PERANAKAN CHINESE POLITICS IN INDONESIA MARY F. SOMERS INTERIM REPORTS SERIES MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT Southeast Asia Program Department of Asian Studies Cornell University Ithaca, New York Price — $2.00 SEAP Publications ^*9? Copy Do not remove from room 213 640 Stewart AvenueA Note Concerning the Interim Reports Series One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholarship is the substantial interval that often intervenes between the completion of field research and the first appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. American scholarship relating to Indonesia has been no exception, and here this delay has been particularly regrettable inasmuch as the extent of research being undertaken is so limited. With respect to much of the research carried out in post-revolu- tionary Indonesia there has been a lag of two to three or more years between the termination of research and the first publication describing its results. From this situation stem a number of unfortunate consequences. Scholars and others having a serious interest in the country, Indonesians as well as Americans, are sometimes required to wait so long before seeing the results of such research that when finally available its importance to them has appreciably diminished. Moreover, because they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and character of this earlier but as yet unreported work, they frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily laying foundations their predeces- sors have laid but not yet divulged and in undertaking analysis of data similar to that already collected and analyzed or largely analyzed. Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia waste much precious time and effort in duplicating or roughly duplicating what has already been done or is in the process of being completed, instead of utilizing such materials, building on them, and possibly refining them. Parenthetically it might be observed that some of those perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print only when attached to a body of material wherein each word has been given its final polish are deprived of what might well have been healthy and useful criticism by those who would have been interested in reading their work at some earlier stage of its processing. Also this reluctance to publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians, because frequently for several years they look in vain for some published account of research for which they smoothed the way or in which they actually participated. Consequently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of American scholars undertaking research in their country. The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project’s Interim Reports Series is to avoid insofar as possible the situation described above. Wherever feasible those undertaking research in connection with our project will perpare preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of their study well before publication of their relatively finished mono- graphs or articles. Our object, then, is to make available in provisional form what we believe to be some of the more important of our findings soon enough to be of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies relating to Indo- nesia or having a serious interest in the topics with which our work is concerned. It is our hope that by doing so we will be of help both to interested Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United States and other countries. In thus submitting Interim Reports for early publication the members of our group will generally be doing so prior to command of all relevant data or before this data has been completely analyzed. Certainly they will be submitting them without having had an opportunity to cast them in finished written form. It should therefore be emphasized that these preliminary reports are to be considered as explicitly tentative and provisional in character. It is our expectation that most of them will be followed by later publications bearing on the same subject of a less tentative and more solid character. We hope that our Interim Reports will elicit candid and open criticism from interested persons reading them. For we believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many cases such criticisms will point the way to better analysis of the data in hand and/or further research on facets of the subject so far not adequately covered. Thus we cordially invite and welcome such criticism. We would appreciate it if those inclined to offer it would write to the author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. George McT. Kahin DirectorPERANAKAN CHINESE POLITICS IN INDONESIA Mary F. Somers f J 4 INTERIM REPORTS SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Southeast A sia Program Department of Asian Studies Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1964 ! ί4 @ 1964 by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project ¥PREFACE This report is the latest of the studies of the Chinese minority in Indonesia to be published by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. The Project has a long-term interest in this subject, and earlier studies which it has published include Giok-Lan Tan’s The Chinese of Sukabumi and Donald E. Willmott’s The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900-1958. In the present Interim Report Mary F. Somers undertakes to view the overseas Chinese question as part of the politics of Indonesia, concen- trating on the persons of Chinese descent who are Indonesian citizens. She devotes particular attention to the peranakan Chinese organization, Baperki, and the role it has played, both in Indonesia’s Chinese commu- nity and generally on the Indonesian political scene. She is also con- cerned with the reaction of the peranakan Chinese to the possibility of cultural assimilation into Indonesian society and the willingness of the Indonesians to accept them. After gaining her B. A. in History and Chinese Language at Trinity College in Washington, D„ C. , Miss Somers entered Cornell University in 1958 as a Ph. D. candidate in the Department of Government and Southeast Asia Program. Following an initial period of research at Cornell and an intensive study of the Chinese (Mandarin) and Indonesian languages, she carried out research in Indonesia from December 1961 to May 1963 under a Foreign Area Training Fellowship. While there she interviewed promi- nent Chinese widely--both in Java and in Sumatra (Palembang, Medan, Padang), in Sulawesi (Makassar) and in Kalimantan (Bandjarmasin, Pontianak, Singkawang). Miss Somers wishes to emphasize that the conclusions she has reached in the report are tentative; and she hopes to develop them further in a forthcoming publication. She would, therefore, welcome any com- ments on or criticisms of her study. G. McT. Kahin Ithaca, N. Y. Director March 16, 1964 iiiA C KNOW LEDG MEN TS So many individuals in Indonesia assisted me in this research that it would be ungrateful to name only a few; therefore, let me say a collective thank you to them all. Particular thanks are due to Profes- sor George McT. Kahin, Professor G. William Skinner, J.A.C. Mackie, and Daniel S. Lev for their comments on the draft of this re- port. Responsibility for any errors is, however, mine. Cornell University Ithaca, New York April 15, 1964 Mary F. Somers ivTABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page INTRODUCTION.................................. . 1 Historical patterns of Chinese settlement ...... . 1 Peranakan-totok divisions................... . 4 Peranakan organizations in Indies public life: Broker politics .......................... 5 BAPERKI......................................... 8 Previous Chinese political activity. .......... 8 Problem of discrimination..................... 9 Citizenship .................................. 9 Baperki established to defend Chinese........ 11 The elections of 1955 11 Siauw’s role in Parliament: minority representation . 12 Dual citizenship treaty with China.......... . 14 Voter exemption from the treaty.............. 15 Assaatism ................................ 16 1957 elections ............................ 18 Chinese schools question ............... 19 Baperki an educational organization in the traditional pattern ..................... 23 DUAL CITIZENSHIP SETTLED, 1959-62 ......... 24 Alien retail ban and its effect. ............. 24 Response of Chinese community ............ 26 Effects of the ban on Indonesia ............. 28 II vCHAPTER Page West Java a special situation................... 28 Dual citizenship treaty goes into effect .... 29 Exemptions from the treaty: Chinese-Indonesian negotiations............ 30 Implementation of the treaty .................. 32 Baperki active in implementation: evaluation of treaty's effects........................ 34 III THE DEBATE ON ASSIMILATION......................... 36 Baperki's view: integration ................... 36 Ambivalent attitude toward Chinese traditions . 36 Peranakan Chinese as a "suku".................. 38 Assimilation and opposition to Baperki .... 38 Political implications......................... 39 Views of older and younger generations .... 40 President Soekarno's intervention.............. 42 1963 riots against Chinese.................. . 45 IV INDONESIAN VIEWS OF THE CHINESE ...... 47 Cultural pluralism and Indonesian unity .... 47 Mass support for anti-Chinese incidents .... 48 Sarekat Islam ................................. 48 Tanggerang incident .......................... 49 The Indonesian revolution: elite attitudes 1945- 49........................................ 49 Elite attitudes 1950-57: Islamic parties .... 50 The nationalists, 1950-57 51 The PKI, 1950-63 .............................. 52 Baperki finds allies in PKI, Partindo.......... 54 Importance of economic problems................ 55 viINTRODUCTION This paper describes the way in which changes in Indonesian politics since the revolution have affected the Chinese in Indonesia, in particular, the so-called peranakans. It devotes attention to the development of Baperki, a peranakan community organization, and to the question of the citizenship of the Indonesian Chinese. In the period since I960, a number of young peranakans have been systematically propagating the idea of assimilation; this paper also attempts to evaluate the prospects for assimilation against the background of both Indonesian and Chinese attitudes. Historical patterns of Chinese settlement Chinese had been coming to Indonesia long before the Europeans ar- rived in the archipelago. In fact, when the first Europeans arrived, there were already Chinese trading establishments in some of Java’s ports. Despite centuries of residence in the islands, however, the Chinese rarely became part of the Indonesian community. For one thing, contact between the two ethnic groups, apart from business transactions, was limited. Originally the resident Chinese com- munity lived in a section of the port city close to the harbor. Their situa- tion was similar to that of alien traders residing in other Asian cities: the Europeans in Canton before 1839 were confined to a special quarter, as were the Dutch in their earliest stay in Bantam. The remains of this pat- tern of settlement still persist in Java, and for the period from 1835 to 1919 the Dutch colonial government restricted the Chinese to residence in special quarters (wijken) of the major towns in Java. (1) Within these 7), pp. 9-16. 3637 entertainment which is popular among peranakans in Central and East Java. Where Javanese influence is less among peranakans, as in Djakarta, a cul- tural program might feature mainland Chinese folk songs and dances as well. In contrast, at Baperki University, where the faculty of arts offers Chinese, Indonesian, and English language and literature for study, it is English which is the overwhelming favorite. Practical young peranakans are choosing, therefore, a widely-spoken and used language, finglish, rather than either Chinese or Indonesian studies. Perhaps the choice of English also indicates peranakan preference for Western education; Chinese studies, the sentimental favorite, takes second place, and Indo- nesian literature is least favored by the students. Baperki’s dental faculty aroused a protest when it included the study of the Chinese language in its curriculum. Its answer was that many of the students might wish to continue their study in China because dentistry was so advanced there. (2) As was mentioned above, graduates of the Chinese-language secondary schools may be admitted to the University. When it promotes Chinese language and contemporary mainland cul- ture, Baperki is not reinforcing something which already exists among peranakans but introducing new elements. So far, however, this has been less important in Baperki’s activities than the promotion of specifically pe ranakan or Indonesian cultural activities. These cultural considerations, indicating a certain ambivalence vis a vis Chinese or Indonesian culture, are but the background for Baperki’s more political statements on "integration." Since its inception Baperki has emphasized the need to fight against discrimination in Indonesian life. The very choice of the word "integration1 was an attempt to identify their cause with that of the Negro in the United States, although the analogy with that minority group breaks down at once on both historical and economic grounds. Baperki refuses to accept the Indonesian argument that the Dutch colonial government consciously favored the Chinese in Indonesia, and that the only way to solve the resulting minority problem must be for Indo- nesia deliberately to discriminate against the Chinese minority, particular- ly in the economic and educational fields, in order to bring about a balance. Baperki admits that Indonesia has a minority who are wealthy, or "economically strong," and a majority who are "economically weak," but denies that this minority/majority division is simply a division between Chinese and Indonesian. In fact, many Indonesians are economically strong, for example some of the indigenous businessmen who have pro- fited from government favoritism in the recent past, and many Chinese are economically weak, for example farmers or poverty-stricken laborers. Since these minority/majority divisions are a matter of class, and not of race, any solution to them cannot follow racial lines. Simply favoring Indonesians over Chinese will not eradicate minority/majority distinctions, (2) Dr. Jetty Rizali Noor, "Perguruan tinggi swastapun harus ’terpimpin'," Star Weekly, 24 October 1959.38 but will aggravate them. Instead the government should favor all poor farmers and laborers as against monopoly capitalists of all races, espec- ially the Europeans who have the strongest link with colonialism. Peranakan Chinese as a "suku" On the matter of the social and cultural future of the Chinese in Indonesia, Baperki advocates cultural pluralism, insisting that the perana· kan Chinese can and will be good Indonesian citizens while remaining a culturally distinct group. The Indonesian motto, "Unity in Diversity" (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), refers to the many ethnic groups (sukus) existing within the Indonesian nation. Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent should be considered no differently from any other suku in Indonesia and should be accepted on the same terms. Conceivably, in some distant future (which Siauw identifies with the achievement of true Indonesian socialism) all sukus will disappear into one Indonesian ethnic group. Only then can the Chinese be expected to be assimilated into the Indonesian nation. Any expectation of earlier Chinese assimilation would be unfair and unrealistic. These opinions, particularly as presented by Siaiiw on behalf of Baperki, take some of their inspiration from the national minority policies of the USSR and the People's Republic of China; Siauw seems to find it desirable that the Chinese in Indonesia achieve a legal status comparable to that of the Thai or Korean peoples in China. While the argument he makes is really one for cultural autonomy and equality of treatment, the analogy is hardly appropriate, for the national minorities in China and Russia (like the Indonesian sukus) occupy a territory of their own, some- thing the Chinese in Indonesia neither have nor would conceivably want. Furthermore, the problem of these national minorities is not complicated by the presence of resident aliens who are also members of the minority group, as is that of the Chinese community in Indonesia. In the Soviet Union or China, all members of the minorities are regarded as Soviet or Chinese citizens. The Baperki argument begins with the undesirability of discrimi- nation against the citizen Chinese as a first premise and argues to a jus- tification of their existence as a separate group, So far as the Indonesian Chinese themselves are concerned, it is a justification of the status quo, and hence a conservative theory. Assimilation and opposition to Baperki In 1959 and I960, a small group of peranakans emerged who be- lieved that the status quo itself was responsible for discrimination against the Chinese citizens of Indonesia. Accordingly, they formulated some ideas on assimilation (assimilasi or asimilasi) of the Chinese which stand in contrast to those of Baperki. The assimilationist group blamed the Chinese themselves for bad relations with the Indonesians. It argued that, in addition to accepting39 Indonesian citizenship, the Chinese should participate more actively in In- donesian political and social life. Instead of despairing of Indonesia over the effects of PP-10, they should dissociate themselves from the fate of the alien Chinese and enter more into the Indonesian social scene. The assimilationists expressed disapproval of organizations and activities •which were predominantly Chinese in membership and those in which citi- zen Chinese mixed with aliens, as in Baperki University. They urged the citizen Chinese to campaign for their acceptance by the Indonesian majority by adopting Indonesian-sounding names and by lowering the bar- riers against Chinese-Indonesian marriage. In other words, assimila- tion meant that the Chinese--at least those who had become Indonesian citizens--must cease to be culturally distinct from the Indonesian major- ity and must dissociate themselves from Chinese traditions. The magazine Star Weekly attempted to popularize the idea of assim ilation when it was first proposed. One of the earliest articles on the sub- ject compared assimilation of Chinese in the Philippines with the existing situation in Indonesia, arguing that complete assimilation of persons of Chinese descent was a fact in the Philippines, and was therefore also possible in Indonesia. (3) When publication of Star Weekly ceased in September 1961 (for reasons not connected with this debate), other young peranakans attempted to continue the movement. The discussion which had begun within the per- anakan, citizen Chinese community soon took on political overtones. H assimilation was the desirable course, then such an organization as Baper- ki was unnecessary and even undesirable. Support of assimilation became for some an indirect way to attack Baperki, whose leadership was regarded as undesirably sympathetic to communism (because of its leaders' coopera- tion with the PKI). Political implications Although the peranakan leaders of the assimilationists have con- sistently denied that they wish to fight Baperki, they cannot escape the im- plications of their stand. Nor does the fact that many of them come from Catholic, Protestant, and other "right-wing" elements in the Chinese community make their arguments that they are free of political motives more convincing. This political division is clearly evident from the way the Indone- sians have reacted to the two sides. While neither Baperki nor the assimilationist group has attracted wide attention or support, both have their promoters in the Indonesian community; Baperki from the "left," the others from the "right." (3) Ong Hok Ham, in Star Weekly, 12 September and 3 October 1959. These are two of a series of articles on the Philippines by Ong.40 Baperki supporters, such as Boejoeng Saleh, who has served as Secretary of the Central Committee of Baperki and got his political train- ing in SOBSI, the labor union affiliate of the PKI, are usually hardly typical Indonesians. Lekra, the artists’ group which has cooperated with Baperki, is a PKI affiliate. Harian Rakjat, the PKI organ itself, has on a number of occasions given support to Baperki’s drives. On the other hand, when the younger proponents of assimilation sought wider support in 1962, they attracted the attention of some members of the military, Colonel Soetjipto of army headquarters and even General Nasution himself. In addition to the army people, a few other Indonesians of the "right" lent their support to the movement's activities in Djakarta. An attempt was made, in 1962, to amalgamate the assimilation forces, under the title Urusan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Organization for the Development of National Unity), with the regional Badan Pembina Potensi Karya (Body for the Development of Functional Potentials), a semi- political "front" of businessmen and other interests under military sponsorship. Certain army leaders are deeply suspicious Of the Chinese. This suspicion stems, in part, from a fear of Chinese support for communism or for Communist China's power politics. Nasution is r£ported to have said that, so long as they remain unassimilated, he regards the Chinese of Indonesia as a potential fifth column. He also remarked in late 1962 that with the settlement of Dutch-Indonesian conflicts ove^r West Irian, the Chinese would find themselves in the position--previously filled by the Dutch--of scapegoat for Indonesia's troubles. These officers naturally welcomed an effort initiated among the Chinese to promote assimilation. Military support was a two-edged sword for the assimilationists. While it was advantageous to have such powerful backing, one of the mo- tives of these backers was suspicion of the very Chinese they purported to help. Furthermore, the name of the military, instead of lending weight to their cause, tended to inspire the feeling among the Chinese that the assimilationists' suggestions were being forced upon them. Some feared a repetition of earlier anti-Chinese actions which were led by the military. The army had touched off the school closings in 1957-58, it carried out the anti-Kuomintang campaign in 1958, and its role in the alien rural re- tail and residence bans in 1959-60 hardly helped improve its image among the Chinese. Views of older and younger generations After 1962, discussion of assimilation became an emotionally charged matter. Stories circulated among peranakans in East Java, for example, that Chinese girls were being accosted with proposals of mar- riage by Indonesian youths who were strangers to them. "It mustn't be forced," cried the peranakans when intermarriage was discussed, as if this were actually what the assimilationists had favored. The older gen- eration of peranakans, particularly those who remember vividly the Dutch period, are particularly resistant to the idea of intermarriage. Older peranakans expressed fear that a daughter who married an Indonesian41 might be readily divorced (divorce is relatively common among Moslem Indonesians and rare among Chinese); some of the same parents expressed approval of a daughter's marriage to a European or an American. Polygamy (Islamic law theoretically allows a man to take four wives) is another cause of peranakan resistance to intermarriage. But, although polygamy is much discussed, it is not nearly so common among Indonesians as the discussion of it, and it is not unknown for a Chinese man in Indonesia to take a second wife. This opposition to assimilation (especially inter- marriage) on the part of the older peranakans may be attributed to resis- tance to Indonesianization among those who can remember the low position held by Indonesians in the colonial society. If in discussing intermarriage the older generation raises difficul- ties against it, the young peranakans--students and younger graduates-- maintain a more open mind on the subject, emphasizing mutual consent, and sometimes, the consent of the parents. Although religious differences remain a barrier, intermarriage is apparently increasing among young peranakan Chinese and Indonesians, particularly where both are Christians. Both young and old recognize that difference of religion compounds the difficulties for a racially mixed marriage. But insofar as the younger generation has had closer association with Indonesians, particularly in the schools, it sees intermarriage as a likely and even desirable proposi- tion, always with the provision, "it must not be forced." Educated Indo- nesians seem to regard resistance to intermarriage on the part of Chinese as an anachronism. They expect it to occur naturally, except perhaps where religious difference interferes. The adoption of Indonesian aliases by adult Chinese has given rise to scorn because, in many cases, it is considered as a seeking for pre- ference in business or a display of shame over a person's Chinese an- cestry. In some cases, it also gives rise to some good-natured joking, as in the story of the Chinese who asked to take the Indonesian name "Kasno" (from bekas Tjino, which literally means ex-Chinese). On the other hand, more young peranakan couples are choosing Indonesian-sounding names, such as Dewi, Arianti, Krishna, for their children, either along with or in place of the Chinese name. In part this replaces an earlier trend (which was not confined to the Christian group) to give Western names to peranakan children. Some Indonesians spoke with approval of this trend in child-naming, but their attitude toward an adult's adoption of an Indonesian alias, particularly when his Chinese name was already well known, was less favorable. That the idea of force has come to be associated with that of assim- ilation represents a defeat for the movement. It partly resulted from the tactical error of appearing to ally so closely with the military and partly from the success of the Baperki counterattack. The attention attracted by the fear of forced intermarriage (it must be mentioned again that marriage of Chinese men and Indonesian women has passed without comment for centuries, especially among the lower classes--it is marriage of a Chinese woman to an Indonesian man which arouses resistance) and the discussion of name-changes has detracted42 from the more basic issues of assimilation: the problem of separate Chi- nese organizations and institutions in Indonesian society. Understandably, Baperki has contributed to the confusion, for criticism of Chinese societies attacks Baperki itself, together with its affiliated organizations and acti- vities and strikes at the very root of peranakan society as it is now organized, Some peranakan organizations have been conscious of this aspect of the problem and have taken various steps to meet it, but almost always within a rather conservative framework. The usual method has been to adopt an Indonesian-sounding translation of its name and to open member- ship to Indonesians, Thus the peranakan religious group Sam Kauw Hui is now Perkumpulan Tribudaja. Some Chinese believers have attempted to stress the Buddhist aspect of their belief in connection with the old Hindu-Buddhist traditions of Java and Bali. (4) The Ta Hsueh Hsueh Sheng Hui, the university students' group now balls itself Perhimi (Per- himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia--Indonesian Students' Association), and its ordinary members must be Indonesian citizens, (5) One such organi- zation whose Indonesian membership is more than token is a sports club in Palembang, now called Dharma Djaja; over one-third of the members are Indonesians, although a few years ago it was an exclusively Chinese organization. (6) President Soekarno's intervention In February 1963, the assimilation-integration controversy reached a climax. The assimilationists attempted to broaden their support by getting President Soekarno’s agreement to a statement endorsing their viewpoint, Soekarno told them "A nation with minorities is no nation” and expressed his support for assimilation as an end to "exclusivism.” (7) Up to late 1962, it was questionable whether the vigor of Baperki's attack on assimilation was in proportion to the threat posed by the assimi- lation movement. The movement never acquired, or even tried to acquire, mass support among the Chinese, particularly after its vehicle Star Weekly was closed- But when it did get some support from the both anti- communist and anti-Chinese military, it became particularly dangerous to Baperki, Therefore, Baperki felt it needed the President's support as quickly as possible, since only Soekarno could give an ideological pro- nouncement of sufficient weight to solve this problem. Fortunately for them, the President had previously displayed considerable sympathy for Baperki and its goals. (4) Star Weekly, 30 May and 6 June, 1959. (5) Republik, 26 October 1957. (6) Interview, 1962. (7) Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Penerbitan Chusus 259), p. 5.43 Some time before his February pronouncement on nation-building and assimilation, Soekarno had been invited to address the Baperki Con- gress to be held March 14-18, 1963 in Djakarta. In order to demonstrate that they too could rally popular support and thereby encourage Soekarno to take an even stronger pro-assimilation stand, the assimilationists pre- pared to hold a conference in Djakarta March 10 to 12, just before the opening of the Baperki Congress. In this, they again had military encour- agement. An additional motive for the conference was the decision to disband the BPPK in May, when martial law would end, and to dissolve it into the National Front. This meant that previous assimilationist activi- ties under BPPK sponsorship would have to find a new sponsor, and a decision was made at the conference to set up an institute to continue the work. A number of cabinet ministers and other officials were invited to address the gathering. Most of these did not appear in person but sent written messages, whose tone favored "nation-building" and an end to "sukuism," that is, ethnic exclusivism. One of the most outspoken was Soenario, PNI member, former Foreign Minister and co-signer of the 1955 agreement on dual citizenship. That he even lent his name as ad- viser to the group throws light on his attitude toward the treaty itself. Soenario argued that the intention of the treaty had been to end the double loyalty of the Indonesian Chinese, so that cultural assimilation to Indo- nesia should follow rejection of the legal tie of Chinese citizenship. That no reorientation of the cultural values of the citizen Chinese had followed the change in their nominal legal status seemed to him to indicate that the realignment of citizenship had been for nothing. Soenario represents a viewpoint which is widespread among non-communist Indonesian leaders. The resolutions from this conference struck again at the "exclusive* organizations among the Chinese and even at schools which, although "national" in form were in practice Chinese in student body. (8) These were clearly directed against Baperki and other successor schools to the old alien schools, and the assimilationists apparently hoped to encourage the government to limit such schools, but they must have recognized that any such government regulation would surely have had adverse ef- fects on many Protestant and Catholic schools, as well as those of Baperki. (Since many supporters of these resolutions came from the Christian group, one is inclined to wonder how much thought they had given to the implementation of their resolution. ) Results of the conference were pre- sented to Soekarno for his approval on March 13. Baperki had begun to rally the support of its left-wing allies against assimilation before its Congress actually opened on March 14. On March 10, Warta Bhakti (successor to Sin Po, the leading peranakan newspaper) published an article by Tan Hwie Kiat, Baperki's information officer, in- sisting that the only solution to the minority problem must come from the achievement of a just and prosperous society through Indonesian socialism. The following day, Harian Rakjat of the PKI presented an editorial on (8) Ibid., p. 50.44 national unity which purported to explain what Soekarno had really meant when he spoke to the assimilationists. "National unity" did not mean that either the Indonesian sukus (Buginese, Javanese, Dayak, Batak, etc.) or the groups such as peranakan A rabs, Chinese or Indians, would disappear, but only that it would be impossible for them to continue being "cosmopoli- tan" or "separatist." Forcing people to change their name (Harian Rakjat put the emphasis on force) would be undemocratic; the important thing was the right to free Indonesia from imperialism and feudalism, from bureaucratic capitalists and landlords. Siauw opened the Congress on March 14 with an address outlining Baperki's achievements to date, and pointing to the growth of Baperki University and the role which its graduates could play in Indonesian dev- elopment. He also asked for wider opportunities for Indonesia's one mil- lion resident aliens (the great majority of whom are Chinese) to be naturalized as Indonesian citizens. (9) A major portion of the address, however, was concerned with economic problems, including foreign capi- tal and inflation. (10) If Soekarno's presence at the meeting had not been enough, his key- note address must have given ample satisfaction to Baperki's functionaries. The President not only praised Baperki, urging it to continue to support his programs, but ridiculed the use of the term asli ("indigenous") in dis- cussions of Indonesia's minority problem. Indonesia recognized no minor- ity, he asserted, unlike the "socialist countries" with their national mi- norities. There was no minority, only a number of ethnic groups or sukus, including the Chinese suku ("suku Tionghoa"). The sukus, in turn, were so many legs (kaki) of the Indonesian body--thus Sundanese, Javanese, Sumatran, Dayak, and peranakan Chinese were all parts of the same Indonesian body. (11) Soekarno probably took this stand in order to avoid alienating either group of the Chinese community, or their respective Indonesian supporters. Baperki has shown itself to have far greater influence among the Chinese themselves, and the President probably felt that his goal, assuring the loyalty and cooperation of the Chinese, could be best met by supporting this group. Nevertheless, Soekarno is interested in national unity. He later encouraged the assimilationists by sponsoring their Institute for the Develop ment of National Unity (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa) in July (9) The naturalization law allows persons born in Indonesia or resident there for five consecutive years (ten non-consecutive years) to ac- quire Indonesian citizenship if they demonstrate knowledge of Indo- nesian language and history, pay a fee (scaled to income), and have no other citizenship (see Willmott, op. cit. , p. 120). To date, very few applicants have actually been naturalized. (10) Most of the text appeared in Harian Rakjat, 15 March 1963. (11) Soekarno, Baperki supaja mendjadi sumbangan besar terhadap rev- olusi Indonesia (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Pener- bitan Chusus 255).45 1963. The President, therefore, supported both factions and rejected neither. 1963 riots against Chinese Although Soekarno was able to say to Baperki that he did not care what kind of a name a person had, so long as he was a patriotic Indone- sian, events soon proved that other Indonesians were not so tolerant. In late March 1963, the first of a series of riots against the Chinese occurred in Tjirebon. The Tjirebon incident was touched off by a court case in which an Indonesian was being tried for the death in August 1962 of a Chinese in a traffic accident. Both the victim and the accused had been associated with "cross-boy" gangs, and during the course of the trial communal tensions mounted. On March 27, they erupted: Chinese shops were stoned, other Chinese-owned property was damaged or threatened, and order was re- stored only by the strict imposition of curfews and other controls. The Tjirebon military commander issued a statement which called for order and, at the same time, cast blame on the Chinese for their ostentatious way of life during a time of economic troubles for the general population. Although there were no further outbreaks in his military dis- trict (that is, in the northeast part of West Java), and the commander de- serves credit for this, his attitude was not a comfort to the Chinese. The following May (May 10), an outbreak in Bandung among students of the technical college spread through the city, causing destruction of great amounts of Chinese-owned property, especially motor vehicles and shop inventories. This touched off riots in other cities and towns of West Java: Tegal (actually in western Central Java), Tasikmalaja, Sukabumi, Tjiandjur, Bogor. While in Bandung, as in Tjirebon (and probably Tegal), the riots sprang from a single incident, in other towns, such as Sukabumi, which suffered most serious damage, and Tjiandjur, demonstrators arrived in the town by truckloads, and other indications point to deliberate provoca- tion. That the incidents spread in such organized fashion must be attribu- ted to insufficient vigilance on the part of the local military and police. Sukabumi, for instance, is the home of the police academy for all of Java, so it would be difficult to argue that there were insufficient forces to cope with the demonstrators, most of whom were young people. On the other hand, the fact that martial law had only been abolished on May 1 may have contributed to some confusion in the town as to who was responsible for maintaining security. In Djakarta, however, and in towns of Central and East Java such as Semarang and Surabaja, local police prevented any outbreaks by keeping close watch on suspected elements, particularly stu- dents. Sympathy incidents also occurred in Medan, Makassar, and Padang. Almost immediately, on May 13 (May 12 had been a Sunday), the PKI published its denunciation of the incidents, attempting to brand the46 instigators as economic saboteurs or Masjumi-PSI renegades. The gov- ernors of West and Central Java and the national police appealed for order. Although the President had been consulted on means of dealing with the demonstrations, Soekarno's full denunciation came on May 19, after the riots had spread to Sukabumi and Tjiandjur. The major trouble spot was West Java, just as it had been in 1959-60, although in 1963 the authorities did not originate the provocations. Although the President, the PKI, and subsequently the press tried to lay the blame on dissident right-wing political groups, it appears that economic causes lay at the root of the riots. In Bandung, for example, Chinese were not personally molested by the rioters, and no Chinese lives were lost. Chinese driving cars were made to leave their vehicles; the cars were overturned and set afire, but the owners were not harmed. While the victims offered no resistance which might have provoked the mobs to turn on them, it is nevertheless clear that the rioters were not interested in attacking Chinese so much as Chinese-owned property, to them the symbol of Chinese economic power.Chapter IV INDONESIAN VIEWS OF THE CHINESE The Baperki view on integration places the burden on the Indonesian majority to accept the Chinese and to banish discrimination. The assimi- lationists appear to assume that Indonesians will readily accept the Chinese minority, if they will abandon certain of their exclusive habits. Because assimilation has been viewed by some Indonesians and outsiders as a solu- tion to the minority problem, it is worth examining the majority attitude toward the Chinese in more detail, also attempting to explain the causes of the periodic outbreaks against the Chinese. Cultural pluralism and Indonesian unity Although the Indonesian motto is "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" ("Unity in Diversity'), even President Soekarno, the nation's number one ideologue, envisages a new all-Indonesian culture in which regional differences will disappear. He recently remarked that Bhinneka (diversity) was "das Sein" (what is) and Tunggal (unity) "das Sollen" (what shall be). (1) In such a view, assimilation of the citizen Chinese can be only a matter of time and, in fact, most peranakan Chinese do foresee an end to Chineseness, but not for some generations. Siauw identifies this with the achievement of a "just and prosperous society." Even if such a distant utopia is ever realized, for the time being Indonesians must live with cultural pluralism. Although inter-Indonesian ethnic relations occasionally lead to disturbances in some major towns, it is relations between Indonesians and Chinese, the largest non-indigenous minority, that give rise to greatest friction and attract most attention. Despite the fact that the two groups have lived side-by-side for cen- turies and despite the frequently discussed Indonesian tolerance for differ- ences, time and again Chinese-Indonesian relations have erupted into violence. The incidents marking the campaign against alien retailers in 1959-60 and the outbreaks of March and May 1963 are only the latest of many such instances in the 20th century. (1) Assimilasi, op. cit. , p. 5. 4748 Mass support for anti-Chinese incidents Any discussion of anti-Chinese incidents or activities, however, must take the distinction between "mass" and "elite" behavior into account. Frequently it is argued that the Indonesian peasant is not anti- Chinese, and that he even regards the Chinese money-lender as a bene- factor (or did in the past when the institution was more prevalent), despite the seemingly outrageous interest rates charged. A peranakan Chinese scholar recently wrote of the harmony and mutual tolerance prevailing in a village near Tanggerang, (2) where about one-third of the residents are Chinese peranakan farmers, although not far from his research site was the scene of the most famous outbreak against the Chinese in recent times, the Tanggerang incident of May 1946. The argument that the Indonesian masses are tolerant of the Chinese fails to take into account the mass sup- port given to many anti-Chinese incidents. Sarekat Islam On the other hand, "elite" attitudes to the Chinese are more easily identified and explained. In the 20th century, the earliest series of anti- Chinese activities centered around the founding of the Sarekat Islam. This organization, the first Islamic-oriented political association, dev- eloped from a group formed by Islamic businessmen in 1909 to fight com- petition from Chinese traders. On the "elite" or leadership level, econo- mic interest thus reinforced religious resentment in forming attitudes toward the Chinese, who were not only business competitors, but of an alien religion. (This attitude would also be typical of the Masjumi leaders who supported Assaat nearly 50 years later and perhaps also of some West Java leaders. ) (3) The development of Sarekat Islam as a mass movement was marked by anti-Chinese incidents in the ten years after 1909 in a number of Javanese cities, including Solo, Surabaja, and Kudus. In all of these towns, Chinese-Indonesian business competition had been especially keen. (4) The appeal to Islam may here have merely been used to arouse mass op- position to the Chinese. In addition, the Sarekat Islam as an organization must have offered a channel for Indonesians to express real grievances against the Chinese. (2) Go Gien Tjwan, Eenheid in verscheidenheid in een Indonesisch dorp (Dissertation: University of Brussels, 1962). (3) The author is indebted to Professor G. William Skinner, who has emphasized the connection between Islamic parties and anti-Chinese politics in his discussions. For a treatment of the relation of Islam to economic activity, see Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town," Economic Dev- elopment and Cultural Change, January 1956, esp. pp. 144-152. (4) Willmott, op. cit. , p. 12.49 Tanggerang incident In Tanggerang, where the Indonesian revolution brought a particular- ly cruel attack on the Chinese in May 1946, crude "racial" differences are not the major divisive force between Chinese and Indonesian. In this area in fact Chinese are often physically indistinguishable from Indonesians, and Islam is the most important element dividing the two ethnic groups in the villages. The old Chinese-owned or managed private lands in the area may also have contributed to Indonesian resentment, and several other factors were at work: outside troublemakers, breakdown of authority in a revolutionary situation, economic differences between the two groups, the desire of some youth to display revolutionary zeal. The principal promo- ters of attacks on the Chinese were irregular armed bands, made up - largely of fanatically Islamic groups from Bantam, who had been left in control of the area when the Indonesian army withdrew in May 1946. There is little doubt, however, that the people of Tanggerang also participated in the attacks. An important factor in mobilizing the masses was almost cer- tainly the appeal of Islam. This is clearly indicated by the fact that, in addition to destroying Chinese life and property, the attackers forced a number of Chinese to be circumcized. (5) The Indonesian revolution: elite attitudes 1945-49 At the time of the Tanggerang incident the Indonesian government was interested in cultivating Chinese support. In view of the intense pres- sures on the Republic then, the leaders did their best to uphold Chinese interests. Cooperation with the Chinese consul, for example, was initially good. The citizenship law of 1946 (6) recognized all Chinese born in Indo- nesia as Indonesian citizens, showing a lack of resentment against the Chi- nese; at the same time it incorporated a provision for Chinese to reject Indonesian citizenship if they wished, something for which the Chinese had fought unsuccessfully in the colonial period. This indicates that the Indo- nesian elite had a good deal of sympathy for the Chinese at that time, al- though this in part stemmed from the desire to mobilize Chinese wealth in the Indonesian interest. (5) Rosihan Anwar published a series of articles defending the position of the Indonesian Republic in Merdeka in June 1946. Star Weekly and Sin Po (the latter even more outspoken) give the Chinese side. Go, op. cit. , pp. 149 and 218, emphasizes that no incidents took place in the village he studies because no outsiders had stirred up trouble. According to other sources, Dutch forces had been in control of the area around his village, east of the town of Tanggerang, and were able to maintain order. The Tanggerang incidents all took place in the vacuum between the advancing Dutch forces and the retreating Indonesian army, an area left in the control of irregular, undisciplined bands. (6) Part of the law is in Willmott, op. cit. , pp. 113-114. The full text is reprinted in Baperki, Segala sesuatu tentang kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (Djakarta: Baperki, n. d. ), pp. 82,. ....50 Nevertheless, the Republic was unable to do what the Chinese most wanted: guarantee Chinese life and property. It could not control the ir- regular fighting units on the republican side who were largely responsible for the attacks on property (which were in practice attacks on Chinese). As the revolution wore on, and incidents continued, even some Chinese who were initially sympathetic to the Republic began to feel that only the Dutch forces could or would protect them. Fear of the Indonesians became a moving force for the Chinese, and they formed their own self-defense or- ganization, the Pao An Tui. It, therefore, appeared to the Indonesians that the Chinese were fighting alongside the Dutch. The mutual mistrust between Chinese and Indonesians engendered during the revolution persists to this day and has greatly influenced Indonesian elite attitudes toward the Chinese. Elite attitudes 1950-57: Islamic parties The attitude of the Indonesian elite toward the Chinese from 1950 to 1957 can be discussed in terms of the political parties. In dealing with the Chinese, the parties were not acting in response to mass pressures, but in the context of their own ideas or of some chance for political gain. The most important Islamic party, Masjumi, when in control of the Natsir cabinet, introduced policies favoring asli (indigenous) Indonesian businessmen over Chinese, (7) The arrests under its successor, the Sukiman cabinet (again Masjumi) in August 1951 were both anti-Communist and anti-Chinese (not only were many PKI leaders imprisoned, but some non-Communist Chinese were arrested as well), representing a further coalescence of basic attitudes. After 1952, the Masjumi split into the modernist Masjumi and conservative Islamic Nahdatul Ulama. While the new Masjumi was the more active and more anti-Communist, both continued the attitudes of the parent party toward the Chinese. Thus, in 1956, when its political fortunes were ebbing, the Masjumi espoused the Assaat movement, a vigorous attack on the Chinese position in the economy, probably in the hopes of regaining some popular support. Although the NU was perhaps more discreet in the matter, its sympathies were with Assaat as well. When the Masjumi was virtually out of the political picture, in May 1959, an NU member, Minister of Trade Rachmat Muljomiseno, formulated the attack on alien retailers. The Indonesian attitude towards the Chinese is not simply a matter of religious difference, however. If Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic nation, it is probably also the most tolerant (perhaps syncretistic is a better word). The religious difference between Chinese and Indone- sian, although important, does not exist in isolation. Like the early Sare- kat Islam, the Moslem parties in Indonesia have derived a great deal of (7) See Amstutz, op. cit. , for a fuller discussion of the government policies towaralndonesian businessmen.51 their support from a class of traders (in Java) whose devotion to business has matched their devotion to religious goals. For the Masjumi, this sup- port came more from the Outer Islands; for the NU, from Java. This economic base among the traders helps explain why the anti-Chinese acti- vity of both these parties most often took the form of government decisions to restrict the Chinese place in the economy by reserving favors for Indo- nesian businessmen. The nationalists, 1950-57 Different motives prompted the secular nationalists, the PNI and others like them, but their policies were anti-Chinese nonetheless. Al- though the first Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) cabinet (July 1953-July 1955) had two ministers of Chinese descent, it vigorously implemented policies in favor of indigenous businessmen. In part, the PNI may have been feath- ering its own nest, with an eye to the need for funds in the 1955 elections. In part, the nationalists were motivated by the conviction that it was un- just and even dangerous to have so much of the country’s wealth and trade controlled by alien hands. By "alien" they often meant citizen Chinese as well. These nationalists, whose attitude is shared to a greater or less degree by many educated Indonesians, especially in Java, believe that even citizen Chinese businessmen cannot be trusted to do business in the best interests of Indonesia because of their family and business ties abroad. That this argument is largely based on prejudice can be inferred from the fact that it fails to distinguish between totok and peranakan. Any severe disruption in the Indonesian economy, as at the time of PP-10, becomes, for the nationalist, a proof of the perniciousness of the Chinese role in the Indonesian economy. He ignores the fact that the disruption was precipi- tated by the severity of the Indonesian attack on Chinese trade. Chinese shopkeepers faced with the prospect of imminent confiscation of their source of livelihood could hardly be expected to continue business as usual. The nationalists, arguing that Indonesia can never be really free while its economy is so much at the mercy of aliens and those of alien de- scent, consider the predominant economic position of the Chinese to be a result of conscious Dutch policy to weaken and control the Indonesians. This attitude, although it has a little historical basis, is often exaggerated and distorted. To many Indonesians, the Chinese personify the evils of the colonial system as much as do the Dutch. Indonesian nationalists also resent lhat most peranakan Chinese are uninterested in Indonesian politics and attribute this to favoritism for the Dutch or for China. In recent years, any city-dwelling Indonesian could observe the enthusiasm displayed by totok Chinese for Chinese national days or the public celebration of Chinese religious festivals. The perana- kan Chinese apathy and distaste for Indonesian political activities then appear to some nationalists as caused by lack of loyalty to Indonesia. The fact that a substantial proportion of the peranakans have had Dutch education and that many continue to speak Dutch to their children is another irritant. (Older Indonesians of the elite may converse in Dutch, but it is dying out quickly and the young seldom learn more than a few52 words. ) In short, in addition to the problem of Chinese cultural difference, Western influence among the peranakans (particularly in the years of bad relations with the Dutch) has irritated Indonesian observers. In the Moslem view, a solution to the minority problem can only come with conversion of the Chinese to Islam. There is evidence that Chinese Moslems have been assimilated as Indonesians, but this happened either before the European period or only in isolated areas. At present, Chinese who are converted to Islam are often suspected by both sides, and conversion is not a popular solution. The nationalist opinion admits the possibility of assimilation. Thus if a Chinese accepts Indonesian citizen- ship, abandons the public display of Chinese (or peranakan) culture for Indonesianization, associates in organizations (including business and politics) with Indonesians, and enters as fully as possible into Indonesian society, he can be accepted. There is today considerable evidence that Chinese who meet Indonesians at the same socio-economic level pass rather quickly into Indonesian society: Chinese peranakan students, gov- ernment employees, and even in some areas, businessmen have testified to this. Essentially, the secular nationalist asks that the Chinese "overcom- pensate," giving clear proof of their loyalty to Indonesia^ before they may be fully accepted as Indonesians. This was an element in the Indonesian approach to the dual citizenship treaty (which was signed by a PNI cabinet), a feeling that if the citizen Chinese were forced to go through a court declaration of their loyalty to Indonesia, they would somehow be more devoted to Indonesian politics and culture. But "overcompensation" or any steps toward assimilation must have a positive motivation. So far Indonesian government citizenship policies, alien taxes, and other forms of discrimination have contributed to making the citizenship choice a purely self-interested one. Peranakan Chinese without hesitation have ascribed the dual citizenship choice to self-interested calculation. Because the problem of economic discrimination looms so large, many steps toward formal assimilation, such as adopting an Indo- nesian name or the Islamic religion, are suspected by both Chinese and Indonesians. The PKI, 1950-63 Of all the major parties, only the PKI has unequivocally supported acceptance of the Chinese peranakans as they are. The PKI has pro- tested nearly every inconvenience visited on the Chinese, from the dual citizenship treaty's active system to the alien tax. It even defended the Chinese at the time of the alien retail ban in 1959-60, a position which was highly unpopular at the time (although in retrospect, the PKI does not seem to have suffered much from its stand). Harian Rakjat argued that nationalization of big European businesses should precede attacks on the retail shops of poor Chinese. (8) (8) Harian Rakjat, 23 November 1959 to 8 December 1959.53 Observers have viewed this pro-Chinese stance either as subservi- ence to the Chinese Embassy or as a defense of Chinese who might be con- tributing towards the PKI coffers. In many cases, the PKI’s support of the Chinese has really been an attack on its own enemies. This is parti- cularly evident in the abuse heaped on the Assaat movement by the PKI where HarianRakjat's attack on Assaatism was as much an assault on the Masjumi as a defense of the Chinese. Doubtless the PKI feared that its opposition had seized on an extremely popular issue and attacked it ac- cordingly. In an important case where Chinese interests conflicted with PKI political interests, the PKI indicated that defending the Chinese was of secondary importance. In late 1953, the Ali cabinet revised the regula- tions governing importers in a manner which proved to be highly unfavor- able to Chinese businessmen. In November of that year Parliament dis- cussed these policies, following an interpellation of a Masjumi member. Siauw took an active part in the discussions, using his speech to evaluate Indonesia’s policies for building a "national economy" and to urge the new cabinet not to indulge in asli politics. He urged that the government consider carefully the bad. effects which favoritism of aslis would have on the Indonesian society and economy. Siauw did not, however, specifically attack the policies of the cabinet then in office. One of the PKI representatives in Parliament also spoke on this point; Sakirman made some criticism of policies which had been carried out by the previous "Masjumi-PSI regime" which, he said, had favored only importers who were Masjumi-PSI party members. On behalf of the PKI, however, he expressed full confidence in the cabinet's plans to work for a national economy. Although the steps the cabinet was taking at the time were not perfect, in general he considered them to be forthright and bold. Among the other actions he praised was the cabinet's decision to send a trade mission to the People's Republic of China. (9) In this case, the PKI was supporting a cabinet which was initiating measures harmful to Chinese business; in fact, the Ali cabinet took office with PKI support in Parliament. The PKI was not prepared to trade its political advantage merely for the sake of defending the Chinese. As late as 1963, the PKI’s attitude on the assimilation question was also influenced by domestic political considerations, for certain military personnel who were extremely unsympathetic to the PKI were on the side of the assimilationists. The PKI is, therefore, most pro-Chinese when those who are anti-Chinese are anti-Communists. The risk in such a policy is probably less that the party will lose popular supporters (this obviously has not happened to date) than that at a time like 1959-60 it might provoke the military to retaliate against it by a too-vigorous defense of (9) Ichtisar Parlemen (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), No. 197, p. 111S; No. 198, p. 1119 and 1120-1121. Siauw was already a member of Parliament in November 1953, although Baperki was not founded until 1954.54 the Chinese. Harian Rakjat was closed in December 1959 for defending the Chinese. In May 1963, the PKI tried to blame the discredited Masjumi-PSI elements and rebels for the anti-Chinese riots. The party also pointed out that the riots were directed against Soekarno and that they attacked the whole people by destroying supplies of food and other basic necessities. In this case, it encouraged its members to cooperate with the police and military in restoring order. (10) Baperki finds allies in PKI, Partindo Despite its defense of the Chinese, the PKI would be embarrassed if large numbers of Chinese flocked to join the party. This may account in part for Tan Ling Djie's minor role in the PKI over the past ten years, although his initial fall from power resulted from a disagreement with the present party leader, Aidit, over party policies. Today, peranakan Chi- nese interested in politics, especially left-wing politics, gravitate instead to Baperki. The frequent cooperation between Baperki leadership and the PKI thus provides a way for the PKI to maintain links with sympathetic Chinese without having the embarrassment of a number of Chinese in its own leadership. In 1963, perhaps in order to refute the charges of alliance with the PKI, Baperki seemed to be seeking closer ties with a relatively new, left- wing nationalist party, Partindo. Three of Baperki's 1963 board of offi- cers were also active in Partindo leadership, H. Winoto Danuasmoro, Oei Tjoe Tat, and Phoa Thwan Hian. (11) Partindo is by definition a nationalist party, devoted to full adherence to all of Soekarno’s ideology. Because of its reputedly close relations with Soekarno, its influence is greater than its mass base. By 1963 the party was considered to be strongly PKI-infiltrated. Baperki leaders themselves justify their left-wing policies, parti- cularly the informal Partindo alliance, as an attempt to draw near to Soekarno for his protection. But this has never brought them into con- flict with the PKI, which is presently working very hard to do just the same thing. For many of Baperki's supporters, of course, discussion of Baperki-PKI relations is irrelevant. To them, the important thing is that the PKI has never sponsored nor obviously condoned discrimination against the Chinese. In need of allies to protect their interests, Indo- nesia's Chinese will find them where they can. The peranakan Chinese as a whole have never paid much attention to ideology, ft could be argued that this alliance with the PKI represents the same kind of "opportunism" which caused many Chinese to appear to (10) Harian Rakjat, 13-20 May 1963. (11) Warta Bhakti, 20 March 1963 and interview, 1963.55 ally with the Dutch during the Indonesian revolution; in both cases, their actions were motivated by the need for protection rather than by positive support for the group concerned. Conceivably, Baperki, in allying itself with the PKI and also seeking Soekarno's protection, hoped to forestall any further elite-level attacks on the Chinese. However, in view of the important role now played by the third and strongest element of the elite, the army, in Indo- nesian public life, and of the army's unsympathetic attitude to the Chinese, these hopes are not likely to be realized. Baperki's relations with the PKI and the left-wing of Indonesian politics may instead merely serve to in- crease the army's distrust of the Chinese. Furthermore, by perpetuating what can almost be called a tradi- tional Chinese community organization and encouraging the Chinese to be- lieve that they can be accepted in Indonesia on their own social and cul- tural terms, Baperki may be performing a disservice to its constituents which is not offset by the good it has done for them. Importance of economic problems Baperki has rightly argued that an ultimate solution to the minority question will come only with great social change. One might add, "great economic change" as well, for economic problems have lain at the base of much Indonesian resentment of the Chinese. One example of the way in which present economic conditions have contributed to bad Chinese- Indonesian relations in the cities, at least, is the effect of inflation. The last few years have witnessed a spiral of rising prices, one sign of the disruption of the Indonesian economy. Like any inflationary process, it has fallen with different effect on the different sectors of the economy. Self-sufficiency has been a boon to many farmers, and some who have watched this trend have argued that they are relatively better off as a result of higher prices for their produce. In the cities, however, a sharp contrast is evident between the ef- fect of inflation on the white-collar salaried class and on the business class. The former--government employees, teachers, and others--have been forced to meet rising costs on totally inadequate salaries by taking on two or more supplementary jobs, cashing in on savings (either money or goods), and relying on the government's periodic sales of low-priced rice and other necessities. A trader, businessman, or professional per- son can escape the effects of rising costs by raising the prices he charges. This is not to argue that businessmen have not felt the effects of economic disruption, certainly most of them must work harder even to stay at the level they maintained a few years ago. But the effects of inflation on the two groups nevertheless do contrast sharply. In Indonesian towns today, Indonesians tend to work for salaries-- even those employed in businesses are most frequently in government businesses and therefore on quite low, fixed salaries. Chinese tend to be private businessmen. The dichotomy is not perfectly rigid, of course;56 more totok Chinese are in business, many peranakans work for salary. -■ Nevertheless, this division has led many politically articulate Indonesians « to believe that the Chinese are profiting from the present situation while the Indonesians become increasingly worse off. Small wonder, then, that the most recent anti-Chinese activities (spring 1963) were attacks by urban youth on Chinese properties. Even should the Indonesian authorities refrain from undertaking policies detrimental to Chinese interests, economic difficulties may of themselves foster resentment against the Chinese. In such a situation, further incidents could result from relatively little provocation. So long as the deterioration of Indonesia’s economy persists, prospects for better Chinese-Indonesian relations are anything but encouraging.