eae

sete

capt i

 

se
Ato

 

 

ie

 
 

 

 

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

 

ANNA ALLEN WRIGHT ~

LIBRARY ENDOWMENT FUND

 

 

 

 

 
Cornell University Library
E 241.S8J72

e Hudso

i

3 3 ota

Poi

“Henin

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
THE STORMING OF STONY POINT
 
THE

STORMING

OF

STONY POINT

ON THE HUDSON

MIDNIGHT, JULY 15, 1779

ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE LIGHT OF UNPUBLISHED
DOCUMENTS

BY

HENRY P. JOHNSTON, A.M.
Professor of History, College of the City of New York.

New Yor«
JAMES T. WHITE & CO
2 1900
Copyright, 1900,
By James T. Waite & Company.

 

(All negiion saaepoad,}
PREFACE.

HE Storming of Stony Point is more or less
vaguely recalled as one of the cleverest ex-
ploits of the Revolutionary War. There is no
doubt as to what men thought of it at the time.
To one it was “the finest stroke that has been
struck this war.” Another saw in it “a second
Trenton,” a comparison that revived, next to Sara-
toga, the happiest turn in the struggle. Another
pardonably regarded it as quite equal to “Caesar’s
Veni, Vidi, Vici.” “Among the most brilliant as-
saults I am acquainted with in history,” wrote
General Charles Lee, who had missed the chance
of having something of the same sort said of his
own tactics at Monmouth the year before. The
congratulatory messages and letters that passed
between Congress, the camp, State authorities
and public men, excited wide-spread rejoicing,
which would have been still deeper could the effect
of the defeat upon the enemy have been fully
measured. No one appreciated the affair more
thoroughly than Washington, who had worked out
the-plan in detail for Wayne to execute, and who
on the following day rode down to the scene to
express his thanks in person to his victorious
troops. .
4 PREFACE.

It was more than an exploit. There was more in
the event than its surprising completeness or the
immediate disturbing effect which a blow of this
kind would naturally have upon the operations of
acampaign. It proved to be decisive for the year,
which at that stage of the contest meant much for
the American cause. How it atfected the general
morale on both sides may appear from the story
itself.

The inducement to go over the ground again lies
in the new material which seems to justify it. For
the first time we get at the official correspondence
on the other side which is exceptionally interest-
ing and historically important. What the English
King, his War Minister, their Commander in
America, officers of rank and opposition fault-
finders had to say about the situation and how
they failed to win success and took defeat, we have
never satisfactorily known. With these un-
earthed contributions the true perspective comes
out.

The documents in question, with so many others,
have been lying these hundred years or more in
the Public Record Office, London, or in private
hands or in society collections—the usual wells
from which to draw. They are not voluminous,
perhaps fortunately, but most of them will be
found to the point. How England tried in vain to
offset the French alliance, how Spain came into
the contest, how the Ministry kept laying plans to
re-establish “legal government” in the Colonies,
PREFACE. 5

how Sir Henry Clinton proposed to handle “Mr.
Washington,” how the latter declined to be
handled, what George Third thought of matters,
how he felt over the Stony Point “misfortune,”
and where some officials, having inside knowledge
of things, put the blame for England’s poor show-
ing down to date—on these and minor points there
is more light. The letters and papers bearing
upon them are included in the first part of the
Appendix, and some in the text of the present
work.

As for American authorities we have to depend,
first of all, on Washington’s correspondence,
especially Sparks’ edition; but President Sparks,
in addition, possessed copies of numerous valuable
manuscripts, home and foreign, which he never
utilized. This collection, now deposited in the
Library of Harvard University, the writer ex-
amined and freely used some years ago. At Yale
University is President Stiles’ unique diary of the
Revolution, which should see the light in printed
form some day, and from its pages we give the
sketch of Stony Point bearing Baron Steuben’s
explanations of it. The late Mr. Henry B. Daw-
son’s monograph, “The Assault on Stony Point,”
is of high value as containing so much from Gen-
eral Wayne’s correspondence, which is preserved
in the Library of the Pennsylvania Historical So-
ciety. With this should be mentioned the “Life of
Wayne,” by the late Professor Charles J. Stille, of
Philadelphia. Governor Clinton’s papers at
6 PREFACE.

Albany have also been consulted. The map of the
scene of action showing especially the route taken
by the storming column, has been compiled mainly
from the manuscript surveys of Washington’s
topographer, Thomas Erskine, F. R. S., in posses-
sion of the New York Historical Society. The
source of other documents is given in the Appen-
dix.

It was with a happy purpose that a number of
gentlemen recently organized a “Society for the
Preservation of Scenic and Historic Places and
Objects in New York”; and they are to be con-
gratulated on having persuaded the State to pur-
chase the battle-ground of Stony Point. This tract
of some thirty acres, lying between the railroad
cut on the west and the Government lighthouse
property at the east end, includes the site of nearly
all the British works, and the field of the actual
fighting. When laid out as a public park, it is to
be hoped that its rugged features will remain un-
touched and that no concessions will be made to
the demands of the modern picnic. The ground
could be marked, and very accurately, with tablets
and memorials. Indeed, there are few spots on the
Hudson where a noble Revolutionary monument
could stand more appropriately or with more im-
posing effect. The national monument at York-
town, Virginia, is the grandest as yet erected to
commemorate that period, but unfortunately the
famous field is off the line of travel and to-day is
all but forgotten. Not even a “pilgrimage” honors
PREFACE. 7

it. Almost as isolated are the handsome shaft at
Saratoga and the stirring sculptures at Mon-
mouth. Bunker Hill and Trenton are more fortu-
nate. What was thought of the Hudson Highlands
it is hardly necessary to repeat—“the key to the
continent,” both sides regarded them—but on the
whole course of the river, with its beauty and asso-
ciations attracting multitudes, there is no mark
to serve as a reminder. A lofty column on Stony
Point dedicated to the men of the Revolution,
whose qualities of strength and vigilance the posi-
tion itself so strikingly typifies, would be very
much to the purpose.

New York City, September ist, 1899.
CONTENTS

PREFACE

I

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN 1779—EUROPE IN THE Con-
TEST

II

Tue Enemy’s PRoposED OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR—
GERMAINE AND CLINTON AS TO WASHINGTON
III
WASHINGTON’s PosrTion AND PLans—STATE OF THE

CouUNTRY AND THE ARMY

IV

CuintTon’s STRATEGY—ADVANCE TO KinG’s FerRY—THE
ConneEcTicuT RaIp

Vv
WasHInGTON’s CoUNTER-MovE—T#HE STORMING OF
Stony Point -
VI
Errect oF Stony Pornt—THE YEAR’s RESULTS AT
HoME AND ABROAD -
VII

APPENDIX—BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES ON
Stony Point anD RELATED INCIDENTS OF THE
CAMPAIGN

PAGE

11

26

34

43

58

88

105
LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

GENERAL ANTHONY WaynE. From SKETCH BY TRUM-

‘PAGE

BULL Frontispiece

VERPLANCKS AND Stony PoINTs, OR GATES OF THE H1GH-
LANDS FROM THE NortTH -

Map or THe Stormina oF Stony Point anp LINE oF
Wayne’s Marcu -

View oF Stony Point From THE SouTH, WHERE THE
Rient CoLuMN ATTACKED

Tue Stizzs’ Sketcu or Stony Pont

PorTRAITS OF COLONELS FEBIGER AND BUTLER
PorTRAITS OF COLONEL Mries anD Mason Huu
EneLisH CONTEMPORARY SURVEY oF Stony Point

View oF East Repovust on Stony Pornt, SToRMED BY
Wayne’s INFANTRY

“View oF THE HigHLANDS AND Hupson From Torn
Mountain, NEAR WaAyYNE’S CAMP

CoLonEL Putnam’s CONTEMPORARY SKETCHES OF STONY
PoInT AND VERPLANCKS =

33

58

88

97

126

144

173

194

194

222
THE STORMING OF STONY POINT

I

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN 1779—-EUROPE IN THE
CONTEST

past middle year of the American Revolution,
*Seventeen Seventy-nine—a year without a
pitched battle or a stirring campaign—was in a
certain sense the determining point of the strug-
gle. The sphere of the war had so far enlarged
that it was no longer merely the question of a re-
bellion. It was the year when the Continental
powers had come to understand their own inter-
ests in the issue, and following the previous ex-
ample of one of their number, either joined sides,
or unwilling as most of them were to precipitate a
general conflict, held entirely aloof. It was the
year when England for the first time practically
stood alone. That the sympathies of Europe were
not with her was plainly shown in the following
spring, when the “Armed Neutrality” was promul-
gated from St. Petersburg.
Events and the jealousies of Courts had been
leading up to this situation. The treaty of 1778
between France and the United States, the char-
12 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

acteristic attitude of Spain, the insistence of Rus-
sia and Prussia and Holland, and some of their
neighbors, on neutral and maritime rights, indi-
cated a trend which had passed quite beyond the
ability of the British Ministers to check or divert.
They were now looking as anxiously across the
Channel as before they had been looking confi-
dently across the Atlantic. The trouble began
with the French alliance. Nothing disturbed and
irritated the mother country more than what she
denounced as an unnatural and ungrateful part-
nership of an English-born people with a common
and hated rival. England’s disgust was a com-
pound, in uncertain proportions, of wounded feel-
ings, indignation and dejection, together with an
ill-concealed consciousness that her American
policy was proving a failure and her diplomatic
management had been none of the shrewdest.

The first impulse of a spirited nation would
have been to redouble energies and strike down
the alliance. This had been done most effectively
in the previous war. In the present case the Eng-
lishman’s inclination was modified by the state of
home politics and his deepened resentment to-
wards his French neighbor. Whatever difference
of opinion existed as to the treatment the rebels
deserved in the new turn of affairs there was none
as to the deserts due the traditional enemy; for,
under the disguise of an alliance, was not France
interfering in a domestic concern, secretly and
then openly abetting rebellion and plotting
ENGLAND'S POLICY IN 1775. 18

deeply for the eventual recovery, through the
rebels themselves, of the valuable region she had
but recently lost in America? Was she not ma-
liciously bent on Great Britain’s ruin? On this
aspect of the matter, English Whig and Tory
thought and felt alike.

What to do in the emergency was about as
grave a question as that presented in 1775. In
that year it was a question whether to conciliate
or coerce the Americans. Great Britain resolved
on coercion with the result that after three years
of much fighting and heavy expenditures no head-
way had been made. Chatham’s early warning
that “You cannot conquer America,” which the
Tory majority laughed at as a bit of passionate
declamation, seemed in 1778 to have had a touch
of prophecy about it. And yet in the light of her
growing military reputation, her expansion of ter-
ritory, the assumed relation of colonists to their
mother country, and her position in Europe, the
England of 1775 could do nothing less than follow
what might be called her historical sense, and
resolve to suppress the revolt. She accepted her
judgment as the will and warning of experience
and ignored theories and experiments. The policy
of retraction and conciliation, the offer of con-
cessions and good-will as urged by Chatham and
Burke, while ethically sound and winning, struck
the average mind as promising less success, and
certainly greater loss of national dignity, than
the policy of force. All Englishmen wished to
14 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

keep the colonies safely within the empire by one
means or another. Concessions at the outset
meant repeated demands and concessions there-
after with the final surrender of nearly all
authority on the part of the general government.
At a certain point the use of force would be inevi-
table, and Tory instinct believed in applying it
first as last.

The French alliance was met just before formal
announcement of it to Great Britain. It was met,
not with a change of Ministry and a set determina-
tion to face it as it stood, but with an unexpected,
and as the outcome emphasized, a humiliating
change of policy. What occurred was a veritable
surrender by the government into the camp of the
Whigs, by its acceptance of their original pro-
gram of concessions for America. Its authors
looked upon it as a necessary coup d@’ etat which
might go far towards solving the war question,
and incidentally strengthen their party’s grip
upon the country. Lord North, the head of the
Ministry, was at this moment the most unpopular
and best abused Englishman in public life. He
was held responsible for the wretched campaigns
in the colonies, and his continuance in office was
freely criticised and denounced as well by many
of his friends as by the opposition. King George
retained him, and at times against North’s own
inclination, as the only available and most pliable
agent to carry out what he conceived to be the
true wish of the great majority of his people,
THE KING’S SENSE OF PUBLIC DUTY. 15

namely, the vigorous prosecution of the Ameri-
can war. While that wish was interpreted mainly
by the heavy government vote in the Commons,
by resolutions of cities and counties, by the
landed interests and through the clergy, repre-
senting only so much loyal Toryism, there can be
little doubt that the nation as such was with him
and still less that the King, with all his stub-
bornness and limited capacities, was honestly and
profoundly impressed with his duty to his sub-
jects and his kingdom. His published correspond-
ence and his general conduct shows that. What
he privately wrote to North midway in the con-
test, June, 1779, reflected his uniform sentiment:
“J should think it the greatest injustice,” he said,
“if it could be supposed that any man in my
dominions more ardently desired the restoration
of peace and solid happiness in every part than I
do; there is no personal sacrifice I could not read-
ily yield for so desirable an object; but at the
same time no inclination to get out of the present
difficulties, which certainly keep my mind very
far from a state of ease, can induce me to enter
into what I look upon as the destruction of the
Empire.”! The King’s mistake—political crime,
his critics have called it—was in doggedly keep-
ing about him a weak, vain and generally unsuc-
cessful Cabinet, without gratifying the country
or his own party with a change, and the trial of

1 There is something impressive about this letter. See Document
No. I in the Appendix.
16 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

new and abler men. He seems to have feared
prominent Tories, whom he might be unable to
control, as much as he hated the leading Whigs.
He was a coercionist, and no Minister who was
not as much a one as himself could meet with
favor or remain in power. But like his advisers
he failed to understand the actual situation; he
was blinded to its weightier demands, abroad and
at home—blinded by his never-failing faith in
success, his determination, prejudices and narrow
horizon.

To thwart France was the matter in hand. On
the 17th of February, 1778, Lord North, anticipat-
ing news of the alliance, sprung his new plan on

‘the House of Commons, confounding the Tories
no less than the Whigs. It was a motion, in brief,
to repeal all the obnoxious tax measures which
had led to the war and practically concede every-
thing America had demanded save independence.
If the colonists would but renounce the French
alliance and return to the old fold with larger and
assured privileges, Great Britain would immedi-
ately withdraw her armies and close the struggle.
The bill further provided that commissioners
should be appointed to proceed to America and
negotiate a peace on these terms. “Concession
and reconciliation” coming from a Ministry with
an iron-clad record was the surprise of the hour;
but the motion went through with little opposi-
tion—the Tories shrinkingly supporting their
leaders and the Whigs disarmed by the govern-
CHATHAM ON THE SITUATION. 17

ment’s adoption of their own policy. Of course,
the scheme was transparent and plausible—
pacify America and then fight France.

Had that early and constant friend of the colon-
ists, the noble Earl of Chatham, survived the
anxieties and excitement of the time it is possible
that he might have reappeared in the councils of
the government and helped extricate England
from her difficulties. Lord North wished to retire,
and who but Chatham was the man to carry out
what was originally Chatham’s policy? But the
King had no love for him, and would only con-
sent to his holding a second place in the new pro-
posed coalition Ministry, a position the Earl
would not accept. Events, however, may have
forced the King to put him at the head. As Chat-
ham was opposed to granting independence to
America, reconciliation could not have beer effect-
ed under then existing conditions. So far as his
contemporaries—among them his political ally,
Lord Shelburne—could gather from his conversa-
tions, “his idea was to withdraw the English
troops from all the continent of America, except
a few strongly fortified and easily held positions
on the coast, and then to concentrate all the naval
and military resources of his country on the
struggle with France. He would have repealed
at one stroke all the vexatious legislation which
had estranged England from her colonies, and he
would have trusted to those common ties of race,
religion and language, on which Shelburne had
18 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

insisted, to make it possible to come to terms. The
task of Chatham would in any case have taxed
the highest resources of his genius, and it is more
than probable that his health and strength would
have given way under the effort.’" In other words,
this statesman seems to have represented the
views of certain Whigs who would have let the
colonists go for the time being, and then, after
crushing France and forcing her to annul the
American treaty, invited them in their dilemma
to return to their former allegiance, and enjoy all
the rights and immunities they desired. Their
plan was the reverse of North’s, namely, first de-
feat France and then pacify America. There were
difficulties in the way of both plans, for if France
threw a force into America, as she subsequently
did, England would have been compelled to fight
both jointly at a disadvantage. Whatever losses
the French would have suffered elsewhere could
have been repaired at the general peace when the
situation in America would have enabled the allies
to name the terms. Independence for the colo-
nies seemed assured in any case. It is interesting
to note that the King also had a plan for meeting
the emergency. Forecasting a French war, he
wrote to North as early as January 1, 1778: “It
might perhaps be wise to strengthen the forces in
Canada, the Floridas and Nova Scotia; withdraw

1 Fitzmaurice, in his ‘‘Life of William Shelburne,” gives the full-
est and most authoritative account published of the attempt to organ-
ize a Whig or coalition Ministry and of Chatham’s attitude and
views at the time. The above quotation is from Chap. I., Vol. III.
THE PEACE COMMISSION. 19

the rest from North America and without loss of
time employ them in attacking New Orleans and
the French and Spanish West India possessions.
We must at the same time continue destroying
the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies, and
thus soon bring both contests to a conclusion;
and this country having had its attention diverted
to a fresh object, would be in a better shape to
subscribe to such terms as Administration might
think advisable to offer America, who on her part
will at such a time be more ready to treat than at
the present hour.”

But Chatham died, the King had endorsed
North’s turn-coat scheme and induced him to con-
tinue in the Cabinet, and it only remained to
despatch peace commissioners across the sea.
Three well-known figures in Court and party cir-
cles, Carlisle, Johnstone and Eden, were appoint-
ed, and for the next six months, from May to
November, 1778, the hopes of the “Administra-
tion,’ as George Third called his government,
centered on their efforts. Whigs and wiser Tories
predicted utter failure. So high did political and
personal feeling run that this olive-branch offer
was openly discredited and ridiculed from the
start. The historian, Gibbon, then member of the
Commons and supporter of the crown, despair-
ingly wrote to a friend: “You see we are reduced
to the humiliation of sueing for a peace. I much
fear we shall have the additional humiliation of
being rejected. In the meantime a French war is
20 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

every day a probable event. I have not seen so
very black a prospect. . . . . I voted with
government, yet I still repeat that in my opinion
Lord North does not deserve pardon for the past,
applause for the present or confidence in the
future.” Walpole’s entry in his diary is sarcastic
and jubilant: “Yesterday, February 17, did the
whole Administration, by the mouth of their
spokesman, Lord North, no, no, not resign; on the
contrary, try to keep their places by a full and
ample confession of all their faults, and by a still
more extraordinary act, by doing full justice both
to America and to the opposition.” The commis-
sioners arrived at their destination at the most
unfavorable moment that could have been chosen.
Burgoyne’s surrender was still the great event in
the air, the French treaty, then just announced to
the States, was accepted as settling the question
of independence, and now the rumor was spread-
ing that Philadelphia, which cost the enemy a
campaign to secure, was about to be evacuated.
In fact the commissioners reached that city, then
the British headquarters in America, only to find
that orders had preceded them to Sir Henry
Clinton, Commander-in-Chief, to abandon the
place and concentrate again at New York as «
French fleet was aiming for the coast. They ar-
rived in May; Clinton withdrew in June, and laid
himself open to attack at Monmouth, which the
Continentals claimed as another victory to set up
against the peace project. Losing no time, how-
THE PEACE POLICY HOPELESS. 21

ever, from Philadelphia the Commissioners com-
municated their mission to Congress. It need not
be said that their offers were received with a re-
buff—indeed not received at all except for publi-
cation throughout the country as an evidence of
the straits to which Great Britain was reduced.
The newspapers commented on them to the
amusement and contempt of the people. Even
Tories acknowledged the inopportuneness of the
arrival. It only made matters worse when the
Commission attempted to treat with the States
separately, and when it reached New York to be
cooped up during the remaining months of its stay
the situation became ludicrous. The task was
hopeless. As the Commissioners could not offer
independence, and as France had guaranteed it,
their proffer of anything less fell flat. The futility
of their errand dawned on them at an early date.
Referring to the brusque reception of their mes-
sages by Congress, they wrote home July 5: “The
treaty of alliance with France, the evacuation of
Philadelphia, the leaving open the whole coast of
America to foreign supplies, the free entrance for
prizes, and these events rapidly following each
other, and represented as the effect of consum-
mate prudence and policy on the part of Congress,
to be supported by further assistance from
Europe, have so elated the persons in authority
through the revolted colonies that we could not
expect an answer more decent at present.” And
again:
99 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

“The decided rejection given by the Congress to
all terms of accommodation short of independ-
ence leaves no room to hope that any success will
attend the commission with which we are honored
except through the exertions of his Majesty’s
arms, or by an appeal to the people at large, or by
negotiation with separate bodies of men and indi-
viduals.” By August the members requested
leave to return home, and on October 3d, just be-
fore sailing they issued a parting proclamation to
the Congress, Assemblies, and people of the
United States repeating their offers, including a
general pardon to the end of the “grace” extended
for forty days after date, and reminding all con-
cerned that, upon a rejection of their terms, Great
Britain could not be expected again to assume the
same liberal attitude toward them. They indulged
in no warning except so far as one could be con-
strued from the expression that “a perseverance
in the present rebellion or any adherence to the
treasonable connection attempted to be framed
with a foreign power will be considered as crimes
of the most aggravated kind.” In America this
was made much of as a threat to resume the war
with fire and sword, and subsequently in Parlia-
ment opposition members denounced it in the
same vein, but the Commissioners and Ministry

1From letters in Stevens’ collection of ‘‘Facsimiles.” American
historians have devoted little space to the visit of the peace com-
missioners, through lack of material. Stevens has now made it pos-
sible to give nearly a complete account of it, the correspondence in
the case being considerable.
BURKE’S SCATHING REBUKE. 23

disclaimed any such intention. Only a more ener-
getic prosecution of the war was meant; and as a
matter of fact the war went on very much as be-
fore. Returning to England the Commission
gladly surrendered its authority. At least one of
its members, William Eden, had closely studied
affairs in America, and subsequently he expressed
himself freely to Attorney-General Wedderburn
on the true causes of their ill-success. The letter,
Document II, in the Appendix, will be found
worth reading. His conclusions, as the deliberate
view of an observing civilian and official, coincide
remarkably with the impartial conclusions of
later investigation. “In plain English,” he closes,
“the times require an unparalleled exertion of
activity, spirit, invention, enterprise, judgment
and concert; of which when I look at the present
Ministry I see neither the existence nor the pos-
sibility.” At home the Commissioners came
in for the usual criticism, but it fell to Edmund
Burke to embalm their memory in the high oratory
of the period when he introduced this scathing
passage in his address to the electors of Bristol in
1780:

“Do you remember our Commission? We sent out a
solemn embassy across the Atlantic Ocean to lay down the
Crown, the peerage, the Commons of Great Britain, at the
feet of the American Congress. That our disgrace might
want no sort of brightening and burnishing, observe who
they were that composed this famous embassy. My Lord

Carlisle is among the first ranks of our nobility. He is the
94 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

identical man who, but two years before, had been put

forward at the opening of a session in the House of Lords,
as the mover of a haughty and rigorous address against
America. He was put in the front of the embassy of sub-
mission. Mr. Eden was taken from the office of Lord
Suffolk, to whom he was then under Secretary of State;
from the office of that Lord Suffolk who, but a few weeks
before, in his place in Parliament, did not deign to inquire
where a Congress of ‘vagrants’ was to be found. This
Lord Suffolk sent Mr. Eden to find these vagrants, with-
out knowing where his King’s generals were to be found,
who were joined in the same Commission for supplicating
those whom they were sent to subdue. They enter the
Capital of America only to abandon it; and these assertors
and representatives of the dignity of England, at the tail
of a flying army, let fly their Parthian shafts of memorials
and remonstrances at random behind them. Their
promises and their offers, their flatteries and their menaces,
were all despised; and we were saved the disgrace of their
formal reception, only -because the Congress scorned to
receive them, while the State House of independent Phila-
delphia opened her doors to the public entry of the am-
bassador of France. From war and blood we went to sub-
mission; and from submission plunged back again to war
and blood, to desolate and be desolated, without measure,
hope or end. I am a Royalist; I blushed for this degrada-
tion of the Crown. I am a Whig; I blushed for the dis-
honor of Parliament. I am a true Englishman; I felt to
the quick for the disgrace of England. I am a man; I felt
for the melancholy reverse of human affairs, in the fall of
the first power in the world.”

And thus the year 1778 was, in great measure,
lost to England. America had not been pacified
BRITISH MINISTRY STIRRED UP. 95

and France had entered the field. In the South
the British were active and met with some suc-
cesses, such as the capture of Savannah. But in
the more important North, Sir Henry Clinton’s
hands had been tied, not only by the presence of
the peace Commission, of which, by virtue of his
position, he was also a member, but by the partial
depletion of his force to strengthen the British
West Indies. Some of his best troops were de-
tached—“the nerves of my army,” as he com-
plained. Stirred up, however, by the failures
chargeable to and the denunciations heaped upon
it, Administration proceeded to lay the lines for a
better record in the important year to come. With
what success, the following chapters are intended
to show.
II

THE ENEMY’S PROPOSED OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR—
GERMAINE AND CLINTON AS TO WASHINGTON

A plan of campaign in America was accord-
ingly devised for 1779. As in preceding years, it
had a very definite objective and promised large
results on paper. In 1776, when the war opened.
on an extensive scale, the British determined to
make New York their central base, sever Wash-
ington’s lines of communication and dissipate his
army. In that year they met with greater suc-
cesses than in any other, but at its close Trenton
and Princeton offset the moral effect of their
progress. In 1777 their capture of Philadelphia
was an insignificant advantage compared with
the failure of Burgoyne’s movement and the sur-
render of his army. In 1778 came the French alli-
ance and the quandary of the enemy, resulting in
the contraction of their operations. In 1779 they
attempted their last campaign in the North, bend-
ing their energies thereafter mainly to the South-
ern States.

Judging from the actual movements of the
British this year, 1779, they appeared to have
waited on circumstances. There was nothing
threatening or serious in what they did, except
for brief intervals. They made no sustained

26
ENEMY’S PLANS FOR 1779. oF

effort. Washington naturally interpreted every
step they took as involving some secret design
against his own position, but he was never in
danger. Historians of the war, both English and
American, properly speak of the operations.as
expeditionary, desultory and without a campaign
character. The enemy, however, opened up with
profound intentions, as they could ill afford to frit-
ter away the year after the peace fiasco of ’78.
These intentions, now just come to light, invest
this period of the war with a fresh interest. At
an early day Lord George Germaine, the Minister
at the head of the war office, a man unequal to the
position, but who assumed a certain expertness in
the art of military planning, wrote out instruc-
tions for Sir Henry Clinton in America, the ma-
terial portions of which under date, Whitehall,
London, January 23, 1779, ran as follows:!

GERMAINE TO CLINTON.

“T will state to you the outlines of the Plan for the
future conduct of the War in North America, submitted
to the King and which His Majesty has thought fit to ap-
prove; but at the same time IJ am Commanded to say to
you that His Majesty has such entire reliance upon your
wisdom, zeal for his service, and great military abilities
that he leaves it to your judgment to make such altera-
tions either in the Plan itself or in the mode pointed out
for its execution as, from your knowledge of many circum-

1 Original letter in ‘Carleton Papers,” London Institution. The

above from President Sparks’ copy of it in Harvard University MSS.
Collections.
28 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

stances which cannot. be known here you shall conceive to
conduce more immediately and effectually to the attain-
ment of the great end of all His Majesty’s measures—
namely, the re-establishment of Legal Government in the
revolted Provinces.

“It is most earnestly wished that you may be able to
bring Mr. Washington to a general and decisive action at

the opening of the Campaign; but if that cannot be effect-
ed it is imagined that with an army of about 12,000 Men
in the field under your immediate Command, you may
force him to seek for safety in the Highlands of New York
or the Jerseys, and leave the Inhabitants of the open
Country at liberty to follow what the Commissioners repre-
sent to be their inclinations and renounce the authority of
the: Congress, and return to their allegiance to His
Majesty. This would obviate the chief objection to the re-
establishment of civil government in New York since a
majority of the Counties in the Province could then send
members to the Assembly, and the antient constitution
could be restored in due form—an event the more to be
desired as it would afford His Majesty the opportunity of
realizing his benign intentions towards his Revolted sub-
jects and removing their ill-founded apprehensions of be-
ing ruled by Military Laws in all time to Come, should they
submit to His Majesty’s Government.

“But besides these immediate good effects, which your
success in that quarter might be expected to be attended
with, the operations proposed to be carried on in other
parts would be greatly facilitated by your obliging General
Washington to keep the whole of his Regular Troops to-
gether to oppose your army, and on the other hand those
operations could not fail to prevent his receiving succours
from the Countries attacked. It is, therefore, intended
STRENGTH OF BRITISH FORCES. 29

that two corps of about 4,000 each, assisted by a naval
force, should be employed upon the seacoasts of the re-
volted Provinces, the one to act on the side of New Eng-
land and New Hampshire, and the other in the Chesa-
peake Bay, and by entering the rivers and inlets, wherever
it was found practicable, seize or destroy their shipping
and stores, and deprive them of every means of fitting out
privateers, or carrying on Foreign Commerce.

“A considerable diversion will also be directed to be
made on the side of Canada, by a succession of parties of
Indians supported by Detachments of the troops there,
alarming and harrassing the Frontiers and making Incur-
sions into the Settlements.

“The reinforcement intended to be sent out to you early
in the Spring to enable you to effect these important ser-
vices will consist of Col. Macdonald’s Highlanders and the
Edinburgh Regiment of 1,000 each, the remainder of Col.
Maclean’s Regiment, which is 400, also 3,000 British and
1,200 German Recruits—making in the whole an addition
of about 6,600 to your present force, which appears from
your last returns to be upwards of 22,000 effectives at New
York and Rhode Island; and as the augmentation of the
British Regiments will extend to those in America some
further addition will be expected in the course of the
Summer.”

We may imagine that the perusal of this letter
put Clinton in no very agreeable mood. The con-
temptuous estimate of Germaine’s abilities which
he privately entertained could hardly have been
modified by the implication in the “Plan” that the
outlines of a campaign in America had to be
drawn up by a Minister at home. A pretty piece
of Cabinet work, My Lord, to devise on the banks
80 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

of the peaceful Thames, but how will it stand a
provincial cloud-burst, say around Anthony’s
Nose on the Hudson? The plan, in brief, proposed
three things.

First—Beat Washington or drive him well
away from settled parts of the country.

Second—Harry the frontiers and the coasts,
North and South.

Third—Restore the province of New York, set
up the former government, welcome the popula-
tion, let them elect a good, loyal Assembly, and
go on in the old way “benignly.” The other colon-
ies would doubtless fall into line.

Now Clinton knew perfectly well that “Mr.
Washington,” who was already in the Jersey hills,
would never put himself in the way of being
beaten, and that to compel him to retreat further,
and especially to keep him at a distance, would
necessitate the permanent occupation of interior
points many miles from New York, which would
subject his communications to constant interrup-
tion and invite such uprisings as overwhelmed
Burgoyne. It would have required double his.
force to occupy and control the Province and
satisfy the other demands of the plan. The most
important point was the handling of Washington,
and what Clinton thought of that task is clearly
stated in his reply to the War Minister under date
of May 14:

1From the same source as previous letter.
SIR HENRY CLINTON’S VIEWS. 31

CLINTON TO GERMAINE.

“My Lord,

; To force Washington to an action upon
terms tolerably equal has been the object of every cam-
paign during this war. The difficulty of attaining that
object in so strong a Country even with the force Sir Wil-
liam Howe had, by this time needs no illustration. Wash-
ington has at this instant 8,000 Continental troops in
Jersey, besides Militia—a number far exceeding what he
had when Sir William Howe marched against him in June,
1777. I believe the force with which your Lordship seems
to apprehend that I might drive Washington from his
present position and oblige him to retire to the Mountains
is in my idea by no means equal to the task, and my
opinion is supported by the conduct of Sir William Howe,
who with an army superior to what mine can possibly be,
thought the attempt to force that position entirely un-
advisable. It shall be my endeavor to draw Washington
forward before he is Reinforced, by indirect Manouvres,
and if he gives in to my views no efforts shall be wanting
to strike at him whilst he is in motion; but if he persists
in keeping his present post I must not flatter myself that
it will be easy to gain any advantage over him or to carry
into effect, as I certainly should wish to do, the measures
which your Lordship appears to recommend.”

No doubt Clinton, in confessing that he found
Washington a hard nut to crack, enjoyed some
consolation in reminding Germaine that his prede-
cessor, Howe, had found him a still harder one.
Both Howe and Burgoyne were now back in Eng-
land, sitting in Parliament, and calling for an in-
vestigation into their conduct in America. Clin-
ton’s failure, up to that time, to do more than they
32 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

found it possible, afforded them an additional
illustration of the difficulties of campaigning in
that country, and so far may have helped out their
case. But Clinton’s predicament was the less
sufferable, as the ill-success of those two generals
made little impression upon the government as to
the support he ought to receive. The new Com-
mander was expected to accomplish greater
things with fewer men. During his entire service
he was constantly mortified and hampered by the
inadequate means placed at his disposal to “rush”
the war in the colonies. This, in fact, with Eden’s
further explanations, accounts for the inability of
the mother country to crush the rebellion. Since
iT76 her armies here had been too weak to effect
permanent results. As long as she entrusted the
chief command to men of only fair capacities, to
safe, methodical heads like Howe and Clinton,
who received their instructions from the home
office, it devolved on that office to supply them
with all the troops they called for. What a mili-
tary genius might have done with the force at
hand was another matter; but the genius was not
forthcoming.

Clinton, however, was thoroughly loyal to
his King, and accepting his orders, forthwith
thought out a bit of strategy by which he might
possibly entrap Washington. Secretly he could
not have expected it to work, for it depended, as
he naively observed to Germaine, on whether the
AmericanChief unwittingly gave into his “views.”
 

NORTH VIEW OF STONY

POINT AND VERPLANCES

 
NUMBER OF BRITISH EFFECTIVES. 83.

And as to his army, he reminded the Minister in
the letter already quoted that he had overrated its
strength. Even with the reinforcements prom-
ised he could not put twelve thousand men in the
field and that was not enough for an effective
campaign.

In this connection it is interesting to note the
means by which Washington was able to arrive at
a close estimate of the enemy’s numbers from
time to time, as may be seen from General Mc-
Dougall’s report of his examination of deserters,
given in Document 18 of the Appendix.

What now was the situation at this date on the
other side of the line?
II

WASHINGTON’S POSITION AND PLANS—STATE OF THE
COUNTRY AND THE ARMY

One must look long and far into the writings of
Washington to find those frequent public expres-
sions of confidence and enthusiasm in the cause
he was fighting for, those urgent and uplifting
appeals to his countrymen to keep strong in heart
and bend every sinew, or even those tocsin calls
to his soldiers in camp and field with which at
times in history the recognized and conscious
leader of a glorious movement has buoyed it over
to success. And yet his leadership saved the na-
tion. He has been compared to William of
Orange, but that Prince controlled proportion-
ately greater resources. He has been compared
to Cromwell, but Cromwell could appeal from pa-
triotism to Puritanism and hold his following by
a double tie as Washington could not. With vary-
ing intellectual endowments, the power of all
three lay in the depth of their faith and the
strength and contagion of their resolution. Prob-
ably the least demonstrative was Washington,
who was reserved, conservative and pre-eminently
practical. Men came to understand him through
his action and the quality of his nature. They
found that as a chieftain he was to be measured,

34
WASHINGTON ON THE COUNTRY’S LETHARGY. 85

not by words, assurances and proclamations,
whose effect was ephemeral, but by the degree of
his patience, vigilance, judgment and energies.
Here lay his strength and quiet greatness. He
satisfied the test after the severest experiences
and inspired profound confidence; and that con-
fidence had first become universal and established
throughout the country at about this period of the
war, the opening of the year 1779.

As in the case of many an accepted and faithful
head of a popular undertaking, Washington failed
to receive adequate support, or more properly, a
support which, as Commander-in-Chief, he could
uniformly depend upon and utilize. If there was
one interval in the struggle when prospects looked
the brightest, we should place it here at this time,
after Saratoga, Monmouth, the treaty with France,
the weakened condition of the enemy, and the
probable further complications in Europe work-
ing to the advantage of America. Washington
recognized all this, but what concerned him most
was the lethargic attitude into which the country
appeared to drop at these very prospects. To his
observation it was shirking the fighting business
and giving itself over to the levities and self-inter-
ests of peace. What he wrote at the close of 1778
might have come from a disheartened Whig in
England at the same date: “Our affairs are in a
more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition
than they have been since the commencement of
the contest.” It is true, he was writing from Phil-
36 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

adelphia, then the capital and socially the minia-
ture London of America, where much wealth and
gaiety had centered, where the French Minister,
Gerard, was holding Court, and assuring all of
ultimate success, where fortunes were made or
lost through the luck or ill-luck of privateers that
found safe ports on the Delaware and Chesapeake,
where Congressmen assembled from all parts of
the country, some with their families, and were
engaging in long debates and wrangles over the
lesser difficulties of the situation, and where the
\tmosphere in general seemed little charged with
the heaviness of a lingering war. Much of this
was on the surface, for Philadelphia remained
always patriotic, but to the Commander-in-Chief,
coming from a distressed camp, it took on an ex-
aggerated form. To Benjamin Harrison, of Vir
ginia, and again to James Warren, of Massachu-
setts, he poured out his soul in the most anxious
terms. To the former he wrote: “If I were to be
called upon to draw a picture of the times and of
men, from what I have seen, heard, and in part
know, I should in one word say, that idleness, dis-
sipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast
hold of most of them; that speculation, peculation,
and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have
got the better of every other consideration, and al-
most of every order of men; that party disputes
and personal quarrels are the great business of
the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an em-
pire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined
HIS ANXIETIES AND FEARS. | 87

finances, depreciated money, and want of credit,
which in its consequences is the want of every-
thing, are but secondary considerations, and post-
poned from day to day, from week to week, as if
our affairs wore the most promising aspect. After
drawing this picture, which from my soul I be-
lieve to be a true one, I need not repeat to you,
that I am alarmed and wish to see my country-
men roused. . . . . Our money is now sink-
ing fifty per cent. a day in this city; and I shall
not be surprised if in the course of a few months,
a total stop is put to the currency of it; and yet an
assembly, a concert, a dinner, or supper, that will
cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only
take men off from acting in this business, but
even from thinking of it, while a great part of the
officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are
quitting the service and the more virtuous few,
rather than do this, are sinking by sure degrees
into beggary and want.”

In Washington’s view, as to every American,
the Revolution, so far from being an inspiration,
was the rational outcome of colonial tendencies,
and now, in war, required but the same aroused
attention, the same common guardianship and
able handling that it received from its civil
leaders in the early days of protests and petitions,
and that it was to receive again when threatened
with disaster on the question of the Constitution.
With the ship upon the 1ight course, with eyes
and hopes turned to a new destination, it was only
388 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

necessary to avoid evils and ordinary dangers and
all would be well; and this is the key-note of
Washington’s extensive correspondence during
the fighting years. His role is largely that of pilot
and protector; where he writes strongly, impres-
sively and sometimes in an impassioned way, it is
to criticise, advise and warn.

Behind this occasional despondency was the
condition of the army-—-a mere skeleton at this
date. Life in Philadelphia would have troubled
the Chief little if Congress had only provided him
with a respectable force. That was now to be a
standing anxiety to the close of the war—few
soldiers. Some critics see in this a mortifying re-
flection on the patriotism of the “fathers”; but
why there were always few and not enough was
due to several natural causes apart from luke-
warmness or sheer disinclination. The principal
one was the effect of Burgoyne’s surrender, and it
operated in New England which was a large re-
cruiting ground. That signal event turned the
common militiaman into something of a general.
He observed that thereafter the enemy hugged the
coast under cover of their ships, and that their
few inland raids did not penetrate far or continue
long. To keep them in wholesome dread of an-
other “Burgoynade,” to protect their own towns
and villages, and to raise the necessary crops for
people and army, it devolved on the militiaman to
remain at home with his local company; and with
these objects in view the Northern States main-
DEFECTS IN AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM. 39

tained a generally excellent militia organization.
Then there was the traditional aversion and oppo-
sition to long terms of service. “Three years or
the War” was a stumbling block to heads of
families and veterans of the French and Indian
war who had been called out only for the cam-
paign months, from May to November, to return
and spend the winters at their firesides instead of
in a dreary and perhaps fatal camp. Again, as
already hinted, the French alliance lulled the
great majority into a sense of security; and just
now, and for the remainder of the war, credited
rumors were afloat that the enemy were about to
abandon the contest, and that recruits would not
be needed. Washington’s uniform and repeated
representations that the Continental army was
the chief defence against the British regulars, that
the former was dwindling, that the latter were
more numerous, and that militiamen invariably
proved a poor reliance in the open field, failed to
have the proper effect against the above consider-
ations. Had Washington ever been in imminent
danger the country would have rallied around
him; but as the enemy, especially after Monmouth,
seemed disinclined to hunt him down, the inde-
pendent and over-wise American saw no present
call to rush to camp. This was the great embar-
rassment. Washington was repeatedly prevented
from taking a promising offensive for the reason
that the average native, judging for himself, re-
garded the existing defensive as sufficiently effec-
40 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

tual. Sooner or later, in his opinion, the enemy
would tire and give up the struggle at all points,
as in 1780 and ’81 they had apparently given it up
in the Northern and Middle States.

There were, however, at this time in the Ameri-
can camps above the line of the Delaware, some
twelve thousand seasoned troops whose service
would not expire for one or two years—the Con-
tinental army proper dating its organization from.
January 1st, 1777—and these might be utilized
with some effect. Several plans were proposed.
For one, the “emancipation of Canada” was
always a favorite object with certain generals and
members of Congress. The attempt was seriously
considered and some preparations were made, but
France declined co-operation and nothing was
, done. Nor was France just then ready to threaten
New York with a fleet, in which case Washington
would have collected every available Continental,
and with militia assistance, made a strenuous
effort to force the enemy from that base. So that
by the time any movement could take place there
seemed to be but one that was feasible, and that
was an expedition against the hostile tribes of the
Six Nations in Western New York, who with the
Tories in that quarter, threatened a repetition of
the Wyoming and Cherry Valley massacres. It
was time they were chastised, and during the
summer a Continental force under General
Sullivan completely defeated them. As _ for
the Commander-in-Chief, he intended with his
CONTINENTAL CAMPS EARLY IN 1779. Al

depleted army to remain in the vicinity of the
enemy.

In the spring of 1779, the Continental troops
were posted as follows:

Washington with regiments from the middle
-and Southern States was still in winter quarters
-at Middlebrook, New Jersey, a few miles north of
Boundbrook, where the men had fared much bet-
ter than at Valley Forge the year before. The
Eastern troops were quartered, the Connecticut
-and New Hampshire division at Redding, near the
New York boundary; the Massachusetts men on
the east side of the Hudson and other points.
West Point was garrisoned with a brigade under
‘General John Paterson. General McDougall took
post at Peekskill; General Gates at Providence.

These several winter encampments, it will be
observed, were centered within supporting dis-
tance of West Point. By forced marches nearly
all-the troops could reach its vicinity in two or
three days. West Point was “the key to the con-
tinent.”! The side that held it controlled the mili-
tary situation. It was to gain possession of it, in-
cluding the line of the river from Albany to New
York, that Burgoyne came down from Canada and
that Clinton marched up in the vain effort to assist
him, in 1777. Recognizing its importance as

1 What a prominent loyalist in New York, Judge William Smith,
thought of its importance, appears in Document 17, Appendix ; and
generally, how far American Tories commented on campaign plans,
to the embarrassment of British Commanders, appears in Spark’s
“Washington,” Vol VI, p. 270-71, note
42 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

guarding the strongest though not the shortest
line of communication between essential New
England and the States below, the Americans
fortified the position and made it practically im-
pregnable. Only once more did the enemy harbor
serious designs upon the Point, but that attempt,
which blackens the record of 1780, both combat-
ants subsequently would have been glad to repu-
diate and forget. “The posts in the Highlands are
of infinite consequence,” wrote Washington when
they appeared to be threatened now in 1779. Those
Highlands were the “mountains” which, on his
own admission, appalled Sir Henry Clinton. They
contained the Thermopylae of the field; but while
nature has tossed them about in grand confusion,
multiplying the peaks and domes and ridges and
gorges, the British invader despaired of finding
the unguarded pathway to the rear.

It was on the outskirts of this region that the
enemy opened up their operations. For a strong
coast diversion, such as Germaine proposed,
General Matthews and Admiral Collier were sent
into the Chesapeake where they desolated Norfolk
and Portsmouth, Virginia, burned vessels and
brought off much tobacco. Otherwise the diver-
sion was of no military consequence.
IV

CLINTON’S STRATEGY—ADVANCE TO KING’S. FERRY—
THE CONNECTICUT RAID

Cligton proposed to force Washington to fight.
If his strategy involved some intricacies which his
antagonist never succeeded in unravelling it was
not because of the latter’s lack of military compre-
hension. What Clinton regarded as a clever game
to play does not appear to have suggested itself to
Washington as one of the probable alternatives of
acampaign. It will be seen that what he thought
to be Clinton’s chief aim was never seriously con-
templated by the British general, and that any
other object that general might have had in view
caused Washington little concern. The plan in
simple terms was this: So manoeuvre against the
Americans as to compel them to accept battle on
open ground away from their mountains, or strike
them while in motion. It depended. on the ma-
noeuvres, and in part on the early arrival of the
promised reinforcement of six thousand men.

So far as Clinton’s correspondence shows he
does not seem to have divulged the details of his
plan until after its complete miscarriage in mid-
summer. He then unburdened his mind to Gen-
eral Haldimand, commanding in Canada, who had
applied for three regiments of infantry for opera-

43
44 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

tions against our northern frontier at a moment
when every available man was needed for the
movements on the Hudson. In accounting for his
failure he explained what he had hoped to accom-
plish.1 It was to have been a campaign against
Washington’s line of supplies and not against
West Point. For his grand operation Clinton had
this in mind: Draw Washington well away from
his strong position at Middlebrook, in New Jersey,
then by rapid marches occupy that camp himself
and threaten the American magazines at Easton
to the west and Trenton below. The move would
presumably recall Washington, and Clinton’s op-
portunity to “beat him” to Germaine’s satisfac-
tion would be at hand.

The first part of the plan was successfully car-
ried oat by a manoeuvre well calculated to throw
the American Commander off the scent. This was
the seizure of King’s Ferry at Stony and Ver-
planck’s Points on the Hudson, thirteen miles be-
low West Point. Ostensibly this meant an ad-
vance upon the latter position.

The enemy moved on King’s Ferry with a com-
bined land and naval expedition. The letters and
accounts of General Clinton, Commodore Collier
and General Pattison, commanding ‘the British
artillery, to be found among the documents in the
Appendix, give many particulars of its approach
up the river. Hardly less interesting are the re-

18ee in Appendix, Document No. 15, Clinton to Haldimand, Sept
9, 1779
ENEMY BEGIN OPERATIONS. 45

ports and messages from the American outposts
and friendly Whigs who watched the enemy from
the banks. The advance began from King’s Bridge
on Friday, May 28th, when a body of troops some
four thousand strong, under command of Major-
General Vaughan, marched out and encamped at
the present Yonkers. The artillery took post to
the east on Valentine’s Hill. On the following
evening General Matthews and Commodore Col-
lier unexpectedly returned from their raid on the
Virginia Coast and Clinton at once decided to
utilize this force also in the Hudson movement.
The ships and transports kept on to Yonkers
where on Sunday, the 30th, General Vaughan like-
wise embarked with a portion of his command,
and on the same day all sailed for Haverstraw
Bay. This was the second and last of the enemy’s
expeditions to the Highlands during the war.
Clinton conducted both. In the first, during the
fall of 1777, he won some reputation by his bold
attempt to relieve Burgoyne, in the course of
which he captured Forts Clinton and Montgomery
on the west bank of the river. The present move
was more threatening in point of force and sup-
posed objective, but the outcome afforded him
much less satisfaction.

On Monday forenoon, the 31st, the enemy
reached Haverstraw Bay and Vaughan’s corps dis-
embarked at Tellar’s Point on the east side some
seven miles below Verplanck’s. Other troops under
Clinton in person sailing further up landed on the
46 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

west side near Haverstraw and late in the after-
noon marched to Stony Point above. The small
American party stationed at that post burned the
block house at the summit of the Point, and re-
treated over Donderberg Mountain. During the
night the British artillerists dragged cannon to
the top, established two batteries and early the
next morning, June 1st, opened fire on the Ameri-
can Fort Lafayette opposite at Verplanck’s.
Vaughan meanwhile marched around to the rear
and Commodore Collier stationed the sloop-of-war
Vulture and row-galley Cornwallis above the point
to cut off escape by water. The garrison replied
to the enemy’s cannonade, but finding itself in a
net, surrendered about noon. It consisted of
seventy men under Captain Thomas Armstrong of
the North Carolina Line, whose misfortune, how-
ever, was to be avenged in the stirring event six
weeks later in which their companions from the
same State were to play a conspicuous part.

To Washington Clinton’s movement was not al-
together a surprise. He had been looking rather
for predatory enterprises or the transfer of the
main field from North to South, but as the cam-
paign season opened he anticipated some demon-
stration in his vicinity were it to operate only asa
blind. Washington was prepared for any move.
Intimations of this Highland expedition had
reached him some days in advance, his sources of
information in the enemy’s lines proving, as usual,
infallible. His “confidential friends” had sent out
CONTINENTALS TAKE THE FIELD. Ay

word that a large number of flat boats had been
collected at Kingsbridge and that troops were con-
centrating in the vicinity apparently for some
secret service. Hearing of the embarkation on the
Hudson, he put his army in motion at once from
Middlebrook toward West Point and halted with-
in supporting distance. Breaking up quarters on
May 30th the troops marghed through Springfield,
Troy, Pompton and Ringwood, New Jersey, and on
June 6th were filing past Tuxedo Lake into the
valley running northeasterly from that point,
known in Revolutionary annals as“Smith’sClove.”
On the following day the Virginia division went
into camp near June’s Tavern, not far from the
present Turner’s station on the Erie Railway,
covering the road to Haverstraw; the Pennsyl-
vania division took post five miles beyond at
“Widow Van Ambrose’s,” at the junction of the
road leading to Ft. Montgomery by way of the
Forest of Dean, and the Maryland division en-
camped between them. Here within easy reach of
West Point, less than twelve miles distant, Wash-
ington awaited developments.

Equally alert were George Clinton, Governor of
New York, and General McDougall, commanding
the troops on the Hudson. The latter, whose head-
quarters were at Peekskill, five miles above King’s
Ferry, had already, under Washington’s instruc-
tions, drawn in the exposed outposts on the line of
the Croton. On May 29th a deserter brought him
word of Vaughan’s advance to Yonkers the previ-
48 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

ous day, and thereafter the enemy’s doings were
frequently reported to him. Why the garrison at
‘Verplanck’s was not withdrawn in time does not
appear. Suspecting before this that the enemy
would march up in force with designs on West
Point, McDougall despatched an urgent request to
the Governor, May 25th, to have the post im-
mediately supplied with provisions. The chief
need was teams for transportation. That stalwart
patriot, one of the famous “war-governors” of the
Revolution, needed little urging. His namesake’s
incursion in 1777, which he had bravely but fruit-
lessly attempted to check, and the disgrace and
mortification entailed in the burning of Kingston,
the capital of the State, had not been forgotten.
The Governor’s Scotch-Irish nature was stirred to
its depths. All his efforts were bent to prevent a
repetition of Sir Henry’s jaunty dash through the
Highlands. Moreover, what was not the case in
17, West Point had become the recognized and
fortified key to the general situation and its pro-
tection, as Washington had written, was of “in-
finite consequence.”

To McDougall Governor Clinton replied: “I
have issued a general impress warrant to
enable the Quartermaster-General to convey to
the different posts sufficient supplies of provisions;
and you may rely upon every other exertion in my
power to forward the business.” At the same time
news came of Indian alarms to the westward re-
quiring the Governor to warn Ulster and Albany
GOVERNOR CLINTON AROUSED. 49

County troops to march to the scene if needed. The
remainder of the State militia he ordered out to
reinforce McDougall. The army supplies at Con-
tinental Village, five miles northeast of Peekskill,
and even the larger magazines at Fishkill, on the
east side, well above West Point, would be in
danger if Clinton pushed on, and they must be
secured. In the emergency everybody, quarter-
masters and commissaries, appealed to the Gover-
nor for assistance. The calls came with such per-
sistence that in addition to what he had already
done, he sent out a general order by express on
May 31st directing the militia to turn out every
team and wagon and hurry them to Fishkill. As
the troops themselves would be needed for service,
he grimly and laconically added that “unarmed
Tories” must be taken along as team drivers. For
loyalists and lukewarm patriots George Clinton
had little consideration. Finally, hearing that the
enemy had reached Verplanck’s and that McDoug-
all was falling back through Continental Village,
the Governor determined to take the field himself.
“T mean to be down to-morrow,” he wrote from
Poughkeepsie, May 31st; “I am endeavoring to
get out all the militia with all possible despatch
and hope to take down a very considerable force.”
Arriving the next day at Fishkill and finding his
orders well obeyed in the presence of teams
enough to remove the stores in case of necessity,
he wrote to McDougall at midnight: “I propose
to act under you in the character of a Brigadier
50 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

General in the Continental Army’; and he pre-
pared to take post toward the Highlands below.
As events proved, the enemy gave the Governor
and his militiamen no opportunity to fight, but
their high spirit and ready muster were appre-
ciated. From Congress John Jay wrote to Clinton
a flattering line: “The exertions of our State have
placed her in a very respectable point of view, and
permit me to tell you that your march to the High-
lands has given occasion to many handsome things
being said and written of you here.”

Thus, on the first of June, the monotony of the
situation on the Hudson had suddenly given way
to something expectant. With the enemy in pos-
session of King’s Ferry, Washington out of his
winter quarters and in the field, and New York
State in arms, the next move on the board was
awaited with lively interest. Clinton being on the
war-path, obviously it was his play again. In
reality no one but himself understood how in-
effectual his opening would probably prove and
that his next proposed play would expose it. In-
action would do the same. Reverting to his letter
to Haldimand it will be observed that while his
main objective was the camp at Middlebrook, Clin-
ton had hopes that Washington would consider
the recovery of King’s Ferry of such importance as
to risk a battle forit. The Ferry was a link in his
short line of communication between New Eng-

1From the MSS. letters of Governor Clinton, State Library,
Albany.
THE BRITISH AT KING’S FERRY. 51

land and the Middle States, and its loss would be a
serious blow as affecting the food supplies for the
Continental army. At least, so thought the enemy,
and they made much of their General’s capital
stroke. It alone justified the expedition. Now
nothing was further from Washington’s mind than
the intention which Clinton imagined he might be
compelled to entertain. Quite true that the cut-
ting of his lower line was no light matter, but far
from vital. While the misfortune would entail in-
convenience and some hardship, the cohesion of
the army was not necessarily endangered. The
utilization of interior and longer lines of communi-
cation would involve delays and larger expense,
but at most the drawback would be but temporary;
and who were more accustomed to meet difficulties
of this nature and patiently abide a better day
than Washington and his veterans of Valley
Forge? To attempt to drive Clinton from his posi-
tion was out of the question. Whatever he may
have put on paper for Haldimand, Clinton could
never have expected an open attack, involving a
general engagement, especially if he lay under
cover of his ships and fortified strongly, as he im-
mediately proceeded to do. Washington’s view of
the situation is expressed in his letters from camp
at Smith’s Clove. To the President of Congress he
wrote: “Our communication by King’s Ferry, far
the easiest, is at an end. The extent and difficulty
of land transportation are considerably increased,
a new resort and sanctuary afforded to the dis-
52 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

affected in these parts of the country, and a new
door opened to draw supplies and to distress and
corrupt the inhabitants. Reasons, which need not
be explained, put it out of our power to prevent it
beforehand or to remedy it now it has happened.
We have taken post for the present with the main
body of the army in this Clove, where we are as
well situated as we could be anywhere else, to suc-
cour the forts (at West Point) in case the future
operations of the enemy should be directed against
them.” Writing to Gates he said that an attempt
to dislodge the British from their naturally strong
positions on both sides of the Hudson “would re-
quire a greater force and apparatus than we are
masters of.” And again: “All we can do is to
lament what we cannot remedy, endeavor to pre-
vent a further progress on the river, and make the
advantages of what they have now gained as
limited as possible.”

But if Clinton could not tempt Washington to
battle around King’s Ferry, he had drawn him out
of his camp in the Jerseys, and the march upon
Middlebrook remained. The merits of his “main
design,” as he called it, is a matter for purely
military criticism. The proof of a plan lies in its
success. In the history of warfare where theory
would have discarded a certain line of strategy,
resolution or genius or “the omnipotence of luck”
have sometimes carried it brilliantly into effect.
In the present case what timely and pre-eminent
advantage would have accrued to Clinton in oc-
SIR HENRY CLINTON’S STRATEGY. 53

cupying the position Washington had just left?
The Middlebrook camp lay twenty-three miles
west of Perth Amboy, or the enemy’s nearest posts
on Staten Island, and Easton, Pennsylvania,
where Continental supplies were stored, was on
the right bank of the Delaware some forty miles
west of Middlebrook. To strike at the magazines
would take the British a three days’ march away
from their base and water communications, even
if they met with no resistance. When, a year later,
Kniphausen with a considerable force made his
raid upon Springfield, New Jersey, no further
away than Middlebrook, he was much annoyed
and delayed by the neighboring militia alone. As-
suming that Clinton’s reinforcements had arrived
in time and that he could throw a flying column of
twelve thousand men into the Jerseys, reaching
Middlebrook without difficulty, and assuming that
Washington had declined to fall in with his
“views” by stubbornly remaining where he was on
the line of the Hudson, the only objective left to
the British General would have been the Easton
stores forty miles further inland. But the alarm
would have preceded him and the greater part of
the stores, easily removable by water carriage on
the Delaware, could have been secured. Specula-
tion turns on Washington’s probable course. He
could have repeated his tactics of June and July,
1777, by marching back and defending himself be-
hind the hills, never risking a general engagement,
or he might have ignored his antagonist’s ma-
54 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

noeuvre as a vain threat, and moved in force on the
King’s Ferry garrisons, beginning seige opera-
tions, and thus recalling Clinton. Furthermore,
had Clinton been reinforced it would have been
possible for Washington to increase his own army
before the former could have availed himself of
his preponderance. The recall of Sullivan with
his three thousand good troops from the Indian
expedition and the temporary abandonment of
various posts would have véry nearly restored the
relative proportion of forces. We may be certain
that in no case would Washington have exposed
himself to defeat, and that had the two armies ap-
proached each other in New Jersey, Clinton, with
Monmouth in fresh recollection, would in all like-
lihood have been as deliberate and cautious as
Howe had been on the same ground two years be-
fore.

The entire month of June passed with no ad-
vance from King’s Ferry. What made the situa-
tion more perplexing was Clinton’s apparent re-
tirement to New York. After fortifying and man-
ning Verplanck’s and Stony Points he withdrew
the main body of his army to the vicinity of
Yonkers and Kingsbridge. Collier with all his
fleet, except the Vulture, also returned. Clinton’s
excuse for this inaction was, of course, his lack of
troops. All his plans, promises and expectations
turned largely on an increase of force. To his
friend and late co-commissioner, William Eden,
at London, he complained bitterly: “July, and no
THE CONNECTICUT RAID. 55

reinforcements arrived; inadequate as it may be,
such as it is, it ought to have been here the first
week in June at the furthest.” “Good God!’ he
exclaims, “what could prevent the troops sailing
in March or even in April!’ He may never have
been officially informed, but the fact was that the
troops were detained at home in consequence of
movements of the French in the English Channel.
“If this cursed war continues,” Clinton goes on,
“great alteration must be made in the method of
conducting it. If reinforcements do not arrive
soon for sea and land I dread consequences. Not
a word from Europe these three months, not a
farthing of money, no information, no army,
nothing but good spirits and a presentiment that
all will go well, a determination at least that
nothing shall be wanting on my part; and I sin-
cerely hope this will be the last campaign of the
war—it must be mine.”

From New York Clinton now threw out another
bait to Washington. Could he tempt him from
West Point with a diversion to the east of the
Hudson—a diversion of such a nature that he
must needs take notice of it? It was worth trying
with the result that Connecticut was treated to
Tryon’s famous July raid whose progress could be
traced by the flames that rose from New Haven,
East Haven, Fairfield, Green’s Farms and Nor-
walk. We have commonly treated this expedition
as a useless and ruthless proceeding, prosecuted
without good military motive and intensifying the
56 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

bitterness of the State-against the enemy. Clin-
ton’s object was legitimate, and the conflagra-
tions, moreover, appear to have been no part of his
program. What his purpose was is hinted at in
his instructions to Tryon and made clear in his
letters to Eden, Germaine and Haldimand. To the
latter he wrote: “I sent expeditions into Connecti-
cut, hoping that the strong invitation of that
Province would have forced Washington to march
to their assistance. Nothing, however, could with-
draw him from New Windsor. Had he given in to
my views and decidedly marched into Connecticut
I should have been able to have taken possession
of his Camp at Middlebrook even with the small
force I had, and kept it for a certain time.” To
Eden he had written as early as July 4th: “Sir
George Collier is sailed into the Sound on a desul-
tory expedition. I need not say for what purpose.
G. W.’s position in the mountains will explain it;
and should he stir I hope the reinforcement from
Europe will put it in my power to avail myself of
any false move he may make.” As to Tryon, his
orders confined him to the destruction of ships and
stores, and the impressment of cattle. “I expect
from this move,” are Clinton’s words to that offi-
cer, “that Washington will either pass the North
River with his whole army or strong detachments,
and I wish you always to be within 24 or 48 hours
of joining me.” The Connecticut invasion was
thus subsidiary to the original plan of the British
Commander-in-Chief. His'eye was still on Middle-
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY. 57

brook. Tryon and Collier sailed on the 3d of July
and were gone ten days.1 They burned two hun-
dred and forty dwellings and seven churches, and
destroyed many barns, mills, stores, shops and
vessels. The blow fell most heavily on Fairfield
and Norwalk. Preparations were then made to
descend upon New London in larger force. To
cover this Connecticut diversion and be in a better
position for speedy concentration, as it would
seem, Clinton, on the 9th moved his army close to
the Connecticut border, encamping at Byram’s
Bridge and Mamaroneck. And there we must
leave him until the 16th, when startling news will
come down from King’s Ferry.

1Particulars of the Connecticut raid, with official papers, may be
found in the valuable pamphlet: ‘‘The British Invasion of New
Haven, Connecticut, by Charles Hervey Townsend.” New Haven,
ee also, at the close of this work, Appendix No. 55, in regard to
Governor Tryon’s conduct and defence of the invasion, some new

facts and letters from ‘‘Observations on Judge Jones’ Loyalist His-
tory of the Revolution,”’ by the present writer.
V

WASHINGTON’S COUNTER MOVE—THE STORMING OF
STONY POINT

The true master of the situation was Washing-
ton. His strength lay in his immobility; it lay in
that unerring judgment and rare poise that en-
abled him to dismiss any passing inclination to
defer to the usual risks of war and accept the
enemy’s repeated challenge. He was not likely to
indulge in the “false move” which Clinton had
hoped his own manoeuvres might, sooner or later,
lead him to make. Why should he attempt the
recovery of King’s Ferry with the heavy losses in-
volved, and in case of failure, the serious weaken-
ing of his West Point defensive? Why now should
he march into Connecticut only to find her towns
burned? Like Clinton, he measured his force. It
was strong enough to hold the key to the High-
lands, not strong enough to take the field.

As the enemy had fortified themselves at Stony
Point and Verplanck’s and their main army might
return at any moment for a further advance,
Washington distributed his troops around West
Point and strengthened its defences. The Vir-
ginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania divisions,
under Sterling, De Kalb and St. Clair, constituted
the right wing under Major-General Putnam. In

58
Washington's Head-Quarter>
et

New Windsor

     
     
   
   
  

ro F
onstetution

seven milea above

 

  

 
 

  
    

        
        
   
      

  
    
 
 

       
 
 

aw AMERIC. ENT
THIS MAP WwW AN c
is compiled from the original Quy eZ
‘ Ayres
surveys of the region by ; a ay wer
Washington’s geographer, aces
Thomas Erskine, F. R. 8., in = oe AW ii Vm ren é
possession of the New York AT CMO i
Historical Societ oe ‘
istorical Society.
a oy Ss wt, wil
4 at! My, ail

uy

|

 
 

N ly,

 

Queensboro’ District

        

     

  

a a (0 PEEKSKILL
Ti) laa ’
i

\ m
\

  

 

    
 
  
 
 

AY
\

  
 

LN
\ Ain

X

THE

pees f PF recmiene

/

yf

STONY POINT

MIDNIGHT, JULY 15.16
179

sy
sunny ft
wy

  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     

 

With
Wayne's Line of March
and
American Position

Seale in the Highlands

 

ibes

  

™M

RSTRA
av® Ww 2a,

 

4
STEUBEN ON THE SITUATION. 59

Smith’s Clove and at the Furnace they guarded
the roads leading to the rear of the Point. The
left wing, composed of Howe’s Massachusetts and
Parson’s Connecticut divisions under Major-Gen-
eral Heath, commanded the approaches on the
east side of the river as far as Continental Village.
The garrison of West Point and Constitution Is-
land opposite, including three brigades of Massa-
chusetts and North Carolina troops, formed the
center under Major-General McDougall. Washing-
ton established his headquarters at New Windsor,
seven miles above. His army about him mustered
less than ten thousand effectives, but it was in a
position to defy the enemy with double the num-
ber. It now remained to be seen whether the lat-
ter would attack. There could be no other object-
ive. There was nothing else in the Northern field
to be so jealously guarded as these interior passes.
Washington. had repeatedly written that West
Point must be Clinton’s aim, and that this was the
universal opinion in camp can hardly admit of
doubt. Baron Steuben reflected it in a paper sub-
mitted to his chief later in July. “Whatever
means the enemy may employ,” he wrote, “I am
positive that their operations are directed exclu-
sively to getting possession of this post, and of
the river as far as Albany. If this is not their
plan, they have not got one which is worth the ex-
pense of a campaign. On their success depends
the fate of America. The consequence is, there-
fore, that there is nothing of greater importance
60 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

to us than to avert this blow. Let them burn
whatever they have not burned already, and this
campaign will add to their shame, but not to their
success. Were West Point strongly fortified, sup-
plied with sufficient artillery, ammunition and
provisions, and a garrison of two thousand men,
we ought not to be induced to take our forces
more than a day’s march from it. I go
farther and say that our army should be
destroyed or taken before we allow them to com-
mence an attack on West Point. Let us defend
the North river and hold this center and the end
of our Campaign will be glorious.” With what
surprise and curious interest. would these Ameri-
can generals have read the outlines of Clinton’s
projected campaign as he had privately confided
them to Haldimand! West Point was not his
object. “Without a fleet and a very superior army
it is not attackable, and, for other motives, I
should never form an idea of attacking it,” he had
written. The situation lay in a nut shell: Clinton
would not march into the mountains; Washington
could not be drawn into the open.

There was a certain tension in this attitude
which might continue without incident through
the campaign season or recoil in an unexpected
way. It was the latter that happened. We pres-
ently reach, not a climax, for movements thus far
had been, as it were, of an ex-parte character, but
a piece of side-play, a brilliant surprise which had
WASHINGTON’S POLICY. 61

all the effect of a grand operation. It was the
storming of Stony Point by the American Light
Infantry at midnight of July 15th.

Washington watched his opportunities. His en-
forced inactivity through the summer, by being
misinterpreted, might have a depressing effect
upon the country. He felt called upon to say to
Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, that while he
deplored the damage and distress occasioned by
Tryon’s invasion, it had been out of his power to
prevent it, and that for sound military reasons he
could not uncover the Highlands. Doubtless he
would have said the same to Governor Livingston,
of New Jersey, had Clinton marched across that
State to Middlebrook or Easton and plundered its
inhabitants. The enemy could be checked only
on the line of the Hudson. Might not they them-
selves make a “false move” in that vicinity of
which he could take advantage? From the mo-
ment they retired to New York early in June
Washington had been harboring the feasibility of
a bold stroke upon their garrisons at the Ferry.
While Clinton’s step backward was a puzzle, it
was an interesting question whether in a strictly
tactical sense those garrisons were not exposed.
There they lay on an American line of communica-
tion, affecting a certain haughty indifference to
the fact that they were much nearer their enemy
than their own supports at New York. To use
the British military term of the day they were a
62 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

standing “affront” to Washington. It was not in
resentment, but to achieve some needed, inspirit-
ing success, like that of Trenton or Bennington,
that the latter soon determined on an enterprise
against them.

Washington’s first thought was to surprise both
garrisons simultaneously. This he abandoned as
too difficult to effect. An assault on one begin-
ning a few minutes in advance of time would give
the alarm to the other. He decided to attempt
Stony Point alone and then, if circumstances
favored, to move openly on Verplanck’s. By the
tenth of July he had learned enough about each—
their fortifications, number of troops, position of
pickets and degree of vigilance—to enable him to
draw up a plan of attack in minute detail. His
information, as the event proved, was remarkably
accurate. At an early day Major Harry Lee, one
of the famous partizan officers of the Revolution,
was instructed to patrol the region and report all
incidents and appearances to headquarters. His
Legion of one hundred and fifty troopers and rifle-
men scattered in companies among the hills and
along the pathways over Donderberg, encountered
the enemy’s foraging parties, picked up deserters,
and obtained intelligence from farmers who were
permitted to take fruit and vegetables to the gar-
rison. Lee’s most active officer, Captain Allen Mc-
Lane, was not prevented on one occasion from
closely approaching the post with a flag of truce,
and his quick eye caught important points in the
RECONNOITERING STONY POINT. 63

position. Colonel Rufus Putnam, formerly Wash-
ington’s Chief Engineer, made a careful survey of
the ground from the surrounding hills and at a
later date surveyed Verplanck’s. His rough draft
of Stony Point is reproduced in these pages. Still
later, Wayne and other officers who were to lead
the assault, made observations for their personal
guidance, and on July 6th Washington himself
rode down with an escort and under cover of Mc-
Lane’s riflemen spent the day reconnoitering the
vicinity before giving the final order for the at-
tempt.1

Stony Point, shooting out into the river, a de-
fiant promontory with rocky and wooded faces,
has been fittingly described as a natural sentinel
guarding the gateway of the far-famed Highlands
of the Hudson. Rising about one hundred and
fifty feet at its highest point it projects more than
half a mile from the line of the shore, but is of

1 From Washington’s Account Book, Revolutionary War :

 

LAWFUL
DOLLARS. | Mongy.

 

June, 1779.|To expenses in going from the

No. 55. cantonmt at Midddlebrook in
the Jerseys to New Windsor &
to West Point, preceeding the
army upon Gen’ Clinton’s
movemt up the No River to
Verplanks Point.............- 1,400

July. .|Toexpencesin Recong the enemy’s
No. 57. Post at Stony Point previous to
the assault of it & on a visit to
it after it was taken.......... 10

 

 
64 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

nearly double the length as an isolated feature in
the scenery. Its westerly or inland slope falls off
irregularly to a marsh, extending in a bended
shape from the river above to the river below.
During the Revolution this marsh was deep and
difficult of passage, especially so at high water,
over which the King’s Ferry road crossed along a
causeway. The Ferry landing was at the foot of a
depression on the northern side of the Point. As
the surrounding ground on the mainland did not
command the promontory, with the artillery then
available to the Americans, the position was in
effect an insular one and possessed great defensive
strength. The enemy fortified it with two sets of
works. On the uneven summit were erected seven
or eight detached batteries which with a few con-
necting trenches would have formed a large en-
closed fort. At the east end it included the site of
the destroyed American blockhouse, now occupied
by the Government lighthouse, and at the west
end a natural rock formation was converted into
a strong bastion. Directly in front of these bat-
teries ran a line of abattis across the Point from
water to water. Lower down toward the main-
land were three outer works on natural projec-
tions with a second line of abattis in front, and all
the woods around were cut down. The garrison
consisted of the Seventeenth regiment of British
Infantry, the grenadier company of the Seventy-
first, a body of Loyal Americans and detach-
ments of artillery, in all something over six hun-
NIGHT ATTACK PROPOSED. 65

dred men, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Henry Johnson, a young officer of approved merit.
They regarded the post as impregnable and called
it their “little Gibraltar.” In fact it was a formid-
able object, on which no sane commander would
think of making an open daylight assault. As for
a night attack by the rebels, the British little
dreamed of it, though never relaxing ordinary
vigilance.

It was a night attack, however, that Washing-
ton meditated. He had chosen Stony Point for the
enterprise for the reasons that Verplanck’s was on
lower ground and could be cannonaded from the
opposite side after capture; that in its fancied
security the Stony Point garrison might be open to
a surprise, and that the moral effect of success in
the case would be increased by the dangers of the
undertaking. In making preparations for it pro-
found secrecy was necessary. Washington con-
fided his plans only to General Wayne and a few
trusty subordinates who were to be immediately
concerned in their execution. His letters and
orders referring to the matter are all in his own
hand. By the tenth of July his views had matured
and he communicated them to Wayne in the form
of “instructions.” The assault, he said, should be
attempted by the Light Infantry alone—a body of
select troops then in process of organization.
Marching “under cover of the night” to the
enemy’s lines, securing every person they found to
prevent discovery and rapidly driving in sentries
66 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

and guards, they were to make the final charge,
“the whole of them,” with fixed bayonets and
muskets unloaded. From the information of a de-
serter and his own observation he judged that the
main approach should be on the south side of the
Point along a beach, or rather sunken sand bar in
which the marsh there terminated, and which was
usually covered with water. This beach has since
been built up by the debris of the river and forms
a roadway to the lighthouse, as may be seen from
the accompanying illustration of the site. It
reaches the Point just west of the line of rocks at
its base about where the advanced line of abattis
came down to the edge. For the first rush or sur-
prise Washington considered two hundred chosen
men and officers sufficient, to be preceded by
small vanguards of prudent and determined men
to remove obstructions, with the main body follow-
ing at a short distance. The officers in the lead
“are to know precisely what batteries or particular
parts of the line they are respectively to possess,
that Confusion and the consequences of indecision
may be avoided.” Smaller detachments might
advance by the causeway and on the north side of
the Point to distract the enemy in their defence
and cut off their retreat, but not to show them-
selves until the assault had opened. “The usual
time for exploits of this kind,” continues Washing-
ton, “is a little before day, for which reason a vigil-
ant officer is then more on the watch; I therefore
recommend a midnight hour. . . . . . A
WASHINGTON’S AND WAYNE’S PLAN. 67

dark night and even a rainy one, if you can find
the way, will contribute to your success.

As it is in the power of a single deserter to betray
the design, defeat the project, and involve the
parties in difficulties and danger, too much cau-
tion cannot be used to conceal the intended enter-
prise to the latest hour from all but the principal
officers of your corps, and from the men till the
moment of execution. . . . . A white feather
or cockade or some other visible badge of distinc-
tion for the night should be worn by our troops,
and a watchword agreed on to distinguish friends
from foes.” This general plan Wayne was in-
formed he might improve or change as occasion
required, which, after another close examination
of the enemy’s position, that officer modified in
two respects. He proposed that there should be
two attacking columns—the right and stronger
one to advance on the south side by the beach, as
Washington had indicated, and the left to strike
by way of the north face at the same time. The
third detachment forming a center and pushing
along the causeway, was to act as a feint and open
a rapid fire on the outworks to divert the enemy
while the two other parties, silently charging up
the flanks and rear, completed the business bay-
onet in hand.

The troops now to be called upon to storm Stony
Point formed the picked corps in the Continental
army known as the Light Infantry. Had modern
methods then prevailed, had the country been
68 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

flooded with dailies and magazines and kodaks
and war correspondents and hero-worshippers,
these soldiers and their exploits would have been
extolled to the skies. Our books contain little
about them. The corps was modelled after a simi-
lar body in the British army which became noted
for its conspicuous service in that war. The two
end companies of a regiment of “regulars” were
called the Light Infantry and Grenadiers and were
composed of chosen men commanded by brave and
experienced officers. During active service these
companies were detached and organized into
separate battalions, and again into brigades,
known collectively as the Light Infantry and
Grenadiers. In the field they formed the van of
the army, the Infantry in advance, and were ex-
pected to guard against surprises and be the first
in action. They were extensively engaged all
through the conflict and suffered heavy losses,
which were repaired by drafts from the regiments
they represented. In Washington’s army this
advanced corps was not so elaborately organized.
It contained no grenadiers, and the Light Infantry
kept its formation only during the campaign sea-
son. For 1775 and 1776 such detachments were
not attempted, the inexperience and brief terms
of the troops preventing. In their place were
Knowlton’s “Rangers” who distinguished them-
selves at Harlem Heights, and Morgan’s well-
known “Riflemen,” so effective at Saratoga. In
1777 we have the first regular American Light
THE LIGHT INFANTRY CORPS. 69

Corps, about a thousand strong, under General
Maxwell, of New Jersey, which was present at
Brandywine, and, in 1778, a similar body under
General Scott, of Virginia, organized after the bat-
tle of Monmouth. During the next three years,
however,—1779, ’80, ’8i—the Infantry were
selected earlier and more carefully, and in two
campaigns made a name for themselves.

Wayne’s corps was drawn from the forty-six
small battalions now under Washington’s im-
mediate command. Organized into four regi-
ments of three hundred and forty men and officers
each it represented the elite of the army. All were
veterans of from one to four years’ service. Had
they carried banners inscribed with the names of
their battles hardly a field of the war to that date,
from Lexington to Monmouth, could have been
omitted. Each regiment being divided into two
battalions three field officers were assigned to it.
The first was commanded by Colonel Christian
Febiger, a young Dane of fortune, who came to
this country on a mercantile venture in 1774 and
when the war broke out stepped to the front with
the Colonists. He had proved himself every inch a
soldier at Bunker Hill and Quebec. His first bat-
talion commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury,
a valiant Frenchman, and for the second battalion
Major Thomas Posey, of Virginia, was selected—
Posey, who kept adding to his laurels and, going
west after the war, became Major-General, in 1812,
and later the second Governor of Indiana. This
70 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

regiment was composed of Virginia troops with
two companies from Pennsylvania. The Colonel
of the second regiment was Richard Butler, prob-
ably the ablest, bravest and most reliable field-offi-
cer of the Pennsylvania line. Troops from his own
State composed the first battalion commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Hay who had gallant-
ly served with Wayne since 1776. The second bat-
talion, Maryland men, with a few from Delaware,
was under Major “Jack” Steward who carried
himself with the jaunty air of a Baltimore “Mac-
caroni” of the day and knew no such thing as fear.
The third regiment was made up wholly of Con-
necticut companies, representing the compara-
tively large division from that State and placed
under the command of Colonel Return Jonathan
Meigs. He knew something about storming as he
had charged under Montgomery upon Quebec and
after his exchange as a prisoner made a clever
descent on the enemy’s shipping at Sag Harbor.
Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Sherman, son of Roger
Sherman, one of the “Signers,” a veteran of four
years’ continuous service, active at Trenton and
Princeton, commanded the first battalion, and
Captain Henry Champion the second, no field offi-
cer being appointed to it until later. The fourth
regiment was not fully organized at the time of the
assault. It was subsequently commanded by
Colonel Rufus Putnam, of Massachusetts, with
Lieutenant-Colonel William Hull, of the same line,
and Major Hardy Murfree, of North Carolina, as
WAYNE AS A LEADER. T1

battalion commanders. At this date it was under
Hull, who, with seven Massachusetts Light Com-
panies, had been in command of the outposts on
the east side of the Hudson and had lately been
transferred to the vicinity of West Point, where
he was joined by Major Murfree and two com-
panies of his own line. Putnam and Hull had
been through the Saratoga campaign and had ex-
perienced much hard service, while Murfree is
remembered by the merchant and traveler, El-
kanah Watson, as “an intrepid officer of the Revo-
lution” who afterwards settled on a plantation on
the Meherrin, where the town of Murfreesboro
has since grown up. Why New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, New York and New Jersey were not repre-
sented in this draft of officers and men is explained
by the fact that the troops from those States
formed the bulk of Sullivan’s force now well on its
way against the western Indians.

All these officers of the Light Infantry had been
selected by Washington, as before he had selected
their leader. His choice fell upon one who would
have been the choice of every man who witnessed
his conduct on the field of Monmouth. With a
growing reputation among the troops of his own
State, he had at this period become well known
throughout the Continental army as one of the
most capable, dashing and magnetic of its Briga-
diers. What he now successfully accomplished
gave him national fame. Anthony Wayne was the
ideal chief of a Light Corps, the soldier above all
others to execute the difficult task at Stony Point.
12 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

The first and second regiments of Infantry were
the first organized, and being on the west side,
were stationed as an advanced guard on the road
from Fort Montgomery, on the Hudson, to Put-
nam’s wing, at the Forest of Dean. Later they en-
camped at a place called Sandy Beach, two miles
above the fort and five miles below West Point.
The third and fourth regiments were kept at sepa-
rate puints until the day before the action, so that
no spy or deserter could report to the enemy the
massing of a dangerous corps only a few hours’
march above them. The night of the 15th had
been named for the attempt, but Meigs and Hull
were not ordered to Wayne’s Camp until the 14th.
At the same time, by Washington’s direction,
Captains Pendleton and Barr and twenty-four men
of the Artillery joined the troops, taking two small
field pieces with them for appearance’s sake. The
detachment, it was hoped, would presently be
handling some captured garrison guns below. All
told, Wayne’s force mustered about thirteen hun-
dred and fifty strong, and on the forenoon of
the 15th it was drawn up as a completed body
for general inspection. It was the first time, as
Wayne stated in his orders, that he had the oppor-
tunity of reviewing them as a whole, and he re-
quired the entire command, officers and men, old
guards and new, to appear, “fresh shaved and well
powdered,” and fully equipped and rationed, that
he might judge of their provision and readiness
for service.
MARCHING ON STONY POINT. 13

At noon the inspection was over, but instead
of being dismissed to its quarters the corps was
wheeled into the road with the head of column
facing southward, and the march upon Stony
Point had begun. Passing the ruins of Fort Mont-
gomery, the troops turned westerly towards the
present village of Queensboro, four miles dis-
tant. This took them under Torn Mountain and
around the base of rugged Bear Mountain into the
back road, which effectually screened them from
observation from the river. The route nearer the
Hudson, by Fort Clinton and through Doodletown,
was more direct but more exposed, and by follow-
ing it the men might the sooner have suspected
the object of their march, which Wayne wished
to keep from them as long as possible. At Queens-
boro, near the house of one Clement, who seems
to have been the solitary inhabitant of the district,
the column, as the orders directed, halted for a
brief rest. The road at this time was unrepaired
and little travelled. Narrow and rough at best, it
fell off at points into the merest pathway, which
led up wild and precipitous hillsides or over deep
swamps or through dense and sweltering ravines.
It was not the region for a midsummer’s afternoon
parade and drill, and as the men picked their way
through it, more often than not in single file, along
the crest of Degaffles Rugh’ and over massive Don-

1 The name of the long elevation, just south of Queensboro, which
Washington’s surveyor, Erskine, gives it on the charts of the region.
The several points here named appear on the accompanying map.
14 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

derberg at its western end, they may have half
solved the meaning of the march. In addition,
why the strict orders on that tedious tramp that
not a soldier was to quit the ranks on any pretext
whatsoever, except at a general halt, and then only
in the company of an officer? Passing Storm’s
house, where Wayne was to meet Major Lee with
the latest information, the troops came to a final
halt at eight o’clock in the evening, thirteen miles
from camp, at the farm of David Springsteel,
one mile and a half directly back or west of Stony
Point.

All precautions meanwhile had been taken to
veil the movement from the enemy. “Knowledge
of your intention ten minutes previously ob-
tained,” Washington had written to Wayne,
“blasts all your hopes,” and he cautioned him to
guard every avenue of approach to the British
works by which spies or deserters could pass.
Wayne detailed some faithful men for this duty.
Before the Light Corps left camp, Captain James

-Chrystie, of the Pennsylvania battalion, had bee
_directed to proceed with a small detachment by—

the Doodletown road, and at night station sentries
close to the Point from the river above to an old
mill near the causeway. He was also “to take and
keep” all the male inhabitants in the vicinity, one
suspected person in particular, and await further
orders. “You'll hear from me this evening,” added
the General. Captain McLane, already referred
to, now perfectly familiar with the country
INSPECTING POINTS OF ATTACK. 15

around, had also been keeping watch, and the day
before had deprived the garrison of some camp
luxuries. “Took the widow Calhoun,” he quaintiy
notes, “and another widow going to the enemy
with chickens and greens. Drove off twenty head
of horned cattle from their pasture.” Then
with his company he lay in the woods the night
through, only to be on hand the next evening to
complete the cordon of sentries around the garri-
son. Colonel Butler and Majors Posey and Lee
had also come down in advance of the troops, once
more to make the most careful observations; and,
finally, Wayne himself, with several field officers,
upon arriving with the column, proceeded to the
front for the third time, inspected the points of
approach as they appeared in the shadows of the
night, and, returning to Springsteel’s, prepared
for the assault. The secret of the enterprise had
been kept to the last moment. Not a breath of
suspicion had reached the enemy. It may be
doubted whether even a single American sentry
knew of the thunderbolt behind him which was
about to be launched against the garrison. The
movement to the point of execution had been most
skilfully planned and conducted, and Wayne’s
only thought now was the charge and his personal
fate. Bravely conscious of the hazard of the at-
tempt and calmly alive to his closer obligations, he
sketched out his will just before the start and in-
closed it to an intimate friend. “I know,” he wrote
him, “that friendship will induce you to attend
16 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

to the education of my little son and daughter.
I fear their tender mother will not survive this
stroke. I am called to sup, but where to break-
fast? Hither within the enemy’s lines in triumph,
or in another world—then farewell.”?

The final dispositions were now made. As the
troops arrived at Springsteel’s they formed in two
columns in rear of a hill. Somewhat later they
were called to attention to hear Wayne’s order of
battle read, and the men for the first time knew
what was before them. Then came an hour’s sup-
pressed excitement and rapid preparation. White
paper was passed around and each man fixed a
piece in his hat that he might know his comrades
from the foe in the thick of the melee. Nota gun,
with the exceptions to be noted, was loaded.
Steuben, their Valley Forge drillmaster, had been
insisting that they must learn to use and depend
upon the bayonet, like the British regular, and
here was their opportunity. The officers carried
espontoons or spears. Very stern and sobering
was the order that if any soldier presumed to load
and fire from the ranks, or begin the battle by any
act of his own, or be so lost to every feeling of
honor as to attempt to retreat one single foot, or
skulk in the face of danger, he was immediately to
be put to death by the officer nearest him. On the

1 Wayne dated his letter at ‘‘Springsteel’s 11 o’clock vp. um. & near
the hour & scene of carnage.” Among the officers, Col. Febiger
left a brief note the day before disposing of his effects in case he was
called upon to take his place, as he expressed it, ‘among the de-
ceas’d heroes of America.”
THE ATTACKING PARTIES. V7

other hand, their General not only expressed the
fullest confidence in the bravery and soldiership of
the troops, not doubting that they would do honor
to the army and their States by winning a glorious
victory; but, following military precedent, he
offered them rewards. Five hundred dollars and
immediate promotion was to be the prize of the
first man entering the enemy’s works; lesser sums
to the next four in order, and, in general, all who
specially distinguished themselves were to be
brought to the favorable notice of the Commander.
in-Chief. To the right column were assigned the
regiments under Febiger, Meigs and Hull. But-
ler’s regiment composed the smaller left column.
Major Murfree, with his two companies, the only
ones to carry loaded guns, was to conduct the feint
in the center. Each column, marching with half-
platoon front, was headed by a strong vanguard of
determined men, all volunteers, one hundred and
fifty for the right and one hundred for the left,
who, with axes in hand and muskets slung, were
to tear away obstructions; while these in turn were
preceded by two parties of an officer and twenty
men, forlorn hopes, to cover the others and be the
first to rush headlong into the hand-to-hand ‘en-
counter. The officers selected to lead were those
who had already reconnoitered the ground, and
were in consequence taken from Febiger’s and
Butler’s regiments., The gallant Fleury was on
the right, Steward on the left, and each was to
aim for a given point as marked on diagrams of
18 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

the works. When Lieutenant Gibbon, of Butler’s,
learned that an officer had been appointed to the
“forlorn” in his column, he protested that lots should
be cast for the honor. This was granted, and the
lot fell to himself, to the keen disappointment of
the others. Lieutenant Knox, of Febiger’s, led the
twenty on the right. Wayne announced to the
command that he should head the larger column
in person; also assuring the troops that General
Muhlenberg’s Brigade would follow in their rear
as a support in case of reverse. Finally, just as
the victorious troops closed in on the enemy and
dashed into the works, they were all to shout and
keep shouting the watchword for the night, “The
Fort’s our own.”

At half-past eleven o’clock the corps advanced
from Springsteel’s, allowing thirty minutes to
reach the marsh at the base of the Point. The
order of battle and the traditions of the neighbor-
hood indicate that the two columns diverged at
the start, the right under Wayne coming around
through the present Stony Point Village, and the
left under Butler following a farm lane, now a
road, toward the northerly side. As the latter
neared the river, Murfree in the rear broke off by
the right to the causeway. All marched in perfect
silence and reached their destined points at the
edge of the marsh promptly at midnight, the hour
set by Washington for the assault. The garrison
extended their pickets to that side only in the day
time. The critical moment had come, and to
THE ASSAULT BEGINS. 79

Wayne’s column it must have been more impres-
sive than to the others. To this southern approach
the enemy’s position presented its most forbidding
aspect, the promontory standing out in black and
threatening relief against the darkness. The ap-
proach, too, was immediately covered by the outer
works and assailants would be received at once
with a heavy fire, while Butler and Murfree
would first have to drive in the sentries some little
distance.

When Wayne’s troops reached the marsh
it was found that the water covering the beach at
the river’s edge, already referred to, was deeper
than anticipated and the quick advance would be
delayed in the wading. But forward they went,
and right there “the storm” as Wayne called it,
broke upon the night. It was two hundred
yards across and as they entered the water—one
officer states it was a little before—they were dis-
covered by the enemy’s pickets opposite, who in-
stantly opened upon them and gave the general
alarm. Without responding straight on the col-
umn moved, preserving its formation remarkably,
and seeming to gather momentum although the
water in places was waist deep. At exactly half-
past twelve—as a Captain who looked at his watch
at the time informs us—the column had crossed
the beach and was close to the outer abattis. The
enemy were now pouring in an incessant fire of
cannon balls, grape shot and musketry, but Fleury
and Knox in advance of every one led with great
80 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

courage and dash; the vanguard tore away the
abattis in part—time was too precious for delay
there—and throwing away their axes unslung
their muskets; the main body followed closely
clambering over the trunks and stakes and form-
ing on the other side, and, passing the outer bat-
tery, all pushed up the steep and broken ascent for
the main works at the summit. In a few minutes
there would be more trying business, but with the
game half in hand there was no flinching. It was
the moment for the Continental soldier to prove
his worth. These men represented the best blood
of the land. Here, as on many a field in the wars
to come, class distinctions were lost in the com-
panionship which patriotism breeds, and charging
up into the teeth of the finest troops in the world
could have been found, side by side, farmers and
merchants, frontiersmen and college graduates,
artisans and planters, good colonial stock, polished
and in the rough, and every man conscious that it
was not for glory but for fireside and country that
he must now strike a winning blow. Brave fel-
lows were falling, but in the darkness and swift
idvance the enemy’s fire failed of serious effect.
Wayne himself received a flesh wound on the head
at the second abattis, but through his aids and
with the point of his spear he still gave directions.
The handsome Captain Selden, of Meigs’ regiment,
was cruelly shot in the side, surviving, however, to
be given the command of Stony Point later in the
war. Captain Phelps, Lieutenant Palmer and En-
THE FEINT IN FRONT. 81

sign Hall, of the same command, fell, shot in arms
and hips. On the left Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel
Hay, of the Pennsylvania battalion, was also
wounded, not fatally; and as for narrow escapes,
there were marks enough to show—Febiger with a
bullet furrow on his nose, Hull, shot through hat
and boot, clothes riddled up and down the ranks,
swords bent, muskets scarred. But these things
were unnoticed—the column was just under the
frowning crest.

Meanwhile the garrison was up in arms. At the
first alarm the artillerists manned the batteries
and the infantry took to their stations and pre-
pared for defence only to be presently amazed at
what was going on around them. Colonel John-
son, the commandant, hurried down with a detach-
ment to the outer line under the impression that
the Americans were attacking at the center. Here
the value of Wayne’s suggestion that there should
be a feint made in front was obvious. It was clear-
ly Major Murfree and his two companies who
were firing and making a great show of forcing
through at that point. The Major’s instructions
were to open “a galling fire” after crossing the
causeway the moment he heard the enemy’s alarm
sounded on Wayne’s approach. He played his part
admirably. Colonel Butler also appeared on the
left at the right moment. After crossing the
marsh at the upper end he rapidly made his way
along the northern face of the Point without meet-
ing much opposition until the first abattis was
82 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

reached. He was but a few minutes behind
Wayne although they had been separated for an
hour and were half a mile apart, so well had the
movement been planned and timed. Major Stew-
ard, leading the column, after avoiding the outer
battery on that flank, directed Lieutenant Gibbon
with the forlorn hope to incline to the right toward
the main works while he kept on to their upper
side. Gibbon, with his clothes “muddy to the neck
and almost torn to rags,” attacked and lost seven-
teen of his twenty men, killed or wounded. With
him as a volunteer was Major Noirmont de Laneu-
ville, an enthusiastic Frenchman, who wished to
share the dangers of the night.

Quick and desperate work now at the summit.
The right column reached it first. Its vanguard
struck the works near the rock or flag bastion at
the western end and rushed through the sally port
or over the parapet. Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury
was the first man in and to him fell the honor of
lowering the enemy’s standard. Right after came
Knox of the forlorn hope with Sergeant Baker, of
Virginia, four times wounded during the action,
as the third. Sergeant Spencer, from the same
State, and Sergeant Donlop, of Pennsylvania, each
twice wounded, were fourth and fifth. On their
heels followed the rest swarming in, Major Posey
and Captain Shelton leading. Immediately the
shout arose, startling the defenders: “The fort’s
our own,” “The fort’s our own!” Clashing of
weapons followed. Bayonet, sword and spear
THE THICK OF THE FIGHT. 83

were pushed with unsparing thrust where sur-
render was not instant. The garrison was not to
be allowed to concentrate or rally. With such ter-
rible energy did the Continentals plunge into the
affray that the enemy, scattering into groups,
were soon raising the cry here and there, “Mercy,
Mercy, dear Americans; Quarter, Quarter!” At
the point where the entrance was effected there
appear to have been two companies of the Seven-
teenth regulars, whose resistance was short lived,
and upon their surrender Major Posey with his
battalion pushed across the enclosure, that is to
the northerly side, while Febiger seized other
points. Meigs at the head of his regiment, and
Hull following, overcame opposition at the east
end around the site of the present lighthouse, ap-
parently capturing the Loyalist corps and retreat-
ing parties. It would also appear that about half
the garrison, six companies of the Seventeenth,
were at this juncture below at the outer redoubts
with Colonel Johnson, looking, as stated, for the
main attack there, when suddenly the shouts of
victory and the din of arms above and behind woke
them to the fact that they were entirely sur-
rounded, entrapped, with the rebels in possession
of their main defences. Johnson turned back only
to fall into the hands of Febiger, to whom he sur-
rendered in person. He was ordered to his tent
under guard. The Seventeenth had a fighting
reputation in the British army and at points it re-
sisted desperately. Captain Tew, one of its oldest
84 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT

and most distinguished officers, gallantly held out,
and refusing to yield, fell at his post. If the de-
tached and bewildered companies attempted to
reach their central works it was only to meet one
or the other of the American wings and be over-
powered. It took but thirty minutes from the time
the beach was crossed to bring matters to this
turn, and, as we have seen, it was mainly effected
by Wayne’s larger column. The left contributed
by sweeping along the northern flank and driving
parties of the enemy into the clutches of the right.
As Major Steward came through the embrasure of
a battery of two large guns, looking up the river,
Posey was there to greet and help him in. With
him among the first on that side was Captain Jor-
dan of the vanguard. Both columns, as Wayne re-
ported reached the summit substantially at the
same time—ten minutes apart. At exactly one
o’clock the work was over. Stony Point was
taken.

Ringing cheers from the Continentals an-
nounced their victory. Hull tells us that they
were quickly answered by the garrison at Ver-
planck’s and from the Vulture in the river, in the
belief that the assailants were repulsed. Word of
their loss reached them through two of the enemy’s
officers. The only man to escape from Stony Point
was Lieutenant Roberts, of the Artillery, who
swam nearly a mile to the man-of-war and enlight-
ened its commander. He could give no particulars
of what had happened beyond his own good luck.
THE VICTORY WON. 85

At Verplanck’s, upon hearing the firing opposite,
Brigade-Major Benson rowed across and climbed
up the Point only to find himself among Ameri-
cans. Darkness helped him out and he found his
way back to be sent with the news of the disaster
to Sir Henry Clinton whom he reached the next
morning at eight. There was no sleep at Stony
Point that night. Wayne’s aids, Majors Fish-
bourne and Archer, and other officers helped their
wounded Commander into the captured works and
immediately he despatched the news to Washing-
ton in a soldierly note:

“Stonzty Pont, 16th July, 1779,
“2 O'Clock A. M.
“Dear Gent:

“The fort & garrison with Col. Johnston are ours.
“Our officers & men behaved like men who are deter-
mined to be free.
“Yours most sincerely,
“ANT’Y WAYNE.”
“GEn’L WASHINGTON.”

Fishbourne bore the message with all speed to
Headquarters, as at a later date Archer was
honored as bearer of full particulars to Congress
at Philadelphia. The General’s congratulatory
order to his own command was equally brief:

“Heap Quarters LicHt INFANTRY,
“Stony Point, July 16, 1779.

‘Field officer for to-morrow—OCol Febiger:
“Gen. Wayne returns his warmest thanks to the officers
and soldiers for their coolness and intrepidity in the storm
86 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

on the enemies works at this place, on the night of the
15th inst.

“The perfect execution of orders and the superior gal-
lantry exhibited on the occasion reflects the highest honor
on the troops engaged.”

Washington immediately sent the news to all
the camps.

‘Heap QUARTERS,
“New Winpsor, July 16, 1779.
“Parole, Wayne.

“Countersign, Light Infantry.

“The Commander-in-Chief is happy to congratulate the
army on the success of the troops under Brigadier-General
Wayne, who, last night, with the corps of Light Infantry,
surprised and took the enemy’s post at Stony Point, with
the whole garrison, cannon and stores, with very incon-
siderable loss on our side. The General has not yet re-
ceived the particulars of the affair, but he has the satisfac-
tion to learn that the officers and men in general gloriously
distinguished themselves in the attack.

“He requests the Brigadier and his whole corps to ac-
cept his warmest thanks for the good conduct and signal
bravery manifested upon the occasion.”

At the same time the entire right wing was put
under marching orders with three days’ rations,
tents and baggage packed, to be ready to meet any
counter move on the part of the enemy.

Hardly was the capture effected when the
American detachment of artillery, under Captains

1 From the only known original in order book of Lieutenant Ben-
jamin, Adjutant to Meigs’ Light regiment.
PRISONERS AND CASUALTIES. 87

Pendleton and Barr, turned the garrison guns on
Verplanck’s Point opposite and bombarded it, but
without eliciting reply. The Vulture they drove
from her moorings down stream. As to losses and
material results it was found after daylight that
the prisoners taken numbered five hundred and
forty-three. They were sent to Easton, Pennsyl-
vania. Of the enemy sixty-three were killed, and
according to their own reports, over seventy
wounded. Of the Americans, fifteen were killed
and eighty-three wounded, two-thirds of the loss
falling on the right column. Fifteen fine pieces of
artillery of various calibres and a considerable
quantity of military stores were captured. The
money value of the latter, by direction of Con-
gress, was subsequently divided “among the gal-
lant troops by whom the post was reduced.”

“
VI

EFFECT OF STONY POINT—THE YEAR'S RESULTS AT
HOME AND ABROAD

Two days after its capture, July 17th, Washing-
ton, Greene, Steuben and other officers rode down
to Stony Point. It was always fresh in Hull’s
recollection how cordially the Commander-in-Chief
took his comrades by the hand and with what joy
his countenance glowed. He minutely examined
every part of the fortifications, his attention being
particularly drawn to those places where the two
columns ascended the hill, mounted the parapets
and first entered the works. The comparatively
small sacrifice of life among his troops astonished
him. High praise poured in from all quarters, such
as is noticed in the Preface and much more. Con-
gress voted gold medals and promotion to the offi-
cers in the van which they conducted so fearlessly
and skilfully—medals to Wayne, Fleury,. and
Steward; promotion to Knox and Gibbon.! Even
ihe enemy applauded the achievement and espe-
cially commented on thehumanity of theassailants .
in granting quarter in every case when military
custom of the time justified the massacre of gar-

1The resolutions of Congress are given in ‘Dawson's “Stony
Point”; cuts of the medals may be found in Lossing’s ‘‘ Field Book

of the Revolution.”
88
‘aanqold aq} JO 1a}UId 4B
doy 0%] 09 TTY ey dn poSaeyo sdood} oyL “9381 9} WO Yovag oy} Suole qovoiddy s,euke ay JO OUT, SuULMOUS

INIOd ANOLS JO MAIA NYAHLNOS

 
VERPLANCK’S POINT. 89

risons surprised at night. The moral effect of the
event was far reaching in the American camp. It
showed that patience and discipline were bearing
fruit, that with such soldiers the Continental
army, small as it was, would be always a power
and right arm on which the cause could depend.
It was the ambition of similar corps in after years
to emulate the Light Infantry of ’Seventy-nine.
The British soldier, too, showed an increased re-
spect for his antagonist. It was a compliment,
hardly in disguise, when generals in New York
were inquiring a little later where “Mr. Wayne”
was stationed.

Respecting Verplanck’s Point it will suffice to
say that Washington was disappointed at the fail-
ure of his plan to attack it as soon as Wayne had
succeeded. A diversion was made there during
the assault to be followed up, if possible, with
something more. Colonel Rufus Putnam had been
directed to approach the position with a detach-
ment on-the night of the 15th and alarm the garri-
son the moment he heard the firing at Stony Point.
This service he performed.! It was expected that
Nixon’s and Paterson’s brigades would be on hand
the next day to close on Verplanck’s and capture
it by the slower process of a seige. The failure is
thus explained by Washington: “The evening ap-
pointed for the attack I directed Major-General
McDougall (at West. Point) to put two brigades

1 See Colonel Putnam’s own account in the Appendix, No. 56, from
the original MSS., with plan of Verplanck’s.
90 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

under marching orders to be moved down towards
Verplanck’s, as soon as he should receive intelli-
gence of the success of the attempt on this side,
and requested General Wayne to let his despatches
to me pass through General McDougall, that he
might have the earliest advice of the event. But
by some misconception, they came directly to.
headquarters, which occasioned a loss of several.
hours. The next morning, Major-General Howe.
was sent to take command of those troops, with
orders to advance to the vicinity of the enemy’s
works, and open batteries against them. I was in
hopes that this might either awe them, under the
impression of what had happened on the other
side, to surrender, or prepare the way for an as-
sault. But some accidental delays, in bringing on
the heavy cannon and intrenching tools necessary
for an operation of this kind, unavoidably re-
tarded its execution, till the approach of the.
enemy’s main body made it too late. General
Howe, to avoid being intercepted, found himself
under the necessity of relinquishing his project
and returning to a place of security.” This opera--
tion would have come under the immediate super-
intendence of General Heath, who commanded on.
that side, but at that moment he was away with
the Connecticut Division, watching the enemy’s.
main force at Mamaroneck. Washington recalled
him on the 16th, to supercede Howe, but on his
arrival on the 18th he found that officer retreating.
It was then too late to effect the object.
ENEMY REOCCUPY STONY POINT. 91

When Sir Henry Clinton learned what had hap-
pened at King’s Ferry he turned about as if panic-
struck. The distant sounds of the midnight can-
non at Stony Point were heard across the hills and
fields of Westchester County in his camp at Mam-
aroneck—so says Colonel Simcoe, one of his daring
troopers—but what they forebode no one could tell
until Benson brought the news the next forenoon.
Immediately Clinton broke up camp, marched his
army back to the Hudson, started a portion of it
by land for Verplanck’s, which he feared would
also fall, recalled Tryon and Collier who were on
the point of sailing for New London from White-
stone, Long Island, and assembled his fleet and
transports off Yonkers again for another but. en-
forced embarkation up the river. Head winds de-
layed them until the 19th, when they arrived in
Haverstraw Bay.

Washington had no intention of holding Stony
Point, as the enemy could besiege it by land and
water, and on the 18th the place was evacuated.
His efficient aids, Colonels Tench Tilghman and
Alexander Hamilton, and other officers superin-
tended the removal of the wounded, prisoners and
stores, the works were dismantled and very little
left to the foe but the bare rock of their late “Gi-
braltar.” Clinton reoccupied it at once, put in a
larger garrison and strengthened the works. His
engineers recognized the defect in their previous
defences by constructing a completely enclosed
work at the summit. At the assault parties of
92 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Wayne’s men entered between the detached bat-
teries. Another mistake would seem to have been
the withdrawal of their night sentries to the inner
edge of the marsh and in having no patrols beyond.
They had shut themselves up in too narrow a com-
pass. The garrison officers, otherwise. disclaimed
having been caught napping.! One of them, Lieu-
tenant Armstrong, was permitted to go into New
York on parole and his report is thus briefly sum-
marized by Adjutant-General Kemble:

“Saturday, July 24th.

“Received advice by Lieut. Armstrong, 17th, who was
made prisoner at Stony Point, that the Garrison was not
surprised, but was all under arms; that upon the first
alarm Colonel Johnson marched with a Detachment to the
place from whence the firing was heard in front; that the
Rebels entered on their left by the Water, got in the rear,
and were in the principal Redoubt before they knew any-
thing of the matter, supposing them to be part of the Gar-
rison; that another party of Rebels got between the princi-
pal Redoubts and out works, by which means the retreat
from the latter was cut off.’

1Irving, Lossing and some others, describing the capture, repeat a
story of the neighborhood that the British pickets were surprised and
gagged by men in disguise, and that the assailants were thus able to
approach very near the main lines before discovery. The tale is
hardly worth considering, a poor tradition. The exploit would have
been mentioned at the time among the numerous other incidents.
Besides, the story requires us to believe that sentinels were gagged
by three different parties at the three different points where the col-
umns crossed the marsh. If the movements were to be simultaneous,
why a picket surprise at one point only?

2“ Kemble Papers,” N. Y. Historical Soc. Vol. I, p. 181. See also
Hull’s account containing his conversation with Johnson.
BRITISH FEEL THE BLOW. 938

Colonel Johnson, of course, defended himself,
reporting to his Chief that he believed that “upon
a just representation you will be fully convinced
that it was not any negleet on my part, nor of the
troops under my command, but the very superior
force of the enemy that caused the capture.” Upon
his exchange more than a year later he called for
aCourtof Inquiry,' whose decision cannot befound
on record, but the report was credited that the
Colonel received a reprimand. He certainly re-
turned to duty, to be taken prisoner again at York-
town. Subsequently he rose to the grade of Gen-
eral in the British army, and was created a
Baronet.

That the enemy, from the Commander-in-Chief
down, keenly felt the blow, is beyond question. It
was more than an “affront.” Clinton admitted
that it paralyzed his operations with the force he
then had. The Connecticut raid and Stony Point
had cost him a thousand men. He could no longer
think of Middlebrook, although reports of the ap-
proach of a French fleet would have required him
to suspend that plan. To Haldimand he wrote:
“The unfortunate affair of Stony Point, tho’ the
enemy quitted it again upon our approach, not
daring to risk a battle for it, retarded me much,
and I was obliged to leave a strong garrison there
to repair the works which two day’s foul wind had

1 The writer is indebted to Mr. John W. Jordan, Librarian of the

Pennsylvania Historical Society, for the order appointing the Court
as given in Document 16, Appendix.
94 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

given the enemy time to demolish. About this
period the Minister puts me on my guard respect-
ing La Motte Piquet’s destination. I was therefore
obliged to collect my army nearer King’s Bridge. I
am disappointed in my expectations of a reinforce-
ment from the West Indies, and weak and miser-
able as I am, I am obliged to comply with your
requisition.” To Germaine he wrote in August:
“I now find myself obliged by many cogent rea-
sons to abandon every view of making an effort in
this quarter’; and among the reasons, he names
the waste of the season and “the operations of the
enemy.”! In his official report on the King’s Ferry
situation, dated July 25th, to be read in London,
he acknowledges that he could not as yet form a
satisfactory opinion as to the “accident,” puts a
fair face on the matter and makes a point of the
fact that Washington declined to remain and ac-
cept battle by attempting to hold Stony Point. His
report, with some important omissions, was pub-
lished at home, and from that the English public
derived about all it ever knew of the summer’s
operations. But within “Administration” circles
the situation could have borne anything but a
roseate hue. What Germaine wrote in reply is
doubly interesting as conveying a rebuke and as
containing one of the very few comments made by
King George on the individual occurrences of the
war in America. The letter is as follows:

1 See this letter in full, No. 14, Appendix,
KING GEORGE ON THE AFFAIR. 95

WHITEHALL, November 4th, 1779.

Sir:

pis The King was much surprised and con-
cerned to hear of the Rebels having assaulted and carried
the Lines at Stony Point, and yet more so at the aggravat-
ing circumstance of the loss of the whole garrison. If
you cannot upon the spot, yet less can I form a decisive
judgment upon this Misfortune, but upon the present
appearance of the transaction it seems extraordinary that
an Enemy who could abandon their undertaking with pre-
cipitation and with circumstances of disgrace should have
made a successful attempt against so strong a Fort. The
loss of such a body of men must be severely felt and la-
mented. At the same time it did not escape the King’s
attention that you acted with your usual Zeal and Activity
upon the occasion, and it would, indeed, have been a
happy event had this Misfortune been the means of bring-
ing Mr. Washington to a decisive engagement. = 4

Iam, &c.,
Guo. GERMAINE.”?

And thus the situation stood for 1779 in the all
important northern field: With neither army ma-
terially reinforced, Washington commanding
about ten thousand men in the Highlands foiled
Sir Henry Clinton commanding about fourteen
thousand effectives including the garrisons about
New York. Had Stony Point not occurred the
campaign would have been described as terminat-
ing in a drawn game. But Stony Point gave it
character. The enemy were defeated and humili-
ated. Their desultory raids ceased. New London

1Spark’s MSS. Collection, Harvard University.
96° THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

was saved. New Jersey was spared. The cam-
paign closed in midsummer—a boon to the Con-
tinental army which was ill-prepared for long and
hard field service. It had suffered but trifling loss
as against the thousand lost to the British. In
prestige the American soldier gained immensely.
The country at large was correspondingly exhilar-
ated and its confidence more firmly grounded.
Washington had outmanoeuvred his antagonist
in masterly fashion and still held the key to the
Continent.

Clinton’s dejection is brought out in his corre-
spondence. A few reinforcements finally reached
him in August under convoy of Admiral Arbuth-
not, but they were insufficient and, as we have
seen, he gave up the field for that year. Moreover,
some camp disorder put many of his troops on the
sick list, or as Clinton afterwards claimed, “the
Admiral brought in his fleet a jail fever which
sent 6,000 men to the hospital immediately.’ Not
surprising that he decided to resign in favor of
Lord Cornwallis. His letter requesting the relief,
No. 13 in Appendix, comes from a soldier whose
spirits were broken. But the King insisted on re-
taining him in command, and at the close of the
year he recovered himself with the capture of
Charleston, South Carolina, and the opening of an
active campaign in that section. In the following
year, however, he was made to share the responsi-

1In Clinton’s ‘‘ Observations on Stedman’s History of the American
War,” London, 1794—a rare pamphlet.
97

SKETCH OF STONY POINT.

‘A stoatug sex Areaqry ‘Arvid Selyg Weplsetd WoLT
‘@LLI ‘ENIOd ANOLG JO ONINUOLG AHL 40 HOLANG

 

 

   

yr*

s ZH rappbogre 7 ho Fat = a7 3

wae bay SEP ye ot

 

 

 
98 THE STORMING OF STONY POIN?1.

bility for Yorktown with Cornwallis, and with the
end of the war he disappeared from public notice.

Whatever the effect of the foregoing operations
might have been in Great Britain, if indeed their
dismal failure was ever realized, it was over-
shadowed that summer by the presence of a new
enemy and alarms at her own shores. In 1779
_ Spain joined France against her, though remain-
ing indifferent if not hostile to American interests.
British statesmen had observed the drift for some
time. The Bourbon “concert” would inevitably be
revived. In the diplomatic field Spain at first
offered to act as mediator between France and
Great Britain, proposing, among other terms, that
there should be a truce of twenty-five or thirty
years between the latter and her colonies and a
truce with France, during which negotiations for
a permanent peace could proceed. Buitain’s invari-
able reply was a willingness to consider the media-
tion the moment France withdrew from the Ameri-
can alliance. She furthermore regarded Spain’s
interest in the matter as purely superficial, cover-
ing a design to combine with France herself, and
continuing her pretended friendship with England
simply to gain time for completing naval and mili-
tary preparations. Spain finally took umbrage,
showed her hand and joined France. On the heels
of this alliance word came that the French ad-
miral d’ Orvilliers with a large fleet had been
joined at Cadiz by a Spanish one equally large
SPAIN JOINS IN THE WAR. 99

under Don Luis de Cordoba, thé whole including
sixty-eight sail of the line and heading for the
English Channel. “Never,” remarks Coxe, in his
memoirs of the Kings of Spain, “Never since the
time of the Armada had the British isles been
threatened with so tremendous an armament and
seldom have they been so unequally prepared for
the contest.” A panic spread over the southern
coast of England whose protection devolved on
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy with but thirty-eight
sail of the line. Disagreement as to plan of action
and hasty preparation on the part of the Bourbon
Admirals saved the English. Cordoba wished to
make an immediate descent on the coast. D’Orvil-
liers insisted on previously destroying the British
fleet, and his advice prevailed. But Hardy kept
around and east of Plymouth whither the allies
were unwilling to follow and risk an action in nar-
row seas. Meantime scurvy spread among the
French and Spanish sailors, hundreds died, and
the fleets put into Brest eventually to separate
and abandon their project. French troops were
massed at Channel ports to invade England—La-
fayette, then at home, active in the preparations—
but nothing came of this. It was in that summer,
also, that the famous Franco-Spanish siege of
Gibraltar began. Under the circumstances the at-
tention of Great Britain could pardonably be with-
drawn from failures in America. “The times are
certainly hazardous,” wrote the King on June
16th, “but that ought to rouse the spirit of every
100 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Englishman to support me, who have no wish but
for the prosperity of my people, and no view but to
do my duty and to shew by firmness in difficulties
that I am not unworthy of the station in which it
has pleased Providence to place me.” In adding
Spain to her enemies England’s task became her-
culean. She bore up for two years longer, but the
end was clearly forecast from 1779.

As for “Mr. Wayne” and his Light Corps, for
whom we must reserve a closing word, they were
the lions of the day in camp and social circles.
When Major Archer and his escort entered Phila-
delphia with despatches for Congress it was with
colors flying, trumpet sounding and hearts elated
with the news. The names of Wayne and his com-
rades were toasted and cheered at dinners, feles
and town-meetings. To the country at large his
victory had come like a refreshing tonic. “I con-
gratulate you on our happy success. The Lord
reigneth, let us rejoyce,” wrote the sedate governor
of Connecticut. The corps remained in the ad-
vance around Fort Montgomery until early in
October when Washington proposed a second at-
tempt on Stony Point. With other troops in sup-
port they marched down in bold view of the enemy,
but prudent counsels prevailed and Wayne moved
on. When Clinton heard of it—he was then at New
York—it was characteristic of him to write: “I
am going to watch Washington.” In a few days
he abandoned King’s Ferry. On October 15th the
WAYNE’S CORPS DISBANDED. 101

Infantry were at Haverstraw Heights where
Wayne informed the command that thereafter it
must always appear at its best, as movements
would take it through towns and villages. “As
the eyes of the Citizens and Country,” runs his
order, “will be more full upon the American Light
Infantry than any other part of the army, the Gen-
eral can’t doubt but that every officer without dis-
tinction will exert himself and require his men
immediately to furbish up their arms and clothing
in the best and neatest manner possible.” The
upnshaven and the unpowdered especially received
a reprimand; and he offered all his Stony Point
prize share for the purchase of needles and thread
with which to mend themselves up. While they
were at Haverstraw the gallant Major Harry Lee,
whose riflemen had followed them in the assault
of the 15th, made his daring attack on Paulus
Hook, now Jersey City, adding to the glory of the
American soldier. Wayne then patrolled the
country below, marched by Fort Lee, showing him-
self down around Staten Island and finally taking
post at Second River, or the present Orange, New
Jersey. There he remained until the respective
armies went into winter quarters. In December,
79, his corps broke up to be merged again in the
main army. In the following year, 1780, a larger
Light Infantry Corps was organized with Lafay-
ette at its head, but Clinton, his army still further
depleted by drafts to the South, gave that ambi-
tious body no opportunity to distinguish itself. In
102 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

the year after, however, 1781, the Light Corps,
again under Lafayette, accomplished great things
in doing more than others to bring Cornwallis to
terms.

It is a mistake to suppose that the Revolution
was won by enthusiasm, by “a handful of undis-
ciplined yeomanry.” The Continental veteran
came to be the equal of any in the field—English,
French, Hessian, the best in Europe. It was the
result of discipline. Like Cromwell, Washington,
by his insistence, developed a soldier who would
be the proper representative of his cause. If the
cause was worth fighting for, men must fight. In
the closing years of the war, on fields like Stony
Point and Yorktown, the British regular found
that the trained provincial would measure arms
with him. In a way, the Cavaliers were finally
met by Ironsides.
AUTHORITIES

THE STORMING OF STONY POINT
AUTHORITIES

No. 1

KING GEORGE TO LORD NORTH ON THE AMERICAN WAR

Kew, June 11, 1779, 25 mins. pv. 10 A, M.

I should think it the greatest instance among
the many I have met with of ingratitude and injustice, if
it could be supposed that any man in my dominions more
ardently desired the restoration of peace and solid hap-
piness in every part of this empire than I do; there is no
personal sacrifice I could not readily yield for so desirable
ap object; but at the same time no inclination to get out
of the present difficulties, which certainly keep my mind
very far from a state of ease, can incline me to enter into
‘what I look upon as the destruction of the empire.

I have heard Lord North frequently drop that the ad-
vantages to be gained by this contest could never repay the
expence; I owne that, let any war be ever so successful, if
persons will sit down and weigh the expences, they will
find, as in the last, that it has impoverished the State, en-
riched individuals, and perhaps raised the name only of the
conquerors; but this is only weighing such events in the
scale of a tradesman behind the counter; it is necessary for
those in the station it has pleased Divine Providence to
place me to weigh whether expences, though very great,
are not sometimes necessary to prevent what might be
more ruinous to a country than the loss of money.
106 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

The present contest with America I cannot help seeing
as the most serious in which any country was ever en-
gaged; it contains such a train of consequences that they
must be examined to feel its real weight. Whether the
laying a tax was deserving all the evils that have arisen
from it, I should suppose no man could alledge that with-
out being thought more fit for Bedlam than a seat in the
Senate; but step by step the demands of America have
risen: independence is their object; that certainly is one
which every man not willing to sacrifice every object to a
momentary and inglorious peace must concur with me in
thinking that this country can never submit to. Should
America succeed in that, the West Indies must follow them,
not independence, but must for its own interest be de-
pendent on North America. Ireland would soon follow
the same plan and be a separate state; then this island
would be reduced to itself and soon would be a poor island
indeed, for, reduced in her trade, merchants would retire
with their wealth to climates more to their advantage, and
shoals of manufacturers would leave this country for the
new empire. These self-evident consequences are not
worse than what can arise should the Almighty permit
every event to turn to our disadvantage. Consequently
this country has but one sensible, one great line to follow,
the being ever ready to make peace when to be obtained
without submitting to terms that in their consequences
must annihilate this empire, and with firmness to make
every effort to deserve success.

[Donne’s ‘‘ Correspondence with Lord North,” Vol. II.]
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 107

No. 2

PEACE COMMISSIONER WILLIAM EDEN TO ATTORNEY-
GENERAL WEDDERBURN, LONDON, ON THE
FAILURES OF THE BRITISH

GREENWICH, July 17, 1779.
My Dear Sir,

It is my lot to have a restless mind which must, and
will, employ itself. Instead therefore of resting on my
oars and enjoying my return to this poor old island, I have
waded thro’ all the printed representations and misrepre-
sentations of every transaction that took place during my
absence. I have endeavored, too, to collect some idea of
our actual situation, so far as the exertions and views of
government and the hazards and interests of the King’s
Dominions are respectively concerned.

Perhaps, as I am more removed from affairs than I have
formerly been and can only see them indistinctly, the pros-
pect appears to me rather gloomier than it ought to do.

The picture, however, which I conceive of
iti is such as I am extremely anxious to bring before your
eyes if I can find words to describe it.

1. Every information to be obtained on the other side
of the Atlantic tends to show that the Rebellion became
formidable only by the waverings and delays of this side,
and by the deference paid in Parliament to the bold as-
sertions of men, who perhaps would not have declaimed
or acted as they did, if they could have foreseen all the
extent of the mischiefs which they were fomenting.

2. It is equally clear, that tho’ our exertions always
came interrupted and late, and consequently were greater
than would otherwise have been necessary; yet when made,
they were sufficient for the purpose, and failed only thro’
108 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

the ill-judgment or the misconduct of the Commanders
employed.

3. [ am also well convinced that the business is still
practicable; indeed I shall be unwilling not to think it so,
even if it were in some degree a Quixotism; for our total
failure will be calamitous to an extent which no man can
foresee or conceive.

4. It must, however, be confessed that our difficulties
are greatly multiplied by the continued strain on our
funds, by the war with France, and by the menacing ap-
pearance of Spain; and it is but too probable that the effort
of this year is the last that we shall be able to make, un-
less it shall be attended with considerable successes.

5. It must also be confessed that the continued ill-for-
tune of the present Government has greatly shaken the
confidence of its best disposed friends, and of the nation in
general. Of this I have shown you some very respectable
instances, and you must have had occasion to observe many
others.

6. In short, we are entering upon the last struggle of
the empire under infinite disadvantages, and I own frankly
to you that I think the Cabinet as at present constituted
totally unequal to the undertaking. It is unpleasant to go
into particulars even in writing to you, but it is not too
much to say of Individuals, that the Person who stands at
the head of the Naval Department and is to direct a Naval
war in which we fight for our existence as a Nation, is
become to the last degree unpopular among the class of
men who are to act under him; besides which professional
knowledge is perhaps necessary in times of real pressure,
and Lord Sandwich, who could name Admiral Graves,
Lord Shuldham and Admiral Gambier to the chief com-
mands in the most interesting stations, must either plead
professional ignorance or must admit some other motive.
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 109

It is but too true, also, that the person who presides in
the American office [Lord North] at the same time that
he precludes every accession of strength from any other
quarter to the King’s Government, has contrived to lose the
esteem and reliance of every description of men, civil or
military, who are to serve with him or under him.

In plain English, the times require an unparallelled ex-
ertion of activity, spirit, invention, enterprize, judgment
and concert; of which, when I look at the present Ministry,
I see neither the existence nor the possibility.

Faithfully and affectionately yours,
WM. EDEN.
[Stevens’ ‘‘ Facsimiles of MSS.”]

No. 3.

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GERMAINE.

HEADQUARTERS PHILLIPSBURG [near
Yonkers, N. Y.], June 18, 1779.

Sir:

Having ever been sensible of the importance
of the posts of Stony Point and Verplank, the most direct
and convenient communication between the provinces on
either side of Hudson River, I have conceived no hour
could be better chosen to possess myself of them, than
when the enemy’s works should be nearly completed; in
these opinions, it has been made the first operation of the
campaign. With the advantages derived from the enemy’s
110 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

labor, I have been able, with little work and few materials,
to establish at this place a post of tolerable security.

I shall not trouble your Lordship with a detail of the
movements for this purpose, but content myself with in-
forming you, that the troops destined for this service,
under Major-General Vaughan, were joined after their em-
barkation by the corps from Virginia, which arrived in just
time to proceed with him up the North River on the 30th
of May.

In the morning of the 31st Major-General Vaughan
landed with the gross of his command on the east side of
the river, eight miles below Verplanks, whilst the Seven-
teenth, Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments, with one
hundred Yagers, which I accompanied, proceeded to within
three miles of Stony Point, where they landed under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Johnson. On the ships coming in view, the
rebels evacuated their works, which were in some forward-
ness, and set fire to a large blockhouse. As the troops ap-
proached to take possession, they made some show of re-
sistance, by drawing up upon the hills, but did not wait a
conflict.

Sir George Collier favored the expedition with the as-
sistance of the galleys and gunboats of the fleet under his
own direction, these exchanged some shot with Fort la
Fayette, a small but compleat work on the east side of the
river, whilst the troops were possessing themselves of the
heights of Stony Point, which commanded it.

In the night, the artillery, which I found necessary, was
landed, and Major-General Pattison assumed the command.
His exertions and good arrangements, seconded by the
cheerful labor of the troops, gave me the satisfaction of see-
ing a battery of cannon and mortars opened at five the next
morning on the summit of this difficult rock. Their effect
was soon perceived, as well as that of the galleys. General
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 111

Vaughan appearing at this time in the rear of the fort,
prevented the retreat which the enemy were concerting.
Under these circumstances, they delivered themselves into
our hands upon the terms of humane treatment, which I
promised them.

The fort mounted four pieces of artillery, and the gar-
rison consisted of one Captain, three Lieutenants, a Sur-
geon’s mate, and seventy privates.

I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship,
that this little success was effected without the loss of a
single man, and that only one Yager was wounded on the
occasion.

[From the London Gazette, July 10, 1779.]

No. 4

COMMODORE SIR GEORGE COLLIER TO THE ENGLISH
ADMIRALTY

RaIsoNABLE, off New York, June 14, 1779.

In my letter to you of yesterday, I mentioned the men-
of-war and transports under my command arriving here
on the 29th of last month from Virginia; you will be
pleased to acquaint their lordships, that immediately on
my anchoring, the Commander-in-Chief of the army in-
formed me of his intention to proceed on an expedition
up the North River, to reduce the works the rebels had
thrown up at Verplanks and Stony Point, for the security
of the important pass of King’s Ferry; the General express-
112 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

ing a wish for my being present, and to have the assistance
of the troops returned from Virginia, I directed the trans-
ports to move up Hudson River immediately, and accom-
panied them in the Raisonable, having also with me the
Camilla, Vulture sloop, Cornwallis, Crane and Philadelphia
galleys and two gunboats. We passed the chevaux-de-frise
without any accident, and came to, with the Raisonable,
about eight miles above Dobb’s Ferry; I then went into
the Camilla, and proceeding on with the transports, an-
chored just out of random shot of Fort la Fayette, which
the rebels had erected on Verplank’s Point; Major-General
Vaughan, with a part of the army, landing on the east.
side, and Sir Henry Clinton, with Major-General Pattison
and the remainder of the troops, on the opposite shore,
about a mile and a half from Stony Point, an exceeding
strong post, where the rebels were erecting a blockhouse,
and fortifying the heights. On our approach they quitted
their works and set them on fire, escaping to the moun-
tains. The troops soon took possession, and, with infinate
fatigue and labor, heavy cannon were dragged up a steep
precipice from a very bad landing-place; the three galleys
being advanced fired upon Fort la Fayette, which was re-
turned by the rebels. Major-General Pattison, of the ar-
tillery, had, with indefatigable perserverance, erected two
batteries (one of which were mortars) during the night,
and at dawn of day began to play upon the rebel fort; the
distance across the river being about a thousand yards, and
was commanded by the high ground of Stony Point; the
cannonading continued all day, during which General
Vaughan and his division marched round and completely
invested the enemy’s post.

So soon as it was dark I ordered the Vulture and Corn-
wallis galley to pass the fort and anchor above it, to pre-
vent the escape of the rebels by water; this was done with-
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 113

out damage, and had the intended effect; the fire from our
batteries and galleys being now much superior to that of
the enemy, they beat the chamade; the cannonading ceased;
a flag of truce was sent in to summons them, and they con-
sented to surrender the fort and their arms and become
prisoners of war. We found the fort a small, complete
little work, with a blockhouse, double ditch, chevaux-deé-
frise and abatis. His Majesty’s troops have taken posses-
sion of it, and are also fortifying the strong post of Stony
Point, by which we are masters of King’s Ferry, and oblige
the rebels to make a detour of ninety miles across the
mountains to communicate with the country east of Hud-
son’s River.
[From the London Gazette, July 13, 1779.]

No. 5

GENBRAL PATTISON, COMMANDING BRITISH ARTILLERY,
TO LORD TOWNSEND

Camp at Stonky Point, 9th June, 1779.
My Lord:

All the troops on Long Island, except one Provincial
Battalion, having quitted their Cantonments, and crossed
over the East River to York Island, a movement was made
on Friday the 28th May, of the following corps, which
marched from the lines, of Kingsbridge in four columns,
viz.:
114 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Left Center Right Center

Left Column Column Column Right Column
Mounted Jagers Ferguson’s Corps Emerick’s Corps Queen’s Rangers.
8rd Battn Hessa LightInfantry of 17th Foot Legion
Grenadiers the Line 23rd do 7th Foot
Regt of Bose ' American 33rd do 68rd Foot
gt 64th do

and form’d a Camp about five Miles beyond it on a very
strong ground, the right extending to East Chester Creek,
and the left to Phillips’s House on the North River. The
British Grenadiers marched from Jamaica to Whitestone,
and, passing over the Sound to Hast Chester, joined the
Encampment. The little Park of Artillery consisting of 4
light 12 Ps’, 2 Royal Howitzers and a Cohorn Mortar on a
traveling carriage, under the command of Captain Roch-
fort, marched the day following, and was placed in the
Center of the Camp on a very Commanding Height, called.
Valentine’s Hill. The Command of the British Troops at.
this Camp was given to Major-General Vaughan, and the
Light Troops and Cavalry to Sir William Erskine. The
Troops left within the Lines of Kingsbridge were the 44th
and 57th Regts. and 3 Hessian Regts. under the Command
of General Knyphansen, the two Battalions of Guards and
3 Hessian Regts. to Garrison New York, and the 26th and
37th Regts. with 2 Provincial Battalions remained on
Staten Island, under Major-General Leslie.

About a fortnight previous to putting the Army in Mo-
tion Sir Henry Clinton communicated to me his Design of
attempting to reduce a Rebel Fort, called La Fayette, situ-
ated at Verplank’s Point on the East Side of the North
River, in the narrow Part of Haverstraw Bay, and that he
intended to give me the command of a Corps, to be em-
ployed on this Service.

This Fort being erected for the Protection of the Pas-
sage from the King’s Ferry on the opposite Side, it was
considered as an Object of Importance, to become Masters
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 115

of it, since it would cut off the principal communication
between the Eastern and Western Colonies, and oblige all
the Supply’s of Provisions or Troops for Mr. Washington
from Connecticut and New England to make a large De-
tour over the Highlands. On the West Side of the River
directly opposite to Fort La Fayette is a very high Bluff
Rock, call’d Stony Point, which commands it, and upon
which the Rebels were raising Works, the General there-
fore determined to get Possession first of this Post, as the
surest Means of reducing the other.

The flank Company’s of the Guards, 42d Regt. Volun-
teers of Ireland and Regt. of Prince Charles arriving very
opportunely from Virginia on Saturday Evening, the 29th
of May, Sir Henry Clinton resolved to carry the intended
Operations up the North River into immediate Execution,
and accordingly ordered the Transports with those Troops
to move up the River that night to Phillips’s House, where
they were to be joined by another Corps, that was to em-
bark there the next Morning from Camp, consisting of the
Light Infantry and Grenadiers of the Line, the Hessian
Grenadiers, 33d Regt. dismounted Legion, Loyal Ameri-
cans and Ferguson’s Corps, under the Orders of Major Gen.
Vaughan.

The Artillery destined for this Service to be commanded
by Capt. Traille, was 3 heavy and 1 light 12 Pr, one light 3
Pr, one 8 Inch Howitzer, one Inch Mortar, four Royals and
two Cohorns. The whole of these, with their Ammunition
and Stores had been embarked on board a Brig for several
Days, except one Light and one Heavy 12 Pr, the 8 Inch
Howitzer, two Royals and light 3 Pr intended to be car-
ried in Gun Boats for the first Landing, and on the fol-
lowing Day, (Sunday the 30th) they were accordingly put
on board the Gun Boats, and proceeded with the Brig that
Evening up the River, under the care of the Vulture Sloop
116 ‘HE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

of War. The Raisonable Commodore Sir George Collier
and the Camilla Frigate went up the same Evening.

Sir Henry Clinton left New York that Day about Noon,
and went in one of his own Vessels to His Head Quarters
at Phillips’s House. Iwas myself on board the Raisonable,
but as it was inconvenient for that large Ship to move up
higher than Tarry Town, the Commodore there shifted his
Broad Pendant to the Camilla and we proceeded to Haver-
straw Bay, which we reached about 12 o’Clock on Monday
noon. As soon as the Enemy discovered our Fleet, we
could perceive they began to draw off many Things from
Stony Point, but whether Guns or Stores, we could not
discover, and very soon after they set fire to their Works
& abandoned the Place.—About 4 o’Clock this Afternoon,
the 17th, 63rd, and 64th Regiment and a Detachment of
120 Jagers landed without Opposition in a small Bay near
Stony Point, whither we marched directly and took Post.
The Commander in Chief went on Shore in Person, and
was pleased to put the Troops under my Command. A
small Body of the Enemy made their appearance, but re-
tired immediately on our landing—the Guns from the Op-
posite Fort fired a great many Shot upon the Armed Gal-
ley’s that. were stationed to cover our landing, but without
effect—The Troops had no sooner gained the Heights of
Stony Point, than Measures were taken to land the Ar-
tillery—The Moon favored this Operation, and admitted
of its being carried on during the Whole Night.—The
Landing place for the Cannon was very inconvenient, being
of deep Mud, and the Hill they were to be drawn up craggy,
and of uncommon Steep Ascent, 58 Men in Harness, be-
sides many more shoving at the Wheels, were scarcely able
to get up a heavy 12 Pr, but the Zeal and Activity of the
Officers which I cannot sufficiently commend, and the good
Disposition of the Soldiers overcome a™ Difficultys with so
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 117

much Expedition that by 5 o’Clock next Morning, Batteries
were prepared and open’d with a 10 Inch Mortar, an 8 Inch
Howitzer & 12 Prs and the Cannonading Bombardment
carried on at the same Time—The Distance from this
Point to the Fort was reported not to exceed eight or nine
hundred yards, but being found to be full fifteen hundred,
the light 12 Pr & small Mortars were of little or no use, but
the 10 Inch Mortar, 8 Inch Howitzer & Heavy 12 Pr were
serv’d to very good effect.

The Commander in Chief, who came on shore from on
board his own Ship early in the Morning, and staid near
an hour on the Battery’s, had the Pleasure to see both Shot
& Shells take Place—About noon upon a 10 Inch Shell
falling into the Body of their Work, and as we since learn’d,
Killing 3 Men, the Enemy ran off and evacuated the Fort,
after throwing some Barrels of Powder into the River.—
Sir Henry Clinton who was with Gen’l Vaughan on the
other Side, perceiving the Fort abandoned, sent me Notice
of it, & orders to stop firing —-But Gen’] Vaughans Corps,
which had march’d from Teller’s Point, where they landed
the evening before, now appearing in Sight, the Rebels
found that their Retreat was cut off, and therefore return’d
to the Fort, and again fired their Cannon.—Sir Henry Clin-
ton sent Cap’t Andre, his Aide-de-Camp with a Flag of
Truce to demand the Surrender of the Fort—The Com-
mandant asked to march out with the Honors of War, but
finding that no other Terms would be granted than Sur-
tendering Prisoners of War, they were after a Short Parly,
consented to, and the British Colours hoisted in the Fort.
—The little Garrison consisted of One Captain, 3 Lieu-
tenants, a Surgeon & 70 Men.—They had one Officer and
3 Men Killed, but we had fortunately neither Officer or
Man hurt.—Their Guns were fired in a good Direction, but
generally so much elevated, on account of our superior
118 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Height, that the shot went over our Heads—This small
Fort appears to have been originally intended as a Block
House, to be defended by Infantry, but a thick Parapet
fraiz’d has since been rais’d round it, under which towards
the River is a Barbette Battery, mounting one 18 Pr & two
4 Pr.—tThe Scarp of the Ditch has a Revetement of Stone,
& is Stockaded, the Whole encompassed besides with a
very strong Chevaux de Fraize, & an Abbatis.

The two first Day’s the militia were impertinently
troublesome by coming down in small Bodies, and firing
upon our Jager Post, but five or Six of them having been
dropt by our Rifle Shot, they thought fit to disappear, and
have given us no further Disturbance, not even to the ad-
vanced Picquet——One Jager was wounded.

Stony Point is by Nature exceedingly strong, from the
several Commanding Heights, and being almost insular, by
means of a Swamp & Creek from the River, is very inacces-
sible; and the Commander in Chief having determined to
maintain this Post, and to render it as strong as possible,
gave Orders for Battery’s to be erected on the several Em-
inencies.—Working Parties were immediately employed
under the Direction of the Engineer’s (Cap’t Mercer & L’
Fyers) and so much Diligence has been used, that there
are already Seven Facine-Batteries nearly completed_—The
Guns intended for These works are two 24 Prs. and two 18
Prs., four 12 Prs., six 6 Prs. and one 3 Pr., one 10 Inch
Mortar, one 8 Inch Howitzer, two Royal Mortars, and two
Cohorns do—and the Platforms will be ready to receive
them in a few Days.—I have the Honor to send Your Lord-
ship a Plan of this Post, shewing how the whole is at
present fortified —There is no Ground that can be said to
Command it, except one Hill which is at upwards of a
Mile Distance, but the almost unsurmountable Difficulty’s
which must attend bringing heavy Cannon over the Haver-
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. t 119

straw Mountains makes any serious attack little to be ex-
pected, however I have Order’d all the Woods in our Front
and on our rightflank to be cut down, and Abbatis to be
made in every Part of practicable Approach A Few Days
ago one of the Refugees employ’d to bring in Intelligence,
having given me Information that 300 Head of Cattle,
which had been driven back by the Rebels, were collected
at a place about Six Miles Distance, under a small Guard
of Militia, I sent out a Detachment of 500 Men under It.
Col. Johnson that Night, in hopes of taking them by sur-
prise, but whether thro’ accident or from Intelligence their
March was soon discovered, when in great Part defeated
the Design, however they brought in the next morning
between Forty & Fifty Head of Cattle, with a Number of
Calves, Hogs & without Loss of a Man Killed or Wounded,
tho’ they were fired upon by scattering Parties upon their
March.

The Commander-in-Chief return’d by Water to his Quar-
ters at Phillips’s House, after the Celebration of His Maj-
esty’s Birth Day, which was performed here, on both sides

of the River by Royal Salutes of Cannon, Vollies of Mus-
ketry and every other Demonstration of Joy.

Our present Operations have certainly had one Effect
much wish’d for, that of obliging Mr. Washington to As-
semble his Troops and quit his Position in the Jerseys.—
By the accounts I have receiv’d from all the Deserters, who
have come into this Camp, his Army, which they say, does
not exceed 6,000, is now march’d as far as Smith’s Clove, a
Narrow Pass of the Highlands, and about ten miles from
hence; that he is to halt ’till he can judge of the Designs
of the British Commander, as in that situation he will be
able to return back to the Jerseys or proceed to West Point,
the only Communication they have now left with Connecti-
cut.—This Place is a great Object of their Jealousy & At-
120 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

tention, and they have been long laboring to render it as
strong as Art can make it.—A Deserter who came in Yes-
terday was so very accurate and distinct in the Description
he gave of the Nature and Situation of their Several Works
as to admit of a, Sketch being made of them, which I take
the Liberty of enclosing, as it may serve (if your Lordship
is not in possession of a better Plan) to give a general idea
of those Forts——He reports that Gen’] Parsons commands
at West Point, and the Garrison in the different Works
consists of Seven Reg’ts from Massachusetts Bay, & two
from North Carolina, besides the Militia who are posted in
the Woods.—That they are Working Night and Day to
strengthen their Works, have got Pikes for the whole Gar-
tison, and have stopt up all the Avenues to the Forts with
felled Trees, & that the Chain which runs across the River
to Fort Constitution is much stronger than that which was
at Fort Montgomery, each link weighing above Seventy
Pounds.

The Troops I have already mentioned under Gen’l
Vaughan (except the Flank Company’s of the Guards, 42nd
Reg’t Volunteers of Ireland, & Reg’t of Prince Charles,
which were sent back to the Camp at Valentine’s Hill) oc-
cupy at present the opposite Posts of Verplank’s Point,
where they have a very strong Position, and as it is in-
tended, to maintain this Post, at least for a time, Block
Houses are erecting on two Eminences near to Fort La
Fayette——General McDougal with three Brigades is said
to be at Continental Valley near Peck’s Kiln River, about
five miles distant.

As the Works carrying on at Stony Point are nearly
finished and every cautionary step taken to give the fullest
Security to this Post, I shall in a few Days, with the Com-
mander-in-Chief’s Permission return to New York.

I am truly sorry to inform your Lordship of the death
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 121

of Captain Fenwick, who died at N. York, the 23rd of May,
and was interr’d there with Military Honors.—He is really
a Publick as well as a Private loss, as he was a very able
Officer and a most worthy Man.—He has left a Widow and
Seven Children. Sir Henry Clinton, is so good to attend
a Commission for the eldest Son (The second Boy is now
13 years of Age and very forward in his Learning, his.
Father having taken great Pains himself with his Educa-
tion, may I presume to recommend him to your Lordship
for the Royal Academy?

Lieut. Lawson being the Senior First Lieut. of the whole
Reg’t, I have appointed him to do duty as Capt’a. Lieut. in
the room of Capt’a. Fenwick ’till further Orders.

I have the Honor to be, &c.,
JAMES PATTISON.
‘Lord Viscount Townshead.
{New York Historical Society Collections. 1875.]

No. 6

8IR HENRY OLINTON TO WILLIAM EDEN, LONDON

New Yor«, July 8, 1779.
Sir:

: July and no reenforcement arrived; inade-
quate as it may be, such as it is it ought to have been here
the first week in June at the furthest. I was lucky in my
attempt at Stony Point, &c. Every day proves more and
more its importance. Had the reenforcement arrived in
192 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

time to have enabled me to follow it up a general action
would probably have been the consequence; as it is I de-
spair of that.

I must refer you to Sir Wm. Erskine. I am sorry he
leaves us, much so indeed; his health is, however, of too
much consequence to his family and friends for him to
neglect it; from him you will learn our situation, our hopes,
our fears—too needless to complain of the total neglect of
us. With what you send us when it arrives we will do the
best. We are told part of Grant’s corps returns to us; for
what we get we shall be most thankfull, and as I must stay
this campaign, I will work my utmost; but you can expect
nothing from our army—in fact at least 20,000 men less
than S. W. H. [Howe] had and Washington very little dim-
inished.

If this cursed war continues great alteration must be
made in the method of conducting it. . . . . If re-
enforcements does not arrive soon for sea and land I dread
consequences. Not a word from Europe these three
months, not a farthing of money, no information, no army,
nothing but good spirits and a presentiment that all will go
well, a determination at least that nothing shall be wanting
on my part; and I sincerely hope this will be the last cam-
paign of the war; it must be mine. Good God! What
could prevent the troops sailing in March or even April;
but I have done.

July 4th— . . J have not closed my letter till
this moment in hopes of something to add to it. Sir G. C.
[Admiral Geo. Collier] is sailed in to the Sound on desul-
tory expedition. JI need not say for what purpose. G.
W.’s position in the mountains will explain it; and should
he stir I hope the reinforcement from Europe will put it in
my power to avail myself of any false move he may make.

[Stevens’ Fac-similes of MSS.]
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 123

No. 7

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO LORD GERMAINE ON LOSS OF
STONY POINT.!

Heap Quarters, Doses Ferry,
25th July, 1779.

My Lord:

In my Dispatch No. 57 I had the honor to inform your
Lordship of my having taken possession of Verplanks and
Stony Point upon the North River. Having fortified and
garrisoned those Posts, I found myself prevented from
prosecuting the advantages which those acquisitions offered
to me by the want of that Reinforcement which I had flat-
tered myself would early have given me the power of act-
ing seriously. Some measures, however, tending towards
my general plan lay still within the Compass of my Force;
and these I pursued, tho’ not without inconvenience.

The Expedition of Major General Tryon in the Sound
was a measure subservient to my main Design. To secure
him in his operations and at the same time to be at hand
to take Advantage of his Success, I withdrew from Ver-
planks all the Troops which were not destined for the gar-
rison, and took Post with them at Byram and Mamaroneck
on the 9th.

On the night of the 15th Instant the Enemy suddenly
assaulted and carried the Lines at Stony Point. The
greater part of the Garrison, consisting of the 17th Regi-
ment of Foot, the Grenadier Company of the 71st Regi-
ment, a Company of the loyal Americans, and a small De-
tachment of the Royal Artillery, under the Command of

1 This letter was printed in the London Gazette October 5, 1779, but
material passages were omitted. It is here reproduced for the first

time in full from the original. Major-General Vaughn, who returned
home at this time, was bearer of the despatch.
124 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Lieut. Colonel Johnson of the 17th Regiment, were either
killed or taken. I have not yet been able to procure ac-
counts sufficiently satisfactory to form a decisive judgment
upon this Accident. I have the Honor to inclose Lieut.
Colonel Johnson’s Account, as likewise that published by
the Rebels. ’

The Enemy immediately began a heavy Cannonade with
our Guns from Stony Point upon Lieut: Colonel Webster,
who commanded at Verplanks, with the 33d Regiment,
loyal Americans, and Detachments from the Royal Artil-
lery and from the 71st Regiment. At the same time Lieut.
Colonel Webster was informed that a considerable Force
was in his rear; who, if they did not mean to attack him
from that quarter, at least would make his Retreat, should
he be driven to that extremity, very difficult.

Upon the first Intelligence I received of this matter L
ordered the Army to advance to Dobb’s Ferry, pushing for-
ward the Cavalry and some light Troops, to the Banks of
the Croton River, to awe the Enemy in any attempt by land
against Verplanks.

Brigadier General Stirling was in the mean time em-
barked with the 42d, 63d and 64th Regiments for the Re-
lief of Verplanks, or the Recovery of Stony Point. The
northerly winds, rather uncommon at this season, opposed
Brigadier General Stirling’s progress till the 19th, when
upon his arriving within sight of Stony Point, the Enemy
abandoned it with Precipitation, and some Circumstances.
of Disgrace.

Lieut. Colonel Webster, who had with great firmness.
supported the heavy fire of the Enemy had not during the
whole time deigned to return a single shot, being sensible
that it would have been of no material effect. The Enemy,
possibly supposing from this Circumstance that he might
have no heavy Cannon, brought down a Galley to carry off
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 125

from Stony Point Part of the Artillery, which would have
found difficulty in retiring thro’ the Roads of the Country.
As soon as the Cannon were aboard the Galley Lieut.
Colonel Webster turned upon her an 18 Pounder, the only
Piece of Navy Ordnance he had, which raked her with
such effect that to prevent her sinking, the Crew ran her
ashore and set fire to her. Such of the Cannon as re-
mained upon Stony Point were burnt or thrown into the
River by the Enemy who immediately made a most precip-
itate Retreat.

Having been apprehensive that the delay occasioned by”
the contrary Wind might have given the Enemy time to
collect a Force at the Points too powerful for Brigadier
General Stirling, and being anxious that no step should
be omitted for the security of Verplanks and Recovery of
Stony Point, I had embarked with the light Infantry and
joined General Stirling in Haverstraw Bay. My whole
Army being within my reach, I had some hopes of being
able to betray Mr. Washington into an Engagement for the
Possession of Stony Point. Possibly he suspected my
view, and declined adventuring any Measure which might
bring on an action in a country unfavorable to him.

Brigadier General Stirling is now at Stony Point with
five Battalions repairing the Works, which are a good deal
damaged.

I thank your Lordship for the Information of the prob-
ability there is that Monsieur de la Mothe Piquet may ap-
pear upon this Coast. I shall take the best measures for
the defence of this Post, but I am obliged to fortify with
caution, lest I should give foundation for an alarm which
the disaffected are very zealous to propagate. I must like-
wise mention that I am by no means provided at present
with sufficient heavy Cannon proper for the purpose.

I cannot close my Letter without lamenting that the
126 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Season is so far advanced, and that I still remain with a
force so inadequate to the services expected from me. I
must acknowledge myself happy to find that I must look
towards General Grant’s Corps for Reinforcements. But
your Lordship will see by the Letter which I have the
Honor to inclose that I am to expect but four Regiments at
present, and I fear that even they will not arrive till the
hour is past in which their services would have been of
the most material consequence. I likewise have some Ap-
prehension that their health may have suffered by the De-
lay.

I have the Honor to be with the greatest Respect your
Lordship’s most obedient and most honorable Servant,

(Signed) H. CLINTON.

[From the original MSS., Public Record Office, London. ]

No. 8

JOURNAL OF LIEUT.-COL, STEPHEN KEMBLE, DEPUTY-ADJU-
TANT-GENERAL BRITISH ARMY

Fripay, July 16th.

At 8 in the morning M[ajor] of B[rigade] Benson came
from Verplanck’s Point with the following Account, that
in the preceeding night, between twelve and one o’clock,
the Post at Stony Point was stormed by the Rebels; that
upon the firing being heard, he went over and was proceed-
ing to the main Redoubt when he was challenged by Rebel
soldiers, from one of whom he heard by accident the watch-
elavsA[Asuuog BIUISILA

UATLAC GUVHOIU “100 UYaADIAGA NVLLSINHO ‘100

 
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 127

word was Washington, and retired availing himself of it;
that before he left it the Rebels had turned some of the
guns and fired upon Verplanck’s Point; who of our people
were killed or who taken, no Account can be given.
{Kemble Papers, N. Y. Historical Society, Vol. I., p. 181.]

No. 9

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHNSON’S REPORT ON THE LOSS
OF STONY POINT

Harpystown [Penn.], July 24, 1779.
Sir:

The bearer, Lieutenant Armstrong, of the 17th Infantry,
will give you a full and perfect account of the unfortunate
event of the morning of the 16th instant, whereon the post
’ of Stony Point fell into the hands of the enemy. I am
inclined to think that upon a just representation you will
be fully convinced that it was not any neglect on my part,
nor of the troops under my Command, but the very su-
perior force of the enemy that caused the capture of the
place.

Inclosed I send a return of the killed, wounded, missing
and prisoners, as nearly as could be collected by command-
ing officers of corps.

The very distressed situation of our people, for want of
necessaries of every kind, occasioned my application for a
flag, in order to have them provided. General Washing-
128 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

ton’s permission to send a subaltern officer of each corps I
received but this instant.

The Commissary of prisoners being under the necessity
of returning immediately, obliges me to draw a conclusion,
referring your Excellency to Lieutenant Armstrong for any
further particulars.

I have the honor to be Your Excellency’s Most Obedient
Servant, H. JOHNSON,

Lieut. Col. 17th Foot.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, &c., &e., &c.

INCLOSURE IN COLONEL JOHNSON’S LETTER.

Return of the killed, wounded, missing and taken prison-
ers by the enemy, of His Majesty’s troops under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry JoHNSON, at the
engagement upon Stony Point, July 16, 1779.

RoyaL REGIMENT or ARTILLERY. Four rank and file,
wounded ; one Lieutenant, missing ; one Captain, one Lieu-
tenant, one Conductor, one drummer, forty-two rank and
file, prisoners.

GRENADIERS OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST REGIMENT. One
Sergeant, one drummer, five rank and file, killed; one Cap-
tain, two Lieutenants, one Sergeant, twenty rank and file,
wounded; one Captain, one Sergeant, twenty-three rank
and file, missing; five Lieutenants, three Sergeants, one
drummer, ninety-five rank and file, prisoners.

SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF Foor. One Captain, two
Sergeants, ten rank and file, killed; one Lieutenant, one
Ensign, forty-three rank and file, missing; one Colonel,
two Captains, six Lieutenants, three Ensigns, one Adju-
tant, one Surgeon, seventeen Sergeants, twelve drummers,
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 129

and two hundred and twenty-two rank and file, prisoners.

Loyat AMERICAN REGIMENT. One Ensign, wounded;
eleven rank and file, missing; one Captain, two Ensigns,
two Sergeants, two drummers, and forty-nine rank and file,
prisoners.

VoLunTEERS OF IRELAND. One Sergeant, prisoner.

Torat. One Captain, three Sergeants, one drumnier,
fifteen rank and file, killed; one Captain, three Lieuten-
ants, two Ensigns, one Sergeant, sixty-seven rank and file,
wounded; one Captain, one Lieutenant, one Sergeant, one
drummer, fifty-four rank and file, missing ;1 one Colonel,
four Captains, twelve Lieutenants, five Ensigns, one Adju-
tant, one Surgeon, one Conductor, twenty-three Sergeants,
sixteen drummers, four hundred and eight rank and file,
prisoners,

Names of the officers, killed, wounded, missing and pris-
oners,

Royat REGIMENT oF ARTILLERY. Lieutenant Roberts*
missing; Captain Tiffin, Lieutenant Harden, Conductor
Enslow, prisoners.

SEVENTY - FIRST GRENADIERS. Captain Campbell,
wounded and missing; Lieutenants Ross and Cumming,
wounded; Lieutenants Dunkinson, Nairn, Ross, Cumming
and Grant, prisoners.

SEVENTEENTH ReciMEnT oF Foot. Captain Tew,
killed; Lieutenant Simpson and Ensign Sinclair, wound-
ed; Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, Captains Darby and
Clayton, Lieutenants Armstrong, Carey, Williams, Simp-
son and Hayman, Ensigns Hamilton, Sinclair and Robin-
son, Adjutant Hamilton, Surgeon Horn, prisoners.

1 These missing, from the American report, were nearly all killed.

2 Roberts, as General Pattison reported, escaped by swimming to
the Vulture.
130 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Loyan American Recrment. Ensign Hugeford,
wounded; Captain Robinson, Ensigns Hugeford and
Swords, prisoners.

Lieutenant Marshall [17th Regt.] prisoner.

N. B.—Surgeon Achmuty, prisoner, not included in the
above.

H. JoHNson,
Lieut.-Col., 17th Regt.

[From London Gazette, October 5, 1779, as given in
Dawson’s ‘‘Stony Point.”

No. 10

GENERAL PATTISON TO LORD TOWNSEND, LONDON

New York, July 26, 1779.

My Lord:
I am exceedingly sorry now to inform your
Lordship of the very extraordinary and sudden Revolution
which has since happen’d at Stony Point—a post consid-
ered to be safe against any Coup-de-Main, and capable of
resisting any open attack that could be made against it;
but the Enemy notwithstanding made a very bold and
daring Attempt on the 15th Instant, about 12 o’clock at
night, and carry’d it by Storm in less than twenty minutes.
The particulars of this singular and unfortunate Event,
which has filled every one with astonishment, are as yet
very little known. The wounded Officers who are brought
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 181

down to New York differ so much in their relation of that
night’s Transactions that it is difficult to form a real judg-
ment of them. The military character of Lieut. Col. John-
son of the 17th Regt., who commanded there, has been so
well established as not.to admit easily of a belief that he
suffered his Garrison to be surprized; yet it is too certain
that two if not three of the Columns of the enemy pene-
trated different Abbatis at the same time, were almost in-
stantly in possession of the advanc’d works, and in a very
few minutes masters of the body of the Place. What the
number of the Assailants were, is not positively known.
They give out themselves that it did not exceed six hun-
dred; if that be true, their Enterprize must have been a
very rash one as the Defenders were nearly as many.

The Attack was Commanded by a Brig’r Gen’] Wayne,
and it must in justice be allow’d to his credit, as well as to
all acting under his Orders, that no instance of Inhuman-
ity was shown to any of the unhappy Captives. No one
was unnecessarily put to the sword or wantonly wounded.
Our loss in Killed is not yet ascertained, but it is thought
to be trifling, and the number of Wounded amounts only
to one Captain, four Subalterns and about eight and thirty
Men, of whom is one Corporal of the Artillery. The Rebels
assert that they had only four men killed. Our loss in Pris-
oners, a very serious one—almost the whole of the 17th
Regt., two Companys of the 71d (Grenadiers), about sixty
of the Loyal American Corps, and I am particularly grieved
to say, one Captain, one Subaltern, 4 Non-Comm’d Officers,
39 privates and one drummer of the Artillery
The two Subalterns were Lieuts. Horndon and Roberts:
the latter made his escape by getting to the Shore and
swimming near a mile to the Vulture Sloop of War. Upon
the arrival here of that Officer I required of him to inform
me in writing of all he knew of that night’s operations, and
132 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

of the reason of his quitting the Place. I beg leave to send
your Lordship a copy of his letter.

No sooner had our troops Surrendered than the Enemy
turned our Cannon upon the Man of War and other Ships
that lay within distance, as also against the opposite post
of Verplank’s Point, then occupied by the 33d Regt., Fer-
guson’s Corps, and part of the Loyal American battalion.
At the same time Gen’l Macdougal with three Brigades
threatened an Attack upon it from the east side, and did
repeatedly attempt to force the picquets, but Lieut. Col.
Webster maintained his ground with great spirit till the
Corps arrived under Brig’r Gen’] Stirling, which upon the
first notice of the Misfortune at Stony Point, was detached
from camp to support him. Sir Henry Clinton at the same
time moved the remainder of the army forwards from Phil-
lipsbourg to Dobb’s Ferry. The Enemy hereupon not only
relinquished their design upon this post, but abandoned
likewise their new acquisition of Stony Point, demolish-
ing the Works and carrying off all the Brass Cannon &
Stores in a large armed galley, mounting one 32 Pr. & eight
4 Prs., which they sent down the River for that purpose.
But luckily on her return up again and ill befriended by
the wind, Lieut. Douglas, who commanded the artillery at
Verplanks played upon her so successfully with an 18 Pr.
that after having hulled her several times, they ran on
Shore to prevent her sinking, then set her on fire, and she
burned to the water’sedge. . . . . Endeavors were
afterwards used to recover the Cannon, but as they have
not succeeded, it is presumed that the Rebels with their
usual industry found some means under favor of the mee
to carry them up the River.

Upon the Enemy evacuating Stony Point, we once more
took possession of it with the 42d, 63d, & 64th Regts. Capt.
Ferguson is made Governor & it is now fortifying with a
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 133

close work, which it had not before. The Army is since
fallen back again from Dobb’s Ferry to its former camp at
Phillipsbourg. ;
IT have the honor to be with Great Respect, &c.,
JAS. PATTISON.
[N. Y. Historical Society Collections, 1875, p. 95.]

No. 11

EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMMODORE GEORGE
COLLIER

After the destruction of Norwalk [Conn.], the men-of-
war and transports went over and anchored in Hunting-
don Bay, upon Long Island, to wait for a supply of ammu-
nition from New York. Sir George Collier took that op-
portunity of meeting the Commander-in-Chief of the army
at Frog’s Neck, who was come there from New York to con-
fer with the Commodore on the intended operations against
New London. They had the satisfaction of receiving in-
telligence that the chastisement the rebels had lately re-
ceived in Connecticut was attended with very favorable
consequences for the King’s cause; that their murmurs
both against Washington and Congress rose very high; and
that they execrated them as the cause of their misfortunes,
from their imbecility in not being able to protect and pre-
vent them.

Many of the principal people in the Province had already
134 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

formed the outlines of an association and seemed deter-
mined to throw off all subjection and allegiance to the
Congress. This account, which was well authenticated, in-
duced the General and Commodore to hope for conse-
quences still more important, by the capture of New Lon-
don; and everything was soon finally adjusted between.
them for beginning the attack in the most vigorous man-
ner. They parted; the General to give orders for the em-
barkation of more troops immediately to reinforce those
under General Tryon, and Sir George to join the fleet.
again in Huntingdon Bay.

A very disagreeable event, however, put a stop to the
favourite expedition against New London; and this was the
surprisal (in the night) of the strong post of Stony Point,
in the North River, which was carried by the rebels with
very little loss and the garrison all made prisoners or
killed. The enterprise was really a gallant one, and as
bravely executed. The rebel troops, under a General
Wayne, formed two attacks with fixed bayonets and un-
loaded arms during the darkness and silence of the night;
it was said that they had taken the precaution to kill every
dog two days before that was within some miles round the
post, to prevent their approach being discovered by their
barking. They began to march from their camp, eleven
miles off, soon after dusk, proceeding with celerity and
silence; and soon after midnight fell in with the British
piquets, whom they surprised and bayonetted a number of
them; the rest hastily retreated, keeping up a straggling
fire, though to very little purpose, for the rebels followed
close at their heels. Their forlorn hope consisted of forty
men, and were followed by a party with hooks on long
poles, to pull aside the abattis and thereby give an entrance
to the Column behind. The works of Stony Point were
not half completed; and as one part of its strength at that:
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 185

time consisted in the abattis, the rebels found no great dif-
ficulty in getting into the body of a work which was quite
open, though on an eminence.

A young man of the name of Johnson, who was Lieut.-
Colonel of the 17th regiment, was left with the charge of
this important post; he was reckoned a brave and good offi-
cer for his years, but the force was certainly inadequate to
its defence. On the first alarm from the piquets he ran
down with the main guard to defend the abattis and sup-
port them. The rebel column was stopped for a few min-
utes, and a brisk firing took place on both sides; but to
Colonel Johnson’s grief and surprise, he heard a cry of
“Victory” on the heights above him, and “the fort’s our
own” (which was the rebel watch-word). He very soon
learned by some of his officers that the enemy were in full
possession of the body of the place; it was certainly so; the
column which was destined for making the other attack
took a short detour around, and climbed up the perpendic-
ular height, which being over the river, nobody expected an
enemy on that side; and the surprise of the King’s troops at
seeing them in possession of the works was extreme. The
laws of war give a right to the assailants of putting all to
death who are found in arms; justice is certainly due to all
men, and commendation should be given where it is de-
served. The rebels had made the attack with a bravery
they never before exhibited, and they showed at this mo-
ment a generosity and clemency which during the course of
the rebellion had no parallel. There was light sufficient
after getting up the heights to show them many of the
British troops with arms in their hands; instead of putting
them to death, they called to them “to throw their arms
down if they expected any quarter.” It was too late then
to resist; they submitted, and the strong post of Stony
Point fell again into possession of the rebels.
136 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

The loss of the King’s troops, considering the place was
taken by storm, was very small, Captain Tew being the only
officer killed and thirty-two men; forty-three were wound-
ed, and the rest were made prisoners. The enemy found
here many brass mortars, many pieces of large cannon, to-
gether with the ammunition necessary for them—an un-
lucky piece of business and fatal to the reputation of a gal-
lant young man, who was certainly left with a force very
inadequate to the purpose for which he was placed at Stony
Point.

Immediately upon this Coup the rebels began a brisk at-
tack upon the opposite post at Verplank’s; it was invested
by a large body of troops, and the mortars and heavy can-
non from Stony Point kept up an incessant fire upon the
works.

On the receipt of this disagreeable news, the Commodore
sent orders to discontinue the blockade of the harbour at
New London, and immediately proceeded back to New
York with all the men-of-war and transports, getting
through that most dangerous pass called Hell Gates, luck-
ily without losing any of the ships. The transports each
received more troops on board at New York, and then, es-
corted by the King’s ships, took their way up the North
River.

The fleet was no sooner descried from Stony Point than
the rebels set fire to everything there that would burn, and
went off with their usual alertness; they had conveyed away
some of the cannon and mortars, but the greatest part of
them were loaded on a galley, with which they proposed
going up the river to their strong post at West Point; but
as the galley was beginning to move she was luckily sunk
either by a shot from Verplank’s, or from the shipping,
the Vulture sloop and two galleys having been left there by
the Commodore for the defence of the posts, who all can-
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 137

nonaded the rebel vessel as soon as their guns could be
brought to bear.

Lieut.-Colonel Webster had defended Fort La Fayette
[at Verplank’s] with great gallantry and little loss; the
tebel army drew off and retired on the first intimation be-
ing received of the approach of the King’s troops up the
River.

{Journal of Sir George Collier, Knt., Vice-Admiral of the Blue.
Naval Chronicle, Vol. 32, p. 372.]

No. 12

ACCOUNT OF THE CAPTURE OF STONY POINT BY THE HIS-
TORIAN STEDMAN, THEN COMMISSARY IN
BRITISH ARMY

But whilst the British Commanders were thus devising
measures for improving the disposition which had mani-
fested itself in Connecticut, General Washington had al-
ready achieved an enterprise which disconcerted all their
present designs against the Province, and called their at-
tention to a different quarter. This was the surprise of the
fort at Stony Point, which was taken by assault in the night
of the fifteenth of July. As the Americans had been but
lately dispossessed of this post, it is presumable that they
were well acquainted with all the accessible approaches that
led to it, as well as with those parts of the works which
were most assailable. But even with these advantages it
was an enterprise of difficulty and danger; and the Ameri-
138 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

can general, Wayne, who conducted it, deserved great praise
for his gallantry and good conduct, as did the troops which
he commanded, for their bravery. These being divided in-
to two columns, entered the works in opposite quarters
and met in the center of them about one in the morning
of the sixteenth of July. The surprise was not so com-
plete but that resistance was made, and the loss in killed
and wounded was nearly equal on both sides. Lieutenant-
Colonel Johnson of the Seventeenth regiment, the grena-
dier company of the Seventy-first, a company of the regi-
ment of Loyal Americans, and a detachment of artillery
amounting in the whole to about six hundred men. Of
these, one hundred and fifty-two were killed or wounded,
and the rest, with the commander, were made prisoners.
The force under General Wayne has not been ascertained;
but from the number of corps of which it consisted, it may
be supposed to have amounted to fifteen hundred, all of
them chosen men.

The conduct of the Americans upon this occasion was
highly meritorious, for they would have been fully justified
in putting the garrison to the sword, not one man of which
was put to death but in fair combat. Colonel Johnson’s
conduct was most deservedly and justly censured.

[‘‘ History of the American War,” by C. Stedman. Vol. II., p. 144.]

 

No. 13
SIR HENRY CLINTON TO LORD GERMAINE

New Yors, August 20, 1779.
My Lord:

I must beg leave to express how happy I am made by the
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 139

return of Lord Cornwallis to this country. His Lordship’s
indefatigable zeal, his knowledge of this country, his pro-
fessional ability and the high estimation in which he is
held by the army must naturally give me the warmest con-
fidence of efficacious support from him in every under-
taking which opportunity may prompt and our circum-
stances allow.

But his presence, My Lord, affords to me another source
of satisfaction. When there is upon the spot an officer in
‘every way so well qualified to have the Interests of his
‘Country entrusted to him, I should hope I might without
‘difficulty be relieved from a station which nobody acquaint-
ed with its conditions will suppose to have sate lightly up-
on me. To say Truth, My Lord, my spirits are worn out
by struggling against the Consequences of many adverse
incidents which, without appearing publicly to account for
my situation, have effectually oppressed me. To enumerate
them would be a painful and unnecessary, perhaps an im-
proper, task. At the same time let me add, My Lord, that
my Zeal is unimpaired, and were I conscious that my par-
ticular efforts were necessary for His Majesty’s service, no
circumstances of private feeling would raise within me a
single wish of retiring from the Command. That, how-
ever, is not the case, for I do seriously give it as my opin-
ion that if the endeavors of any Man are likely, under our
present prospects, to be attended with success, Lord Corn-
wallis’s for many reasons stand among the first. ‘

The only Reinforcement, then, upon which I am to reck-
on is two new raised Regiments and the Recruits of this
army. To counterbalance the advantage I might gain by
this I am obliged to send two thousand men to Canada,
and if the exigency of affairs demands that I shall be sub-
jected to General Haldimand’s requisition, it likewise
obliges me to send him troops of proper discipline. Your
140 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Lordship will judge whether in effect the balance will re-
main much-in my favor, and whether I have not reason to
expect that no Reinforcements can arrive which will in any
measure enable me to act with the necessary vigor.

Thus circumstanced and convinced that the Force under
my command at present, or that will be during this cam-
paign, is not equal to the services expected from it, I must
earnestly request your Lordship to lay before His Majesty
my humble supplications that he will permit me to resign
the Command of this army to Lord Cornwallis. His Majes-
ty’s assent to this petition will crown the many favors of
which my heart will ever retain the most grateful remem-
brance. Tam, &ce.,

H. CLINTON.

[Spark’s copies of ‘‘Carleton Papers,” Harvard University Library. ]

No. 14
SIR HENRY CLINTON TO LORD GERMAIN

N. Y., August 21, 1779.
My Lord:

s), Your Lordship will no doubt have been
aware that the delay of our expected Reinforcements, the
waste of the season and the operations of the Enemy in that
important Interval must naturally have so influenced cir-
cumstances as to render utterly unsuitable to the present
hour that plan to which the past movements of this cam-
paign have been merely preparatory.
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 141

I now find myself obliged by many cogent reasons to
abandon every view of making an effort in this Quarter.
The precautions which Mr. Washington has had leisure to
take make me hopeless of bringing him to a general action
and the season dissuades me strongly from losing time in
the attempt. . . . .

Having seized on the Stations of Verplanks and Stony
Point on the Hudson’s River with a view to offensive op-
erations in this country their principal importance must
cease when that design is discarded; and as without. great
Reinforcements, which we cannot expect, nothing of Con-
sequence can be carried on again in this quarter, I shall
probably abandon those Posts, not having troops sufficient
without hazard and difficulty to maintain them thro’ the
winter. Iam, &c.,

H. CLINTON.

[Spark’s copies of ‘‘Carleton Papers,” Harvard University Library. }

No. 15

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GENERAL HALDIMAND,
CANADA, REVIEWING THE CAMPAIGN

5 New York, Septr- 9th, ’79.
Sir:

é The Reinforcements which I have been so
long expecting from Europe arrived here on the 25th of
last month with Admiral Arbuthnot, and consists only of
two raised Regiments and the British Recruits for the
142 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Army. Feeble as this Reinforcement is, had it arrived
early in June, I am of opinion, and not alone in it, that
very serious purposes might have with great prospect of
success been attempted. A few words will explain the op-
erations I intended, grounded on the hopes of its early
arrival.

In the first place I opened the Campaign three weeks
before Washington expected, or was prepared for it. I
seized his short communication with the Eastern Provinces
by King’s Ferry. I did suppose he must either march di-
rectly to recover it, risking a general action under unfavor-
able terms, or put himself immediately behind the moun-
tains to save Fort Defiance, &c., at West Point. He had
reason to be jealous of that Post, tho’ without a fleet and
very superior army it is not attackable, and, for other mo-
tives, I should never form an idea of attacking it. He
threw himself behind the mountains, where he was much
distressed, as he was still obliged to live from his maga-
zines at Trenton and Easton [Penn]. The country fur-
nished little grass as yet for cavalry or carriage horses, and
the effects of a severe winter upon the roads were unre-
paired. As I had an army afloat ready to debark on either
side I could by a rapid march have got hold of his strong
position at Middlebrook [New Jersey], in which situation
I should have been upon his communications with Trenton
and nearer to his stores at Easton than he could be for
some days.

Whether the importance of his communication with the
lower Delaware (which on account of the water carriage is
certainly the best) or his apprehensions for the Magazines
at Easton, from whence not only his own army in part, but
Sullivan’s against the Indians were supplied, would have
tempted him to hazard a general action, is not positively
to be determined. I am not alone, however, in thinking
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 143

that it probably would, as the alternative gave him only a
choice of difficulties, the east side of the River being al-
ready devoured and the harvest at some distance. To have
attempted this move with 6,000 men or less would have
been absurd, for you must observe it was necéssary that I
should have enough to keep the post, detach for the pur-
pose of breaking into their communication and secure my
own by Springfield [New Jersey].

In expectation of the promised Reinforcement I fortified
Stony Point and Verplank’s, leaving near 1,000 men for
their defence. I collected what troops could be spared
from Rhode Island and sent expeditions into Connecticut,
hoping that the strong invitation of that province would
have forced Washington to march to their assistance. Noth-
ing, however, could withdraw him from New Windsor [on
the Hudson]. Had he given into my views and decidedly
marched into Connecticut I should have been able to have
taken possession of his camp of Middlebrook even with
the small force I had, and kept it for a certain time, but as
the Fleet have been detained so long it is lucky for me that
he did not give me the opening; for, tho’ I might have se-
cured my first object, he would soon have collected a force
sufficient to make me quit my position, at least by break-
ing in upon my communications and my retreat; at the
same time that it would have been a victory for him would
cut off all hopes in a future day to regain that important
post.

Having received information that four Regiments were
on their way to me from the West Indies, I prepared every-
thing to make my move upon their arrival. The unfor-
tunate affair at Stony Point, tho’ the enemy quitted it again
upon our approach, not daring to risk a battle for it, re-
tarded me much, and I was obliged to leave a strong Gar-
rison there to repair the work which two days’ foul wind
144 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

had given the enemy time to demolish. About this period
the Minister puts me on my guard respecting La Motte
Piquet’s destination. I was therefore obliged to collect the
army near Kingsbridge.

I am disappointed in my expectations of a Reinforce-
ment from the West Indies, and, weak and miserable as 1
am, I am obliged to comply with your requisition, and
therefore, Sir, I send you three Regiments, one of which is
British, and considering the large detachments that have
been already made from this army, is a great proportion.

Tam, &c.,
H. CLINTON.

[Spark’s copies of ‘‘Carleton Papers,” Harvard University Library. ]

No. 16
COURT OF INQUIRY FOR COLONEL JOHNSON
HEADQUARTERS, New York, 11th December, 1'780.

Parole, Preston & Presbury. : C. Sn. Monaco.

me Lieut. Colonel Johnson of the 17th Regt.
having requested a Court of Inquiry to examine into his
conduct relative to the defence of Stony Point, His Excel-
lency, the Commander-in-Chief, is pleased to order a Court
of Inquiry to meet accordingly at Roubelat’s Tavern in
New York on Wednesday, the 13th Inst., at Ten o’Clock, to
consist of Major General Phillips, President, Brigadier
 

MAJOR WILLIAM HULL

COL. RETURN J. MEIGS

Massachusetts

Connecticut
BRITISH AUTHORITIES. 145

General Leland, Brig’r Gen’l Birch, Lieut. Colonel Gun-
ning and Lieut. Colonel Abercromby, members.

[From General Robertson’s MSS. Orderly Book, 1780-81, in posses-
sion of Pennsylvania Historical Society.]

 

No. 17

IMPORTANCE OF THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS. BY THE
LOYALIST JUDGE, WILLIAM SMITH

[New York.]

The intelligent American [i. e., the Loyal-
ist] is persuaded that no success short of the recovery of
one of the Middle Colonies to the King’s obedience will put
a period to the Rebellion. Other events may be more or
less conducive to it, but this he perceives connected with a
distraction of the councils of the Rebels, the discontinu-
ance of their intercourse, the annihilation of their Com-
merce, the subversion of their usurpations, the dissipation
of their army, the insurrection of the Loyalists and the to-
tal dissolution of the Confederacy.

When Washington was importuned by Connecticut to
save her from the flames Mr. Tryon was lighting up on
her coasts in July, 1779, he replied: ‘Tho’ I have twelve
thousand men with me, I can’t cover all the Colonies. The
Hudson is the key of the Continent, and while I hold it
for the general advantage, each colony must be left to her
own exertions for repelling a particular invasion.” Full
146 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

well he knew, and the Congress who taught him the lesson
have supported his resolution, that while his Bread came
from one side of the River and his Meat from the other,
the loss of it was the destruction of his army and the ruin
of his Party. He saw that the reduction of the Highland
Forts laid New England open on every side to the British,
to the Canadians, to the Indians, and to the Loyalists of the
unrecovered Counties of New York; and that there would
then be a door of access to this formidable junction for
crowds of their oppressed brethren from New England on
the east, and as far as they chose to travel from the West.

The uses of a command of the Hudson are so obvious as
to make the neglect of it not only our astonishment, but
the subject of inauspicious speculation.

[Stevens’ Facsimiles of MSS. ]

No. 18
BRITISH FORCE AT NEW YORK, FEBRUARY, 1779

Estimate of the Enemy’s strength and position in New
York and its dependencies, collected and collated from the
Examination of the most sensible Deserters, British, Hes-
sian and New Levies and sensible friends of America—tak-
en by M. General McDougall at his quarters at sundry
times till 16th day of February, 1779.
 

 

 

 

 

 
  

 

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 147
CORPS. STR'NGTH| CANTONMENTS.
HORSE.
British 17th Light Dragoons ....... 300 ‘/Long Island.
New § Lord Cathcart’s Legion....; 50 do. _ do.
Levies ) Emerich’s ......... seeeeae 30 New York Island.
INFANTRY. 380
British Brigade of Guards.......... 1500 City of New York.
Grenadiers, 14 comp s..... eevee | 700 Jamaica, L. Island.
Light Infantry,14 do, .......... 700 South Hampton, do.
Meliss ease os wialsiascee e.ief 200 Harlem on N, Y. Is-
land.
Pithiy esc ed 410 Near Ft. Washington,
N. Y. Island.
D3 wisieicisjeiee s aie ea aay 350 City of New York.
QGthi weiss weeds evcas 810 Staten Island.
BBO i vissinie ses eaeeas 300 Bedford, L. Island.
ST theses ones veces -.| 800
Highlanders, 42d, two battalions...| ‘750 Bedford, L. Island.
Bathe ia cs cieteee.s 300 Laurel Hill, opp. Ft.
Washington.
40th bceee eo evadad 350
DIL: “hardisverteascnaie:stoctoee- 6 450 At & near Ft. Wash-
ington.
G3) sciieegheiaecoieneloe ys. 320 Bloomingdale, N. Y.
64 geawenaaeuse ess 300 Long Island.
7305
Hessian ..... 1 Batt » Chasseurs ...| 350 Flushing, L. Island.
Grenadiers...3 Battn ............. 840 City of N. York.
1 Life Guards........ 350 N ee Bridge,
Hereditary ..8d Prince’s.......... 850 Brookline, L. Island.
rince....... 4 Charles. . | 850 0. 0.
6 Donops..........-- 300 Near Ft. Washington.
% Losbergs .......... 350 7 Mile Stone, ae Me
8 Kniphausens.......| 350 Along N. River, do.
9 Trumbacks........ 850 Barracks, near Ft.
Wash’n.
10 Mirbacks..........} 350 Harlem.
3940
New Levies, Cathcart’s Legion..... 100 Long Island.
Lord Rawdon’s, or Irish Volukices 350 Bowery, N.Y. Island.
Robinson’s ........+. 150 Harlem, do.
Simcoe’s Rangers ....) 250 Long Island.
Ludlow’s Batt 1, Delancey’s Brigade| 150 Loyld’s Neck, do.
Barton’s do. Skinner's do. {| 250 Cuckold’s Town,
. Staten I'd.
Buskirk’s do. do. do. 200 Staten Island.
Emerick’s Chasseurs ......00..-.+- 90 This Side King’s

_ Bridge.

 

1540

 

 

 

Total,

13,165
148 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

General McDougall endorses the foregoing with a long
note stating that he secured the information by closely
questioning the deserters in regard to their regimental and
company strength and comparing it with published ac-
counts. “No question,” he says, “remains in my mind
of the Truth of this Estimate.” He adds that the Seven-
teenth Foot [afterwards captured at Stony Point] “altho’
cut to pieces at Princeton, has had large draughts from
the reduced Regiments. A Corporal of it, who detailed the
duty deserted and was very minutely examined at my
Quarters. He appeared to be a sober, intelligent fellow.
The 57th is by the concurrent examination of sixty de-
serters the strongest in America.”

[Governor Clinton’s MS. Papers, Albany, No. 2118.]

No. 19

WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS ON
MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY.

Heap QUARTERS, MIDDLEBROOK, (N. J.) May 25, 1779.

By intelligence through different channels from New
York, it would seem as if the enemy there have some
important enterprise in Contemplation. They have been
drawing all their force to a point, and have collected a
number of boats at Kingsbridge which are so prepared
as to indicate an attempt that requires secrecy and silence.
The appearances are strong, and make it necessary that
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 149

we should be on our guard; though they may only be
calculated for demonstration, perhaps to divert and de-
tain the force we are sending on the western service.

[Spark’s Washington, Vol. 6, p. 262.]

No. 20
GENERAL McDOUGALL TO GOVERNOR CLINTON

HeaD QUARTERS, PEEKSEILL,
May 25th, 1779.
Dear Sir:

By late intelligence received by the Commander-in-
Chief and myself from New York, I have reason to con-
clude that the enemy have in contemplation some secret
expedition; and there is great reason to suppose his de-
sign is against these Posts. The Commander-in-Chief is
so persuaded of it that he has ordered me to call in
all the Out Posts. If an attack should be made on West
Point I am afraid, in spight of all my exertions since I
have been at this Post, that a sufficient quantity of pro-
visions has not been got in. I must therefore intreat your
assistance to the Deputy Quarter Master General with re-
spect to his collecting in the Country the teams necessary
for the transporting Provisions to that Post, and the carry-
ing off the superfluous stores should the Enemy come up
in great force. I make no doubt you will excuse this
150 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

application, as upon such an Event the utmost Exertions
are necessary.
I am with much Esteem,
Dr. Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
ALEX: McDOUGALL.
His Excellency Governor Clinton.
[Clinton MSS. Papers, Albany, No. 2171.]

No. 21
GOVERNOR CLINTON TO GENERAL McDOUGALL

Sir:

In consequence of your letter of yesterday just now re-
ceived, I have issued a general Impress Warrant to enable
the Qur. Mr. Genl. to convey to the different posts suffi-
cient supplies of Provisions; and you may ‘rely upon every
other exertion in my power to forward the Business. This
is the third general Impress Warrant I have granted for
this service and it is to be lamented that upon every fresh
alarm the same want of Provisions still remains.

I enclose you an extract of a letter from Colo. Pawling
with some Intelligence from the westward which, as it
seems to correspond with other reports, and also with the
accounts contained in your letter, may be true. I have
therefore ordered the Regiments of Colo. Cantine and Colo.
Snyder of Ulster, and Genl. Ten Broeck’s Brigade of Al-
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 151

bany County, in case of an alarm, to march to and cover
the Frontier—the rest of the militia to strengthen the
Posts under your command.
Iam &c.,
GEORGE CLINTON.
May 26: 1779.
[Clinton MSS. Papers, Albany, No. 2173.]

No. 22.

GENERAL McDOUGALL’S EXAMINATION OF
A DESERTER

Patrick Rogers says he is a native of Ireland and was a
corporal in Lord Cathcart’s legion and deserted this morn-
ing in company with two others of the same corps. He says
that the 17th British regiment of horse, Yagers, Simcoes,
the 7th, 23rd and 63rd British regiments lay on this side
the bridge encamped from Cortlandt’s to Valentine’s. That
last evening he carried orders from General Kniphausen to
Sir William Erskine for the troops mentioned to march
at 6 o’clock this morning. That he overheard Colonel
Emerick read the orders which mentioned that all the
troops on this side the bridge were to march out 18 miles
into the country with their tents and baggage and there
encamp.

That the British and Hessian Grenadiers, British Light
Infantry and 17th Foot were to march to William’s Bridge
152 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

with tents, &c., and there encamp. That the Hessian
Guards and 44th British Regt. and Robinson corps with
Capt. Sandford’s independent troop of horse were to do
the duty on New York island. That a serjeant of his own
corps told him he saw the brigades consisting of 6 regi-
ments embark at New York on the 27th instant, and that
they sailed the day following up to Fort Washington, and
that he heard several guns fired from the ships and that
it was reported they were going to attack some fort up
the river.
[Governor Clinton’s Letters, Albany. ]

No. 23

GENERAL McDOUGALL TO GOVERNOR CLINTON AN-
NOUNCING APPROACH OF THE ENEMY

Si ConTINENTAL VILLAGE, 31st May, 5 P. M.
ar:

The enemy have advanced up the river in about thirty-
five large vessels, and a great number of flatt bottomed
boats, as far as Tellars Point, where they have landed about
1,500 men, and a few at Haverstraw. They are in great
force, and they have not yet passed King’s ferry. To-
morrow I suppose they will pass—their force must be very
considerable.

Viiiaer, June 1st, 1779, 7 a. M.
My Dear Sir:

I received your favour of 10 o’clock last night, early

this morning. The enemy debarked all his force mostly
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 153

on the east side from Croton’s to Tellar’s Point, and to-
wards the ferry. ‘Two prisoners taken last night agree
in the accounts, that the enemy’s detachment is returned
from Virginia and composed part of the army now on the
river. It did not land in New York. The militia to
assemble at Fishkill, I suppose will wait orders then, and
give what assistance they can in guarding the shore. At
foot you have a list of the enemy’s vessels. No intelligence
this morning.
Iam, &c.,
McDOUGALL.
13 ships,
3 brigs,
4 Topsail schooners,
6 do __ sloops,
3 gallies,
15 or 20 smaller vessels,
A great number of Flat Bottom’d and Gun Boats.
[Clinton’s Papers, Albany. ]

No. 24

COLONEL WOODHULL TO COLONEL MALCOLM,
NEAR WEST POINT

HAVERSTRAW, June 7th, 1779.

Dear Sir:
I mean to give you a short detail of the situation of the
enemy on and about the river as appears to me on a close
154 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

and particular review with a good glass, which I could
see almost as well as if I was on the very spot—They are
at work like a parcel of devils in fortifying both Stony
Point and Verplank’s point. They have got no less than
five redoubts, to all appearance, finished and their cannon
mounted on Stony Point—on Verplank’s point to all ap-
pearance they have made two distinct lines all around our
little fourt and on the back of the fourt a large distance
are drawing a line across the point from their present sit-
uation—in my weak opinion it will be extremely difficult
to dislog them—if it is done it must be by storm with
sword in hand, as there is no heiths at a proper distance
in my opinion that will command them; admitting this to
be the case it is easy fortelling without the sperit of prover-
sie the bad consequences of their not being disloged—their
ships of war are all returned down the river except one
sloop of sixteen guns, and it is supposed that the main
body of their troops is returned likewise. I believe from
report here that two divisions of General Washington’s
army was within eight miles of King’s ferry last night—
this moment it is reported that a party of the enemy landed
at the Long Clove and have taken some stock off from the
neighbourhood of the pond—this much in haste.
From your most Humb. Servt.,
To Coll. Malcom, JESSE WOODHULL.
near West Point.
[Governor Clinton’s MSS., Albany, No. 2388. ]
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, 155

No. 25
WASHINGTON’S INSTRUCTIONS TO WAYNE

5 New WInpeor, July 10th., 1779.
Dear Sir:

Immediately upon receipt of Your Letter of this date,
I ordered the Quartermaster-General to furnish the Es-
pontoons you wrote for, and presume you will get them
in a day or two.

My ideas of the Enterprise in contemplation are these:
that it should be attempted by the Light Infantry only,
which should march under cover of night and with the
utmost secrecy to the Enemy’s lines, securing every person
they find, to prevent discovery. Between one and two
hundred chosen men and officers I conceive fully suffi-
cient for the surprise; and apprehend the approach should
be along the Water on the South side, crossing the Beach
and entering the abatis. This party is to be preceded by
a Vanguard of prudent and determined men, well com-
manded, who are to remove obstructions, secure the sen-
tries, and drive in the guards. They are to advance the
whole of them with fixed Bayonets and muskets unloaded.
The officers commanding them are to know precisely what
Batteries, or particular parts of the line, they are respect-
ively to possess, that confusion and consequences of inde-
cision may be avoided. These parties should be followed
by the main body at a small distance, for the purpose of
support and making good the advantages which may be
gained, or to bring them off in case of repulse and disap-
pointment. Other parties may advance to the works (but
not so as to be discovered until the conflict is begun) by
the way of the causeway and the River on the north, if
practicable, as well as for the purpose of distracting the
Enemy in their defence, as to cut off their retreat. These
156 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

parties may be small, unless the access and approaches
should be considered very easy and safe.

The Three approaches here mentioned should be well
reconnoitred beforehand, and by persons of observation.
Single men in the night will be more likely to ascertain
facts, than the best glasses in the day. A white feather,
or cockade, or some other visible badge of distinction for
the night, should be worn by our Troops, and a Watchword
agreed on to distinguish friends from Foes. If success
should attend the Enterprise, measures should be instantly
taken to prevent, if practicable, the retreat of the gar-
rison by water, or to annoy them as much as possible if
they attempt it; and the guns should be immediately turned
against the shipping and Verplanck’s point, and covered, if
possible, from the Enemy’s fire.

Secrecy is so much more essential to these kind of en-
terprises, than numbers, that I should not think it ad-
visable to employ any other than the light troops. If a
surprise takes place, they are fully competent to the busi-
ness; if it does not, numbers will avail little. As it is in
the power of a single Deserter to betray the design, de-
feat the project, and involve the party in difficulties and
danger, too much caution cannot be used to conceal the
intended enterprise till the latest hour from all but the
principal officers of your corps, and from the men till the
the moment of execution. A knowledge of your intention,
ten minutes previously obtained, will blast all your hopes;
for which reason asmall detachment, composed of men whose
fidelity you can rely on, under the care of a Judicious Offi-
cer, should guard every avenue through the marsh to the
Enemy’s works, by which our Deserters or the spies can
pass, and prevent all intercourse. The usual time for ex-
ploits of this kind is a little before day, for which reason
a vigilant officer is then more on the watch. I therefore
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 157

Tecommend a midnight hour. I had in view to attempt
Verplanck’s point at the same instant, that your operations
should commence at Stony Point; but the uncertainty of
co-operating in point of time, and the hazard which would
be thereby run of defeating the attempt on Stony Point,
which is infinitely more important (the other being depend-
ent) has induced me to suspend the operation.

These are my general ideas of the plan for a surprize;
but you are at liberty to depart from them in every in-
stance, where you may think they may be improved, or
changed for the better. A Dark night, or even a rainy one
(if you can find the way) will contribute to your success.
The officers, in these night marches, should be extremely
attentive to keep their men together, as well for the pur-
pose of guarding against desertion to the enemy, as to
prevent skulking. As it is a part of the plan, if the sur-
prize should succeed, to make use of the enemy’s Cannon
against their shipping and their post on the other side,
it would be well to have a small detachment of artillery
with you to serve them. I have sent an order to the park
for this purpose, and, to cower the design, have ordered
down a couple of light field-pieces. When you march, you
can leave the pieces behind. So soon as you have fixed
your plan and the time of execution, I shall be obliged to
you to give me notice. I shall immediately order you a
reinforcement of Light Infantry and Espontoons.

[From Dawson's ‘‘Assault on Stony Point.”]
158 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

No. 26.
WAYNE’S ORDER OF BATTLE

The troops will march at —— O’clock and move by the
Right making a short halt at the Creek or run next on this
side Clements’s. Every Officer and non-commissioned Offi-
cer must remain with and be answerable for every man,
in their platoons; no soldier will be permitted to quit his
ranks on any pretext whatever until a general Halt is
made and then to be attended by one of the Officers of
the Platoon.

When the Head of the Troops arrive in the rear of the
Hill Z Fuger [Febiger] will form his Regiment into a
Solid Column of a half Platoon in front as fast as they
come up. Colo. Meggs will form next in Febiger’s rear
and Major Hull in the rear of Megg’s which will form the
right column.

Colo. Butler will form a Column on the left of Febiger
and Major Murphrey in his Rear.

{When this is performed each man will Receive a Gill
of Rum and have the following Orders made publick to the
whole, viz. ]!

Every Officer and Soldier are then to fix a piece of
white paper in the most conspicuous part of his Hat or Cap
as an Insignea to be distinguished from the Enemy.

At the word March Colo. Flury will take charge of One
Hundred and fifty determened and picked men, properly
Officered, with their Arms unloaded, placing their whole
Dependence on the Bay[onet] who will move about twenty
paces in front of the Right Column by the Rout 1 and
enter the Sally port b. He is to detach an officer and

1 The sentence in brackets is crossed out in the original MSS. No
rum appears to have been distributed, but the order, or its substance,
was read to the corps,
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 159

twenty men a little in front whose business will be to
secure the sentries and Remove the Abattis and obstruction .
for the Column to pass through. The Column will follow
close in the Rear with sholder’d muskets led by Colo.
Febiger and Gen]. Wayne in person. When the works are
forced—and not before, the Victorious troops as they enter
will give the Watch word [“The fort’s our own”] with a
repeated and loud voice to drive the Enemy from their
Works and Guns which will favor the pass of the whole.
troops. Shou’d the Enemy refuse to Surrender and at-
tempt to make their escape by water or otherwise, effectual
means must be used to effect the former and to prevent
the Latter.

Colo. Butler will move by the rout 2, preceded by One:
Hundred chosen men with fixed Bayonets, properly offi-
cer’d, and Unloaded [muskets] under the command of.
, at the distance of about 20 yards in front of the
Column, which will follow under Colo. Butler with shold-
ered Muskets and enter the Sally port E or d occationally;
these Hundred will also detach a proper Officer and twenty
men a little in front to Remove the obstructions. As soon
as they gain the Works they are also to give and continue
the Watch Word which will prevent confusion and mis-
takes.

Major Murphey will follow Colo. Butler to the first fig-
ure 3 when he will divide a litile to the Right and left
and wait the Attack on the Right which will be his Signal
to begin and keep up a perpetual and gauling fire and en-
deavour to enter between and possess the Work aa.

If any Soldier presumes to take his Musket from his
sholder or Attempt to fire or begin the Battle until ordered
by his proper Officer, he shall be instantly put to Death by
the Officer next him, for the misconduct of one man is not
to put the whole Troops in danger or disorder and be

 
160 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

suffered to pass with life. After the troops begin to ad-
vance to the Works the strictest Silence must be ob-
served and the closest attention paid to the commands of
the Officers.

The General has the fullest Confidence in the bravery
and fortitude of the Corps that he has the Happiness to
command. The distinguished Honor conferred on every
Officer and Soldier who has been drafted into this Corps
by His Excellency, Genl. Washington, the Credit of the
States they respectively belong to, and their own Reputa-
tion will be such powerful motives for each man to dis-
tinguish himself that the General cannot have the least
doubt of a Glorious Victory; and he hereby most Solemnly
engages to Reward the first man who enters the works
with Five Hundred Dollars and Immediate promotion; to
the Second 400, to the third 300, to the fourth 200, and
to the fifth 100 Dollars, and will represent the conduct
of every Officer and Soldier who distinguishes himself on
this occation in the most favorable point of view to His
Excellency, whose greatest pleasure is in rewarding merit.

But shou’d there be any soldier so lost to every feeling
of Honor, as to attempt to Retreat one single foot or Skulk
in the face of danger, the Officer next to him is immediate-
ly to put him to Death,—that he may no longer disgrace
the Name of a Soldier or the Corps or State he belongs to.

As General Wayne is determined to share the danger
of the Night—so he wishes to participate of the glory of
the day in common with his fellow Soldiers.

[From Dawson’s ‘‘Assault on Stony Point.”]:
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 161

No. 27
GENERAL WAYNE TO CAPTAIN CHRYSTIE

Fort Monteomery, July 15, 1779.
Sir:

You will march by the Doodletown route, and approach
as near the enemy’s lines as convenient before night, so as
not to be discovered. You will fix upon the proper place
to post your sentries from the river towards the old mill
near the causeway, so as to prevent any person from going
into or coming out from the enemy but what you secure.
You are to take and keep all the male inhabitants in the
vicinity of the enemy’s lines until further orders, particu-
larly the person you had in charge the other day. Yow’ll
hear from me this evening.

I am, Sir, your Hum. Servt.,
ANT. WAYNE.

Capt. Chrystie.

No. 28

GENERAL WAYNE TO WASHINGTON ON THE
SUCCESS OF THE ASSAULT

Stony-Point, July 17, 1779.
Sir:
I have the honour to give you a full and particular
relation of the reduction of this point, by the light-infantry
under my command.
162 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

On the 15th instant at 12 o’clock we took up our line
of march from Sandy-beach, distant 14 miles from this
place; the roads being excessively bad and narrow, and
having to pass over high mountains, through deep morass-
es, and difficult defiles, we were obliged to move in single
files the greatest part of the way. At eight o’clock in the
evening, the van arrived at Mr. Springsteel’s, within
one and a half miles of the enemy, and formed into columns
as fast as they came up, agreeable to the order of battle
annexed; viz. Colonels Febiger’s and Meig’s regi-
ments, with Major Hull’s detachment, formed the right
column; Col. Butlers regiment and Major Mur-
free’s two companies, the left. The troops remained in
this position until several of the principal officers with
myself had returned from reconnoitring the works. Half
after eleven o’clock, being the hour fixed on, the whole
moved forward, the van of the right consisted of one hun-
dred and fifty volunteers, properly officered, who advanced
with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets, under the com-
mand of Lieut. Col. Fleury; these were preceded by
twenty picked men, and a vigilant and brave officer, to
remove the abattis and other obstructions. The van of the
left consisted of one hundred volunteers, under the com-
mand of Major Steward, with unloaded muskets and fixed
bayonets, also preceded by a brave and determined officer,
with twenty men, for the same purpose as the other.

At twelve o’clock the assault was to begin on the right
and left flanks of the enemy’s works, whilst Major Mur-
free amused them in front; but a deep morass covering
their whole front, and at this time overflowed by the tide,
together with other obstructions, rendered the approaches
more difficult than were at first apprehended, so that it was
about twenty minutes after twelve before the assault be-
gan, previous to which I placed myself at the head of
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 163

Febiger’s regiment or right column, and gave the troops
the most pointed orders not to fire on any account, but
place their whole dependence on the bayonet, which order
was literally and faithfully obeyed. Neither the deep
morass, the formidable and double rows of abattis, or the
strong works in front or flank, could damp the ardor of the
troops, who in the face of a most tremendous and inces-
sant fire of musketry, and from cannon loaded with grape-
shot, forced their way at.the point of the bayonet, through
every obstacle, both columns meeting in the center of the
enemy’s works nearly at the same instant. Too much
praise cannot be given to Lieut. Col. Fleury (who struck
the enemy’s standard with his own hand), and to Major
Steward, who commanded the advanced parties, for
their brave and prudent conduct.

Colonels Butler, Meigs, and Febiger conducted them-
selves with that coolness, bravery and perseverance,
that will ever insure success. Lieut. Col. Hay was wound-
ed in the thigh, bravely fighting at the head of his battal-
ion. I should take up too much of your Excellency’s time,
was I to particularize every individual who deserves it, for
his bravery on this occasion. I cannot, however, omit
Major Lee, to whom I am indebted for frequent and very
useful intelligence, which contributed much to the suc-
‘eess of the enterprise, and it is with the greatest pleasure
I acknowledge to you, I was supported in the attack by all
the officers and soldiers under my command, to the utmost
of my wishes. The officers and privates of the artillery
exerted themselves in turning the cannon against Ver-
planck’s point, and forced them to cut the cables of their
shipping, and run down the river.

I should be wanting in gratitude was I to omit mention-
ing Capt. Fishbourn and Mr. Archer, my two aids
de camp, who on every occasion showed the greatest in-
164 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

trepidity, and supported me into the works after I re-
ceived my wound in passing the last abattis.

Inclosed are the returns of the killed and wounded of
the light infantry, as also of the enemy, together with the
oumber of prisoners taken, likewise of the ordnance and
stores found in the garrison.

I forgot to mention to your Excellency, that previous to
my marching, I had drawn General Muhlenberg into
my rear, who, with three hundred men of his brigade,
took post on the opposite side of the marsh so as to be in
readiness either to support me, or to cover a retreat in case
of accident, and I have no doubt of his faithfully and ef-
fectually executing either, had there been any occasion for
him.

The humanity of our brave soldiery, who scorned to take
the lives of a vanquished foe calling for mercy, reflects the
highest honor on them, and accounts for the few of the
enemy killed on the occasion.

I am not satisfied with the manner in which I have men-
tioned the conduct of Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox,
the two gentlemen who led the advanced parties of twen-
ty men each—their distinguished bravery deserves the
highest commendation—the first belongs to the sixth Penn-
sylvania regiment, and lost seventeen men killed and
wounded in the attack; the last belongs to the ninth ditto,
who was more fortunate in saving’ his men, though not
less exposed.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your Excellency’s Most obedient humble servant,
ANTHONY WAYNE.
GENERAL WASHINGTON.

[Spark’s Washington, Vol. VI., p. 587.]
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 165

No. 29

WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS
ON THE ASSAULT

HEAD QuaRTERS, NEw WINDSOR.
July 20th, 1779.

Sir:

On the 16th instant I had the honor to inform Congress
of a successful attack upon the enemy’s post at Stony Point,
on the preceding night, by Brigadier-General Wayne and
the corps of light infantry under his command. The ulter-
ior operations, in which we have been engaged, have hith-
erto put it out of my power to transmit the particulars of
this interesting event. They will now be found in the en-
closed report, which I have received from General Wayne.
To the encomiums he has deservedly bestowed on the offi-
cers and men under his command, it gives me pleasure to
add, that his own conduct throughout the whole of this
arduous enterprise merits the warmest approbation of Con-
gress. He improved upon the plan recommended by me,
and executed it in a manner that does signal honor to his
judgment and to his bravery. In a critical moment of the
assault, he received a flesh-wound in head with a musket-
ball, but continued leading on his men with unshaken firm-
ness.

I now beg leave for the private satisfaction of Congress,
to explain the motives which induced me to direct the at-
tempt. In my further letters I have pointed out the advan-
tages, which the enemy derived from the possession of this
post and the one on the opposite side, and the inconven-
iences resulting from it to us. To deprive them of the for-
mer, and remove the latter, were sufficient inducements to
endeavor to dispossess them. The necessity of doing some-
thing to satisfy the expectations of the people, and recon-
166 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

cile them to the defensive plan, we are obliged to pursue,
and to the apparent inactivity which our situation imposes
upon us; the value of the acquisition in itself, with re-
spect to the men, artillery and stores, which composed
the garrison; the effect it would have upon the successive
operations of the campaign, and the check it would give to
the depredations of the enemy at the present season; all
these motives concurred to determine me to the under-
taking. The certain advantages of success, even if not so
extensive as might be wished, would, at all events, be very
important; the probable disadvantages of a failure were
comparatively inconsiderable, and, on the plan that was
adopted, could amount to little more than the loss of a
small number of men.

After reconnoitring the post myself, and collecting all
the information I could get of its strength and situation,
I found that, without hazarding a greater loss than we were
able to afford, and with less likelihood of success, the at-
tempt to carry it could only be by way of surprise. I there-
fore resolved on this mode, and gave my instructions ac-
cordingly, as contained in No. 2, in hopes that Verplanck’s
point might fall in consequence of the reduction of the
other. Dispositions were made for the purpose, which un-
luckily did not succeed. The evening appointed for the
attack, I directed Major-General McDougall to put two
brigades under marching orders to be moved down towards
Verplanck’s as soon as he should receive intelligence of the
success of the attempt on this side, and requested General
Wayne to let his despatches to me pass through General
McDougall, that he might have the earliest advice of the
event. But through some misconception, they came di-
rectly on to Head Quarters, which occasioned a loss of
several hours. The next morning, Major-General Howe,
was sent to take command of those troops, with orders to
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 167

advance to the vicinity of the enemy’s works, and open bat-
teries against them. It was hoped that this might either
awe them into a surrender under the impression of what
had happened on the other side, or prepare the way for an
assault. But some accidental delays, in bringing on the
heavy cannon and trenching tools necessary for an opera-
tion of this kind, unavoidably retarded its execution, till
the approach of the enemy’s main body made it too late.
General Howe, to avoid being intercepted, found himself
under a necessity of relinquishing his project, and retiring
to a place of security. I did not unite the two attacks at
the same time and in the same manner, because this would
have rendered the enterprise more complex, more liable
to suspicion, and less likely success, for want of an exact
co-operation, which could hardly have been expected.
When I came to examine the post at Stony Point, I
found it would require more men to maintain than we
could afford, without incapacitating the army for other
operations. In the opinion of the engineer, corresponding
with my own and that of all the general officers present, not
less than 1,300 men would be requisite for its complete de-
fence; and, from the nature of the works, which were op-
ened towards the River, a great deal of labor and expense
must have been incurred, and much time employed, to
make them defensible by us. The enemy depending on
their shipping to protect the rear, had constructed their
works solely against an attack by land. We should have
had to apprehend equally an attack by water, and must
have enclosed the post. While we were doing this, the
whole army must have been in the vicinity, exposed to the
risk of a general action on terms, which it would not be
our interest to court, and out of reach to assist in carrying
on the fortifications at West Point, or to support them in
ease of necessity. These considerations made it an unani-
168 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

mous sentiment to evacuate the post, remove the cannon
and stores, and destroy the works, which was accomplished
on the night of the 18th, one piece of heavy cannon only
excepted. For want of proper tackling within reach to
transport the cannon by land, we were obliged to send them
to the fort by water. The movements of the enemy’s ves-
sels created some uneasiness on their account, and induced
me to keep one of the pieces for their protection, which
finally could not be brought off without risking more for its
preservation than it was worth. We also lost a galley,
which was ordered down to cover the boats. She got un-
der way on her return the afternoon of the 18th. The
enemy began a severe and eontinuéd cannonade upon her,
from which, having received some injury which disabled
her for proceeding, she was run ashore. Not being able
te get her afloat till late in the flood tide, and one or two
of the enemy’s vessels under favor of the night passed
above her, he was set on fire and blown up.

Disappointed in our attempt on the other side, we may
lose some of the principal advantages hoped for from the
undertaking. The enemy may re-establish the post at
Stony Point, and still continue to interrupt that com-
munication. Had both places been carried, though we
should not have been able to occupy them ourselves, there
is great reason to believe the enemy would hardly have
mutilated their main body a second time, and gone through
the came trouble to regain possession of posts where they
had been so unfortunate. But though we may not reap all
the benefits, which might have followed, those we do reap
are very important. The diminution of their force, by the
loss of so many men, will be felt in their present circum-
stances. The artillery and stores will be a valuable ac-
quisition to us, especially in our scarcity of heavy cannon
for the forts. The event will have a good effect upon the
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 169

minds of the people, give our troops greater confidence in
themselves, and depress the spirits of the enemy propor-
tionably. If they resolve to re-establish the post, they must
keep their force collected for the purpose. This will serve
to confine their ravages within a narrower compass, and to
a part of the country already exhausted. They must lose
part of the remainder of the campaign in rebuilding the
works; and, when they have left a garrison for its defence,
their main body, by being lessened, must act with so much
the less energy, and so much the greater caution.

They have now brought their whole force up the river,
and yesterday landed a body at Stony Point. It is sup-
posed not impossible, that General Clinton may endeavor
to retaliate by a stroke upon West Point; and his having
stripped New York as bare as possible, and brought up a
number of small boats, are circumstances that give a color
to the surmise. Though all this may very well be resolved
into different motives, prudence requires that our disposi-
tions should have immediate reference to the security of
this post; and I have, therefore, drawn our force together,
so as that the whole may act in its defence on an emergency.
To-morrow I remove my own quarters to the fort.

It is probable Congress will be pleased to bestow some
marks of consideration upon those officers who distin-
guished themselves upon this occasion. Every officer and
man of the corps deserves great credit; but there were par-
ticular ones, whose situation placed them foremost in dan-
ger, and made their conduct most conspicuous. Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Fleury and Major Stewart commanded the two
attacks. Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox commanded the
advanced parties, or forlorn hopes; and all acquitted them-
selves as well as it was possible. These officers have a claim
to be more particularly noticed. In any other service pro-
motion would be the proper reward, but in ours it would
170 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

be injurious. I take the liberty to recommend in prefer-
ence some honorary present, especially to the field officers.
A brevet captaincy to the other two, as it will have no
operation in regimental rank, may not be amiss.

Congress will perceive, that some pecuniary rewards were
promised by General Wayne to his corps. This was done
with my concurrence; and in addition to them, as a greater
incitement to their exertions, they were also promised the
benefit of whatever was taken in the fort. The artillery.
and stores are converted to the use of the public; but, in
compliance with my engagements, it will be necessary to
have them appraised, and the amount paid to the captors
in money. I hope my conduct in this instance will not be
disapproved. Mr. Archer, who will have the honor of de-
livering these despatches, is a volunteer Aid to General
Wayne, and a gentleman of merit. His zeal, activity and
spirit are conspicuous upon every occasion.

P. S.—Congress may possibly be at a loss what to do
with Mr. Archer. A captain’s brevet, or a commission in
the army at large, will be equal to his wishes; and he de-
serves encouragement on every account. Lest there should
be any misapprehension, as to what is mentioned about the
manner of sending despatches through General McDougall,
I beg leave to be more explicit. I directed General Wayne,
when he marched of his ground, to send his despatches in
the first instance to the officer of his baggage-guard, left
at the encampment from which he marched, who was to
inform his messenger where I was to be found. I left word
with this officer to forward the Messenger to General Mc-
Dougall, and I desired General McDougall to open the des-
patches. The Messenger, who was Captain Fishbourn, came
directly on, either through misconception in General
Wayne, in the officer of the guard, or in himself.

I forgot to mention that two flags and two standards
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 171

were taken, the former belonging to the garrison, and the
latter to the seventeenth regiment. These shall be sent to
Congress by the first convenient opportunity.

{From Spark’s Washington, Vol. VI.]

No. 30
WASHINGTON TO THE REV. DR. WILLIAM GORDON

West Pornt, 2 August, 1779.
Dear Sir:
The assault of Stony Point does much
honor to the Troops employed in it, as no men could be-
have better. They were composed of the Light Infantry of
every State (now in this part of the army), commanded by
Genl. Wayne, a brave, gallant and sensible officer. Had it
not been for some untoward accidents, the stroke would
have been quite compleat. The plan was equally laid for
Verplank’s Point, and would most assuredly have succeed;
ed, but for delays, partly occasioned by high winds, and
partly by means which were more unavoidable. A com-
bination, however, of causes produced such a delay as gave
the enemy time to move in force, and render further opera-
tions dangerous: and improper; the situation of the Post,
and other circumstances which may easily be guessed, in-
duced me to resolve a removal of the stores, and the de-
struction of the works at Stony Point, which was accord-
ingly done the third day after it was taken.
The Enemy have again repossessed the ground, and are
172 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

busily employed in repairing the works with a force fully
adequate to the defence of the spot, which in itself is a
fortification—surrounded, as it is, - a deep morass ex-
ceedingly difficult of access.

[Ford’s Washington, Vol. 8, p. 1.J

No. 31
WASHINGTON TO GENERAL GATES AT PROVIDENCE

Heap QuaRTERs, July 29, 1779. -
Dear Sir:

You will have heard before this reaches you of a suc-
cessful attack made upon Stony Point on the night of the
15th by Brigadier General Wayne and the corps of Light
Infantry under his command. The number of prisoners
taken, including the wounded, amounts to 1 Lt. Colonel, 4
captains, 19 subalterns, 3 staff officers and 516 non-com-
missioned officers and privates. The killed is estimated at
about 50. There were fifteen pieces of fine artillery in the
garrison of different size, with a proportion of stores. On
our part we had fifteen killed and eighty-four wounded;
among the latter were seven officers, none mortally. Gen-
eral Wayne himself received a flesh wound in the head. The
subsequent reduction of Verplank’s point made a part of
the plan, but in this we were disappointed by some acci-
dental and unavoidable delays which gave the enemy time
to march to its relief. When we came to examine Stony
Point, we found that it would require more men to main-
68LI ‘Uopuoy ‘daydeisoay s,3ury ‘WopEd
£Q WUT [VUIBUO WoIZ paonpary “SLL ‘SdaoulZuq ysTyiqd Aq pokaaAamg sv ‘syLOM $}]

puy
INIOd ANOLS JO NVTd

  
  

yr LS

  

Ad

 

Pee
wo Pamlny

      

aah aT

   

arr
apt
sae
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 173

tain it than we could spare, and a great deal of time to put
it in a state of defense against a water attack. The enemy
had constructed their works wholly with a view to a land
attack. Had we attempted to keep it, the army must have
remained in the vicinity till the defences were completed,
and this would have put it in the power of the enemy to
bring us to a general action on their own terms; besides,
uncovering West Point and exposing that important post
to imminent hazard. We therefore removed the cannon
and stores and destroyed the works.
[Spark’s Collection, Harvard Library. ]

No. 32
WASHINGTON TO BENJAMIN HARRISON, OF
VIRGINIA
West Porn, Oct. 25, 1779.
Dear Sir:
... . . The latter end of May, as I have hinted al-

ready, General Clinton moved up to King’s ferry in force,
and possessed himself of Stony and Verplank’s points.
Alarmed at this (for I conceived these works and the com-
mand of the river, in consequence was really the object, and
the other only an advance to it), I hastened to its succour.
But the return of the enemy towards the last of June, after
having fortified and garrisoned the points, convinced me
that such was not their design, or that they had relin-
quished it, till their reinforcements should have arrived.’
174 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Since which these posts, Stony Point and Verplank’s, have
changed masters frequently, and after employing the en-
emy a whole campaign, costing them near a thousand men,
in prisoners, by desertions and other ways, and infinate
labour, is, at length, in statu quo; that is, simply a con-
tinental ferry again.

[Spark’s MSS., Harvard.]

No. 33
GENERAL GREENE TO COLONEL COX

StonEy-Pornt, Kine’s Ferry, July 17,1779. _
Dear Sir:

I wrote you a hasty account yesterday morning of a sur-
prize Gen. Wayne had effected upon the garrison at this
place. He marched about two o’clock in the afternoon
from fort Montgomery with part of the light infantry of
the army, amounting to about 1,400 men. The garrison
consisted of between 5 and 600 men, including officers.
The attack was made about midnight; and conducted with
great spirit and enterprize, the troops marching up in the
face of an exceeding heavy fire with cannon and musketry,
without discharging a gun. This is thought to be the per-
fection of discipline; and will for ever immortalize Gen.
Wayne, as it would do honor to the first General in Europe.
The place is as difficult of access as any you ever saw,
strongly fortified with lines, and secured with a double row
of abatis. The post actually looks more formidable on the
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 175

ground than it can be made by description; and, con-
trary to almost all other events of this nature, inereases our
surprize by viewing the place and the circumstances.

The darkness of the night favoured the attack, and made
our loss much less than might have been expected. The
whole business was done with fixed bayonets. Our loss in
killed and wounded amounted to 90 men, including officers
—eight only of which were killed. Gen. Wayne got a slight
wound (upon the side of his head), and three or four other
officers, among the number is Lieut. Col. Hay, of Penn-
sylvania; but they are all in a fair way of recovery.

The enemy’s loss is not certainly known, neither have we
any certain account of the number of prisoners, as they
were sent away in the dark, and in a hurry; but it is said
they amount to 440, about 30 or 40 were left behind un-
able to march, and upwards of 30 were buried.

The enemy made little resistance after our people got
into the works; their cry was, “Mercy, mercy, dear, dear
Americans!”

We found in the garrison 15 pieces of ordnance, of dif-
ferent kinds, principally brass. There is also a prodigious
quantity of ordnance stores, and some few belonging to the
Quartermaster’s department.

The enemy are now right opposite to us on Ver Plank’s
Point. They are much more strongly fortified on that
side than this, having seven enclosed redoubts. We are
now cannonading them across the river, which is little more.
than half a mile over. We are throwing at the rate of an
hundred shot and shells an hour. Gen. How is on the other
side with a body of troops, and is to open batteries to-
night.

[From Dawson’s ‘‘Stony Point,” p. 90.]
176 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT. ne a

No. 34

THE ATTACK DESCRIBED BY A CONNECTICUT
OFFICER

CaMP NEAR THE RUINS OF
Fort Monteomery, July 24, 1779.

Since my last I have been engaged in one of the most
serious and fortunate transactions of my life; I mean the
attacking the works on Stony Point by storm.

On the 15th inst. at 12 o’clock, about 1,150 of chosen
troops, the light infantry of our army, Commanded by
Brig. General Wayne, marched from this place, arrived
within two miles of Stony Point by sunset, and made dis-
position for attacking at midnight, viz.: a solid column of
700 men to go below the fort, march up the bank of the
river, and attack it on the south side, 300 in column to at-
tack it the north side, about 150 to make a feint of attack-
ing in front. From these columns was detached parties to
cover the heads of them, cut away pickets, and remove im-
passable. obstructions. At 12 o’clock we came across the
enemy’s picket guard, about half a mile from the fort, who
fired on us and retired to the fort without our taking any
notice of them.

Exactly at half-past 12 (I looked at my watch), the en-
emy fired generally on us from all their works as the front
of the large column (in which I was) had got to the first
line of abattis, in about ten rods of the out works of the
fort. The fire was very brisk from cannon and grape shot
and lagrange, as well as from small arms with ball and
buck shot, through which our troops advanced with the
greatest regularity and firmness without firing a gun or
once breaking their order, except to climb the abattis, and
then formed instantly after passing them, till a part of
us forced into their works over the parapet and a part
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 177

through their sally port. A little small arm firing and con-
siderable bayonetting closed the scene exactly at 1 o’clock,
where we remained under arms and the enemy under guard
till daylight.

J was surprized when I viewed in the morning the dif-
ficulties our troops surmounted. The situation of ground
was one of the strongest that nature ever form’d; three
sides of it was surrounded by water, which was guarded by
the shipping; the other side was a deep,'miry, marsh, which
was from water to water, making the point an island, which
is rocky highland of difficult access. Through the marsh
we waded (which was up to my waist), directly under one
of the enemy’s works, which kept an incessant fire on us,
and the abbatis lay on the bank of the marsh. This piece of
ground was fortified by all British art and industry; two
lines of their abattis extended quite across the point into
the river each way, and in the places easiest of approach
was three lines besides the common breastworks.

This situation and these works was defended by the 17th
regiment of light infantry (a corps kept full by draughts of
their best troops), the grenadiers of the 71st regt., two com-
panies of Royal Americans, and artillery men to man fifteen.
pieces of ordnance, 8 of which were brass, with every ap-
paratus necessary for defence. The prisoners taken amount
to 544; about 40 of the enemy slain, all after we got into
the works. A number of the enemy escaped by boats to
their shipping, which lay in the passage of King’s ferry.
We turned their own cannon on them soon after we got
their works, which soon drove them from their station
down the river.

The enemy’s camp we took all standing, stored with
every convenience; a large quantity of fixed ammunition
was found in the magazine. Our loss during the action
amounts to but little more than 100 killed and wounded.
178 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Gen. Wayne was wounded in the head, in front of the large
column, but not dangerous. Four officers were wounded
in the regiment I belonged to, which was commanded by
Col. Meigs. Capt. Ezra Selden, of Lyme, was one, ‘by a
musket ball which lodged in his hip. The enemy wasted
their fire mostly over our heads. I cannot help observ-
ing that so closely connected is humanity with real brav-
ery, that notwithstanding the depredation the enemy had
‘lately committed in our State, the cruelties our soldiers
have suffered from them, and the works carried wholly by
storm, yet I believe not one of the enemy was hurt after
he had thrown down his arms and asked for quarter; they
were, however, exceedingly submissive. We levelled the
enemy’s works, brought off the stores and plunder, and re-
turned to this place the 20th [18th] at night. We lost
the Lady Washington galley by the fire of the enemy’s work
on Verplank’s point the day before we left Stony Point;
we burned and left her.

[From the ‘‘Connecticut Gazette,” New London, August 11, 1779.]

No. 35

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN SAMUEL SHAW,
OF KNOX’S ARTILLERY

ad Give me your hand, my dear friend, and let
your honest heart receive my Congratulation. Take the
following as an indisputable fact: it is no Carolina story.
The Enemy previous to going down the river garrisoned
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 179

Stony Point on this side, and the work which they took
from us on the other, by which they cut off the Communi-
cation of King’s Ferry. His Excellency, our illustrious
Commander-in-Chief, having pretty good intelligence of
the situation and strength of the garrison at Stony Point,
determined to attempt carrying it. The enterprise was re-
solved on last night, and executed this morning between
one and two oclock, by General Wayne, and the light in-
fantry of the army, who gallantly effected one of the most
complete surprises which has taken place during this war.
The Fort, Cannon, Stores and garrison of about five hun-
dred men, from the seventeenth and seventy-first regiments
and new levies, are our own. Our killed and wounded do
not amount to ten; among the latter, General Wayne slight-
ly, who had his head seratched by a musket-ball. Notwith-
standing it was night—a surprise—the usage of arms justi-
fying, and the lex talionis demanding a carnage, yet that
humanity, that amiable weakness, which has ever distin-
guished Americans, prevailed. No unnecessary slaughter
was made; the forfeited lives of the garrison were spared.
Immediately after this affair the enemy’s guard-ships went
down the river, leaving their troops on the other side to
shift for themselves. Perhaps something may be attempted
against them, though, after such an example, it is to be
supposed they will be pretty well guarded against a sur-
prise. This success will be an incitement to future at-
tempts, and doubtless give a complexion to the ensuing
operations of the Campaign. I hope it is only a prelude to
something better.

The fortifications and defences of the river are in such
a state, that, should the part of our army in this quarter
make a movement, which is not improbable, we need be
under very little, if any, apprehensions for its fate. The
whole British army would not dare to storm it; and should
180 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

they regularly besiege it, our army might arrive in time
for its relief. Ergo, I believe they will not try the experi-
ment.

[From Shaw’s published ‘‘Journals.”]

No. 36

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SCAMMELL TO MESHECK
WEARE, GOVERNOR OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

H. QuarTERS Moors House, NEAR West Pont
Augt. 4th, ’79.

Sir:
.... I beg leave to congratulate you on the late success of
our Arms in the Reduction of Stony Point, where as great
Discipline, Coolness and Intrepidity were exhibited as by
any Troops in the world. You will, long before this reaches
you, hear the Particulars. I have only to add that Genl.
Washington perceiving it was in vain to persue the enemy
while they were destroying the Sea Coasts of Connecticut,
as it would fatigue our army to no effect, their shipping
always putting it in their Power to escape us. He there-
fore, after having reconnoitred the post very critically
himself, gave Orders to Genl. Wayne to attack the place,
and the plan of Attack, concluding it would effectually
draw the enemy from ravaging the Sea Coasts in Case it
succeeded. He was right in his Conjecture as the enemy
immediately left burning, and Clinton with his whole Force
proceeded up Hudson’s River where to his no small morti-
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 181

fication he found his American Gibraltar (as they had
vainly call’d it) destroy’d, and his Garrison of upwards of
600 men killed and taken.

Genl. Washington loath to weaken his army by multiply-
ing Garrisons thought proper to destroy the works and re-
tire to his old position near West Point; ‘he is at present
fortifying it in such a Manner that the main Army may be
able to take the Field leaving a proper Garrison which,
till the works are completed, would be unsafe. I hope in
a Week or ten Days we shall be able to move from the
Highlands. We are well inform’d that the enemy will
shortly receive a very considerable Reinforcement, nearly
7,000 strong. Should that Number arrive, we expect a
very hot Campaign, and the States will be under a Neces-
sity of making great exertions.

I am with the highest esteem

And Regard, Yr. Very Humble
Servt.,
ALEXANDER SCAMMELL.
[From MSS. Collections Mass. Historical Society. ]

No. 37

COLONEL FEBIGER’S ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK }
Sir:

In a Philadelphia Paper of the 27th of July last I see
his Excellency General Washington’s letter to Congress

1 Colonel Febiger evidently wrote this for publication, but with-
held it, probably as reflecting too pointedly on the alleged partiality
of Wayne’s report of the assault.
182 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

relative to the Reduction of Stony Point, dated New Wind-
sor, July 21st, as likewise General Wayne’s letter to his
Excellency, dated Stony Point, July 17th, 1779, giving,
as the General pleases to say, a full and particular rela-
tion of the reduction of the point by the light Infantry
under his command.

As I am one of those who had shared the Dangers and
labor of this attempt, and observing that in General
Wayne’s Relation of the matter, which must be chiefly
collated from relations of the officers, some very glaring
mistakes inserted, I must entreat you to give the following
a place in your useful paper for the better information of
the publick. I shall adhere to facts and you are at Liberty
to show my real name, which I enclose you, to any person
or persons who conceive themselves concerned in the mat-
ter.

Iam Yours, &c.,
MILES.

ENCLOSURE.

As to General Wayne’s first paragraph as above [prob-
ably a slip from newspaper] he proceeds to repeat the line
of march which is just to where he returned from recon-
noitering the works. Half after eleven o’clock the whole
moved forward; the van of the right consisted of 150 volun-
teers commanded by Lt. Col. Fleury. These were pre-
ceded by 20 picked men under command of Lieut. Knox,
not, as the General mentions, to remove the abatis. and
other obstructions, but to cover Capt. Shelton, who com-
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 183

manded the front of the remaining 130 men of whom
men had their musketts slung and carried axes for
that purpose; but when Lt. Col. Fleury had taken post
with Lieut. Knox in front of the 20 men, and Capt. Skelton
finding it impossible to remove the abatis, and the gallant
Major Posey, whose name has not even been mentioned,
at the head of Febiger’s Regiment pressing close upon him,
threw away his axes and took to the Bayonet and followed
Fleury and Knox into the works at not more than
yards distance.

In the 3rd paragraph I agree with the General as far
as “forced their way.” But the Order relative to not firing
was disobeyed by Mr. Gibbons, who, instead of advancing
with musquettes unloaded, halted outside of the enemy’s
main Works and kept up a fire. I would by no means in-
sinuate that the Gentleman was backward in doing his
Duty, but as the General seems to lay great stress on his
gallantry, and a letter dated New Windsor in which it is
mentioned that Lieut. Gibbons, a native of your city, first
entered the enemy’s works, I must candidly inform the
publick that he did not, and though he was heard to say
that he had 17 men killed and wounded out of 20, I must
likewise contradict that and inform your readers that after
he halted and began to fire and got in disorder, Major
Stewart’s party, and I believe the whole left column past
him, and can with Confidence affirm that he did not enter
the works till long after they were in our full possession
and a cannonade had begun on the Enemy’s vessels.

To prove that both columns did ‘not meet in the ‘center
of the enemy’s works nearly at the same instant, I must,
in order to elucidate the matter, return to where the Gen-
eral placed himself at the head of the right column. Af-
ter he had been there some time he ordered Colo. Febiger
who was marching by his side, to go along the Flank of

 

 
184 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

his Regt. and see his order about the dependance on their
bayonets only executed, and to bring up the rear of his
Regiment and prevent Confusion. This was at the Rale
[?] before the Column entered the morass on the right.
The Column proceeded on with great rapidity until it
had crossed the first abatis where Colo. Febiger observed
their progress somewhere obstructed and proceeded up the
left flank and ordered where Lieut. McDowall [was] with
part of his regiment to break off and advance up and force
their way through the Sally port near the Flag staff where
Skelton had entered. The latter had scaled the parapet
whilst Posey [! pushed over the left flank closely followed
by Col. Meigs at the head of his regiment. Here Colo.
Febiger also got in and secured Colo. Johnson, the Com-
mandant, whilst Posey] marched across the works and
formed where, on the Battery facing north, Stewart after-
wards entered. ['Colo. Meigs inclined to the right and
formed in the works facing down River and Major Hull,
who followed him, formed on the works facing Verplanck’s
point.] Lieut. Knox and Captain Lawson and several
other parties were sent off to secure the enemy who were
endeavoring to escape to their shipping, when Colo. Fe-
biger went over to Posey and there saw Capt. Jordan, of
Stewart’s battalion, just entering the works 2, which was
at least 8 or 10 minutes after Colo. Johnson had surrend-
ered to him, and of course the right column led by Posey
had full possession of the Fort previous to even a single
man of the left being in.

Colo. Febiger, who entered with his regiment, immedi-
ately. seized the first officer he found and demanded Colo.
Johnson, the Commandant, who surrendered to him and
was secured. The Colo. detached several parties to secure
the enemy who were endeavoring to make their escape,

iErased in the MSS.
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 185

and I have heard him say that when he went over to see
how Posey was posted he observed Capt. Jordan of Stew-
art’s battalion just entering the works 2.

The encomiums past on Lieut. Colo. Fleury and Major
Stewart I believe to be justly due them. I doubt not but
Colonels Meigs, Butler and Febiger are much obliged to
the General for his good opinion of their Coolness, bravery
and perseverance. Lieut. Colo. Hay’s bravery is undoubt-
ed and Major Lee’s character as a useful and intelligent
officer is obvious to every one who knows him. I was an
eye witness to the support given the General by most of
the officers and soldiers under his command, and must con-
fess their bravery, good order and readiness to obey and
execute far exceeded my most sanguine expectations.

The officers and men of the Artillery are highly com-
mendable; they marched to the charge without a single
weapon offensive or defensive, and on their entering the
work their officers seemed unhappy untill they were em-
ployed against the Enemy.

Captains Fishbourne and Archer undoubtedly did their
duty and deserve all the Credit given them. General
Muhlenburg, who was posted for our support with a brig-
ade of my Countrymen, I doubt not would effectually have
supported the charge or covered the retreat had necessity
required it.

I agree with the General in commending the humanity
and bravery of my fellow soldiers, as I never saw greatness
of soul displayed in a fairer light to more advantage. The
General. in his last paragraph is not satisfied with the
manner in which:he has mentioned Lieuts. Gibbons and
Knox. Tl say nothing more about Gibbons. Lieut.
Knox’s conduct speaks for itself, yet if there is merit in
losing men I believe Knox’s would overbalance.

I have done with particularizing paragraphs contained
186 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

in General Wayne’s letter, but when I view the whole in

substance the publick would be induced to conclude from

it that General Wayne was at the head of the Column till

the works were actually possessed. This was not the case.

The General was wounded between the abattis. The Col-

umn proceeded under the direction of Colonel Febiger.
[From the Febiger MSS. ]

No. 38.
COLONEL FEBIGER’S LETTERS TO HIS WIFE

Srony Point, July 16, 1779.
My Dear Girl:

I have just borrowed pen, ink and paper to inform you
that yesterday we march’d from Fort Montgomery, and at
12 o’clock last night we stormed this Confounded place,
and, with the loss of about fourteen killed and forty or
fifty wounded, we carried it. I can give you no particu-
lars as yet. A musquet ball scraped my nose. No other
damage to “Old Denmark.” God bless you.

Farewell,
FEBIGER.

Fort Monteomery, July 27th, 1779.
My Dear Girl:

T’ll now give you the particulars of our enterprise. Af-
ter having reconnoitered Stony Point well, we saw that by
a Secret and bold stroke it might perhaps be carried; and
our affairs being in a critical situation induced his Excel-
lency to risk it, and on the 15th instant we marched very
secretly, securing all passes and preventing country. people
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 187

from going in—and at dark were within one mile of the
Fort where we lay till 12 o’clock at night—when my regi-
ment at the head of the right column, and Colonel Butler’s
at the head of the left, with proper “forlorn hope” and
advanced guards marched and attacked the works, who re-
ceived us pretty warmly.

But the bravery of our men soon overcame all dangers,
and about 1 o’clock we were in full possession of the Fort,
where I had the pleasure to taking Colonel Johnson, who
Commanded, myself, and ordered him to his tent. At
daybreak we found we had taken 1 Lieut. Colonel, 25 Cap-
tains and Lieutenants, and 544 non-commissioned officers
and privates, exclusive of the killed and some that drowned
in endeavoring to get to their shipping. We took 15 pieces
of Artillery, with fixed ammunition for a three months’
siege, 2 standards and 1 flag, 10 marquees and a large quan-
tity of tents, Quartermaster’s stores, baggage, &c., &c.

His Excellency joined us in the afternoon when an at-
tack was to be made on the other side, but through some .
difficulties it was delayed. We remained there three days,
which were employed in cannonading the enemy, and re-
moving the stores, and on the evening of the 18th we
evacuated and destroyed the works and set fire to the re-
mains,

This obliged General Clinton to come up with his whole
army to King’s Ferry, where he now is. What may be his
next move we cannot as yet ascertain. If he intends for
our Fort I think he will be damnably drubbed, as this
most glorious affair has given double vigor and spirit to
our men.

Farewell,
CHRISTIAN FEBIGER.

[From MSS, Letter Book of Colonel Febiger in possession of tho
late Col. George L. Febiger, U. 8. A., in 1879.]
188 THE STORMING OF STONY POIN'. ie

No. 39

COLONEL FEBIGER TO THOMAS JEFFERSON

To his Excellency, Governor Jefferson, of
the State of Virginia.
Camp NEAR Fort MONTGOMERY,
July 21, 1779.
Sir:

‘You must undoubtedly before this have heard of and
seen the particulars of our glorious and successful enter-
prise at Stony Point, which renders my giving you a detail
unnecessary. But as I had the honor to command all the
troops from our State employed on that service I think
it my duty, in justice to those brave men, to inform you
that the front platoon of the forlorn hope consisted of
Virginians, and the front of the vanguard, of Virginians
only, and the front of the column on the right of Posey’s
battalion composed of 4 companies of Virginians and 2
Pennsylvanians. Lieut. Colonel Fleury, who led the ad-
vance composed of 150 volunteers, ‘first entered the works.
Seven of my men in the forlorn hope who entered first were
either killed or wounded.

I have the happiness to say that every officer and sol-
dier behaved with a fortitude and bravery peculiar to men
who are determined to be free, and overcame every danger
and difficulty without confusion or delay, far surpassing
any enterprise in which I have had an active part. .

I request neither reward or thanks, but am happy in
having done my duty and shared the dangers and honor
of the day; but could wish, if not inconsistent, that the
citizens of Virginia might know from your authority that
their troops deserve their thanks and support.

Iam, &.,
CHRISTIAN FEBIGER, Colonel.
[From the Febiger MSS.] ss
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 189

No. 40

COLONEL FEBIGER TO COLONEL HETH, OF
VIRGINIA

Liaut INFANTRY CAMP, NEAR Fort

Monteomery, Sept. 13, 1779.
Dr. Heth:

.... I will assure you that my regiment which composed
the front of the right column was in the works, and the

Commandant, Colo. Johnson, had surrendered to me at least
10. minutes before [the left column entered]. The gal-

lant Posey, a most valuable Posey, helped Major Stewart,
who commanded the advance of the left, into the works.
Lieut. Knox, who is a Pennsylvanian and deserves credit,
commanded Virginians, and Lieut. Colo. Fleury likewise;
they both belong to my regiment which is composed of
& companies Virginians and two Pennsylvanians.
Yours, &c.,
FEBIGER.
[From the Febiger MSS. ]

No. 41

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HULL’S ACCOUNT OF
THE ATTACK

On the morning of the 14th of July, 1779, Major Hull
was ordered to march to Sandy Beach and unite his corps
to that of General Wayne. Two companies of North Caro-
190 {HE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

lina infantry commanded by Major Murfee, were directed
to join the troops at Sandy Beach. These were placed in
the detachment of Major Hull, whose command now con-
sisted of about four hundred men. At eleven o’clock of
the morning of the 15th of July, the march was commenced
over rugged and almost impassable mountains, and contin-
ued for fourteen miles, when the detachment arrived, a
little before dark in the evening, within a mile and a
half of Stony Point. Here it halted. General Wayne with
his principal officers reconnoitred the works, and now for
the first time was communicated to the troops the object
of the enterprise. He stated that the attack was to be
made on Stony Point at twelve o’clock that night. That
the detachment was to be divided into two columns; to ad-
vance with unloaded muskets, and depend entirely on the
bayonet; that it was his determination to persevere until
in complete possession of the fort; and that if any man at-
tempted to load his piece, leave his station, or retreat, he
was instantly to be put to death by the officer or soldier
next him.

General Wayne then gave in detail the disposition of
the troops. The column on the right was to consist of
Febiger’s and Meigs’ regiments and Hajor Hull’s detach-
ment, and to be led by General Wayne himself. The col-
umn on the left was to consist of Colonel Butler’s regi-
ment. Major Hull was directed to detach Major Murfee’s
two companies to form the centre of the two columns, and
tc advance near to a part of the fort that was not to be
assailed, and to keep up a constant fire with a view to
distract and draw off attention from the real point of at-
tack; Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Posey to com-
mand a corps of one hundred and fifty volunteers to pre-
cede the column on the right, and Major Stewart with one
hundred volunteers, to precede the column on the left.
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 191

A forlorn hope of twenty men was attached to each col-
umn—one led by Lieutenant Gibbon, the other by Lieuten-
ant Knox. Their duty was to remove the abatis and other
obstructions in the way of the troops. About half-past
eleven the two columns commenced their march in plat-
oons. The beach was more than two feet deep with water,
and before the right column reached it we were fired upon
by the out-guards which gave the alarm to the garrison.
We were now directly under the fort, and closing in a
sclid column ascended the hill, which was almost perpen-
dicular. When about half way up our course was impeded
by two strong rows of abatis, which the forlorn hope had
not been able entirely to remove. The column proceeded
silently on, clearing away the abatis, passed to the breast-
work, cut and tore away the pickets, cleared the cheveaux
de frise at the sally-port, mounted the parapet and entered
the fort at the point of the bayonet. All this was done
under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and as strong
a resistance as could be made by the British bayonet. Our
column on the other side entered the fort at the same
time. Each of our men had a white paper in his hat, which
in the darkness distinguished him from the enemy, and
the watchword was, “The fort is our own.” Our troops
reached the area of the garrison, not having fired a gun,
the enemy still firing on us. The men made free use of
the bayonet, and in every direction was heard, “The fort
is our own.” We were compelled to continue the dread-
ful slaughter owing to the fierce and obstinate resistance
of the enemy. They did not surrender until nearly one
hundred men were killed and wounded: after which their
arms were secured and they were assembled under a strong
guard in an angle of the fort until morning. Major Murfee
acted his part with great address, keeping up an inces-
sant fire between the two columns, thus diverting the at-
192 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

tention of the assailed from the point of attack. His two
companies were the only American troops that fired a
gun. In ascending the hill, just after he had passed the
abatis, General Wayne was wounded in the head by a mus-
ket ball, and immediately fell. He remained on the spot
until the British surrendered, when some other officers and
myself bore him into the fort, bleeding, in triumph. Three
long and loud cheers were now given, and reverberating
in the stillness of night amidst rocks and mountains sent
back an echo in glad response to the hearts of the victors.
They were quickly answered by the enemy’s ships of war
in the river, and by the garrison at Verplanck’s Point, un-
der the belief that the Americans were repulsed.

Our troops lost no time in collecting the cannon of the
garrison and turning them against the shipping in the
river. The officer of the British artillery was requested to
furnish the key of the powder magazine; he hesitated, and
said that he only received his orders from Colonel Johnson.
He was informed that Colonel Johnson was superseded in
command, and that there must be no delay, or the con-
sequences might be unpleasant. The key was produced,
the pieces of ordnance loaded, and the news of what had
happened sent to the shipping from the mouths of the
cannon. They made no return to our fire, and the tide
being strong, they slipped their cables and were carried
down by the current. In the same manner the intelligence
was announced at the fort at Verplanck’s Point, but no
reply was made.

Soon after the surrender, a lieutenant of my detach-
ment informed me that he had killed one of the men in
obedience to orders, and that he regretted it more than he
could express. He said that as the column was ascending
the hill, the man left his station and was loading his mus-
ket. His commander ordered him to return and desist
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 193

from loading. He refused, saying that he did not under-
stand fighting without firing. The officer immediately ran
him through the body. I replied: “You performed a pain-
ful duty, by which, perhaps, victory has been secured, and
the life of many a brave man saved. Be satisfied.” Col-
onel Johnson remained in his marquee until morning, with
other of the officers. I was frequently with him during the
night. It was intimated by some one that the garrison had
been surprised. Colonel Johnson observed that we should
not do ourselves or him the injustice to say that he had
been surprised.

He begged the gentleman who made the remark to recol-
lect the fact that the firing commenced before we passed
the marsh; that all his men were at their stations with
their arms and completely dressed before our columns be-
gan to ascend the hill. That an incessant fire had been kept
up until we entered the works, and the garrison surrend-
ered. Yet it has been represented by some historians of
the Revolution that the British were taken by surprise.
But the distance from the fort, from which our columns
were fired upon, the incessant roar of musketry and artillery
while we were ascending the precipice, the condition of the
troops when the garrison surrendered, are facts which show
that success was owing to the valor, perseverance and su-
perior physical strength of the assailants. Fifteen Ameri-
cans were killed and eighty-three wounded. Colonel John-
son in his return reports twenty killed of the British, in-
cluding one officer, and sixty-eight privates wounded. The
prisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three.

The following day we were employed in burying the
dead. I had two narrow escapes; one ball passed through
the crown of my hat, another struck my boot. General
Washington came to the fort next day, and the interesting
scene of his arrival is perfectly fresh in my remembrance.
194 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

I recollect how cordially he took me by the hand, and the
satisfaction and joy that glowed in his countenance.

I attended him with a number of other field officers,
General Wayne being prevented by his wound. Washing-
ton minutely viewed every part of the fortifications. His
attention was particularly drawn to those places where the
two columns ascended the hill, mounted the parapets, and
first entered the works. He expressed his astonishment
that we were enabled to surmount the difficulties and at-
tain our object with so inconsiderable a loss. And here he
offered his thanks to Almighty God, that He had been our
shield and protector amidst the dangers we had been called
to encounter.

[From Hull’s ‘‘Memoirs” of the War as reprinted in “‘ Magazine
of American History,” Vol. XXVIII., p. 182.]

No. 42

GENERAL HEATH TO HON. J. POWELL, PRESIDENT
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COUNCIL

Hiauuanps, July 22, 1779.
Sir:

An opportunity offering to write you, duty and inclina-
tion prompt me to embrace it. This I should have done
sooner, had not pressing business prevented. I have at
present the honor to command the left wing of the army,
consisting of two Divisions of Infantry and three Regi-
ments of Horse, including Col. Armands.
 

REDOUBT

East End of British Works on Stony Point, stormed by Wayne’s Corps,
July 15-16th, 1779.

 

VIEW OF THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS

Looking toward Peekskill from Torn Mountain, three miles west of
Ft. Montgomery and Wayne’s Cup
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 195

The army are in high health, and equal to any body of
Troops of their number in the world. The enemy not
long since committed the unparalleled depredations in Con-
necticut on the Sound, of which I apprehend you have had
the particulars. While they were in the full career of
this wanton and barbarous war, insulting the aged and the
fair, the Illustrious, the magnanimous Washington, formed
a plan, the most honorable and daring against their strong
works at Stony Point. The Light Infantry of the army
with fixed Bayonets and without a musket loaded carried
the works on the morning of the 16th Instant, making the
whole garrison Prisoners. The enemy had about 60 men
killed and 40 or 50 wounded, and about 500 prisoners.
Our loss is inconsiderable, considering the enterprise. Iron
ordnance taken in the works, two 24, two 18 and one 12
pounders. Brass, two 12 pounders and one Ditto light,
one 10 in. Mortar, one 8 in. Howitzer and 1 Grass Hopper,
2 Royalls, 2 Cohorns with small arms, Cohorns, ammuni-
tion, &c., &. Indeed, this is one of the prettiest affairs
of the war. e%

With the most sincere friendship I have the honor to
be

Sir, Your Most Obed. Sert.,
W. HEATH.

The Hon. J. Powell, Esq.

[Heath MSS., Massachusetts Historical Society. ]
196 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

No. 43

M. GERARD, FRENCH AMBASSADOR, TO
BARON STEUBEN

PHILADELPHIA, July 27, 1779.

. . . . Nothing is in my opinion more just, my dear
baron, than the eulogy which you bestow upon the ex-
pedition against Stony Point. Plan, execution, courage,
discipline, address and energy, in short, the most rare qual-
ities were found united there, and I am convinced that this
action will as much elevate the ideas of Europe about the
military qualities of the Americans, as the success [has ex-
hibited] the talent of our illustrious and amiable general.
IT have sent an express to Baltimore to look out for a vessel
which might immediately carry the news of this triumph to
France. Although I am not as fond as you are of all the
individuals here, the success of this country touches me as
much as that of our own arms. As to General Wayne, I
believe that we both entertain the same sentiments. When
you see him, please tell him that nobody regards with more
pleasure than I the glory which he is going to acquire.

The honor which our brave and noble Fleury won on
this occasion touches me equally, and I anticipate with
pleasure the flattering recompense which he is destined to
receive. I consider this brilliant success a new inducement
for him to stay in America; he at least cannot leave us in
the course of this campaign. I am going to write to my
Court, that it may grant him such rewards as prove the
interest which it takes in the success of America.

[Kapp’s “ Life of Steuben,” p. 230.]
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 197

No. 44

LIEUTENANT JOHN GIBBON TO CAPTAIN
ALLEN McLANE

Puina., Nov. 27, 1821.
My Dear Old Friend:

. ... Your Journal I shall look for with much pleasure as
I know it must contain much of reality, for most of our
histories, like that of Mr. Botta, abound in fiction; certain-
ly do so on particular events. On the affair of Stony Point
you should be well informed, but there were some facts
in my knowledge at the time and on the occasion which
would go to derogate, not a little, from the high and liber-
all encomiums which were bestowed on some, very little
deserving—but those events are passed and in oblivion.

Stewart, you know, commanded the advance of the left
column under the command of Butler; he assigned the
post of honor to Waters [?] which McCullough and my-
self claimed an equal right, and out of the whole body of
subaltern officers belonging to that Column we were the
only competitors. I demanded it as a right and it was
conceded, and lotts were drawn after ye order of battle was
formed and the lott fell upon me. I shall never forget
Stewart’s conduct to me on the occasion, having been dis-
appointed in his favourite to take ye forlorn.

After passing ye creek and first abbattis I was rapidly
advancing with my little party, knowing the way much
better than he did, when Stewart came up and ordered
me to wheel to the right and advance by sections till we
came to an abbattis, cher. D frise and Battery on which
were 8 or 9 guns. I had no right to say he was wrong,
altho’ by this order the order of attack, which I well knew,
198 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

was materially changed, and had we failed would have been
ascribed to him only. He certainly disguised nothing that
would tend to appall even stouter hearts than ours might
prove. One thing I affirm after I advanced and got in
possession: I saw no more of Stewart; I had been at least
20 minutes in possession, with 40 prisoners and many
killed, for you know we went in with unloaded arms and
were to depend on ye bayonett, which we did, ere any part
of the Column came up. Jordan was the first, observing
“you little devil, you have left us nothing to do.”

The situation of the standard [a ship’s ensign] was
on an isolated rock within the line of works and not 50 feet
from my position. Goodbread, a soldier of mine, one of
the four that remained unhurt, did I believe strike the
standard and Gamble [who was a Captain in Febiger’s]
has said to me that it was handed down and that Fleury
took it. I remember my own impression was that I should
punish the soldier for leaving his post, but was detered
from it as the fellow had behaved so gallantly through the
night, and I did sett up a claim of reward for him. I
could myself have struck the flag at any time for an half
hour, but I had too much to occupy me. If young Norman
De Nuville [a young relation of the Marquis who volun-
teered with me on that occasion] were alive, his testimony
would prove a great deal.

As a young man I had enough to spoil me on that oc-
casion; every post that could render me conspicuous was
in my offer—to go on board the Vulture sloop with a flag
and after to take ye colours to Phila., both of which I de-
clined, perhaps from not knowing how to value such things
at the time—more so, however, from excessive fatigue and
my clothes being muddy up to my neck and torn almost
to rags. I was asked if Archer might take my place. Such
little things as these come across me and I have wrote
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 199

them to refresh your memory. If we meet in the winter
we can dilate more on these things.
God bless you prays
Yours, &c.,
JOHN GIBBON.

[From McLane MSS. Papers, Vol. III., New York Historical
Society. ]

No. 45

FROM JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN ALLEN McLANE
OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Friday the 2 July.—By Genl. Washingtoh’s orders went

in with a flag to conduct Mrs. Smith to see her sons. [In
’ this connection the following memorandum appears else-
where in the journal: “McLane discovered the unfinished
situation of the works on Stony Point while accompanying
Mrs. Smith with a flag and communicated his observations
to head quarters, which Discovery determined Genl. Wash-
ington to carry it by storm on the night of the 17th July,
1779.]

Saturday, 3d of July.

Took post at the short Clove, nothing occurring this day.
At 8 o’clock moved down towards Stony Point—lay close
to the works—all quiet this night.

Tuesday, July 6th—Lay on the line all this day—his
Exclly. Genl. Washington reconnoitred the Enemy’s works.
200 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Wed., July 14.—Moved down to the hills in front of
Stony Point—took the widow Calhoon and another widow
going to the enemy with chickens and greens—Drove off 20
head of horned cattle from the enemy’s pasture, the prop-
erty of John Deinke, Saml. Calhoon and Jacob Rose—gave
them their cattle.

Lay in the woods this night near Captain Hutchinsons.

Thursday, July 15th —This morning mustered my com-
pany at Hutchins’ house—at ten o’clock rode with Majors.
Posey and Lee to reconnoitre the enemy’s lines—Genl.
Waine moved down from the forest to the ground near the
lines—at 8 o’clock at night moved my company close to the.
enemy’s sentrys in order to intersept intelligence—at 30
minutes past 12 o’clock the light infantry began the at-
tack on the lines, Genl. Waine at their head—they rushed
on with fixed bayonets and carried the lines in 25 minutes—
killed one Capt., 21 privates, wounded 4 subs, 66 privs.,
took one Coll., 4 Caps., 15 subalterns, 468 men—at the
same time a feint was made against Verplank’s point.

Friday, July 16.—Began to cannonade Verplank’s point
-—Capt. Rudolf marched off the prisoners to Kakeate—
about 12 o’clock the prisoners rushed on the sentrys cry-
ing fire [?]—the sentry shot one Sergt. dead and wounded
14 men, which prevented them from escaping.

July 17th, Saturday—His Exclly. sent me to collect
wagons to move the stores off the point—still cannonading
the works on Verplank’s—this day troops arrived from
New York.

Sunday, July 18—Removed the stores and cannon—
Dismantled the lines.

{McLane’s MSS. Journal, New York Historical Society. |
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 901

No. 46

ACCOUNT FROM THE NEW YORK JOURNAL, AND
THE GENERAL ADVERTISER, (HOLT’S)

PovugHKEEpsiz, August 2, 1779.

In our paper of the 19th ult. was inserted a short ac-
count, of the taking of Stony Point, at Kings Ferry, on the
west side of the North River (a strong fort, which the ene-
my had been for many weeks laboriously constructing, and
expensively furnishing with ample supplies of artillery,
small arms, ammunition and stores; and which they osten-
tatiously showed to some of our people, and affected to call
a second Gibraltar, impregnable to any attack of the Amer-
ican forces.) This fort was attacked about 2 o’clock in
the morning of the 16th of July last, by a detachment con-
sisting of about 1,200 men drafted from the troops of each
of the United States, under the command of Brigadier-
General Wayne. In addition to the account already pub-
lished of this affair, we now add the following further par-
ticulars.

The detachment marched, in two divisions, and about
one o’clock came up to the enemy’s pickets, who by firing
their pieces gave the alarm, and with all possible speed
ran to the fort; from every quarter of which, in a short
time, they made an incessant fire upon our people. They
with fixed bayonets and uncharged pieces, advanced with
quick but silent motion through a heavy fire of cannon and
musketry, till getting over the abbatties, and scrambling up
the precipices, the enemy called out, “Come on, ye damn’d
rebels, come on.” Some of our people softly answered,
“Don’t be in such a hurry, my lads, we'll be with you
presently.” And accordingly, a little more than 20 minutes
from that time the enemy first began to fire, our troops
902 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

overcoming all obstructions and resistance, entered the fort;
and spurred on by their resentment of the former cruel
bayoneting, which many of them, and others of our people
had experienced, and of the more recent and savage bar-
barity of plundering and burning unguarded towns, mur-
dering old and unarmed men, abusing and forcing defence-
less women, and reducing multitudes of innocent people
from comfortable livings, to the most distressful want of
the means of subsistance;—Deeply affected by these cruel
injuries, our people entered the fort with a resolution of
putting every man to the sword; but the cry of “Mercy!
Mercy! dear Americans! Mercy! Quarter! brave Americans,
Quarter! Quarter!” disarmed their resentment in an in-
stant; insomuch that even Colonel Johnson, the Command-
ant, has freely and candidly acknowledged, that not a drop
of blood was spilt unnecessarily. Oh, Britain; turn thy
eye inward—Behold and tremble at thyself!

Colonel Fleury, who commanded the van guard and be-
haved with his usual gallantry, was the first man who
mounted the bastion, and struck the English flag. All our
officers and men behaved with remarkable bravery—They
were even emulous to go upon the Forlorn Hope, which was
decided by lot, when one gentleman thereby excluded from
that command, spoke of himself as a child of misfortune
from the cradle, while the other leaped for joy.

We have received no official returns of the killed and
wounded on either side, nor of the prisoners, arms, am-
munition and stores, taken in the fort; but according to
the accounts we have received they were as follows, viz.:

Of our people, about 25 killed, and upwards of 50 wound-
ed; among which General Wayne received a slight wound
on the side of his face; Col. Hay, of Pennsylvania, a wound
in the thigh; and of Col. Meigs’ regiment, Capt. Phelps
wounded in the arm; Capt. Seldon, badly in the hip; Lieut.
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 2038

Palmer, in the arm and thigh; Ensign Hall, in the hip,
and his arm broke; 5 of the wounded privates are dead,
the rest likely to recover.

Of the enemy. Killed, about 60, one of whom was Capt.
Tew, of the 17 Grenadiers, who was too obstinate to sub-
mit, and another officer, who died of his wounds. Their
wounded were also supposed to be about 60, among whom
were two or three officers. Prisoners of the enemy 405,
including the Commandant, Lieut. Col. Johnson, of the
17th regiment; and 23 other officers, all of whom were
sent off for Pennsylvania.

Among the prisoners, we hear, were two sons of Beverly
Robinson (of New York, now a Colonel in the service of
the enemy, against his country) and a son of the late Rev.
Dr. Auchmuty, late Rector of Trinity Church. We hear it
was with great difficulty these 3 were saved by our officers
from being sacrificed to the resentment of the soldiery;
who being about to retaliate upon them with bayonets, the
usage our people have repeatedly received from the British
troops, they begged for mercy, and to excite pity said they
were Americans. This plea, proving them to be traitors, as
well as enemies, naturally increased the fury of our soldiers,
who were upon the point of plunging bayonets into their
breasts, when they were restrained by their officers.

Since the above account, it is said, the following returns
of the killed, wounded and prisoners, at Stony Point, have
been made, viz.:

Killed, supposed to be between 30 and 40. Prisoners,
466 privates, 23 officers, and 43 wounded, sent in to the
enemy to be exchanged; in all 532, besides the killed.

Our troops brought off all the artillery, stores, &c., con-
sisting, we are told, of 15 pieces of brass and iron cannon,
mortars and howizers, among which were two 24 pounders,
two brass 12’s, sundry field pieces, one 12 inch mortar,
204 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

four howitzers, 10 inch to five and a half, a full complement
of cartridges, ball, shells, &c., for the above; 700 stands
of arms, tents, several hogsheads of rum, wine, cheese, a
variety of other stores, and a small quantity of provisions.

By one of the enemy’s orderly books, which fell into
our hands, it appears that they were apprised of our de-
sign of attacking the fort, and had prepared for it by
giving directions at 9 o’clock that night, for the garrison
to man the walls, and lie on their arms. It appears also
from Rivington’s Royal Gazette of the 12th of July, that
13 deserters, or rather traitors (seduced by bribery and
false pretences of the British emissaries, to become enemies
to their country) had informed the enemy of our design to
attack the fort, though it is not probable that they had any
knowledge of the intended attack, but by conjecture. Riv-
ington’s paper, though it might with great propriety, be
called a magazine of lies, yet sometimes contains articles
of truth—that is when a matter of truth happens to coin-
cide with, and favours their designs of fraud and villainy.
In this instance, therefore, we may believe him, when to
injure our cause he tells us that they knew of our design
of attacking the fort—Tho’ it is probable they had such
confidence in their own strength that they did not make
a necessary improvement of the information.

No. 47

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SILL, OF THE CONNECTICUT
LINE, TO DR. WALDO

; NeExson’s Point, July 29, 1779.
Dear Sir:

.... The taking the Fort at Stony Point is a convincing
proof of the bravery of the Americans and is acknowledged
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 205

by ourenemies. Therehas nothing been done in the war that
exceeds or even equalled it. The officers and soldiers that
were in the attack have gained immortal honor. Capt.
Selden received a wound in the back; the ball is extracted,
and he will be well soon. Sergent Davis received a ball
which entered one of his eyes and went out at the other
cheek, I hope will do well.

This, sir, from your sincere friend and humble servant,

D. F. SILL,

By three times three.

No. 48

DEPOSITION OF THE EXPRESS MESSENGER
FROM GENERAL HEATH

This certifies that I, James Chambers, am a Guide to
General Heath’s Division, and that I was sent off Express
by General Heath with a letter to General Glover, Saturday,
10 o’clock in the forenoon—at which time General Heath
ordered me to publish through the Country, and to General
Glover in particular, that General Wayne had made an at-
tack on the Enemy’s Fort at Stony Point at 2 o’clock
Friday morning, which he carried by assault—kill’d and
wounded about 100 of the Enemy, and made prisoners.
206 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

of 500 more, with the loss of only four Men kill’d and
himself slightly wounded in the arm.
JAMES CHAMBERS.
Sworn to before me in East Haven, Conn., this 18th
day of July, 1779.
JNO. GLOVER,
B. General.
[From Trumbull Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. X.,
No. 365.]

No. 49
RETURN OF AMERICAN LOSSES AT STONY POINT

A return of the killed and wounded of the light infantry
at the storming of Stony Point under the command of
Brigadier-General Wayne, July 15, 1779.

CoLonEL Fesiarr’s Reciment. Killed, 1 Sergeant, 6
privates. Wounded, 7% Sergeants, 1 Corporal, 29 privates.

CotoneL Burier’s Reaiment. Killed, 1 Sergeant, 2
privates. Wounded, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Sergeants, 2
Corporals, 25 privates.

CotoneL Meztes’ Reciment. Killed, 3 privates.
Wounded, 2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Sergeant, 6 pri-
vates.

Mason Huti’s Detacument. Killed, 2 privates.
Wounded, 1 Lieutenant, 4 privates.

Torat. Killed, 2 Sergeants, 13 privates. Total wound-
ed, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 10
Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 64 privates.
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 207

GENERAL RETURN OF THE PRISONERS TAKEN
AT STONY POINT.

Officers sent to Easton on parole: 1 Lieutenant Colonel,
4 Captains, 12 Lieutenants, 4 Ensigns, 1 Conductor of Ar-
tillery, 1 Assistant Surgeon.

Officers and Privates wounded and sent in: 2 Lieuten-
ants, 1 Ensign, 1 Surgeon, 39 Privates. Left at Kakiate:
9 Privates, 2 Attendants. Sent to Easton: 441 Privates,
25 Servants to Officers. Total 543.

[Dawson’s ‘‘Stony Point.”]

No. 50.

BARON STEUBEN ON THE MILITARY
SITUATION, 1779.

Kapp states in his “Life of Steuben,” p. 232, that he
found among the Baron’s papers the following opinion
written by him at Washington’s request regarding the gen-
eral military status after the capture of Stony Point:

West Point, July 27, 1779.—Our present situation is
about the same as it was at the Commencement of this Cam-
paign. The enemy is still numerically superior. Their
troops are better provided than ours. They are better able
to carry out their plans, and on account of their ships, they
are masters of the coast and of the mouth of the North

River.
208 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

The taking of Stony Point was a great advantage for our
side. It has not only encouraged the army, but the people.
It has shown the enemy that our generals know how to
make a plan, and that our officers and soldiers know how
to carry it out with boldness and precision. It has delayed
the field operations of the enemy, but it has not altogether
defeated their plans.

Let us examine what those plans probably are. The
great preparation which the enemy have made to protect
themselves on both sides of the river at Kings Ferry, the
time, labor and expense they have employed in fortifying
this point—can they have any other object than the burn-
ing and plundering of the coast of Connecticut? Would
they have fortified Stony and Verplanck’s Points to ter-
minate their conquests there for this campaign? Neither
supposition is at all probable. Their plans must be more
comprehensive. Having fortified these two points, and
leaving a sufficient garrison in them, they are at liberty
to take the rest of their forces wherever they think proper,
and in case of a reverse these two points are a support
for their troops, and a harbor for their vessels.

They will then invade the country with 2 view to en-
courage us to follow them by detachments, or with our full
force, while they will be ready at any moment to make
an attack on West Point, with three or four thousand men
and the vessels necessary for their transport. If, on the
other hand, we do not allow ourselves to be drawn from
our present position by their invasions, it is possible that
they may send a corps of five or six thousand men, on
either side of the river, to seem to threaten our flanks, and
to try to maneuver in our rear, so as to attack West Point.
This, however, seems to me very difficult, particularly on
the side of the fort.

Whatever means they may employ, I am positive that
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 209

their operations are directed exclusively to getting posses-
sion of this post, and of the river as far as Albany. If
this is not their plan they have not got one which is worth
the expense of a campaign. On their success depends the
fate of America. The consequence is, therefore, that there
is nothing of greater importance to us than to avert this
blow. Let them burn whatever they have not burned
already, and this campaign will add to their shame but not
‘to their success. Were West Point strongly fortified, sup-
plied with sufficient artillery, ammunition and provisions,
and a garrison of two thousand men, we ought not to be
induced to take our forces more than a day’s march from it.
To have the means of relieving it, I go further and say,
that our army should be destroyed or taken before we al-
low them to commence an attack on West Point. . .
Let us defend the North river and hold West Point, aud
the end of our campaign will be glorious.

P. S.—The above is my opinion upon the present con-
dition of affairs. The arrival of our ally’s fleet on the
coast would materially change our plan of operations.

No. 51
PLANS FOR DEFENCE OF WEST POINT, JULY, 1779

At a Board of General Officers assembled at General
[Israel] Putnam’s quarters, July 22d, 1779, agreeable to
the directions of his Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief,
communicated in his letter of the 20th instant:
910 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

Present:—Major Generals Putnam and DeKalb; Brig-
adiers: Smallwood, Muhlenberg, Gist.

Major General Putnam laid before the Board the letter
of the Commander-in-Chief requesting him to consult with
the principal officers and form a disposition for oppos-
ing the enemy in concert, as well in the first instance at
landing as during their progress towards the works in case
they should make an attempt upon them.

Whereupon, the Board after duly considering the mat-
ter, gave it as their opinion—that the troops remain in
their present positions, and that it will be expedient for
Genl. Muhlenberg to post a picket consisting of a Captain
and 20 men at Clement’s, a sub. and 20 on the road lead-
ing from the furnace to the right of Clement’s down to
Haverstraw, and a sub. and 20 on the coal road; that one
whole battalion from the same brigade should be posted
at Rose’s farm who are to keep a picket on the road lead-
ing to Doodlestown and Clement’s, and if the enemy ad-
vance in force on either of these roads, Genl. Muhlenberg
should dispute the passage as long as he may think prud-
ent and then take possession of the two roads leading from
the forest to West Point, giving them every annoyance till
he can be sustained.

The battalion at Rose’s farm, if they are obliged to
retreat, will take the path leading through the valley from
Rose’s farm to West Point, disputing the passage all the
way.

The Board are further of the opinion that there ought
to be posted from the Light Infantry a picket consisting
of 1C—2S—2S—2C—30P at Doodlestown, a picket of the
same number at Fort Montgomery, to detach 18—1C0—
30P to the stone house on the road leading to Rose’s farm
and another picket of 1S—1S—1C—20P at Stony Beach.

If the enemy should attack Genl. Muhlenberg by the
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 211

way of the Forest of Dean and attempt to force a passage
from thence to West Point with their main body, Genl.
Woodford’s brigade will hang upon the left flank and
rear, to be supported by the Maryland and Pennsylvania
troops as circumstances may require. The Light Infantry
temaining near their present position, to maintain the pass-
age of the road along the river should a column of the
enemy attempt to force their way in that quarter, but if
not, the Light Infantry will then attack their right flank
and rear in concert with the other troops; but in case the
main body should land in two columns at Doodlestown and
Stony Beach and endeavor to force their way along the
river with a view to gain the heights in the rear of and
adjacent to the fort at West Point, their passage must be
disputed by the Light Infantry and Maryland division in
front, supported by the brigades of Woodford and Muhlen-
berg, which will attack on the left flank and rear of the
enemy in their approach.

In order to frustrate the enemy’s intentions and the bet-
ter to serve the objects in view by the different corps co-
operating and keeping up a constant communication with
each other, the Board submit the expediency of drawing
out runners of actual light armed men from each corps
to convey intelligence as occasion may require, to facilitate
which the Board are also of opinion that they ought to be
exempt from all other duty and to be sent out immediately
to be made acquainted with the different routes and ways
on which they will necessarily be employed.

[From MSS. of Gen. Rufus Putnam, Marietta, Ohio.]
THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

212

[-vyavayAsuuag ‘osf1qQ souer ureydep jo srsdegq wor,7]

     
                

rl:

wees ‘op 4SIZ
IE: || oe ]ise foxes eatwninetaceneretaise ss 430y WILT
sefeedes|ecfeefeseeces coneeee reetees Kory pesoy

*‘s1ou0slig

 

“SHSOULV]
“SNOdDuOG

    

“Summa vanog

“ENAVM INDY UAACVOING AT CHANVNNWOD PNINYOR AHL NI ATOf JO AVG HLOT
HHL NO INIOG AHNOLG LV LIAVSSY GHL NI NHHV], GNV CHGNOOM GATITY FHL do NYOLaYy V

‘SASSOT SAWANG GH 40 NYOLEY NVOIANV
"eg ‘ON
213

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES.

[‘ansfrqy sourep upeyduy jo srodeg w01,q]

 

 

 

     

 

 

*AIOUIV 1B hogy |||Pe7 asses nese arsee: Satie uoysem Hoer Iyonpuog It
“‘popunom oy} Wat 4ueg |'** teees* CIO UNUIO[Og ‘wording I
*yIOX 0} 9U0S PUG OP [rreeeree eee teeee eee Aqnanyov PUNT ‘op 9
“hi “a { ‘op |e peeeeee BveNs puosis3nyt “uA ‘op q
Po ppehory [recceecestteccceetee eee ote SpdoMg P,WOrT ‘op 3
*yaOX 0} ques pue popunom [i aAllO “3g Aue ‘op g
sedis nastica ieiorent ate nisin ‘ uoylmey £100 Hf ‘op z
“usisug T lfrreee ceeeeee wut
dial, Sis baw clctontatsints wosuiqoy ‘q Holaparg
ia ii sase sent ene Treusrey “aA ‘op $I
"op ROD a. | Rees eee a ee ex810W._P.BYITY "0p el
“yIOK 0} JUGS puw popunoM [TT * SUIDIOIND HOV ‘op 21
igen 3 quesp “3q0%u ‘op I
sini ++ ggogy “Our ‘op ot
aeaee auren "WA ‘op 6
‘gaoopeuerpy [trtrtets rere creer vosugounc pAByory ‘op Q |fectereetee = 4512
“Aroqaay pedo [oc crete cree ees vopurey ‘HAL ‘op L
bawiaie ere hem ig tana tiestetualen TawudeR ‘our ‘op 9
““pooymey ‘our 4, ‘op g
sueeeenes uosdunig ‘op ;
+ oooh? SUIRITTAL OWL "TAAL ‘op g
set seeseeeest ROTBO) OBE] ‘op z
“sqnory T
fsa eeu eee Suoaqeunsry “UA
“suvoloury pesory ‘++ GosuIqoy ss, ‘op g
“AMOIV YeAO foe rere Ugh “UM “op y
ee ee eee Aqied ‘our ‘op &
wo eeee mozyARID “4q0y ‘op z ee
‘qZeqy oures “sqnoyy] Omg pur poytH | MOT “dep Eo [terete aa
wane eee uo,suyor A090] “ojo. “a1 tT
“SaLLTVASVO “SHRVN “HNVE ‘ON "3, LOU

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘ LNIOd ANOLS LY NONVL SAWVN SUAOLMIO HSLLIYA FHL £0 LSTI V

"eo "ON
214 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.
No. 54

FROM THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, AND
GENERAL ADVERTISER,
July 28th, 1779

Hark! hear the Trumpet’s pleasant Sound!
Behold yon brave young Men!

With British Ensigns half display’d
The trophies of our Wayne,

Welcome, young Heroes, from the field,
Where ye did Laurels gain;

Let ev’ry Heart exult with Joy,
And praise our gallant Wayne.

See Gibbons on the Barriers mount!
Each soldier darts a-maine—

And every Youth with Ardour burns,
To emulate our Wayne.

The British Butchers hang their Heads,
Their Shame for us sustain;

Whilst evry Heart with Freedom Fraught,
Praises the humane Wayne.

No more let Faction, Fraud, Intrigue,
Our Cause and Councils stain;

Since Envy’s Shafts no Hold can take
Of Washington and Wayne.

See Freedom’s Banners high unfurl’d,
They spread from Shore to Shore;

And Malice from her Seat is hurl’d,
She falls—to rise no more.
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 215

No. 55

WAYNE’S LIGHT INFANTRY CORPS, 1779—
PARTIAL ORGANIZATION

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANTHONY WAYNE,
CoMMANDING.

Arps-pz-Camp.
Major Benjamin Fishbourne—Major Henry Archer.

BrigaDE Magor,
Major Henry McCormick.

SURGEON,
Doctor Samuel McKenzie.

 

FIRST REGIMENT.
Colonel Christian Febiger.
First BatraLion. SECOND BATTALION.

Lieut.-Col. Fleury. Major Thomas Posey.
Two companies, Virginia. Four companies, Virginia.
Two companies, Pennsyl-

vania.
SECOND REGIMENT.
CotonEL RicHarp BUTLER.
First BattTaLion. SeconD BAtTTaLion.

Lieut.-Col. Samue] Hay. Major John Steward.
Four companies Pennsyl- Four companies, Maryland.
vania.
916 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

THIRD REGIMENT.
CoLONEL RETURN JONATHAN MEIGs.
First BAtTALion. SECOND BaTTALION.

Lieut.-Col. Isaac Sherman. Four companies, Connecticut.
Four companies, Connecti- Acting Major Henry Cham-
cut. pion.
Adjutant, Lieutenant Aaron Benjamin.
Surgeon’s Mate, Theodore Wadsworth.

FOURTH REGIMENT.

CoLonEL RuFrus Putnam.

First Batta.ion. SEconD BATTALION.
Major William Hull. Major Hardy Murfree.
Four companies, Massachu- Two companies, North Caro-
setts. lina.
' ees ve . Two companies, Massachu-
setts.

It is known that Captains Lawson, Gamble and Shelton,
of Virginia, and Captains Jordan and Ashmead, of Penn-
sylvania, belonging to the First and Second Regiments,
were in the assault. In one orderly book we find that Pri-
vate John Griffey, of the Pennsylvania battalion, was pro-
moted to a sergeantcy for “gallant behavior” at Stony
Point. Otherwise the company organizations of the Corps
cannot be found, except in the case of the Connecticut, or
Third, Regiment. As given in the official work, “Con-
necticut in the Revolution,” the subaltern officers of Meigs’
command were as follows:
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 217

CAPTAINS.
Henry Champion. Ezra Selden.
Seth Phelps. Henry Ten Eyck.
Eleazer Clanghorn. John St. John.
Theophilus Monson. Ephraim Chamberlain.
LIEUTENANTS.
Charles Miller. John Tiffany.
Edward S. Coleman. Tiffany Taylor.
Joseph Shayler. Edward Palmer.
Aaron Benjamin. Phineas Grover.
ENSIGNS.
Theophilus Woodbridge. Robert Allyn.
Ebenezer Wales. Israel (or John) Strong.
John Trowbridge. Samuel Deforest.
Salmon Hubbell. Tallmadge Hall.

Ichabod Spencer.

After the assault the Second Connecticut Battalion was
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Sumner, Sill and
Johnson, in succession.

Among the casualties in the same were Corporals Jacob
Bailey and John Rundle, and Private Eli Mix, killed; Cor-
poral David Edgar and Private Jones, wounded.

In the papers published in Dawson’s “Stony Point” are
many minor particulars respecting the corps and the event,
such as the distribution of the prize money, protests of
officers, and Wayne’s replies, &c.

Three American deserters were found in the captured
works and summarily hanged in the “flag” bastion.
218 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

No. 55.
TRYON AND THE NEW HAVEN RAID, 1779.

Judge Thomas Jones, a New York Loyalist, sharply criti-
cises Sir Henry Clinton, and in the matter of the Connec-
ticut raid exonerates Tryon. But the Judge’s sources of
information were largely hearsay and his prejudices ex-
aggerated rumors that reached him.

The Connecticut movement appears to have grated
on the Judge’s feelings so harshly that relief could only
come, as we may infer, by charging all the burning, plun-
dering and desecration committed by the British at the
towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, directly upon
Clinton and his orders. The responsibility is fixed upon
him in person, and the officers in charge of the expedition
so far relieved of all blame. There is no uncertainty as
to the author’s meaning and intent on this point.

“From the well-known humanity, charity and generosity
of General Tryon,” he writes (Vol. I., p. 315), “no man
in his perfect senses can ever imagine that the troops
under his command were, with his consent, suffered to
plunder peaceable inhabitants, towns to be burnt, holy
buildings destroyed, and thousands of innocent inhabitants
of both sexes, of all ages, and the greater part loyalists, to
be divested of all the comforts of life and turned into the
open fields, no habitations to protect them, exposed to
the inclemency of the weather, and covered by the canopy
of heaven only. General Tryon’s humanity was such that
nothing but express orders could have induced him to act
a part so inconsistent with his well-known and established
principles. Clinton was at this time Commander-in Chief.”

It happens, however, that the unfavorable impression
of Clinton which the Judge seeks to perpetuate in this
extract, is entirely dispelled by Tryon’s own pen. Thus
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 219

to Lord Germaine he wrote July 28, 1779: “The honor of
your Lord’s duplicate dispatch on the 5th May, No. 21,
afforded me the greatest satisfaction in the King’s appro-
bation of my conduct on the Alert to Horse Neck. It will
be an additional comfort to me if my late expedition on
the Coast of Connecticut meets the same royal testimony.”
As if to emphasize his own approval of the affair, he adds:
“My opinion remains unchangeable respecting the utility
of depradatory excursions. I think Rebellion must soon
totter if those excursions are reiterated and made to ex-
tremity.”

Tryon in due time had the happiness to receive a favor-
able reply from the home government, and in returning his
acknowledgments to Germaine, wrote Feb. 26, 1780: “I
am honored with your Lordship’s Dispatches of the 4th
Nov. and circular letter of the 4th Dec. and derive great
comfort from His Majesty’s gracious approbation of my
conduct, and the officers under my command on the Con-
necticut Expedition last summer.”

These few expressions on the part of the leader of the
raid sufficiently answer Judge Jones as to the former’s
conduct and responsibility. The last official reference
which Tryon seems to have made to the subject appears
in the following note he sent to Governor Trumbull just
before his departure for England: ;

“New York, 19th April, 1780.

“Sir, I take the opportunity by a Prisoner on Parole to
send you a few of the Publications of this City, particularly
the benevolent Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief
and my Successor Governor Robertson, which when laid
before your Council and Published in your Papers, may
pave the way for a happy Reconciliation.

“As General Robertson has succeeded me both in my civil
and military command, I shall probably not visit your coast
290 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

any more, but return to England the first favorable occa-
sion to repair a Constitution much impaired in the service
of my King and Country.

“With my hearty wishes that the hour may be near at
hand when the Prodigal children shall return to the In-
dulgent Parent,

“Your Most Obedt. Servant,
“WM. TRYON.”

{From ‘Observations on Judge Jones’ Loyalist History of th
Revolution.” By Henry P. Johnston, New York, 1880.]

No. 56

THE ATTEMPT ON VERPLANCK’S POINT—COLONEL
RUFUS PUTNAM’S ACCOUNT

“Colonel Putnam has permission to take as many men
as he chooses of his own regiment, or any other, for special
service and to pass all guards.

G. WASHINGTON,

“July 9th, 1779.”

The service here intended was to examine the enemy’s
works on Verplanck’s point. I set out. from Constitution
Island opposite West Point, in the afternoon of the 10th
with fifty men and reached Continental Village about sun-
set, and after dark I proceeded by a back road to a point
where I concealed my party in the woods, intending the
next morning to examine the works; but soon after we halt-
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 991

ed a very heavy rain set in which continued all night and
all the next day. The morning after, we concealed our-
selves in a barn; the next morning, July 12th, was fair,
but our arms and ammunition were so wet that they were
entirely useless. I retired to a deserted house, where
we built fires, broke up our cartridges, dried what powder
was not wholly destroyed and cleaned our arms, many of
which we were obliged to unbreech. We were in this dis-
armed and defenceless state from early in the morning until
the middle of the afternoon. Apprehensive that the enemy
might have got knowledge from some of the inhabitants,
who probably must have seen us, I marched the party di-
rectly along the great road (in sight of the enemy’s block-
house) towards Peekskill and when at a convenient place
I turned into the woods again, where I concealed the party
until toward morning, when I took them on to the ground
near to where I posted myself to take observations; which
having completed I returned July 13, to camp.

July 14th. I went to New Windsor and made my re-
port to General Washington. Marshall, in his “Life of
Washington,” tells us that two brigades under the com-
mand of Genl. McDougall had been ordered to approach
the enemy on the east side of the river. This order to
McDougall, if ever given, I presume was given on the morn-
ing of the 15th, for the following reasons. When I waited
on General Washington on the 14th, he informed me that
he had relinquished the idea of a real attack on Verplanck’s
point at the same time it was to be made on Stony Point,
but intended the attack on that point should be only a
feint; and for that purpose he had ordered Nixon’s brig-
ade to march that day to Continental Village. He then
instructed me to take as many men from that brigade as
I thought proper, and make my arrangements to be on
the ground ready to fire on the enemy at Verplanck’s point
9299 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT. :

 

 

 

 

 

SkETCH oF Stony Pornt, By CoLonEL RuFus
Pournam, 1779.

REFERENCES.

J.—The Capital work on the highest part of the point command-
ing the out-fleches, which is conformed tothe broken emi-
nence it is built on.

2,2,2.—Fleches built on so many little eminences.

8.—Each of these small characters represent a [tent] in the prin-
ciple encampment—numbers uncertain being covered by
the works and the declivity of the hill.

+t.—Two rows of abbattis across the point, from water to water.

A,—Ferry Stairs.

—Bridge and Causeway on the left to main land.
(Original in Library, Cornell University.]
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 293

 

 

 

 

 

SKETCH OF VERPLANCK’s Point, By CoLONEL Rurus Putnam,
Juuy, 1779.

 

REFERENCES.
1.—Fort De La Fayette, with Blockhouse and Barbet Battery.
2.—American Barbett.
8, 3.—Two new barbettes [built] by the Britons.
t.—Abbattis.
4.—British Tents, about one regiment.
5.—Board Hutts in form of tents.

6.—Ferry stairs.

[From original draft in Library, Cornell University. ]
994 THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

the moment I found Wayne had attacked Stony Point.
At the same time the General informed me that as no
one knew of the intended attack but those who had the
charge of its execution, that but one of his own family
was let into the secret.

I had not the least doubt that the brigade had marched
that afternoon, but when I returned to the camp (after
sunset) I found them still there. On inquiring the reason
why they had not marched Nixon told me he had obtained
leave from Genl. McDougall to delay his mareh, and on
enquiring what time he would march in the morning, he
informed me he should send on a guard of fifty men ac-
cording to his engagement to Genl. McDougall. I was ex-
ceedingly perplexed to know how to act; on the whole I told
him I was charged with executing a special service and
requested him to increase the detachment to one hundred
men under the command of a field officer, and that they
should march very early in the morning to Continental
Village.

July 15th. General Washington came down early to
West Point and Colonel Tilghman [aide to Washington]
came to the Island to enquire why Nixon’s brigade had
not marched the day before. I gave him an account of
what I had done and soon set out after the detachment,
which had marched under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Smith. I remained at the Village until night and then
made such arrangements as I thought proper to fulfill the
intention of the General. As soon as I saw that Wayne
had commenced his attack on Stony Point we fired on their
out block house and guard at the creek and thus alarmed
the garrison on Verplanck’s point, which was the only ob-
ject contemplated for that night.

July 16th. I remained this morning in full view of
the enemy until eight or nine o’clock when I marched
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. 995

up to Continental Village, where in the course of the day
Nixon’s and Patterson’s brigades arrived, but without their
field pieces, artillery men, or so much as an ax or spade,
or any orders what they were to do. About ten o’clock
at night General Howe arrived to take the command; he
called on me for information; I told him the troops had
brought no artillery with them, which in my opinion was
necessary on account of a block house which stood in the
way of our approach to the main work on the point, nor
had they brought any axes or entrenching tools, and that
it was impossible to cross the creek without rebuilding the
bridge, which had been destroyed.

July 17th. Sometime about the middle of the day two
twelve pounders arrived, and a few axes were collected, I
believe from the inhabitants and a bridge was begun or
proposed to be begun. I cannot say how far the prepara-
tions had advanced hefore we were alarmed by the advance
of a British party by the way of the Croton, on which we
retreated.

[From Colonel Putnam’s MSS. papers in possession of Marietta
College, Marietta, Ohio. ]
INDEX.

Allyn, Ensign R., of Meigs’ Regt., at
Stony Point, 217.

American Revolution, importance of
the year 1779, 11, 106.

ee troops, etc. See Continen-

al, }

André, Maj., receives surrender of
Verplanck’s Point, 117.

Archer, Maj., aid to Wayne, 85, 215;
bears despatches to Congress, 85,
100; praised, 163.

“ Armed Neutrality ” and England, 11.

Armstrong, Capt. T., surrenders Ver-
planck’s Point, 46, 117.

Armstrong, Lieut. W., paroled pris-
oner, British, 129, 213. -

Army. See British and Continental.

Ashmead, Capt., at Stony Point, 216.

Auchmuty, Surgeon, prisoner, 130,

”

Bailey, Corporal J., Meigs’ Regt.,
killed at Stony Point, 217.

Baker, Sergeant, in forlorn hope,
wounded, 82.

Barr, Capt., Mass., Knox’s artillery,
at Stony Point, 72.

Benjamin, Lieut. A., adjutant Meigs’
Regt., at Stony Point, 216, 217.

Benson, Maj., British, narrowly es-
capes at Stony Point, 85; takes the

F news to Clinton, 91.

British army, as stationed at New
York, 1779, 146-47; effectives, 29, 33;
losses, 87, 93, 96; returns of casual-
ties, names of officers prisoners,
129, 212, 213. See Light Infantry.

Burgoyne, Gen., mentioned, 31, 45.

Burke, Edmund, scathing reference
to peace commission, 22.

Butler, Col. R., of Penn., at Stony
Point, 70; commands left column,
81; reconnoitres enemy’s position,

s

Campbell, Capt., British, wounded,

Garey, Lieut., British, prisoner, 129,

Carlisle, Lord, peace commissioner,

Chamberlain, Capt. B., at Stony
Point, 217.

Champion, Capt. H., at Stony Point,
70, 217.

 

Chatham, Earl of, and policy of con-
ones 18; attitude toward France,

Chrystie, Capt. J., Penn., at Stony
Point, 74; Wayne's orders to, 161.

Cieenern, Capt. E., at Stony Point,

Clayton, Capt., prisoner, 218.

Clinton Fort, 45. See map of the re-

ion.

Clinton, Gov. Geo., N. Y., alert, 47;
calls out militia and issues impress
warrants, 48; takes the field. 49;
complimented by Jay, 50; corre-
spondence with McDougall, 146,
149-153,

Clinton, Sir Henry, British com-
mander-in-chief, 20, 21; Germaine’s
instructions to, 27; reply, with com-
ments on Washington’s position,
30-81; compares his task with
Howe’s, 31; proposed ne of,
48, 44, 50, 52; seizes King’s Ferry,
44-46; retires to N. Y., 54; disap-
pone about reinforcements, 55;

is Connecticut diversion, 55; re-
turns to recover Stony Point, 91;
feels the blow, 93; gives up main
plan, 98-95; report on operations,
109; on loss of Stony Point, 123; let-
ter complaining of neglect, 122: to
Haldimand, giving plans for the
year, 140-144; begs to resign in favor
of Cornwallis, 140.

Coleman, Lieut. E. S., Meigs’ Regt.,
at Stony Point, 217.

Collier,Commodore Geo.,Britishnavy,
takes part in seizure of King’s
Ferry, 4, 46,110; returns to N. Y.,
54; letter reporting operations, 111;
journal of on Wayne's capture of

tony Point, 133.

Connecticut troops at assault on
Stony Point, 70, 216-17; officer of
describes the capture, 176.

Connecticut raid, Eiinton’s object in
ordering it, 55,56; Tryon conducts
it, 67, 218.

Continental army, why weak, 38, 39;
effectives in 1779, 40, 59; winter
quarters at Middlebrook, etc., 41;
marches to Smith’s Clove, 47;
around West Point, 58, 59; fine dis-
cipline in later years, 101,194. See
Light Infantry.

Continental village; see position east
of the Hudson on map of the region.

Cordoba, Don Louis de, codperates
with French fleet in English Chan-
nel, 98; fails, 98.

227
228

Cornwallis, Clinton desires to resign
in favor of, 139.
Cumming, Lieut., prisoner, 129, 213.

Darby, eg, prisoner, 213.

Dawson, . B., “Assault on Stony
Point,” 5, 217.

Deforest, Ensign S., at Stony Point,
217.

De Kalb, Gen., commands Maryland
division, 58, 210.
Donlop, Sergeant,
wounded, 82.

D’Orvilliers, admiral of French fleet,
fails, 98.

Doodletown, N. Y.. 73, 210-11. See
map of the region.

Duncanson, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

forlorn hope,

Easton, Pa., stores at, and enemy's
designs, 44, 53.
Easton, J., prisoner, 213.
Eden, Wm., peace commissioner, 19;
letter on British failures, 107.
Edgar, D., wounded at Stony Point,
7

England, alone in 1779, 11; policy in
1775, 13; and the French alliance,
12-16; Spain hostile, 98.

Enslow, conductor, prisoner, 129.

Erskine, T., Washington’s topog-
rapher, 6. See map of region.

Febiger, Col. C., at Stony Point, 69,
83; criticises Wayne’s report, 182;
letter to his wife on the victory,
186; to Jefferson, 188; to Col. Heth,
189; 215.

Fishbourne, Major, aide to Wayne,
85, 215; conduct praised, 163.

Fleury, Lieut.-Col., at Stony Point,
es ae man in the works, 82: medal

0, 88.

Forest of Dean, 47,211. See map of
the region.

France, Am. treat

with, and effect
on England, 12;

pain joins, 98.

Canis, Capt., Va., at Stony Point,

Gates, Gen., at Providence, 41; Wash-
ington to,

George III., King, sense of public
duty, 15: plan of operations, 18; on
Stony Point, 95; on the outlook, 98;
to Lord North on the war, 105.

Gerard, French ambassador,on Stony
Point, 196.

 

INDEX.

Germaine, Lord, outlines campaign
to Clinton, 27; ‘latter's reply, 31.

Sunpees historian, on peace project,
1

Gibbon, Lieut., leads forlorn hope, 78,
82; promoted, 88; letter on the as-
sault, 197.

wa Gen., Md., with board of officers,

10.

Glover, Gen., marches to West Point,

Grant, Lieut., prisoner, 213.
Greene, Gen., account of the assault,

Griffey, John, promoted sergeant for
Leslie 8 at Stony Point, 216.
Grover, Lieut. P., at Stony Point, 217.

Haldimand, Gen., Clinton to, on the
campaign, 43, 141.

Hall, Ensign T., wounded, 81, 217.

Hamilton, Alex., at Stony Point after
capture, 91.

Hamilton, Ensign H., prisoner, 218.

Hardy, Admiral Chas., British, pro-
tects Channel coast, 98.

Harndon, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

Hay, Lieut.-Col., at Stony Point, 70,
215; wounded, 81.

Hayman, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

Heath, Gen., commands left wing, 59;
watches Clinton, 90; letter on the
assault, 194,

Horn, Surgeon, prisoner, 121, 213.

Howe Gen. R., 59; at Verplanks, 90,

Howe, Sir Wm., Clinton on his cam-
paigns, 31.
Hubbell Ensign S., at Stony Point,

217.
Buster Highlands, importance of,

Huy reford, Lieut., prisoner, 130.
Hull, Maj. Wm., at Stony Point, 70,
83, 184, 216; account of assault, 189.

J ay, John, compliments Gov. Clinton,

Jefferson, Thos., Febiger to on Stony
Point, 188.

Johnson, Lt.-Col. H., commands Brit-
ish garrison at Stony Point, 65, 81;
surrenders to Febiger, 83; ex-
changed, 93; explanation of defeat,
127, 135; court of inquiry, 144.

Johnson, Lt.-Col. O., Conn., 217.

Johnstone, Gov., British peace com-
missioner, 19.

Jones, Private, Conn., wounded ‘at

5 Prony Cou ae ‘
ordan, Capt., +, at Stony Point.
184, 198, 216. 2 ;
INDEX.

Kemble, Adj.-Gen., on loss of Stony
Point, 92, 126.

King’s Bridge, N. Y., enemy advance
from, 45.

King’s Ferry, seized by enemy, 44-46;
importance, 51, 114.

Knox Lieut., Penn., leads forlorn
hope, 78, 81; promoted, 88.

Lafayette, Ft., at Verplancks, cap-
tured, 46.

Laneuville, Maj. N. de, at Stony
Point, 82.

Lawson, Capt., Va., at Stony Point,
184, 216.

Lee, Maj. Harry, patrols near Stony
Point, 62;_ praised by Wayne, 163;
surprises Paulus Hook, 101.

Light Infantry, organized, 67-8; ser-
vice, 72, 738, 101; Wayne’s corps, 215.

McClare, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

McCormick, Maj. H.,  brig.-maj.
Wayne's corps, 215.

McDougall, Gen., on the Hudson, 41,
47; reports to Gov. Clinton, 48; com-
mands center at West Point, 59;
cela strength of the enemy,
146-7; letters to Clinton, 149-153;
examination of a deserter, 151.

Richenzls, Surgeon, Wayne’s corps,

McLane, Capt. Allen, reconnoitres
Stony Point, 62, 74; journal of, 199.

Malcolm, Col. Wm., letter to, 153.

Mamaroneck, N. Y., British army at,

Marshall, Lieut., prisoner, 213.
Maryland, troops at Stony Point, 215.
TEs a wehunetiey troops at Stony Point,

Matthews, Gen., 42, 45.

Mawhood, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

Maxwell, Gen., with Light corps in
1777, 69.

Meigs, Col. R. J., at Stony Point, 70,
83, 184, 215; regt. under, 216-17.

Middlebrook, N. J., Am. winter quar-
ters at, 41. See New Jersey.

Miller, Lieut. C., 217.

Mix, Eli, killed at Stony Point, 217.

Montgomery, Ft., on Hudson, 45;
Wayne’s camp near ruins of, 72, 73.
See map of region.

Muhlenberg, Gen., Va., as a reserve to
Wayne, 164, 185; with board of offi-

cers, 210.
Munson, Capt. T.,at Stony Point, 217.
Murfree, Maj. H., North Carolina, at

Stony Point, 70, 78, 81, 216.

Nairn, Lieut., British, prisoner, 129.
New Hampshire, troops in Sullivan’s
expedition, 71; letter to gov. of, 180.

 

229

New Jersey, troops in Sullivan’s ex-
pedition, 71; Clinton’s proposed
operations in, 44, 53, 54.

New York Historical Society, Er-
skine’s MSS. maps, 6.

New York State, purchases Stony
Point battle-ground, 6; troops in
Sullivan’s expedition, 71; militia
called out, see Geo. Clinton, Gen.
McDougall; N. Y. Journal account
of victory, 201.

New Windsor, N. Y., Washington's
headquarters at, 59.

Nixon, Gen., Mass., and Verplanck’s,

North Carolina, troops at Stony Point,

North, Lord, 14; peace program, 16;
the king to, 105.

Palmer, Lieut. E., wounded at Stony
Point, 80, 217.

Paterson, Gen. John, Mass., garrison
commander, West Point, 41; ordered
to Verplanck’s, 89, 225.

Pattison, Gen., British, letters from
on seizure and storming of Stony
Point, 113, 130; 110. ‘

Peace Commission, 1778, appointed,
19; mission hopeless, 21; denounced
by Burke, 23. :

SERaIStOn, Capt., Va., at Stony Point,

Pennsylvania “Gazette,” ode to the
victory, 214. |
Pees troops at Stony Point,

5,

Phelps, Capt. S., wounded, 80; 217.

Posey, Maj. T., at Stony Point, 69, 82,
183, 185, 189, 215. ;

Putnam, Gen. Israel, commands right
wing, 58; board of officers, 209.

Putnam, Col. R., in Light corps, 70,
216; plans of Stony and Verplanck’s
Points, 62, 222, 223; account of at-
tack on latter, 220.

Queensboro district, Wayne marches
through to Stony Point, 73. See
map of the region.

Rhode Island, troops in Sullivan’s ex-
pedition, 71. : |
Roberts, Lieut., escapes by swimming,

Robertson, Gov , succeeds Tryon, 219.
Robinson, Capt. Wm., prisoner, 203,

213.
Robinson, Lieut., prisoner, 203, 213.
Ross, Lieut., prisoner, 213.
230

Rudolf, Capt., Lee’s Legion, marches
off the prisoners, 200.
Rundle, J., killed at Stony Point, 216.

St. Clair, Gen., commands Penn. divi-
sion, 58.

St. John Capt. J., at Stony Point, 217.

poeoes l, Adj.-Gen., on the assault,

Scott, Gen., of Va., 69.

Selden, Capt. E., wounded at. Stony
Point, 80, 204; 217.

Shaw, Capt. S., on the assault, 178.

Shayler, Lieut. J., at Stony Point, 217.

Shelton, Capt., at Stony Point, 82,

Sherman, Lt.-Col. I., in the assault,
Sill, Lt.-Col., on the assault, 204.
Simpson, Lieut., prisoner, 129, 213.
Sinclair, Lieut., prisoner, 129.
Smallwood, Gen., board of officers,

Smith's Clove, Am. army at, 47.
aia EB; Judge Wm., on the situation,

Spain, enters the contest, 987; navy
fails, 97, 98.
Bpen cers Ensign I., at Stony Point,

Spencer, Sergeant, forlorn hope,
wounded, 82.
Springsteel’s, Wayne’s column at, 74,

, 1B.

Stedman, British historian, on loss of
Stony Point, 187.

Sterling, Gen., commands Virginia
division, 58.

Steuben, Baron, on the situation, 59,
207; on the bayonet, 76.

Steward, Maj. Jack, at the assault,
70; medal to, 88; 215.

Stiles, Pres. Yale College, sketch of
Stony Point, 5, 97.

Stille, Prof. C. J., “‘ Life of Wayne,” 5.

anes Gen., British, at Stony Point,

Stary. oint, purchased by state of

N. Y., 6; enemy capture, 44, 46, 54;
Washington decides to recapture,
62; description of, 63; enemy fortify,
64; their ‘little Gibraltar,” 65, 91,
92; Washington and Wayne plan
night attack on, 65-67; march to,
78-75; assault on, 79-82; victor:
won, 84; abandoned by Ams., 91,
167; retaken by British, 91; losses
at, 87, 128, 206, 212-13; results of vic-
tory, 96; attack described by offi-
cers, 131, 1384, 176, 182; draft of by
Col. Putnam, 222. See Clinton,
Washington, Wayne, and Preface,

Storm’s house, 74.

Strong, Ensign, at Stony Point, 217.

Sullivan, Gen., expedition against
Indians, 40.

 

INDEX.

Swords, Ensign R., British, prisoner,
129, 213,

Taylor, Lieut. T., at Stony Point, 217.
Tellar’s Point, enemy land at, 45.
te Eyck, Capt. H., at Stony Point,

Tew, Capt., British, killed at Stony
Point, 83. 7

Tiffany, Lieut. J., at Stony Point, 217.

Tiffin, Capt., prisoner, 129, 213.

Tilghman, Lt.-Col. T., aide to Wash-
ington, 91, 224.

Trowbridge, Ensign J., at Stony
Point, 217. Z

Trumbull, Gov., Conn., on the victory,

100.
Tryon, Gen., Connecticut raid, 56, 57,

Tuxedo Lake, Am. army marches by,

Valentine’s Hill, 45.

Valley Forge, 41.

Vaughan, Gen., leads enemy’s ad-
vance, 45, 46, 47, 110.

Verplanck’s Point, enemy attack, 44,
45; captured, 46, 49; Washington
proposes to recapture, 62; failure
explained, 89; Col. Putnam’s ac-
count of, 220; draft of, 223.

Virginia, enemy's expedition to, 42;
troops at Stony Point, 215.

Wadsworth,T., Surgeon, Meigs’ Regt.,
at Stony Point, 2i6. ;
Washington, Gen., 3, 5, 6, 27: active
campaign against proposed, 28, 30
81, 82, 43; compared with William of
Orange and Cromwell, 34; his great
qualities, 35; deplores the general
lethargy, 36-8; his army (see Conti-
nental army) on the Highland
pore, 42; enemy's strategy, 44-46;
reaks up winter quarters, 47; in
“Smith’s Clove,” 47; view of the
situation, 51-54; the Connecticut
raid, 56; master of the field, 58;
headquarters at New Windsor, 59;
pros to attack Stony Point, 62,
5; at the Point, 63, n, 88; plan of
assault, 65-67; appoints Wayne to
the Light corps, 71; announces vic-
tory, 85; on failure at Verplanck’s,
89; Clinton outgeneralled by, 96;
suggests second attempt on Stony
Point, 100; letters to Congress on
enemy’s movements, 148; to Wayne
with instructions, 155; full report of
victory, 165; to Dr. Gordon, 171; to
Gate ates, 172; to Benj. Harrison,
INDEX. 931

Wayne, Gen., 3, 5; appointed to com- webster, Col., British, ably defends

mand Light Infantry, 715 recon- Verplanck’s, 124, 137.

noitres Stony Point, 63; ‘Washing- West Point, key to the situation, 41;
ton’s instructions to, 65-67; Wayne 8 44; 52; army stationed around, 58;
changes in the plan, 67, 81;_his force, Gen. Paterson, garrison comman-
72, marches on Stony Point, 733 der, 41; ‘MeDougall at, 595 strongly
makes final dispositions, 76; his Ger) cd, 60; not Clinton’s objects ©
will, 75; leads right column, 78; 60; Steuben on, 59, 207; plans for
wounded, 80; announces victory, 85; defence of, 209.

thanks from “Washington, 86; Con- Williams, Lieut., prisoner, 213.

gress votes him @ gold medal, 88; Woodbridge, Ensign J. at Stooy
movements after Stony Point, 100; Point, 217.

order of battle, 158; full report Woodford, Gen., Va. Brigade near
of assault, 161; com osition of ‘West Point, 211.

‘Wayne's Corps, 67, (215; his camp Woodhull, Col. Jesse, to Col. Malcolm
near Ft, Montgomery, 5° map of on activity of the enemy at King’s

region. Ferry, 153.
oe cee
es ere
oe Fea eee
ieee ee ieee