the army’s emergency measures,
had been revoked. The arrested men were free and the ban on publications
had been lifted. Army activity in the streets of Djakarta had been re-
duced to the normal level. The stage was set for a new political battle.
(37)	For the full text see Merdeka. November 1952» The authenticity
of this text was certified by Col. Nasution. See the circular letter
of the Biro Staf Umum Angkatan Darat, Pedoman, December 6, 1952»
(38)	ILid.
(39)	See, fojr instance, Merdeka. October 31, November 1, and the statement
of the Biro Informasi Staf Angkatan Perang (Information Bureau of
the Armed Forces Staff), Merdeka. December 5 and 6.127
But Before looking at this let us attempt to examine further the
events of October 17. Did they constitute an attempt to "do a Naguib"?
Did the army leaders act out of anger and panic, or was there a clearly
conceived plan of defending their positions by changing the whole balance
of power? Did their desire for the dissolution of parliament spring
from a wish to see the existing cabinet more capable of carrying out
its policy? Or was their main aim to place the whole government in a
position of dependence on themselves, or to displace it? These questions
continued to be debated vehemently for many months.
In the first place it is clear that the demonstration was substan-
tially an army-organized affair. It is true that feeling against parlia-
ment was high; for the luxurious living of the M.P.'s, their business
success, and the connection between their role and the slowness of govern-
ment action, had made it easy for the P.S.I. and other groups to make
them scapegoats for the inchoate general feeling of disappointment
with the fruits of the new independence. But a number of those who.took
part in this rapidly and efficiently organized demonstration had traveled
into the city in army trucks. Some in fact were identified as soldiers
in civilian clothes. Furthermore Col. Dr. Mustopo, the eccentric head
of the army dental services, actually stated in a press interview
published on the morning of October 17 that he had organized the demonstra-
tion. (ho) It is clear that several officers of the General Staff knew
on the previousday that a demonstration would take place.
A number of those who took part in the demonstration were either
personal follower? of. Dr. Mustopo, a man whose influence in working class
Djakarta was very considerable at this time, or members of gang-like
village guard organizations such as KOBRA (Komando Organisasi Barisan
Rakjat, Organizational Command of the Brigade of the People) with rfhich
he had associations. Others who took part are known to have done so for
money. But in addition certain parties appear to have been involved-.
There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence here which points in the
direction of the Socialist Party, or, at least, certain groups in it.
It was Pedoman and Indonesia Raya, the papers supporting the Socialist
Party,which on the morning of the 17th demanded the dissolution of
parliament. In addition there was almost certainly participation by
(4θ) In his account the action was taken at his own initiative. He ex-
plained that President Soekarno had come to know of it and asked him
on October 16 to call it off. He would try to prevent it from being
held, Mustopo claimed to have told the President, but he feared that
this would no longer be possible. Finally he said he had told
Col. Nasution on October 16 of the forthcoming demonstration.
Sumber (Djakarta), October 17, 1952. Mustopo’s role was later
described by Sutomo (Bung Tomo), who had been a close associate of
his. According to Sutomo, Mustopo was used by a "certain group" and
was himself "a small screw of a large machine." Merdeka,
October 28, 1952.128
significant numbers of members of the national-communist Partai Murba and
the smaller Permai (Persatuan Rakjat Marhaen Indonesia, Indonesian Pro-
letarians* Union) and P.R.I. (Partai Rakjat Indonesia, Indonesian People’s
Party). (4l) However, principal responsibility for the demonstration
must be attributed to sections of the army leadership, including some
high officers of the General Staff as well as the individual Col. Dr.
Mustopo.
What then were the purposes which activated the army leaders who
were the main actors of the drama of October 17? To answer this question
it is necessary to look at a number of earlier developments inside the
armed forces leadership. Despite some conflicting evidence, it
may be regarded as established that Col. Nasution was engaged, for several
months before October 17, in working out plans for a type of military
coup. It seems that his plans, to which the Minister of Defense and
Major-General Simatupang were opposed, involved using the Siliwangi
Division, the West Java territorial division commanded by Col. A. E.
Kawilarang, to effect a change which would make for stronger government
by giving greater power to President Soekarno, at the same time making
him partly dependent on army support. (42) Nasution had discussed much
V4l) Murba involvement is to be explained partly in terms of personal
associations between some Murba leaders and one or two men high in
the central leadership of the army and partly in terms of a concern
to participate in and heighten any potentially revolutionary situation
Μ. H. Lukman of the P.K.I. described it as one of a series of
anarchist type actions to which the Trotskyists were then resorting.
"Kerdjasama Kaum Sosialis Kanan dan Trotskis dalam Peristiwa 17
Oktober" (The Cooperation between the fiight-Wing Socialists and
Trotskyists in the October 17 Affair), Bintang Merah, Vol. VII,
No. 2-4, October-November, 1952, pp. 105 ff®
(42) There had been signs of dissatisfaction with the weak government
produced by the existing parliamentary regime. A number of leaders
of both the P.N.I. and the Masjumi favored a return to the presiden-
tial system which had been adopted in August 1945 and abandoned
three months later. Several P.N.I. leaders were known to want
President Soekarno to take dictatorial power into his hands, and
several leaders of the Masjumi were in favor of Vice-President Hatta
assuming greater powers than he had under the existing consitution.
The P.IoR. leader Abbas Surianataatmadja had stated at a congress of
this party on September 22 that Indonesia needed a strong man like
Ataturk or Naguib. Mrs. Easuna Said, an independent M.P. of ’’op-
positionist" leanings, had proposed dissolution of the existing
parliament in the course of the first reading debates on the program
of the Wilopo cabinet. See Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas
Program Kabinet Wilopo (The Government’s Statement of the Policy of
the Wilopo Cabinet and its Replies to Parliamentary Criticism),
Kementerian Penerangan, Djakarta, 1952, p. 45.129
of this with President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta some time before
the October crisis and he is reported to have received some encouragement
from the former. Also, several days before October 17, he had spoken
about his plans to the Prime Minister.
Then an important disagreement developed between Soekarno and
Wasution. The President would not approve a list submitted by Wasution
of officers and politicians to be arrested at the time of the proposed
coup. The changes made by Soekarno in this list were resented particularly
by a group of younger officers of the General Staff who had been support-
ing Wasution. The result was that by October 16 the initiative in plan-
ning the action had passed from Wasution to these younger men, in
particular to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Lieut. Col. Sutoko and Lieut.
Col. Dr. Aziz Saleh and the Military Police head Lieut. Col. S. Parman.
This group was not held together by any common political viewpoint other
than the anti-politician ideology of the army, although some of its mem-
bers had Socialist Party sympathies. What these men sought to do remains
unclear, but there can be little doubt that there were some plans for a
coup type action. (43)
The larger group of army leaders who met on October 16, and again
in the early morning of October 17, were faced with a situation at once
exasperating and highly confused. Some of them had been angered by the
behavior of parliament. They had been bewildered by the zigzags of
P.W.I. policy. Many were afraid of having their work undone and some of
losing their positions. Some too were seriously concerned lest army
disunity should erupt in violence. This could be triggered, they believed
by the actions of the Black Dragon type organization of the armed forces
intelligence head Lieut. Col. Lubis, an active leader of the "PETA group."
Something had to be done. But what?
Relations between parliament and cabinet were at a deadlock. For
these army leaders it was imperative that parliament should yield and not
cabinet; this pointed to dissolution. But dissolution was constitution-
ally dubious and in practice impossible without the approval of the Presi-
dent. (44) how it was true that Soekarno had given certain indications
(43)	On October 15 the English language daily Times of Indonesia, edited
by the editor of Indonesia Raya which had very close connections
with the army leadership, published a version of the Djojobojo
prophecy. In what were obvious references to Soekarno and the Sultan
of Jogjakarta, the piece ended "The Leader would soon pass from
power and his place would be taken by a prince of the ancient land,
Java."
(44)	The statement of the 1950 constitution, "The President’s declaration
of dissolution shall at the same time be an order for the election
of a new Parliament with 3θ days," was interpreted by many as mean-
ing that there could be no dissolution if it was technically im-
possible to hold elections within a thirty day period. According to
a strict interpretation of the constitution the right of dissolution
is vested not with the President as a matter of prerogative, but
rather with cabinet. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office Of President
in Indonesia, pp. 26-27. However President Soekarno had shown on130
that he shared the army leaders8 general feelings against parliament.,
And he had entered into political cooperation with Nasution on this basis»
Yet this cooperation had broken down., and those of the army officers who
had long nurtured antagonisms against the President were confirmed in
their view that he had to be opposed» Now apparently he had thrown his
weight on the side of the sponsors of the Manai Sophian motion, or so at
least some of the officers believed» The President was the key to the
whole situation, but his position on the central issues was unclear» Thus
the question wass If action was to be taken should it go only as far as
was possible with the cooperation of the President, or should it be
pressed further if need be?
Action was particularly strongly urged at these meetings by the group
of Lieut. Cols. Sutoko and Dr» Aziz Saleh of the General Staff and Lieut»
Col» S. Parman of the Military Police, and it appears that this group
was supported by certain of the divisional commanders from the provinces,
particularly Col. Kawilarang of West Java» But the nature of the action
which these men proposed is not clear» Nor is it. clear what breadth of
agreement was reached at these meetings. What is certain is that a number
of the most important of the actions of October 1? were not the result
of agreement by the larger officer group which met on the 16th and 17th»
These actions in fact resulted from the independent initiative of a
number of army elements. Thus most of the divisional commanders were
taken completely Y>y surprise by the occurrence of the demonstration—^as
indeed was the Defense Mihister. Whatever the role of Dr. Mustopo in
organizing the demonstration (and whatever interpretation one places on
his account of his statements to Soekarno and Nasution) he was certainly
not acting as a disciplined'member of a putsch group» ■ And even at the
palace there were contrasts in the behavior Of different members of the
officer group. While the attitude of some of them to the President was
one of challenge and defiance, Lieut. Col. Sutoko and Col. Simbolon
actually had tears in their eyes as they spoke. Similarly the burst of
army activity, which had first appeared on the streets while the President
was addressing the demonstrators, was the result of planning not by all
the officers who later went to the Presidency but by a smaller General
Staff group cooperating with the Djakarta city commander, Lieut. Col.
Taswin. It was this smaller group which cut communications, ordered the
arrests, press bans and curfew and banned public meetings. And it is
probable that the important and provocative decision to train cannons
on the Presidency was taken at a still lower level of responsibility, by
a single batallion commander.
The confusion and lack of coodination which characterized these
developments goes far to explain why it was that the officers were pre-
pared to accept the President’s refusal to accede to their demands. It
previous occasions that he would not be bound to strict interpreta-
tions of his constitutional role. Moreover some of the cabinet’s
legal advisers maintained that, by analogy with Dutch constitutional
practice, a deadlock of this kind could be broken by a prerogative
action of the head of state, in which he either dismissed the
cabinet or dissolved parliament.131
is a fact that certain groups within the army leadership wanted some sort
of a coup, an assertion of military power which would radically change the
power "balance. But this group had only partial support from the army
leaders who went to the President. The group as a whole had made a
timing mistake "by going to the President after he had addressed the
demonstrators. And they had allowed the President’s antagonism to "be
aroused "by the guns which faced the palace. Thus when Soekarno stood
firm against the demands which they Brought to him, majority opinion
within the group turned against the party which wanted to force the
issue at stake.
When this group presented its point of view again at the subsequent
meetings later in the day and on October 18 it was clear that further
action could be taken only if the army felt itself strong and united
enough to take power into its own hands. This was all the clearer for
the fact that Vice-President Hatta, who had previously encouraged the
army leaders in their demand for the dissolution of parliament, was not
prepared to become involved in an army action taken in defiance of the
President. In addition Bambang Supeno, Lieut. Col. Zulkifli Lubis and
other members of the "PETA group” had by now had considerable success
in organizing opposition to the army leaders, using the name of the
President. And, as Major-General Simatupang stressed in these meetings,
the army leaders had no clear conception of what they would do with full
powers over civilian affairs once they had assumed them. (45)
It is therefore impossible to give a clear-cut answer to the question
of whether or not there was an attempt at coup d’etat. There was an
attempt to intimidate tlae President, but it was not pressed. There were
important groups of the army leadership which wanted action which would
result in a radical change in the balance of political power. But these
groups did not have any carefully elaborated plans. And their influence
within the leadership as a whole was not clearly predominant. No one can
say what political change or how much they would have introduced if they
had taken state power into their own hands.
For some days after October 17 bewilderment prevailed. On October 18
it was announced that the cabinet would continue in office, with consider-
ation of the Manai Sophian motion postponed. There was no indication
that Sultan Hamengku Buwono would resign. There would be no cabinet
crisis, it seemed. As the army’s emergency measures were undone one by
one and the territorial commanders returned to their own commands, a
reassuring uneventfulness came over the political scene. But the atmos-
phere remained strained. The press, Merdeka and Mimbar Indonesia (daily)
on the one hand, and Indonesia Raya and Pedoman on the other, was unusually
circumspect and uninformative. The numerous appeals of government and
government-supporting leaders for moderation were evidence that the
(45) See T. B.Simatupang, Pelopor dalan Perang, Pelopor dalan Damai
(A Forerunner in War and Peace), Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta,
1954, pp. 101-105, a discussion of the practical case against
military dictatorship.132
surface calm gave no proper cause for relief. (46) Meanwhile a tremendous
variety of explanations of the events of October 17 were in circulation and
there were rumors of intense behind-the-scenes political activity both inside
and outside the army.
On October 21 came the first official attempt at clarification, in
a radio address of Prime Minister Wilopo. There was no cabinet crisis,
the Prime Minister stated, adding that the Consultative Committee of
parliament wished the cabinet to continue in office, and further that
the territorial commanders together had made a statement of loyalty to
the government. He referred to "undesirable aspects" of the happenings
of October 17, but said that these happenings also "reflect a desire to
check a trend in parliamentary development which had produced an atmosphere
in which a government cannot do its work." (47) Wilopo was clearly more
concerned to appeal for calm and moderation than to provide a full ex-
planation of what had happened. Many who had expected detailed clarifi-
cation were disappointed. The newspaper-reading public continued to be
bewildered and in many cases anxious, sensing that this was a situation
in which new and unpredictable political forces were at work.
This sense of bewilderment was heightened when it became clear that
the political battle of October 17 was shifting from Djakarta to the
regions. It was not long before it appeared in one or other form in the
center of every one of the seven military commands. Demonstrations like
the one in Djakarta on October 17, with organizationally unidentified
persons demanding the dissolution of parliament, appeared in Semarang on
October 20, in Bandjarmasin (Kalimantan) on October 24, in Medan on
October 27 and in Bandung on November 8. In the three other centers of
military power there were happenings of much greater significance—blood-
less coups to overthrow the local territorial commander.
The first of these remarkable coups was in the East Java division.
East Java had long been the main stronghold of the "BETA group," of the
sections of the army opposed to the policies of the Defense Ministry.
However the acting territorial commander there, Lieut., Col. Dr. Suwondho,
who was in charge while Col. Bambang Sugeng was on sick leave, was not a mem-
ber of this group. When he returned to Surabaja from Djakarta on October 19
Suwondho found that a number of leading "PETA group" officers, including
Col. Bambang Supeno, Col. Sungkono, Col. Suhud and Lieut. Col. Sapari,
had arrived in East Java before him. These men had been asked by President
Soekarno to rally opposition in East Java to the Djakarta leaders of the
army, and in this they were quickly successful. Lieut. Col. Suwondho’s
position was weak, but on October 21 he struck back. In a strongly
worded order of the day he attacked those members of the army who had
(46)	See for instance the statements of Mohammad Natsir, Aneta, October
18,. Mr. Mohammad Boem, Antara, October 18.
(47)	Government Statement Ministry Of Information, October 21, 1952.133
been "screaming with the opportunists among the politicians, who had
promised them positions." At the same time he appealed for army unity,
stating that the alternative was "balkanization of the state." (48)
But Suwondho could not hold his position. Almost immediately after
he had issued this statement he was arrested by order of the Bambang
Supeno supporters in the divisional headquarters. The General Staff in
Djakarta sentJhieut. Cols. Barman and Suprapto to Surabaja, armed with a
mandate to take whatever action they thought necessary, but these men could
do no more than legitimize the power change which had taken place. On
October 22 the divisional headquarters in Surabaja announced that
Suwondho had been dismissed by the General Staff delegation from Djakarta,
that the most senior regimental commander in East Java, lieut. Col. R.
Sudirman, had been declared acting territorial commander, and that he
had revoked Suwondho’s Order of the Day. Two days later Sudirman issued
a long statement. He asserted that Suwondho’s leadership of the division
had become unacceptable because of his active participation in the undemo-
cratic actions of October 17. He proclaimed as unjustifiable "firstly
the acts of those armed forces functionaries who had used the powers of
their offices to take action directed towards a dissolution of parliament
and secondly the repressive measures which had been taken in close
connection with these actions." Finally he professed his loyalty to
President Soekarno and expressed the hope that he, as Supreme Commander,
would effect a settlement of the whole affair. (49)
Both the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Army
visitea East Java in· early November. But Sudirman maintained his posi-
tion as acting,-territorial commander and made no concessions in his
attitude to the army leaders in Djakarta, but on the contrary made
several public demands for punitive action against those who had been
involved in the October 17 affair. It was clear that President Soekarno
was supporting the Sudirman group. Faced with a political situation
which was both complicated and highly dangerous—so much so that civil
war was a seriously discussed possibility—the army leadership did
nothing against Sudirman.
One consequence of this inaction was to encourage similar coups
elsewhere. Thus on November 16, Col. Gatot Subroto, territorial com-
mander of East Indonesia with headquarters in Makassar, was arrested and
supplaced by his Chief of Staff, Lieut.-Col. J. F. tfarouw—in this case
with the active cooperation of the P.N.I. governor of Sulawesi, Sudiro.
Again there had been a visit from unofficial couriers of the President.
Again the coup was made as a protest against the actions of the territorial
(48)	Aneta, Surabaja, October 22, 1952.
(49)	Aneta, Djakarta, October 26, 1952. See also the account of these
developments in Sumber, (Djakarta), October 29 and in the statement
of Lieut. Col. Sutoko, Indonesia Raya, October 31.134
commander in relation to the actions of October 17 s although in fact
Gatot Subroto had not been among those who went to the presidency on that
day. Again too the name of the President was used by the man usurping
authority, and again the hope was expressed that the President would
settle the whole army conflict. (50) One important difference lay in
the fact that Lieut. Col. Warouw’s statements were cast in stronger
language than those of Lieut. Col. Sudirman had been. Warouw spoke of
the events of October 17 as an attempt at coup d’etat and as intimidation
of the head of state,and declared that he would be unprepared to meet
Sultan Hamengku Buwono or Col. Nasution on their planned visit to Makassar
unless they carried a specific mandate from the President. Furthermore
there were signs that regionalist and anti-Javanese feeling had become
associated with the affair, which some people in the area saw as the ouster
of a Javanese by a Sulawesian.Lt.Col. Warouw hails from Minahasa in North
Sulawesi.) (51)
A week later a parallel situation developed in South Sumatra. Here
the position of the "anti-October 17 group" in the army had just been
strengthened by what President Soekarno had said in a five-day speaking
tour of the area. Headed by the brigade commander Lieut. Col. Kretarto,
this group finally took action on November 23, taking power out of the
hands of the acting territorial commander Lieut. Col. Kosasih. Kosasih
was said to be unwilling to take a firm stand on the October 17 problem
and unable to surmount the conflicts existing in the army under his
command. In this case the government was able to find a solution which
was acceptable to those who had made the coup and at the same time saved
it from the humiliation which it had suffered in East Java and East
Indonesia. On November 24 it issued a statement condemning the Kretarto
action and the next day it reappointed the pensioned Col. Bambang Utojo,
a man of the "PETA group" who had been territorial commander of South
Sumatra until September 1952.
There was indeed little that the cabinet could do to assert its
authority in the face of these challenges in the regions. Military action
against East ^ava or East Indonesia was scarcely conceivable. There did
exist the possibility of organizing counter coups against the usurping
commanders. But action of this kind would have involved a degree of
partisanship with the central leadership of the army for which the cabinet
was not prepared. Indeed most of its members were personally inclined
to support the Djakarta army leaders, viewing their actions of October 17
with sympathy or at least without strong hostility. But from a number
(50)	One accusation which Warouw leveled against his superior, Col. Gatot
Subroto, was that the latter had told a group of officers that he
would take orders only from the Vice-President and Defense Minister.
Antara, November 18, 1952.
(51)	See Pedoman, November 18 and the denial by Lieut. Col. Warouw, Antara.
November 18.135
of the parties of the cabinet, and particularly from the Prime Minister’s
P.N.I., there was heavy pressure for a policy against these army leaders»
Furthermore President Soekarno pressed the cabinet strongly to take action
not against Sudirman, Warouw or Kretarto, but rather against Nasution,
Simatupang and Ali Budiardjo. And with the army itself so deeply and
openly divided, it no longer constituted a counterweight to the President’s
pressure, as had so often been the case in previous political crises»
The political balance had swung sharply to the advantage of the anti-
October 17 forces.
The cabinet’s policy was one of slow and cautious adaptation to the
realities of the new power situation. Though it realized that its own
interests were tied closely to those of the pro-October 17 officers it
was incapable of effecting a solution which favored this group. Even so
it continued to be attacked strongly by the anti-October 17 group both
in and outside the army. It appeared to be able to please no one. Yet
its policy of dexterous compromises and ingenious face-saving formulas—
the Wilopo overkappingspolitiek or "all under one roof policy"—was
successful in saving the country from bloodshed.
The basis of its policies for a settlement was given in a govern-
ment statement of November 22. In this the governmen* presented a much
fuller account of what had happened on October 17 than it had previously
given, but it made no reference (or at most one very indirect one), to
the army coups in the regions. Maintaining that the demonstration of
October 17 "must be understood in relation to the previous debates in
parliament," it nevertheless declared as unjustifiable "the participa-
tion of several officers and men of the armed forces in the organization
of this demonstration,” the "large amount of army activity, exceeding
what was required for the maintenance of security" and "the demand of
ttj.e army leadership for the dissolution of parliament." There had
been no seizure of power, and there should be no exaggerated interpreta-
tions of the events of the day. But the government "would not tolerate
the above-mentioned actions taken in violation of the limits of the army’s
role and would take the necessary steps wherever they had occurred."
It was not long before a beginning was made with these steps.
Parliament reassembled on November 27. On December 5 the cabinet announced
the first of a series of changes in the central army leadership. Col.
Nasution and Lieut. Cols. Sutoko and Parman were suspended. On December 16
Col. Bambang Sugeng, the inactive commander of the East Java territorium,
who was generally regarded as the most moderate and capable of the
"PETA group" men in the army, was appointed as acting Chief of Staff to
replace Nasution. But the Sultan and Bambang Sugeng were committed to
widely different ways of tackling the problem of army disunity, and,
with Bambang Sugeng in a politically stronger position, Hamengku Buwono’s
position was virtually intolerable.136
It was East Indonesia which afforded the showdown. Col, Bambang
Sugeng returned from a trip to Makassar committed to legitimize the posi-
tion of Lieut. Col. Warouw as acting commander of the territory, (52)
When the cabinet decided on January to uphold this decision,, the Sultan
announced his resignation. The Deputy-Prime Ministers, Prawoto Mangkusasmito
of the Masjumi, took over interim charge of the Defense portfolio, only
to give it to the Prime Minister a few days later. Then on January 2,
the same day as Lieut. Col. Warouw was ceremonially installed in Makassar
as acting commander, the cabinet reversed its stand. In what was an
attempt to prevent the threatened resignation of the two P.S.I. ministers,
it appointed another man. Col. Sadikin, then divisional commander in
Kalimantan and a man who had kept a neutral position between the two main
rival groups in the army, as East Indonesia commander. Presented with
this volteface Col. Bambang Sugeng immediately offered his resignation.
But this was not accepted and the acting Chief of Staff remained at his
post. Sadikin, it then became clear, was not prepared to go to East
Indonesia. Lieut. Col. Warouw remained in charge of the East Indonesia
command till 1956. The P.S.Io ministers accepted the rebuff and remained
in the cabinet.
For the political parties the two months following October 17 were
full of intense activity, their press organs and central and branch
committees frequently issuing statements on the changing situation.
The first series of such statements concerned itself mainly with the
question of dissolution of parliament. A number of minor organizations
and a larger number of newspapers supported dissolution, and argued that
elections should be held on the basis of emergency laws. (53) The great
majority of parties opposed it and demanded that parliament should re-
assemble immediately. (5M These included not only the P.K.I., P.N.I.,
(52)	To install a person formally as the acting functionary in a particu-
lar Military or civil post is a common technique in Indonesian govern-
mental! practice. It represents the first stage of a process of
legitimation which is two-fold. A person formally installed in an
office on an acting basis has the opportunity to create for himself
the support he needs to continue in that office. If he succeeds
and maintains his superiors’ trust he may be accorded full status.
If he fails it will be easy to withdraw him. But in many cases he
will continue as the acting functionary for a period of many months
or even years, exercising all the powers of the office but enjoying
only some of its prestige, because the government prefers not to
confer full legitimacy on him.
(53)	See the statement of Partai Kedaulatan Rakjat (People’s Sovereignty
Party), Antara (Makassar), October 22, and the editorials of Indonesia
Raya. October 25, Indonesia Berdjoang (Bandjarmasin), October 21,
and Suara Rakjat (Surabaja), October 25, 1952.
(5^) Up to the time of the reassembling of parliament on November 27,
3h0 letters had been sent it by organizations and groups of organiza-137
P.S.I.I. and P.I.R., but also the Masjumi and its youth orgattization
G.P.I.I. All without exception stated that they favored early elections.
There was no statement from the Socialist Party, except Sjahrir's of
October 18 jin which he laughed off the charge that he had called for
the dissolution of Parliament. The Partai Murba on November 1 attacked
parliament as a stronghold defending the Round Table Conference Agree-
ment, but on the other hand made no specific demand for its dissolution.
It also denied having participated in the demonstration.
After the coup in the territorial command of East Java the political
issues became more complicated. The Socialist papers, which now saw it
as politically disadvantageous to advocate dissolution of parliament,
concentrated on the case for government action against the usurper of
military power in the division, Lieut.-Col. Sudirman. On this issue
they were better able to win outside support, and a number of groups
inside other parties, and particularly the Masjumi and Christian
parties, took their part. The opposition concentrated on the events of
October 17. Their most commonly used technique was the joint statement
signed by the representatives of a large number of parties and other
organizations—trade unions, veterans’, women’s and youth bodies, etc.—
in a particular town or area. (55) These joint statements were usually
made as the result of joint P.N.I.-P.K.I. initiative. The local branches
of the minor nationalist party P.I.R., the Moslem P.S.I.I. and the
national-communist Murba were involved in almost every case, and some
of the more moderately phrased statements were signed also by representa-
tives of Masjumi and the Christian parties in the particular areas. All
of these statements supported the continued functioning df parliament
until elections could be held, and some demanded that it should reassemble
immediately. Several affirmed the signatories’ agreement with the con-
tents of the President’s speech to the demonstrators of October 17, and
others used such tetins as "fascist,” "coup d’etat" and "dictatorship"
in condemning the actions of the army leaders on that day. The most
strongly worded denunciations of these actions came from different parts
of East Java, suggesting that the political atmosphere in.this province
had been strongly affected by the coup which had taken place within its
military command. (56)
tions in support of its continued functioning. See Gusti Majur,
"Pintu Pemilihan Umum" (The Threshold of Elections), Mimbar Indonesia
(weekly), December 20, 1952.
(55)	See for instance the statements of 13 organizations at Jogjakarta,
Berita Indonesia, October 24, of 8 organizations at Bujdttinggi,
Antara, October "31, of 15 organizations at Surakattth, Ahtara,
October 31, of 21 organizations at Semarang, Aneta, November 3,
of 43 organizations at Palembang, Aneta, November 16, and of 15
organizations at Kutaradja, Tegas, November 17, 1952.
(56)	See for instance the joint statements of organizations in Lumadjang
(November 5), Malang (November 6), Madiun (November 20), and
Surabaja (December 6).138
Here then was another focus of political conflict—between those who
demanded a solution in the center first, and those who insisted that the
East Java problem, later the problem of the three territoria, should be
settled before any others. The argument was rather like the egg-or-chicken
one. One side, the ”pro-October 17 group,” stressed the necessity for
government action to deal with the coups in the territorial army commands.
The other side, the "anti-October 17 group", insisted that these were
merely actions taken in response to the far more fundamental constitutional
violations of October 17» Thereupon the first side took the argument
back to what they said had evoked the happenings of October 17, the
irresponsibility of the parliamentarians in their criticism of the army
leaders. And from the second side came further castigations of the
policies of the army leadership in the previous period.
The post October 17 period presents a double situation as far as
party alignments are concerned. Immediately after October 17 there
existed a temporary alignment of P.N.I. and Masjumi against the Socialist
Party—inasmuch as the Sukiman group had established a position of tem-
porary ascendance within the leadership of the Masjumi. There was sharp
resentment in the Masjumi of the Military Police’s arrest of its leaders,
Dr. Sukiman and Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, and thus on October 29 the Execu-
tive Council of the party voiced its disapproval of "the dissolution of
Parliament at the present time in any way which is unconstitutional"
and asked that parliament should reassemble immediately. (57) For a time
it seemed as if the basis was being laid for a renewal of cooperation
between the "conservative" leaders of the Masjumi and the P.N.I., and
it was widely speculated that this cooperation coulj create the basis
for a new cabinet like that of Dr. Sukiman. This was one interpretation
placed on the demands made by Mr. Sartono of the P.N.I. and a day later
by Dr. Sukiman, for the resignation of Sultan Hamengku Buwono. (5θ)
On the other hand however there was a very much stronger tendency
for the P.N.I. to cooperate with the Communist Party and "oppositionist"
groups and thereby to alienate the Masjumi and strengthen the hold in it
of the P.S.I.-oriented Natsir wing. The Communist Party was a strong
and willing ally of the groups in the P.N.I. who favored a "strong"
solution, severe in its punishment of the army leaders of the pro-October
17 group, and its help was considerable in mobilizing the impressive
demonstration of opinion represented by the many joint statements. In
party terms the main beneficiary of these was the P.N.I. For the shifts
in army personnel worked clearly in this party’s favors the new acting
C57) Abadi, October 30.
(58) Mr. Sartono, Harian Umum (Surabaja), December 5, Nr® Sukiman,
Merdeka, December 6. See also the statement of Dr. Sukiman on
November 7»which he denied that he sought the fall of the Wilopo
cabinet, but added that if it fell it would have to be replaced by
a presidential cabinet.139
Chief of Staff Col» Bambang Sugeng8 the reinstalled South Sumatra commander
Col» Bambang Utojo and a number of the leading men of the groups which
had seized military power in East Java and East Indonesia were sympathiz-
ers of the PoNolo The Communists asked no price in terms of army ap-
pointments; they hoped for no more than to see P«S.I. influence in the
army weakened and to strengthen their own association in the public
mind with the P°N.Io and President Soekarnoo
Within the P»N»I» the concern for an anti-October 17 solution united
the oppositionist Sidik group with the conservative group of Sartonc and
intensified their strength vis-a-vis the group of Wilopo. Both of the
first two groups were beneficiaries of the post-October 17 changes in
the power situation in the army. Leaders from both groups had cooperated
closely with President Soekarno in bringing these changes about» Thus
when the party held its sixth congress at Surabaja on December 6-11,
the Prime Minister was subjected to vigorous criticism with regard to his
handling of the October 17 affair» In a particularly strongly worded
pronouncement the congress resolveds
1» "to condemn the October 17 affair as a violation of democracy;
2. to justify the efforts made in the provinces to prevent further
violations of democracy;
3» to urge the government to act faster towards a solution of
the above affair^ it being understood that its efforts must
be based on agreement between it and the President as Supreme
Commander; and
4» to urge all members of the party to remain alert in struggling
for democracy»" (59)
Wilopo had been all but disavowed by his own party» At the same
time it had become clear that the Masjumi continued to be a strong
supporter of the cabinet» With the P»N»I» so successful in turning the
October 17 affair to its own advantage0 Masjumi opinion had swung away
from the anti-October 17 group again9 and so the Sukiman group lost its
momentary ascendancy in the party» The overall result was a major
widening of the breach between the dominant leaders of the country’s two
main parties. With Masjumi-PoNoIo cooperation thus undermined and the
power of the Socialist-sympathizing groups generally greatly reduced»,
the cabinet was seriously weakened» It is only slight exaggeration to
speak of it as existing in a "political oxygen tent" from October 17 to
the time of its fall» (6o) But the October 17 affair had strengthened
its position with regard to one point of its policys that of preparing
elections.
(59) Aneta (Surabaja). December 10s 1952»
(60)
Robert Ο» Bone Jr.s
"The Future of Political Parties
February 195^»
in Indonesia9"141
CHAPTER VI
TOWARDS ELECTIONS
The country’s first general elections had been promised and scheduled
for a very long time. They were initially planned to be held as early
as January 19^6. But the circumstances of the revolution did not permit
the holding of more than regional (residency and regency) polls—except
in certain of the Dutch-sponsored states, where however there was con-
siderable official interference with the freedom of the ballot. In the
period after December 19^-9 every cabinet made elections for a Constituent
Assembly an important part of its program. The Hatta cabinet initially
planned to conduct elections so that it would be an elected Constituent
Assembly which would decide between a federal and a unitary state struc-
ture. But it was impelled to bring about a unitary state by more direct
means, and little was done about elections.
The Natsir cabinet did introduce an elections bill in February 1951,
a bill for elections on an indirect suffrage, and its Education Minister,
Mr. Wongsonegoro, stated then that he hoped elections would begin in ■
August 1951· (1) But the cabinet fell before the bill had been discussed
in parliament. Its successor, the Sukiman cabinet, organized four series
of elections in selected areas, direct universal suffrage elections in
Sangir-Talaud and Minahasa (both in North Sulawesi) in May and June,
1951, indirect universal suffrage elections in the Jogjakarta area in
August and October, and direct elections on a literacy franchise in the
town of Makassar in early February 1952. At the same time it agreed to
support the bill which the Natsir government had submitted to parliament.
But on August 1, 1951, it was informed in a joint report from the sub-
divisions (non-specialized committees) of parliament that this bill was
unacceptable. Parliament asked for elections on a direct franchise.
However, no government bill on this matter had been submitted to parlia-
ment when the Sukiman government fell in February, 1952. The promise of
this cabinet’s Minister of Justice, Mr. Yamin, in June, 1951, that a
Constituent Assembly would be sitting by December of that year, remained
unfulfilled. (2)
When the Wilopo cabinet acceded to office, at a time when the much
publicized Indian elections were nearing completion, there were signs of
a renewed emphasis on the importance of early elections. One of the
(Γ)' Antara, February 5, 1951·
(2) Antara, June 7, 1951·142
cabinet’s first acts was to table a bill for the registration of voters»
This it did in July» The Minister of the Interior, fioem, stated that he
hoped that this would be dealt with quickly, adding that the elections
bill would follow upon it. Mononutu, as the cabinet’s Minister of Infor-
mation, said in May that he hoped the elections would be completed by the
middle of 1953» (3) However, the sub-divisions of parliament did not
discuss the Registration of Voters Bill till September and then replied
with a statement of objections to some of its most important features»
In particular the parliamentary sub-divisions objected to the principle
that the final onus of registration should be on the voter» They took
the stand that the village registration committee should be finally
responsible. On the other hand, parliament had in July used its right
of initiative to move for a measure for filling its currently vacant
seats on the basis of party nominations, (4)
It was the October 17 affair which put an end to this cabinet-par-
liament "ping-pong." (5) For some months before October 17 a number of
newspapers sympathetic to the Socialist Party had charged that it was
the parliamentarians’ concern with their personal fortunes which was
delaying the making of an electoral law» These attacks were intensified
as the parliamentary debates on the army approached their climax, and
they attracted support from most sections of the newspaper-reading public.
After October 17 "early elections" constituted a political symbol to
which all parties were obliged to accord respect» The demand that elec-
tions be held soon was included in virtually all of the hundreds of
statements and joint statements of political organizations in this period,
and in almost all political editorials. The advocates of the dissolution
of parliament were most clearly in favor. Many of them proposed elec-
tions on the basis of an emergency law made by cabinet. However their
opponents, who advocated the continued functioning of parliament until
elections could be held, were challenged to declare their support of early
elections as determinedly, and did so. Thus there was, particularly in
October and November, an element of competition between the parties as
regards the positiveness with which they advocated elections.
(3)	Antara. May 25, 1952.
(4)	This draft bill, prepared by a committee headed by Mr. Sunarjo of the
P.N.I., was adopted by parliament on the basis of its right of legis-
lative initiative on June 30, 1952» The P.S.I., Christian Party and
Labor Party, opposed it. The government postponed action on the
matter. Action was subsequently taken by the cabinet of Mr. Ali
Sastroamidjojo, and' a government bill of similar provisions became
law on December 31, 1953·
(5)	This term is Used derisively in Gusti Majur "Fi-ntu Pemilihan Umum"
(The Threshold of Elections). Mimhar Indonesia (weekly). February 20,
1952.143
Elections were widely seen as a way out of the situation of politi-
cal instability, which had reached new heights in the period of the
October 17 crisis. It was argued that the frequent postponements of
elections had had a politically demoralizing effect.- Elections would
have a salutary effect as a filter of political parties,and with the
existence of an elected parliament an important source of political
unrest would be eliminated. The journalist Darsjaf Rahman argued that
elections would lead to the tapping of new sources of leadership and
strengthen the ties between government and people. (6) Mohammad Natsir
cautioned that ’’elections would be no magic Open Sesame” but added that
they ’’would give a real picture of political strengths and, by bringing
about greater stability, purify and strengthen democracy. (7)
In addition there was a high degree of sensitivity within the
political elite to the repeated recommendations of foreign observers
that elections should be held with maximum speed. (8) Some Indonesian
leaders accepted the overseas advice at its face value, and believed
that elections would indeed produce greater political stability. Others
accepted it as a challenge to their pride in the democratic nature of
the Republic. Thus Sajuti Melik believed that elections would produce a
worse parliament than the one then in existence, but advocated them
nevertheless, because ’’indeed we are rather embarrassed, for our ’democratic
state* has now been in existence seven and a half years, and still there
have been no elections for parliament, or a Constituent Assembly." (9)
For the Wilopo cabinet, faced with a political whirlwind and unable
to do much more than keep a tenuous balance between the many conflicting
forces struggling for dominance, the pressure for elections provided a
unique opportunity. Reduced to political impotence with regard to many
aspects of its original program, it could, by virtue of the strong pro-
elections feeling of the newspaper-reading public, act quickly in this
one field, thereby restoring some of its lost prestige. Furthermore to
work towards elections was one thing which the government could do which
was expected to fdvor the Socialists and Socialist-sympathizers, at a
(6)	' Darsjaf Rahman, "Pemilihan Umum, untuk ketenangan politik dan
Saringan partai politik" (Elections for Political Peace and as a
Filter of Political Parties), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, February 9,
1952.
(7)	Hikmah, April 11, 1953»
(8)	These recommendations did not by any means come from Western sources
only. They were made with great frequency by Indian journalists and
commentators, particularly after the Indian elections had got under
way at the end of 1951. See Phyllis Rolnick, Indian Attitudes toward
Indonesia, Fall 1950-Spring 1955, unpublished paper, Southeast Asia
Program, Cornell University, 1958? PP° 18-27, 53·
(9)	Pesat (weekly, Jogjakarta), March 8, 1953·144
time when politically effective opinion was obliging it to take a number
of steps, particularly in army personnel policy, which favored anti-
Socialist groups.
Thus on October 21 the cabinet took a formal decision to hasten the
holding of elections for the Constituent Assembly. On the 25th Foreign
Minister Mukarto stated that the elections would begin in the middle of
1953. Three days later the Ministers of Economic Affairs and the Interior,
Sumanang and Roem, ordered the printing within a month of 50 million
"voter’s,cards’*intended for purposes of registration, and on the same
day the Minister of Justice, Lukman Wiriadinata, announced a cabinet
decision for elections on a direct voting system. A number of heads of
provincial electoral offices in Java and Sumatra issued statements at the
same time concerning the preparations which had been made in their areas. (10)
The government had clearly decided to draw maximum and speedy advantage
from the new sense of urgency about elections.
But to understand the significance of the changes which the October 17
affair wrought with regard to action towards elections it is necessary to
examine the causes of the earlier delays. Technical factors,such as the
inadequacy of communications, trained personnel and government finances,
and the serious disturbances of order in parts of the country such as
West Java and South Sulawesi, are certainly part of the explanation.
But more important are political factors.
In the first place a number of individual M.P.’s owed their seats
to circumstances and anomaly and realized clearly that elections would
unseat them. Many of these were independents or members of small
parries and parliamentary fractions with little or ho mass backing.
Others who were in parties with favorable elections prospects did not
curry favor with the leadership of their parties. All of these men
expected to lose their seats, (ll)
(10)	" In Java and Sumatra more than 2000 electoral offices had been
established. See statement of Mr. Soebagio Reksodipoero, Secretary
of Central Electoral Office. Antara, May 10, 1952. These were
mainly on the sub-district level. The offices were those of the
general civil administration (namong orad.ja). and members of election
committees had access to them for masters related to elections. As
the legal basis for these offices was in a law of the year 1948,
with validity only for Java and Sumatra, election offices and com-
mittees could not be established outside these two islands.
(11)	Only 63 of the 230 persons who were members of the temporary parlia-
ment on August 1, 1954 were among the 25? elected in the elections
of September 1955- (This includes those who resigned their membership
immediately after assuming it in order to become ministers of the
second cabinet of Mr. Ali Sasuroamidjojo. It does not include those
who regained membership by government appointment—as representatives
of minority groups or members for West Irian.)145
A factor of even greater importance was the fear of a major swing
towards the specifically Islamic parties. In the existing parliament
these held less than 25$ of the seats. This arose from the fact that
the santri or persons of strongly Islamic orientation were under-repre-
sented in the leadership of the revolution. It also reflected the fact
that it was aristocratic elements, usually relatively weak in their
Islamic loyalties, which had occupied positions of greatest prominence
in the Dutch-sponsored states. Yet it was taken for granted that in
any election "based on universal suffrage Islam would "be the strongest
single election symbol. The dominant position which the Masjumi had
achieved in the regional legislative councils established in Java and
Sumatra on the basis of Government Regulation ho. 39 of 1950 confirmed
a number of the non-Moslem parties in their fears of elections. (12)
And these fears grew when the Masjumi proved itself able to secure 18
seats of the 40 in the elections in Jogjakarta—generally considered
anything but a Moslem stronghold.
Virtually all observers, Indonesian and foreign, were expecting the
Masjumi to emerge from nation-wide elections as the strongest single
party. The newly independent Rahdatul Ulama had barely begun to organize
politically, and its potential strength was almost entirely unappreciated.
Most discussion of the likely outcome of elections centered on whether
the Masjumi’s plurality would be such as to enable it to govern by itself
and on which of the factions inside the Masjumi would have ascendancy
after the elections. Among members of non-Islamic parties the fear was
widespread that elections would mean the end of the state based on the
"Pantja Sila” or Five Principles and its replacement by an "Islamic
State." Some thought this would mean merely a difference in the wording
of the Preamble to the Constitution. But others were afraid that it
would entail a major shift of power affecting the whole community, and
especially the whole civil service. (13)
Again it had been clear for a long time that any electoral system
(12)	The members of these councils were elected in each province, regency
or municipality by electoral colleges composed of the representa-
tives of all established organizations of the area.
(13)	Mr. Jusuf Wibisono of the Masjumi had stated after the last congress
of his party that "the parties which are less strongly in favor of
the early holding of parliamentary elections do not yet fully
understand the ideals of the Islamic community, and specifically
the Masjumi, in their bearing on the form of the Indonesian state."
Rieuwsgier, August 28, 1952. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, executive chair-
man of the P.S.I.I. (Islamic Association Party) had said that he
was convinced that the holding of elections would lead to "a very
big shift in the political balance,which might harm the groups now
occupying the leading position in the state." Indonesia Raya,
September 4, 1952.146
consistent with the provisions of the interim constitution would result
in weaker representation for the areas outside Java (which were in fact
considerably over-represented in the existing parliament). The economic
consequences of this could be considerable—for the tendency for Java to
benefit from the revenue earned by the exports of the richer Outer Islands
might well be accentuated. And quite apart from this economic factor,
there was the long-standing anti-Javanese feeling in the outside provinces,
which in the post-revolutionary years had tended to coalesce with anti-
Djakarta feeling, and so to grow as dissatisfaction with the fruits of
the revolution grew. Where such feeling was strong, there was every
reason to believe that the prospect of increased Javanese representation
in Parliament would not be welcomed.
Finally it was believed that a number of social groups would lose
from the local changes in power relations which would result from the
social ferment of campaigning. Fears of this sort were widespread, but
they existed particularly outside Java and Sumatra, where the imuact of
the Japanese occupation and revolution had been felt least, and
where some 300 petty principalities continued to exist. The stimulus of
elections to political party life in these principalities might well,
it was thought, be enough to cause their rulers to fall. Many of these
rulers had been given a role of importance in the Dutch-sponsored federal
states and thus they had relatively strong representation in the existing
parliament.
These factors go far to explain the slowness of parliament in moving
for elections. In the case of the successive cabinets, who share the
responsibility for delays in almost equal measure, thebe are also other
factors to be Considered, factors which bear on the whole problem of
weak government in the post-revolutionary period.
In the first place the members of every cabinet had to bear a heavy
load of administrative responsibility. With no clear lines of responsi-
bility established within the government service, many ministers were
constantly burdened with a host of day-to-day decisions such as are dele-
gated to civil service functionaries in more firmly routinized bureau-
cracies. Moreover many of these decisions were inevitably political.
For political parties had established power centers in most government
agencies, and in each of these it was necessary for administrative deci-
sions to be taken in the light of a particular political balance. Fur-
thermore each of the cabinets of the 1950-52 period had to face a succession
of immediately critical political issues. Such tasks as the holding of
elections, which were not immediately pressing, were pushed to the side
of the governmental table.
But there were other consequences too' of the complicated political
situation,within which·each of the cabinets of this period had to
maneuver. These cabinets were not only kept busy by the directly politi-
cal tasks confronting them; they were frequently hamstrung by them. All1^7
of the cabinets of the period were short-lived. Whenever a seriously
divisive issue arose and a cabinet took action upon it, it almost always
fell. Thus its successors were warned against resolute action. The
Natsir government fell on the issue of the structure of the regional
councils; and such was the heat of party antagonism aroused on this ques-
tion that successive cabinets were obliged to avoid taking any action
on tuis matter. Deadlock at this point, particularly between the Masjumi
and P.N.I., was an important cause of the long and costly inaction of
the central government in the whole matter of regional autonomy. The
Sukiman government fell on the issue of acceptance of American aid on
the terms of the Mutual Security Act. The Wilopo cabinet which followed
it was obliged, as will be seen later, to evade a number of foreign
policy issues which, if acted upon, would have split the Masjumi-P.N.I.
coalition.
The cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, were indeed incapable
of resolute action on a number of the most basic long-term problems
besetting the country. In this context it is understandable that to
bring in an election bill was thought of as playing with political
dynamite. The fall of the Natsir cabinet, on the regional councils
issue, was recalled. Any measure which bore on the future voting strengths
of the parties could well arouse divisions great enough to cost a cabinet
its life, it was believed. The issue of direct versus indirect elections
had still not been finally decided. The question of methods of registra-
tion of voters had been shown to be contentious when parliament had
debated the government’s bill on the matter. The number and size of
electorates had been the subject of newspaper controversy. Most important
of all there was considerable evidence that a number of parties, including
some government parties, were afraid of early elections. To press vigor-
ously for an elections law in circumstances like these, could easily
produce an intensity of conflict between government parties which would
give a cabinet no alternative but to resign. This was the situation
which elections, it was hoped, would change. But meanwhile the situation
existed.
Finally there was government hesitance about the wisdom of holding
elections. Party and factional conflict at the Djakarta level was bitter.
The tapering off of the Korea War boom was likely to bring a further
sharpening. Was it wise to hold elections in an atmosphere like this,
when campaigning could be expected to intensify the conflict and infuse
it into many lower layers of society, at a time when the army, many of
its cliques and groups subject to influence from different political
parties, could not be relied upon to remain outside? (14) Would elections
(l"4) The Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Major-General Simatupang wrote,
"With the approach of elections the competition between political
groups to widen their influence will be greater and sharper. The
effort to ensure that the armed forces continue to act as a single
united and disciplined organization standing outside this competi-
tion will be...more difficult." T. B. Simatupang, "17 Agustus 1952148
not lead to every sort of extremism? Would they not make the conflicts
between the democratic nationalist parties so bitter, that the outgroups
which were the would-be heirs to the existing democratic regime, the
Communists and Darul Islam, and perhaps their foreign backers, would
succeed in their efforts to be involved in these struggles? Hesitant
on grounds like these, politically weak, administratively overburdened
and faced by parliamentary hostility, governments relegated elections
to a place of low priority.
After October 17 however government action was speedy. An ad hoc
ministerial committee consisting of Mr. Eoem and Mr. Lukman, of Justice
and the Interior respectively, worked rapidly to prepare a draft elections
bill for submission to cabinet. By November 25 the bill, as approved by
cabinet, had been submitted to parliament. When parliament reassembled
two days later, for the first time since October 17, it began immediately
to discuss this bill.
In the following 18 weeks the elections bill was debated in three
readings and then clause by clause with a consideration of amendments.
The bill received wide attention and support. There were popular ex-
positions of the idea of elections and of the particular bill under
discussion in a variety of government and private magazines. At the same
time a rush of booklets by lawyers, journalists, politicians and govern-
ment servants, on the same subjects, came from the publishing houses. (15)
Parties began establishing special election committees, and emphasizing
elections as an occasion demanding heightened party loyalty.
However, for a considerable time after the October 17 affair, there
was hope in some quarters that the passing of the elections bill could
be prevented, or at least postponed. The most cursory glance at the press
of the time indicates that some sections of it were much more enthusiastic
supporters of elections than others. All sections indeed wrote supporting
editorials, but in the case of some sections, generally those'which had
been opposed to the army leadership in the debates before October 17,
there was a distinct coolness on the subject from December onwards.
These papers placed their central emphasis on "settling the October 17
dan Person!an-Persoalan Kemiliteran ki'ta."Mimbar Indonesia (weekly).
August 17, 1952.
(15) Rustan Sutan Palindih, Rakjat Berdaulat dan Pemilihan Umum (The
Sovereignty of the People and Elections), Bulan Bintang, Djakarta,
1952; Sakirman, Tentang Pemilihan Umum (Concerning Elections),
Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1952; Rachmady dan Husny Abbas, Pemilihan Umum,
Politis dan Technis (Elections, Political and Technical Aspects),
Endang, Djakarta, 1953. For an annotated list of the books and
booklets on elections published after the bill became law see Adi
Negoro, Pemilihan Hmum dan Djiwa Masjarakat di Indonesia. Bulan
Bin tang, Djakarta, 1953, pp. 4-6.149
Affair/' by which they meant punishing those who, in their opinion, had
attempted to enact a coup d’etat. "Settle the October 17 Affair" and
"All Attention to Elections" became rival slogans. By implication the
"Settle the October 17 Affair" groups made it clear that they did not
support the elections bill inasmuch as it was the result of the events
of October 17. Merdeka, for instance, wrote that "there would not be
anything fishy about the general elections, if they were not interpreted
by some critical people as having been prompted by the October 17
Affair." The same editorial outlined a number of difficulties with re-
gard to elections, the possibility of interference by persons who took
different stands on the October 17 Affair, the bad economic conditions
of the country, the lack of security in areas like West Java, and the
apathy among the mass of the rural population·. (16)
In private a number of M.P.’s of the anti-October 17 group gave it
as their opinion that the rush to get elections was a PoS.I. maneuver
to detract attention from what had happened on October 17. The same men
argued that both the elections bill and the preparations for elections
had to be given the full and detailed attention of government and parlia-
ment and were, therefore, not to be dealt with hastily. (17) Their
opponents asserted strbngly that there was obstruction of the elections
bill in parliament--and this accusation came not only from Socialist-
sympathizing newspapers and magazines but also from official and semi-
official organs of the Masjumi. (18)
One attempt to prevent the passing of the elections bill was a
series of motions which distracted attention from the elections issue.
The first of these was an amendment proposed by Djaswadi Suprapto of
the P.N.l. to a government bill on company tax. This amendment asked
that limited companies earning an annual profit of between R 100,000 and
R 500,000 should be taxed progressively at rates of between 25% and J?5%,
rather than at an overall rate as proposed by the government, of 40%.
Djaswadi moved the amendment, he said, in order to protect national
enterprises. The Minister of Finance opposed it because he estimated
that it would cost the Treasury E 200 million. Nevertheless the amendment
was passed on February 4, with the P.N.l. and P.S.I.I. voting with the
Communists, Murba, Progressive Fraction, P.I.E., P.fi.N. and Nahdatul
Ulama. Only the Masjumi, the P.S.I. and the two Christian parties
supported the government. It had been thought that the ‘Finance Minister
might resign if the amendment was passed, but he merely stated that
(16)	Quoted in~weekly press review of Times of Indonesia (Djakarta),
February 18, 1953.	. ,
(17)	Cf. Mimbar Indonesia (daily), November 55 1952, Sunday Courier
(Communist-sympathizing weekly), December 24, 1952.
(18)	Suara Masjumi (The Voice of the Masjumi), monthly, Djakarta, Jan.-
Feb. 1953°, Hikmah, weekly, Djakarta, April 11, 1953 s Abadi, January-
April passim.150
cabinet had yet to come to a decision on the matter, as in every case of
amendment of a government hill.
A second motion, introduced on February 9 "by Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri
(Progressive), asked for the establishment of a separate Ministry for the
Navy and Air Force» Its other signatories included menbers of the Murba
and Labor parties and the independent Mrs. Rasuna Said» Here clearly
was an attempt to bring the issues of October 1? back into the center of
the political arena» But the Consultative Committee of Parliament decided
that discussion of this motion should be postponed»
The third and most important of the motions was introduced a day
later,on February 10» This was the motion of Otto Eondonuwu, of the Pro-
gressive Fraction, signed also by representatives of P.E.n». the nabor
Party, Ρ.Ι.Ε» and Murba, for the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the U»SoS»H» by the end of the current year. As a corollary of the
independent foreign policy in almost any of its many interpretations
this had general appeal. It was dangerous to the cabinet because of the
two main parties’ commitment to opposite points of view on it» On the
one hand the Eondonuwu motion paralleled a demand in the P.N.I.’s urgency
program. Furthermore the Ρ.Ν.Ι. Foreign Minister, Mukarto Notowidigdo,
was personally commi’ueo to cue eariy establishment of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Ηηίυη» u9) On the other hand the Masjumi, as now became
widely known, had insisted on inaction in this matter as the price of
its participation in the Wilopo cabinet, when this cabinet was being
formed» (20) For some time it appeared as if this motion would drive the
elections bill off the political stage, and even that it would cause the
cabinet’s fall, which was much discussed at this time. But it was eventu-
ally decided by the Consultative Committee of Parliament that further
discussion of the Eondonuwu motion would be postponed until after the
elections bill had become law»
Each of these three motions had important intrinsic aims. But there
can be little doubt, in view of their timing, their political contentious-
ness and their common basis of support—in the minor nationalist parties,
"oppositionists," Ρ.Ν.Ι» and P.K.I^that considerable sections of their
supporters were motivated by a desire to sidetrack the elections bill and
were not averse to causing the cabinet’s fall by their actions.
These efforts to delay passage of the bill reached a climax in early
March, as parliament began the clause by clause stage of its discussion
of the bill» No less than 200 amendments were tabled at this stage, and
(19)	Before leaving New York to take up his cabinet post Mukarto had
stated that the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow
could not be postponed any longer. Antara, April 2^, 1952°
(20)	See Mimbar Indonesia (daily), quoted in Times of Indonesia, February
18, 1953°151
the debate proceeded very slowly, with a great deal of time being
devoted to minor clauses» At the same time however press opposition to
delaying tactics reached a peak of intensity» The Medan daily Waspada
wrote, "What seems like a majority of the honorable members are now acting
as if they were intentionally sabotaging the bill so that their seats
in parliament can be safe still longer." (21) Isa Anshary bluntly
accused the P.H.I. of being afraid of elections. Mohammad Natsir was
indignant at a Communist-sponsored amendment for a census to precede the
holding of elections» If passed, he said, this amendment would lead
to a delay in elections of from one to two years. (22)
At this point the would-be delayers conceded defeat. On March 12
the Consultative Committee of parliament took the important decision to
postpone parliamentary discussion of the Eondonuwu motion and all other
matters until after the elections bill had become law. Several days
later the chairman of parliament, Mr. Sartono of the Ρ.Ν.Ι», initiated
a new procedure in debate. Thenceforth all amendments to the elections
bill were first discussed in committee, between their signatories, the
two government ministers, Roem and Lukman, and the chairman and vice-
chairmen of parliament. The result was unprecedented legislative team-
work which led to the passing of the amended bill on April 1.
Ironically it was in the last two weeks of the debate, when amend-
ments were being discussed rapidly and systematically, that the parties
and the various sections of the press were most concerned to accuse one
another of attempting to produce delay. Almost all groups joined in the
accusations at this stage. Quaintest of all was the one from Merdeka.
This paper, hitherto a leader of opposition both to the Wilopo cabinet
and to early elections, praised the P.N.I. and P.K.I. for doing their
best to prevent "a certain group" (Merdeka*s term for the P.S.I.) from
delaying elections and causing a cabinet crisis—only to add that it was
already too late to prevent the fall of the cabinet. (23) Quj recuse
s’excuse.
The evidence is considerable that a number of parties which were
afraid of early elections, worked for a large part of the time when the
elections bill was being debated, for the postponement of its passage.
However, at a certain point which came in early March, when it was clear
that strong public support existed for early elections, and that further
delaying or sidetracking tactics would be dangerous to the prestige of
parliament, these groups evidently decided to abandon these, and immedi-
ately took a strongly positive stand in favor of the early passage of
the bill. One may assume that they hoped to exert influence in other
(21)	tfaepadaT^Murch 12, 1953«
(22)	Keng Po, March 13, 1953»
(23)	Merdeka, March 16, 1953»152
ways against the holding of early elections. One such way was to create
difficulties for the execution of the numerous governmental measures
necessary to implement the law. Another was to attempt to unseat the
Wilopo cabinet.
But before going on to discuss the situation which existed when the
elections bill had become law, we should look back at the course of the
bill in parliament. (24) Indirectly this provides an important source
of information on the politics of the elections issue. As submitted to
parliament on November 25, the bill was for universal suffrage elections
for both a Constituent Assembly (elected,, according to the interim con-
stitution on the basis of one member for every 150,000 residents,, with
appointees to represent Indonesian citizens of the Chinese,, European and
Arab minority groups) and a Parliament (elected similarly, but on the
basis of one member for 300,000 residents, with similar provision for
appointees). Literates would be able to vote either for the list of a
party or organization or for one candidate within such a list5 illiterates
only for a list as such, by choosing a symbol marked on the ballot paper.
The basis of the government’s bil] was proportional representation.
This was never publicly challenged. (23; But there was considerable con-
troversy as to the number of electoral districts for which separate lists
were to be constructed. The government bill, itself a result of a long
series of compromises, posited 15 electoral districts, three in Java and
twelve outside. The number of representatives for each electoral district
(24)	See Rant.jangan Undang-undang Pemilihan Anggauta Konstituante dan
Dewan Perwakilan Rakiat (Draft Bill for the Election of Membersof
the Constituent Assembly and Parliament), Kementerian Penerangan,
November 21, 1952. The law which finally emerged was published
as a booklet of the Ministry of Information, For the Election of
Members of the Constituent Assembly and of the House of Representa-
tives, 1953. For discussions of the "law "see Boyd R. Compton," "The
Indonesian Election Law," Far Eastern Survey, April-May 1954, and
Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, pp. 1-5» Deeply
influenced by Dutch constitutional and electoral practice, the bill
also incorporated features which had been observed by the teams of
electoral officers sent to Australia and India. More particularly
it reflected the lessons learned in the trial elections held in
Indonesia, particularly the elections in Minahasa and Jogjakarta.
(25)	In personal conversation the writer found several Indonesian leaders
to believe a single member constituency system to be preferable.
But these men also thought that it would be impossible for such a
system to gain the approval of the existing parliament, dominated
as it was by small parties which stood to gain from proportional
representation.153
would be determined on a population basis» The undistributed votes of
the various parties and organizations in each electoral district would be
centrally pooled in a second state of allocation of seats» In this sys-
tem the fact of a multiplicity of districts favored the relatively
sparsely populated areas outside Java,, and particularly areas where the
rate of voting participation could be expected to be low» whereas the
pooling arrangements5 which ensured that virtually no votes would be
"lost3” promised to work to the advantage of the large population districts
in Java»
Challenges to this system came from several sides» A Catholic
Party amendment for one all-Indonesian electoral district., apparently
favoring medium-sized parties with support distributed in many parts of
the countryP drew support from the P»K»I»9 Murba, Progressive Fraction
and PoS»IoIo3 but was defeated 92^29» An amendment of the Socialist
Party for 33 districts, delineated according to ethniolinguistic cri-
teria, and apparently favoring parties with strength in East Indonesia,
drew support from the Democratic Fraction, but was also defeated, as was
one from P»I»E» for 24 districts, which the two Christian parties and
the Democratic Fraction supported» The only amendment which secured a
majority was the one of the Labor Party, supported by the Masjumi and
Ρ0Ν0Ι0, which increased the number of electoral districts by one, by the
separation of Greater Djakarta from West Java» This favored parties
strong in West Java and worked against those with more than proportionate
support in Djakarta»
A surprise amendment came from the Ρ»Ν»Ι» member I» Α» Moesis» This
asked that the number of seats per electoral district be determined not
strictly according to population but according to the number of regencies
(kabupaten) in each» It was defeated, despite support from the P»I»R»9
P»S»Io, the Labor Party and the Progressive and Democratic Fractions»
If passed, this motion, which the government spokesmen declared unconsti-
tutional, would have radically changed the balance of representation in
favor of the areas outside Java» The outer islands would have received
250 seats as compared with 263 for Java, whereas on a population basis
the ratio would have been approximately 1?5 to 338» (26)
Another proposal favoring the areas outside Java, that of Sahetappy
Engel of the Democratic Fraction, asked that each electorate be assured
a minimum of 10 seats In the Constituent Assembly and 5 in the new
Parliament» It was supported by the P»N»I» and P»S»I»9 but was
(2^) Ιη'Έΐϊϊ-writer’s view it is conceivable that the P»N»I» should
have expected less electoral success in Java than outside» P»N»IO
sponsorship of this amendment could be explained on the supposition
that the parliamentary party knew that the amendment would be de-
feated in parliament, or not accepted by the government as being in
conflict with the constitution»15h
also defeated. However a modification of this amendment, with the minimum
figures as six and three, was accepted by the government.
Just as important was the franchise issue. The government bill pro-
posed universal franchise of everyone over 18. It is a reflection of
the extent to which liberalism has influenced the thinking of this pre-
dominantly Moslem country that the female franchise was not at any stage
publicly questioned. Nor was the idea of a direct election challenged—
although there had been strong support for indirect elections earlier. (27)
On the other hand, amendments were proposed for the further extension of
the franchise. A Communist amendment for the lowering of the minimum age
to 16 was defeated by 93 votes to 28. On the other hand a Masjumi amend-
ment for the suffrage to include also persons under 18 who are or have
been married, was carried by 58 votes to 5^°
The government maintained that the bill under discussion should be
for the election of a Constituent Assembly and a Parliament either to-
gether or within a very short time of one another. It defeated a P.I.R.-
Murba amendment for the holding of only Constituent Assembly elections.
According to the interim constitution this would have involved the
Constituent Assembly carrying out the functions of parliament, with most
legislative work done by a Working Parliament of about 5θ elected from
its membership. This amendment does not appear to have been rooted in
any calculated concern for party advantage. (28)
The parties' tactical interests were more easily detected when the
(2?) This is suggested by the fact that both the Natsir and Sukiman
cabinets favored the indirect system. However public statements
favoring the indirect system were very few, particularly after the
parliamentary report of August 1, 1951, favoring the direct system.
The shared ideology of the newspaper-reading public demanded of
parties that they should profess their faith in the people by
affirming the direct elections principle. That the Masjumi was the
strongest advocate of the indirect system is suggested by a statement
of support for this system made by the party's Secretary-General
K. H. Taufiqurrahman as late as October 23, 1952. But Mr. Roem,
the Masjumi Minister for the Interior, was one of the main architects
of the government bill providing for direct elections, and no
Masjumi parliamentarian opposed the direct voting principle in the
course of the parliamentary debate on the bill.
(28) It is clear to the writer from his discussions with parliamentary
leaders at the time that in the case of many of the amendments the
parties did not carefully consider the implications of particular
technical provisions in the light of their own interests. Under
these circumstances the influence of a party leader's favorite con-
stitutional theory could be important,as could persuasion by members
of a cooperating party.155
debate turned to procedures of registration, candidacy and voting, and
to the division of electoral authority between various ministries and
various layers of the administration. While the original bill had placed
final responsibility for registration of voters at the regency level, an
amendment of the Masjumi and smaller government parties, which the govern
ment subsequently accepted, placed it lower, at the level of the sub-
district. A P.N.I. amendment to place the final onus of registration on
the registration committee rather than the voter, was rejected. Appar-
ently the P.N.I. expected support particularly from government officials,
and more support at the higher levels of the administration than at the
lower.
The government proposal that illiterates should vote for a party
or other list by its symbol, and that literates should have a choice
between this method and that of writing the name of either a party or
one individual candidate on the ballot paper, was upheld. A Catholic
Party amendment for a system of registration receipts to be produced on
election day,as in the Jogjakarta election, was rejected.
A P.N.I.-Progressive motion to have all electoral bodies placed
directly under the Prime Minister, was defeated by 79 votes to 56, and a
subsequent motion of the independent Zainul Baharuddin with support from
the P.N.I., the Progressive Fraction, P.S.I.I., and Murba, to have all
bodies under the Minister for the Interior was rejected by 71 to 50.
Finally a Masjumi amendment for the reconstitution of the electoral
committees which had been established in Java and Sumatra under the 1948
law was carried by 56 votes to 50· (29)
Throughout the debate on the bill government parties frequently
voted with the opposition. This and the fact that so many amendments
were proferred led to the fear that the final product of the debate
would be a hotch-potch. (30) But this can hardly be said to have been
the case. The elections act as proclaimed on April 4 bears marks of
ultra-democratic imagination, which promised to be both expensive and
burdensome to efficient administration of elections, in a country which
had never before had them on a national scale. But it constitutes a
workable system. With the bill passed the government was in a position
to take a number of thereto legally impossible steps towards elections.
Political factors apart, there was no reason why nation-wide balloting
could not be held within a year. (31)
(29)	Concern had been expressed, because the existing Central Electoral
Office was headed by a member of the P.N.I.	executive, Mr.
Soebagio Beksodipoero.	'
(30)	See for instance Pedoman, March 14, 1953·
(31)	The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Roem, stated in early March that
elections would take place no later than 10 months after the final
passage of the bill. Aneta, March 27, 1953·156
However political handicaps were to he faced even in the two months
following the passage of the hill. Cabinet moved fairly rapidly to the
task of appointing a Central Electoral Committee. According to its con-
ception, this Committee was to consist of one representative of each of
the government parties. The independent M.P. Mr. Assaat was to he chair-
man and the Masjumi’s parliamentary leader Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap deputy-
chairman. The composition of the committee was decided upon at the
cabinet*s meeting on April 28. But no P.N.I. member was named. Nor was
the decision publicized. P.N.I. opposition to the cabinet’s approach in
the matter meant that no Committee had been formally established when the
Wilopo cabinet resigned on June 2.
The great importance of the elections question for the political
parties is clear. Which parties then were the ones in favor of the post-
ponement of elections? And how did the issue between postponers and
hasteners affect the general pattern of political alignments?
Of central importance in this regard was the P.N.I. It was the
P.N.I.’s support of delaying and sidetracking endeavors, most of which
were actually sponsored by members of minor nationalist parties or
’’oppositionist” groups, which gave these endeavors their importance. On
any of the many estimates then made, the P.N.I. would lose much of its
power from elections, unless it had somehow succeeded in strengthening
its position greatly by the time they were held. Of significance in
P.N.I. thinking in this connection was the fact, much discussed at the
party’s congress in December 1952, that it had next to no electioneering
funds. It was impossible for any major party to take a stand against
elections as such. For by March 1953, when strong public pressure for
elections had been sustained for five months, the majority of political
leaders felt that—unless there were unforeseen developments such as a
breakdown of the democratic nationalist structure—elections would have
to be held. But it was possible for the P.N.I. to work for a postponement
of elections. And it was possible to work for a situation in which the
P.N.I. as a party would gain greater advantages from occupancy of govern-
ment power than was the case under Wilopo. It is this double course
to which the P.N.I., or rather its two strongest groups, of Sidik
Djojosukarto and Mr. Sartono, became committed. In the top counsels of
the party it was only the relatively small group of Mr. Wilopo and his
associates who advocated early elections. These men argued that the
political stability which elections promised to brings would lessen the
prospects of extreme groups like the Communists and the Darul Islam.
But the interests of the party overrode them.
Much of the initiative for the sidetracking ventures came from the
minor nationalist parties, Parindra, the Labor Party, P.I.R., P.R.N.,
S.K.I. and the Democratic Fraction, and from the national-communist
Partai Murba and its sympathizers. Oppositionist attitudes were strong
among these parties, particularly those of them not represented in the157
cabinet» All of them except Murba were substantially without a basis
of grassroots support, and all were afraid of an increase in the power
of Islam in government»
The Moslem League parties, P»S»I»I» and Nahdatul Ulama, were associ-
ated with the P»N»I« in some of the activities which appear to have
been motivated by the fear of early elections, although they were ex-
pected to increase their parliamentary representation in elections, and
although they sought to create some, sort of an Islamic State» One
possible explanation of this is in terms of the bitterness of rivalry
between these parties and the Masjumi» In addition it is probable that
these parties wanted to use to the full the situation then existing,
where their usefulness to the P»N»I» and associated parties gave them
considerable bargaining power»
The Communist Party’s attitude towards elections is to be understood
in a similar way» On most estimates the P»K»I» was expected to attain
either second or third position in an election» Furthermore its leaders,
carefully noting the experience of their fellow-Communists in the Indian
elections, foresaw the great advantages which the electioneering situa-
tion would give them in their task of creating class consciousness and
stimulating popular demands for economic betterment» (32) But the
P»K»I»ps overriding concern was for the continuance of its alliance with
the Ρ0Ν0Ι0 It was the P»N»I» which was the chief guarantor of the
Communists’ freedom of movement, a freedom which had gained them very
great successes in the Wilopo period, but which was endangered by that
very fact» According to the PoK»I» itself the number of its members and
candidate members had risen from 7910 in March 1952 bo more than 100,000
in February 1953» (33) This prompted a much publicized appeal by Dr»
Sukiman in March that Indonesia should, like India, adopt a firmly anti-
communist policy in internal affairs» To guard against 'this possibility
the Ρ0Κ0Ι0 stood greatly in need of backing from the P»K»Io Communist
policy was therefore oriented to supporting the P»N»Io in its efforts
to have elections postponed»
The party which had advocated elections most consistently throughout
the post-revolutionary period was the PoSoI» This in itself requires
explanation when it is considered that the Socialists were likely neither
to increase their representation in elections nor to benefit from a
further association of Islamic religion with government» Socialist
(32)	See Sakirman, Tentang Pemillhan Umum (Concerning Elections),
Pembaruan, Djakarta, 19529 pp° it23»
(33)	Μ» Η» Lukman, "Kewaspadaan dalam Peluasan Keanggautaan Partai"
(Vigilance .in the Expansion of Party Membership), Bintang Merah,
Vol» IX, ho» 2, February 1953s Ρ» 535 ϋ» Aidit, "Djalan ke
Demokrasi Bakjat bagi Indonesia" (The fioad to People’s Democracy
for Indonesia), Bintang Merah, Vol» IX, No» 9-10, September-October
1953, P. ^01o158
leaders explained their stand in terms of their concern for political
stability. They saw political stabilization as a first prerequisite for
economic development and believed it to be in their own interest in that
their party cnuld not operate effectively in a political situation
dominated by irrationality,. Some of the party’s leaders argued further
that for stability it was necessary that Islam be given greater political
power. The alternative„ they said, was to encourage the Masjumi to turn
towards Darul Islam»
Moreover the P»S»I» expected to be able to benefit directly from a
Masjumi electoral victory» Sjahrir told a Manchester Guardian correspond
ent that he was confident that "places would be found for Socialists in
the government if the Masjumi Party won the election»" (34) He added
that his party did not "take too seriously Masjumi talk about making
Indonesia an Islamic State»"
The two Christian parties took a similar position of positive sup-
port for the elections program of the cabinet, although they had not
frequently appealed for elections in the previous period. Their basis
of potential voting strength was, if not large, at least reliable. On
the other hand they were exceedingly apprehensive of the possibility of
an Islamic State, This latter factor produced pressures, particularly
in the Protestant Parkindo, for an abandonment of support for the
Masjumi-Socialist policies of which the energetic pursuit of elections
was a central component. But both parties remained committed to these
policies»
The Masjumi itself did not have the P»S»I»’s record of demands for
early elections. This may be in part because the party was loath to
appear critical of the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets, both headed by
Masjumi members. It may also be that pressure against elections was
exerted by rural propertied groups within the party, who feared the
stimulus which electioneering could give to social ferment. But in any
event the Masjumi's leaders were prominent advocates of early elections
in the period of the tfilopo cabinet. The pronouncements of Masjumi
leaders made after October 1? were particularly strong on this point,
those, of Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, of the Sukiman group, no less so that those
of Mohammad Natsir. On February 24, 1953;) the party’s Madjlis Sjuro
(Religious High Council) issued an edict which stated that the holding
of elections was an obligation under religious law. Preparations were
being made at the same time for the Muktamar Alim-Ulama dan Muballigh
(34) March 16, 1953» P°S»I» leaders were inclined to believe that the
effect of elections would be to strengthen the position of the
Natsir group in the Masjumi» P»N»I» men and persons from the
Christian parties on the other hand tended to believe that elections
would result in a strengthening of the reactionary and fundamental-'
ist Islam associated with the name of Isa Anshary»159
Islam se-Indonesia (All-Indonesian Conference of Religious Scholars and
Missionaries) to he held in April, which was to issue further edicts on
elections and on the future Islamic constitution, In the last stages of
the parliamentary debate the Masjumi parliamentary fraction took steps
to counteract the efforts to achieve delay» It first agreed to withdraw
all hut the most important of its amendments to the government bill,
then proposed that the parliamentary recess he postponed until the hill
had become law»
Thus the elections debates, coming upon and coalescing with the
October 17 issue;, further emphasized the tendency for political polariza-
tion described earlier. If fear of elections had been a factor urging
the P.N.I, and the minor nationalist and "oppositionist" groups to co-
operate with the Communists in the middle of 1952, it was all the more
important a factor after October 17, when the possibility of the early
holding of elections had.become much greater. Similarly the P»S»I»9
increasingly thrown upon the Masjumi by the failure of the October 17
Affair, was able to draw closer to this party on the basis of a common
stand on the issue of elections» The Wilopo group grew weaker inside the
P.N.I. because its leader’s policy for early elections was dangerous to
the interests of the party» Contemplating the possibility of early
elections, the Masjumi and Ρ,Ν.Ι» were each forced to concentrate on
closing its ranks and pursuing its interests as a party. Thus the two
main parties grew increasingly hostile to one another.
The importance of the elections factor in driving a wedge between
the P.N.I, and the Masjumi was all the greater for the fact that the
elections which were planned were for a Constituent Assembly as well as
a parliament. . Inevitably therefore there arose the, question of the role
which Islam would be accorded in the new constitution. This came to the
political foreground, both while the election bill was under discussion
and soon thereafter, in the form of a debate between the supporters of
the existing Pantja Sila or Five Principles of State and the advocates
of a "state based on Islam,"
This new phase of political controversy was sparked by a speech of
President Soekarno at Amuntai in strongly Moslem South Kalimantan, on
January 27» Commenting on a banner which asked "Iidonesia a National
State or an Islamic State?", President Soekarno is reported to have said,
"The state we want is a national state consisting of all Indonesia. If
we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not
Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands and
Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of
the territory of Indonesia will not want to be part of the Republic." (35)
("35) Antara, 'January 29, 1953»ΐ6θ
This speech was the cause of strong protest» The Masjumi leader
Kiai Isa Anshary was the first to register objections. In a note to the
government he declared the President’s utterance to he undemocratic, un-
constitutional and in conflict with the ideology of Islam which is pro-
fessed by the great majority of Indonesian citizens. (36) After him the
Nahdatul Ulama, the Masjumi’s youth organization G.P.I.I., the Front
Muballigh Islam (Moslem Missionaries* Front) of Worth Sumatra, the Central
Sumatra centered Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah, Islamic Educational
Association) and a number of other Moslem organizations registered their
disapproval.
The G.P.I.I. stated that the President had exceeded his constitutional
limitations, that his speech had sown seeds of separatism, and that it
represented a taking of sides by the head of state with groups opposed
to the ideology of Islam. The Nahdatul Ulama, in a similar declaration,
expressed strong opposition to the idea that an Islamic government
should be thought incapable of preserving national unity. The Front
Muballigh Islam presented the view that although the Pantja Sila was not
in conflict with Islam, it also did not fulfill all the requirements of
the Islamic teachings.
A number of P.N.I. leaders came to President Soekarno’s defense.
Some argued for the special prerogatives of President Soekarno as a man
who was a revolutionary leader and inspirer of his people as well as a
constitutional head of state. Others referred to the long-standing
divisions between Islamic scholars in Indonesia in the matter of nation-
alism and the role of the national state. (37) Pointing to the strongly
articulated fears of Indonesian Christians of what their lot would be in
an Islamic State, they spoke of the danger to democracy of oppression
by a majority. At the level of polemic they singled out Isa Anshary and
attacked him as a fanatic and unscrupulous agitator. The radical P.N.I.
leader Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro referred to Anshary as a "new friend of the
Darul Islam" (38) and this charge was echoed by the Communist Party,
which was then engaged in a campaign to link the Masjumi in the public
mind with the Darul Islam. Thereupon Isa Anshary, in a repeated call
for a withdrawal of the President’s Amuntai speech, said that this had
helped the Darul Islam, by shutting the door for the Islamic community
which was pursuing its ends through parliamentary channels.
This bitter controversy was a source of considerable embarrassment
to the intellectual leaders of the Masjumi. These men saw Anshary’s
directness and his appeal to mass radicalism as a danger both to their
(36)	Aneta, February 2, 1953-
(37)	For instance Sajuti Melik, Negara Nasional ataukah Negara Islam,
Kedaulatan Eakjat, Jogjakarta, February 15» 1953» P· 37.
(38)	Sin Po, March 11, 1953·1ό1
own position in the party and. to the party’s relationships with other
political organizations» Thus both Mohammad Natsir and Dr» Sukiman made
statements which attempted to minimize the importance of the issues
which had been raised. They argued that the disagreement was the result
of a confusion of terms, and that the matter was an internal one of the
Moslem community and not to be discussed in exaggerated terms outside
it. (39)
But the controversy raged on. It reached a second stage shortly
after the elections bill had become law. At a sports ground rally in
Djakarta on the occasion of Mi’radj, the Prophet Mohammad’s Ascension
to Heaven, April 12, a number of leaders of Moslem political parties
made challenging speeches centering on the hope of an Islamic electoral
victory. The last and longest of the addresses,which was also the most
uncompromising,was by Isa Anshary. Anshary came directly to the issues
which the President’s Amuntai speech had brought to the fore. "In Indo-
nesia at the present time," he said, "there is a cold war between Islam
on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic and
aren’t. The central question is whether the state is to be based on
God's laws or not." Let there be a demarcation line, Anshary said,
between the Islamic and the non-Islamic groups, let us be rid of those who
are half end half. The Koran was totalitarian, he went on to say. The
Islamic State, as established by Mohammad himself, ensured generous
protection of the religious rights of Christians and Jews, but it gave
no protection to hypocrite Moslems. An oblique reference made it clear
that the speaker included the President among the latter. The heavy
applause given to this speech of Isa Anshary stood in strong contrast to
the cool and expressly unenthusiastic reception which President Soekarno
received when he spoke at a large Mi’radj meeting held at the presidential
palace on the same evening. (^0)
But this impressive show of strength by Isa Anshary produced a wave
of reactions. At a mass meeting of the P.N.I. in Bandung on April 19
four leaders of this party made election speeches. Isnaeni urged his
listeners not to elect "double-dealers in religion." Gatot Mangkupradja
challenged the voters to "choose between Isa Anshary and Bung Karno."
Anshary hit back by accusing Gatot of "political chicanery using the
name of the head of state." But, it was the Masjumi leader who came in
for most criticism when the press expressed its fears of the consequences
of immoderate electioneering. Although the attitude of the Masjumi as a
party was never expressed in this context and was presumably considerably
different from the attitude of Isa Anshary, there is no doubt that this
leader’s radicalism heightened the fears of the P.N.Io—and of President
Soekarno—-of Masjumi strength.
r^T^eTAntara, March 6, and Aneta. March 21 for Natsir’s views and
Antara. March 5 for Sukiman’s.
(4o) These remarks on the atmosphere at the two meetings are based on
the author's personal observations.102
In April there was widespread apprehensiveness at the prospect of
an election campaign In which all the contending parties would resort to
unrestrained agitation0 Observers noted that President Soekarno had
found vehement support for his views on Islam in the state when he had
traveled in Christian areas like Tapanuli and equally vehement opposition
to them when he had spoken in such strongly Moslem areas as Atjeh» Some
wrote of the possibility of civil war breaking out if the parties were
too extreme in their campaigningo (4l) Large numbers of editorials
echoed the words of the chairman of parliament» Mr» Sartono9 that parties
should not forget the limits of good manners in theirpronouncements about
one another» (42)
In the same month of April there was an All-Indonesian Conference
of Religious Scholars (Ulamp) and Missionaries (Muballigh) held in Medan»
This was a case unprecedented in recent times of the meeting of a large
number of religious leaders of the Moslem community to confer and speak
out on primarily political problems» The conference came to be held
partly because elections were expected in the near future$ and partly
also because of the stimulus which the community of the orthodox had
received as a result of the speech of the President at Amuntai» The
organizers were supporters of the Masjumi» After five days of delibera-
tion the 217-man conference issued a fatwa (decree representing a consensus
of religious authority) and several keputusan (decisions)» The fatwa
instructed all Moslems to cast a vote in the forthcoming elections and to
give it to "candidates committed to the implementation of the teachings
and laws of Islam in the state»" In one of the keputusan the conference
set down a statement of what were the essentials of an Islamic constitu-
tion» This was true to Islamic fundamentals in providing that "the basis
of law of the State shall be the Koran and Hadith" and that "the Head of
State shall be an Indonesian citizen of Moslem faith»" At the same time
it was modern in its clauses on parliamentary government;, on basic human
rightsj on equal rights for women and on government regulation (guidance)
of the economy» (43)
Here then was a statement of the highest common factor of agreement
within the religious community on the controversial question of the
"Islamic state" or "state based on Islam»" This was a significant
T4l) E»g» Mohammad Ibnoe Sajoeti (Sajuti Melik)s Demokrasi Pantja Sila
dan Perdjoangan Ideologis Didilamnja» Pesat9 Jogja9 Djakarta,, 1953?
p» 31 and passim»
(42)	See for instance Berita Indonesia» April 23§ Harlan Rakjat» April 23?
Pemandangan» Apri.124? Mimbar Indonesia (daily)94pril 25»
(43)	See Dasar-dasar Perd.joangan Partai Polltlk Islam Indonesia Masjumi»
Islamyah9 Medan s 1954 9 ρρ».105^107»" ""	..163
political achievement» The conference itself was an organizational
achievement of major proportions--despite the fact that the members did
not agree to the proposal for a continuing organization to represent
religious opinion»
In the months of March and April there was considerable Darul Islam
activity, raids by armed gangs particularly in West Java» At the same
time a trial was proceeding in Bandung of Affandi Eidhwan, a leader of
the Masjumi youth organization G»PoI»I»? charged with associations with
the Darul Islam rebels under Kartosuwirjo» A GoP.I.I» colleague Achmad
Buchari was awaiting trial in Djakarta on a similar charge» Both were
soon to be found guilty. The successful mass oratory of Isa Anshary and
the organizational achievement of the Medan Ulama conference were there-
fore seen by secular nationalists in the context of their fear of the
theocratic professions and terroristic practice of the Darul Islam,
Non-Moslems and members of not specifically Moslem political groups
believed they were facing a new confidence among the orthodox Moslems,
and particularly the extremists among them» As a result they grew
more and more afraid not only of a transformation of the Pantja Sila
State into an Islamic State such as might result from elections, but
also of an election campaign in which Islamic mass fanaticism could
readily be aroused»
Subsequent events proved these fears to have been greatly exaggerated
But they were nonetheless real at the time. And they were an important
factor in strengthening the association of the P,N.I« with all anti-
Masjumi organizations, especially the Communist Party.165
CHAPTER VII
THE FALL OF THE CABINET
In the three of four months before it fell on June 2 the Wilopo
cabinet faced crisis after crisis. Such wag the strength of opposition
to it, and so strong the antagonism between its two major parties,
Masjumi and P.N.I., that it all but fell on several occasions. In this
period it found it particularly difficult to get on with its task of
making political decisions. It could enact only governmental business
of the most routine nature. More than at any previous time in its
existence it could survive in office only by evading the contentious
issues placed before it. The deadlock between the major parties which
finally resulted in its fall, may be interpreted as the sign of a new
alignment of political forces—P.N.I., minor nationalist parties, Moslem
League parties and Communists against Masjumi, Socialists and Christians-
to which expression was given later in the formation of the cabinet of
Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo.
But to understand this development it is important that we should
look at it in the light of the economic and social situation existing in
the period. The country’s economic position in the first five months
of 1953 showed .a significant improvement in comparison with 1952. Import
were cut radically—they amounted to 22% less than in the first five
months of 1952—and this created a favorable balance of trade, (l) This
was achieved despite the fact that the total value of exports for the
first half of the year was only US $63-9 million, $11.9 million less
than in the previous six months. (2)
In addition foodstuffs production had grown considerably and there
had been a significant increase in the output of textiles. (3) The
economic position of rural and lower class Indonesians had improved to
a small but important extent. On the other hand the import cuts created
inflationary pressures in the cities. Furthermore, many of the effects
of the large budget deficit of 1952 came to be felt at this period.
Thus there was a marked rise in urban retail prices between January and
March. But the price index fell again as from April as a result of a
regulation raising importers’ pre-payment requirements, for this forced
(1)	For this and many other pieces of information in this section I am
indebted to Mr. Hans 0, Schmitt.
(2)	Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1953. ΡΡ» 10, 7^-5·
(3)	Ibid., pp. 72, 78.166
importers to dump stocks to recover liquidity» A fairly satisfactory
degree of price stability was thus maintained in the first half of 1953—
at the expense mainly of the importers» (4)
In the country’s internal security there was some improvement, hut
not much. The picture in West Java gave cause for hope» There the Wilopo
cabinet was applying a policy of increasing toughness against the Darul
Islam and other bands» The result was an actual increase in the scale of
bandit activity in the last three quarters of 1952, but an improvement in
the first half of 1953» In the first five months of 1953 there were no
major outbreaks of terrorism and the rebels appeared to have been reduced
to operating in small bands» In May it was possible to announce a com-
plete lifting of the curfew in Djakarta»
On the other hand the situation remained as serious as before in
South Sulawesi» There the Kahar Muzakar group, which now described
itself as part of the "Islamic State of Indonesia"(of the West Java
Darul Islam leader Kartosuwirjo)became further entrenched in its power.
By the middle of 1953 important areas of both the South-East and South-
West legs of the island were in the group’s hands. Following the seizure
of military power in Makassar by Lieut» Col. Warouw there were a number
of eruptions of regionalist and religious discord inside the Sulawesi
units of the army, and one result of these was a decline in the pace of
government action against Kahar Muzakar. The Prime Minister was forced
to state that "restoration and maintenance of security will take a long
time." (5)
Two indices of social stability and political health in post-
revolutionary Indonesia are the level of regionalist feeling and the
intensity of anti-foreign sentiment. The period of the Wilopo cabinet
saw a definite increase in regionalist feeling. Already in July 1952
the Djakarta press had reported the wide circulation of a letter which
(4)	Information from Mr. Hans 0. Schmitt»
(5)	Antara, April 1, 1953» For government statistics on the casualties
and damages inflicted by the Darul Islam in West Java in 1953 and 195^
see Nasution, op. cit», p. 92»16?
sought support for the establishment of a "state of Sumatra.” (6) At
the same time there had been reports of gang violence between Javanese
and Sulawesi students studyingat the Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta. (7)
Such signs became more frequent in the first months of 1957. Thus
the reburial in April 1953 of the Toba Batak king, King Sisingamangaradja
XII, killed by the Dutch in 1907, was made the occasion for challenging
calls for Batak and Tapanuli solidarity. Among the Minangkabau of West
Sumatra regionalist and anti-Djakarta feeling was stirred at the same
time in protest against the splitting up and disarming of several com-
panies of the Minangkabau-manned "Pagarrujung Batallion," which had been
stationed in West Java. Regionalist feeling among the Sundanese of
West Java had prompted the establishment in March of the federalist
Pagujuban Baja Sunda (Sundanese Cultural Association) and similar senti-
ment in Sulawesi led to the launching of the Gerakan Pemuda Federal
Republik Indonesia (Federalist Youth Movement of the Republic of Indonesia)
in Makassar in May. (8)
In all these areas resentment was felt at the lack of effective
regional and local autonomy. In numerous parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi
political leaders voiced their acute disappointment at the smallness
of budget allocations given to their area, in comparison with the
particular area's contribution to export earnings. And on top of these
anti-Djakarta protests came ones directed against the ethnic Javanese,
against the appointment of Javanese as high officials outside their
own region and against what were described as efforts to Javanize Indo-
nesian culture. (9)
Regionalism assumed its most challenging forms in Sulawesi. Here
the ..'arouw army coup of November 16, 1952» had fanned the flames of
regional and ethnic feeling and produced much disintegration of govern-
ment authority. Accurate information on the state of affairs on this
island was difficult to obtain outside it, as news censorship was
(£) Aneta, July 15, July 16, 1952.
(7)	Nieuwsgier (Djakarta), August 7, 1952.
(8)	Antara, April 7, Keng Po, March 23, Antara, May 18, 1953·
(9)	See for instance the statement of H. Darwisj Djambek, chairman of
the Partai Islam Indonesia, with headquarters in Central Sumatra,
Aneta, April 5, 1953· Such protests were in fact made much more
frequently than the newspaper record suggests. The fact that they
were thought to do violence to nationalist feeling made press men
loath to record them. For a full discussion of the development of
regionalist attitudes in the post-revolutionary period see Gerald S.
Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem,
Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University,
forthcoming, September 1958.168
imposed by the military authorities of the East Indonesia command. But
certain disturbing facts were known. In December 1952 there had been
pitched battles between two battalions of government troops at Pare-Pare.
Two army officers were murdered in Makassar in January, and several
others were kidnapped in the following months. At the same time there
were repeated reports of the persecution of Christians in Central Sulawesi,
not only by Kahar Muzakar followers but also by certain units of the
government forces. In March the Djakarta weekly Sjasat reported that
several government agencies in South Sulawesi had begun to issue export
licenses and exact customs and taxes on their own authority. It added
that the situation was gradually developing into one which could only
be called warlordism. (10) Whereas intense antagonisms existed between
various ethnic groups of the island—the Christian and influential
Mj nnha sans, the strongly Moslem Buginese and Makassarese and the largely
Christian Toradjas—a general opposition to Djakarta was common to all
the groups.
In the first months of 1953 a number of Djakarta political figures
and newspapers drew attention to the rise of regionalist feeling, warning
of the consequences if the central government did not do more to win the
regions' favor. (11) At the same time high government officials were
seriously concerned about the danger of separatist movements not only in
Atjeh (extreme North of Sumatra) where the Daud Beureueh rebellion was
to break out in September, 1953, but also in the Moluccas. There clearly
was cause for anxiety. Regionalist feeling was as yet very weak if
compared with what it became later, particularly in and since 1956. (12)
But there were numerous indications that dangerously strong centrifugal
forces were at work.
Anti-foreign feeling·, a second index of social ferment and political
discontent, was given frequent expression in the Wilopo cabinet's period
of office, and particularly in its last part., But here it is necessary
to refer immediately to a number of actions on the foreign, and particu-
larly the Dutch, side, which afforded strong stimulus to such feeling.
A series of decisions by the Dutch government and Dutch courts provided wide
scope for Indonesian protests.
(10)	Siasat, March 8, 1953»
(11)	See the statements of Otto Rondonuwu (Progressive Fraction) Antara,
January 25j of Sjahrir, Keng Po, March 18; of F. A. Pitoi (P.I.R.)
Keng Po. March 19; and of Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, Keng Po, March 20,
1953· Also the editorials of Sin Po. January 28 and Siasat (weekly),
March 8, 1958.
(12)	Organized smuggling, supported by local military commanders in rich
exporting areas for the sake of regional development, was begun only
late in 1954—significantly in Sulawesi. By this time inflation,
disadvantageous particularly to exporters, had assumed much greater
proportions than under the Wilopo cabinet.169
In December 1952 the Dutch government summarily arrested two Indo-
nesian students in Holland suspected of being Communist sympathizers,
Go Gien Tjwan, director of the Antara newsagency in Holland and, Sunito,
chairman of the Perhimnunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association). Later
in the same month the P.K.I. leaders, Aidit and Njoto, who had arrived
in Holland for a congress of the Communist Party of the Netherlands,
were expelled from the country. And in April 1953 the Dutch government
gave similar treatment to Chaerul Saleh, a former guerrilla leader of
Murba or national-communist political orientation^who was studying in
Holland on an Indonesian government assignment.
A similar occasion for protest was the surprising findings of the
Netherlands court in January, in the case of the attempted assassination
of the Indonesian Military Attache at the Hague, Lieutenant-Colonel
Harjono. The decision of the judge in this case was to give one of the
accused a sentence of one year, and declare the other free. (13) The
contrast was stark between this decision and th&t of the court at
Hollandia in West Irian or West New Guinea on January 30, which gave
gaol sentences of up to 13 years to 43 Indonesians accused of infiltra-
tion into the uninhabited island of Gak which is part of West Irian. (14)
The issue of sovereignty over West Irian had excited strong nation-
alist and anti-Dutch feelings whenever it had been brought to the fore-
front of political discussion by one or other happening, and this had
occurred roughly two or three times a year since the failure of the
Irian talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands in December 1950· THe
Dutch government’s attitude as from mid-1952, that there was no point in
further negotiations on this matter, was the subject of frequent calls
by Indonesian political leaders and editors for some sort of a "tough"
policy against the Dutch. Thus on September 6, 1952, Mr. Djody Gondokusumo
of the minor nationalist party P.H.N., who was then chairman of the
Foreign Affairs section of parliament, stated that, in the event of
negotiations failing to secure the return of West Irian, Indonesia should
employ force to this end—rather than to use what Mr. Djody saw as the
other way open, that of asking for United States help. Appeals for the
government to take a firmly anti-Dutch stand came primarily from the
side of the "oppositionist" parties and factions, sections of the P.N.I.
leadership and the Communists, but some were made by representatives of
almost every political group.
(13)	Strong protests against this decision were made in the Dutch press
at the time. E.g.s Het Yrije Volk, January 6, 1953, Het Parool,
January 7, 1953 (both Labor Party journals), de Volkskrant, January 7,
1953 (Catholic People’s Party publication).
(14)	The Indonesians were men from the neighboring island of Gebe (part
of the Moluccas) who owned gardens on Gak.170
In the first months of 1953 the West Irian issue was again made
current by the Gak infiltration case of January and the Dutch report of
larger-scale armed infiltration by Indonesians south of Vogelkop in May,
The latter report was regarded in Djakarta as fictitious and an attempt
to counter earlier Indonesian reports of the movements of Dutch submarines
in the Moluccas area» (15) Whatever the truth of these various reports,
it is clear that the situation was one in which anti-Dutch feeling could
readily grow0
Throughout this period there were repeated reports of the involvement
of individual Dutchmen in the bandit activity of the Darul Islamo This
was the subject of sustainedly vociferous press and political party pro-
tests, All this coming on top of a four-year revolutionary war and a
situation where vast economic power in the country remained in foreign,
mainly Dutch, hands, created a situation in which a high level of anti-
Dutch sentiment could be expected.
But this should not obscure the fact that anti-Dutch sentiment had
also another aspect, as a form both of expression and of canalization of
political discontent, Sjahrir, in our period, stressed its role in
"blinding the people to reality," (16) and Mr, Jusuf Wibisono discussed
it in the context of a quotation from Karl Mannheim on the scapegoat
system, (17) This aspect helps to explain why there were relatively few
manifestations of anti-Dutch feeling outside Javas discontent there could
be channeled into resentment of Java,
Anti-Dutch feeling found much more expression in the press and in
political party statements than it did in the actions of the cabinet or
its agencies. It represented a political factor of major importance
standing in the way of the Wilopo cabinet on matters related to foreign
capital. Thus it contributed to the cabinet’s failure to implement
policies to which it was committed in relation to existing foreign plan-
tation and mines and to the proposed regulations to attract new foreign
investment.
As far as the Wilopo cabinet was concerned, it certainly had no policy
of stimulating or channeling anti-foreign feeling, whether anti-Dutch,
anti-American or directed against any other country. It attempted no
spectacular ventures in the field of foreign policy, and, while adhering
to the framework of the "independent foreign policy" as set by its pre-
decessor’s fall on the M,S,A, issue, it concerned itself principally with
economically fruitful relations with other countries—in practice mainly
(15)	See Nieuwsgier (Djakarta, Dutch-language), May 19, 1953°
(16)	Sikap, August 18, 1952,'
(17)	"Popularitet dan tanggung-djawab" (Popularity and Responsibility),
Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), August 17, 1952,171
countries of the West. Placing a high valuation on economic development,
it acted on the belief that Western countries and their nationals could
play a positive role in this.
Nevertheless it was obliged to take some actions demanded by anti-
foreign feeling. One example of this was the gaoling and subsequent ex-
pulsion of the Indo-European editress of the Nieuw Sourabaiasch Handelsblad.
Mrs. Fuhrie-Mierop who for some time had editorialized against the
government, the President and Indonesian nationalism generally. A more
significant example was the government’s attitude in the case of the
group of Surabaja law students who in April 1953 smashed the offices of
the Dutch-language daily De Yri.ie Pers after this newspaper had stated
editorially that the Dutch language was a necessity for students of
Indonesian law. The government censured the students, but it took no
legal action against them and the Minister for Information, Mononutu, said
the incident should serve as a warning to the foreign press not to regard
Indonesian sensitivities lightly. This paralleled the government’s
stand in January, when it withdrew a moderately worded protest against
the expulsion of Aidit and Njoto from Holland, in response to demands
from the more radically anti-Dutch Foreign Affairs section of parliament.
To measure anti-foreign sentiment is next to impossible. Even the
anti-foreign sentiment which is given political articulation is extremely
difficult to measure. But it seems probable that politically articulated
anti-foreign sentiment actually increased in the Wilopo cabinet period.
It certainly remained at a high point—very high in terms of the require-
ments of the government's economic planning, although low as compared
with its intensity in more recent periods. And it retained this intensity
despite the fact that it was accorded much less government encourage-
ment under Wilopo than it had been under Sukiman. Part of the explana-
tion for this lies undoubtedly in the increasingly uncomuromising attitude
of Holland. But it would seem that another part of it should be sought in
deeper pressures towards social and political discontent. These pressures,
of which regionalism was another expression, had a basis both in the
general situation of revolutionary aftermath—social dislocation, rapid
growth of consumer expectations, the existence of a large group of up-
rooted ex-revolutionaries and so on—and in the particular economic
difficulties arising from the post-Korea fall in prices for Indonesia’s
exports.
Such pressures towards social and political discontent could be
seen also in other phenomena of the time. In particular there were a
number of instances in which the government failed to impose its will
in the face of defiance either by its own instrumentalities or by outsiders.
Some of this was a consequence of the October 17 affair, and particularly
of the regional military coups which followed it. The beneficiaries
of these coups, having seen the cabinet’s inability to take strong action
against them, continued to challenge its authority. In April and May
1953, as we shall see, the territorial commanders of East Java and East172
Indonesia, defied the cabinet demonstratively in ways which cost it a
severe loss of prestige» The confusion and fragmentation of authority
within the army command in Sulawesi had similar effects»
Wilopo’s last months in office saw also the first major eruption of
a clique conflict which had been going on inside the air force,, in parti-
cular between the air force Chief of Staff, Commodore Suryadarma, and the
head of the educational division of the force, Vice-Commodore Η» Sujono»
This struggle produced not only house arrests and en bloc resignations,,
but also an aerial demonstration over a part of Djakarta» (18)
Another type of challenge to government authority was in a series of
attacks by politically irate youths and students on newspaper officers»
For the attack on the office of De Vrije Pens was one of a series of
similar incidents» Violence had been used earlier against the premises
of the Dutch-language Malang Post at Malang, the Antara rooms at Semarang
and the offices of Waspada at Medan»
This then is the background against which the party political
developments of the period must be seen» It would be wrong to conclude
that there had been nothing but deterioration in the socio-political
health of the country», but there were certainly many signs of continuing,
and in some cases increasing, instability» And the significance of this
was perceived by many of the country’s leaders» Whereas it is true that
many members of the elite regarded the various phenomena as inevitable
in a growing pains situations yet pessimism was undoubtedly on the increase
in the group as a whole» There was much discussion of the "danger of
disintegrations” (19) of "a sort of fragmentation of society" (20) and
of "dangers to the standards of social morality»" (21) Both disappointment
and intense personal worry were felt by many in responsible positions»
(18)	In a letter of May 13 to the Presidents Vice-Presidents Defense
Minister and other high officers of the air force, Vice-Commodore
Sujono declared that the air force Chief of Staff had abused his
authority and should be investigated» Sujono was placed under
house arrest by Suryadarma9 whereupon his supporters in the air
force staged their demonstrations» See Antara and Aneta, May 13-31
passim»
(19)	Mimbar Indonesia (dail/)9 May Z6S 1953°
(20)	Statement of the Health Minister, Dr» J» Leimena, Aneta, April 28,
1953»
(21)	Siasat, April 26, 1953» This was in part a reference to the fact
that there had been several disclosures of corruption immediately
before this date» One much-discussed case was that of the "leak"
of the examination papers for the nation-wide final examinations
of junior and senior high schools»173
April and May 1953 saw the development of a chain of political
crises each of which came close to being the cahinet’s last. This was
at a time of sustained press and party controversy on the questions of
Islamic State and Pantja Sila. At the same time four other issues
came to the forefront of the political stage roughly in succession.
These were in the fields of foreign policy, of army affairs, of financial
policy and of foreign investment. Each case highlights a political prob-
lem of long-term importance. At least three of them show the new overall
pattern of party alignments which had gradually crystallized in the Wilopo
cabinet period.
The foreign policy issue arose from the motion of Eondonuwu of the
Progressive Fraction for the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in
Moscow before the end of 1953· The "oppositionist " Communist and
P.N.I. supporters of this motion argued that diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union were essential if a truly independent foreign policy
was to be pursued and if Indonesia was to make her maximum contribution
to world peace. They spoke of the people’s resentment at the fact that
the government had for three years promised the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with Russia "as soon as possible," yet in practice done
nothing, and maintained that this was a violation of a "gentlemen’s
agreement" reached when the Soviet Union promised support for Indonesia’s
entry into the United Nations. Finally they stressed the possibilities
of trade with the U.S.S.R. Deploring the very low prices then offered
on the Western rubber and tin market, and the uncooperative attitude of
Great Britain and the United States with regard to proposals for price
stabilization agreements, they argued that Indonesia could only benefit
from gaining access to an alternative potential market. (22)
The Masjumi, which led the opposition to the motion, based its case
principally on a legalistic point. Affirming that it supported diplo-
matic relations in principle, it declared that the timing of any exchange
of ambassadors was a matter that had to be left to the cabinet. At the
same time however Masjumi speakers and editors stressed the danger that
a Soviet embassy in Djakarta would play a Trojan horse role. Recalling
the difficulties which the Sukiman government had faced with the heavily-
staffed embassy of the Chinese People’s Republic, they argued that Indo-
nesia had nothing to gain by opening her doors to new possibilities of
subversive activities.
(22)' The attitude of the U.S. and U.K. in the matter of price stabiliza-
tion schemes had been demonstrated at the E.C.A.F.E. conference held
in Bandung in February. The attitude of the U.S. was to become
very clear at the Copenhagen conference of the International Rubber
Study Group in May, for at this conference it was U.S. opposition
which killed the proposal of the conference’s working group, strongly
supported by the natural rubber producing countries, for the estab-
lishment of "buffer stocks" of rubber.1?4
But these latter arguments had little appeal in the prevailing climate
of political thinking of the newspaper-reading public,, Most of the
Socialist and Socialist-sympathizing press supported the Rondonuwu
motion. When the stand of the P.N.Io executive committee in favor of the
motion was endorsed hy its larger party council on March 8, it was clear
that the motion would command a majority. It did, when it was put to the
vote on April 9» Only the Masjumi, Parindra, Catholic Party, Nahdatul
Ulama and Democratic Fraction voted against it, with the P°S.IO abstaining.
As well as the P.N.I., three other government parties, the (Protestant)
Christian Party, the Labor Party and the minor Moslem party P.S.I.I.,
all voted for the motion. Parliament had overruled the cabinet once
more, and in a sense split it in half.
But the earlier predictions that this would mean the cabinet’s
resignation or disintegration were not fulfilled. Its Minister of Infor-
mation, Mononutu, stated that "the major narties, including the Masjumi
and P.N.I., do not want a cabinet crisis!’. ,23) The Masjumi parliamentary
leader, Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap, said on n.pril 11 that his party would
only consider withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet if and when the
cabinet actually decided to establish an embassy in Moscow, and the
Masjumi-sympathizing daily Abadi was hopeful that with the new post-Stalin
"peace offensive" a situation would arise in which diplomatic relations
would be possible. (24)
The vote on the Rondonuwu motion is significant for the fact that
it was the first occasion in the Wilopo cabinet period when the Issue of
attitudes towards Communism played an important role. It was the first
instance in the post-revolutionary period of an issue involving attitudes
to Communism on which the two main parties as such took opposing stands.
This suggests that the ensuing change in the pattern of political
alignments in Indonesia was in some degree an accommodation to the terms
of the cold war struggle.
The month of April saw the government challenged by critical devel-
opments in the army. In the three months since the resignation of Sultan
Hamengku Buwono from the Defense Ministry the cabinet had continued to
pursue its "all under one roof policy," seeking to heal the still open
wounds of the October 1? affair by compromises which would allow all
parties concerned to preserve a maximum of prestige. The toughest
challenges to it came from the territorial commands of East Java and
East Indonesia. These made repeated demands, which were "leaked" to the
press, for the dismissal and punishment of all those involved in what
had happened in Djakarta on October 17.
(23) Antara, April 11, 1953°
(24) Abadi, April 11, 1953175
The government made some concessions to this group. In January for
instance it placed the former territorial commander for East Indonesia,
Col. Gatot Subroto,on non-active service. But it ordered no arrests and
laid no legal charges. At the same time it successfully steered through
parliament a number of measures for army reorganization and demobiliza-
tion, which were basically similar to those which had come under such
heavy fire in the army debates of August, September and October of the
preceding year. (25) The objection of certain ’’oppositionist*' members
of parliament that a basic defense law should be made first, was countered
by the government when on March 31 it established a State Committee for
Defense Affairs, consisting of representatives of parliament and the
Defense Ministry, to draft such a law.
With this general course the "anti-October 17” officers were not
satisfied. Particularly in the East Java division, whose acting commander
Lieut. Col. Sudirman continued to cooperate closely with Col. Bambang
Supeno, there were more demands for strong action against those who had
instigated and led the affair of October 17. Moreover there was a clear
use of sanctions. Thus on March 10, after the new acting Chief of Staff
of the army, Col. Bambang Sugeng, had decided to transfer the former
acting commander of East Java, L5eut.-Col. Dr. Suwondho to Djakarta,
Sudirman declared that the East Java army leadership "could not take it
upon itself to guarantee the safety of Lieut.-Col. Suwondho," if the latter
went to Djakarta. Suwondho was then still under arrest. On the following
day a report of an East Java army doctor was published to the effect that
Suwondho was ill and so could not go to Djakarta.
In reply the government made no attempt to assert its authority.
Instead it decided on March 31 to transfer the Secretary-General of the
Ministry of Defense, Mr. Ali Budiardjo to a position as Deputy-Head of
the National Planning Board, and placed in his post ex-Colonel Hidajat,
a man regarded as standing outside the division between the "pro-October
17" and "anti-October 17" groups in the army. Five days earlier an
Indonesian and a Dutch delegation had begun discussions for the repatria-
(25) Parliament ratified two earlier emergency laws on army affairs and
four new bills which represented a modification of the four bills
submitted by Sultan Hamengku Buwono in July 1952. The most conten-
tious of the bills provided for the retirement of soldiers who failed
to comply with certain physical requirements, but these were less
exacting than those in the 1952 bill, and the educational require-
ments were abandoned. Thus an estimated 5θ»θθθ soldiers would by.
stages leave the service, as comnared with the earlier figure of
80,000. The plan of a new "core" army, for which young men of high
educational qualifications should oe recruited, remained the same.
Col. Nasution later commented on the irony of the situation where
his plans were adopted immediately after he and his colleagues were
removed from the positions from which they could implement them.
Tjatatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, pp. 280-281.176
tion of the Netherlands Military Mission, which had come under such
strong parliamentary fire in the pre-October 17 debates. In April an
agreement was reached whereby the mission would be repatriated at the end
of the year . (26)
But the East Java command remained dissatisfied. At the same its
limited success emboldened it. Thus on April b it wrote a letter to the
government (with a copy to the Defense section of parliament), urging
that "the investigation of the October 17 affair should immediately be
officially turned over to the Chief Public Prosecutor (Djaksa Agung)",
further that "the government should take firm steps against those whu
are regarded as the instigators of the October 17 affair" and that it
itself "would not be responsible for the consequences" if these things
were not done by April 15» (27) This was virtually an ultimatum.
Again the cabinet was forced to make concessions. Wilopo addressed
a closed session of parliament on April 11. Subsequently the chairman of
parliament issued a communique summarizing the government’s statement.
With an ambiguity which appeared to be intended, the communique said the
government would "expedite the investigation (pengusutan)" of the October
17 affair, that "the Chief Public Prosecutor and Court had freedom to
carry out their duties," and that the government itself would "expedite
the reorganization of the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the
reformation of the personnel of the army headquarters." (28)
Henceforth more and more persons who were or were thought to have
been involved in the October 17 developments were called to in camera
hearings at the Chief Public Prosecutor’s office. This was seen as part
of a full-scale pre-judicial investigation of the whole affair. Just
before April 15 the government sent the Chief Public Prosecutor himself
to East Java to confer with the army leaders there. And Keng Po reported
that there would be transfers of 50 high and middle ranking officers in
May. (29) All these were steps to conciliate the East Java leaders,
and some of them were condemned as such by the Masjumi and Socialist-
sympathizing press. (30) But they too failed to satisfy the East Java
command. Lieut. Col. Sudirman and his supporters were particularly
(26)	An "exception was made for some 80 members of the naval arm of the
mission, who would continue to work in Surabaja for some time longer
See Protokol Hasil Perundingan Penjelesaian Missi Militer Belanda
(Protocol of Results the Negotiations for the Termination of the
Netherlands Military Mission), Ministry of Information, Djakarta,
April 21, 1953»
(27)	Quoted in Keng Po, April 15, 1953»
(28)	Antara. April 11, 1953»
(29)	Keng Po, April 15j 1953»177
concerned that the last of the earlier triumvirate, the Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Major-General Simatupang, should he taken out of his
post. This demand was strongly supported hy the President. But it was
one to which Wilopo, with the cabinet behind him, had decided he would
not accede.
On April 17 the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Defense Ministry
Secretary-General Hidajat and the acting Chief of Staff of the army
Col. Bambang Sugeng, set off on a tour.of four military districts. The
climax of the trip came in East Java. Landing at Surabaja’s airport on
April 26, the delegation was not met by any of the East Java military .
leaders—but instead by a group of tanks! Going on to the headquarters
of the East Java district in Malang, they found the headquarters offices
empty. They did find one prominent regimental commander, Lieut. Col.
Abimanju, at his home, but he was prepared to speak to them only on his
own behalf and not on behalf of the division. (31) Few greater indigni-
ties have been suffered by any Indonesian Prime Minister.
Wilopo’s answer came in an announcement of the cabinet on April 30
that it would ask parliament for a vote of confidence on its handling
of the October 17 affair. If this was not forthcoming it would resign.
The announcement was directed primarily towards the Prime Minister’s own
party. Wilopo’s aim was to present the P.N.I. with a choice: it should
either overthrow him or give him its full support. . With a substantial
degree of P.N.I. support he could handle the East Java situation, he
believed, but not without it.
But the P.N.Io had not been consulted by Wilopo before the cabinet’s
announcement, and there was strong feeling among the leaders of the party
that the choice could only embarrass the party. These men did not want,
to endorse the cabinet’s army policies because they regarded them as still
too lenient towards the "pro-October 17 group" officers and their poli-
tical supporters. But they also did not want the immediate fall of the
cabinet, which would clearly follow if the P.N.I. voted against the govern
ment on the confidence issue. For this would be, in Sajuti Melik’s words,
"to force its fall without prior preparation." (32)
’Preparation’ meant preparation of the composition of the successor
cabinet. The fall of Wilopo was now spoken of by many as merely a ques-
T30) See forinstance Haluan (Padang), April 15, Mimbar Umum (Medan),
April l6, Mestika (Medan). April 18 and Sumber (Djakarta), April 21,
1953»
(31)	See Pedoman, April 29, 30s 1953»
(32)	Sajuti Melik, "Kabinet akan minta Votum kepertjajaan?” (Will the
Cabinet ask for a Vote of Confidence?), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly),
May 9, 1953» Compare the attitude of Mr. Sartono, Keng Po, May 4,
1953»178
tion of time. The anti-Wilopo majority of the P.N.I. leadership was ready
to force the cabinet’s resignation on an appropriate issue at any time.
But it wanted to wait till the political constellation was such as to
give it maximum bargaining power in the cabinet formation struggles
which would follow. And this time had not yet arrived. On May 5 the
P.N.I. executive declared that the cabinet should work on and continue
its efforts to settle the October 1? affair—without asking for a vote
of confidence from parliament.
The cabinet revoked its decision on the following day. It would
not ask parliament for a vote of confidence. This produced protest from
the P.S.I.I. and from the cabinet's two remaining non-party ministers,
Ir. Djuanda of Communications and Dr. Bahder Djohan of Education. The
P.S.I.I. withdrew its minister, the Minister of Social Affairs, Anwar
Tjokroaminoto, with the party’s parliamentary leader Arudji Kartawinata
stating that his party regarded the October 17 affair as a coup d’etat
which had failed. For some time it appeared that the two non-party
ministers would also resign. But by May 8 it was clear that they had
been prevailed upon to reverse their earlier intention to do so. In a
reshuffle of portfolios E. P. Soeroso of Parindra, the former Minister of
Personnel Affairs, was appointed Minister of Social Affairs, and the
Ministry of Personnel Affairs was abolished and replaced by a Personnel
Affairs Board under the Prime Minister (with Soeroso as Deputy-Chairman).
The P.S.I.I. did not implement its announced intention of joining with
the Partai Murba to move a motion of no-confidence in the cabinet with
regard to its handling of the army situation.
Thus the cabinet could work on. The P.N.I.’s statement had the
effect of strengthening its position slightly. And there was some
cooling off of feeling in the army in East Java as a result of the fact
that Mr. Ali Budiardjo, Major-General Simatupang and Col. Nasution were
all called to present testimony before the Chief Public Prosecutor. But
the Prosecutor laid no charges against any of the persons investigated.
And the cabinet was unable in the remaining three and a half weeks of its
life to take any significant step towards an integrated solution of the
army problem.
The government's economic and financial policies were a major factor
producing challenges to its continued existence. These challenges too
came to a head in April and May 1953» But to understand them one must
go back to developments in the latter part of 1952.
Knocked off its appointed political course by the October 17 affair,
the Wilopo cabinet decided to adopt what might be called a minimum
policy and concerned itself with only two important goals, to create an
elections law and to create a budget. It succeeded in the first, but
failed in the second. At least it failed to get parliamentary ratifica-
tion of its 1953 budget, which, though submitted in November 1952, was179
not debated till after the fall of the Wilopo cabinet. Nevertheless the
cabinet used this budget as a basis for its policies.
It was certainly an austerity budget. To keep the deficit down to
R. 1.8 billion the ministries, particularly Defense and the Interior,
were given sharnly reduced allocations. Everything was done to prevent
inflation; for it was seen that this would be seriously anti-develop-
mental, hitting not only the consumer but also the exporter and the
industrial entrepreneur who depended on imported raw materials. At the
same time the budget scheduled increases in certain forms of taxation,
including death duties and taxes on private cars. The cabinet was clearly
persisting in its politically bold policies';of placing the balance of
payments burden on the shoulders of the bureaucracy, importers and the
upper and middle income groups in the cities. It would continue to
work for a demobilization of soldiers. On the other, hand its budget
message made no reference to civil service rationalization. (33)' '
The measures of the cabinet in the field of importing were a source
of even greater controversy. On January 14 the Ministry of Economic
Affairs announced that it would temporarily cease to accept new Indonesian
importers into the favored "Benteng Group." (3^) Eight days later there
followed a regulation of the Economic Affairs and Finance Ministers
revising and extending the import surcharge system. A thirty-three and
a third percent surcharge was now placed on a number of goods previously
on the free list, such as bicycles, condensed milk, caustic soda and many
kinds of books and magazines.
This was in line with the cabinet’s general policy of enforcing
reductions at the expense of luxury, semi-luxury and semi-essential con-
sumer goods, while allowing a constant supply of essential consumer items
and at the same time increasing the proportion of imports of capital
goods and of raw materials needed for economic expansion. But the regu-
lation led to rapid price rises, particularly for non-essential goods.
Heavy criticism followed in the pres’s and parliament. The government
defended itself by pointing to the fact that it had succeeded in the
central task of maintaining stability in the prices of basic foodstuffs.
But the criticism continued vociferously.
(33) This fact was criticized by the President of the Java Bank,
Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Report of the Java Bank 1952-53.
p. 98.
(3^) The firms in this group were allowed to import certain commodities
from which "stronger" importers were debarred. By this time approx-
imately 700 firms had been recognized as members of the "Benteng
Group". See N. Amstutz, The Development of Indigenous Indonesian
Impori^rs in Indonesia, 1950-1955. unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Fletcher School, 1958.180
Then on April 1 the cabinet took steps to force prices down. It
increased the required pre-payment on applications for foreign exchange
from W’ to 75$. At the same time it entered into a "gentlemen’s agree-
ment" with the commercial banks to observe credit ceilings. These would,
significantly, apply to national Indonesian importers as well as foreign
firms. (35)
These measures were effective in undoing most of the earlier price
rises, because they forced importers to sell .their stocks cheaply in order
to get liquid working capital. But they antagonized the. importers strong-
ly. They were hardest on small and medium-sized import enterprises,
which meant on most of those operated as national Indonesian firms. As
a result of them national importers received only 37° 9$ of the total
foreign exchange allocation in the first four months of 1953s as compared
with 42.7/^ in the year 1952. (38)
The significance of these acts of defiance of the interests of
Indonesian importers is clear from the vantage point of 1958° In the
five-year interval major strides have been taken in the direction of
Indonesianization of business, not only in the importing field but also
in road, sea and air transport, stevedoring, ricemilling, plantations,
exporting and banking. (37) The biggest of these strides were taken
by the Wilopo cabinet’s immediate successor, the first cabinet of Mr.
Ali Sastroamidjojo—at the cost of serious inflation and a decline in
the rate of investment.
The Wilopo cabinet’s policies stand in strong contrast to these.
Indeed .Wilopo and his associates also sought to place greater economic
power into the hands of nationals of the country. But the primary
emphasis of their policies was on raising per capita income, and so they
concentrated on promoting developmental investment and stability of
prices. In a period when major government sunnort for Indonesianization
extended as yet only to importing (and some road and sea, transport),
Wilopo and Sumitro sought to restrict even this for the sake of other
more long-range goals, many of whose beneficiaries were as yet politically
inarticulate. By this policy they defied not only importers but all those
in and near the political elite who demanded economic power.
(35)	"The Government Import Regulations," Indonesian Affairs, September-
October 1953° Also The Monetary Research Section of the Ministry, of
Finance, "Economic Review of 1952 and Outlook for 1953/' Ekonomi
dan Keuangan di Indonesia (Economics and Finance in Indonesia), May
1953°
(36)	N. Amstutz, op. cit., Chapter II.
(37)	See John Paul Meek, The Government and Economic Development in
Indonesia, 1950-195^-° unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Virgin ia, 19567 Also John 0. Sutter, Indonesian!sasi, 1950-1955.
forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.181
The government had suffered severe criticism for its unconcern for
the development of national enterprise at the time of the Djaswadi amend-
ment on corporation tax in February 1953» There had been numerous alle-
gations then that it was subservient to the economic pressures of
foreigners,and,with P.N.I.,PoScI.I.and oppositionist support the amendment
had been carried.
In March and April import policy became the main butt of criticism,
but here a large number of parties took part in protesting against the
government’s measures. Thus it was the Masjumi leader K. H. Tjikwan,
chairman of the Economic Affairs section of parliament, who on April 10
introduced a motion protesting against the surcharge regulations. Signed
also by members of the P.N.I., Parindra, the Catholic Party, the Demo-
cratic Fraction, the Progressive Fraction, Murba and P.K.I., the motion
asked the government to submit to parliament a bill incorporating the
surcharge regulations of both August and January. Such measures, the
signatories affirmed, ought to be taken on the basis either of laws or
of emergency laws, not simply by government regulations.
In the debate which followed there was sharp criticism of the pre-
payments regulations as well as the surcharges. For some time it appeared
that the Tjikwan motion might be the issue on which the cabinet would
resign. On May 28 parliament passed the motion by a vote-of 97 to 0.
But the Ministers of Finance and Economic affairs accepted the defeat.
A stronger motion of Mohammad Sadak of P.I.S., which asked that the
import surcharge regulations be immediately frozen, was defeated by 58
votes to 27 on the same evening, with none of the government parties
supporting it. Economic and financial policy was not an immediate cause
of the cabinet’s fall. But it was of great importance in welding together
the opposition which was finally to overwhelm the cabinet.
The issue which finally did precipitate the cabinet’s fall was one
over the position of foreign capital. This issue, which came to a head
in the "Tandjong Morawa affair”, arose from the existence of large
numbers of peasant squatters on land leased to foreign estates in East
Sumatra. Some of these persons, former estate workers and villagers
from the surrounding areas, had begun to squat in the Japanese occupation;
the Japanese authorities had urged them to grow foodstuffs, and they did
so there,particularly on large areas of tobacco land lying fallow. Many
others had come in the post-revolutionary period, mostly from the less
fertile Tapanuli plateau, and were continuing to come in considerable
numbers. By early 1953 there were approximately 62,000 families on the
tobacco estates of the area alone. (38)
T38restatement”’of Abdullah Jusuf, P.N.I. parliamentarian, Antara,
April 8, 1953» For a general discussion of the whole problem see
Karl J, Pelzer, "The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific
Affairs, June 1957» Also Clark E. Cunningham, The Postwar Migration
of the Toba»Bataks to East Sumatra, Cultural Report Series, South-
east Asia Studies, Yale University, Newhaven, 1958.182
But the foreign lessees who had cultivated these lands before the
war, and in many cases between 1946 and 1949, continued to have legal
claims to them» Most of these were guaranteed by the Sound Table Conference
agreement of 1949. Moreover the Indonesian government had an interest in
the restoration of the lands to the foreign, mainly Dutch, companies
which had leased them. This was partly because of their ability to earn
badly needed foreign exchange. But in addition the government believed
that the request for return of these squatter-occupied lands in East
Sumatra (and the other request from Eoyal Dutch Shell for return of its
North Sumatran oilwells, then in the temporary charge of an Indonesian
government board) were seen overseas as tests of its willingness and
ability to protect the foreign investment which it sought to attract.
In July 1951 Mr. Iskeq Tjokrohadisurjo of the P.N.I., as the Sukiman
cabinet’s Minister for the Interior, had settled on a compromise basis,
for a solution. He came to an agreement with the tobacco planters’
organization, D.P.V. (Deli Planters Vereniging), whereby the members of
this organization would return 130,000 hectares of their 255,000 hectares
of concession lands in return for a new 30-year lease for the remaining
125,000 hectares. The government would resettle the 62,000 squatter
families found on the 125,000 hectares.
Little was done to implement the resettlement decision within the
life of the Sukiman cabinet. But the Wilopo cabinet made a beginning.
However its efforts were challenged almost immediately as a result of
what happened on March l6, 1953 in the sub-district of Tandjong Morawa
near Medan.
On this date East Sumatran peasant resistance.to the land return
program came to a head when police tried forcible dislodgement of a group
of Chinese and Indonesian peasants by ploughing up their lands with
tractors. The demonstrators replied by attempting to seize the police-
men's weapons. The police started shooting, and five of,the peasant
demonstrators, four of them Chinese and one Indonesian were killed.
Numerous arrests followed. (39)
The press outcry which followed the report of this incident led to
the establishment of a number of committees of enquiry, both by particular
parties and by parliament. Their investigations laid bare the explosive-
ness of the political and social background against which the Tandjong
Morawa shooting must be seen.
Abdullah Jusuf, a Ρ.Ν.Ιο member of parliament who was sent by his
party to investigate the situation, concluded that the policy of the
(39) For accounts of this incident see Antara, March 17, 1953» Harian
Hakjat, March 17, Keng Po, March 21 and Waktu (weekly, Medan)", May 2.
Also statement of the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Eoem, Aneta, .
April 10, 1953»183
Governor of Worth Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, of the Masjumi, in allocating
land to estates and peasants respectively, was highly detrimental to the
latter, who were given inferior land and inadequate compensation". Fur-
ther, Abdullah Jusuf alleged that Hakim had received H. 600,000 from the
D.P.V., officially as money to compensate the dislodged peasants, but in
fact administered irregularly. Hakim, who was governing without a legis-
lative council, was, according to Jusuf, creating an atmosphere of fear
by the extent to which he used secret police. (4o)
Very different explanations were given by representatives of the
Minister of the Interior, and by the Masjumi members of the parliamentary
commission which visited East Sumatra in late March and early April.
These investigators emphasized the large role played by Chinese peasants
in opposition to the government's land distribution program, and connected
this with the journey to Medan at the time of the Tandjong Morawa affair
of a representative of the Chinese consul in Djakarta, a journey against
which the Foreign Ministry had expressed objections. Further they quoted
the report of Sabiruddin, First Commissioner of Police in North Sumatra
to the effect that the sub-section committee of the P.K.I. for Deli-
Serdang was responsible for the incident which occurred. (41)
It is impossible to explain these developments without discussing
factors of party politics such as these. For in East Sumatra at this
time party competition was intense, not least so between different party-
backed peasant organizations. The widespread opposition which existed
to the strongly anti-Communist governor was a factor of considerable
importance, as was the P.N.I.'s concern to replace him with a candidate
of its own.
But this was more than a party issue. It was a conflict with deep
social roots. One must indeed refer to Communist organizational stiffening
in explaining the vigor with which the peasants of Tandjong Morawa were
prepared to defend their land. But more important is the simple fact
that they strongly wanted to remain on this land. They and their fellow-
squatters naturally saw the government as acting in the interests of the
estates, and the estates were in their eyes the remaining representatives
of the same foreign imperialism against which the revolution had been
fought. Thus the ground was fertile for peasant organizations which
opposed the government’s policies. For the P.N.I., then just establishing
its peasant organization Petani (Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia) in
North Sumatra, this was a crucial fact.
The Tandjong Morawa affair is a good illustration of the difficulties
which the Wilopo cabinet and every one of its predecessors and successors
has faced in the post-revolutionary period, Weak in terms of party
(40) Antara?“April 8, 1953»
(4l) See Antara. April 23? 1953? Pedoman, April 28, 1953·184
support, the cabinet was incapable of surmounting the challenges which
small determined groups like the squatters of East Sumatra could advance.
It was particularly weak in issues involving foreign enterprises. This
was partly because of the great power of trade unions and peasant organi-
zations and their ease of access to party political influence. It resulted
also from the political weakness in which all foreign enterprises were
engulfed in post-revolutionary Indonesia because of their very foreignness.
And, perhaps more important still, it arose from the weakness, primarily
economic and also political, of the propertied groups of Indonesians who
had an interest in siding with foreign capital against unions and peasant
organizations. In this particular case the opposition of a small peasant
group—and the violent reaction of the police to it—had the effect of
bringing the cabinet’s resettlement program to a virtual standstill.
Between 1951 and 1956, Professor Pelzer writes, "the government was
unable either to prevent further invasion of the tobacco estates by new
squatters or to remove the old squatters." (42.) The problem of squatting,
not only on foreign-leased estate lands but also on public lands in towns
and forests in many parts of the country, has continued as a major
obstacle to consistent economic policies. (43)
(42)	Loc'. cit.
(43)	The government faced a somewhat similar problem in the case of the
North Sumatran(Pangkalan Brandan) oilwells of the B.P.M. (Royal Dutch
Shell). These wells had been in Republican hands at the end of the
period of armed struggle in 1949. Thenceforth they operated under
an Indonesian government board on a temporary basis, producing at
only 1-2/a of their pre-war annual rate. The Masjumi advocated their
return to Shell, as the only way in which their production could be
restored quickly. On the other hand the P.N.I. party council,
vociferously supported by the P.N.I. of North Sumatra, asked for
their nationalization.
The Vilopo cabinet supported the Masjumi point of view in the
matter, the P.N.I. Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Sumanang, being
convinced of the economic advantages of returning the wells. But
Sumanang’s announced intention to return the wells led to such
trenchant criticism of both him and Vilopo at the P.N.I. congress of
December 1952 that it became clear that the cabinet could not act.
.Thus the status quo, with which no party was satisfied, would con-
tinue for the time being. The only persons whose interests would
have been directly affected by a return of the wells to the Dutch
company were a small group of Indonesian managers. But the step
was clearly in defiance of very strong nationalist feeling.
The situation has remained substantially unchanged to the time of
writing. The difficulty of making a final choice as to the future
Of the wells has been a major factor handicapping all foreign oil work
in Indonesia, for it has been effective in holding up mining legis-
lation, which is required before new leases can be granted to any
foreign oil company. See Higgins, Indonesia’s Economic Stabilization
and Development, pp. 104-5.185
In the middle of May the government’s land policy in East Sumatra
was made the basis of a motion of no-confidence in the Minister of the
Interior, Mr. fioem. This was moved by the P.E.I.-sympathizing representa-
tive of the SAKTI (Sarekat Tani Indonesia, Indonesians Peasants Associa-
tion), Sidik Eertapati. Several days later it was modified, reportedly
in an attempt to make it qualify for P.N.Ii support, and from then on it
merely demanded that the process of transferring land to the D.P.V.
should be halted, and all persons arrested in connection with the Tandjong
Morawa affair released» However, after the parliamentary debates on the
(modified) motion on May 21 and 22 it became clear that the Minister of
the Interior still regarded the motion as one of no-confidence, and that
the Masjumi supported him fully.
Would the P.N.I. support the Sidik Kertapati motion? This was the
crucial question. At a meeting of representatives of the P.N.I. and
Masjumi on May 2.6, when a number of issues dividing the two parties
were discussed, the P.N.I.’s attitude on the motion was still not known.
However, by the time of the next meeting of Masjumi and P.N.I. represen-
tatives on June 1, the situation had changed. By this time the P.N.I.
of North Sumatra had threatened to secede from the party if its parlia-
mentary fraction did not support the motion. A majority of the P.N.I.
executive had decided that fioem would have to go if the cabinet was to
be allowed to live on. But this was quite unacceptable, to the Prime
Minister as well as to the Masjumi.
The P.N.I.'s final offer was on a quite different matter, the ques-
tion of a replacement for the P.N^I. Information Minister, Mononutu, who
was soon to take up an appointment as Ambassador in Peking. The P.N.I.
said it would abstain when the Sidik Kertapati motion was put if the
Masjumi agreed to forego its earlier veto of the P.N.I.»s candidate for
the Information Ministry, the Sidik group leader Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro.
But the Masjumi rejected this offer.
Thereupon the P.N.I. party council decided to urge that the two main
parties should together bring the cabinet to an end. On June 2, before
a vote had been taken on the Sidik Kertapati motion, the cabinet decided
to dissolve itself.
Which then were the forces which brought the cabinet down? From
March 1953 onwards there were repeated calls for its resignation by Mr.
Jusuf Wibisono of the Sukiman group of the Masjumi. Mr. Jusuf criticized
the cabinet for its financial policies, its lack of a clear policy to
attract foreign capital and its readiness to make concessions to organized
labor. (44) But the cabinet did not fall as a result of opposition from
the Sukiman group of the Masjumi5 this group was by no means united in
(44) Keng Po, March 14, March 31, May 19, 1953·186
support of the stand of Jusuf Wibisono, lor did it resign "because of any
development of tensions inside itselfo In his letter to the chairman
of parliament in which Wilopo announced the resignation he made specific
reference to the fact that "it has "been possible to continue cooperation
inside the cabinet itself in facing the problems which have recently
arisen»" The reason he gave for the resignation was that "in the present
constellation of forces the cabinet cannot count on sufficient support,,,
from the parties which support it in parliament," (45) The parties to
which he referredmay have included the minor Moslem P,S,I,I, and possibly
also the Labor Party, But the reference was principally to the Ρ,Ν,Ι,
Thus to explain the Wilopo cabinet’s fall one must look first to
the Ρ,Ν,Ι, It is the increasing power in this party of the groups opposed
to the Wilopo cabinet—.and the growing hope of these groups that a
successor cabinet could be found which would do more to implement their
policies—which explains why the cabinet had eventually to concede
defeat.
Ρ,Ν,Ι. support for the Wilopo cabinet was unenthusiastic from the
start. Already in the first months of the cabinet’s term of office the
party issued statements whose emphasis was strongly at variance with the
policy approach of the cabinet. The army debates and the October 17
affair brought the differences to the point of conflict. Then at the
party congress in early December 1952 there was a showdown.
This congress at Surabaja was an unusually stormy one. The October
17 dissensions had barely begun to subside. Through them the long-standing
dislike of a majority of the Ρ,Ν,Ι, leaders for the Socialist Party had
been newly set aflame. The feeling at the congress was strong that the
Wilopo cabinet was altogether too strongly influenced by the P.S.I.,
particularly in its army and economic policies, Mr, Wilopo was subjected
to vehement criticism for hesitating to take strong action against the
army leaders who had led the October 17 affair. The Ρ,Ν,Ι, Minister for
Economic Affairs, Mr, Sumanang, was attacked by almost every speaker on
economic policy for his announced policy of returning the North Sumatran
oil wells to Dutch Shell, All of the four Ρ,Ν,Ι, ministers were charged
with indifference to party discipline.
One demand which was frequently made at the congress was that the
Ρ,Ν,Ι, ministers in the cabinet should do more to promote the party’s
interests. This was urged particularly in relation to the forthcoming
elections. The ministers were instructed to use their influence to
strengthen the party and especially to overcome its poor financial situa-
tion, (46)
(45)	Antara. June 3? 1953°
(46)	Among the members of the sub-committee established at the congress
for the purpose of collecting funds to defray the party’s elections18?
The strength of the congress’s hostility to the policies of the
cabinet can he seen in the results of the party elections held at the
congress» There Sidik Djojosukarto was re-elected chairman» Wilopo
was displaced from the deputy-chairmanship by Soewirjo, a man of the older
conservative group of Sartono» And the other three men elected to the
five-man group which would be responsible for selecting the (large)
party council were Mangunsarkoro, Sabilal Basjad and Manai Sophian, all
associates of the party leader Sidik» Wilopo himself was ninth in the
vote, receiving only 424 votes as compared with Sidik”s 2728. The Sidik
group clearly won a resounding victory» This was confirmed in early
March at the first meeting of the party council selected by the five
men chosen by the congress» At this meeting a new twelve-man executive
was elected and its membership indicates the clear dominance of the
Sidik group in the party» (47)
Henceforth there was to be a protracted period of close cooperation
between the radically nationalist Sidik group and the older, conservative
group of Mr» Sartono and Mr» Ali Sastroamidjojo. In fact it became
common to speak of the "Sidik-Sartono group" (or simply the "Sidik group"
to refer to the same persons) as one of only two major factions
in the party.
The months following the congress saw little change in the cabinet's
policies* Wilopo did give considerable concessions to the anti-October
17 group in his stand on the problems of the army» Sumanang ceased to
press for the return of the North Sumatra oilwells to Shell.(at the same
time doing nothing about the P.N.I. demand for their nationalization).
But in economic and financial fields the cabinet continued and intensified
its defiance of important interests allied or potentially allied with the
P.N.I.,.firstly national importers and secondly the whole upper and middle
class of the cities» In the vital matter of advancing P.N.I. interests
through government influence, particularly in relation to the forthcoming
elections, the P.N.I. ministers continued to be uncooperative. While
working resolutely for early elections—at a time when their party regarded
itself as unprepared for these—they did next to nothing to strengthen
the party’s position in facing them» Mr. Sumanang appears to have been
expenses were Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo and Dr» Ong Eng Die. These
two men had recently been appointed to the directorship of the newly
formed "P.N.I* bank," the Bank Umum National (National General Bank),
Mr. Iskaq as its board chairman and Dr. Ong as its executive vice-
chairman. In the Ali' Sastroamidjo jo babinet, which followed upon
that of Wilopo, Mr.f’Iskaq emerged as Minister of Economic Affairs
and Dr. Ong as Minister of Finance.
(47) The five men dropped from the executive were Mr. Wilopo, Dr. A. K.
Gani, Bahendra Koesnan, Sarino Mangunpranoto and Drs. Yap Tjoan
Bing. They were replaced by Soetojo Mertodimoeljo, S. Hadikusumo,
Mrs. Soedarman, Saleh Umar and Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo.188
almost as quick to brush off requests for privileges when they came from
the PoNolo as he was when they came from individual PXL· "businessmen,,
The contrast is sharp "between this attitude and that of the P»N»I»
ministers in the cabinet of Mr» Ali Sastroamidjojo» The latter made a
systematic attempt to use government power to strengthen their party’s
electoral prospects» They did this through pressure on the Ministries
of Finance, the Interior and Information and on the Central Electoral
Committee and through the system of the cabinet’s first Minister of
Economic Affairs,, Mr» Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, whereby "special licenses"
were granted to importers who agreed to contribute to PoNdo funds» (48)
With the PoNolo ministers continuing to defy their party in a number
of important ways, the party leaders’ hostility to the cabinet increased»
But this hostility was tempered by the fact that the composition of the
cabinet which might be expected to succeed Wilopo’s could not be predicted
with any degree of certainty» During the period of the Sukiman cabinet
it had been possible for the P»S»Io-led opposition to work on the assump-
tion that the successor to the Sukiman cabinet would be one in which it
would be more adequately represented» But in the situation in the first
five months of 1953» it was more of a gamble for any .group to assume that the
cabinet which would succeed the existing one would give it greater power»
Roughly speaking,, four possibilities existed» Possibly a cabinet
like the one of Dr» Sukiman would be formed with a core of ministers from
the conservative groups of the PoNdo and Masjumig and the support—
perhaps even the personal leadership—of the President» A second possi-
bility was a cabinet with a Masjumi-PoNd» core,, but with the PoSoI»-
sympathizing elements of the two main parties, the Natsir and Wilopo
groups» However this composition, essentially the same as that of the
Wilopo cabinetpwas thought to be possible only if the cabinet were led
by Hatta» A number of Masjumi and PoSd» leaders had advocated a Hatta
presidential or business cabinet and were to do so more emphatically during
the June-July cabinet crisis» (49) A third alternative was a new Natsir
(48)	' The Djakarta daily Sumber later gave it as one reason for the Wilopo
cabinet’s fall that the PoN»I» ministers in this cabinet had "failed
to use their power in the interest of the P»Ndo in the coming
general elections»’’ August 39 1953°
(49)	The possibility of a presidential cabinet, that is a cabinet headed
by the President or Vice-President» was not provided for in the
existing (temporary) constitution» This important escape clause
had been eliminated by the commission which made the 1950 constitu-
tion out of the 1945 and 1949 ones» Nevertheless a number of influ-
ential persons had urged repeatedly before and during post-1950
cabinet crises that Hatta should be called back to the Prime Minister’s
position, which he had occupied in the last two years of the armed
struggle» Many of these persons argued that the President, should
take the unconstitutional step of asking him to be Prime Minister189
cabinet, based on the Masjumi and smaller parties and excluding the
P.N.I. Finally a number of observers were discussing the possibility
of a cabinet such as was actually formed, basing itself on the P.N.I.
and its allies and excluding the Masjumi»
In assessing these possibilities the tacticians of the parties had
to bear three new factors in mind. One was the widened gulf between the
Masjumi and the P.N.I. The Wilopo cabinet had seen a decline of the
influence of the Sukiman group within the Masjumi and a decline of the
Wilopo group within the P.N.I. These tendencies could be expected to
continue as the approach of elections made each party close its ranks
and concern itself increasingly with its interests as a party. This made
any sort of P.N.I.-Masjumi cabinet (our first and second possibilities)
difficult of achievement. There were in fact to be three separate
attempts to form a Masjumi-P.N.I. cabinet of one of the two types (or a
combination) in the cabinet crisis which followed Wilopo’s resignation,,,
and all were to fail.
A second factor was the increasingly noticeable divergence of poli-
tical viewpoints between President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta.
This had developed in the course of the Wilopo cabinet period as the
President had come to be more and more closely associated with the
politics of the P.N.I. Hatta’s views were closer to the positions of the
Masjumi and P.S.I. This divergence was an important fact militating
against the possibility of a Hatta presidential or business cabinet.
Thirdly the parties had to consider the implications of the increas-
ingly active political role of President Soekarno. The President had
become deeply involved in the politics of the army struggle. In the
cabinet formation situation he could be expected to use his powers of
prerogative to lessen the chances of a cabinet over which he could
wield little influence. This factor lessened the likelihood of a
Natsir-type cabinet. By a process of elimination there appeared to be
favorable prospects for the fourth alternative, that of a cabinet based
on the P.N.I. and no other major party. The prospects seemed good despite
the fact that Mr. Sartono had failed to form a cabinet of this type when
he was appointed formateur after the fall of the Natsir cabinet, and
despite the further fact that it was unprecedented for the Masjumi, the
country's largest party and the party most influential in the regional
councils, to be excluded from a cabinet. Nevertheless every party had
reason to be cautious.
It is impossible to know clearly how P.N.I. thinking on this crucial
while remaining Vice-President. Others were in favor of his forming
a business cabinet and at the same time resigning from the Vice-
Presidency (with the possibility of returning to it later). Hatta’s
own stated attitude was that he would resign from his office to form
and head a cabinet if asked to do so by parliament. See A. K. Pringgo
digdo, The Office of President in Indonesia, pp. 16, 29-30.190
"succession problem" developed in the first months of 1953» But it would appear
that there was a definite increase in the party leaders’ optimism on this point
at approximately the time of the first meeting of the newly selected party
council in the second week of March. It was at this time that the newly elected
second deputy-chairman of the party, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, stated that "the P.N.I
respects and is prepared to cooperate with any party on a basis of cooperation and
goodwill." (50) This was the first of a series of statements by P.N.I. leaders on
the possibility of greater cooperation with the Communists. (51) It was at this
time too that the Djakarta daily Merdeka. not a P.N.I. organ but edited by a man
in close touch with the leaders of the Sidik and Sartono wings of the party,
began to call openly for Wilopo’s resignation. (52)
By the end of April if not earlier, the P.N.I. leaders had decided
to look for a way to overthrow the cabinet. By this time the cabinet was
extremely weak and it seemed to many in the P.N.I., as it did to a number
of other persons, that the only way to have a government which could govern
by resolving issues rather than shelving them would be through the resigna-
tion of Wilopo and the abandonment of the Masjumi-P.N.I. coalition. At the
same time the P.N.I. leadership considered that the risk involved in over-
throwing the cabinet was worth taking.
It may well be that P.N.I. action against the cabinet was positively
urged by President Soekarno. There were certainly strong indications of his
hostility to the Wilopo cabinet, particularly because of its army policies and
also because of personality conflicts.
Altogether the chances seemed good that the Wilopo cabinet’s successor
would be either a P.N.I.-centered cabinet excluding the Masjumi, such as was
actually formed, or a cabinet of the Sukiman type, based on the conservative
and anti-Socialist groups in the P.N.I. and Masjumi. In either event the P.N.I.
leaders expected to benefit. They would certainly see to it that men of surer
party loyalty held the portfolios allotted to the P.N.I. Thus from March or at
least April onwards the Sidik and Sartono group leaders of the party appear to
have concerned themselves not with whether the cabinet should fall but rather
with when and how this should happen.(53)
(50)	Sin To , March 11, 1953·
(51)	See the later statement of Sidik Djojosukarto "The P.N.I. can cooperate
with any party on a basis of cooperation and goodwill" (Badio Surabaja,
April 29,1953) and the statement of the P.N.I. executive immediately after
the cabinet’s decision to resign to the effect that the party is "prepared
to cooperate with anybody and any (political) current" (Keng Po,June ^,1953)»
(52)	Merdeka. March 16,1953» Also March 23, April 30, May 15 and May 20,1953
(all editorials).
(53)	It was often argued that the numerous crises of the cabinet’s last two
months—those arising from the Bondonuwu motion, from the East Java
officers* "ultimatum" and the Tandjong Morawa affair—were created by
the P.N.I. with the specific purpose of forcing the cabinet to stand down.
The decision in March to choose the cabinet’s Information Minister Mononutu
as the new Ambassador in Peking was described as similarly motivated; it
certainly did cause the cabinet additional difficulties.191
It was the P.N.I. whose decisions were immediately determinative in
the matter of ending the cabinet’s life» No other party played anything
but a secondary role in forcing the actual resignation. But the fall of
the cabinet cannot be interpreted merely in terms of the internal develop-
ments inside one party. For the fall of Wilopo resulted from a basic
refocussing of party alignments which was itself closely related to changes
in the relative strength of the country’s main political forces. In
fact the fall of the cabinet was a product of the same chain of develop-
ments which led subsequently to the formation and long period of office
of the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo.
When the successor cabinet of Ali was formed the main beneficiaries
were the P.N.I., which obtained the Prime Ministership and three other
major portfolios, the minor nationalist parties (P.I.R., with three
portfolios, and four other parties with one each), the minor Moslem
parties (Nahdatul Ulama with three seats and P.S.I.I. with two) and the
Indonesian Communist Party. The Communist Party did not obtain any
portfolios, but two persons often thought to be sympathizers of the party
were included in the cabinet as representatives of the Progressive
Fraction and the Indonesian Peasant Front (Β.Τ.Γ., Barisan Tani Indonesia)
respectively. The party itself acquired a position of importance as a
government-supporting party, as the new cabinet was partially dependent
on its support in parliament.
Now the emergence of this combination of forces was not able to be
predicted with certainty when the Wilopo cabinet was still in office.
We have seen that roughly four possible types of cabinet were able to be
foreseen. But the whole story of the Wilopo cabinet is evidence that the
pattern of alignments which emerged with the coming into office of the
cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo was not accedental. Cooperation between
the Ρ.Ν.Γ., the minoi nationalist parties, the minor Moslem parties and
the Communists on the one hand and between the Masjumi, P.S.I. and
Christian parties on the other was not merely the result of the clash of
tactics in the period of formation of the Ali cabinet. On the contrary
it was the fruit of a long and gradual process creating basically new
political relationships.
One central aspect of these new relationships was the heightened
inability of the P.N.I. and Masjumi to cooperate with one another. This
we have discussed above. But another aspect is of equal importance.
This is the fact that a number of developments of the W|lopo period made
a P.N.I.-led cabinet which excluded the Masjumi a practicable possibility.
The Wilopo cabinet period saw the creation of the Nahdatul Ulama as a
political party outside the Masjumi. It saw a rapid rise in the size and
influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. Finally it witnessed the
crucial defeat of the pro October 1? group within the army. This was
important both in itself and because it weakened the army as an extra-
parliamentary power center and so indirectly increased the power of
President Soekarno over cabinet politics. All of these changes streng-192
thened the group of parties which attained power with the formation of
the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo. In one sense therefore one may
regard the Nahdatul Ulama, the P.K.I. and President Soekarno as important
agents with the P.N.I. of the process which brought the Wilopo period to
an end.
In the case of the Nahdatul Ulama it is difficult to know how far
there was conscious realization of the implications of the change. The
role which the new party played while various attempts were being made
to form a cabinet to succeed Wilopo's suggests that it itself was as yet
barely conscious of its potential importance.
But there can be no doubt that the Communist Party saw the new possi-
bilities. The party’s theoretical organ Bjntang Merah commented early
on the overall power change which manifested itself after October 1? and
opened the way for the P.K.I. to become involved in the divisions within
the main body of the nationalist elite. In February 1953 it wrote edi-
torially, "Whereas the question was until recently one of a struggle for
power between the group of Sukiman as representatives of American imperial-
ism and the group of Sjahrir as representatives of Dutch and British imper-
ialism, it is now changed, thanks to the stand of our Party which has been
followed by the whole People. It has become a struggle for the defense of
democracy against the efforts to seize power of those who want to fascize
the government." (5^)
Between January and June 1953 the tone of P.K.I. pronouncements was
one of increasingly strong opposition to the cabinet. Wilopo was increa-
singly separating himself from the support of the people, Bjntang Merah
declared, increasingly becoming one with the Sjahrir group. It was up to
the Prime Minister to decide whether he would continue to base himself
on the support of the..people or to abandon this decisive factor. (55)
At the same time the party was growing more and more confident not
only in its own strength but in the solidity of its cooperation with "demo-
cratic elements, including progressives in the P.N.I. and other parties." (56)
(Bjntang Merah. Vol. IX, No.2.
(55)	hoc, cit.
(56)	D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Barn, Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1953» Re-
turning from Czechoslovakia and other East European countries in
mid-May, Aidit made statements strongly endorsing the party’s policy
of cooperation with the P.N.I. Eulogizing patriotism, he made special
mention of the importance of honoring national heroes and poets. E.g.
Antara. May 15, 1953. The P.K.I.’s parliamentary leader, Ir. Sakirman,
also stressed patriotism in his address on May 20 as Vice-Chairman
of the National Awakening Day Committee. The following day, Aidit
attacked Vice-President Hatta, who had also spoken, for saying nothing
about Indonesian patriotism. Sin Po, May 21, 1953»193
Thus while in February it was still calling on its members to ’’fight with
all our strength to prevent the return to power of the Sukiman-Subardjo-
Wibisono-Kasman group," there appeared to be much less fear of this
eventuality in April and May, The April issue of Bjntang Merah editori-
alized that "the present situation is one where the government and state
apparatus of Indonesia are still too much under the control of imperialist
compradore elements and their followers, whereas the forces of democracy
are growing fast o’’ (57) The implication was clearly that the PoE.I» no
longer had reason to fear a fall of the cabinet» Like the PoNoI» the
Communist Party now saw the new alliance as sufficiently strong to make
action against Wilopo worth taking»
Summing up one may say that the Wilopo cabinet fell as the result
of a two-fold development. One central factor was the growing inability
of the country’s two main parties, Masjumi and PoN.I., to cooperate with
oneanother. A second factor, closely related, was the increasing power
of the P.N.I. and its new allies, that is, of the forces which had an
interest in a particular type of successor to the cabinet of Wilopo.
At a more fundamental level the cabinet fell for the same reasons
that it failed to implement a number of the most important policies to
which it was committed. To these reasons we turn in our final chapter.
(57Τ"0ρΓΉΐ~νο1° IX» Ko, 4»195
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
The record of the Wilopo cabinet is one of notable achievements and
instructive failures» When it returned its mandate on June 2, 1953, it
had been in office for fourteen months, longer than any of its three pre-
decessors of the post-revolutionary period» The hard work, devotion and
ability of the individual ministers who composed the cabinet was generally
recognized, as was the spirit of teamwork which characterized its opera-
tions» The cabinet’s leaders were men with a concern for systematic
long-term planning and the solution of basic problems»
The most significant achievements of the cabinet were in the economic
field» The measures it took to meet the balance of payments crisis were
highly successful» The stringency of its measures in the field of import-
ing, combined with the fact of unexpected surpluses from the oil industry,
made possible a sharp reduction in the rate of depletion of foreign re-
serves» (l) The cabinet was unable to prevent rises in the level of
domestic prices, but it succeeded in confining these principally to luxury
and semi-luxury articles»
The cabinet had notable success too in the reorganization of govern-
ment finances» The determination with which it pursued its austerity goals
enabled it to persuade the separate Ministries to accept severe budget
cuts» Thus a thoroughly detailed working budget for 1953 existed before
the beginning of that year—a major achievement, despite the fact that
parliamentary approval for the budget had yet to be given» Moreover the
cabinet greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the budget control machinery
of the Finance Ministry» (2) Its success in eliminating many forms of
waste had salutary effects not only economically but also in strengthening
political morality» At the same time it was able to achieve production
increases in a number of important fields, particularly of such basic
foodstuffs as rice, corn, cassava, fish and livestock» (3) The cabinet
placed heavy emphasis on expanding rice production towards the goal of
self-sufficiency in rice» Major production increases, combined with the
system of ’'injections” of imported rice, enabled it to succeed—where its
predessor had failed—in keeping rice prices stable»
(Ϊ) Information provided by Mr» Hans 0» Schmitt»
(2)	Higgins, op» cit»» pp» 6-7»
(3)	Qp° cit»» pp» 11-12»196
The country’s textile output grew rapidly also. In the first half
of 1953 it attained an annual rate of 6l million metres—as compared with
the 23 million metres produced in 1951» The cabinet was less success-
ful with regard to the importation of cloth for the domestic clothing
industry. Its policy of centralizing both the importation and the dis-
tribution of cambrics in the hands of a single cooperative organization
of batik producers resulted in practice in marked shortages of cloth,
some racket profiteering and an increase in speculative trading. (5)
The same period saw encouraging increases in the domestic production
of industrial raw materials and in the licensed capacity of certain con-
trolled industries for which statistics were made available. (6) The
structure of imports in 1953 in evidence of success of the cabinet’s
policy of increasing the proportion of imports of capital goods needed for
economic expansion. (?) In addition the period saw the establishment of
several new institutions of significance for long-term economic develop-
ment. The National Planning Bureau, an agency established to coordinate
governmental planning and facilitate the channeling of economic advice
by foreign specialists, was opened early in the life of the cabinet.
Djakarta’s first stock exchange was inaugurated at approximately the same
time. In April 1953 the government introduced new statutes for the Java
Bank nationalized 14 months earlier, thereby creating the machinery to
regulate relat ions between this central bank and the government.
In such relatively non-political spheres of economic life as cooper-
atives, rural small industry, road and sea communications, transmigration
or inter-insular resettlement and the expansion of educational and train-
ing facilities the cabinet pursued policies which were essentially similar
to those of its predecessors, and with comparable significant success. (8)
(4)	Economic Report on Asia and the Far East. 1953. ECAFE, Bangkok, 195^ >
p. 72
(5)	N. Amstutz, op. cit.
(6)	Higgins, op. cit.. p. 12.
(7)	Higgins, op. cit., p. 9» Also Djawaban Pemerintah atas Pertanjaan
Seksi Perekonomlan dari D.P.H. Sementara,, ,jang diutjapkan oleh Menteri
Perekonomian pada'tgl. 3lTMa.ret~r953~TReply of the Government to
Questions from the Economic Affairs Section of Parliament, given by
the Minister of Economic Affairs, March 31, 1953)s Ministry of Infor-
mation, Djakarta, 1953»
(8)	The number of persons resettled under one of the several inter-insular
"transmigration” schemes in 1953 was ^8,35h. This was higher than*
in any earlier post-revolutionary year, but lower than in 195^· Biro
Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Bureau), Statistik 195.6 (Statis-
tics 1956), B.P.S., Djakarta, 1956, p. 16.197
Politically it was effective in three significant aspects of economic
policy» It was able to prevent the development of a dangerous inflation.
It successfully defied pressures for rapid Indonesianization of "business.
Finally it was able to free itself in part from the constant pressure for
ad hoc policies and thus could bring into existence a few of the prere-
quisites for long-term development planning.
In more directly political fields there are also a number of posi-
tive achievements to record. Strike activity declined markedly in the
Wilopo cabinet period, so that it accounted for the loss of less than
1,000,000 man-days in 1952 and for only 50^000 man-days in the first
half of 1953—as compared with 3,720,000 in 1951» (9) This was due in
large part to the cooperative attitude of the P.KoI. to the cabinet.
But it should be added that the cabinet took strong action against
Communist-led strikes on at least two important occasions, the strike of
autonomous region employees in Central Java in April 1952 and the East
Java sugar strike of late July of that year. The period saw a rise
in the influence of the small non-Communist labor federations—partly due
to support from the Labor Ministry.
Within the government service the cabinet may be said to have ’’held
the line” against pressures for expansion and greater politicization.
There was an Increase in the size of the bureaucracy, but it was princi-
pally in such fields as teaching which were still understaffed. Because
the individual members of the Wilopo cabinet were as strongly loyal to
one another as they were to their respective parties the number of poli-
tical appointments made in the civil service, or at least in its higher
echelons, was small.
Cabinet pressure against wasteful spending lessened the rate at which
patronage was dispensed and kept outright corruption at a fairly low
level. The country’s vigilant press was able to unearth only a small
number of cases of corruption in the whole 14-month period. Corruption
was not the fact to be accepted which it became for much of the political
elite in the period of the next three cabinets.
Legal norms were fairly satisfactorily maintained. The cabinet
initiated several major political trials, those of Sultan Hamid II of
West Borneo, who had been involved in the Westerling coup of January
1950, of Captain Abdul Aziz of the former Netherlands Indies Army who had
led the Makassar revolt of April of the same year, and of Affandi Bidhwan
and Achmad Buchari, leaders of the G.P.I.I. (Masjumi youth organization)
charged with associations with the Darul Islam. All of these trials were
conducted quietly and with decorum. Moreover major strides were taken
towards the elimination of military jurisdiction in civil affairs though
the lifting of the State of Siege in many parts of the country and of the
milder State of War in some others. Of the 21,400 persons who were under
(9) Economic
0
am
East, 1953. p. 71»198
arrest in May 1952 on the basis of the War and Siege regulations all but
7,500 had been set free by the end of that year. (10) Despite the fact
that the government showed weakness in several cases of mob attacks on
newspaper offices, the country’s press did on the whole maintain its high
degree of effective freedom.
In the field of foreign policy the government’s achievements appear
at first sight to have been conspicuous by their absence. Concerned with
bread to the virtual exclusion of circuses, the Wilopo cabinet certainly
made no attempt to use the field of foreign policy to bolster its home
prestige. On the other hand it took a number of foreign policy steps
which were of economic importance. It was able in January 1953 to come
to an agreement with the USA for the continuation of its economic and
technical assistance on a basis formally outside the Mutual Security Ad-
ministration. It initiated Indonesia’s entry into the Colombo Plan.
Further it applied for the country’s admission to the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment.
To end the list of the cabinet’s political achievements, it succeeded
in creating an election law.
But when all this hrs been said the fact remains that the cabinet
failed in terms of its own goals. It failed signally in its policies
for the army. Here the endeavor was made to implement large-scale reor-
ganization. Those principally responsible saw this not only as a budgetary
necessity. They saw it in long-range terms as a contribution to Indo-
nesia’s domestic security and defensive capacity and further to her
political unity and stability. Again they sought, through reorganization,
to canalize the dynamic energies of the former revolutionary army into a
number of activities in the field of economic development.
All this was made impossible because the reorganization plans
aroused such great antagonisms in the army. In the actual event the
cabinet’s policies in the army were almost entirely self-defeating.
Divisions in the army grew more acute through closer links with poli-
tical cleavages and the overall effect was a sharpening of these very
political cleavages and their projection onto the geographical plane.
The army’s effectiveness against the disturbers of domestic security was
lessened as the role of politics in the army grew and as budget cuts were
made at the expense of equipment rather than salaries, (ll) In fact, as
we have seen, the government was unable to effect more than minor improve-
ments in the security of the disturbed areas of the country. Attempting
(10)	Statement of Major Imam Sukarto, Head of Army Information Department,
Antara, March 23, 1953·
(11)	Nasution, op. cit., pp. 258, 289-90.199
to strengthen the army’s ability to unite the archipelago republic,, the
cabinet produced instead an intensification of tendencies to warlordism.
Hoping to divert soldier energies into the fields of reconstruction and
development, it actually turned them to greater varieties of political
activity and thereby added a new dimension to political instability.
It is true that the October 17 whirlwind had roots much deeper than
the policies of the Wilopo cabinet» But it was this cabinet’s determina-
tion to arrive at basic solutions, combined with the concurrent sharp
fall in exports revenues, which brought the long-standing situation to a
head» And this situation the cabinet failed to master» Instead it
became its victim; for indeed it was the October 17 affair, more than
any other single factor, which produced the cabinet’s political crippling»
The Wilopo cabinet had a similar record of failure in the sphere of
its policies to make use of foreign investment» The members of the
cabinet did believe that they should make efforts to attract the private
foreign investor» Indonesians should not place exaggerated faith in
foreign investment, they thought; for the primary source of developmental
capital was the Indonesian people themselves. But the attempt should be
made to attract additional foreign capital in order that development and
the achievement of a reasonable level of living might come more quickly» (12)
One way to do this was by the promulgation of an explicit set of
terms for the operation of foreign capital in Indonesia, a statement
telling the investor clearly what part of his profits he could transmit
outside the country annually, what his obligations were to train Indo-
nesian nationals, how long he would be secure against possible nation-
alization, and so on» It was the stated aim of the Wilopo cabinet, fre-
quently reiterated, to issue such a statement» (13) draft, which
Professor Higgins describes as liberalized, was all but formally
adopted. (l4) But the fact is that no statement had been issued by
the time the cabinet fell.
Of much greater importance is the fact that the cabinet failed in
its policies towards the foreign capital already invested in the country.
Its weakness here was clearly demonstrated in the Tandjong Morawa affair;
(12)	See the statements of the Minister of Finance, Dr. Sumitro Djojo-
hadikusumo, Keng Po, November 29, 1952, and the statement of the
Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Sumanang, Antara, March 18, 1953»
(13)	See the statements of Information Minister Arnold Mononutu, Antara,
July 3, 1952, Communications Minister Ir. Djuanda, Antara, August 28,
1952, Prime Minister Mr. Wilopo, Aneta. September 3, 1952, the
official cabinet announcement of February 27, 1953, Antara. February
28, 1953, and the statement of Economic Affairs Minister Mr. Sumanang,
Antara. March 28, 1953°
(l^l)	P° ^ °200
it was shown there to he politically incapable of implementing its part
of an agreement with foreign plantations» And if it failed by commission
in the question of squatting on East Sumatran estates it failed by omis-
sion in the matter of the North Sumatran oilwells. There the political
hazards of taking the action on which the cabinet had decided were seen
as too great» The damaged wells were not returned to Dutch Shell, but
continued in their uncertain status and very low rate of output»
The Wilopo cabinet period saw what was probably a slight increase
in overseas confidence in the country’s viability as a sphere of invest-
ment. But almost certainly the rate if disinvestment by foreigners,
through estate closings and such indirect techniques as the indiscriminate
tapping of rubber trees, was more rapid than the rate of new foreign
investment.
In the important question of decentralization and regional autonomy
the cabinet’s record is one of postponement of major action» It decreed
autonomy or self-governing status to some areas such as Kalimantan and
certain parts of Sulawesi and the Moluccas which had hitherto had only
administrative status. Early in its period of office it established two
committees to recommend action in the field of financial relations between
the central government and the regions, a ministerial committee consisting
of the Ministers of Finance and the Interior, Dr» Sumitro and Mr. Koem,
and a committee of officials, under the chairmanship of Mr» Nasroen of
the Ministry of the Interior. (15)
But these committees worked slowly. Any basis for a settlement of
financing relationships had necessarily to be a political basis, repre-
senting a positive government stand with regard to the interest conflicts
which existed between richer and poorer areas of the country and between
central government agencies and all others» Such a basis was never found.
Despite demands from a number of regions for greater financing powers,
there was no major step away from the existing system of financing regional
needs substantially by central government subsidies determined on an
ad hoc basis. (16) The long-promised law to regularize relations between
the central government and the regional ones and increase the financial
powers of the latter was not made.
Furthermore no step was taken to relieve the anomalous situation
which existed in relation to the interim regional legislative councils
(15)	On the work of the Nasroen committee see J. de Bruine, "Financiele
Verhouding tussen de Centrale Eegering en de Daerahs,” Ekonomi dan
Keuangan Indonesia. Vol. VIS No. 2-3, February-March, 1953»
(16)	See Douglas S. Paauw, ’’The Hole of Local Finance in Indonesian
Economic Development," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia. Vol. VIII,
No. 1, January 1955»201
established in many parts of Java and Sumatra under Government Regula-
tion 39 of 1950· These continued to function in most of the provinces
where they had been established in the period of the Natsir cabinet, but
elsewhere there were no legislative councils. Masjumi opposition ensured
that there was no alternative system of establishing councils on a tem-
porary pre-elections basis. On the other hand P.N.I. opposition was
effective against pressure for early regional elections. Thus the status
quo, with which no party was satisfied,, was maintained. The cabinet merely
stated that regional elections would follow the elections for parliament
and the Constituent Assembly and be conducted on similar lines.
One can add a number of other fields in which the cabinet failed to
take decisive action. It did little or nothing to simplify the organiza-
tion of the central government. This matter too was turned over to a
committee, the Committee for the Organization of the Ministries under
the chairmanship of Mr. A. E. Pringgodigdo, Director of the President’s
cabinet, and It was only on April 195^ that the committee submitted its
findings. The plans for rationalization in the government services,
plans which were actually never given cabinet endorsement, were in effect
abandoned with the development of the October 1? crisis.
A similar situation existed in some aspects of foreign policy.
Thus the cabinet did not Implement its promise to resume the regotiations
with the Netherlands which had been broken off with the fall of the
Sukiman cabinet. In these negotiations the question of the Netherlands-
Indonesian Union and the economic provisions of the Round Table Confer-
ence agreement of 19^9 had been discussed together with the question of
sovereignty over Irian (or West Irian). But when Holland subsequently
refused to discuss the Irian question any further the PoN.I. opposed
further negotiations on Indonesian grievances against other aspects, of
the existing treaty relationship. Similarly the cabinet took no action
in the matter of the reparations negotiations with Japan which were begun
under the Sukiman cabinet and temporarily abandoned in January 1952. (17)
This was in part because of the parties’ conflicting stands in the matter
of ratification of the San Francisco treaty with Japan. Finally nothing
was done in the matter of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.—not
even after the passage of the Rondonuwu motion.
In the field of agrarian reform the action promised in the government’s
program was not taken. The same may be said of the matter of educational
reform. Finally in the field of labor legislation the government did
prepare and endorse a number of bills but did not succeed in making them
into law. (18)
(17)	The "cabinet had made no specific promises in this regard.
(18)	In view of the great importance attached by the men of the Wilopo
cabinet to economic development it should be said that the cabinet
did not attempt to tackle the politically most difficult tasks202
The Wilopo cabinet was holder and more ambitious than any other
cabinet of the post-revolutionary period. It was probably as successful
as any other cabinet in terms of achieving a set goal. It had a longer
life and more positive achievements than any of the other cabinets which
attempted to tackle basic long-term problems, the cabinets of Natsir
(September 1950-March 1951)> Sukiman (April 1951-i’eDruary 1952) and the
second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (March 1955-March 1957)· Slight as
was its respite from the constantly recurring political crises which
threatened its very existence, it nevertheless succeeded more than any
other cabinet of the period in freeing itself from the pressure for ad
hoc solutions to underlying problems.
How then are the cabinet’s failures to be explained? We shall
concern ourselves here with two types of explanations. We shall consider
first the party political factors which limited the cabinet’s operations
and then go on to examine the general political framework and particularly
the disproportion which existed between the tasks of government in post-
revolutionhry Indonesia and the resources available to governments.
Throughout its period of office and particularly towards the end of
it, the cabinet was forced to inaction by the divisions between the
parties represented in it, and particularly by divisions between the
Masjumi and the P.H.I. This was the case in such foreign policy fields
as the question of West Irian and of economic relations with Holland,
the question of diplomatic exchange with the U.S.S.E. and the matter of
resumption of reparations talks with Japan. It was the case also in
questions related to the role of foreign capital in the country, particu-
larly in the matter of the request of Dutch Shell for the return of its
wells in North Sumatra. The same deadlock explains the cabinet’s inaction
on the issue of the composition of the regional councils.
Already at the time of the cabinet’s assumption of power the two
major parties had adopted mutually contradictory positions on a number
of these matters—In some cases with the solemnity of congress resolu-
tions. But this fact acquired new importance with the development of
new tensions between the two parties in the cabinet’s period of office.
The central aspect of these new tensions--and it was both a causal
and a derivative aspect—was the change inside the P.N.I. The weakness
of the Wilopo cabinet was a measure of the weakness of Mr. Wilopo and
his followers inside their own party. As the Wilopo group lost more and
associated with a determined approach to economic development and
modernization in countries such as Indonesia. There was periodic
discussion at the governmental level of such recommendations as the
lengthening of the working day from seven to eight hours, the re-
organization of taxation to increase the rate of domestic capital
accumulation and the institution of birth control programs. But
neither the Wilopo cabinet nor any other cabinet attempted to take
action in any of these fields.203
more of its influence inside the P.M.I., so the cabinet lost the power
to act as the independent team which it was in the early period of its
term. By March or April 1953 it had lost almost all of its independence.
The decisions of the regular Tuesday meetings of the cabinet were
strictly circumscribed by what was decided at the Monday meetings of the
executives of the two parties. The changed situation was reflected in
the stand of the Masjumi executive at the time of the cabinet’s resigna-
tion,that a "business cabinet" was no longer possible. (19)
In a wider sense both the increased tension between the Masjumi
and the P.M.I. and the decline in Wilopo’s position inside his own party
were part of an overall change in political alignments. They were part
of the polarization of forces which placed the Masjumi, P.S.I. and
Christian parties on one side of the political fence and the P.M.I.,
the Moslem League parties (Mahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I.), the minor
nationalist parties and the P.K.I. on the other, stronger, side.
In the early period of the cabinet’s life the crucial political
issues were ones on which the two main parties were both internally
divided. They were issues between two sections of the intellectual
component of the political elite, between the P.S.I.-sympathizing groups
on the one hand and the anti-Socialist conservatives on the other. (See
the chart on page 122.) The mass leader elements had relatively little
influence at this level.
By the time the cabinet was about to fall the divisions inside the
two main parties had come to be much less important. In each case one
group had achieved a position of clear preponderance. The Matsir group
had come to wield predominant influence inside the Masjumi. The P.M.I.
had come under the virtually complete control of an alliance of the con-
servative intellectual leaders around Mr. Sartono and Mr. All Sastroamidjojo
with the mass leaders around Sidik Djojosukarto. Furthermore the P.M.I.
was cooperating increasingly closely with the P.K.I. The Communist
Party and the minor Moslem parties were in any case growing in power.
The P.M.I.’s need for anti-Masjumi allies made these mass leader groups
a factor of importance in cabinet politics. Thus there developed a change
of alignments of basic importance for the whole course of politics in
the post-revolutionary period. The combination of forces on which the
Wilopo cabinet was based was no longer viable.
A number of political party developments of the period of the Wilopo
cabinet contributed to this change of alignments. One was the Mahdatul
Ulama’s secession from the Masjumi, formalized in July 1952. Another
was the consolidation of the power of the -Natsir group inside the Masjumi
which resulted from this party’s conference in August 1952. The process
was carried much further by the October 1? affair which heightened
tensions between Wilopo and his party, forged closer links between the
(19) Antara, June 3» 1953»204
P.N.I. and the Communist Party, and brought President Soekarno into an
increasingly active involvement with P.N.I. politics. A final contribu-
tory factor was the government’s vigor in pushing for early elections.
With elections to be held in a fairly short time, there was strong pressure
on all parties to close their ranks and pursue their own ends as parties
as vigorously as possible. The P.N.I., fearful of the grassroots power
of Masjumi-led Islam, was anxious to postpone the elections for which the
government was vigorously pressing. To be able to prepare itself for
the elections in the way it wanted to, it needed to break its association
with the Masjumi and to gain and hold government power without sharing
it with its major rival. And for this it needed new allies.
At the level of extra-parliamentary forces there was a major power
shift which also contributed to the change in party alignments. For the
October 17 affair upset what was previously a delicate balance between
the army leadership and the personal power of President Soekarno. With
the pro October 17 officers removed from the leadership of the army this
balance was destroyed. And with army divisions more acute and open the
army ceased temporarily to play any important role at the level of Djakarta
politics. (20) The power of President Soekarno grew correspondingly
greater. This was an important factor strengthening the new alliance of
the P.N.I. with the mass leader groups, for without it it is doubtful
whether this group could have expected to win and keep government power.
But the change in alignments may also be explained at another level.
It is certainly significant that the power of all mass leader and opposi-
tionist groups was rising in our period. This is true not only for the
P.K.I., the Moslem League parties and the Sidik group of the P.N.I., but
also for the Isa Anshary group inside the Masjumi. Moreover the period
saw a major victory of mass leader officers over intellectuals in the
army.
One factor which helps explain this rising power of mass leader
forces is the growing anticipation of elections; for electioneering
requires the skills of the mass leader rather than those of his counter-
part, the intellectual. But a more important part of the explanation
lies in the existence of a diffuse but increasingly powerful political.
discontent. This discontent was reflected in the increase of regionalist
feeling in the Wilopo period and in the fact of a continuing high level
of anti-foreign sentiment. It was channeled in a variety of ways. But
in every case mass leaders were the chief agents of the channeling process
and the intellectuals* regime the chief target of their protest.
(20) This lasted till the ceremonial restoration of army unity at the
Jogjakarta military conference of February 1955- Shortly after this
important conference a substantially reunited army leadership acted
decisively on the Djakarta political stage, forcing the resignation
of the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo. See Smail, op. cit.205
looking at the growth of mass leader influence in terms of rising
political discontent, we come to more fundamental aspects of the Wilopo
cabinet’s failures. For this brings us to examine the general social
and political framework within which all governments of the post-revolu-
tionary period have had to work.
When one examines the political reactions which the Wilopo cabinet
invoked against itself by its army policies and its policy in the squatting
issue in East Sumatra it is impossible to explain its failures simply
by reference to conflict between the government parties. For in these
cases the party conflict was merely the projection of a wider social
conflict. Moreover it was the projection of a necessary governmental
dilemma, for the social conflicts in question were ones with which
governments were forced to become involved to the extent that they
pursued vigorous policies oriented to long-term solutions. In these
cases the failures of the Cabinet must be traced back to the geographical,
economic and social realities of post-revolutionary Indonesia and to
the lack of resources at the disposal of governments attempting to deal
with these realities.
One basic reality is that Indonesia is a country whose very island
nature and long history of divisions makes political consensus difficult
to maintain. It is a country with a multiplicity of diverse and con-
flicting social interests and a wide diffusion of political power, where
a powerful will to unity must contend with centrifugal tendencies rooted
in both history and economic structure.
Her long period of colonial rule left Indonesia with acute economic
problems. When independence came it came to a country whose agricultural
capacity was increasingly incapable of keeping up with a rapid rate of
population increase. It came to a country whose economic structure was
one-sidedly export-oriented and whose governmental machine was heavily
dependent on raw materials exports and the prices these fetched on a
highly fluctuating world market. And it came in the aftermath of a period
of great physical destruction. Moreover it came to a country whose people
had not been trained to take over its government, but who on the contrary
had been barred from political and administrative participation except
at low levels.
The problems which this heritage presented for the governments of
independent Indonesia were made even more formidable as a result of the
revolutionary means by which independence was achieved. The revolution
and the Japanese occupation which preceded it caused tremendous social
ferment and high new expectations. In particular it created a new group
of young men taken out of their traditional roles in villages and towns
to become its soldiers, propagandists and organizers. These men, an206
estimated 5θΟ»θΟΟ» fired with militant political idealism, had been
promised a stake in the new society of independence. But the post-revolu-
tionary leadership had great difficulty in fulfilling this promise. The
regime as a whole lacked the resources to integrate the group adequately
in terms of the personal aspirations of its members and their ideological
aspirations for the society as a whole. Thus every government had to
face the fact that a large segment of its politically effective public
opinion was dissatisfied with its role in post-revolutionary society and
therefore prone to find political expression through various forms of
"oppositionism."
The relative importance of these ex-revolutionaries within the news-
paper reading public was all the greater because there existed no firmly
rooted indigenous propertied class which could exert major countervailing
power. And moreover the ex-revolutionaries were well equipped to provide
political leadership for the much larger number of persons who were
affected by ongoing social change and freshly stimulated expectations of
material advancement.
The governments of the period faced additional pressures of a differ-
ent kind at the level of the political elite. Here they had to deal
with repeated demands from politico-commercial cliques clamoring to fill
what was potentially an economic vacuum. They had to face a variety of
claims for bureaucratic patronage. And they had to create minimal con-
sensus in the face of a splintered and fractionalized system of parties.
Furthermore this system was not merely an institutional barrier; it
reflected the existence of a multiplicity of small power centers, each
in a position to veto many types of government action. (21)
With such great achievements expected of them and at the same time
such a variety of obstacles limiting their ability to implement consistent
policies, the cabinets of the period were yet poorly endowed with govern-
mental resources. The Wilopo cabinet had full disposition over a cen-
tralized and unified police force and the efficient pamong nrad.ia corps
or general civil administration. In addition it possessed important
instruments of political control in the Ministries of Education, Informa-
tion and Religion. But on the other hand its ability to use the army as
its instrument was severely limited by the army’s internal divisions
and its aspirations to political influence. The power of the navy and
air force, particularly important in archipelago conditions, was miniscule
And the level of efficiency of most of the country’s administrative
organs was low.
In addition the cabinet labored under constitutional disabilities.
It could be overthrown by parliament but lacked effective power to call
(21) See Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia,” in
Philip W. Thayer, Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, Johns
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1956 s pp. 128 ff.207
for parliament to he dissolved.» For in the matter of dissolution the
President’s decision was final» The fact that President Soekarno could
and did exercise wide influence over government, through the use of
independent and non-responsible power, was a major limitation on the
cabinet.
Finally Wilopo had very little time. His cabinet survived for only
14- months and in the last eight months of that time it was so fully
occupied with the political tasks of preserving its existence that little
time was left for the actual task of government. The short life of
cabinets is especially crippling in Indonesian conditions because so much
of the country’s planning is done at the ministerial level rather than
within the civil service. Thus the members of the Wilopo cabinet had
to think through many of the problems of their ministries anew. In many
cases they did not press for parliamentary consideration of bills sub-
mitted by their predecessors until they had examined them. Yet these
same men also bore a heavy load of administrative responsibility. They
were called on to make decisions in a variety of matters of detail,
which were however of political importance because of the lack of routi-
nization of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Their ability to enact policy
was further impeded by the time-consuming procedures which parliament
used to deal with their bills. (22)
These were the fundamental limitations within which government
operated in the Wilopo period and, mutatis mutandis, in the whole of the
period since the end of the revolution. In all of the post-revolutionary
period a major discrepancy has existed between what is expected of govern-
ments and what they can do to fulfill or channel these expectations.
This discrepancy explains the growth of political ferment in its various
forms. And it explains the weakening of the consensus which existed at the
level of the political elite in 1950 and whose terms were set by the intellectu
als. As this consensus has grown weaker power within the political elite
has tended to shift from intellectuals to mass leaders (using these
terms always in our particular sense). In fact the whole of the post-
revolutionary period has seen a rise in the influence of mass leaders.
Mass organizations have grown in political importance—labor and veterans’
organizations, regionalist organizations and military units—and conse-
quently there has been a rise in the power of their leaders, men skilled
as organizers and mediators of ideas. Intellectuals have maintained
their ascendency in the bureaucracy and have continued to hold large
numbers of cabinet posts. But their political influence has waned as
they have been held responsible for the failure of governments to do
what was expected of them. As the number of intellectuals has risen
particular individuals of the group have become more teadily dispensable.
Intellectuals in government have tended more and more to act as the
(22) For a statistical survey of the laws, emergency laws, government
regulations and presidential regulations enacted between 1950 and
1955 see Pringgodigdo, op. cit., p. 4l.208
representatives of collective entities outside their group. In part they
have become spokesmen for propertied interests. But because of the rela-
tive weakness of these interests they have tended to fall back more and
more on mass organizations and their leaders and to become representatives
of these. This has made government generally weaker and more negative,
for the power of different mass leader groups has tended to be effective
in mutually contradictory directions.
This brings us finally to a discussion of the place of the Wilopo
cabinet in the sequence of eight cabinets which have held office since
December 1949.
The Wilopo cabinet's resignation was followed by a record 60-day
crisis in which four distinct attempts to form a cabinet—of Mangunsarkoro
and Mr. Roem, of Mukarto Notowidigdo of the P.N.I. (with two distinct
commissions) and of Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap of the Masjumi—all failed.
The crisis was finally terminated with the success of Mr. Wongsonegoro,
chairman of P.I.R., who announced that he had been able to form a cabinet
with Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo of the P.N.I. as Prime Minister and himself
as First Deputy Prime Minister. This cabinet, now kno’-,r| as the first Ali
Sastroamidjojo cabinet, was a coalition of the P.N.I. with the Moslem
League parties and the minor nationalist parties. It held office for
almost two years, supported by the P.K.I. and opposed by the Masjumi,
the P.S.I. and the Catholic Party, (soon afterwards also by the Protestant
Parkindo and the Democratic Fraction and later by a section of P.I.R.).
The successor of this first cabinet of Mr. Ali was the short-lived
cabinet of Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap of the Masjumi (August 1955-March 195&)·
This was originally composed of the Masjumi, the P.S.I. and the Christian
parties, most of the minor nationalist parties and the two large Moslem
League parties, Nahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I., but these last two subse-
quently resigned. It faced the opposition of the P.N.I. and P.K.I. and
later of the Moslem League parties.
Thus the composition of these two cabinets represents the new align-
ment of political forces which evolved in the period of the cabinet of
Wilopo. In the 31 months of their existence there was a firm alliance
of the Masjumi with the P.S.I. and one almost equally firm between the
P.N.I. and the Communists. The Christian parties swung definitely to
the Masjumi and P.S.I. side, and the Moslem League parties more hesitantly
to the side of the P.N.I. and P.K.I. The minor nationalist parties suc-
ceeded in selling their parliamentary votes to each side in turn, but at
the expense of accentuating the internal divisions inside themselves—
to the point of open breach in the case of the P.I.R. and P.R.N. The
internal divisions inside the P.N.I. and the Masjumi grew less and less
important. President Soekarno came to be more clearly and openly associ-
ated with the P.N.I. and its allies, and Vice-President Hatta with the
Masjumi-led bloc. So the division between the two men became wider. It209
reached a climax during the army crisis of June-July 1955, which led to
the resignation of the first All cabinet and its replacement by the cabinet
of Burhanuddin.
In terms of party alignments the period of these two cabinets was
merely an unfolding of the tendencies whose beginnings we have observed
in the period of Wilopo. But this unfolding was at the same time a
process of consolidation. This was partly because each of these two
cabinets, and particularly that of Ali, used government power widely for
party ends. But more particularly it resulted from the increasing im-
portance of regionalism and of conflict between Java and the outer
islands.
Bor the lines of the inter-regional conflict ran parallel to those
of the issue between parties. The Ali cabinet rested primarily on the
parties strong in Java. The Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet on the other hand
was based on parties strong outside Java, or at least outside East and
Central Java, the main area of the ethnic Javanese. The election results
made this clear, clearer than it had previously been seen to be. The
Nahdatul Ulama and P.K.I. each obtained more than 85% of their
votes in Java and more than 65% from Central and East Java. By contrast
only 51% of the Masjumi's votes came from Java, and only a little over
25% from Central and East Java. The P.S.I. obtained 46% of its votes in
Java and only 12% from the Central and Eastern areas. And neither of
the Christian parties obtained as much as 11% of its voting support
from the main island. (23)
The alignment pattern changed temporarily with the formation of the
second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (March 1956-March 195?)· One effect
(23) The population of Java was then reckoned to be 66.2% of that of all
Indonesia, and the population of East and Central Java 45.6% See
Herbert Peltfcu The Indonesian Elections of 1955, p. 62.
To some extent this coalescing of party and regional alignments
was the product of the policies of the Ali and Burhanuddin cabinets.
It is a fact that the Ali cabinet placed economic burdens primarily
on the areas outside Java. policy of inflation financing was
hardest on exporters, whose strength is primarily outside the main
island. And Its rapid Indonesianization of shipping created serious
impediments to the flow of inter-insular trade. Regionalism grew
rapidly in the Ali cabinet period. The Burhanuddin cabinet reversed
the tendency to inflation financing and rapid Indonesianization.
The negative effects of its economic policies were felt most strongly
by importers and more generally by the new business class of Indo-
nesians, a class primarily centered in Java.210
of the elections of September and December 1955 had been to awaken the
long dormant P.N.I. fears of the P.K.I. Thus this cabinet, formed as
the elected parliament was assembling, was one in which the P.N.I. and
Masjumi were both represented. A P.N.I.-led cabinet, it included five
ministers each of the P.N.I., Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama. The P.K.I.
was the one major party excluded. But it supported the cabinet.
But it was not long before the old divisions between the P.N.I.-led
and Masjumi-led blocs of parties came strongly to the fore again. They
limited the cabinet’s capacity for action to an even greater extent than
they had in the case of the cabinet of Wilopo. The Nahdatul Ulama coop-
erated chiefly with the P.N.I. And the P.K.I. was able to regain its
close associations with the P.N.I. With the P.N.I. increasingly dominant
in Djakarta and regionalist feeling mounting rapidly outside Java, there
was strong pressure for the Masjumi to leave the cabinet. It finally
did this on January 1957 after the resignation of the Sumatran Hatta from
the Vice-Presidency and after the first of the bloodless coups by officer-
led regional Councils, in Central and North Sumatra.
Since that time the pattern of alignments has been substantially
as it was from the period of the Wilopo cabinet onwards. This pattern
is reflected in the present cabinet, the ’’extra-parliamentary business
cabinet" formed by “the President and led by Ir. Djuanda (non-party). The
main portfolios in this cabinet are held by P.N.I. leaders, leaders of
the minor Moslem parties and non-party persons, and the cabinet is sup-
ported by the P.K.I. The Masjumi and Catholic party oppose the cabinet
and the P.S.I. also in all except formality.
However the Djuanda cabinet period has seen major increases in the
power of extra-parliamentary forces—of regional elites, of President
Soekarno and of the military. Correspondingly it has seen a great decline
in the power of political parties as such—with the exception of the
Communist Party. The pattern of party alignments as described above has
therefore lost much of its importance.
Examining the cabinets of the period since 194-9 in terms of the poli-
tical context in which each went about its work it is possible to
establish a rough division into three main periods. The first four of
the eight cabinets, those of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, all
operated within a somewhat similar framework. In their period, between
December 1949 and June 1953» the political elite was still substantially
united on fundamentals. The intellectual leaders of the revolution re-
tained a position of primacy within the elite and the most important
political cleavages were between sections of the intellectual group.
Constitutionalism operated slowly but fairly effectively, with the main
extra-parliamentary power centers, the President and the army leadership,
balanced off against one another. In this context it was possible for
cabinets to concern themselves with long-term policies, and so to come to
grips with some of the basic and difficult political tasks of government.211
The political context was very different in the period of the next
two cabinets9 the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo and the one of
Burhanuddin Harahap, between August 1953 and March 1956. By this time
there was much less left of the unity of the nationalist elite on poli-
tical fundamentals. This elite had been split as a result of a decline
in the power of its unifying intellectual component. In the new bi-
polar situation, mass leader elements, including the Indonesian Communist
Party, were involved in the main issues of cabinet politics. Also Cold
War issues played a role of increased importance.
The deeper divisions within the elite, combined with the fact of
impending elections, resulted in a lessening of respect for the rules of
constitutional politics. Moreover the main extra-parliamentary forces,
the President and the army, were now no longer delicately balanced
against one another and so each in turn intervened on the central political
stage—with greatly increased openness.
In their policy orientation the Ali and Burhanuddin cabinets repre-
sent a surrender to the forces which crippled and eventually overthrew
Wilopo. They governed almost entirely on an ad hoc basis. Unlike their
predecessors they made few attempts at long-term planning. They were
interim pre-election cabinets and the work of each of them, and particu-
larly of the Ali cabinet, was circumscribed by the requirements of elec-
tions politics'.
The current phase since March 1956, the period of the second Ali
cabinet and the present cabinet of Djuanda, has been characterized prin-
cipally by the importance of the regional conflict and the projection of
political divisions onto the geographical plane. In this post-election
period the importance of parties has declined. But there has been a
further rise in.the power of mass leaders, and a further increase in the
role of extra-parliamentary forces. An attempt at long-term policies
was made at the beginning of the period but the subsequent development
of a series of · acute economic, political and military crises has made
government by ad hoc decisions a necessity.
The Wilopo period was a turning point in the politics of post-
revolutionary Indonesia, as it marked the transition from the first to
the second of these three main phases. In the first place the Wilopo
period saw a decisive victory of mass leader forces over political forces
led by intellectuals. Mass leaders were dramatically successful in the
army in the October 17 affair. Moreover there was a sharp rise in
their influence in party politics. The 14-month period saw the gradual
ending of the situation which had prevailed thereto, where cabinet politics
was substantially confined to intellectual-led political forces. In the
early period of the cabinet the main contenders at this level were still
the Socialist-sympathizing ’’younger generation" (Natsir, Wilopo, P.S.I.)
and the more conservative Soekarno-allied "older generation" (Sukiman,
Sartono, P.I.fi., etc.). But with the development of the October 17 crisis,212
the subsequent increase in Masjumi-P.N.I. tensions and. the P.N.I.’s search
for allies among mass leader political groups, the center of conflict
shifted. Thenceforth there was no inter-party group of intellectual-led
anui-Socialist conservatives. The increasing power of mass leader groups
had created a situation where only one intellectual-led political force
existed—roughly the equivalent of the Socialist-sympathizing group, but
new more accurately described as a Masjumi-led group. The intellectuals
of the P.N.I.-led group, mainly conservative anti-Socialists, were no
longer able to wield independent power as intellectuals; for they were
tied to an alliance of predominantly powerful mass leaders. With this
major decline in the role of intellectuals, the unity of the political
elite on fundamental objectives was severely impaired.
A second aspect of the watershed role of the Wilopo period is seen
in the fact that it witnessed the first full showdown between the country’s
main extra-parliamentary forces, the President and the leadership of the
army. Where previously these two giant spectators had intervened only
indirectly in the arena of constitutional politics, they did so all but
openly in the army crisis of 1952, the developments of October 17 in
Djakarta and the subsequent military coups in Surabaja, Makassar and
Palembang. This showdown issued in an overwhelming victory for President
Soekarno and a great decline in the influence of the army. One result
was to strengthen the political forces associated with the President for
several years. Another was to weaken constitutionalism as a vehicle for
political conflict. The constitutional framework inaugurated by the in-
tellectuals declined in importance with the decline in power of the in-
tellectuals as the unifying component of the political elite.
Finally the Wilopo cabinet period is of focal significance because
this cabinet was able and willing to pursue policies oriented to long-
term political and economic solutions. In this respect it stands in
contrast to its successor cabinets,all of which were obliged by the poli-
tical dynamics of their position io govern more exclusively on an ad hoc
basis.
In a situation increasingly dominated by political ferment the Wilopo
cabinet addressed itself with striking determination to what it saw as
the basic long-term problems which Indonesian governments had to solve.
The cabinet’s period was one in which internal pressures to political
discontent were accentuated by such external factors as the fall of inter-
national raw materials prices and the increasing intransigence of the
policy of Holland towards Indonesia. It was a period of rising regionalist
feeling and constantly high anti-foreign sentiment. Yet the cabinet dared
to go ahead with the implementation of its unpopular policies, defying
the sectional challenges to its authority, whatever their source. The
very attempt was a major unrecognized achievement.