US D 214.9/6:15-3 -~----~--------------~---------' FMFRP 15-3 lit A:Concept of Commllnd and Control L.',J •.,,.; '· ~·. \f l~ !._) f.-f !,wh,:.. [ .i \l ;; ~ rJ·\-.1 ~·-••:·r:R.St·--ry AT t3L)FF:~~-~(_) NOV 2 9 19~J4 PeN t4o t'so3oo oo I i I : i' I ~~ I \ • < :~:_[ J~ .r DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters, United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 3 August 1994 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 15-3, A Concept ofCommand and Control, is published to disseminate a significant contribution to the development of command and control doctrine. FMFRPs in the 15 series are a special category of publications: operational and tactical thoughts that, while not approved Marine Corps concepts or doctrine, add significantly to the study of the subject and have the potential to become part of emerging concepts and doctrine. This publication is being disseminated to generate discussion which, along with this concept, will form the foundation for the development of FMFM 1-4, Command Dominance, the capstone command and control doctrinal manual. 2. SCOPE This reference publication was written by Major John F. Schmitt, USMCR, under the supervision of Major General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, C41, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. It presents a theory of command in maneuver warfare as practiced by the Marine Corps. It also offers a conceptual framework for the development and exercise of effective command in all operational settings across the full spectrum of conflict. 3. READERS' RECOMMENDATIONS Comments and suggestions concerning this publication are welcome. Address recommendations to- Commanding General Doctrine Division (C 42) Marine Corps Combat Development Command 2042 Broadway Street Suite 210 Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021 4. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS C. E. WILHELM Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: 140 150300 00 C:ommand and Control CONTENTS Foreword Operation VERBALIMAGE 1 Section I. The NatureofCommand &Control 14 Section 2~ Command & ControlTheory 23 Section 3. CreatingEffectiveCommand.&Control 41 EndNotes 53 The following story is intended to illustrate certain of the concepts and capabilities described in the command and control concept. It is a work of fiction, and any similarities to persons living or dead is purely coincidental. OPERATION VERBAL IMAGE Scene: A troubled comer of the globe, sometime in the near future. The Marine Expeditionary Force makes preparations for an upcoming offensive. 2248 Monday: Maj. John Gustafson had taken over as the regimental intelligence officer just in time for Operation VERBAL IMAGE. Who thinks up the names for these operations anyway? he wondered. This would be his first command briefing and he wanted to make a good impression. The colonel baa a reputation for being a tough, no-nonsense boss-and the best regimental commander in the division. Gustafson would be thorough and by-the-numbers. He would have all the pertinent reports on hand, pages of printouts containing any piece of data the regimental commander could possibly want. He went over his briefing in his mind as he walked with his stack of reports through the driving rain to the command tent. The colonel arrived, just back from the front and soaking wet, and said, "All right, let's get started. S-2, you're up." Gustafson cleared his throat and began. He had barely gotten through the expected precipitation when the colonel held up his hand as a signal to stop. Gustafson noticed the other staff officers smiling knowingly. "Listen, S-2," the colonel said, "I don't care about how many inches of rainfall to expect. I don't care about the percentage of lunar illumination. I don't want lots of facts and figures. Number one, I don't have time, and number two, they don't do me any good. What I need is to know what it all means. Can the Cobras fly in this stuff or not? Will my tanks get bogged down in this mud? Don't read me lists of enemy spottings; tell me what the enemy's up to. Get inside his head. You don't have to impress me with how much data you can collect; I know you're· a smart guy, S-2. But I don't deal in data; I deal in pictures. Paint me a picture, got it?" "Don't worry about it, major," the regimental executive officer had said later, putting a hand on Gustafson's shoulder. "We've all been through it." 0615 Tuesday: The operation was getting underway. In his battalion command post LtCol. Dan Hewson observed with satisfaction as his units moved out toward their appointed objectives. He watched the progress on the computer screen before him. On the 19-inch screen was depicted a color map of the battalion zone of action. The map was covered with luminous-green unit symbols, each representing a rifle platoon or smaller unit. If a unit was stationary the symbol remained illuminated; when the unit moved, the symbol flashed momentarily. !Hewson ·clicked ron ;a [Unit 'Sy,m'bol·with ;the computer mouse, and !the unit ;destgnator :and !latest:strength 1r~p01trcame tqp ron 1the :screen. /A jplatoon from Mpha \C0mpany,; 1they .'shmild 1be m0ving i~y now. ··~GetrQn rthe ho0k ;and !find ·:oul What A'lpha'.'s ;piK)lJlem iis;" lPlewson lbaiked. '"illell;them .to igetmoviqg.'" '~ithIli~pid'ease ihe ",zoomed" ·down in ·sc-ale 1fr0m ll::ll!QO{@O@ lo 11::25;000 rand .centered tthe on''1ttthey 1teac'h rter,riain rqpprceciation ,anymore nt iTrhe !Basic .'School? ·~GetJBrav.o (on tthe lline," ;he lbaiked. "ilielltthem )1 \Want :second1plat00n rto :tum ;rftg'ht ;and lhead n0rtheast 1up ithat 1draw.. Now. And rtell rthem ;first jplatoon ineeds ItO lffiOYe tqp ;about:2.00:yards; !th~y"'1re OUt cc;ff ;al~gnment."' :Satisfied 'that(evetyfhiQg was 1underrcontrdl iin iBra¥o'';s iZ0ne, ffilewson .'Scm'lled ·.over \fo tdhedk (On amn. iA'IJRS, (Qonnms utton was rcued. !But llike ;all ~them0re (experienced lMarnnes fhe iinsisted c0n ccalling tthe 1new tequ·~pment:~y;the told name. ·"~p1that (draw:"1Connors 1r~peated, getting ~anyibetter ." iln Ifact, iit was 1getting rconsiderably 'WOrse, C~pt. .!Jim Knutsen 1decided;as !he JpilO'ted the ibu:ffeting ,attack:'helicqpter. /A:squall·was 1mov:ing lback iin. \Geo at 500 feet, visibility (dow:n rinside a mile :and ·worsening. 'Tm glad !I'm :not those ~pooribastards;'' \Coble :said, iindica~g;a:mechanized ;column ;on ;the :muddy :trail ibelow tthem ito 'Starboard. '"Y(ou [gOtthat;iight:" \Knutsen 'Said, IDOt 1paying iffiUCh ;attention. l.U:ntil (Coble (cursed :sharply.. '"11hose ;aren''!t rours:" rCoble ~said. "Tiake ;a ilodk, ;skipper. lBMP.s, T.i8Bs:" \Coble was ~dead'right. Wlhat tthey \Were Jloo~gat was :an!enemy;mechariized 'CO'lumn, Knutsen ,;guessed, cof ;at ileast tbattalion .·strength. lPrdba:bly ;more. !Knutsen ibariked tthe cCobra away .'sharp~y110 ;avoid rdetection, ;and lhis 'W'iqgman lft!illowed. 'Whaf'S 1wrong 1w'iih ihis;pictur..e.? 1Knutsen :said ;tolhimself. ·lihe JID.ission ibriie'fmg lhad ·said 1nothing :aboutrenemy mechariized !forces ;~}'Where1near ~this •\licinicy. 'if:he ·enemy :had :apparently e'fore iit 1reac'hed ~the turiits ;at tthe Iront-:arrd ithat was 1pmv.ided :theyreven 'believed rsuch 1..__..1C : >IAdjacent I Requests Requirements Orders/guidance issued Coordination Coordination ~~bordinate "~ Fig. 5. Schematic showing modes of execution information flow. 35 TOP ECHELON ~~ INTERMEDIATE '::"~::::t'ill!l! ~1jr{il i{ti{t1jr 1jri{t1jr ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ BOTTOM ECHELON II ;::i~::::· Fig. 6. Schematic illustrating examples of different modes of image-building information flow. 36 standardized report, and the standard operation order. The pipeline is often used to transmit large amounts of generic information which is gathered or available on a routine basis. Pipeline information usually arrives on a scheduled basis or as it becomes available, and so is generally timely. However, being of a general nature, pipeline information is not tailored to the specific conditions of the situation and may or may not even be relevant. Moreover, critical information may get lost in a mass of routine data. The alarm is another one-way transmission of information, but it has no set format or schedule. Rather than operating routinely like the pipeline, the alarm mode works only by exception. If developing events are consistent with the commander's image, the alarm remains inactive. The alarm triggers only when some unexpected information threatens to violate the commander's image-information about some event which would likely upset the plan, for example. When an alarm-triggering event occurs, the gatherer communicates the information to the appropriate commander by the most direct means available, even if it means "jumping" intermediate echelons of command. Alarm information most defmitely does not follow the pipeline path, where it could get lost among more routine information. A commander may explicitly identify certain alarm triggers--contingencies which he anticipates could disrupt his plan. Or alarm triggers may be implicit, based on mutual understanding. In any event, successful alarm information flow requires that subordinates share the commander's image and recognize image-violating events. By contrast, a pure demand-pull system does not rely on the ability to anticipate information needs; it is inactive until a demand is made on it. In a pure demand-pull system, the user (i.e., the commander or his stafO generates all information requirements. Such systems are said to be demand-driven: the flow of information is triggered by the demand for that information. Typically, the demand triggers a "ctemand-cascade,"9 as the requirement filters down the chain of command until it reaches the appropriate level for gathering. 1bis takes time and can be a burden to lower echelons. The alternative to the "demandcascade" is for the commander to keep dedicated gathering assets which answer directly to him, such as the directed telescopes already mentioned. Demand-pull can ensure the optimal allocation of scarce resources to those tasks which the commander has identified as critical; it can deliver information specifically tailored to the commander's information needs; and it will produce only that information which the commander requests. These characteristics can be both strengths and weaknesses of a demand-pull system. They can be strengths because information ·flow is tailored specifically to identified requirements. However, they can also be weaknesses because there will often be information requirements that the commander has not identified-such as the alarm mode discussed earlier-and in a pure demand-pull system those requirements will go unsatisfied. One definite disadvan!age of demand-pull is the cost in time, since the search fpr information does not begin until the commander has already identified the need for that information. In the time between the demand for information and the delivery of the information, the information may have become obsolete. Finally, a commander in a pure demand-pull system will fmd himself without access to any information in the event of a communications failure, while a commander in a pure supply-push system can fall back on the most recent information delivered before the failure. 37 In practice, the different modes of information are far from incompatible; in fact, they can effectively complement one another in the same command and control system. DECISION-MAKING THEORY Decision making is central to command and control. A principal aim of command and control is to enhance the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Several general principles apply. First, since war is a clash between opposing wills, we must realize that we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. We must take our enemy into account, recognizing that while we are trying to impose our will on him, he is trying to do the same to us. Second, whoever can make and implement his decisions faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decision making is thus a time-competitive activity. Third, a military decision is not merely a mathematical computation. Decision making requires the intuitive and analytical ability to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. This ability is the product of experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception and character. Fourth, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem; we should not agonize over one. We should adopt a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk, and do it more quickly than our foe.w As Gen. George Patton said: "A good plan violently executed Now is better than a perfect plan next week." And fmally, in general, the lower the echelon of command, the faster and more direct is the decision process. A smallunit leader's decisions are based on factors that he usually observes firsthand. At successively higher echelons of command, the commander is further removed from events by time and distance. As a consequence, the lower we can push the decision-making threshold, the faster will be our decision cycle.ll As we might expect, the defining features of the command and control problem, uncertainty and time, exert a significant influence on decision making. As knowledge about a situation increases, our ability to make an effective decision also increases. Since knowledge is based on information, as information increases (provided it is relevant and accurate) the effectiveness of the decision should also increase. At some point in the process, however, when basic knowledge has been satisfied and the effort focuses on details, we reach a point of diminishing returns-when the potential effectiveness of the decision does not increase in proportioQ to the information gained or the time and effort needed to gain it. Meanwhile, as the amount of information increases to a point, knowledge increases and the time needed to make an effective decision decreases. Beyond that point, however, additional information has the opposite effect; it only serves to cloud the situation, impeding understanding and causing the commander to require longer to reach the same decision that he could have reached sooner with less infonnati'On.l2 This reinforces the point made earlier that it is not so much the amount of informatio"n that matters, but the right element of information available at the right time. Several theories exist as to how human beings make decisions.l3 The model, or models, we choose must be consistent with our philosophy of command and will be reflected in the planning procedures and decision aids we adopt. The traditional view is that decision making is an analytical process, based on generating several different options, identifying criteria for evaluating 38 these options, assigning values to the evaluation criteria, rating each option according to the criteria, and tabulating the scores to find the best option. The basic idea is to compare multiple options concurrently to come up with the optimal solution. As a result, analytical decision making tends to be methodical, complex and time consuming. Theoretically, experience is not necessary to effective analytical decision making; only reasoning power is. The other basic approach is called intuitive decision making, which rejects the computational approach of the analytical method and instead relies on an experienced commander's (and staffs) intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a particular problem and arrive at the proper decision. Intuitive decision making thus replaces analysis with experience and judgment. The intuitive model focuses on situation assessment, as opposed to the analytical model which focuses on the comparison of multiple options. Intuitive decision making aims at"satisficing," fmding the first solution which will satisfactorily solve the problem, rather than on "optimizing," as the analytical approach does. The intuitive model is consistent with our view that, war being ultimately an art rather than a science, there is no absolute right answer to any problem. The intuitive model works on the assumption that, due to the judgment gained byexperience, the commcp1der will generate a workable first solution, and therefore it is not necessary to generate multiple options. Intuitive decision making is generally much faster than analytical decision making. Iftime permits, the commander may evaluate his decision; if he finds it defective, he moves on to the next reasonable solution. Each model has different strengths and weakness, and which model is benet in a given situation depends on the nature of the situation, particularly on how much time and information is available. The analytical approach may be more appropriate for mobilization, pre-hostility, or contingency planning, when time is not a factor and extensive information can be gathered. However, the intuitive approach clearly is more appropriate for the typically fluid, rapidly changing conditions of war, when time and uncertainty are critical factors. The analytical approach may be more useful in situations in which it is necessary to document or justify a decision (more likely to be the case in an environment of detailed control). Moreover, the analytical approach may have merit in situations in which commanders are inexperienced or in which they face neverbefore-experienced problems. While the two models represent conceptually distinct approaches to decision making, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive in practice. The commander may, for example,· incorporate certain analytical methods into an essentially intuitive process when the situation warrants and time permits. CONCLUSION Our beliefs about the true nature of war lead us to one of two responses to dealing with the fundamental problem of command: either pursuing certainty or coping with uncertainty. No other possible responses exist. These responses lead to two distinctly different theories of control. Each theory in tum imposes its own requirements on the various aspects of command and control-decision making, communications, information management, planning, organization, training, education, doctrine, and so on-and so forms the basis for a distinct and comprehensive command and control system. The question is: Which approach do we adopt? The Marine Corps concept of command and control is based on accepting uncertainty as an undeniable fact and being able to operate 39 effectively despite it. The Marine Corps command and control system is thus built around mission control, which allows us to create tempo, flexibility and the ability to exploit opportunities but which also requires us to decentralize and rely on low-level initiative. A discussion of such a command and control system will be the subject of the next section. 40 Section 3 Creating Effective Command & Control The fact that, historically speaking, those armies have been most successful which did not tum their troops into automatons, did not attempt to control everything from the top, and allowed subordinate commanders considerable latitude has been abundantly illustrated. -Martin Van Creveld, Command in War Having anived at a common understanding of the fundamental nature and having laid out the key theories of command and control, our fmal step is to develop the characteristics of an effective command and control system. How do we create effective command and control, both in our units and within the Marine Corps as a whole? THE CHALLENGES TO THE SYSTEM Before we discuss the design features of our command and control system, it might help to review the challenges that the system must face. What obstacles must our command and control system overcome and what must it accomplish? First and foremost, the system must deal effectively with the twin problems of uncertainty and time. It must function effectively across a broad spectrum of conflicts and environments-that is, in "any clime and place." Moreover, while designed principally to work effectively in war, it should also apply to peacetime activities, operational or adminis~tive; we should not expect Marines to learn one system on a peacetime basis and then have to shift to another for war. It must provide the ability to adapt to rapidly changing situations and to exploit fleeting opportunities. It should be able to generate a higher tempo of action than the enemy. It should be able to withstand disruption of all kinds, created by the enemy or self-induced, which we recognize will be a normal course of events. It should be able to gather information quickly, accurately and selectively and get the right information to the right person at the right time and in the right form-without creating information overload. It should enhance effective image building and sharing. The command and control system should provide insight into the nature of the problem facing us and into the nature and designs of our enemy. It should help us to identify critical enemy vulnerabilities, and should provide the means for focusing our efforts 41 against those vulnerabilities. At the same time, it should conceal our true designs from the enemy. It should establish goals which are both meaningful and practicable, and it should devise workable plans to accomplish those goals. It should facilitate making timely and sound decisions despite incomplete and unclear information, and it should provide the means to modify those decisions quickly to suit changing situations. It should permit us to direct, shape and modify our actions quickly and effectively. It should allow us to monitor events closely enough to ensure proper execution and allow modifications, yet without interfering with subordinates' execution. It should communicate instructions quickly, clearly and concisely, and in such a way that provides subordinates the necessary guidance without inhibiting their initiative. In short, it must enhance the commander's ability to perform his duties-to "put the pieces together"-and so serve as a force multiplier. With this in mind, what should be the features of such a command and control system? MISSION CONTROL First and foremost, our command and control system must be based on mission control. We realize that theoretically pure mission control as described earlier is impossible in practice and that the type of control we exercise in a particular situation must depend on the unique requirements of the situation. But we should employ mission control to the greatest possible extent that the situation allows. Why is this so? Mission control is the one method of control which deals with equal effectiveness with the problems of uncertainty and time. Since we recognize that precision and certainty are impossible in war anyway, we willingly sacrifice them for speed and agility. Moreover, mission control is central to the tactics of maneuver warfare. Mission control provides the flexibility to deal with rapidly changing situations and to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity. It provides the degree of cooperation necessary to ensure harmony of effort yet gives commanders at all levels the latitude to act with initiative and boldness. The higher the level of command, the more general should be the supervision and the less the burden of detail. Mission control seeks to minimize the degree of positive control exercised during execution; the senior intervenes in the subordinate's conduct of operations only in exceptional cases. Thus every commander in his own sphere is accustomed to the full exercise of authority and the free application of judgment and imagination.l Mission control relies on the use of mission tactics, in which the senior assigns missions and explains his intent, but leaves subordinates free to choose the means and manner of accomplishment. The senior achieves control-in the form of cooperative effort-before the fact, through the proper preparation of his subordirlates and through his use of commander's intent. While assigned tasks may be obviated by events, the commander's intent is enduring and irlviolable and allows the subordinate to act with initiative yet in harmony with the senior's desires. Mission control thus seeks to maximize low-level initiative while achieving a high level of cooperation in order to ensure better battlefield results.2 Orders should include restrictive control measures and should prescribe the manner of execution only to the minimum degree needed to provide for . necessary coordination which cannot be achieved by any other means. Orders should be brief and simple, relying on subordinates to work out the details of 42 execution (and at the same time providing them the latitude to do so) and to effect the necessary coordination. Mission control thus places a premium on lateral coordination between units as well as vertical communications up and down the chain. INITIATIVE Initiative is an essential element of mission control, since mission control depends on the willingness of subordinates to act without instructions. Our maneuver warfare doctrine places a premium on energetically seeking and rapidly exploiting opportunities, and this is possible only through initiative. Initiative amounts to distributing the authority to decide and act throughout an organization rather than localizing it in one spot. And as we have already discussed, where there is authority, there is also responsibility. In other words, not only must subordinates be free to act on their own authority, they must view it equally as their responsibility to act. Our command and control must be characterized by a bias for decision and action at all levels. Put another way, the command and control process must be self-starting at every level of command, meaning that each commander within his own sphere acts upon the need for action rather than on orders from above directing him to act. Senior commanders can foster initiative by assigning minimum objectives rather than maximum limits. It is important to point out that initiative does not mean that a subordinate has the freedom to act without regard to guidance from above. Initiative is not an excuse to act like a "loose cannon." In fact, ifanything, initiative places an even greater burden on the subordinate. Initiative requires that the subordinate always keep the larger situation in mind and act in consonance with his senior's intent. The freedom to act with initiative thus implies a greater obligation to act in a disciplined and responsible way. Initiative places a greater burden on the senior as well. Delegating authority to his subordinates does not absolve him of ultimate responsibility. He must frame his intent in such a way that it provides his subordinates sufficient guidance to act in consonance with his desires while at the same time not restricting their freedom of action. Commanders must be adept at expressing their intent clearly and forcefully. This is a skill that requires practice. Additionally, initiative has an important psychological effect on the members of an organization. Recognizing what needs to be done and taking the action necessary to ensure success is a satisfying experience and a powerful stimulant to human endeavor. People who are not merely carrying out orders but are acting on their own initiative feel a greater responsibility for the outcome and will naturally act with greater vigor. Thus, initiative spread throughout, rather than localized with the senior commander, is a source of great strength and energy for any organization, especially in times of Grisis.3 MUTUAL TRUST Mission control demands mutual trust among the members of the organization-trust in the abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers and seniors. Trust is the essential basis for cooperation. It is a function of familiarity and respect, which in turn are the products of shared values and outlook. A senior trusts that his subordinates will carry out the assigned missions competently with minimal supervision, will act in consonance with his 43 ]desires, will inform him as necessary of any developments, and will effect the necessary lateral coordination. Subordinates meanwhile trust that the senior will provide the necessary guidance and will support them loyally and fully, even when they make mistakes. Trust has a reverse side: it must be earned as well as given. We earn the trust of others by demonstrating competence, a sense of responsibility, loyalty and self-discipline. This last is essential. Discipline is of fundamental importance in any military endeavor. But since mission control is decentralized rather than centralized and spontaneous rather than coercive, discipline is not imposed from above; it must be generated from within. In order to earn his senior's trust, a subordinate must demonstrate the self-discipline to accomplish the mission with minimal supervision and to act always in accord with his senior's larger intent. The senior, in order to earn his subordinate's trust, must likewise demonstrate that he will provide the subordinate the framework within which to act and will support and protect the subordinate in every way when he exercises initiative. IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING & COMMUNICATION The fmal essential ingredients of effective mission control are implicit understanding and communication. Cooperation is essential to any military operation, but since mission control seeks to minimize restrictive control measures, centralized coordination and detailed instructions, we must find another way to create cooperation. We do it by relying on implicit understanding and communications. These peculiar human abilities allow us to hannonize our actions intuitively with others.4 Implicit understanding and communication do not occur automatically. They are abilities which we must actively foster, and are the product of a common ethos and repeated practice-as with the members of the seasoned basketball team mentioned earlier who think and move as one or the members of a jazz band who can improvise freely without losing their cohesion. This has significant implications for doctrine, education and training, as we will discuss. INTUITIVE DECISION MAKING Based on the finn belief that precision is less important than initiative and rapid action, our command and control system should emphasize intuitive decision making as the norm, while admitting that certain deliberate situations may benefit from a more analytical_approach. We choose the intuitive model as the norm because we realize that the vast majority of situations will be fluid, changeable and uncertain and that time will be short. Emphasizing experienced judgment and intuition over deliberate analysis, the intuitive model helps to generate tempo, while also having the inherent flexibility to deal with uncertainty. Moreover, the intuitive model is consistent both with the belief that there is no perfect solution to battlefield problems and with a system which presumes the capacity for sound judgment from decision makers at all levels of the organization. However, we should understand the factors which favor an analytical approach and when the situation warrants-especially when time is not a critical factor-we should maintain the ability to reinforce intuitive decision making with analysis. 44 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT Since infonnation is the lifeblood of any command and control system, effective command and control must have an effective way of managing infonnation flow. Our management of infonnation should facilitate the rapid, distributed and unconstrained flow of infonnation of all kinds in all directions while at the same time providing the ability to discriminate as to importance, quality and timeliness as a means of providing focus and preventing infonnation overload. It should support the flow of both image-building and execution infonnation. In the case of the latter, it should enhance the commander's ability to communicate his vision with clarity and intensity. In any event, the ultimate aim, stated earlier but worth repeating, is to supply the right infonnation to the right person at the right time in the right fonn. Remember, the purpose of infonnation in the first place is to enhance knowledge, which in tum means that information should be supplied, to the greatest extent possible, in the form of meaningful images rather than in masses of raw data. Titis means that our system must have the means of filtering, fusing and prioritizing information. By filtering we mean assessing the value of infonnation and culling out that which is not pertinent or important. By fusing we mean condensing information into an easily usable form and to a level of detail appropriate to the level of command. And by prioritizing we mean expediting the flow of important infonnation. All information management should focus on critical information requirements, a focus which demands vision on the part of the commander and understanding on the part of subordinates in order to identify and recognize those critical needs. We recognize that infonnation travels by a variety of means and channels. We acknowledge the importance of implicit as well as explicit communications and informal communications as well as fonnal, and our system must make use of all of these channels. Our system must provide for lateral and "diagonal" as well as vertical communications and should ensure that information flow is interactive rather than linear. Our system should provide redundant channels as a safeguard against disruption; which channel infonnation follows is less important than whether it reaches the right person. Our system should provide for echelon-jumping capability to ensure that important information passes to the appropriate level directly and without delay. Echelon-jumping does not mean, however, that intennediate echelons are left "out of the loop." After critical infonnation has passed directly between the primarily concerned echelons, both those echelons should inform intermediates by standard channels. :To the greatest extent possible, since information is "changed" by each person who handles it, important infonnation should pass directly between principal users, eliminating middlemen specialists, such as equipment operators or clerks. Wherever possible, person-to-person information should be communicated by word of mouth and face to face, since bumans communicate not only by what they say but also by how they say it. The desire to have principals communicate directly and by voice whenever possible does not mean that we do not need to keep a record of communications; permanent records are important as a means of affirming understanding and for historical reasons. Our infonnation management system should be a hybrid exhibiting the best characteristics of supply-push and demand-pull.5 We recognize that supplypush is the most efficient way to provide much of the information needed routinely. Through the implicit understanding and shared images of its 45 members, the system should attempt to anticipate the commander's needs and should attempt to "push" that information to an easily accessible, local data base. The commander then "pulls" from the base only that information which he needs. In this way we avoid the danger of information overload associated with supply-push and the delay associated with demand-pull. We also recognize that the commander will likely be unaware of the need for certain information, so we must ensure that truly critical, time-sensitive "alarm" information gets "pushed" directly to the commander without delay. In order for this to work, subordinates must be cued in to what constitutes critical information, which in tum re-emphasizes the importance of mutual understanding. Additionally, since no system can effectively anticipate all the commander's information needs, we must have a means of gathering and supplying specific elements of information on demand. This means should provide the required information quickly and directly, and without creating a "demand cascade" which burdens lower echelons. In other words, our system should provide the commander with directed telescopes, be they people or equipment, by which he can satisfy his own specific information needs quickly. It is important, however, that the directed telescope not interfere (or be perceived to interfere) with the normal functioning of the chain of command: the perception of spying or intruding on the province of subordinate commanders can lead to distrust within the organization. FOCUSING COMMAND & CONTROL Focus of efforts is a central concept of maneuver warfare, and it applies to command and control as to any resource. The focus of the command and control effort should reflect the overall focus of efforts. We should focus the command and control effort on critical tasks and at critical times and places, which we can do by a variety of means. We concentrate information-gathering assets and other command and control resources where they are needed most. We concentrate planning, coordination, analysis and other command and control activities on the most important tasks and we exercise economy elsewhere. We prioritize information requirements and concentrate gathering,processing and communications on the critical elements. We ftlter and fuse information and we manage information flow to ensure that critical, timesensitive information moves quickly and effectively and less important information does not clutter communication$ channels. We manage that most precious of all commodities, time, to ensure that the most important tasks receive our earliest and utmost attention. We especially ensure that the commander devotes his time and energies only to critical tasks and that he is protected against mundane distractions. The commander should only do those things which only the commander can do, or which nobody else can do adequately. Routine tasks must be delegated to others. "Clearly, in order to focus command and control, we must have ad.equate guidance, and therefore one of the essential functions of command is to focus the command and control effort. The key way a commander can provide focus is by his personal attention and presence. In the words of Field Marshal Sir William Slim, the Allied commander in Bunna in the Second World War: "One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is the flair for putting himself in the right place at the vital time." As we have mentioned, by positioning himself at the critical spot 46 the commander can observe events more directly and avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information filters up the chain of command. In so doing, the commander can gain firsthand the essential "feel" for the situation which cannot be gained any other way. Equally important, he can influence events more directly and avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information fllters down the chain of command. By his personal presence the commander can provide the leadership that is so essential to success in war. And simply by the moral authority that his personal presence commands, the commander directs emphasis to the critical spot and focuses effort on the critical task. The commander thus becomes the focal point of the command and control effort, and the whole system supports and reinforces him. We have already discussed the need to gain accurate images of several different "pictures." The commander goes wherever he must to get the most important picture. For the "close-up" picture, this often means at the "front"-which does not necessarily mean at the forwardmost point of contact on the ground, but wherever the critical action is taking place or the critical situation is developing. For ground commanders, even senior ones, this may in fact mean at or near the point of contact But for others, and even for ground commanders, this may mean with a subordinate commander in the critical sector, in a ready room listening to flight debriefs during an important phase of an air campaign, at a critical point along a route of march, or in an aircraft flying over the battlefield. Ifthe critical view at a particular moment is the "overall" picture, the commander may want to be in the operations center of his command post piecing together various reports from far-flung sources, or even at a higher. headquarters learning about the larger situation (although in general it is better for senior commanders to come forward than for subordinate commanders to go rearward to exchange information). And for that matter, if he is trying to get inside the mind of an adversary who has made a bold and unexpected move that has shattered his image of the situation, the best place may be sitting against a tree by himself, sequestered from distractions, alone with a map and his thoughts. Clearly, our philosophy of command calls for energetic and active commanders with a flair, as Slim says, for being in the critical place, lending leadership, judgment and authority wherever it is needed most. The commander might start at his command post, where he can piece together an · overall image and supervise the development of the plan, but should then usually move "forward" to supervise execution at the decisive spot, returning to the command post only long enough to adjust his overall image of the developing situation before moving out again to the next critical spot. The important point is that the commander must not feel tied to his command post, unable to leave it for fear of missing a valuable report. When the commander leaves the command post, it is imperative that he empower the staff to act on his behalf.· The staff must be able to act with initiative in the absence of the commander, and therefore must share the commander's image of the situation and understand his designs. Mutual trust and implicit understanding apply to the staff as much as to subordinate commanders. Ifhe does not empower the staff to act on his behalf, the commander will become a prisoner in his own headquarters, out of touch with reality and limited in his ability to influence events. 47 THE COMMAND & CONTROL SUPPORT STRUCTURE It is important to keep in mind that the command and control support structure merely provides the supporting framework for our command and control system; it does not constitute the system itself. The sole purpose of the support structure it to assist people in making effective use of information. Developingeffective command and control will require strong advocacy for programswhich are consistent with our approach to command and control as described in these pages. In addition to supporting our approach to command and control,the components of our command and control support structure must be compatible with one another. And since people are the driving element behind command and control, the components of the structure, together and alone, must be "user friendly"; they should be designed first and always with people in mind. TRAINING, EDUCATION & DOCTRINE Collectively, training, education and doctrine prepare people for the role they play in command and control. First, since mission control demands initiative and sound decision making at all levels, training, education and doctrine must aim at fostering initiative and improving decision-making ability among all Marines. Second, training, education and doctrine must prepare Marines to function effectively in an environment of uncertainty, disorder and limited time. Exercise scenarios should purposely include elements of disorder and uncertainty-an unexpected development, an unexpected unit introduced into the scenario, or a "short-fuze" mission change, as examples. Field exercises and command post exercises should purposely include disruption of the command and control system-for example, "destruction" of a main command post or loss of communications during a critical phase of an operation.Planning exercises should incorporate severe time limits, for example, to simulate stress and tempo. As Field Marshal Erwin Rommel said: "A commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them up to it." Third, doctrine and training should prescribetechniques and procedures which place a premium on flexibility, speed and adaptability-fast and simple staff planning models, for example. Last and perhaps most important, training, education and doctrine should provide a shared ethos, common experiences and a shared way of thinking as the basis . for the trust, cohesion and implicit communication that are essential to mission control. Doctrine especially should establish a common perspective on how Marines approach the problems of command and control. PROCEDURES Command and control procedures, the techniques by which we perform various command and control functions, must be consistent with our view of an uncertain environment and with Our overall style of command and control. First of all, we must recognize that procedures per se apply only to rote or mechanical tasks, and not to acts of judgment. Procedures may help with the decision process, for example, but the decision itself is the product of an intuitive and creative act. In that respect, the purpose of procedures "is not to restrict human judgment, but to free it for the tasks only it can perfonn."6 Our command and control procedures should be designed for speed and simplicity. They should be designed for simplicity so that we can master them 48 easily and perform them quickly and smoothly-"instinctively"-under conditions of stress. They should be designed for speed so that we can generate tempo, which we recognize to be a fundamental characteristic of effective command and control. Streamlined staff planning sequences, for example, are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones. The standard should be simple models which we can expand if time and circumstances permit, rather than inherently complex models which we try to "crunch" when time is short-which is likely to be most of the time. As Second World War German Gen. Hermann Balck said to his staff: "Don't work hard, work fast." MANPOWER Since people are the flrst and driving element of our command and control system, effective manpower management is essential to command and control. And since our command and control is based on decentralized control we can argue that command and control is not just the province of senior commanders and their staffs: all Marines are involved in command and control in one way or another. Any Marine who contributes to effective operations by practicing mission tactics and using initiative to further his commander's intent and exploit opportunities is likewise contributing to effective command and control. It is important, then, that all Marines, regardless of grade, be well versed in the principles and methods of mission control. More specifically, since mission control relies heavily on individual skills and judgment, our manpower management system should recognize that all Marines of a given grade are not interchangeable, and should seek to put the right person in the right billet based on specillc ability and temperment Additionally, the manpower management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering the cohesion, teamwork and implicit understanding that are vital to mission control. We recognize that casualties in war will take a toll on personnel stability, but the greater stability a unit has initially, the better it will absorb those casualties and incorporate replacements. ORGANIZATION We have already discussed the impact of organization on the effectiveness of command and control. The general aims of organization with regard to command and control should be to ensure unity of effort, reasonable spans of control, and effective information flow. Organization should not inhibit communications in any way, but instead should facilitate the rapid distribution of information in all directions. We should seek to strike a balance between organizational "width" and "depth" that is suited to the particular situation. The aim is to "flatten" the organization to the greatest extent compatible with reasonable spans of control; we should have the organizational flexibility to eliminate or bypass selected echelons of command or staff as appropriate in order to improve operational tempo and the speed and accuracy of information flow. Additionally, it is not necessary that all echelons of command exercise all functions of command. Just as we task organize our force, so should we task organize our command and control structure. A word is in order about the size of staffs. We have already made the point that the more complex the mission, the more information is needed to accomplish it. The historical trend toward complexity has led over time to 49 ila:r;ger ;and more!CGmplex 'headquarters uriits--especially in ,organizations which Tely \On rdetailed1contrdl. lLikewise, ;the larger and more complex the )headquarters, rthe m0re :inf0lrnation 'it Tequires :to function. This :increase ,in ~informationiin tum Jrequires ran 'even ]arger :headquaiters, ;and the result is oa ·spira1in:g increase ;in tthe 'Size of'headquarters :units. However, ,the larger ;a :c0mmand ;and 1COntr01 rorgariizafion, ithe 'longer iit ;generaJly lakes :that