3Jk>» >>- mm Bi^^:\ ^^ ^ U/Viv^/" f' THE LIBRARY ST. JOHN'S SEMINARY Brighton, Massachusetts . ^4 mi^ ^'^^^^'i. .^'>;''^^^^2:^,/* ■^^^ H^'v .vY^ ^•Vp i «.«'*;'r-'^'-' ST JOHN'S'SEl^ilNAIlY LIBRAEY S9 LAKE STREET BRIGHTON. MA 02135 Ci\o Si JOHN'S SEivUN/J^Y LIBRARY 99 LAKE STREET BRIGHTON, MA 02135 THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY. Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2009 witin funding from Boston Library Consortium IVIember Libraries littp://www.archive.org/details/ideaofuniversityOOnewm r« O I f) -■' ■■^ o '. .:. . THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED I. IN NINE DISCOURSES DELIVERED TO THE CATHOLICS OF DUBLIN il. IN OCCASIONAL LECTURES AND ESSAYS ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN
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I.
UNIVERSITY TEACHING
CONSIDERED IN NINE DISCOURSES.
Ilospes eram, et collegistis Me.
IN GRATEFUL NEVER-DYING REMEMBRANCE
OF HIS MANY FRIENDS AND BENEFACTORS,
LIVING AND DEAD,
AT HOME AND ABROAD,
IN GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND, FRANCE,
IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, POLAND, ITALY, AND MALTA,
IN NORTH AMERICA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES,
WHO, BY THEIR RESOLUTE PRAYERS AND PENANCES,
AND BY THEIR GENEROUS STUBBORN EFFORTS,
AND BY THEIR MUNIFICENT ALMS,
HAVE BROKEN FOR HIM THE STRESS
OF A GREAT ANXIETY,
THESE DISCOURSES,
OFFERED TO OUR LADY AND ST. PHILIP ON ITS RISE,
COMPOSED UNDER ITS PRESSURE,
FINISHED ON THE EVE OF ITS TERMINATION,
ARE RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED
BY THE AUTHOR.
LN FEST. PRESENT,
B. M. V.
NOV. 21, 1852.
PREFACE
THE view taken of a University in these Discourses
is the following : — That it is a place of teaching
universal l^nowledge. This implies that its object is, on
the one hand, intellectual, not moral ; and, on the other,
that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather
than the advancement. If its object were scientific and
philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University
should have students ; if religious training, I do not see
how it can be the seat of literature and science.
Such is a University in its essence, and independently
of its relation to the Church. But, practically speaking,
it cannot fulfil its object duly, such as I have described
it, without the Church's assistance ; or, to use the theo-
logical term, the Church is necessary for its integrity.
Not that its main characters are changed by this incor-
poration : it still has the ofifice of intellectual education ;
but the Church steadies it in the performance of that
office.
Such are the main principles of the Discourses which
follow ; though it would be unreasonable for me to ex-
pect that I have treated so large and important a field
of thought with the fulness and precision necessary to
secure me from incidental misconceptions of my meaning
on the part of the reader- It is true, there is nothing
b
X Pre/ace.
novel or singular in the argument which I have been
pursuing, but this does not protect me from such mis-
conceptions ; for the very circumstance that the views I
have been delineating are not original with me may lead
to false notions as to my relations in opinion towards
those from whom I happened in the first instance to
learn them, and may cause me to be interpreted by the
objects or sentiments of schools to which I should be
simply opposed.
For instance, some persons may be tempted to com-
plain, that I have servilely followed the English idea of
a University, to the disparagement of that Knowledge
which I profess to be so strenuously upholding; and
they may anticipate that an academical system, formed
upon my model, will result in nothing better or higher
than in the production of that antiquated variety of
human nature and remnant of feudalism, as they consider
it, called "a gentleman."* Now, I have anticipated this
charge in various parts of my discussion ; if, however,
any Catholic is found to prefer it (and to Catholics of
course this Volume is primarily addressed), I would have
him first of all ask himself the previous question, what
he conceives to be the reason contemplated by the Holy
See in recommending just now to the Irish Hierarchy
the establishment of a Catholic University .? Has the
Supreme Pontiff recommended it for the sake of the
Sciences, which are to be the matter, and not rather of the
Students, who are to be the subjects, of its teaching?
Has he any obligation or duty at all towards secular
knowledge as such } Would it become his Apostolical
Ministry, and his descent from the Fisherman, to have a
zeal for the Baconian or other philosophy of man for its
* Vid. Ruber's English Universities, London, 1843, vol. ii,, part i, pp.
^21, etc.
Preface. xi
own sake ? Is the Vicar of Christ bound by office or by
vow to be the preacher of the theory of gravitation, or
a martyr for electro-magnetism ? Would he be acquit-
ting himself of the dispensation committed to him if he
were smitten with an abstract love of these matters, how-
ever true, or beautiful, or ingenious, or useful? Or rather,
does he not contemplate such achievements of the intel-
lect, as far as he contemplates them, solely and simply
in their relation to the interests of Revealed Truth ?
Surely, what he does he does for the sake of Religion ;
if he looks with satisfaction on strong temporal govern-
ments, which promise perpetuity, it is for the sake of
Religion ; and if he encourages and patronizes art and
science, it is for the sake of Religion. He rejoices in
the widest and most philosophical systems of intellectual
education, from an intimate conviction that Truth is his
real ally, as it is his profession ; and that Knowledge
and Reason are sure ministers to Faith.
This being undeniable, it is plain that, when he sug-
gests to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Uni-
versit}^, his first and chief and direct object is, not science,
art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of know-
ledge, but some benefit or other, to accrue, by means of
literature and science, to his own children ; not indeed
their formation on any narrow or fantastic type, as, for
instance, that of an "English Gentleman" may be called,
but their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or
intellectual. Nothing short of this can be his aim, if, as
becomes the Successor of the Apostles, he is to be able
to say with St. Paul, ''Non judicavi me scire aliquid inter
vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum." Just as
a commander wishes to have tall and well-formed and
vigorous soldiers, not from any abstract devotion to the
military standard of height or age, but for the purposes
xii Preface,
of war, and no one thinks it any thing but natural and
praiseworthy in him to be contemplating, not abstract
qualities, but his own living and breathing men ; so, in
like manner, when the Church founds a University, she
is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their
own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to
their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and
usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their
respective posts in life better, and of making them more
intelligent, capable, active members of society.
Nor can it justly be said that in thus acting she sacri-
fices Science, and, under a pretence of fulfilling the duties
of her mission, perverts a University to ends not its own,
as soon as it is taken into account that there are other
institutions far more suited to act as instruments of
stimulating philosophical inquiry, and extending the
boundaries of our knowledge, than a University. Such,
for instance, are the literary and scientific *^ Academies,"
which are so celebrated in Italy and France, and which
have frequently been connected with Universities, as
committees, or, as it were, congregations or delegacies
subordinate to them. Thus the present Royal Society
originated in Charles the Second's time, in Oxford; such
just now are the Ashmolean and Architectural Societies
in the same seat of learning, which have risen in our own
time. Such, too, is the British Association, a migratory
body, which at least at times is found in the halls of the
Protestant Universities of the United Kingdom, and the
faults of which lie, not in its exclusive devotion to science,
but in graver matters which it is irrelevant here to enter
upon. Such again is the Antiquarian Society, the Royal
Academy for the Fine Arts, and others which might be
mentioned. This, then, is the sort of institution, which
primarily contemplates Science itself, and not students ;
Preface, xiii
and, in thus speaking, I am saying nothing of my own,
being supported by no less an authority than Cardinal
Gerdil. " Ce n'est pas," he says, '' qu'il y ait aucune
veritable opposition entre I'esprit des Academies et celui
des Universites ; ce sont seulement des vues differentes.
Les Universites sont etablies pour enseigner les sciences
aux eleves qui veulent s'y former; les Academies se
proposent de noiivelles recheixhes a faire dans la carriere
des sciences. Les Universites d' Italic ont fourni des
sujets qui ont fait honneur aux Academies ; et celles-ci
ont donne aux Universites des Professeurs, qui ont rempli
les chaires avec la plus grande distinction."*
V The nature of the case and the history of philosophy
combine to recommend to us this division of intellec-
tual labour between Academies and Universities. To
discover and to teach are distinct functions ; they are
also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in
the same person. He, too, who spends his day in dispens-
ing his existing knowledge to all comers is unlikely to
have either leisure or energy to acquire new. The com-
mon sense of mankind has associated the search after
truth with seclusion and quiet. The greatest thinkers
have been too intent on their subject to admit of interrup-
tion ; they have been men of absent minds and idosyn-
cratic habits, and have, more or less, shunned the lecture
room and the public school. Pythagoras, the light of
Magna Grsecia, lived for a time in a cave. Thales, the
light of Ionia, lived unmarried and in private, and refused
the invitations of princes. Plato withdrew from Athens
to the groves of Academus. Aristotle gave twenty years
to a studious discipleship under him. Friar Bacon lived
in his tower upon the Isis. Newton indulged in an intense
severity of meditation which almost shook his reason.
* Opere, t. iii., p. 353,
xiv Preface.
The great discoveries in chemistry and electricity were
not made in Universities. Observatories are more fre-
quently out of Universities than in them, and even when
within their bounds need have no moral connexion with
them. Porson had no classes ; Elmsley lived good part
of his life in the country. I do not say that there are
not great examples the other way, perhaps Socrates,
certainly Lord Bacon ; still I think it must be allowed on
the whole that, while teaching involves external engage-
ments, the natural home for experiment and speculation
is retirement.
Returning, then, to the consideration of the question,
from which I may seem to have digressed, thus much I
think I have made good, — that, whether or no a Catholic
University should put before it, as its great object, to
make its students "gentlemen," still to make them some-
thing or other is its great object, and not simply to pro-
tect the interests and advance the dominion of Science.
If, then, this maybe taken for granted, as I think it may,
the only point which remains to be settled is, whether I
have formed a probable conception of the sort of benefit
which the Holy See has intended to confer on Catholics
who speak the English tongue by recommending to the
Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University ; and
this I now proceed to consider.
Here, then, it is natural to ask those who are interested
in the question, whether any better interpretation of the
recommendation of the Holy See can be given than that
which I have suggested in this Volume. Certainly it
does not seem to me rash to pronounce that, whereas
Protestants have great advantages of education in the
Schools, Colleges, and Universities of the United King-
dom, our ecclesiastical rulers have it in purpose that
Catholics should enjoy the like advantages, whatever they
Preface, xv
are, to the full. I conceive they view it as prejudicial to
the interests of Religion that there should be any culti-
vation of mind bestowed upon Protestants w^iich is not
given to their own youth also. As they wish their schools
for the poorer and middle classes to be at least on a par
with those of Protestants, they contemplate the same ob-
ject also as regards that higher education which is given to
comparatively the few. Protestant youths, who can spare
the time, continue their studies till the age of twenty-one
or twenty-two ; thus they employ a time of life all-im-
portant and especially favourable to mental culture. I
conceive that our Prelates are impressed with the fact
and its consequences, that a youth who ends his educa-
tion at seventeen is no match {cceteris paribus) for one
who ends it at twenty-two.
All classes indeed of the community are impressed
with a fact so obvious as this. The consequence is, that
Catholics who aspire to be on a level v/ith Protestants in
discipline and refinement of intellect have recourse to
Protestant Universities to obtain what they cannot find
at home. Assuming* (as the Rescripts from Propaganda
allow me to do) that Protestant education is inexpedient
for our youth, — we see here an additional reason why
those advantages, whatever they are, which Protestant
communities dispense through the medium of Protest-
antism should be accessible to Catholics in a Catholic
form.
What are these advantages } I repeat, they are in one
word the culture of the intellect. Robbed, oppressed,
and thrust aside. Catholics in these islands have not been
in a condition for centuries to attempt the sort of educa-
tion which is necessary for the man of the w^orld, the
statesman, the landholder, or the opulent gentleman.
Their legitimate stations, duties, employments, have been
xvi Preface.
taken from them, and the qualifications withal, social
and intellectual, which are necessary both for reversing
the forfeiture and for availing themselves of the reversal.
The time is come when this moral disability must be
removed. Our desideratum is, not the manners and habits
of gentlemen ; — these can be, and are, acquired in various
other ways, by good society, by foreign travel, by the
innate grace and dignity of the Catholic mind ; — but the
force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the
versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers,
the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before
us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but com-
monly is not gained without much effort and the exercise
of years.
This is real cultivation of mind ; and I do not deny
that the characteristic excellences of a gentleman are
included in it. Nor need we be ashamed that they should
be, since the poet long ago wrote, that '"' Ingenuas didi-
cisse fideliter artes Emollit mores." Certainly a liberal
education does manifest itself in a courtesy, propriety,
and polish of word and action, which is beautiful in itself,
and acceptable to others ; but it does much more. It
brings the mind into form, — for the mind is like the body.
Boys outgrow their shape and their strength ; their limbs
have to be knit together, and their constitution needs
tone. Mistaking animal spirits for vigour, and over-
confident in their health, ignorant what they can bear
and how to manage themselves, they are immoderate
and extravagant ; and fall into sharp sicknesses. This
is an emblem of their minds ; at first they have no prin-
ciples laid down within them as a foundation for the
intellect to build upon ; they have no discriminating con-
victions, and no grasp of consequences. And therefore
they talk at random, if they talk much, and cannot help
Preface. xvii
being flippant, or what is emphatically called ^* young^
They are merely dazzled by phenomena, instead of per-
ceiving things as they are.
It were well if none remained boys all their lives ; but
what is more common than the sight of grown men,
talking on political or moral or religious subjects, in that
offhand, idle way, which we signify by the word unreal?
" That they simply do not know what they are talking
about '*' is the spontaneous silent remark of any man of
sense who hears them. Hence such persons have no
difficulty in contradicting themselves in successive sen-
tences, without being conscious of it. Hence others,
whose defect in intellectual training is more latent, have
their most unfortunate crotchets, as they are called, or
hobbies, which deprive them of the influence which their
estimable qualities would otherwise secure. Hence others
can never look straight before them, never see the point,
and have no difficulties in the most difficult subjects.
Others are hopelessly obstinate and prejudiced, and, after
they have been driven from their opinions, return to them
the next moment without even an attempt to explain
why. Others are so intemperate and intractable that
there is no greater calamity for a good cause than that
they should get hold of it. It is very plain from the
very particulars I have mentioned that, in this delinea-
tion of intellectual infirmities, I am drawing, not from
Catholics, but from the world at large ; I am referring
to an evil which is forced upon us in every railway
carriage, in every coffee-room or table-d' hote, in every
mixed company, an evil, however, to which Catholics are
not less exposed than the rest of mankind.
When the intellect has once been properly trained and
formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it
will display its powers with more or less effect according
xviii Preface,
to its particular quality and capacity in the individual.
In the case of most men it makes itself felt in the good
sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour, self-
command, and steadiness of view, which characterize it
In some it will have developed habits of business, power
of influencing others, and sagacity. In others it will
elicit the talent of philosophical speculation, and lead
the mind forward to eminence in this or that intellectual
department. In all it will be a faculty of entering with
comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of
taking up with aptitude any science or profession. All
this it will be and will do in a measure, even when the
mental formation be made after a model but partially
true ; for, as far as effectiveness goes, even false views of
things have more influence and inspire more respect than
no views at all. Men who fancy they see what is not
are more energetic, and make their way better, than
those who see nothing ; and so the undoubting infidel,
the fanatic, the heresiarch, are able to do much, while the
mere hereditary Christian, who has never realized the
truths which he holds, is unable to do any thing. But, if
consistency of view can add so much strength even to
error, what may it not be expected to furnish to the
dignity, the energy, and the influence of Truth !
Some one, however, will perhaps object that I am
but advocating that spurious philosophism, which shows
itself in what, for want of a word, I may call "viewi-
ness," when I speak so much of the formation, and con-
sequent grasp, of the intellect. It may be said that the
theory of University Education, which I have been
delineating, if acted upon, would teach youths nothing
soundly or thoroughly, and would dismiss them with
nothing better than brilliant general views about all
things whatever.
Preface. xix
This indeed, if well founded, would be a most serious
objection to what I have advanced in this Volume, and
would demand my immediate attention, had I any reason
to think that I could not remove it at once, by a simple
explanation of what I consider the true mode of educa-
ting, were this the place to do so. But these Discourses
are directed simply to the consideration of the aims and
principles of Education. Suffice it, then, to say here, that
I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual
training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of
science, method, order, principle, and system ; of rule
and exception, of richness and harmony. This is com-
monly and excellently done by making him begin with
Grammar ; nor can too great accuracy, or minuteness
and subtlety of teaching be used towards him, as his
faculties expand, with this simple purpose. Hence it is
that critical scholarship is so important a discipline for
him when he is leaving school for the University. A
second science is the Mathematics : this should follow
Grammar, still with the same object, viz., to give him a
conception of development and arrangement from and
around a common centre. Hence it is that Chronology
and Geography are so necessary for him, when he reads
History, which is otherwise little better than a story-
book. Hence, too. Metrical Composition, when he reads
Poetry ; in order to stimulate his powers into action in
every practicable way, and to prevent a merely passive
reception of images and ideas which in that case are
likely to pass out of the mind as soon as they have
entered it. Let him once gain this habit of method,
of starting from fixed points, of making his ground
good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows
from what he does not know, and I conceive he will be
gradually initiated into the largest and truest philoso-
XX Preface.
phical views, and will feel nothing but impatience and
disgust at the random theories and imposing sophistries
and dashing paradoxes, which carry away half-formed
and superficial intellects.
Such parti-coloured ingenuities are indeed one of the
chief evils of the day, and men of real talent are not slow
to minister to them. An intellectual man, as the world
now conceives of him, is one who is full of '' views " on
all subjects of philosophy, on all matters of the day. It
is almost thought a disgrace not to have a view at a
moment's notice on any question from the Personal
Advent to the Cholera or Mesmerism. This is owing in
great measure to the necessities of periodical literature,
now so much in request. Every quarter of a year, every
month, every day, there must be a supply, for the grati-
fication of the public, of new and luminous theories on
the subjects of religion, foreign politics, home politics,
civil economy, finance, trade, agriculture, emigration,
and the colonies. Slavery, the gold fields, German
philosophy, the French Empire, Wellington, Peel, Ire-
land, must all be practised on, day after day, by what
are called original thinkers. As the great man's guest
must produce his good stories or songs at the evening-
banquet, as the platform orator exhibits his telling facts
at mid-day, so the journalist lies under the stern obliga-
tion of extemporizing his lucid views, leading ideas, and
nutshell truths for the breakfast table. The very nature
of periodical literature, broken into small wholes, and
demanded punctually to an hour, involves the habit of
this extempore philosophy. "Almost all the Ramblers,"
says Boswell of Johnson, "were written just as they
were wanted for the press ; he sent a certain portion of
the copy of an essay, and wrote the remainder while the
former part of it was printing." Few men have the gifts
Pre/ace, xxi
of Johnson, who to great vigour and resource of Intellect,
when it was fairly roused, united a rare common-sense
and a conscientious regard for veracity, which preserved
him from flippancy or extravagance in writing. Few
men are Johnsons ; yet how many men at this day are
assailed by incessant demands on their mental powers,
which only a productiveness like his could suitably
supply ! There is a demand for a reckless originality of
thought, and a sparkling plausibility of argument, which
he would have despised, even if he could have displayed ;
a demand for crude theory and unsound philosophy,
rather than none at all. It is a sort of repetition of the
" Quid novi } " of the Areopagus, and it must have an
answer. Men must be found who can treat, where it is
necessary, like the Athenian sophist, de omni scibili,
" Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aliptes,
Augur, Schoenobates, Medicus, Magus, omnia novit."
I am speaking of such writers with a feeling of real
sympathy for men who are under the rod of a cruel
slavery. I have never indeed been in such circumstances
myself, nor in the temptations which they involve ; but
most men who have had to do with composition must
know the distress which at times it occasions them to
have to write — a distress sometimes so keen and so
specific that it resembles nothing else than bodily pairt
That pain is the token of the wear and tear of mind ;
and, if works done comparatively at leisure involve such
mental fatigue and exhaustion, what must be the toil of
those whose intellects are to be flaunted daily before the
public in full dress, and that dress ever new and varied,
and spun, like the silkworm's, out of themselves ! Still,
whatever true sympathy we may feel for the ministers
of this dearly purchased luxury, and whatever sense we
xxii Preface,
may have of the great intellectual power which the
literature in question displays, we cannot honestly close
our eyes to its direct evil.
One other remark suggests itself, which is the last I
shall think it necessary to make. The authority, which
in former times was lodged in Universities, now resides
in very great measure in that literary world, as it is
called, to which I have been referring. This is not satis-
factory, if, as no one can deny, its teaching be so off-
hand, so ambitious, so changeable. It increases the
seriousness of the mischief, that so very large a portion
of its writers are anonymous, for irresponsible power
never can be any thing but a great evil ; and, moreover,
that, even when they are known, they can give no better
guarantee for the philosophical truth of their principles
than their popularity at the moment, and their happy
conformity in ethical character to the age which admires
them. Protestants, however, may do as they will : it is
a matter for their own consideration ; but at least it
concerns us that our own literary tribunals and oracles
of moral duty should bear a graver character. At least
it is a matter of deep solicitude to Catholic Prelates that
their people should be taught a wisdom, safe from the
excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institu-
tions which have stood the trial and received the sanc-
tion of ages, and administered by men who have no need
to be anonymous, as being supported by their consis-
tency with their predecessors and with each other,
November 21, 1852.
UNIVERSITY TEACHING.
DISCOURSE
I. Introductory
II. Theology a Branch of Knowledge . •
III. Bearing of Theology on other Knowledge
IV. Bearing of other Knowledge on Theology
V. Knowledge its own end ....
VI. Knowledge viewed in relation to Learning
VII. Knowledge viewed in relation to Professional Skill
VIII. Knowledge viewed in relation to Religious Duty
IX. Duties of the Church towards Knowledge ,
PAGE
I
19
43
71
99
124
151
179
DISCOURSE I
INTRODUCTORY
I.
IN addressing myself, Gentlemen, to the consideration
of a question which has excited so much interest,
and elicited so much discussion at the present day, a?
that of University Education, I feel some explanation is
due from me for supposing, after such high ability and
wide experience have been brought to bear upon it,
that any field remains for the additional labours either
of a disputant or of an inquirer. If, nevertheless, I still
venture to ask permission to continue the discussion,
already so protracted, it is because the subject of Liberal
Education, and of the principles on which it must be
conducted, has ever had a hold upon my own mind ; and
because I have lived the greater part of my life in a
place which has all that time been occupied in a series
of controversies both domestic and with strangers, and
of measures, experimental or definitive, bearing upon it.
About fifty years since, the English University, of which
I was so long a member, after a century of inactivity, at
length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was
giving no education at all to the youth committed to its
keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities which its pro-
fession and its station involved, and it presents to us
7* I
2 Discourse /.
the singular example of an heterogeneous and an inde-
pendent body of men, setting about a work of self-refor-
mation, not from any pressure of public opinion, but
because it was fitting and right to undertake it. Its
initial efforts, begun and carried on amid many ob-
stacles, were met from without, as often happens in such
cases, by ungenerous and jealous criticisms, which, at
the very moment that they were urged, were beginning
to be unjust. Controversy did but bring out more
clearly to its own apprehension the views on which its
reformation was proceeding, and throw them into a
philosophical form. The course of beneficial change
made progress, and what was at first but the result of
individual energy and an act of the academical corpora-
tion, gradually became popular, and was taken up and
carried out by the separate collegiate bodies, of which
the University is composed. This was the first stage of
the controversy. Years passed away, and then political
adversaries arose against it, and the system of education
which it had established was a second time assailed ; but
still, since that contest was conducted for the most part
through the medium, not of political acts, but of treatises
\nd pamphlets, it happened as before that the threatened
dangers, in the course of their repulse, did but afford
fuller development and more exact delineation to the
principles of which the University was the representativq
In the former of these two controversies the charge
brought against its studies was their remoteness from
the occupations and duties of life, to which they are the
formal introduction, or, in other words, their imitility ; in
the latter, it was their connexion with a particular form of
belief, or, in other words, their religious excliisiveness.
Living then so long as a witness, though hardly as an
actor, in these scenes of intellectual conflict, I am able
Introductory. 3
to bear witness to views of University Education, with-
out authority indeed in themselves, but not without
value to a Catholic, and less familiar to him, as I con-
ceive, than they deserve to be. And, while an argument
originating in the controversies to which I have referred,
may be serviceable at this season to that great cause in
which we are here so especially interested, to me per-
sonally it will afford satisfaction of a peculiar kind ; for,
though it has been my lot for many years to take a
prominent, sometimes a presumptuous, part in theological
discussions, yet the natural turn of my mind carries me
off to trains of thought hke those which I am now about
to open, which, important though they be for Catholic
objects, and admitting of a Catholic treatment, are
sheltered from the extreme delicacy and peril which
attach to disputations directly bearing on the subject-
matter of Divine Revelation,
2.
There are several reasons why I should open the
discussion with a reference to the lessons with which
past years have supplied me. One reason is this : It
would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed to have
got up my opinions for the occasion. This, indeed, would
have been no reflection on me personally, supposing I
were persuaded of their truth, when at length addressing
myself to the inquiry ; but it would have destroyed, of
course, the force of my testimony, and deprived such
arguments, as I might adduce, of that moral persuasive-
ness which attends on tried and sustained conviction.
It would have made me seem the advocate, rather than
the cordial and d ^liberate maintainer and witness, of the
doctrines which I was to support ; and, though it might
be said to evidence the faith I reposed in the practical
4 Discourse /.
judgment of the Church, and the intimate concurrence
of my own reason with the course she had authoritatively
sanctioned, and the devotion with which I could promptly
put myself at her disposal, it would have cast suspicion
on the validity of reasonings and conclusions which
rested on no independent inquiry, and appealed to no
past experience. In that case it might have been plau-
sibly objected by opponents that I was the serviceable
expedient of an emergency, and never, after all, could
be more than ingenious and adroit in the management of
an argument which was not my own, and which I was
sure to forget again as readily as I had mastered it.
But this is not so. The views to which I have referred
have grown into my whole system of thought, and are,
as it were, part of myself. Many changes has my mind
gone through : here it has known no variation or vacilla-
tion of opinion, and though this by itself is no proof of
the truth of my principles, it puts a seal upon conviction,
and is a justification of earnestness and zeal Those prin-
ciples, which I am now to set forth under the sanction of
the Catholic Church, were my profession at that early
period of my life, when religion was to me more a matter
of feeling and experience than of faith. They did but
take greater hold upon me, as I was introduced to the
records of Christian Antiquity, and approached in senti-
ment and desire to Catholicism ; and my sense of their
correctness has been increased with the events of every
year since I have been brought within its pale.
And here I am brought to a second and more important
reason for referring, on this occasion, to the conclusions
at which Protestants have arrived on the subject of
Liberal Education ; and it is as follows : Let it be ob-
served, then, that the principles on which I would conduct
the inquiry are attainable, as I have already implied, by
Introductory. 5
the mere experience of life. They do not come simply
of theology ; they imply no supernatural discernment ;
they have no special connexion with Revelation ; they
almost arise out of the nature of the case ; they are
dictated even by human prudence and wisdom, though a
divine illumination be absent, and they are recognized
by common sense, even where self-interest is not present
to quicken it ; and, therefore, though true, and just, and
good in themselves, they imply nothing whatever as to
the religious profession of those who maintain them.
They may be held by Protestants as well as by CathoUcs ;
nay, there is reason to anticipate that in certain times
and places they will be more thoroughly investigated,
and better understood, and held more firmly by Protest-
ants than by ourselves.
It is natural to expect this from the very circumstance
that the philosophy of Education is founded on truths
in the natural order. Where the sun shines bright, in
the warm climate of the south, the natives of the place
know little of safeguards against cold and wet. They
have, indeed, bleak and piercing blasts ; they have chill
and pouring rain, but only now and then, for a day or a
week ; they bear the inconvenience as they best may, but
they have not made it an art to repel it ; it is not worth
their while; the science of calefaction and ventilation is
reserved for the north. It is in this way that Catholics
stand relatively to Protestants in the science of Edu-
cation ; Protestants depending on human means mainly,
are led to make the most of them^ : their sole resource is
to use what they have ; " Knowledge is " their " power"
and nothing else ; they are the anxious cultivators of a
rugged soil. It is otherwise with us ; ^^ f lines ceciderunt
mihi in prcEclarisT We have a goodly inheritance. This
is apt to cause us (I do not mean to rely too much on
6 Discourse /,
prayer, and the Divine Blessing, for that is impossible ; but)
we sometimes forget that we shall please Him best, and get
most from Him, when, according to the Fable, we '' put
our shoulder to the wheel," when we use what we have by
nature to the utmost, at the same time that we look out
for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and
hope. However, we are sometimes tempted to let things
take their course, as if they would in one way or another
turn up right at last for certain ; and so we go on, living
from hand to mouth, getting into difficulties and getting
out of them, succeeding certainly on the whole, but with
failure in detail which might be avoided, and with much
of imperfection or inferiority in our appointments and
plans, and much disappointment, discouragement, and
collision of opinion in consequence. If this be in any
measure the state of the case, there is certainly so far
a reason for availing ourselves of the investigations
and experience of those who are not Catholics, when we
have to address ourselves to the subject of Liberal
Education.
Nor is there surely any thing derogatory to the position
of a Catholic in such a proceeding. The Church has
ever appealed and deferred to witnesses and authorities
external to herself, in those matters in which she
thought they had means of forming a judgment: and
that on the principle, Ctdqtie in arte sua credendum.
She has ever used unbelievers and pagans in evidence
of her truth, as far as their testimony went. She avails
herself of scholars, critics, and antiquarians, who are not
of her communion. She has worded her theological teach-
ing in the phraseology of Aristotle ; Aquila, Symmachus,
Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris, all more
or less heterodox, have supplied materials for primitive
exegetics. St. Cyprian called TertuUian his master;
Introductory. 7
St. Augustin refers to Ticonius ; Bossuet, in modern
times, complimented the labours of the Anglican Bull;
the Benedictine editors of the Fathers are familiar with
the labours of Fell, Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge.
Pope Benedict XIV. cites according to the occasion the
works of Protestants without reserve, and the late French
collection of Christian Apologists contains the writings
of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley. If, then, I
come forward in any degree as borrowing the views of
certain Protestant schools on the point which is to be
discussed, I do so. Gentlemen, as believing, first, that the
Catholic Church has ever, in the plenitude of her divine
illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she
has found in their teaching or their measures ; and next,
that in particular places or times her children are likely
to profit from external suggestions or lessons, which have
not been provided for them by herself.
3.
And here I may mention a third reason for appealing
at the outset to the proceedings of Protestant bodies in
regard to Liberal Education. It will serve to intimate
the mode in which I propose to handle my subject
altogether. Observe then, Gentlemen, I have no inten-
tion, in any thing I shall say, of bringing into the argument
the authority of the Church, or any authority at all ; but
I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of
human reason and human wisdom. I am investigating
in the abstract, and am determining what is in itself right
and true. For the moment I know nothing, so to say,
of history. I take things as I find them ; I have no con-
cern with the past ; I find myself here ; I set myself to
the duties I find here ; I set myself to further, by every
means in my power, doctrines and views, true in them-
8 Discourse L
selves, recognized by Catholics as such, familiar to my
own mind ; and to do this quite apart from the consider-
ation of questions which have been determined without
me and before me. I am here the advocate and the
minister of a certain great principle ; yet not merely
advocate and minister, else had I not been here at all. It
has been my previous keen sense and hearty reception
of that principle, that has been at once the reason, as I
must suppose, of my being selected for this ofhce,
and is the cause of my accepting it. I am told on
authority that a principle is expedient, which I have
ever felt to be true. And I argue in its behalf on its
own merits, the authority, which brings me here, being
my opportunity for arguing, but not the ground of my
argument itself.
And a fourth reason is here suggested for consulting
the history of Protestant institutions, when I am going
to speak of the object and nature of University Education.
It will serve to remind you. Gentlemen, that I am con-
cerned with questions, not simply of immutable truth,
but of practice and expedience. It would ill have
become me to undertake a subject, on which points of
dispute have arisen among persons so far above me in
authority and name, in relation to a state of society,
about which I have so much to learn, if it involved an
appeal to sacred truths, or the determination of some
imperative rule of conduct. It would have been pre-
sumptuous in me so to have acted, nor am I so acting.
Even the question of the union of Theology with the
secular Sciences, which is its religious side, simple as it
is of solution in the abstract, has, according to difference
of circumstances, been at different times differently
decided. Necessity has no law, and expedience is often
one form of necessity. It is no principle with sensible
Introductory, g
men, of whatever cast of opinion, to do always what is
abstractedly best. Where no direct duty forbids, we
may be obliged to do, as being best under circumstances,
what we murmur and rise against, while we do it. We
see that to attempt more is to effect less ; that we must
accept so much, or gain nothing ; and so perforce we
reconcile ourselves to what we would have far otherwise,
if we could. Thus a system of what is called secular
Education, in which Theology and the Sciences are
taught separately, may, in a particular place or time, be
the least of evils ; it may be of long standing ; it may be
dangerous to meddle with ; it may be professedly a
temporary arrangement ; it may be under a process of
improvement ; its disadvantages may be neutralized by
the persons by whom, or the provisions under which, it is
administered.
Hence it was, that in the early ages the Church al-
lowed her children to attend the heathen schools for the
acquisition of secular accomplishments, where, as no
one can doubt, evils existed, at least as great as can
attend on Mixed Education now. The gravest Fathers
recommended for Christian youth the use of Pagan
masters ; the most saintly Bishops and most authorita-
tive Doctors had been sent in their adolescence by
Christian parents to Pagan lecture halls.* And, not to
take other instances, at this very time, and in this very
country, as regards at least the poorer classes of the
community, whose secular acquirements ever must be
limited, it has seemed best to the Irish Bishops, under
the circumstances, to suffer the introduction into the
country of a system of Mixed Education in the schools
called National. Such a state of things, however, is
passing away ; as regards University education at least,
* Vide M. L'Abbe Lalanne's recent work.
lo Discourse I.
the highest authority has now decided that the plan,
which is abstractedly best, is in this time and country
also most expedient.
4.
And here I have an opportunity of recognizing once
for all that higher view of approaching the subject of
these Discourses, which, after this formal recognition, I
mean to dispense with. Ecclesiastical authority, not
argument, is the supreme rule and the appropriate guide
for Catholics in m^atters of religion. It has always the
right to interpose, and sometimes, in the conflict of
parties and opinions, it is called on to e :ercise that
right. It has lately exercised it in our own instance : it
has interposed in favour of a pure University system for
Catholic youth, forbidding compromise or accommodation
of any kind. Of course its decision must be heartily
accepted and obeyed, and that the more, because the
decision proceeds, not simply from the Bishops of Ire-
land, great as their authority is, but the highest authority
on earth, from the Chair of St. Peter.
Moreover, such a decision not only demands our
submission, but has a claim upon our trust. It not only
acts as a prohibition of any measures, but as an ipso
facto confutation of any reasonings, inconsistent with it.
It carries with it an earnest and an augury of its own
expediency. For instance, I can fancy. Gentlemen,
there may be some, among those who hear me, disposed
to say that they are ready to acquit the principles of
Education, which I am to advocate, of all fault what-
ever, except that of being impracticable. I can fancy
them granting to me, that those principles are most
correct and most obvious, simply irresistible on paper, but
maintaining, nevertheless, that after all, they are nothing
Introductory. 1 1
more than the dreams of men who live out of the world,
and who do not see the difficulty of keeping Catholicism
anyhow afloat on the bosom of this wonderful nine-
teenth century. Proved, indeed, those principles are, to
demonstration, but they will not work. Nay, it was
my own admission just now, that, in a particular in-
stance, it might, easily happen, that what is only second
best is best practically, because what is actually best is
out of the question.
This, I hear you say to yourselves, is the state of
things at present. You recount in detail the numberless
impediments, great and small, formidable or only vexa-
tious, which at every step embarrass the attempt to carry
out ever so poorly a principle in itself so true and
ecclesiastical. You appeal in your defence to wise and
sagacious intellects, who are far from enemies to Catho-
licism, or to the Irish Hierarchy, and you have no hope,
or rather you absolutely disbelieve, that Education can
possibly be conducted, here and now, on a theological
principle, or that youths of different religions can, under
the circumstances of the country, be educated apart from
each other. The more you think over the state of
politics, the position of parties, the feelings of classes,
and the experience of the past, the more chimerical
does it seem to you to aim at a University, of which
Catholicity is the fundamental principle. Nay, even if
the attempt could accidentally succeed, would not the
mischief exceed the benefit of it 1 How great the
sacrifices, in how many ways, by which it would be
preceded and followed 1 how many wounds, open and
secret, would it inflict upon the body politic ! And, if
it fails, which is to be expected, then a double mischief
will ensue from its recognition of evils which it has been
unable to remedy. 1 hese are your deep misgivings ;
1 2 Discourse I,
and, in proportion to the force with which they come to
you, is the concern and anxiety which you feel, that
there should be those whom you love, whom you
revere, who from one cause or other refuse to enter
into them.
5-
This, I repeat, is what some good Catholics will say
to me, and more than this. They will express them-
selves better than I can speak for them in their behalf, —
with more earnestness and point, with more force of
argument and fulness of detail ; and I will frankly and
at once acknowledge, that I shall insist on the high theo-
logical view of a University without attempting to give
a direct answer to their arguments against its present
practicability. I do not say an answer cannot be given ;
on the contrary, I have a confident expectation that, in
proportion as those objections are looked in the face,
they will fade away. But, however this may be, it would
not become me to argue the matter with those who
understand the circumstances of the problem so much
better than myself. What do I know of the state of things
in Ireland, that I should presume to put ideas of mine,
which could not be right except by accident, by the side
of theirs, who speak in the country of their birth and
their home.'' No, Gentlemen, you are natural judges of
the difficulties which beset us, and they are doubtless
greater than I can even fancy or forbode. Let me, fur
the sake of argument, admit all you say against our
enterprise, and a great deal more. Your proof of its
intrinsic impossibility shall be to me as cogent as my
own of its theological advisableness. Why, then, should
I be so rash and perverse as to involve myself in trouble
not properly mine } Why go out of my own place t
l7itrodudo7y. 1 3
Why so headstrong and reckless as to lay up for myself
miscarriage and disappointment, as though I were not
sure to have enough of personal trial anyhow without
going about to seek for it ?
Reflections such as these would be decisive even
with the boldest and most capable minds, but for one
consideration. In the midst of our difficulties I have
one ground of hope, just one stay, but, as I think, a
sufficient one, which serves me in the stead of all other
argument whatever, which hardens me against criticism,
which supports me if I begin to despond, and to
which I ever come round, v/hen the question of the
possible and the eicpedient is brought into discussion.
It is the decision of the Holy See ; St. Peter has spoken,
it is he who has enjoined that which seems to us so
unpromising. He has spoken, and has a claim on us to
trust him. He is no recluse, no solitary student, no
dreamer about the past, no doter upon the dead and
gone, no projector of the visionary. He for eighteen
hundred years has lived in the world ; he has seen all
fortunes, he has encountered all adversaries, he has
shaped himself for all emergencies. If ever there was
a power on earth who had an eye for the times, who
has confined himself to the practicable, and has been
happy in his anticipations, whose words have been facts,
and whose commands prophecies, such is he in the
history of ages, who sits from generation to generation
in the Chair of the Apostles, as the Vicar of Christ, and
the Doctor of His Church.
6.
These are not the words of rhetoric. Gentlemen, but of
history. All who take part v/ith the Apostle, are on the
winning side. He has long since given warrants for the
14 Discourse 1. .
confidence which he claims. From the first he has
looked through the wide world, of which he has the
burden ; and, according to the need of the day, and the
inspirations of his Lord, he has set himself now to one
thing, now to another ; but to all in season, and to no-
thing in vain. He came first upon an age of refinement
and luxury like our own, and, in spite of the persecutor,
fertile in the resources of his cruelty, he soon gathered,
out of all classes of society, the slave, the soldier, the
high-born lady, and the sophist, materials enough to
form a people to his Master's honour. The savage hordes
come down in torrents from the north, and Peter went
out to meet them, and by his very eye he sobered them,
and backed them in their full career. They turned aside
and flooded the whole earth, but only to be more surely
civilized by him, and to be made ten times more his
children even than the older populations which they had
overwhelmed. Lawless kings arose, sagacious as the
Roman, passionate as the Hun, yet in him they found
their match, and were shattered, and he lived on. The
gates of the earth were opened to the east and west, and
men poured out to take possession ; but he went with
them by his missionaries, to China, to Mexico, carried
along by zeal and charity, as far as those children of
men were led by enterprise, covetousness, or ambition.
Has he failed in his successes up to this hour } Did he,
in our fathers' day, fail in his struggle with Joseph of
Germany and his confederates, with Napoleon, a greater
name, and his dependent kings, that, though in another
kind of fight, he should fail in ours } What grey hairs
are on the head of Judah, whose youth is renewed like
the eagle's, whose feet are like the feet of harts, and
underneath the Everlasting arms ?
In the first centuries of the Church all this practical
Introdudojy. 1 5
sagacity of Holy Church was mere matter of faith, but
every age, as it has come, has confirmed faith by actual
sight ; and shame on us, if, with the accumulated testi-
mony of eighteen centuries, our eyes are too gross to
see those victories which the Saints have ever seen by
anticipation. Least of all can we, the Catholics of islands
which have in the cultivation and diffusion of Knowledge
heretofore been so singularly united under the auspices
of the Apostolic See, least of all can we be the men to
distrust its wisdom and to predict its failure, when it
sends us on a similar mission now. I cannot forsret that,
at a time when Celt and Saxon were alike savage, it was
the See of Peter that gave both of them, first faith,
then civilization ; and then again bound them together
in one by the seal of a joint commission to convert and
illuminate in their turn the pagan continent. I cannot
forget how it was from Rome that the glorious St. Patrick
was sent to Ireland, and did a work so great that he
could not have a successor in it, the sanctity and learning
and zeal and charity which followed on his death being
but the result of the one impulse which he gave. I
cannot forget how, in no long time, under the fostering
breath of the Vicar of Christ, a country of heathen super-
stitions became the very wonder and asylum of all people,
— the wonder by reason of its knowledge, sacred and
profane, and the asylum of religion, literature and
science, when chased away from the continent by the
barbarian invaders. I recollect its hospitality, freely
accorded to the pilgrim ; its volumes munificently pre-
sented to the foreign student ; and the prayers, the
blessings, the holy rites, the solemn chants, which sancti-
fied the while both giver and receiver.
Nor can I forget either, how my own England had
meanwhile become the solicitude of the same unwearied
1 6 Discourse I,
eye : how Augustine was sent to us by Gregory ; how he
fainted in the way at the tidings of our fierceness, and,
but for the Pope, would have shrunk as from an
impossible expedition ; how he was forced on " in
weakness and in fear and in much trembling," until he
had achieved the conquest of the island to Christ. Nor,
again, how it came to pass that, when Augustine died
and his work slackened, another Pope, unwearied still,
sent three saints from Rome, to ennoble and refine the
people Augustine had converted. Three holy men set
out for England together, of different nations : Theodore,
an Asiatic Greek, from Tarsus ; Adrian, an African ;
Bennett alone a Saxon, for Peter knows no distinction of
races in his ecumenical work. They came with theology
and science in their train ; with relics, with pictures, with
manuscripts of the Holy Fathers and the Greek classics ;
and Theodore and Adrian founded schools, secular and
monastic, all over England, while Bennett brought to the
north the large library he had collected in foreign parts,
and, with plans and ornamental work from France,
erected a church of stone, under the invocation of St.
Peter, after the Roman fashion, " which," says the his-
torian,* "he most affected." I call to mind how St.
Wilfrid, St. John of Beverley, St. Bede, and other saintly
men, carried on the good work in the following genera-
tions, and how from that time forth the two islands,
England and Ireland, in a dark and dreary age, were
the two lights of Christendom, and had no claims on each
other, and no thought of self, save in the interchange of
kind offices and the rivalry of love.
7.
O memorable time, when St. Aidan and the Irish
* Cressy.
Introducfojy, 1 7
monks went up to Lindisfarne and Melrose, and taught
the Saxon youth, and when a St. Cuthbert and a St.
Eata repaid their charitable toil ! O blessed days
of peace and confidence, when the Celtic Mailduf pene-
trated to Malmesbury in the south, which has inherited
his name, and founded there the famous school which
gave birth to the great St. Aldhelm ! O precious seal
and testimony of Gospel unity, when, as Aldhelm. in
turn tells us, the English went to Ireland "numerous as
bees ; " when the Saxon St. Egbert and St. Willibrod,
preachers to the heathen Frisons, made the voyage to
Ireland to prepare themselves for their work ; and when
from Ireland went forth to Germany the two noble
Ewalds, Saxons also, to earn the crown of martyrdom !
Such a period, indeed, so rich in grace, in peace, in love,
and in good works, could only last for a season ; but,
even when the light was to pass away from them, the
sister islands were destined, not to forfeit, but to transmit
it together. The time came when the neighbouring
continental country was in turn to hold the mission
which they had exercised so long and well ; and when
to it they made over their honourable office, faithful to
the alliance of two hundred years, they made it a joint
act. Alcuin was the pupil both of the English and of
the Irish schools ; and when Charlemagne would revive
science and letters in his own France, it was Alcuin, the
representative both of the Saxon and the Celt, who was
the chief of those who went forth to supply the need of
the great Emperor. Such was the foundation of the
School of Paris, from which, in the course of centuries,
sprang the famous University, the glory of the middle
ages.
The past never returns ; the course of events, old in
7* 2
1 8 Discourse /.
its texture, is ever new in its colouring and fashion.
England and Ireland are not what they once were, but
Rome is where it was, and St. Peter is the same : his
zeal, his charity, his mission, his gifts are all the same.
He of old made the two islands one by giving them
joint work of teaching ; and now surely he is giving us
a like mission, and we shall become one again, while we
zealously and lovingly fulfil it
19
DISCOURSE II.
THEOLOGY A BRANCH OF KNOWLEDGE.
THERE were two questions, to which I drew your
attention, Gentlemen, in the beginning of my first
Discourse, as being of especial importance and interest
at this time : first, whether it is consistent with the idea
of University teaching to exclude Theology from a place
among the sciences which it embraces ; next, whether it
is consistent with that idea to make the useful arts and
sciences its direct and principal concern, to the neglect
of those liberal studies and exercises of mind, in which
it has heretofore been considered mainly to consist.
These are the questions which will form the subject of
what I have to lay before you, and I shall now enter upon
the former of the two.
I.
It is the fashion just now, as you very well know, to
erect so-called Universities, without making any provi-
sion in them at all for Theological chairs. Institutions
of this kind exist both here and in England. Such a
procedure, though defended by writers of the genera-
tion just passed with much plausible argument and not
a little wit, seems to me an intellectual absurdity ; and
my reason for saying so runs, with whatever abruptness,
into the form of a syllogism : — A University, I should
20 Disc^vrse II.
lay down, by its very name professes to teach universal
knowledge: Theology is surely a branch of knowledge :
how then is it possible for it to profess all branches of
knowledge, and yet to exclude from the subjects of its
teaching one which, to say the least, is as important
and as large as any of them ? I do not see that either
premiss of this argument is open to exception.
As to the range of University teaching, certainly the
very name of University is inconsistent with restrictions
of any kind. Whatever was the original reason of the
adoption of that term, which is unknown,* I am only
putting on it its popular, its recognized sense, when I say
that a University should teach universal knowledge.
That there is a real necessity for this universal teaching
in the highest schools of intellect, I will show by-and-by;
here it is sufficient to say that such universality is con-
sidered by writers on the subject to be the very charac-
teristic of a University, as contrasted with other seats of
learning. Thus Johnson, in his Dictionary, defines it to
be " a school where all arts and faculties are taught ; "
and Mosheim, writing as an historian, says that, before
the rise of the University of Paris, — for instance, at Padua,
or Salamanca, or Cologne, — " the whole circle of sciences
then known was not taught ; " but that the school of
Paris, ''which exceeded all others in various respects^
as well as in the number of teachers and students, was
the first to embrace all the arts and sciences, and there-
fore first became a University." f
If, with other authors, we consider the word to be
derived from the invitation which is held out by a Uni-
versity to students of every kind, the result is the same ;
for, if certain branches of knowledge were excluded,
* In Roman law it means a Corporation. Vid. Keuffel, de Scholis.
f Hist. vol. ii. p. 529. London, 1841.
Theology a Branch of Knowledge. 21
those students of course would be excluded also, who
desired to pursue them.
Is it, then, logically consistent in a seat of learning
to call itself a University, and to exclude Theology
from the number of its studies ? And again, is it won-
derful that Catholics, even in the view of reason, putting
aside faith or religious duty, should .be dissatisfied with
existing institutions, which profess to be Universities, ^
and refuse to teach Theology ; and that they should in
consequence desire to possess seats of learning, which
are, not only more Christian, but more philosophical
in their construction, and larger and deeper in their
provisions ?
But this, of course, is to assume that Theology is a
science, and an important one : so I will throw my argu-
ment into a more exact form. I say, then, that if a
University be, from the nature of the case, a place of
instruction, where universal knowledge is professed, and
if in a certain University, so called, the subject of Reli-
gion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable, —
either, on the one hand, that the province of Religion is
very barren of real knowledge, or, on the other hand, that
in such University one special and important branch of
knowledge is omitted. I say, the advocate of such an
institution must say this, or he must say that; he must own,
either that little or nothing is known about the Supreme ^Z'
Being, or that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not.
This is the thesis which I lay down, and on which I shall
insist as the subject of this Discourse. I repeat, such a
compromise between religious parties, as is involved in "-
the establishment of a University which makes no reli-
gious profession, implies that those parties severally
consider, — not indeed that their own respective opinions
are trifles in a moral and practical point of view — of
22 Discourse IL
course not ; but certainly as much as this, that they
are not knowledge. Did they in their hearts believe
that their private views of religion, whatever they are,
were absolutely and objectively true, it is inconceivable
that they would so insult them as to consent to their
omission in an Institution which is bound, from the
nature of the case — from its very idea and its name —
to make a profession of all sorts of knowledge whatever.
I think this will be found to be no matter of words.
I allow then fully, that, when men combine together
for any common object, they are obliged, as a matter of
course, in order to secure the advantages accruing from
united action, to sacrifice many of their private opinions
and wishes, and to drop the minor differences, as they
are commonly called, which exist between man and man.
No two persons perhaps are to be found, however inti-
mate, however congenial in tastes and judgments, how-
ever eager to have one heart and one soul, but must
deny themselves, for the sake of each other, much which
they like or desire, if they are to live together happily.
Compromise, in a large sense of the word, is the first
principle of combination ; and any one who insists on
enjoying his rights to the full, and his opinions without
toleration for his neighbour's, and his own way in al/
things, will soon have all things altogether to himself^
and no one to share them with him. But most true as
this confessedly is, still there is an obvious limit, on the
other hand, to these compromises, however necessary they
be ; and this is found in the proviso, that the differences
surrendered should be but '* minor," or that there should
be no sacrifice of the main object of the combination, in
the concessions which are mutually made. Any sacrifice
Theology a Branch of Knowledge. 2^
which compromises that object is destructive of the
principle of the combination, and no one who would be
consistent can be a party to it.
Thus, for instance, if men of various religious denomi-
nations join together for the dissemination of what are
called " evangelical " tracts, it is under the belief, that,
the object of their uniting, as recognized on all hands,
being the spiritual benefit of their neighbours, no reli-
gious exhortations, whatever be their character, can
essentially interfere with that benefit, which faithfully
insist upon the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. If,
again, they agree together in printing and circulating the
Protestant Bible, it is because they, one and all, hold to
the principle, that, however serious be their differences
of religious sentiment, such differences fade away before
the one great principle, which that circulation symbolizes
■ — that the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the
Bible, is the religion of Protestants. On the contrary,
if the committee of som.e such association inserted tracts
into the copies of the said Bible which they sold, and
tracts in recommendation of the Athanasian Creed or
the merit of good works, I conceive any subscribing
member would have a just right to complain of a pro-
ceeding, which compromised the principle of Private
Judgment as the one true interpreter of Scripture,
These instances are sufficient to illustrate my general
position, that coalitions and comprehensions for an
object, have their life in the prosecution of that object,
and cease to have any meaning as soon as that object is
compromised or disparaged.
When, then, a number of persons come forward, not
as politicians, not as diplomatists, lawyers, traders, or
speculators, but with the one object of advancing Uni-
versal Knowledge, much we may allow them to sacrifice.
24 Discourse II.
— ambition, reputation, leisure, comfort, party-interests,
gold ; one thing they may not sacrifice, — Knowledge
itself. Knowledge being their object, they need not of
course insist on their own private views about ancient or
modern history, or national prosperity, or the balance of
power; they need not of course shrink from the co-ope-
ration of those who hold the opposite views ; but stipulate
they must that Knowledge itself is not compromised ; —
and as to those views, of whatever kind, which they do
allow to be dropped, it is plain they consider such to be
opinions, and nothing more, however dear, however im-
portant to themselves personally ; opinions ingenious,
admirable, pleasurable, beneficial, expedient, but not
worthy the name of Knov/ledge or Science Thus no
one would insist on the Malthusian teaching being a sine
qua non in a seat of learning, who did not think it simply
ignorance not to be a Malthusian ; and no one would
consent to drop the Newtonian theory, who thought it
to have been proved true, in the same sense as the ex-
istence of the sun and moon is true. If, then, in an
Institution which professes all knowledge, nothing is
professed, nothing is taught about the Supreme Being,
it is fair to infer that every individual in the number of
those who advocate that Institution, supposing him con-
sistent, distinctly holds that nothing is known for certain
about the Supreme Being ; nothing such, as to have any
claim to be regarded as a material addition to the stock
of general knovv^ledge existing in the world. If on the
other hand it turns out that something considerable is
known about the Supreme Being, whether from Reason
or Revelation, then the Institution in question professes
every science, and yet leaves out the foremost of them.
In a word, strong as may appear the assertion, I do not
see how I can avoid making it, and bear with me, Gentle-
Theology a Branch oj Kiioiv Ledge. 25
men, while I do so, viz., such an Institution cannot be
what it professes, if there be a God. I do not wish to
declaim ; but, by the very force of the terms, it is very
plain, that a Divine Being and a University so circum-
stanced cannot co-exist.
3.
Still, however, this may seem to many an abrupt con-
clusion, and will not be acquiesced in : what answer,
Gentlemen, will be made to it } Perhaps this : — It will
be said, that there are different kinds or spheres of
Knowledge, human, divine, sensible, intellectual, and the
like ; and that a University certainly takes in all varie-
ties of Knowledge in its own line, but still that it has
a line of its own. It contemplates, it occupies a certain
order, a certain platform, of Knowledge. I understand
the remark ; but I own to you, I do not understand how
it can be made to apply to the matter in hand. I can-
not so construct my definition of the subject-matter of
University Knowledge, and so draw my boundary lines
around it, as to include therein the other sciences com-
monly studied at Universities, and to exclude the
science of Religion. For instance, are we to limit our
idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our
senses .-* then we exclude ethics ; by intuition .'* we ex-
clude history ; by testimony t we exclude metaphysics ;
by abstract reasoning } we exclude physics. Is not the
being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed
dov/n by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought
home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by
the suggestions of our conscience t It is a truth in the
natural order, as well as in the supernatural. So much
for its origin ; and, when obtained, what is it worth } Is
it a great truth or a small one t Is it a comprehensive
26 Discourse II,
truth ? Say that no other rehglous idea whatever were
given but it, and you have enough to fill the mind ; you
have at once a whole dogmatic system. The word
" God " is a Theology in itself, indivisibly one, inex-
haustibly various, from the vastness and the simplici^
of its meaning. Admit a God, and you introduce
among the subjects of your knowledge, a fact encom-
passing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact
conceivable. How can we investigate any part of any
order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which enters
into every order t All true principles run over with it,
all phenomena converge to it ; it is truly the First and
the Last. In word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough
to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and
religious, and to lay down that we will address ourselves
to the one without interfering with the other ; but it is
impossible in fact. Granting that divine truth differs in
kind from human, so do human truths differ in kind one
from another. If the knowledge of the Creator is in a
different order from knowledge of the creature, so, in like
manner, metaphysical science is in a different order from
physical, physics from history, history from ethics.
You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle
of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with
divine.
I have been speaking simply of Natural Theology ;
my argument of course is stronger when I go on to
Revelation. Let the doctrine of the Incarnation be
true : is it not at once of the nature of an historical fact,
and of a metaphysical } Let it be true that there are
Angels : how is not this a point of knowledge in the
same sense as the naturalist's asseveration, that myriads
of living things might co-exist on the point of a needle.?
That the Earth is to be burned by fire, is, if true, as
Theology a Branch of Knowledge, 27
large a fact as that huge monsters once played amid its
depths ; that Antichrist is to come, is as categorical a
heading to a chapter of history, as that Nero or Julian
was Emperor of Rome ; that a divine influence moves
the will, is a subject of thought not more mysterious
than the result of volition on our muscles, which we
admit as a fact in metaphysics.
I do not see how it is possible for a philosophical mind,
first, to believe these religious facts to be true ; next, to
consent to ignore them ; and thirdly, in spite of this, to go
on to profess to be teaching all the while de omni scibili.
No ; if a man thinks in his heart that these religious facts
are short of truth, that they are not true in the sense in
which the general fact and the law of the fall of a stone to
the earth is true, I understand his excluding Religion from
his University, though he professes other reasons for its
exclusion. In that case the varieties of religious opinion
under which he shelters his conduct, are not only his
apology for publicly disowning Religion, but a cause of
his privately disbelieving it. He does not think that any
thing is known or can be known for certain, about the
origin of the world or the end of man.
4.
This, I fear, is the conclusion to which intellects, clear,
logical, and consistent, have come, or are coming, from
the nature of the case ; and, alas ! in addition to this
prhnd-facie suspicion, there are actual tendencies in the
same direction in Protestantism, viewed whether in its
original idea, or again in the so-called Evangelical move-
ment in these islands during the last century. The reli-
gious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that
Religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or senti-
ment. The old Catholic notion, which still lingers in the
2 8 Discourse II.
Established Church, was, that Faith was an intellectual
act, its object truth, and its result knowledge. Thus it
you look into the Anglican Prayer Book, you will find
definite credenda, as well as definite agenda ; but in pro-
portion as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashion-
able to say that Faith was, not an acceptance of revealed
doctrine, not an act of the intellect, but a feeling, an
emotion, an affection, an appetency; and, as this view
of Faith obtained, so was the connexion of Faith with
Truth and Knowledge more and more either forgotten
or denied. At length the identity of this (so-called)
spirituality of heart and the virtue of Faith was acknow-
ledged on all hands. Some men indeed disapproved
the pietism in question, others admired it ; but whether
they admired or disapproved, both the one party and
the other found themselves in agreement on the main
point, viz. — in considering that this really was in sub-
stance Religion, and nothing else ; that Religion was
based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that
nothing was objective, every thing subjective, in doctrine.
I say, even those who saw through the affectation in
which the religious school of which I am speaking clad
itself, still came to think that Religion, as such, consisted
in something short of intellectual exercises, viz., in the
affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions and
consolations, in pleasurable sensations, sudden changes,
and subhme fancies. They learned to believe and to
take it for granted, that Religion was nothing beyond a
supply of the wants of human nature, not an external
fact and a work of God. There was, it appeared, a
demand for Religion, and therefore there was a supply ;
human nature could not do without Religion, any more
Aan it could do without bread ; a supply was absolutely
necessary, good or bad, and, as in the case of the articles
Theology a Braiich of Kitowledge. 29
of daily sustenance, an article which was really inferior
was better than none at all. Thus Religion was useful,
venerable, beautiful, the sanction of order, the stay of
government, the curb of self-will and self-indulgence,
which the laws cannot reach : but, after all, on what was
it based ? Why, that was a question delicate to ask,
and imprudent to answer ; but, if the truth must be
spoken, however reluctantly, the long and the short of
the matter was this, that Religion was based on custom,
on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty,
on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many,
many things, but not at all on reason ; reason was nei-
ther its warrant, nor its instrument, and science had as
little connexion with it as with the fashions of the season,
or the state of the weather.
You see. Gentlemen, how a theory or philosophy,
which began with the religious changes of the sixteenth
century, has led to conclusions, which the authors of
those changes would be the first to denounce, and has
been taken up by that large and influential body which
goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian ; and how,
where it prevails, it is as unreasonable of course to de-
mand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand
one for fine feehng, sense of honour, patriotism, grati-
tude, maternal affection, or good companionship, pro-
posals which would be simply unmeaning.
5.
Now, in illustration of what I have been saying, I will
appeal, in the first place, to a statesman, but not merely
so, to no mere politician, no trader in places, or in votes,
or in the stock market, but to a philosopher, to an orator,
to one whose profession, whose aim, has ever been to
cultivate the fair, the noble, and the generous. I cannot
30 Discourse IL
forget the celebrated discourse of the celebrated man to
whom I am referring ; a man who is first in his pecuHar
walk; and who, moreover (which is much to my purpose),
has had a share, as much as any one alive, in effecting
the public recognition in these Islands of the principle
of separating secular and religious knowledge. This
brilliant thinker, during the years in which he was exert-
ing himself in behalf of this principle, made a speech
or discourse, on occasion of a public solemnity ; and in
reference to the bearing of general knowledge upon reli-
gious belief, he spoke as follows :
"As men," he said, " will no longer suffer themselves
to be led blindfold in ignorance, so will they no more
yield to the vile principle of judging and treating their
fellow-creatures, not according to the intrinsic merit of
their actions, but according to the accidental and in-
voluntary coincidence of their opinions. The great
truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth,"
and he prints it in capital letters, " that man shall no more
render account to man for his belief, over which he has
himself no control. Henceforward, nothing shall prevail
upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he
can no more change, than he can the hue of his skin or
the height of his stature."* You see, Gentlemen, if this
philosopher is to decide the matter, religious ideas are
just as far from being real, or representing anything
beyond themselves, are as truly peculiarities, idiosyn-
cracies, accidents of the individual, as his having the
stature of a Patagonian, or the features of a Negro.
But perhaps this vvas the rhetoric of an excited
moment. Far from it. Gentlemen, or I should not have
fastened on the words of a fertile mind, uttered so long
ago. What Mr. Brougham laid down as a principle in
* Mr. Brougham's Glasgow Discourse.
Theology a Branch of K^iowledge. 31
1825, resounds on all sides of us, with ever-growing con-
fidence and success, in 1852. I open the Minutes of
the Committee of Council on Education for the years
1848-50, presented to both Houses of Parliament by com-
mand of Her Majesty, and I find one of Her Majesty's
Inspectors of Schools, at p. 467 of the second volume,
dividing " the topics usually embraced in the better class
of primary schools" into four : — the knowledge of signs,
as reading and writing ; of facts, as geography and
astronomy ; of relations and laws, as mathematics ; and
lastly sentiment, such as poetry and music. Now, on
first catching sight of this division, it occurred to me to
ask myself, before ascertaining the writer's own resolu-
tion of the matter, under which of these four heads
would fall Religion, or whether it fell under any of them.
Did he put it aside as a thing too dehcate and sacred
to be enumerated with earthly studies } or did he dis-
tinctly contemplate it when he made his division.? Any-
how, I could really find a place for it under the first
head, or the second, or the third ; — for it has to do
with facts, since it tells of the Self-subsisting ; it has
to do with relations, for it tells of the Creator ; it
has to do with signs, for it tells of the due manner of
speaking of Him. There was just one head of the
division to which I could not refer it, viz., to sentiment ;
for, I suppose, music and poetry, which are the writer's
own examples of sentiment, have not much to do with
Truth, which is the main object of Religion. Judge then
my surprise. Gentlemen, when I found the fourth was
the very head selected by the writer of the Report in
question, as the special receptacle of religious topics.
" The inculcation of sentiment',^ he says, " embraces read-
ing in its higher sense, poetry, music, together with
moral and religious Education." I am far from intro-
32 Discourse II.
ducing this writer for his own sake, because I have no
wish to hurt the feehngs of a gentleman, who is but
exerting himself zealously in the discharge of anxious
duties ; but, taking him as an illustration of the wide-
spreading school of thought to which he belongs, I ask
what can more clearly prove than a candid avowal like
this, that, in the view of his school. Religion is not
knowledge, has nothing whatever to do with knowledge,
and is excluded from a University course of instruction,
not simply because the exclusion cannot be helped,
from political or social obstacles, but because it has no
business there at all, because it is to be considered
a taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more ?
The writer avows this conclusion himself, in the ex-
planation into which he presently enters, in which he
says : " According to the classification proposed, the
essential idea of all religious Education will consist in the
direct cultivation of t\\Q feelings. '' What we contemplate,
then, what we aim at, when we give a religious Educa-
tion, is, it seems, not to impart any knowledge whatever,
but to satisfy anyhow desires after the Unseen which
will arise in our minds in spite of ourselves, to provide the
mind with a means of self-command, to impress on it the
beautiful ideas which saints and sages have struck out, to
embellish it with the bright hues of a celestial piety, to
teach it the poetry of devotion, the music of well-ordered
affections, and the luxury of doing good. As for the in-
tellect, its exercise happens to be unavoidable, whenever
moral impressions are made, from the constitution of the
human mind, but it varies in the results of that exercise,
in the conclusions which it draws from our impressions,
according to the peculiarities of the individual.
Something like this seems to be the writer's mean-
ing, but we need not pry into its finer issues in order to
Theology a Branch of Knowledge, 33
gain a distinct view of its general bearing ; and taking
it, as I think we fairly may take it, as a specimen of the
philosophy of the day, as adopted by those who are not
conscious unbelievers, or open scoffers, I consider it
amply explains how it comes to pass that this day's phi-
losophy sets up a system of universal knowledge, and
teaches of plants, and earths, and creeping things, and
beasts, and gases, about the crust of the earth and the
changes of the atmosphere, about sun, moon, and stars,
about man and his doings, about the history of the world,
about sensation, memory, and the passions, about duty,
about cause and effect, about all things imaginable,
except one — and that is, about Him that made all these
things, about God. I say the reason is plain because
they consider knowledge, as regards the creature, is
inimitable, but impossible or hopeless as regards the
being and attributes and works of the Creator.
6.
Here, however, it may be objected to me that this re-
presentation is certainly extreme, for the school in ques-
tion does, in fact, lay great stress on the evidence afforded
by the creation, to the Being and Attributes of the
Creator. I may be referred, for instance, to the words of
one of the speakers on a memorable occasion. At the
very time of laying the first stone of the University of
London, I confess it, a learned person, since elevated to
the Protestant See of Durham, which he still fills, opened
the proceedings with prayer. He addressed the Deity, as
the authoritative Report informs us, "the whole sur-
rounding assembly standing uncovered in solemn silence."
'' Thou," he said, in the name of all present, " thou hast
constructed the vast fabric of the universe in so wonder-
ful a manner, so arranged its motions, and so formed its
'* 3
34 Discourse II.
productions, that the contemplation and study of thy
works exercise at once the mind in the pursuit of human
science, and lead it onwards to Divine Truth!' Here is
apparently a distinct recognition that there is such a
thing as Truth in the province of Religion ; and, did the
passage stand by itself, and were it the only means we
possessed of ascertaining the sentiments of the powerful
body whom this distinguished person there represented,
it would, as far as it goes, be satisfactory. I admit it ;
and I admit also the recognition of the Being and cer-
tain Attributes of the Deity, contained in the writings of
the gifted person whom I have already quoted, whose
genius, versatile and multiform as it is, in nothing has
been so constant, as in its devotion to the advancement
of knowledge, scientific and literary. He then certainly,
in his " Discourse of the objects, advantages, and plea-
sures of science," after variously illustrating what he
terms its '' gratifying treats," crowns the catalogue with
mention of " the highest of all our gratifications in the
contemplation of science," which he proceeds to explain
thus :
" We are raised by them," says he, " to an understand-
ing of the infinite wisdom and goodness which the Creator
his displayed in all His works. Not a step can be taken
in any direction," he continues, " without perceiving the
most extraordinary traces of design ; and the skill, every
where conspicuous, is calculated in so vast a proportion
of instances to promote the happiness of Hving creatures,
and especially of ourselves, that we can feel no hesitation
in concluding, that, if we knew the whole scheme of
Providence, every part would be in harmony with a plan
of absolute benevolence. Independent, however, of this
most consoling inference, the delight is inexpressible, of
being able to follow, as it were, with our eyes, the mar-
TJieology a Branch of Knowledge. 35
vellous works of the Great Architect of Nature, to trace
the unbounded power and exquisite skill which are
exhibited in the most minute, as well as the mightiest
parts of His system. The pleasure derived from this
study is unceasing, and so various, that it never tires the
appetite. But it is unlike the low gratifications of sense
in another respect : it elevates and refines our nature,
while those hurt the health, debase the understanding,
and corrupt the feehngs ; it teaches us to look upon all
earthly objects as insignificant and below our notice,
except the pursuit of knowledge and the cultivation of
virtue, that is to say, the strict performance of our duty
in every relation of society ; and it gives a dignity and
importance to the enjoyment of life, which the frivolous
and the grovelling cannot even comprehend."
Such are the words of this prominent champion of
Mixed Education. If logical inference be, as it un-
doubtedly is, an instrument of truth, surely, it may be
answered to me, in admitting the possibility of inferring
the Divine Being and Attributes from the phenomena
of nature, he distinctly admits a basis of truth for the
doctrines of Religion.
7.
I wish, Gentlemen, to give these representations their
full weight, both from the gravity of the question, and
the consideration due to the persons whom I am arraign-
ing ; but, before I can feel sure I understand them, I
must ask an abrupt question. When I am told, then, by
the partisans of Universities without Theological teaching,
that human science leads to belief in a Supreme Being,
without denying the fact, nay, as a Catholic, with full
conviction of it, nevertheless I am obliged to ask what
the statement means in their mouths, what they, the
36 Discourse II.
speakers, understand by the word " God." Let me not
be thought offensive, if I question, whether it means the
same thing on the two sides of the controversy. With
us Catholics, as with the first race of Protestants, as with
Mahometans, and all Theists, the word contains, as I
have already said, a theology in itself. At the risk of
anticipating what I shall have occasion to insist upon in
my next Discourse, let me say that, according to the
teaching of Monotheism, God is an Individual, Self-
dependent, All-perfect, Unchangeable Being ; intelligent,
living, personal, and present ; almighty, all-seeing, all-
remembering; between whom and His creatures there is
an infinite gulf ; who has no origin, who is all-sufiicient
for Himself; who created and upholds the universe ; who
will judge every one of us, sooner or later, according to
that Law of right and wrong which He has written on
our hearts. He is One who is sovereign over, operative
amidst, independent of, the appointments which He has
made; One in whose hands are all things, who has a pur-
pose in every event, and a standard for every deed, and
thus has relations of His own towards the subject-matter
of each particular science which the book of knowledge
unfolds ; who has with an adorable, never-ceasing energy
implicated Himself in all the history of creation, the
constitution of nature, the course of the world, the
origin of society, the fortunes of nations, the action of the
human mind ; and who thereby necessarily becomes the
subject-matter of a science, far wider and more noble than
any of those which are included in the circle of secular
Education.
This is the doctrine which behef in a God implies in
the mind of a Catholic : if it means any thing, it means
all this, and cannot keep from meaning all this, and a
great deal more ; and, e^^n though there were nothing
Theology a Bi^anch of Knowledge. 37
in the religious tenets of the last three centuries to dis-
parage - dogmatic truth, still, even then, I should have
difficulty in believing that a doctrine so mysterious, so
peremptory, approved itself as a matter of course to
educated men of this day, who gave their minds atten-
tively to consider it. Rather, in a state of society such
as ours, in which authority, prescription, tradition, habit,
moral instinct, and the divine influences go for nothing-,
in which patience of thought, and depth and consistency
of view, are scorned as subtle and scholastic, in which
free discussion and fallible judgment are prized as the
birthright of each individual, I must be excused if I
exercise towards this age, as regards its belief in this
doctrine, some portion of that scepticism which it
exercises itself towards every received but unscrutinized
assertion whatever. I cannot take it for granted, I must
have it brought home to me by tangible evidence, that
the spirit of the age means by the Supreme Being what
Catholics mean. Nay, it would be a relief to my mind
to gain some ground of assurance, that the parties in-
fluenced by that spirit had, I will not say, a true apprehen-
sion of God, but even so much as the idea of what a true
apprehension is.
Nothing is easier than to use the word, and mean no-
thing by it. The heathens used to say, "God wills,"
when they meant " Fate ;" " God provides," when they
meant " Chance ;" " God acts," when they meant " In-
stinct" or "Sense;" and "God is every where," when
they meant " the Soul of Nature." The Almighty is
something infinitely different from a principle, or a
centre of action, or a quality, or a generalization of
phenomena. If, then, by the word, you do but mean a
Being who keeps the world in order, who acts in it, but
only in the way of general Providence, who acts towards
38 Discourse IL
us but only through what are called laws of Nature,
who is more certain not to act at all than to act independ-
ent of those laws, who is known and approached indeed,
but only through the medium of those laws ; such a God
it is not difficult for any one to conceive, not difficult for
any one to endure. If, I say, as you would revolu-
tionize society, so you would revolutionize heaven, if you
have changed the divine sovereignty into a sort of con-
stitutional monarchy, in which the Throne has honour
and ceremonial enough, but cannot issue the most
ordinary command except through legal forms and
precedents, and with the counter-signature of a minister,
then belief in a God is no more than an acknowledgment
of existing, sensible powers and phenomena, which none
but an idiot can deny. If the Supreme Being is power-
ful or skilful, just so far forth as the telescope shows
power, and the microscope shows skill, if His moral law
is to be ascertained simply by the physical processes of
the animal frame, or His will gathered from the im-
mediate issues of human affairs, if His Essence is just as
high and deep and broad and long as the universe,
and no more ; if this be the fact, then will I confess
that there is no specific science about God, that theo-
logy is but a name, and a protest in its behalf an
hypocrisy. Then is He but coincident with the laws of
the universe ; then is He but a function, or correlative,
or subjective reflection and mental impression, of each
phenomenon of the material or moral world, as it flits
before us. Then, pious as it is to think of Him, while
the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes
by, still, such piety is nothing more than a poetry of
thought or an ornament of language, and has not even
an infinitesimal influence upon philosophy or science, of
which it is rather the parasitical production.
Theology a Branch 0/ Knowledge, 39
I understand, in that case, why Theology should require
no specific teaching, for there is nothing to mistake
about ; why it is powerless against scientific anticipations,
for it merely is one of them ; why it is simply absurd in
its denunciations of heresy, for heresy does not lie in the
region of fact and experiment. I understand, in that
case, how it is that the religious sense is but a " senti-
ment," and its exercise a " gratifying treat," for it is like
the sense of the beautiful or the sublime. I understand
how the contemplation of the universe "leads onwards to
divine truth," for divine truth is not something separate
from Nature, but it is Nature with a divine glow upon
it. I understand the zeal expressed for Physical Theo-
logy, for this study is but a mode of looking at Physical
Nature, a certain view taken of Nature, private and
personal, which one man has, and another has not, which
gifted minds strike out, which others see to be admirable
and ingenious, and which all would be the better for
adopting. It is but the theology of Nature, just as we
talk of the philosophy or the romance of history, or the
poetry of childhood, or the picturesque, or the sentimen-
tal, or the humorous, or any other abstract quality, which
the genius or the caprice of the individual, or the fashion
of the day, or the consent of the world, recognizes in
any set of objects which are subjected to its contem-
plation.
8.
Such ideas of religion seem to me short of Monotheism ;
I do not impute them to this or that individual who be-
longs to the school which gives them currency ; but what
I read about the " gratification " of keeping pace in our
scientific researches with "the Architect of Nature;"
about the said gratification " giving a dignity and import-
ance to the enjoyment of life," and teaching us that
40 Discourse II.
knowledge and our duties to society are the only earthly
objects worth our notice, all this, I own it, Gentlemen,
frightens me ; nor is Dr. Maltby's address to the Deity
sufficient to reassure me. I do not see much difference
between avowing that there is no God, and implying that
nothing definite can for certain be known about Him ;
and when I find Religious Education treated as the cul-
tivation of sentiment, and Religious Belief as the acci-
dental hue or posture of the mind, I am reluctantly but
forcibly reminded of a very unpleasant page of Meta-
physics, viz., of the relations between God and Nature
insinuated by such philosophers as Hume. This acute,
though most low-minded of speculators, in his inquiry
concerning the Human Understanding, introduces, as is
well known, Epicurus, that is, a teacher of atheism, de-
livering an harangue to the Athenian people, not indeed
in defence, but in extenuation of that opinion. His ob-
ject is to show that, whereas the atheistic view is nothing
else than the repudiation of theory, and an accurate
representation of phenomenon and fact, it cannot be
dangerous, unless phenomenon and fact be dangerous.
Epicurus is made to say, that the paralogism of philo-
sophy has ever been that of arguing from Nature in
behalf of something beyond Nature, greater than Nature ;
whereas, God, as he maintains, being known only
through the visible world, our knowledge of Him is ab-
solutely commensurate with our knowledge of it, — is
nothing distinct from it, — is but a mode of viewing it.
Hence it follows that, provided we admit, as we cannot
help admitting, the phenomena of Nature and the world,
it is only a question of words whether or not we go on
to the hypothesis of a second Being, not visible but im-
material, parallel and coincident with Nature, to whom
we give the name of God. " Allowing," he says, " the
Theology a Branch of Knowledge. 41
gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the
universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree
of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears
in their workmanship ; but nothing farther can be proved,
except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and
flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning.
So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear,
so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The
supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis ;
much more the supposition that, in distant periods of
place and time, there has been, or will be, a miore magni-
ficent display of these attributes, and a scheme of admin-
istration more suitable to such imaginary virtues."
Here is a reasoner, who would not hesitate to deny
that there is any distinct science or philosophy possible
concerning the Supreme Being ; since every single thing
we know of Him is this or that or the other phenomenon,
material or moral, which already falls under this or that
natural science. In him then it would be only consistent
to drop Theology in a course of University Education :
but how is it consistent in any one who shrinks from his
companionship } I am glad to see that the author,
several times mentioned, is in opposition to Hume, in
one sentence of the quotation I have made from his
Discourse upon Science, deciding, as he does, that the
phenomena of the material world are insufficient for the
full exhibition of the Divine Attributes, and implying
that they require a supplemental process to complete
and harmonize their evidence. But is not this supple-
mental process a science } and if so, why not acknow-
ledge its existence } If God is more than Nature,
Theology claims a place among the sciences : but, on the
other hand, if you are not sure of as much as this, how
do you differ from Hume or Epicurus ?
42 Discourse IL
9.
I end then as I began : religious doctrine is knowledge.
This is the important truth, little entered into at this day,
which I wish that all who have honoured me with their
presence here would allow me to beg them to take away
with them. I am not catching at sharp arguments, but
laying down grave principles. Religious doctrine is
knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is
knowledge. University Teaching without Theology is
simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good
a right to claim a place there as Astronomy.
In my next Discourse it will be my object to show
that its omission from the list of recognized sciences is
not only indefensible in itself, but prejudicial to all the
rest.
43
DISCOURSE III.
BEARING OF THEOLOGY ON OTHER BRANCHES OF
KNOWLEDGE.
WHEN men of great intellect, who have long and
intently and exclusively given themselves to the
study or investigation of some one particular branch of
secular knowledge, whose mental life is concentrated and
hidden in their chosen pursuit, and who have neither
eyes nor ears for any thing which does not immediately
bear upon it, when such men are at length made to realize
that there is a clamour all around them, which must be
heard, for what they have been so little accustomed to
place in the category of knowledge as Religion, and that
they themselves are accused of disaffection to it, they are
impatient at the interruption ; they call the demand
tyrannical, and the requisitionists bigots or fanatics.
They are tempted to say, that their only wish is to be
let alone; for themselves, they are not dreaming of offend-
ing any one, or interfering with any one ; they are pur-
suing their own particular line, they have never spoken a
word against any one's religion, whoever he may be,
and never mean to do so. It does not follow that they
deny the existence of a God, because they are not found
talking of it, when the topic would be utterly irrelevant.
44 Discourse II L
All they say is, that there are other beings in the world
besides the Supreme Being ; their business is with them.
After all, the creation is not the Creator, nor things
secular religious. Theology and human science are two
things, not one, and have their respective provinces,
contiguous it may be and cognate to each other, but not
identical. When we are contemplating earth, we are not
contemplating heaven ; and when we are contemplating
heaven, we are not contemplating earth. Separate sub-
jects should be treated separately. As division of labour,
so division of thought is the only means of successful
application. '' Let us go our own way," they say, " and
you go yours. We do not pretend to lecture on Theology,
and you have no claim to pronounce upon Science."
With this feeling they attempt a sort of compromise,
between their opponents who claim for Theology a free
introduction into the Schools of Science, and themselves
who would exclude it altogether, and it is this : viz., that
it should remain indeed excluded from the public
schools, but that it should be permitted in private,
wherever a sufficient number of persons is found to
desire it. Such persons, they seem to say, may have it
all their own way, when they are by themselves, so that
they do Bot attempt to disturb a comprehensive system
of instruction, acceptable and useful to all, by the in-
trusion of opinions peculiar to their own minds.
I am now going to attempt a philosophical answer to
this representation, that is, to the project of teaching-
secular knowledge in the University Lecture Room, and
remanding religious knowledge to the parish priest, the
catechism, and the parlour ; and in doing so, you must
pardon me. Gentlemen, if my subject should oblige me
to pursue a lengthy and careful course of thought, which
may be wearisome to the hearer : — I begin then thus : —
Bearing of Theology on Other Knoiv ledge. 45
Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind ;
and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose
it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their
relations, which stand towards each other pretty much
as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as
contemplated by the human mind, forms one large
system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself
into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as
being portions of a whole, have countless relations of
every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the
apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves, or in
their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken
together form one integral subject for contemplation, so
there are no natural or real limits between part and
part ; one is ever running into another ; all, as viewed
by the mind, are combined together, and possess a
correlative character one with another, from the internal
mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sen-
sations and consciousness, from the most solemn appoint-
ments of the Lord of all down to what may be called the
accident of the hour, from the most glorious seraph down
to the vilest and most noxious of reptiles.
Now, it is not wonderful that, with all its capabilities,
the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a
single glance, or gain possession of it at once. Like a
short-sighted reader, its eye pores closely, and travels
slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its in-
spection. Or again, as we deal with some huge structure
of many parts and sides, the mind goes round about it,
noting down, first one thing, then another, as it best may,
and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making
progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees
46 Discourse III.
and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject
to itself a knowledge of that universe into which it has
been born.
These various partial views or abstractions, by means
of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called
sciences, and embrace respectively larger or smaller por-
tions of the field of knowledge ; sometimes extending far
and wide, but superficially, sometimes with exactness
over particular departments, sometimes occupied together
3n one and the same portion, sometimes holding one part
in common, and then ranging on this side or that in abso-
lute divergence one from the other. Thus Optics has for
its subject the whole visible creation, so far forth as it is
simply visible ; Mental Philosophy has a narrower pro-
vince, but a richer one. Astronomy, plane and physical,
each has the same subject-matter, but views it or treats
it differently; lastly, Geology and Comparative Anatomy
have subject-matters partly the same, partly distinct.
Now these views or sciences, as being abstractions, have
far more to do with the relations of things than with
things themselves. They tell us what things are, only or
principally by telling us their relations, or assigning pre-
dicates to subjects ; and therefore they never tell us all
that can be said about a thing, even when they tell some-
thing, nor do they bring it before us, as the senses do.
They arrange and classify facts ; they reduce separate
phenomena under a common law ; they trace effects to a
cause. Thus they serve to transfer our knowledge from
the custody of memory to the surer and more abiding
protection of philosophy, thereby providing both for its
spread and its advance : — for, inasmuch as sciences are
forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master
and increase it ; and, inasmuch as they are instruments,
to communicate it readily to others. Still, after all, they
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge, 47
proceed on the principle of a division of labour, even
though that division is an abstraction, not a literal
separation into parts ; and, as the maker of a bridle or
an epaulet has not, on that account, any idea of the
science of tactics or strategy, so in a parallel way, it is
not every science which equally, nor any one which fully,
enlightens the mind in the knowledge of things, as they
are, or brings home to it the external object on which it
wishes to gaze. Thus they differ in importance ; and
according to their importance will be their influence,
not only on the mass of knowledge to which they all
converge and contribute, but on each other.
Since then sciences are the results of mental processes
about one and the same subject-matter, viewed under its
various aspects, and are true results, as far as they go,
yet at the same time separate and partial, it follows that
on the one hand they need external assistance, one by
one, by reason of their incompleteness, and on the other
that they are able to afford it to each other, by reason,
first, of their independence in themselves, and then of
their connexion in their subject-matter. Viewed alto-
gether, they approximate to a representation or sub-
jective reflection of the objective truth, as nearly as is
possible to the human mind, which advances towards the
accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to
the number of sciences which it has mastered ; and
which, when certain sciences are away, in such a case has
but a defective apprehension, in proportion to the value
of the sciences which are thus wanting, and the import-
ance of the field on which they are employed.
3.
Let us take, for instance, man himself as our object of
contemplation ; then at once we shall find we can view
48 Discourse II L
him in a variety of relations ; and according to those
relations are the sciences of which he is the subject-matter,
and according to our acquaintance with them is our pos-
session of a true knowledge of him. We may view him
in relation to the material elements of his body, or to his
mental constitution, or to his household and family, or
to the community in which he lives, or to the Being who
made him ; and in consequence we treat of him respec-
tively as physiologists, or as moral philosophers, or as
writers of economics, or of politics, or as theologians.
When we think of him in all these relations together, or
as the subject at once of all the sciences I have named,
then we may be said to reach unto and rest in the idea
of man as an object or external fact, similar to that which
the eye takes of his outward form. On the other hand,
according as we are only physiologists, or only politicians,
or only moralists, so is our idea of man more or less
unreal; we do not take in the whole of him, and the
defect is greater or less, in proportion as the relation is,
or is not, important, which is omitted, whether his relation
to God, or to his king, or to his children, or to his own
component parts. And if there be one relation, about
which we know nothing at all except that it exists, then
is our knowledge of him, confessedly and to our own
consciousness, deficient and partial, and that, I repeat,
in proportion to the importance of the relation.
That therefore is true of sciences in general which we
are apt to think applies only to pure mathematics, though
to pure mathematics it applies especially, viz., that they
cannot be considered as simple representations or in-
formants of things as they are. We are accustomed to
say, and say truly, that the conclusions of pure mathe-
matics are applied, corrected, and adapted, by mixed ;
but so too the conclusions of Anatomy, Chemistry,
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge. 49
Dynamics, and other sciences, are revised and completed
by each other. Those several conclusions do not represent
whole and substantive things, but views, true, so far
as they go ; and in order to ascertain how far they
do go, that is, how far they correspond to the object
to which they belong, we must compare them with the
views taken out of that object by other sciences. Did
we proceed upon the abstract theory of forces, we should
assign a much more ample range to a projectile than in
fact the resistance of the air allows it to accomplish.
Let, however, that resistance be made the subject ot
scientific analysis, and theri we shall have a new
science, assisting, and to a certain point completing, for
the benefit of questions of fact, the science of projection.
On the other hand, the science of projection itself, con-
sidered as belonging to the forces it contemplates, is
not more perfect, as such, by this supplementary in-
vestigation. And in like manner, as regards the whole
circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of
fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatize, except
hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles. For
instance, the Newtonian philosophy requires the admis-
sion of certain metaphysical postulates, if it is to be more
than a theory or an hypothesis ; as, for instance, that
what happened yesterday will happen to-morrow ; that
there is such a thing as matter, that our senses are trust-
worthy, that there is a logic of induction, and so on.
Now to Newton metaphysicians grant all that he asks ;
but, if so be, they may not prove equally accommodating
to another who asks something else, and then all his
most logical conclusions in the science of physics would
remain hopelessly on the stocks, though finished, and
never could be launched into the sphere of fact.
Again, did I know nothing about the movement of
7* 4
50 Discourse III.
bodies, except what the theory of gravitation supplies,
were I simply absorbed in that theory so as_ to make
it measure all motion on earth and in the sky, I should
indeed come to many right conclusions, I should hit off
many important facts, ascertain many existing relations,
and correct many popular errors : I should scout and
ridicule with great success the old notion, that light bodies
flew up and heavy bodies fell down ; but I should go on
with equal confidence to deny the phenomenon of capil-
lary attraction. Here I should be wrong, but only be-
cause I carried out my science irrespectively of other
sciences. In like manner, did I simply give myself to
the investigation of the external action of body upon
body, I might scoff at the very idea of chemical affinities
and combinations, and reject it as simply unintelligible.
Were I a mere chemist, I should deny the influence of
mind upon bodily health ; and so on, as regards the
devotees of any science, or family of sciences, to the ex-
clusion of others ; they necessarily become bigots and
quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts which
do not belong to their own pursuit, and thinking to effect
everything without aid from any other quarter. Thus,
before now, chemistry has been substituted for medicine ;
and again, political economy, or intellectual enlighten-
ment, or the reading of the Scriptures, has been cried up
as a panacea against vice, malevolence, and misery.
4.
Summing up. Gentlemen, what I have said, I lay it
down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its
subject-matter is one ; for the universe in its length and
breadth is so intimately knit together, that we cannot
separate off portion from portion, and operation from
operation, except by a mental abstraction ; and then
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge, 5 1
again, as to its Creator, though He of course in His own
Being is infinitely separate from it, and Theology has its
departments towards which human knowledge has no
relations, yet He has so implicated Himself with it, and
taken it into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His
providence over it, His impressions upon it, and His
influences through it, that we cannot truly or fully con-
template it without in some main aspects contemplating
Him. Next, sciences are the results of that mental
abstraction, which I have spoken of, being the logical
record of this or that aspect of the whole subject-matter
of knowledge. As they all belong to one and the same
circle of objects, they are one and all connected to-
gether ; as they are but aspects of things, they are
severally incomplete in their relation to the things them-
selves, though complete in their own idea and for their
own respective purposes ; on both accounts they at once
need and subserve each other. And further, the com-
prehension of the bearings of one science on another,
and the use of each to each, and the location and limi-
tation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all,
one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of
science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a
science of sciences, v/hich is my own conception of what
is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word,
and of a philosophical habit of mind, and which in these
Discourses I shall call by that name. This is what I
have to say about knowledge and philosophical know-
ledge generally ; and now I proceed to apply it to the
particular science, which has led me to draw it out.
I say, then, that the systematic omission of any one
science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and
completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in
proportion to its importance. Not even Theology itself,
52 Discourse III.
though it comes from heaven, though its truths were
given once for all at the first, though they are more
certain on account of the Giver than those of mathe-
matics, not even Theology, so far as it is relative to us,
or is the Science of Religion, do I exclude from the law
to which every mental exercise is subject, viz., from that
imperfection, which ever must attend the abstract, when
it would determine the concrete. Nor do I speak only
of Natural Religion ; for even the teaching of the Catho-
lic Church, in certain of its aspects, that is, its religious
teaching, is variously influenced by the other sciences.
Not to insist on the introduction of the Aristotelic philo-
sophy into its phraseology, its explanation of dogmas
is influenced by ecclesiastical acts or events ; its inter-
pretations of prophecy are directly affected by the issues
of history ; its comments upon Scripture by the con-
clusions of the astronomer and the geologist ; and its
casuistical decisions by the various experience, political,
social, and psychological, with which times and places
are ever supplying it.
What Theology gives, it has a right to take ; or rather,
the interests of Truth oblige it to take. If we would not
be beguiled by dreams, if we would ascertain facts as
they are, then, granting Theology is a real science, we
cannot exclude it, and still call ourselves philosophers.
I have asserted nothing as yet as to the pre-eminent
dignity of Religious Truth ; I only say, if there be
Religious Truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it
without prejudice to truth of every kind, physical, meta-
physical, historical, and moral ; for it bears upon all
truth. And thus I answer the objection with which I
opened this Discourse. I supposed the question put to
me by a philosopher of the day, " Why cannot you go
your way, and let us go ours .?" I ansv>er, in the name
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge, 53
of the Science of Religion, "When Newton can dis-
pense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense
with us." So much at first sight ; now I am going on to
claim a little more for Theology, by classing it with
branches of knowledge which may with greater decency
be compared to it.
5.
Let us see, then, how this supercilious treatment of so
momentous a science, for momentous it must be, if there
be a God, runs in a somewhat parallel case. The great
philosopher of antiquity, when he would enumerate the
causes of the things that take place in the world, after
making mention of those which he considered to be
physical and material, adds, " and the mind and every-
thing which is by means of man."* Certainly ; it would
have been a preposterous course, when he would trace
the effects he saw around him to their respective sources,
had he directed his exclusive attention upon some one
class or order of originating principles, and ascribed
to these everything which happened anywhere. It
would indeed have been unworthy a genius so curious,
so penetrating, so fertile, so analytical as Aristotle's, to
have laid it down that everything on the face of the
earth could be accounted for by the material sciences,
without the hypothesis of moral agents. It is incredible
that in the investigation of physical results he could
ignore so influential a being as man, or forget that, not
only brute force and elemental movement, but know-
ledge also is power. And this so much the more, inas-
much as moral and spiritual agents belong to another,
not to say a higher, order than physical; so that the
omission supposed would not have been merely an
* Arist. Etliic. Nicom., iii. 3.
54 Discourse III,
oversight in matters of detail, but a philosophical error,
and a fault in division.
However, we live in an age of the world when the
career of science and literature is little affected by what
was done, or would have been done, by this venerable
authority ; so, we will suppose, in England or Ireland, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, a set of persons of
name and celebrity to meet together, in spite of Aristotle,
in order to adopt a line of proceeding which they conceive
the circumstances of the time render imperative. We will
suppose that a difficulty just now besets the enunciation
and discussion of all matters of science, in consequence
of the extreme sensitiveness of large classes of the com-
munity, clergy and laymen, on the subjects of necessity,
responsibility, the standard of morals, and the nature of
virtue. Parties run so high, that the only way of avoid-
ing constant quarrelling in defence of this or that side of
the question is, in the judgment of the persons I am sup-
posing, to shut up the subject of anthropology altogether.
This is accordingly done. Henceforth man is to be as if
he were not, in the general course of Education ; the moral
and mental sciences are to have no professorial chairs,
and the treatment of them is to be simply left as a matter
of private judgment, which each individual may carry out
as he will. I can just fancy such a prohibition ab-
stractedly possible ; but one thing I cannot fancy pos-
sible, viz., that the parties in question, after this sweeping
act of exclusion, should forthwith send out proposals on
the basis of such exclusion for publishing an Encyclo-
paedia, or erecting a National University.
It is necessary, however, Gentlemen, for the sake of the
illustration which I am setting before you, to imagine
what cannot be. I say, let us imagine a project for
organizing a system of scientific teaching, in which the
Bearing of Theology on Othej^ Knowledge. 55
agency of man in the material world cannot allowably
be recognized, and may allowably be denied. Physical
and mechanical causes are exclusively to be treated of ;
volition is a forbidden subject. A prospectus is put out,
with a list of sciences, we will say, Astronomy, Optics,
Hydrostatics, Galvanism, Pneumatics, Statics, Dynamics,
Pure Mathematics, Geology, Botany, Physiology, Ana-
tomy, and so forth ; but not a word about the mind and
its powers, except what is said in explanation of the
omission. That explanation is to the effect that the
parties concerned in the undertaking have given long and
anxious thought to the subject, and have been reluctantly
driven to the conclusion that it is simply impracticable
to include in the list of University Lectures the Philo-
sophy of Mind. What relieves, however, their regret is
the reflection, that domestic feelings and polished man-
ners are best cultivated in the family circle and in good
society, in the observance of the sacred ties which unite
father, mother, and child, in the correlative claims and
duties of citizenship, in the exercise of disinterested
loyalty and enlightened patriotism. With this apology,
such as it is, they pass over the consideration of the
human mind and its powers and works, "in solemn
silence," in their scheme of University Education.
Let a charter be obtained for it ; let professors be ap-
pointed, lectures given, examinations passed, degrees
awarded : — what sort of exactness or trustworthiness,
what philosophical largeness, will attach to views formed
in an intellectual atmosphere thus deprived of some of
the constituent elements of daylight .f* What judgment
will foreign countries and future times pass on the labours
of the most acute and accomplished of the philosophers
who have been parties to so portentous an unreality }
Here are professors gravely lecturing on medicine, or
56 Discourse III.
history, or political economy, who, so far from being bound
to acknowledge, are free to scoff at the action of mind
upon matter, or of mind upon mind, or the claims of
mutual justice and charity. Common sense indeed and
public opinion set bounds at first to so intolerable a
licence ; yet, as time goes on, an omission which was
originally but a matter of expedience, commends itself
to the reason ; and at length a professor is found, more
hardy than his brethren, still however, as he himself main-
tains, with sincere respect for domestic feelings and good
manners, who takes on him to deny psychology in toto,
to pronounce the influence of mind in the visible world
a superstition, and to account for every effect which is
found in the world by the operation of physical causes.
Hitherto intelligence and volition were accounted real
powers ; the muscles act, and their action cannot be repre-
sented by any scientific expression ; a stone flies out of the
hand and the propulsive force of the muscle resides in the
will ; but there has been a revolution, or at least a new
theory in philosophy, and our Professor, I say, after speak-
ing with the highest admiration of the human intellect,
limits its independent action to the region of speculation,
and denies that it can be a motive principle, or can exer-
cise a special interference, in the material world. He
ascribes every work, every external act of man, to the
innate force or soul of the physical universe. He observes
that spiritual agents are so mysterious and unintelligible,
so uncertain in their laws, so vague in their operation, so
sheltered from experience, that a wise man will have
nothing to say to them. They belong to a different
order of causes, which he leaves to those whose pro-
fession it is to investigate them, and he confines himself
to the tangible and sure. Human exploits, human devices,
human deeds, human productions, all that comes under
Bearmg of Theology on Other Knoiv ledge. 5 7
thescholastictermsof* genius" and "art," and the meta-
physical ideas of "duty," "right," and "heroism," it is
his office to contemplate all these merely in their place
in the eternal system of physical cause and effect. At
length he undertakes to show how the whole fabric of
material civilization has arisen from the constructive
powers of physical elements and physical laws. He
descants upon palaces, castles, temples, exchanges, bridges,
causeways, and shows that they never could have grown
into the imposing dimensions which they present to us,
but for the laws of gravitation and the cohesion of part
with part. The pillar would come down, the loftier the
more speedily, did not the centre of gravity fall within its
base ; and the most admired dome of Palladio or of Sir
Christopher v/ould gWQ way, were it not for the happy
principle of the arch. He surveys the complicated
machinery of a single day's arrangements in a private
family ; our dress, our furniture, our hospitable board ;
what would become of them, he asks, but for the laws of
physical nature .? Those laws are the causes of our
carpets, our furniture, our travelling, and our social inter-
course. Firm stitches have a natural power, in propor-
tion to the toughness of the material adopted, to keep
together separate portions of cloth ; sofas and chairs
could not turn upside down, even if they would ; and it
is a property of caloric to relax the fibres of animal
matter, acting through water in one way, through oil in
another, and this is the whole mystery of the most
elaborate cuisine: — but I should be tedious if I con-
tinued the illustration.
6.
Now, Gentlemen, pray understand how it is to be here
applied. I am not supposing that the principles of
58 Discourse III,
Theology and Psychology are the same, or arguing from
the works of man to the works of God, which Paley has
done, which Hume has protested against. I am not
busying myself to prove the existence and attributes of
God, by means of the Argument from design. I am
not proving anything at all about the Supreme Being.
On the contrary, I am assuming His existence, and I do
but say this : — that, man existing, no University Pro-
fessor, who had suppressed in physical lectures the idea
of volition, who did not take volition for granted, could
escape a one-sided, a radically false view of the things
which he discussed ; not indeed that his own definitions,
principles, and laws would be wrong, or his abstract
statements, but his considering his own study to be the
key of everything that takes place on the face of the
earth, and his passing over anthropology, this would be
his error. I say, it would not be his science which was
untrue, but his so-called knowledge which was unreal.
He would be deciding on facts by means of theories.
The various busy world, spread out before our eyes, is
physical, but it is more than physical ; and, in making
its actual system identical with his scientific analysis,
formed on a particular aspect, such a Professor as I have
imagined was betraying a want of philosophical depth,
and an ignorance of what an University Teaching ought
to be. He was no longer a teacher of liberal knowledge,
but a narrow-minded bigot. While his doctrines pro-
fessed to be conclusions formed upon an hypothesis or
partial truth, they were undeniable ; not so if they pro-
fessed to give results in facts which he could grasp and
take possession of Granting, indeed, that a man's arm
is moved by a simple physical cause, then of course we
may dispute about the various external influences which,
when it changes its position, sway it to and fro, like a
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge. 59
scarecrow' in a garden ; but to assert that the motive
cause is physical, this is an assumption in a case, when
our question is about a matter of fact, not about the
logical consequences of an assumed premiss. And, in
like manner, if a people prays, and the wind changes, the
rain ceases, the sun shines, and the harvest is safely
housed, when no one expected it, our Professor may, if
he will, consult the barometer, discourse about the
atmosphere, and throw what has happened into an
equation, ingenious, even though it be not true ; but,
should he proceed to rest the phenomenon, in matter of
fact, simply upon a physical cause, to the exclusion of a
divine, and to say that the given case actually belongs to
his science because other like cases do, I must tell him,
Ne sutor ultra crepidam : he is making his particular
craft usurp and occupy the universe. This then is the
drift of my illustration. If the creature is ever setting in
motion an endless series of physical causes and effects,
much more is the Creator ; and as our excluding volition
from our range of ideas is a denial of the soul, so our
ignoring Divine Agency is a virtual denial of God.
Moreover, supposing man can will and act of himself in
spite of physics, to shut up this great truth, though one,
is to put our whole encyclopaedia of knowledge out of
joint ; and supposing God can will and act of Himself in
this world which He has made, and we deny or slur it
over, then we are throwing the circle of universal science
into a like, or a far worse confusion.
Worse incomparably, for the idea of God, if there be
a God, is infinitely higher than the idea of man, if there
be man. If to blot out man's agency is to deface the
book of knowledge, on the supposition of that agency
existing, what must it be, supposing it exists, to blot out
the agency of God t I have hitherto been engaged in
6o Discourse IIL
showing that all the sciences come to us as one, that
they all relate to one and the same integral subject-
matter, that each separately is more or less an abstrac-
tion, wholly true as an hypothesis, but not wholly trust-
worthy in the concrete, conversant with relations more
than with facts, with principles more than with agents,
needing the support and guarantee of its sister sciences,
and giving in turn while it takes : — from which it follows,
that none can safely be omitted, if we would obtain the
exactest knowledge possible of things as they are, and
that the omission is more or less important, in propor-
tion to the field which each covers, and the depth to
which it penetrates, and the order to which it belongs ;
for its loss is a positive privation of an influence which
exerts itself in the correction and completion of the rest.
This is a general statement ; but now as to Theology in
particular, what, in matter of fact, are its pretensions,
what its importance, what its influence upon other
branches of knowledge, supposing there be a God, which
it would not become me to set about proving ? Has it
vast dimensions, or does it lie in a nutshell ? Will its
omission be imperceptible, or will it destroy the equili-
brium of the whole system of Knowledge ? This is the
inquiry to which I proceed.
7.
Now what is Theology ? First, I will tell you w^hat it
is not. And here, in the first place (though of course I
speak on the subject as a Catholic), observe that, strictly
speaking, I am not assuming that Catholicism is true,
while I make myself the champion of Theology.
Catholicism has not formally entered into my argument
hitherto, nor shall I just now assume any principle
peculiar to it, for reasons which will appear in the sequel,
/:
Bearing of Theology on Other K^iowledge. 6 1
though of course I shall use Catholic language. Neither,
secondly, will I fall into the fashion of the day, of identi-
fying Natural Theology with Physical Theology ; which
said Physical Theology is a most jejune study, considered
as a science, and really is no science at all, for it is
ordinarily nothing more than a series of pious or polemical
remarks upon the physical world viewed religiously,
whereas the word " Natural " properly comprehends man
and society, and all that is involved therein, as the great
Protestant writer, Dr. Butler, shows us. Nor, in the third
place, do I mean by Theology polemics of any kind ; for
instance, what are called " the Evidences of Religion,"
or " the Christian Evidences ;" for, though these constitute
a science supplemental to Theology and are necessary
in their place, they are not Theology itself, unless an
army is synonymous with the body politic. Nor, fourthly,
do I mean by Theology that vague thing called " Chris-
tianity," or " our common Christianity," or " Christianity
the law of the land," if there is any man alive who can
tell what it is. I discard it, for the very reason that it
cannot throw itself into a proposition. Lastly, I do not
understand by Theology, acquaintance with the Scrip-
tures ; for, though no person of religious feelings can
read Scripture but he will find those feelings roused,
and gain much knowledge of history into the bargain,
yet historical reading and religious feehng are not science.
I mean none of these things by Theology, I simply
mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about
God put into system ; just as we have a science of the
stars, and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth,
and call it geology.
For instance, I mean, for this is the main point, that,
as in the human frame there is a living principle, acting
upon it and through it by means of volition, so, behind
62 Discourse III.
the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible,
intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when
He will. Further, I mean that this invisible Agent is in
no sense a soul of the world, after the analogy of human
nature, but, on the contrary, is absolutely distinct from
the world, as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and
Sovereign Lord. Here we are at once brought into the
circle of doctrines which the idea of God embodies. I
mean then by the Supreme Being, one who is simply
self-dependent, and the only Being who is such ; moreover,
that He is without beginning or Eternal, and the only
Eternal ; that in consequence He has lived a whole
eternity by Himself; and hence that He is all-sufficient,
sufficient for His own blessedness, and all-blessed, and
ever-blessed. Further, I mean a Being, who, having
these prerogatives, has the Supreme Good, or rather is
the Supreme Good, or has all the attributes of Good in
infinite intenseness ; all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all
love, all holiness, all beautifulness ; who is omnipotent,
omniscient, omnipresent; ineffably one, absolutely perfect ;
and such, that what we do not know and cannot even
imagine of Him, is far more wonderful than what we do
and can. I mean One who is sovereign over His own will
and actions, though always according to the eternal Rule
of right and wrong, which is Himself. I mean, moreover,
that He created all things out of nothing, and preserves
them every moment, and could destroy them as easily as
He made them; and that, in consequence. He is separated
from them by an abyss, and is incommunicable in all
His attributes. And further. He has stamped upon all
things, in the hour of their creation, their respective
natures, and has given them their work and mission and
their length of days, greater or less, in their appointed
place. I mean, too, that He is ever present with His
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge. t'X)
works, one by one, and confronts every thing He has
made by His particular and most loving Providence, and
manifests Himself to each according to its needs ; and
has on rational beings imprinted the moral law, and
given them power to obey it, imposing on them the duty
of worship and service, searching and scanning them
through and through with His omniscient eye, and
putting before them a present trial and a judgment to
come.
Such is what Theology teaches about God, a doctrine,
as the very idea of its subject-matter presupposes, so
mysterious as in its fulness to lie beyond any system,
and in particular aspects to be simply external to nature,
and to seem in parts even to be irreconcileable with
itself, the imagination being unable to embrace what the
reason determines. It teaches of a Being infinite, yet
personal ; all-blessed, yet ever operative ; absolutely
separate from the creature, yet in every part of the
creation at every moment ; above all things, yet under
every thing. It teaches of a Being who, though the
highest, yet in the work of creation, conservation,
government, retribution, makes Himself, as it were, the
minister and servant of all ; who, though inhabiting
eternity, allows Himself to take an interest, and to have
a sympathy, in the matters of space and time. His are
all beings, visible and invisible, the noblest and the vilest
of them. His are the substance, and the operation, and
the results of that system of physical nature into which
we are born. His too are the powers and achievements
of the intellectual essences, on which He has bestowed
an independent action and the gift of origination. The
laws of the universe, the principles of truth, the relation
of one thing to another, their qualities and virtues, the
order and harmony of the whole, all that exists, is from
64 Discourse III.
Him ; and, If evil is not from Him, as assuredly it is not,
this is because evil has no substance of its own, but is
only the defect, excess, perv^ersion, or corruption of that
which has substance. All we see, hear, and touch, the re-
mote sidereal firmament, as well as our own sea and land,
and the elements which compose them, and the ordinances
they obey, are His. The primary atoms of matter, their
properties, their mutual action, their disposition and
collocation, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, light, and
whatever other subtle principles or operations the wit of
man is detecting or shall detect, are the work of His
hands. From Him has been every movement which
has convulsed and re-fashioned the surface of the earth.
The most insignificant or unsightly insect is from Him,
and good in its kind ; the ever-teeming, inexhaustible
swarms of animalculse, the myriads of living motes in-
visible to the naked eye, the restless ever-spreading
vegetation which creeps like a garment over the whole
earth, the lofty cedar, the umbrageous banana, are His.
His are the tribes and families of birds and beasts, their
graceful forms, their wild gestures, and their passionate
cries.
And so in the intellectual, moral, social, and political
world. Man, with his motives and works, his languages,
his propagation, his diffusion, is from Him. Agriculture,
medicine, and the arts of life, are His gifts. Society,
laws, government, He is their sanction. The pageant of
earthly royalty has the semblance and the benediction
of the Eternal King. Peace and civilization, commerce
and adventure, wars when just, conquest when humane
and necessary, have His co-operation, and His blessing
upon them. The course of events, the revolution of
empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras,
the progresses and the retrogressions of the world's
Bearing of Theology on Other K^iowledge, 65
history, not indeed the incidental sin, over-abundant as
it is, but the great outlines and the results of human
affairs, are from His disposition. The elements and
types and seminal principles and constructive powers of
the moral world, in ruins though it be, are to be referred
to Him. He " enlighteneth every man that cometh into
this world." His are the dictates of the moral sense, and
the retributive reproaches of conscience. To Him must
be ascribed the rich endowments of the intellect, the
irradiation of genius, the imagination of the poet, the
sagacity of the politician, the wisdom (as Scripture calls
it), which now rears and decorates the Temple, now
manifests itself in proverb or in parable. The old saws
of nations, the majestic precepts of philosophy, the
luminous maxims of law, the oracles of individual wis-
dom, the traditionary rules of truth, justice, and religion,
even though imbedded in the corruption, or alloyed with
the pride, of the world, betoken His original agency, and
His long-suffering presence. Even where there is habi-
tual rebellion against Him, or profound far-spreading
social depravity, still the undercurrent, or the heroic out-
burst, of natural virtue, as well as the yearnings of the
heart after what it has not, and its presentiment of its
true remedies, are to be ascribed to the Author of all
good. Anticipations or reminiscences of His glory haunt
the mind of the self-sufficient sage, and of the pagan
devotee ; His writing is upon the wall, whether of the
Indian fane, or of the porticoes of Greece. He introduces
Himself, He all but concurs, according to His good plea-
sure, and in His selected season, in the issues of unbelief,
superstition, and false worship, and He changes the cha-
racter of acts by His overruling operation. He conde-
scends, though He gives no sanction, to the altars and
shrines of imposture, and He makes His own fiat the
7* 5
66 Discourse IIL
substitute for Its sorceries. He speaks amid the incan-
tations of Balaam, raises Samuel's spirit in the witch's
cavern, prophesies of the Messias by the tongue of the
Sibyl, forces Python to recognize His ministers, and
baptizes by the hand of the misbeliever. He is with the
heathen dramatist in his denunciations of injustice and
tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon
crime. Even on the unseemly legends of a popular
mythology He casts His shadow, and is dimly discerned
in the ode or the epic, as in troubled water or in fan-
tastic dreams. All that is good, all that is true, all that
is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it
perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural,
moral as well as material, comes from Him. \r^\^
8.
If this be a sketch, accurate in substance and as far as
it goes, of the doctrines proper to Theology, and espe-
cially of the doctrine of a particular Providence, which is
the portion of it most on a level with human sciences, I
cannot understand at all how, supposing it to be true, it
can fail, considered as knowledge, to exert a powerful
influence on philosophy, literature, and every intellectual
creation or discovery whatever. I cannot understand
how it is possible, as the phrase goes, to blink the ques-
tion of its truth or falsehood. It meets us with a pro-
fession and a proffer of the highest truths of which the
human mind is capable ; it embraces a range of subjects
the most diversified and distant from each other. What
science will not find one part or other of its province
traversed by its path t What results of philosophic
speculation are unquestionable, if they have been gained
without inquiry as to what Theology had to say to them }
Does it cast no light upon history ? has it no influence
Bearing of Theology on Other Krioivledge, 67
upon the principles of ethics ? is it without any sort of
bearing on physics, metaphysics, and political science ?
Can we drop it out of the circle of knowledge, without
allowing, either that that circle is thereby mutilated, or on
the other hand, that Theology is really no science ?
And this dilemma is the more inevitable, because
Theology is so precise and consistent in its intellectual
structure. When I speak of Theism or Monotheism, I
am not throwing together discordant doctrines ; I am
not merging belief, opinion, persuasion, of whatever kind,
into a shapeless aggregate, by the help of ambiguous
words, and dignifying this medley by the name of
Theology. I speak of one idea unfolded in its just pro-
portions, carried out upon an intelligible method, and
issuing in necessary and immutable results ; understood
indeed at one time and place better than at another,
held here and there with more or less of inconsistency,
but still, after all, in all times and places, where it is found,
the evolution, not of half-a-dozen ideas, but of one.
9.
And here I am led to another and most important
point in the argument in its behalf, — I mean its wide re-
ception. Theology, as I have described it, is no accident
of particular minds, as are certain systems, for instance,
of prophetical interpretation. It is not the sudden birth of
a crisis, as the Lutheran or Wesleyan doctrine. It is not
the splendid development of some uprising philosophy,
as the Cartesian or Platonic. It is not the fashion of a
season, as certain "medical treatments may be considered.
It has had a place, if not possession, in the intellectual
world from time immemorial ; it has been received by
minds the most various, and in systems of religion the
most hostile to each other. It has prima facie claims
68 Discourse III.
upon us, so imposing, that it can only be rejected on the
ground of those claims being nothing more than impos-
ing, that is, being false. As to our own countries, it
occupies our language, it meets us at every turn in our
literature, it is the secret assumption, too axiomatic to be
distinctly professed, of all our writers ; nor can we help
assuming it ourselves, except by the most unnatural
vigilance. Whoever philosophizes, starts with it, and
introduces it, when he will, without any apology. Bacon,
Hooker, Taylor, Cudworth, Locke, Newton, Clarke,
Berkeley, and Butler, and it would be as easy to find
more, as difficult to find greater names among English
authors, inculcate or comment upon it. Men the most
opposed, in creed or cast of mind, Addison and Johnson,
Shakespeare and Milton, Lord Herbert and Baxter,
herald it forth. Nor is it an English or a Protestant
notion only ; you track it across the Continent, you
pursue it into former ages. When was the world with-
out it } Have the systems of Atheism or Pantheism, as
sciences, prevailed in the literature of nations, or received
a formation or attained a completeness such as Mono-
theism } We find it in old Greece, and even in Rome,
as well as in Judea and the East. We find it in
popular literature, in philosophy, in poetry, as a positive
and settled teaching, differing not at all in the appear-
ance it presents, whether in Protestant England, or in
schismatical Russia, or in the Mahometan populations,
or in the Catholic Church. If ever there was a subject
of thought, which had earned by prescription to be
received among the studies of a University, and which
could not be rejected except on the score of convicted
imposture, as astrology or alchemy ; if there be a science
anywhere, which at least could claim not to be ignored,
but to be entertained, and either distinctly accepted or
Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge. 69
distinctly reprobated, or rather, which cannot be passed
over in a scheme of universal instruction, without involv-
ing a positive denial of its truth, it is this ancient, this
far-spreading philosophy.
10.
And now, Gentlemen, I may bring a somewhat tedious
discussion to a close. It will not take many words to
sum up what I have been urging. I say then, if the
various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of
teaching in a University, so hang together, that none
can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of
the rest, and if Theology be a branch of knowledge, of
wide reception, of philosophical structure, of unutterable
importance, and of supreme influence, to what con-
clusion are we brought from these two premisses but
this t that to withdraw Theology from the public
schools is to impair the completeness and to invalidate
the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them.
But I have been insisting simply on Natural Theology,
and that, because I wished to carry along with me those
who were not Catholics, and, again^ as being confident,
that no one can really set himself to master and to
teach the doctrine of an intelHgent Creator in its fulness,
without going on a great deal farther than he at present
dreams. I say, then, secondly : — if this Science, even
a<: human reason may attain to it, has such claims on
the regard, and enters so variously into the objects, of
\he Professor of Universal Knowledge,- how can any
Catholic Imagine that it is possible for him to cultivate
Philosophy and Science with due attention to their
ultimate end, which is Truth, supposing that system of
revealed facts and principles, which constitutes the
Catholic Faith, which goes so far beyond nature, and
70 Discotcrse III.
which he knows to be most true, be omitted from among
the subjects of his teaching ?
In a word, Rehgious Truth is not only a portion, but
a condition of general knowledge. To blot it out is
nothing short, if I may so speak, of unravelling the web
of University Teaching. It is, according to the Greek
proverb, to take the Spring from out of the year ; it is
to imitate the preposterous proceeding of those trage-
dians who represented a drama with the omission of its
principal part.
71
DISCOURSE IV.
BEARING OF OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE ON
THEOLOGY.
I.
NOTHING is more common in the world at large
than to consider the resistance, made on the part
of religious men, especially Catholics, to the separation
of Secular Education from Religion, as a plain token
that there is some real contrariety between human science
and Revelation. To the multitude who draw this infer-
ence, it matters not whether the protesting parties avow
their belief in this contrariety or not ; it is borne in upon
the many, as if it were self-evident, that religious men
would not thus be jealous and alarmed about Science,
did they not feel instinctively, though they may not
recognize it, that knowledge is their born enemy, and
that its progress, if it is not arrested, will be certain to
destroy all that they hold venerable and dear. It looks
to the world like a misgiving on our part similar to that
which is imputed to our refusal to educate by means of
the Bible only ; why should you dread the sacred text,
men say, if it be not against you ? And in Hke man-
ner, why should you dread secular education, except
that it is against you ? Why impede the circulation
of books which take religious views opposite to your
own } V/hy forbid your children and scholars the free
72 Discourse IV.
perusal of poems or tales or essays or other light
literature which you fear would unsettle their minds ?
Why oblige them to know these persons and to shun
those, if you think that your friends have reason on their
side as fully as your opponents ? Truth is bold and un-
suspicious ; want of self-reliance is the mark of false-
hood.
Now, as far as this objection relates to any supposed
opposition between secular science and divine, which is
the subject on which I am at present engaged, I made a
sufficient answer to it in my foregoing Discourse. In it
I said, that, in order to have possession of truth at all,
we must have the whole truth ; and no one science, no
two sciences, no one family of sciences, nay, not even all
secular science, is the whole truth ; that revealed truth
enters to a very great extent into the province of
science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it on
one side, in compliment to secular science, is simply,
under colour of a compliment, to do science a great
damage. I do not say that every science will be equally
affected by the omission ; pure mathematics will not
suffer at all; chemistry will suffer less than politics,
politics than history, ethics, or metaphysics ; still, that
the various branches of science are intimately connected
with each other, and form one whole, which whole is im-
paired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by
any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever
kind, and that revealed knowledge is very far indeed
from an inconsiderable department of knowledge, this I
consider undeniable. As the written and unwritten word
of God make up Revelation as a whole, and the written,
taken by itself, is but a part of that whole, so in turn
Revelation itself may be viewed as one of the constituent
parts of human knowledge, considered as a whole, and
Bearing of Other IC?iowledge on Theology. 73
its omission is the omission of one of those constituent
parts. Revealed Religion furnishes facts to the other
sciences, which those sciences, left to themselves, would
never reach ; and it invalidates apparent facts, which,
left to themselves, they would imagine. Thus, in the
science of history, the preservation of our race in Noah's
ark is an historical fact, which history never would
arrive at without Revelation ; and, in the province of
physiology and moral philosophy, our race's progress
and perfectibility is a dream, because Revelation con-
tradicts it, whatever may be plausibly argued in its be-
half by scientific inquirers. It is not then that Catho-
lics are afraid of human knowledge, but that they are
proud of divine knowledge, and that they think the
omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or
divine, to be, as far as it goes, not knowledge, but
ignorance.
2.
Thus I anticipated the objection in question last week:
now I am going to make it the introduction to a further
view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine. I
observe, then, that, if you drop any science out of the
circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for
it ; that science is forgotten ; the other sciences close
up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds,
and intrude where they have no right. For instance, I
suppose, if ethics were sent into banishment, its territory
would soon disappear, under a treaty of partition, as it
may be called, between law, political economy, and
physiology ; what, again, would become of the pro-
vince of experimental science, if made over to the Anti-
quarian Society ; or of history, if surrendered out and
out to Metaphysicians .? The case is the same with the
74 Discourse IV.
subject-matter of Theology ; it would be the prey of a
dozen various sciences, if Theology were put out of
possession ; and not only so, but those sciences would
be plainly exceeding their rights and their capacities in
seizing upon it. They would be sure to teach wrongly,
where they had no mission to teach at all. The enemies
of Catholicism ought to be the last to deny this : — for they
have never been blind to a like usurpation, as they have
called it, on the part of theologians ; those who accuse
us of wishing, in accordance with Scripture language, to
make the sun go round the earth, are not the men to
deny that a science which exceeds its limits falls into
error.
I neither then am able nor care to deny, rather I
assert the fact, and to-day I am going on to account for
it, that any secular science, cultivated exclusively, may
become dangerous to Religion ; and I account for it on
this broad principle, that no science whatever, however
comprehensive it may be, but will fall largely into error,
if it be constituted the sole exponent of all things in
heaven and earth, and that, for the simple reason that it
is encroaching on territory not its own, and undertaking
problems which it has no instruments to solve. And I
set off thus ;
3.
One of the first acts of the human mind is to take
hold of and appropriate what meets the senses, and here-
in lies a chief distinction between man's and a brute's use
of them. Brutes gaze on sights, they are arrested by
sounds ; and what they see and what they hear are
mainly sights and sounds only. The intellect of man,
on the contrary, energizes as well as his eye or ear, and
perceives in sights and sounds something beyond them.
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology. 75
It seizes and unites what the senses present to it ; it
grasps and forms what need not have been seen or
heard except in its constituent parts. It discerns in Hnes
and colours, or in tones, what is beautiful and what is
not. It gives them a meaning, and invests them with
an idea. It gathers up a succession of notes into the
expression of a whole, and calls it a melody ; it has a
keen sensibility towards angles and curves, lights and
shadows, tints and contours. It distinguishes between
rule and exception, between accident and design. It
assigns phenomena to a general law, qualities to a subject,
acts to a principle, and effects to a cause. In a word,
it philosophizes ; for I suppose Science and Philosophy,
in their elementary idea, are nothing else but this habit
of viewing, as it may be called, the objects which sense
conveys to the mind, of throwing them into system, and
uniting and stamping them with one form.
This method is so natural to us, as I have said, as to be
almost spontaneous ; and we are impatient when we can-
not exercise it, and in consequence we do not always
wait to have the means of exercising it aright, but we
often put up with insufficient or absurd views or inter-
pretations of what we meet with, rather than have none
at all. We refer the various matters which are brought
home to us, material or moral, to causes which we happen
to know of, or to such as are simply imaginary, sooner
than refer them to nothing; and according to the activity
of our intellect do we feel a pain and begin to fret, if we
are not able to do so. Here we have an explanation of
the multitude of off-hand sayings, flippant judgments,
and shallow generalizations, with which the world
abounds. Not from self-will only, nor from malevolence,
but from the irritation which suspense occasions, is the
mind forced on to pronounce, without sufficient data for
76 Discourse IV.
pronouncing. Who does not form some view or other,
for instance, of any public man, or any public event, nay,
even so far in some cases as to reach the mental delinea-
tion of his appearance or of its scene ? yet how few have
a right to form any view. Hence the misconceptions of
character, hence the false impressions and reports of words
or deeds, which are the rule, rather than the exception,
in the world at large ; hence the extravagances of un-
disciplined talent, and the narrowness of conceited igno-
rance ; because, though it is no easy matter to view things
correctly, nevertheless the busy mind will ever be viewing.
We cannot do without a view, and we put up with an
illusion, when we cannot get a truth.
4-
Now, observe how this impatience acts in matters of
research and speculation. What happens to the ignorant
and hotheaded, will take place in the case of every person
whose education or pursuits are contracted, whether they
be merely professional, merely scientific, or of whatever
other peculiar complexion. Men, whose life lies in the
cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method
of thought, have no more right, though they have often
more ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own
pursuit but beyond its range, than the schoolboy or the
ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister. But they must
have something to say on every subject ; habit, fashion,
the public require it of them : and, if so, they can only
give sentence according to their knowledge. You might
think this ought to make such a person modest in his enun-
ciations; not so: too often it happens that, in proportion
to the narrowness of his knowledge, is, not his distrust
of it, but the deep hold it has upon him, his absolute
conviction of his own conclusions, and his positiveness in
Bearing of Other Knowledge on llieology, 77
maintaining them. He has the obstinacy of the bigot,
whom he scorns, without the bigot's apology, that he has
been taught, as he thinks, his doctrine from heaven.
Thus he becomes, what is commonly called, a man of one
idea ; which properly means a man of one science, and
of the view, partly true, but subordinate, partly false,
which is all that can proceed out of any thing so partial.
Hence it is that we have the principles of utility, of
combination, of progress, of philanthropy, or, in material
sciences, comparative anatomy, phrenology, electricity,
exalted into leading ideas, and keys, if not of all know-
ledge, at least of many things more than belong to them, —
principles, all of them true to a certain point, yet all
degenerating into error and quackery, because they are
carried to excess, viz. at the point where they require
interpretation and restraint from other quarters, and
because they are employed to do what is simply too
much for them, inasmuch as a little science is not deep
philosophy.
Lord Bacon has set down the abuse, of which I am
speaking, among the impediments to the Advancement
of the Sciences, when he observes that " men have used
to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with
some conceits which they have most admired, or some
Sciences which they have most applied; and give all things
else a tincture according to them utterly untrite and im-
proper. ... So have the alchemists made a philo-
sophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and
Gilbertus, our countryman, hath made a philosophy out
of the observations of a lodestone. So Cicero, when,
reciting the several opinions of the nature of the soul, he
found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony,
saith pleasantly, * hie ab arte sua non recessit,' ' he was
true to his art' But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh
78 Discourse IV.
seriously and wisely when he saith, 'Qui respiciunt
ad pauca, de facili pronunciant/ ' they who contemplate
a few things have no difficulty in deciding.' "
5v
And now I have said enough to explain the incon-
venience which I conceive necessarily to result from a
refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of
Universal Knowledge ; — it is not only the loss of Theo-
logy, it is the perversion of other sciences. What it
unjustly forfeits, others unjustly seize. They have their
own department, and, in going out of it, attempt to do
what they really cannot do ; and that the more mis-
chievously, because they do teach what in its place is
I true, though when out of its place, perverted or carried to
1 excess, it is not true. And, as every man has not the
I capacity of separating truth from falsehood, they per-
I suade the world of what is false by urging upon it what
* is true. Nor is it open enemies alone who encounter us
here, sometimes it is friends, sometimes persons who, if
not friends, at least have no wish to oppose Religion, and
are not conscious they are doing so ; and it will carry
out my meaning more fully if I give some illustrations
of it.
As to friends, I may take as an instance the cultivation
of the Fine Arts, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, to
which 1 may add Music. These high ministers of the
Beautiful and the Noble are, it is plain, special attendants
and handmaids of Religion ; but it is equally plain that
they are apt to forget their place, and, unless restrained
with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at
becoming principals. Here lies the advantage, in an
ecclesiastical point of view, of their more rudimental
state, I mean of the ancient style of architecture, of Gothic
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology. 79
sculpture and painting, and of what is called Gregorian
music, that these inchoate sciences have so little innate
vigour and life in them, that they are in no danger of
going out of their place, and giving the law to Religion.
But the case is very different when genius has breathed
upon their natural elements, and has developed them
into what I may call intellectual powers. When Paint-
ing, for example, grows into the fulness of its function as
a simply imitative art, it at once ceases to be a dependant
on the Church. It has an end of its own, and that of
earth : Nature is its pattern, and the object it pursues is
the beauty of Nature, even till it becomes an ideal beauty,
but a natural beauty still. It cannot imitate that beauty
of Angels and Saints which it has never seen. At first,
indeed, by outlines and emblems it shadowed out the
Invisible, and its want of skill became the instrument of
reverence and modesty ; but as time went on and it at-
tained its full dimensions as an art, it rather subjected
Religion to its own ends than ministered to the ends of
Religion, and in its long galleries and stately chambers,
did but mingle adorable figures and sacred histories with
a multitude of earthly, not to say unseemly forms, which
the Art had created, borrowing withal a colouring and a
character from that bad company. Not content with
neutral ground for its development, it was attracted by
the sublimity of divine subjects to ambitious and hazar-
dous essays. Without my saying a word more, you will
clearly understand, Gentlemen, that under these circum-
stances Religion was bound to exert itself, that the world
might not gain an advantage over it. Put out of sight
the severe teaching of Catholicism in the schools of Paint-
ing, as men now would put it aside in their philosophical
studies, and in no long time you would have the hierarchy
of the Church, the Anchorite and Virgin-martyr, the
8o ' Discourse IV.
Confessor and the Doctor, the Angelic Hosts, the
Mother of God, the Crucifix, the Eternal Trinity, sup-
planted by a sort of pagan mythology in the guise of
sacred names, by a creation indeed of high genius, of
intense, and dazzling, and soul-absorbing beauty, in
which, however, there was nothing which subserved the
cause of Religion, nothing on the other hand which did
not directly or indirectly minister to corrupt nature and
the powers of darkness.
6.
The art of Painting, however, is peculiar : Music and
Architecture are more ideal, and their respective arche-
types, even if not supernatural, at least are abstract and
unearthly ; and yet what I have been observing about
Painting, holds, I think, analogously, in the marvellous
development which Musical Science has undergone in
the last century. Doubtless here too the highest genius
may be made subservient to Religion ; here too, still
more simply than in the case of Painting, the Science
has a field of its own, perfectly innocent, into which
Religion does not and need not enter; on the other
hand here also, in the case of Music as of Painting, it is
certain that Religion must be alive and on the defensive,
for, if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal
over it. Music, I suppose, though this is not the place
to enlarge upon it, has an object of its own ; as mathe-
matical science also, it is the expression of ideas greater
and more profound than any in the visible world, ideas,
which centre indeed in Him whom Catholicism mani-
fests, who is the seat of all beauty, order, and perfection
whatever, still ideas after all which are not those on
which Revelation directly and principally fixes our gaze.
If then a great master in this mysterious science (if I
Bearing of Other K?wwledge on Theology, 8 1
may speak of matters which seem to lie out of my own
province) throws himself on his own gift, trusts its in-
spirations, and absorbs himself in those thoughts which,
though they come to him in the way of nature, belong
to things above nature, it is obvious he will neglect
everything else. Rising in his strength, he will break
through the trammels of words, he will scatter human
voices, even the sweetest, to the winds ; he will be borne
upon nothing less than the fullest flood of sounds which
art has enabled him to draw from mechanical contri-
vances ; he will go forth as a giant, as far as ever his in-
struments can reach, starting from their secret depths
fresh and fresh elements of beauty and grandeur as he
goes, and pouring them together into still more marvel-
lous and rapturous combinations ; — and well indeed and
lawfully, while he keeps to that line which is his own ;
but, should he happen to be attracted, as he well may,
by the sublimity, so congenial to him, of the Catholic
doctrine and ritual, should he engage in sacred themes,
should he resolve by means of his art to do honour to
the Mass, or the Divine Office, — (he cannot have a more
pious, a better purpose, and Religion will gracefully
accept what he gracefully offers ; but) — is it not certain,
from the circumstances of the case, that he will be
carried on rather to use Religion than to minister to it,
unless Religion is strong on its own ground, and reminds
him that, if he would do honour to the highest of
subjects, he must make himself its scholar, must humbly
follow the thoughts given him, and must aim at the
glory, not of his own gift, but of the Great Giver ?
7.
As to Architecture, it is a remark, if I recollect aright,
both of Fenelon and Berkeley, men so different, that it
7 « 6
82 Discourse IV,
carries more with it even than the names of those cele-
brated men, that the Gothic style is not as simple as
befits ecclesiastical structures. I understand this to be
a similar judgment to that which I have been passing
on the cultivation of Painting and Music. For myself,
certainly I think that that style which, whatever be its
origin, is called Gothic, is endowed with a profound and
a commanding beauty, such as no other style possesses
with which we are acfjuainted, and which probably the
Church will not see surpassed till it attain to the Celestial
City. No other architecture, now used for sacred pur-
poses, seems to be the growth of an idea, whereas the
Gothic style is as harmonious and as intellectual as it is
graceful. But this feeHng should not blind us, rather it
should awaken us, to the danger lest what is really a
divine gift be incautiously used as an end rather than as
a means. It is surely quite within the bounds of pos-
sibility, that, as the renaissance three centuries ago
carried away its own day, in spite of the Church, into
excesses in literature and art, so that revival of an almost
forgotten architecture, which is at present taking place
in our own countries, in France, and in Germany, may
in some way or other run away with us into this or that
error, unless we keep a watch over its course. I am not
speaking of Ireland ; but to English Catholics at least it
would be a serious evil, if it came as the emblem and
advocate of a past ceremonial or an extinct nationalism.
We are not living in an age of wealth and loyalty, of
pomp and stateliness, of time-honoured establishments,
of pilgrimage and penance, of hermitages and convents
in the wild, and of fervent populations supplying the
want of education by love, and apprehending in form
and symbol what they cannot read in books. Our rules
and our rubrics have been altered now to meet the
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology, ^i^
times, and hence an obsolete discipline may be a
present heresy.
8.
I have been pointing out how the Fine Arts may pre-
judice Religion, by laying down the law in cases where
they should be subservient. The illustration is analo-
gous rather than strictly proper to my subject, yet I
think it is to the point. If then the most loyal and
dutiful children of the Church must deny themselves,
and do deny themselves, when they would sanctify to a
heavenly purpose sciences as sublime and as divine as
any which are cultivated by fallen man, it is not wonder-
ful, when we turn to sciences of a different character, of
which the object is tangible and material, and the
principles belong to the Reason, not to the Imagination,
that we should find their disciples, if disinclined to the
CathoHc Faith, acting the part of opponents to it, and
that, as may often happen, even against their will and
intention. Many men there are, who, devoted to one
particular subject of thought, and making its principles
the measure of all things, become enemies to Revealed
Religion before they know it, and, only as time proceeds,
are aware of their own state of mind. These, if they
are writers or lecturers, while in this state of unconscious
or semi-conscious unbelief, scatter infidel principles under
the garb and colour of Christianity ; and this, simply
because they have made their own science, whatever it
is. Political Economy, or Geology, or Astronomy, to the
neglect of Theology, the centre of all truth, and view
every part or the chief parts of knowledge as if de-
veloped from it, and to be tested and determined by its
principles. Others, though conscious to themselves of
their anti-christian opinions, have too much good feeling
84 Discourse IV.
and good taste to obtrude them upon the world. They
neither wish to shock people, nor to earn for themselves
a confessorship which brings with it no gain. They
know the strength of prejudice, and the penalty of in-
novation ; they wish to go through life quietly ; they
scorn polemics ; they shrink, as from a real humiliation,
from being mixed up in religious controversy ; they are
ashamed of the very nam.e. However, they have had
occasion at some time to publish on some literary or
scientific subject ; they have wished to give no offence ;
but after all, to their great annoyance, they find when
they least expect it, or when they have taken consider-
able pains to avoid it, that they have roused by their
publication what they would style the bigoted and
bitter hostility of a party. This misfortune is easily
conceivable, and has befallen many a man. Before he
knows where he is, a cry is raised on all sides of him ;
and so little does he know what we may call the lie of
the land, that his attempts at apology perhaps only
make matters worse. In other words, an exclusive line
of study has led him, whether he will or no, to run
counter to the principles of Religion ; which principles
he has never made his landmarks, and which, whatever
might be their effect upon himself, at least would have
warned him against practising upon the faith of others,
had they been authoritatively held up before him.
9.
Instances of this kind are far from uncommon. Men
who are old enough, will remember the trouble which
came upon a person, eminent as a professional man in
London even at that distant day, and still more eminent
since, in consequence of his publishing a book in which
\ie so treated the subject of Comparative Anatomy as
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology, 85
to seem to deny the immateriality of the soul. I speak
here neither as excusing nor reprobating sentiments
about which I have not the means of forming a judg-
ment ; all indeed I have heard of him makes me men-
tion him with interest and respect ; anyhow of this I
am sure, that if there be a calling which feels its position
and its dignity to lie in abstaining from controversy and
in cultivating kindly feelings with men of all opinions,
it is the medical profession, and I cannot believe that
the person in question would purposely have raised the
indignation and incurred the censure of the religious
public. What then must have been his fault or mistake,
but that he unsuspiciously threw himself upon his own
particular science, which is of a material character, and
allowed it to carry him forward into a subject-matter,
where it had no right to give the law, viz., that of spiri-
tual beings, which directly belongs to the science of
Theology }
Another instance occurred at a later date. A livincf
dignitary of the Established Church wrote a History of
the Jews; in which, with what I consider at least bad
judgment, he took an external view of it, and hence was
led to assimilate it as nearly as possible to secular his- h
tory. A great sensation was the consequence among '
the members of his own communion, from which he still
suffers. Arguing from the dislike and contempt of pole-
mical demonstrations which that accomplished writer has
ever shown, I must conclude that he was simply betrayed
into a false step by the treacherous fascination of what
is called the Philosophy of History, which is good in its
place, but can scarcely be applied in cases where the
Almighty has superseded the natural laws of society and
history. From this he would have been saved, had he
been a Catholic ; but in the Establishment he knew of
86 Discourse IV.
no teaching, to which he was bound to defer, which
might rule that to be false which attracted him by its
speciousness.
lO.
I will now take an instance from another science, and
will use more words about it. Political Economy is the
science, I suppose, of wealth, — a science simply lawful
and useful, for it is no sin to make money, any more
than it is a sin to seek honour ; a science at the same
time dangerous and leading to occasions of sin, as is the
pursuit of honour too ; and in consequence, if studied by
itself, and apart from the control of Revealed Truth,
sure to conduct a speculator to unchristian conclusions.
Holy Scripture tells us distinctly, that " covetousness,"
or more literally the love of money, " is the root of all
evils ; " and that " they that would become rich fall into
temptation ; " and that " hardly shall they that have
riches enter into the kingdom of God ; " and after draw-
ing the picture of a wealthy and flourishing people, it
adds, "They have called the people happy that hath
these things ; but happy is that people whose God is the
Lord : " — while on the other hand it says with equal
distinctness, " If any will not work, neither let him eat;"
and, " If any man have not care of his own, and espe-
cially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith,
and is worse than an infidel." These opposite injunc-
tions are summed up in the wise man's prayer, who says,
" Give me neither beggary nor riches, give me only the
necessaries of life." With this most precise view of a
Christian's duty, viz., to labour indeed, but to labour for
a competency for himself and his, and to be jealous of
wealth, whether personal or national, the holy Fathers
are, as might be expected, in simple accordance.
" Judas," says St. Chrysostom, " was with Him who
Bearing of Other Knoiv ledge on TJieology. 87
knew not where to lay His head, yet could not restrain
himself ; and how canst thou hope to escape the con-
tagion without anxious effort ? " " It is ridiculous," says
St. Jerome, " to call it idolatry to offer to the creature
the grains of incense that are due to God, and not to
call it so, to offer the whole service of one's life to the
creature." "There is not a trace of justice in that
heart," says St. Leo, "in v/hich the love of gain has
made itself a dwelling." The same thing is emphatically
taught us by the counsels of perfection, and by every
holy monk and nun anywhere, who has ever embraced
them ; but it is needless to collect testimonies, when
Scripture is so clear.
Now, observe. Gentlemen, my drift in setting Scripture
and the Fathers over against Political Economy. Of
course if there is a science of wealth, it must give rules
for gaining wealth and disposing of wealth, and can do no-
thing more ; it cannot itself declare that it is a subordi-
nate science, that its end is not the ultimate end of all
things, and that its conclusions are only hypothetical,
depending on its premisses, and liable to be overruled
by a higher teaching. I do not then blame the Political
Economist for anything which follows from the very
idea of his science, from the very moment that it is
recognized as a science. He must of course direct his
inquiries towards his end ; but then at the same time it
must be recollected, that so far he is not practical, but
only pursues an abstract study, and is busy himself in
establishing logical conclusions from indisputable pre-
misses. Given that wealth is to be sought, this and
that is the method of gaining it. This is the extent to
which a Political Economist has a right to go ; he has
no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be
sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price
88 Discourse IV.
of happiness ; I say, this is to pass the bounds of his
science, independent of the question whether he be
right or wrong in so determining, for he is only con-
cerned with an hypothesis.
To take a parallel case : — a physician may tell you,
that if you are to preserve your health, you must give
up your employment and retire to the country. He
distinctly says "if;" that is all in which he is concerned,
he is no judge whether there are objects dearer to you,
more urgent upon you, than the preservation of your
health ; he does not enter into your circumstances, your
duties, your liabilities, the persons dependent on you ;
he knows nothing about what is advisable or what is
not ; he only says, " I speak as a physician ; if you
would be well, give up your profession, your trade,
your office, whatever it is." However he may wish it, it
would be impertinent in him to say more, unless indeed
he spoke, not as a physician but as a friend ; and it
would be extravagant, if he asserted that bodily health
was the summum bonum, and that no one could be
virtuous whose animal system was not in good order.
II.
But now let us turn to the teaching of the actual
Political Economist, in his present fashionable shape. I
will take a very favourable instance of him : he shall be
represented by a gentleman of high character, whose
religious views are sufficiently guaranteed to us by his
being the special choice, in this department of science,
of a University removed more than any other Protes-
tant body of the day from sordid or unchristian princi-
ples on the subject of money-making. I say, if there
be a place where Political Economy would be kept in
order, and would not be suffered to leave the high road
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology. 89
and ride across the pastures and the gardens dedicated
to other studies, it is the University of Oxford. And if
a man could anywhere be found who would have too
much good taste to offend the religious feeling of the
place, or to say any thing which he would himself allow
to be inconsistent with Revelation, I conceive it is the
person whose temperate and well-considered composi-
tion, as it would be generally accounted, I am going to
offer to your notice. Nor did it occasion any excite-
ment whatever on the part of the academical or the re-
ligious public, as did the instances which I have hitherto
been adducing. I am representing then the science of
Political Economy, in its independent or unbridled
action, to great advantage, when I select, as its specimen,
the Inaugural Lecture upon it, delivered in the Univer-
sity in question, by its first Professor. Yet with all these
circumstances in its favour, you will soon see. Gentlemen,
into what extravagance, for so I must call it, a grave
lawyer is led in praise of his chosen science, merely
from the circumstance that he has fixed his mind upon
it, till he has forgotten there are. subjects of thought
higher and more heavenly than it. You will find be-
yond mistake, that it is his object to recommend the
science of wealth, by claiming for it an ethical quality,
viz., by extolling it as the road to virtue and happi-
ness, whatever Scripture and holy men may say to the
contrary.
He begins by predicting of Political Economy, that
in the course of a very few years, " it will rank in public
estimation among the first of moral sciences in interest
and in utility." Then he explains most lucidly its
objects and duties, considered as "the science which
teaches in what wealth consists, by what agents it is
produced, and according to what laws it is distributed,
go Discourse IV,
and what are the Institutions and customs by which pro-
duction may be facilitated and distribution regulated, so
as to give the largest possible amount of wealth to each
Individual." And he dwells upon the interest which
attaches to the inquiry, " whether England has run her
full career of wealth and improvement, but stands safe
where she is, or whether to remain stationary is impos-
sible." After this he notices a certain objection, which
I shall set before you in his own words, as they will
furnish me with the illustration I propose.
This objection, he says, is, that, " as the pursuit of
wealth is one of the humblest of human occupations,
far inferior to the pursuit of virtue, or of knowledge, or
even of reputation, and as the possession of wealth is
not necessarily joined, — perhaps it will be said, is not
conducive, — to happiness, a science, of which the only
subject is wealth, cannot claim to rank as the first, or
nearly the first, of moral sciences."^ Certainly, to an
enthusiast in behalf of any science whatever, the temp-
tation is great to meet an objection urged against its
dignity and worth ; however, from the very form of it,
such an objection cannot receive a satisfactory answer
by means of the science itself It is an objection exter-
nal to the science, and reminds us of the truth of Lord
Bacon's remark, " No perfect discovery can be made
upon a flat or a level ; neither is it possible to discover
the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you
stand upon the level of the science, and ascend not to a
higher science." f The objection that Political Economy
is inferior to the science of virtue, or does not con-
duce to happiness, is an ethical or theological objection;
the question of its " rank " belongs to that Architectonic
* Introd. Lecture on Pol. Econ. pp. 1 1, 12.
f Advancement of Learning,
Bearing of Other Knoiv ledge on TheolGgy. g i
Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the
arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims
and arranges the places of all the departments of know-
ledge which man is able to master. I say, when an
opponent of a particular science asserts that it does
not conduce to happiness, and much more when its
champion contends in reply that it certainly does con-
duce to virtue, as this author proceeds to contend, the
obvious question which occurs to one to ask is, what
does Religion, what does Revelation, say on the point ?
Political Economy must not be allowed to give judg-
ment in its own favour, but must come before a higher
tribunal. The objection is an appeal to the Theologian ;
however, the Professor does not so view the matter ; he
does not consider it a question for Philosophy ; nor in-
deed on the other hand a question for Political Economy ;
not a question for Science at all ; but for Private Judg-
ment, — so he answers it himself, and as follows :
12.
"My answer," he says, "is, first, that the pursuit of
wealth, that is, the endeavour to accumulate the means of
future subsistence and enjoyment, is, to the mass of
mankind, the great source of moralimprovement" Now
observe. Gentlemen, how exactly this bears out what I have
been saying. It is just so far true, as to be able to instil
what is false, far as the author was from any such design.
I grant, then, that, ordinarily, beggary is not the means of
moral improvement ; and that the orderly habits which
attend upon the hot pursuit of gain, not only may effect
an external decency, but may at least shelter the soul
from the temptations of vice. Moreover, these habits of
good order guarantee regularity in a family or household,
and thus are accidentally the means of good ; moreover,
92 Discourse IV.
they lead to the education of its younger branches, and
they thus accidentally provide the rising generation with
a virtue or a truth which the present has not : but with-
out going into these considerations, further than to allow
them generally, and under circumstances, let us rather
contemplate what the author's direct assertion is. He
says," the ^rvdi^d^fowx \.o accumidate!' the words should be
weighed, and for what? " for enjoyment ; " — " to accumu-
late the means of future subsistence and enjoymicnt, is, to
the mass of mankind, the great source," not merely a
source, but the great source, and of what ? of social and
political progress ?— such an answer would have been
more within the limits of his art, — no, but of something
individual and personal, " of moral improvement^ The
soul, in the case of ^'the mass of mankind," improves in
moral excellence from this more than any thing else, viz.,
from heaping up the means of enjoying this world in
time to come ! I really should on every account be
sorry. Gentlemen, to exaggerate, but indeed one is taken
by surprise, one is startled, on meeting with so very
categorical a contradiction of our Lord, St. Paul, St.
Chrysostom, St. Leo, and all Saints.
"No institution," he continues, "could be more bene-
ficial to the morals of the lower orders, that is, to at least
nine-tenths of the whole body of any people, than one
which should increase their power and their wish to
accumulate ; none more mischievous than one which
should diminish their motives and means to save." No
institution more beneficial than one which should increase
the wish to acctumilate ! then Christianity is not one of
such beneficial institutions, for it expressly says, " Lay
not up to yourselves treasures on earth ... for where
thy treasure is, there is thy heart also ;" — no institution
more mischievous than one which should diminish the
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology, 93
motives to save! then Christianity is one of such mischiefs,
for the inspired text proceeds, " Lay up to yourselves
treasures in heaven, where neither the rust nor the moth
doth consume, and where thieves do not dig through,
nor steal."
But it is not enough that morals and happiness are
made to depend on gain and accumulation ; the practice
of Religion is ascribed to these causes also, and in the
following way. Wealth depends upon the pursuit of
wealth ; education depends upon wealth ; knowledge
depends on education ; and Religion depends on know-
ledge ; therefore Religion depends on the pursuit of
wealth. He says, after speaking of a poor and savage
people, " Such a population must be grossly ignorant.
The desire of knowledge is one of the last results
of refinement ; it requires in general to have been im-
planted in the mind during childhood ; and it is absurd
to suppose that persons thus situated would have the
power or the will to devote much to the education of
their children. A further consequence is the absence
of all real religion ; for the religion of the grossly igno-
rant, if they have any, scarcely ever amounts to more
than a debasing superstition."* The pursuit of gain
then is the basis of virtue, raligion, happiness ; though
it is all the while, as a Christian knows, the " root
of all evils," and the " poor on the contrary are blessed,
for theirs is the kingdom of God."
As to the argument contained in the logical Sorites
which I have been drawing out, I anticipated just now
what I should say to it in reply. I repeat, doutbtless
" beggary," as the wise man says, is not desirable ; doubt-
less, if men will not work, they should not eat ; there is
doubtless a sense in which it may be said that mere
* Intr. Lect., p. i6.
94 Discourse IV,
social or political virtue tends to moral and religious
excellence ; but the sense needs to be defined and the
statement to be kept within bounds. This is the very-
point on which I am all along insisting. I am not
denying, I am granting, I am assuming, that there is
reason and truth in the " leading ideas," as they are
called, and " large views " of scientific men ; I only
say that, though they speak truth, they do not speak the
whole truth ; that they speak a narrow truth, and think it
a broad truth ; that their deductions must be compared
with other truths, which are acknowledged to be truths,
in order to verify, complete, and correct them. They say
what is true, exceptis excipiendis ; what is true, but
requires guarding ; true, but must not be ridden too
hard, or made what is called a hobby ; true, but not the
measure of all things ; true, but if thus inordinately,
extravagantly, ruinously carried out, in spite of other
sciences, in spite of Theology, sure to become but a
great bubble, and to burst.
13.
I am getting to the end of this Discourse, before I
have noticed one tenth part of the instances with which
I might illustrate the subject of it. Else I should have
wished especially to have dwelt upon the not unfrequent
perversion which occurs of antiquarian and historical re-
search, to the prejudice of Theology. It is undeniable
that the records of former ages are of primary import-
ance in determining Catholic doctrine ; it is undeniable
also that there is a silence or a contrariety abstractedly
conceivable in those records, as to an alleged portion of
that doctrine, which would be sufficient to invalidate its
claims on our acceptance ; but it is quite as undeniable
that the existing documentary testimony to Catholicism
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology. 95
and Christianity may be so unduly valued as to be
made the absolute measure of Revelation, as if no part
of theological teaching were true which cannot bring its
express text, as it is called, from Scripture, and authori-
ties from the Fathers or profane writers, — whereas there
are numberless facts in past times which we cannot deny,
for they are indisputable, though history is silent about
them. I suppose, on this score, we ought to deny that
the round towers of this country had any origin, because
history does not disclose it ; or that any individual came
from Adam who cannot produce the table of his an-
cestry. Yet Gibbon argues against the darkness at the
Passion, from the accident that it is not mentioned by
Pagan historians : — as well might he argue against the
existence of Christianity itself in the first century, be-
cause Seneca,. Pliny, Plutarch, the Jewish Mishna, and
other authorities are silent about it. Protestants argue
in a parallel way against Transubstantiation, and Arians
against our Lord's Divinity, viz., on the ground that
extant writings of certain Fathers do not witness those
doctrines to their satisfaction : — as well might they say
that Christianity was not spread by the Twelve Apostles,
because we know so little of their labours. The evidence
of History, I say, is invaluable in its place ; but, if it as-
sumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth,
it goes beyond its place. We are putting it to a larger
ojffice than it can undertake, if we countenance the
usurpation ; and we are turning a true guide and bless-
ing into a source of inexplicable difficulty and inter-
minable doubt.
And so of other sciences : just as Comparative Ana-
tomy, Political Economy, the Philosophy of History, and
the Science of Antiquities may be and are turned
against Religion, by being taken by themselves, as I
96 . Discourse IV.
have been showing, so a like mistake may befall any
other. Grammar, for instance, at first sight does not
appear to admit of a perversion ; yet Home Tooke
made it the vehicle of his peculiar scepticism. Law
would seem to have enough to do with its own clients, and
their affairs ; and yet Mr. Bentham made a treatise on
judicial Proofs a covert attack upon the miracles of
Revelation. And in like manner Physiology may deny
moral evil and human responsibility ; Geology may deny
Moses ; and Logic may deny the Holy Trinity ; * and
other sciences, now rising into notice, are or will be
victims of a similar abuse.
14.
And now to sum up what I have been saying in a few
words. My object, it is plain, has been — not to show
that Secular Science in its various departments may take
up a position hostile to Theology ; — this is rather the
basis of the objection with which I opened this Discourse ;
— but to point out the cause of an hostility to which all
parties will bear witness. I have been insisting then on
this, that the hostility In question, when it occurs, is
coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitance of
Science from its proper course ; and that this exorbi-
tance is sure to take place, almost from the necessity of
the case, if Theology be not present to defend its own
boundaries and to hinder the encroachment. The human
mind cannot keep from speculating and systematizing ;
and if Theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory,
adjacent sciences, nay, sciences which are quite foreign to
Theology, will take possession of it. And this occupation
is proved to be a usurpation by this circumstance, that
these foreign sciences will assume certain principles as
* \^id. Abelard, for instance.
Bearing of Other Knowledge on Theology. 97
true, and act upon them, which they neither have
authority to lay down themselves, nor appeal to any
other higher science to lay down for them. For example, ^
it is a mere unwarranted assumption if the Antiquarian \
says, " Nothing has ever taken place but is to be found in I
historical documents ; " or if the Philosophic Historian !
says, " There is nothing in Judaism different from other
political institutions;" or if the Anatomist, ''There is
no soul beyond the brain ; " or if the Political Economist,
" Easy circumstances make men virtuous." These are
enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment ;
and it is Private Judgment that infects every science
which it touches with a hostility to Theology, a hostility
which properly attaches to no science in itself whatever.
If then. Gentlemen, I now resist such a course of
acting as unphilosophical, what is this but to do as men
of Science do when the interests of their own respective
pursuits are at stake } If they certainly would resist the
divine who determined the orbit of Jupiter by the
Pentateuch, why am I to be accused of cowardice or
illiberality, because I will not tolerate their attempt in
turn to theologize by means of astronomy } And if ex-
perimentalists would be sure to cry out, did I attempt
to install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astro-
nomy and medicine, why may not I, when Divine Science
is ostracized, and La Place, or Buffon, or Humboldt, sits
down in its chair, why may not I fairly protest against
their exclusiveness, and demand the emancipation of
Theology ?
15.
And now I consider I have said enough in proof of
the first point, which I undertook to maintain, viz., the
claim of Theology to be represented among the Chairs
7* 7
gS Discourse IV.
of a University. I have shown, I think, that exclusive-
ness really attaches, not to those who support that claim,
but to those who dispute it. I have argued in its behalf,
first, from the consideration that, whereas it is the very
profession of a University to teach all sciences, on this
account it cannot exclude Theology without being untrue
to its profession. Next, I have said that, all sciences
being connected together, and having bearings one on
another, it is impossible to teach them all thoroughly,
unless they all are taken into account, and Theology
among them. Moreover, I have insisted on the important
influence, which Theology in matter of fact does and must
exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and
correcting them ; so that, granting it to be a real science
occupied upon truth, it cannot be omitted without great
prejudice to the teaching of the rest. And lastly, I have
urged that, supposing Theology be not taught, its
province will not simply be neglected, but will be actually
usurped by other sciences, which will teach, without
warrant, conclusions of their own in a subject-matter
which needs its own proper principles for its due forma-
tion and disposition.
Abstract statements are always unsatisfactory ; these,
as I have already observed, could be illustrated at far
greater length than the time allotted to me for the
purpose has allowed. Let me hope that I have said
enough upon the subject to suggest thoughts, which
those who take an interest in it may pursue for them-
selves.
99
DISCOURSE V.
KNOWLEDGE ITS OWN END.
A UNIVERSITY may be considered with reference
either to its Students or to its Studies ; and the
principle, that all Knowledge is a whole and the sepa-
rate Sciences parts of one, which I have hitherto been
using in behalf of its studies, is equally important when
we direct our attention to its students. Now then I
turn to the students, and shall consider the education
which, by virtue of this principle, a University will give
them ; and thus I shall be introduced. Gentlemen, to
the second question, which I proposed to discuss, viz,
whether and in what sense its teaching, viewed relatively
to the taught, carries the attribute of Utility along with it.
I.
I have said that all branches of knowledge are con-
nected together, because the subject-matter of knowledge
is intimately united in itself, as being the acts and the
work of the Creator. Hence it is that the Sciences, into
which our knowledge may be said to be cast, have multi-
plied bearings one on another, and an internal sympathy,
and admit, or rather demand, comparison and adjustment.
They complete, correct, balance each other. This con-
sideration, if well-founded, must be taken into account,
not only as regards the attainment of truth, which is
lOO DiscotiT^e V,
their common end, but as regards the influence which
they exercise upon those whose education consists in the
study of them. I have said already, that to give undue
prominence to one is to be unjust to another ; to neglect
or supersede these is to divert those from their proper
object. It is to unsettle the boundary lines between
science and science, to disturb their action, to destroy
the harmony which binds them together. Such a pro-
ceeding will have a corresponding effect when introduced
into a place of education. There is no science but tells
a different tale, when viewed as a portion of a whole,
from what it is likely to suggest when taken by itself,
without the safeguard, as I may call it, of others.
Let me make use of an illustration. In the combination
of colours, very different effects are produced by a
difference in their selection and juxta-position ; red, green,
and white, change their shades, according to the contrast
to which they are submitted. And, in like manner, the
drift and meaning of a branch of knowledge varies with
the company in which it is introduced to the student.
If his reading is confined simply to one subject, however
such division of labour may favour the advancement of a
particular pursuit, a point into which I do not here enter,
certainly it has a tendency to contract his mind. If it is
incorporated with others, it depends on those others as
to the kind of influence which it exerts upon him. Thus
the Classics, which in England are the means of refining
the taste, have in France subserved the spread of revolu-
tionary and deistical doctrines. In Metaphysics, again,
Butler's Analogy of Religion, which has had so much to
do with the conversion to the Catholic faith of members
of the University of Oxford, appeared to Pitt and others,
who had received a different training, to operate only in
the direction of infidelity. And so again, Watson, Bishop
Knoivledo^e its Own Eiid. loi
^
of Llandafif, as I think he tells us in the narrative of his
life, felt the science of Mathematics to indispose the
mind to religious belief, while others see in its investiga-
tions the best parallel, and thereby defence, of the Chris-
tian Mysteries. In like manner, I suppose, Arcesilas
would not have handled logic as Aristotle, nor Aristotle
have criticized poets as Plato ; yet reasoning and poetry
are subject to scientific rules.
It is a great point then to enlarge the range of studies
which a University professes, even for the sake of the
students ; and, though they cannot pursue every subject
which is open to them, they will be the gainers by living
among those and under those who represent the whole
circle. This I conceive to be the advantage of a seat of
universal learning, considered as a place of education.
An assemblage of learned men, zealous for their own
sciences, and rivals of each other, are brought, by familiar
intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace, to
adjust together the claims and relations of their respective
subjects of investigation. They learn to respect, to
consult, to aid each other. Thus is created a pure and
clear atmosphere of thought, which the student also
breathes, though in his own case he only pursues a few
sciences out cf the multitude. He profits by an intel-
lectual tradition, which is independent of particular
teachers, which guides him in his choice of subjects, and
duly interprets for him those which he chooses. He
apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles
on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its
shades, its great points and its little, as he otherwise
cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that his education
is called " Liberal." A habit of mind is formed which
lasts through life, of which the attributes are, freedom,
equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom ; or
I02 Discourse V,
what in a former Discourse I have ventured to call a
philosophical habit. This then I would assign as the
special fruit of the education furnished at a University,
as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of
teaching. This is the main purpose of a University in
its treatment of its students.
And now the question is asked me, What is the use
of it .'* and my answer will constitute the main subject of
the Discourses which are to follow.
2.
Cautious and practical thinkers, I say, will ask of me,
what, after all, is the gain of this Philosophy, of which I
make such account, and from which I promise so much.
Even supposing it to enable us to exercise the degree of
trust exactly due to every science respectively, and to
estimate precisely the value of every truth which is any-
where to be found, how are we better for this master view
of things, which I have been extolling .? Does it not re-
verse the principle of the division of labour .^ will prac-
tical objects be obtained better or worse by its culti-
vation } to what then does it lead .? where does it end }
what does it do } how does it profit .? what does it
promise } Particular sciences are respectively the basis
of definite arts, which carry on to results tangible and
beneficial the truths which are the subjects of the know-
ledge attained ; what is the Art of this science of
sciences .? what is the fruit of such a Philosophy .? what
are we proposing to effect, what inducements do we hold
out to the Catholic community, when we set about the
enterprise of founding a University "i
I am asked what is the end of University Education,
and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I
conceive it to impart : I answer, that what I have already
Knowledge its Own End, 103
said has been sufficient to show that it has a very tan-
gible, real, and sufficient end, though the end cannot be
divided from that knowledge itself. Knowledge is capa-
ble of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the
human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really
such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all know-
ledge, it is true also of that special Philosophy, which
I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth
in all its branches, of the relations of science to science,
of their mutual bearings, and their respective values.
What the worth of such an acquirement is, compared
with other objects which we seek, — wealth or power or
honour or the conveniences and comforts of life, I do not
profess here to discuss ; but I would maintain, and
mean to show, that it is an object, in its own nature so
really and undeniably good, as to be the compensation
of a great deal of thought in the compassing, and a
great deal of trouble in the attaining.
Now, when I say that Knowledge is, not merely a
means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of
certain arts into which it naturally resolves, but an end
sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake, surely
I am uttering no paradox, for I am stating what is both
intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common
judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of
mankind. I am saying what at least the public opinion
of this day ought to be slow to deny, considering how
much we have heard of late years, in opposition to
Religion, of entertaining, curious, and various knowledge.
I am but saying what whole volumes have been written
to illustrate, viz., by a " selection from the records of Phi-
losophy, Literature, and Art, in all ages and countries,
of a body of examples, to show how the most unpropitious
circumstances have been unable to conquer an ardent
io4 Discourse V,
desire for the acquisition of knowledge." * That further
advantages accrue to us and redound to others by its
possession, over and above what it is in itself, I am very-
far indeed from denying ; but, independent of these, we
are satisfying a direct need of our nature in its very
acquisition ; and, whereas our nature, unlike that of the
inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection,
but depends, in order to it, on a number of external aids
and appliances. Knowledge, as one of the principal of
these, is valuable for what its very presence in us does
for us after the manner of a habit, even though it be
turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct
end.
3.
Hence it is that Cicero, in enumerating the various
heads of mental excellence, lays down the pursuit of
Knowledge for its own sake, as the first of them. " This
pertains most of all to human nature," he says, " for we
are all of us drawn to the pursuit of Knowledge ; in
which to excel we consider excellent, whereas to mis-
take, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, is both an
evil and a disgrace." t And he considers Knowledge
the very first object to which we are attracted, after the
supply of our physical wants. After the calls and duties
of our animal existence, as they may be termed, as re-
gards ourselves, our family, and our neighbours, follows,
he tells us, "the search after truth. Accordingly, as
soon as we escape from the pressure of necessary cares,
forthwith we desire to see, to hear, and to learn ; and
consider the knowledge of what is hidden or is wonder-
ful a condition of our happiness."
* Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties. Introd.
f Cicer. Offic. init.
Knowledge its Own End, 105
This passage, though it is but one of many similar
passages in a multitude of authors, I take for the very-
reason that it is so familiarly known to us ; and I wish
you to observe, Gentlemen, how distinctly it separates
the pursuit of Knowledge from those ulterior objects to
which certainly it can be made to conduce, and which
are, I suppose, solely contemplated by the persons who
would ask of me the use of a University or Liberal
Education. So far from dreaming of the cultivation of
Knowledge directly and mainly in order to our physical
comfort and enjoyment, for the sake of life and person,
of health, of the conjugal and family union, of the social
tie and civil security, the great Orator implies, that it is
only after our physical and political needs are supplied,
and when we are "free from necessary duties and cares,"
that we are in a condition for " desiring to see, to hear,
and to learn." Nor does he contemplate in the least
degree the reflex or subsequent action of Knowledge,
when acquired, upon those material goods which we set
out by securing before we seek it ; on the contrary, he
expressly denies its bearing upon social life altogether,
strange as such a procedure is to those who live after the
rise of the Baconian philosophy, and he cautions us
against such a cultivation of it as will interfere with our
duties to our fellow-creatures. " All these methods," he
says, " are engaged in the investigation of truth ; by the
pursuit of which to be carried off from public occupa-
tions is a transgression of duty. For the praise of virtue
lies altogether in action ; yet intermissions often occur,
and then we recur to such pursuits ; not to say that the
incessant activit}^ of the mind is vigorous enough to
carry us on in the pursuit of knowledge, even without
any exertion of our own." The idea of benefiting
society by means of " the pursuit of science and know-
io6 Discourse V,
ledge " did not enter at all into the motives which he
would assign for their cultivation.
This was the ground of the opposition which the elder
Cato made to the introduction of Greek Philosophy
among his countrymen, when Carneades and his com-
panions, on occasion of their embassy, were charming
the Roman youth with their eloquent expositions of it.
The fit representative of a practical people, Cato esti-
mated every thing by what it produced; whereas the
Pursuit of Knowledge promised nothing beyond Know-
ledge itself. He despised that refinement or enlargement
of mind of which he had no experience.
4.
Things, which can bear to be cut oiT from every thing
else and yet persist in living, must have life in themselves ;
pursuits, which issue in nothing, and still maintain their
ground for ages, which are regarded as admirable, though
they have not as yet proved themselves to be useful,
must have their sufBcient end in themselves, whatever it
turn out to be. And we are brought to the same con-
clusion by considering the force of the epithet, by which
the knowledge under consideration is popularly desig-
nated. It is common to speak of " liberal knowledge,"
of the " liberal arts and studies," and of a " liberal edu-
cation," as the especial characteristic or property of a
University and of a gentleman ; what is really meant
by the word ? Now, first, in its grammatical sense it is
opposed to servile; and by "servile work" is understood,
as our catechisms inform us, bodily labour, mechanical
employment, and the like, in which the mind has little
or no part. Parallel to such servile works are those arts,
\i they deserve the name, of which the poet speaks,*
* T^x^V T'^XW ^(TTep^e Kal t6xv t^X^V^-
Vid. Arist. Nic. Ethic, vi.
Knowledge its Owfi End. 107
which owe their origin and their method to hazard, not
to skill ; as, for instance, the practice and operations of
an empiric. As far as this contrast may be considered
as a guide into the meaning of the word, liberal educa-
tion and liberal pursuits are exercises of mind, of reason,
of reflection.
But we want something more for its explanation, for
there are bodily exercises which are liberal, and mental
exercises which are not so. For instance, in ancient
times the practitioners in medicine were commonly
slaves ; yet it was an art as intellectual in its nature, in
spite of the pretence, fraud, and quackery with which it
might then, as now, be debased, as it was heavenly in its
aim. And so in like manner, we contrast a liberal
education with a commercial education or a professional ;
yet no one can deny that commerce and the professions
afford scope for the highest and most diversified powers
of mind. There is then a great variety of intellectual
exercises, which are not technically called " liberal ; " on
the other hand, I say, there are exercises of the body
which do receive that appellation. Such, for instance,
was the palaestra, in ancient times ; such the Olympic
games, in which strength and dexterity of body as well
as of mind gained the prize. In Xenophon we read of
the young Persian nobility being taught to ride on horse-,
back and to speak the truth ; both being among the
accomplishments of a gentleman. War, too, however
rough a profession, has ever been accounted Hberal,
unless in cases when it becomes heroic, which would
introduce us to another subject.
Now comparing these instances together, we shall
have no difficulty in determining the principle of this
apparent variation in the application of the term which
I am examining. Manly games, or games of skill, or
lo8 Discourse V,
military prowess, though bodily, are, it seems, accounted
liberal ; on the other hand, what is merely professional,
though highly intellectual, nay, though liberal in com-
parison of trade and manual labour, is not simply called
liberal, and mercantile occupations are not liberal at all.
Why this distinction ? because that alone is liberal know-
ledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is
independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses
to be informed (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed
into any art, in order duly to present itself to our con-
templation. The most ordinary pursuits have this specific
character, if they are self-sufficient and complete ; the
highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond
them. It is absurd to balance, in point of worth and
importance, a treatise on reducing fractures with a game
of cricket or a fox-chase ; yet of the two the bodily
exercise has that quality which we call " liberal," and
the intellectual has it not. And so of the learned pro-
fessions altogether, considered merely as professions ;
although one of them be the most popularly beneficial,
and another the most politically important, and the third
the most intimately divine of all human pursuits, yet
the very greatness of their end, the health of the body,
or of the commonwealth, or of the soul, diminishes, not
increases, their claim to the appellation "liberal," and
that still more, if they are cut down to the strict exigen-
cies of that end. If, for instance. Theology, instead of
being cultivated as a contemplation, be limited to the
purposes of the pulpit or be represented by the cate-
chism, it loses, — not its usefulness, not its divine character,
not its meritoriousness (rather it gains a claim upon these
titles by such charitable condescension), — but it does lose
the particular attribute which I am illustrating; just as
a face worn by tears and fasting loses its beauty, or a
Knoivledge its Own End, 109
labourer's hand loses its delicateness ; — for Theology
thus exercised is not simple knowledge, but rather is
an art or a business making use of Theology. And
thus it appears that even what is supernatural need not
be liberal, nor need a hero be a gentleman, for the plain
reason that one idea is not another idea. And in like
manner the Baconian Philosophy, by using its physical
sciences in the service of man, does thereby transfer them
from the order of Liberal Pursuits to, I do not say the
inferior, but the distinct class of the Useful. And, to
take a different instance, hence again, as is evident,
v/henever personal gain is the motive, still more distinc-
tive an effect has it upon the character of a given pursuit ;
thus racing, which was a liberal exercise in Greece, for-
feits its rank in times like these, so far as it is made the
occasion of gambling.
All that I have been now saying is summed up in a
few characteristic words of the great Philosopher. " Of
possessions," he says, " those rather are useful, which
bear fruit ; those libei^al, which tend to enjoyment. By
fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue ; by enjoyable,
where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the usijig!'*
5.
Do not suppose, that in thus appealing to the ancients,
I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and
fettering Philosophy with the reasonings of paganism.
While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these
matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth.
While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent,
being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze
the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind.
He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas,
* Aristot. Rhet. i. 5.
no Discourse V,
before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think
correctly, is to think like Aristotle , and we are his dis-
ciples whether we will or no, though we may not know
it. Now, as to the particular instance before us, the
word " liberal " as applied to Knowledge and Education,
expresses a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever
will be, while the nature of man is the same, just as the
idea of the Beautiful is specific, or of the Sublime, or of
the Ridiculous, or of the Sordid. It is in the world
now, it was in the world then ; and, as in the case of
the dogmas of faith, it is illustrated by a continuous
historical tradition, and never was out of the world, from
the time it came into it. There have indeed been dif-
ferences of opinion from time to time, as to what pur-
suits and what arts came under that idea, but such
differences are but an additional evidence of its reality.
That idea must have a substance in it, which has main-
tained its ground amid these conflicts and changes,
which has ever served as a standard to measure things
withal, which has passed from mind to mind unchanged,
when there was so much to colour, so much to influence
any notion or thought whatever, which was not founded
in our very nature. Were it a mere generalization, it
would have varied with the subjects from which it was
generahzed ; but though its subjects vary with the age,
it varies not itself. The palaestra may seem a Hberal
exercise to Lycurgus, and illiberal to Seneca ; coach-
driving and prize-fighting may be recognized in Elis,
and be condemned in England ; music may be despica-
ble in the eyes of certain moderns, and be in the highest
place with Aristotle and Plato, — (and the case is the
same in the particular application of the idea of Beauty,
or of Goodness, or of Moral Virtue, there is a difference
of tastes, a difference of judgments) — still these varia-
Knowledge its Own End. jit
tions imply, instead of discrediting, the archetypal idea,
which is but a previous hypothesis or condition, by
means of which issue is joined between contending
opinions, and without which there would be nothing to
dispute about.
I consider, then, that I am chargeable with no para-
dox, when I speak of a Knowledge which is its own end,
when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman's know-
ledge, when I educate for it, and make it the scope of a
University. And still less am I incurring such a charge,
when I make this acquisition consist, not in Knowledge
in a vague and ordinary sense, but in that Knowledge
which I have especially called Philosophy or, in an ex-
tended sense of the word, Science ; for whatever claims
Knowledge has to be considered as a good, these it has
in a higher degree when it is viewed not vaguely, not
popularly, but precisely and transcendently as Philo-
sophy. Knowledge, I say, is then especially liberal, or
sufficient for itself, apart from every external and ulterior
object, when and so far as it is philosophical, and this I
proceed to show.
Now bear with me, Gentlemen, if what I am about to
say, has at first sight a fanciful appearance. Philosophy,
then, or Science, is related to Knowledge in this way : —
Knowledge is called by the name of Science or Philoso-
phy, when it is acted upon, informed, or if I may use a
strong figure, impregnated by Reason. Reason is the
principle of that intrinsic fecundity of Knowledge, which,
to those who possess it, is its especial value, and which
dispenses with the necessity of their looking abroad for
any end to rest upon external to itself. Knowledge, in-
deed, when thus exalted into a scientific form, is also
112 Discourse V,
power ; not only is it excellent in itself, but whatever
such excellence may be, it is something more, it has a
result beyond itself. Doubtless ; but that is a further
consideration, with which I am not concerned. I only
say that, prior to its being a power, it is a good ; that it
is, not only an instrument, but an end. I know well it
may resolve itself into an art, and terminate in a
mechanical process, and in tangible fruit ; but ijt also
may fall back upon that Reason which informs it, and
resolve itself into Philosophy. In one case it is called
Useful Knowledge, in the other Liberal. The same person
may cultivate it in both ways at once ; but this again
is a matter foreign to my subject ; here I do but say
that there are two ways of using Knowledge, and in
matter of fact those who use it in one way are not likely
to use it in the other, or at least in a very limited mea-
sure. You see, then, here are two methods of Education ;
the end of the one is to be philosophical, of the other to
be mechanical ; the one rises towards general ideas, the
other is exhausted upon what is particular and external.
Let me not be thought to deny the necessity, or to decry
the benefit, of such attention to what is particular and
practical, as belongs to the useful or mechanical arts; life
could not go on without them ; we owe our daily welfare
to them ; their exercise is the duty of the many, and we
owe to the many a debt of gratitude for fulfilling that
duty. I only say that Knowledge, in proportion as it
tends more and more to be particular, ceases to be
Knowledge. It is a question whether Knowledge can
in any proper sense be predicated of the brute creation ;
without pretending to metaphysical exactness of phrase-
ology, which would be unsuitable to an occasion like this,
I say, it seems to me improper to call that passive sen-
sation, or perception of things, which brutes seem to
Knowledge its Own End. 113
possess, by the name of Knowledge. When I speak of
Knowledge, I mean something intellectual, something
which grasps what it perceives through the senses ; some-
thing which takes a view of things ; which sees more
than the senses convey ; which reasons upon what it
sees, and while it sees ; which invests it with an idea.
It expresses itself, not in a mere enunciation, but by an
enthymeme : it is of the nature of science from the first,
and in this consists its dignity. The principle of real
dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness, con-
sidered irrespectively of its results, is this germ within it
of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how
it comes to be an end in itself ; this is why it admits of
being called Liberal. Not to know the relative dispo-
sition of things is the state of slaves or children ; to have
mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the
ambition, of Philosophy,
Moreover, such knowledge is not a mere extrinsic or
accidental advantage, which is ours to-day and another's
to-morrow, which may be got up from a book, and
easily forgotten again, which we can command or com-
municate at our pleasure, which we can borrow for the
occasion, carry about in our hand, and take into the
market ; it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a
personal possession, and an inward endowment. And
this is the reason, why it is more correct, as well as more
usual, to speak of a University as a place of education,
than of instruction, though, when knowledge is concerned,
instruction would at first sight have seemed the more
appropriate word. We are instructed, for instance, in
manual exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades,
and in ways of business ; for these are methods, which
have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained
in rules committed to mem.ory, to tradition, or to use,
7* 8
114 Discourse V,
and bear upon an end external to themselves. But
education is a higher word ; it implies an action upon
our mental nature, and the formation of a character ; it
is something individual and permanent, and is commonly-
spoken of in connexion with religion and virtue. When,
then, we speak of the communication of Knowledge as
being Education, we thereby really imply that that
Knowledge is a state or condition of mind ; and since
cultivation of mind is surely worth seeking for its own
sake, we are thus brought once more to the conclusion,
which the word " Liberal " and the word " Philosophy "
have already suggested, that there is a Knowledge,
which is desirable, though nothing come of it, as being
of itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years
of labour.
7-
This, then, is the answer which I am prepared to give
to the question with which I opened this Discourse.
Before going on to speak of the object of the Church in
taking up Philosophy, and the uses to which she puts it,
I am prepared to maintain that Philosophy is its own
end, and, as I conceive, I have now begun the proof of
it. I am prepared to maintain that there is a knowledge
worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what
it does ; and what minutes remain to me to-day I shall
devote to the removal of some portion of the indistinct-
ness and confusion with which the subject may in some
minds be surrounded.
It may be objected then, that, when we profess to
seek Knowledge for some end or other beyond itself,
whatever it be, we speak intelligibly ; but that, what-
ever men may have said, however obstinately the idea
may have kept its ground from age to age, still it is
Knowledge its Own End, 115
simply unmeaning to say that we seek Knowledge for
its own sake, and for nothing else ; for that it ever leads
to something beyond itself, which therefore is its end,
and the cause why it is desirable ; — moreover, that this
end is twofold, either of this world or of the next ; that
all knowledge is cultivated either for secular objects or
for eternal ; that if it is directed to secular objects, it is
called Useful Knowledge, if to eternal. Religious or
Christian Knowledge ; — in consequence, that if, as I have
allowed, this Liberal Knowledge does not benefit the
body or estate, it ought to benefit the soul ; but if the
fact be really so, that it is neither a physical or a secular
good on the one hand, nor a moral good on the other, it
cannot be a good at all, and is not worth the trouble
which is necessary for its acquisition.
And then I may be reminded that the professors of this
Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge have themselves, in
every age, recognized this exposition of the matter, and
have submitted to the issue in which it terminates ; for
they have ever been attempting to make men virtuous ;
or, if not, at least have assumed that refinement of mind
was virtue, and that they themselves were the virtuous
portion of mankind. This they have professed on the
one hand ; and on the other, they have utterly failed in
their professions, so as ever to make themselves a proverb
among men, and a laughing-stock both to the grave and
the dissipated portion of mankind, in consequence of
them. Thus they have furnished against themselves both
the ground and the means of their own exposure, with-
out any trouble at all to any one else. In a word, from
the time that Athens was the University of the world,
what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without
practising, and to aspire without attaining } What has
the deep and lofty thought of its disciples ended in but
1 1 6 Discourse V.
eloquent words ? Nay, what has its teaching ever medi-
tated, when it was boldest in its remedies for human ill,
beyond charming us to sleep by its lessons, that we
might feel nothing at all? like some melodious air, or
rather like those strong and transporting perfumes, which
at first spread their sweetness over every thing they
touch, but in a little while do but offend in proportion as
they once pleased us. Did Philosophy support Cicero
under the disfavour of the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca
to oppose an imperial tyrant ? It abandoned Brutus, as he
sorrowfully confessed, in his greatest need, and it forced
Cato, as his panegyrist strangely boasts, into the false
position of defying heaven. How few can be counted
among its professors, who, like Polemo, were thereby
converted from a profligate course, or like Anaxagoras,
thought the world well lost in exchange for its posses-
sion ? The philosopher in Rasselas taught a superhuman
doctrine, and then succumbed without an effort to a trial
of human affection.
" He discoursed," we are told, " with great energy on
the government of the passions. His look was venerable,
his action graceful, his pronunciation clear, and his
diction elegant. He showed, with great strength of
sentiment and variety of illustration, that human nature
is degraded and debased, when the lower faculties pre-
dominate over the higher. He communicated the
various precepts given, from time to time, for the con-
quest of passion, and displayed the happiness of those
who had obtained the important victory, after which
man is no longer the slave of fear, nor the fool of hope . . ,
He enumerated many examples of heroes immoveable
by pain or pleasure, who looked with indifference on
those modes or accidents to which the vulgar give the
names of good and evil."
Knowledge its Own End, 117
Rasselas in a few days found the philosopher in a
room half darkened, with his eyes misty, and his face
pale. " Sir," said he, " you have come at a time when
all human friendship is useless ; what I suffer cannot be
remedied, what I have lost cannot be supplied. My
daughter, my only daughter, from whose tenderness I
expected all the comforts of my age, died last night of
a fever." " Sir," said the prince, " mortality is an event
by which a wise man can never be surprised ; we know
that death is always near, and it should therefore always
be expected." " Young man," answered the philosopher,
"you speak like one who has never felt the pangs of
separation." " Have you, then, forgot the precept," said
Rasselas, " which you so powerfully enforced ? . . . con-
sider that external things are naturally variable, but
truth and reason are always the same." *' What comfort,"
said the mourner, *' can truth and reason afford me }
Of what effect are they now, but to tell me that my
daughter will not be restored ? "
8.
Better, far better, to make no professions, you will
say, than to cheat others with what we are not, and to
scandalize them with what we are. The sensualist, or
the man of the world, at any rate is not the victim of fine
words, but pursues a reality and gains it. The Philo-
sophy of Utility, you will say. Gentlemen, has at least
done its work ; and I grant it, — it aimed low, but it has
fulfilled its aim. If that man of great intellect who has
been its Prophet in the conduct of life played false to
his own professions, he was not bound by his philosophy
to be true to his friend or faithful in his trust. Moral
virtue was not the line in which he undertook to instruct
men; and though, as the poet calls him, he were the
1 1 8 Discourse V,
"meanest" of mankind, he was so in what may be called
his private capacity and without any prejudice to the
theory of induction. He had a right to be so, if he chose,
for any thing that the Idols of the den or the theatre
had to say to the contrary. His mission was the
increase of physical enjoyment and social comfort ; *
and most wonderfully, most awfully has he fulfilled his
conception and his design. Almost day by day have
we fresh and fresh shoots, and buds, and blossoms,
which are to ripen into fruit, on that magical tree of
Knowledge which he planted, and to which none of
us perhaps, except the very poor, but owes, if not his
present life, at least his daily food, his health, and
general well-being. He was the divinely provided
minister of temporal benefits to all of us so great, that,
whatever I am forced to think of him as a man, I have
not the heart, from mere gratitude, to speak of him
severely. And, in spite of the tendencies of his philoso-
phy, which are, as we see at this day, to depreciate, or
to trample on Theology, he has himself, in his writings,
gone out of his way, as if with a prophetic misgiving
of those tendencies, to insist on it as the instrument of
that beneficent Father,t who, when He came on earth in
visible form, took on Him first and most prominently
* It will be seen that on the whole I agree with Lord Macaulay in his
Essay on Bacon's Philosophy. I do not know whether he would agi-ee
with me.
f De Augment, iv. 2, vid. Macaulay's Essay ; vid. also "Inprincipio
operis ad Deum Patrem, Deum Verbum, Deum Spiritum, preces fundimus
humillimas et ardentissimas, ut humani generis serumnarum memores, et
peregrinationis istius vitse, in qua dies paucos et malos terimus, novis suis
elee/nosynis, per mantis nosti'as, familiam humanam dotare dignentur.
Atque illud insuper supplices rogamus, ne humana divinis officiant ; neve
ex reseratione viarum senses, et accensione majore luminis naturalis, aliquid
incredulitatis et noctis, animis nostris erga divina mysteria oboriatur," etc.
ricef. Instaur. Magn.
Knowledge its Own End, 119
the office of assuaging the bodily wounds of human
nature. And truly, like the old mediciner in the tale,
"he sat diligently at his work, and hummed, with
cheerful countenance, a pious song ; " and then in turn
'* went out singing into the meadows so gaily, that those
who had seen him from afar might well have thought it
was a youth gathering flowers for his beloved, instead
of an old physician gathering healing herbs in the
morning dew." *
Alas, that men, in the action of life or in their heart
of hearts, are not what they seem to be in their moments
of excitement, or in their trances or intoxications of
genius, — so good, so noble, so serene ! Alas, that Bacon
too in his own way should after all be but the fellow of
those heathen philosophers who in their disadvantages
had some excuse for their inconsistency, and who surprise
us rather in what they did say than in what they did
not do ! Alas, that he too, Hke Socrates or Seneca, must
be stripped of his holy-day coat, which looks so fair, and
should be but a mockery amid his most majestic gravity
of phrase ; and, for all his vast abilities, should, in the
littleness of his own moral being, but typify the intel-
lectual narrowness of his school ! However, granting
all this, heroism after all was not his philosophy : — I
cannot deny he has abundantly achieved what he
proposed. His is simply a Method whereby bodily dis-
comforts and temporal wants are to be most effectually
removed from the greatest number ; and already, before
it has shown any signs of exhaustion, the gifts of nature,
in their most artificial shapes and luxurious profusion
and diversity, from all quarters of the earth, are, it is
undeniable, by its means brought even to our doors, and
we rejoice in them.
* Fouque's Uiaknown Patient.
I20 Discottrse V,
9.
Useful Knowledge then, I grant, has done its work ;
and Liberal Knowledge as certainly has not done its
work, — that is, supposing, as the objectors assume, its
direct end, like Religious Knowledge, is to make men
better ; but this I will not for an instant allow, and,
unless I allow it, those objectors have said nothing to
the purpose. I admit, rather I maintain, what they have
been urging, for I consider Knowledge to have its end in
itself. For all its friends, or its enemies, may say, I
insist upon it, that it is as real a mistake to burden it
with virtue or religion as with the mechanical arts. Its
direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation
or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the
loom in motion, or to direct the steam carriage ; be it
ever so much the means or the condition of both ma-
terial and moral advancement, still, taken by and in
itself, it as little mends our hearts as it improves our
temporal circumstances. And if its eulogists claim for
it such a power, they commit the very same kind of
encroachment on a province not their own as the
political economist who should maintain that his science
educated him for casuistry or diplomacy. Knowledge
is one thing, virtue is another ; good sense is not con-
science, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and
justness of view faith. Philosophy, however enlightened,
however profound, gives no command over the passions,
no influential motives, no vivifying principles. Liberal
Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic,
but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentlemen, it is
well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a
candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and
courteous bearing in the conduct of life ; — these are the
Knowledge its Own End, 121
connatural qualities of a large knowledge ; they are tiie
objects of a University ; I am advocating, I shall illus-
trate and insist upon them ; but still, I repeat, they are
no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness,
they may attach to the man of the world, to the profli-
gate, to the heartless, — pleasant, alas, and attractive as
he shows when "decked out in them. Taken by them-
selves, they do but seem to be what they are not ; they
look like virtue at a distance, but they are detected by
close observers, and on the long run ; and hence it is
that they are popularly accused of pretence and hypo-
crisy, not, I repeat, from their own fault, but because
their professors and their admirers persist in taking them
for what they are not, and are officious in arrogating for
them a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the
granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a
thread of silk ; then may you hope with such keen and
delicate instruments as human knowledge and human
reason to contend against those giants, the passion and
the pride of man.
Surely we are not driven to theories of this kind, in
order to vindicate the value and dignity of Liberal
Knowledge. Surely the real grounds on which its pre-
tensions rest are not so very subtle or abstruse, so very
strange or improbable. Surely it is very intelligible to
say, and that is what I say here, that Liberal Education,
viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect,
as such, and its object is nothing more or less than
intellectual excellence. Every thing has its own perfec-
tion, be it higher or lower in the scale of things ; and the
perfection of one is not the perfection of another.
Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good
in their kind, and have a des^ of themselves, which is an
object of pursuit. Why do you take such pains with
122 Discourse V.
your garden or your park ? You see to your walks and
turf and shrubberies ; to your trees and drives ; not as
if you meant to make an orchard of the one, or corn or
pasture land of the other, but because there is a special
beauty in all that is goodly in wood, water, plain, and
slope, brought all together by art into one shape, and
grouped into one whole. Your cities are beautiful, your
palaces, your public buildings, your territorial mansions,
your churches ; and their beauty leads to nothing beyond
itself. There is a physical beauty and a moral : there is
a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being,
which is natural virtue ; and in like manner there is a
beauty, there is a perfection, of the intellect. There is
an ideal perfection in these various subject-matters,
towards which individual instances are seen to rise, and
which are the standards for all instances whatever. The
Greek divinities and demigods, as the statuary has
moulded them, with their symmetry of figure, and
their high forehead and their regular features, are the
perfection of physical beauty. The heroes, of whom
history tells, Alexander, or Caesar, or Scipio, or Saladin,
are the representatives of that magnanimity or self-
mastery which is the greatness of human nature. Chris-
tianity too has its heroes, and in the supernatural order,
and we call them Saints. The artist puts before him
beauty of feature and form ; the poet, beauty of mind ;
the preacher, the beauty of grace : then intellect too, I
repeat, has its beauty, and it has those who aim at it.
To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it
to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its know-
ledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application,
flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource,
address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible
(for here we are inquiring, not what the object of a
Knowledge its Own End, 123
Liberal Education is worth, nor what use the Church
makes of it, but what it is in itself), I say, an object as
intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the
same time, it is absolutely distinct from it.
10.
This indeed is but a temporal object, and a transitory
possession ; but so are other things in themselves which
we make much of and pursue. The moralist will tell
us that man, in all his functions, is but a flower which
blossoms and fades, except so far as a higher principle
breathes upon him, and makes him and what he is im-
mortal. Body and mind are carried on into an eternal
state of being by the gifts of Divine Munificence ; but
at first they do but fail in a faiUng world; and if the
powers of intellect decay, the powers of the body have
decayed before them, and, as an Hospital or an Alms-
house, though its end be ephemeral, may be sanctified
to the service of religion, so surely may a University,
even were it nothing more than I have as yet described
it. We attain to heaven by using this world well,
though it is to pass away ; we perfect our nature, not by
undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature,
and directing it towards aims higher than its own.
1-4
DISCOURSE VI.
KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO LEARNING.
I.
IT were well if the English, like the Greek language,
possessed some definite word to express, simply and
generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as
" health," as used with reference to the animal frame, and
"virtue," with reference to our moral nature. I am not
able to find such a term ; — talent, ability, genius, belong
distinctly to the raw material, which is the subject-matter,
not to that excellence which is the result of exercise and
training. When we turn, indeed, to the particular kinds
of intellectual perfection, words are forthcoming for our
purpose, as, for instance, judgment, taste, and skill ; yet
ev^en these belong, for the most part, to powers or
habits bearing upon practice or upon art, and not to any
perfect condition of the intellect, considered in itself.
Wisdom, again, is certainly a more comprehensive word
than any other, but it has a direct relation to conduct,
and to human life. Knowledge, indeed, and Science
express purely intellectual ideas, but still not a state
or quality of the intellect ; for knowledge, in its ordinary
sense, is but one of its circumstances, denoting a posses-
sion or a habit ; and science has been appropriated to
the subject-matter of the intellect, instead of belonging
in English, as it ought to do, to the intellect itself. The
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning. [25
consequence is that, on an occasion like this, many words
are necessary, in order, first, to bring out and convey
what surely is no difficult idea in itself, — that of the
cultivation of the intellect as an end ; next, in order to
recommend what surely is no unreasonable object ; and
lastly, to describe and make the mind realize the particular
perfection in which that object consists. Every one
knows practically what are the constituents of health or
of virtue ; and every one recognizes health and virtue as
ends to be pursued ; it is otherwise with intellectual
excellence, and this must be my excuse, if I seem to
any one to be bestowing a good deal of labour on
a prehminary matter.
In default of a recognized term, I have called the
perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philo-
sophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind,
or illumination ; terms which are not uncommonly given
to it by writers of this day : but, whatever name we
bestow on it, it is, I believe, as a matter of history, the
business of a University to make this intellectual culture
its direct scope, or to employ itself in the education of
the intellect, — just as the work of a Hospital lies in
healing the sick or wounded, of a Riding or Fencing
School, or of a Gymnasium, in exercising the limbs, of
an Almshouse, in aiding and solacing the old, of an
Orphanage, in protecting innocence, of a Penitentiary,
in restoring the guilty. I say, a University, taken in its
bare idea, and before we view it as an instrument of the
Church, has this object and this mission ; it contemplates
neither moral impression nor mechanical production ; it
professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in
duty ; its function is intellectual culture ; here it may
leave its scholars, and it has done its work when it
has done as much as this. It educates the intellect
126 Discourse VL
to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards
trath, and to grasp it
2.
This, I said in my foregoing Discourse, was the object
of a University, viewed in itself, and apart from the
Catholic Church, or from the State, or from any other
power which may use it ; and I illustrated this in various
ways. I said that the intellect must have an excellence
of its own, for there was nothing which had not its
specific good ; that the word " educate" would net be
used of intellectual culture, as it is used, had not the
intellect had an end of its own ; that, had it not such an
end, there would be no meaning in calling certain
intellectual exercises "liberal," in contrast with "useful,"
as is commonly done ; that the very notion of a philo-
sophical temper implied it, for it threw us back upon
research and system as ends in themselves, distinct from
effects and works of any kind ; that a philosophical
scheme of knowledge, or system of sciences, could not,
from the nature of the case, issue in any one definite art
or pursuit, as its end ; and that, on the other hand, the
discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research
and systematizing led, were surely sufficient ends, though
nothing beyond them were added, and that they had
ever been accounted sufficient by mankind.
Here then I take up the subject ; and, having deter-
mined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct
and sufficient in itself, and that, so far as words go, it
is an enlargement or illumination, I proceed to inquire
what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philo-
sophy consists in. A Hospital heals a broken limb or
cures a fever: what does an Institution effect, which
professes the health, not of the body, not of the soul,
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Lear7iing. 12']
but of the intellect ? What is this good, which in
former times, as well as our own, has been found worth
the notice, the appropriation, of the Catholic Church ?
I have then to investigate, in the Discourses which
follow, those qualities and characteristics of the intellect
in which its cultivation issues or rather consists ; and,
with a view of "assisting myself in this undertaking, I
shall recur to certain questions which have already been
touched upon. These questions are three : viz. the
relation of intellectual culture, first, to mere knowledge ;
secondly, to professional knowledge ; and thirdly, to
religious knowledge. In other words, are acqidrernefits
and attainments the scope of a University Education t
or expertness in particular arts and pursuits ? or inoral
and religious proficiency ? or something besides these
three ? These questions I shall examine in succession,
with the purpose I have mentioned ; and I hope to be
excused, if, in this anxious undertaking, I am led to
repeat what, either in these Discourses or elsewhere, I
have already put upon paper. And first, of Mere
Knowledge^ or Learning, and its connexion with intel-
lectual illumination or Philosophy.
3.
I suppose the prhna-facie view which the public at
large would take of a University, considering it as a place
of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for
acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many
subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the
mental faculties ; a boy's business when he goes to
school is to learn, that is, to store up things in his
niemory. For some years his intellect is little more
than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for
storing them ; he welcomes them as fast as they come to
128 Discourse VL
him ; he lives on what is without ; he has his eyes ever
about him ; he has a hvely susceptibility of impressions ;
he imbibes information of every kind ; and little does he
make his own in a true sense of the word, living rather
upon his neighbours all around him. He has opinions,
religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very
positive in them and sure about them ; but he gets them
from his schoolfellows, or his masters, or his parents, as
the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations,
such also is he in his school exercises ; his mind is obser-
vant, sharp, ready, retentive ; he is almost passive in the
acquisition of knowledge. I say this in no disparage-
ment of the idea of a clever boy. Geography, chronology,
history, language, natural history, he heaps up the matter
of these studies as treasures for a future day. It is the
seven years of plenty with him : he gathers in by hand-
fuls, like the Egyptians, without counting ; and though,
as time goes on, there is exercise for his argumentative
powers in the Elements of Mathematics, and for his
taste in the Poets and Orators, still, while at school, or
at least, till quite the last years of his time, he acquires,
and little more ; and when he is leaving for the Univer-
sity, he is mainly the creature of foreign influences and
circumstances, and made up of accidents, homogeneous
or not, as the case may be. Moreover, the moral habits,
which are a boy's praise, encourage and assist this
result ; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, despatch,
persevering application; for these are the direct conditions
of acquisition, and naturally lead to it. Acquirements,
again, are emphatically producible, and at a moment ;
they are a something to show, both for master and
scholar ; an audience, even though ignorant themselves
of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend
when questions are answered and when they are not.
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learrmig. i2<^
Here again is a reason why mental culture is in the minds
of men identified with the acquisition of knowledge.
The same notion possesses the public mind, when it
passes on from the thought of a school to that of a
University : and with the best of reasons so far as this,
that there is no true culture without acquirements, and
that philosophy presupposes knowledge. It requires a
great deal of reading, or a wide range of information, to
warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious
subject ; and without such learning the most original
mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to
refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result
or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons
who profess a different view of the matter, and even
act upon it. Every now and then you will find a
person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his
own resources, despises all former authors, and gives the
world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon
religion, or history, or any other popular subject. And
his works may sell for a while ; he may get a name in
his day ; but this will be all. His readers are sure to
find on the long run that his doctrines are mere theories,
and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff in-
stead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly
as it rose.
Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of
expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it ;
this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I
begin with it as a first principle ; however, the very truth
of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion
that it is the whole of the matter. A narrow mind is
thought to be that which contains little knowledge ; and
an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and
what seems to put the matter beyond dispute is, the
;• 9
130 Discourse VL
fact of the great number of studies which are pursued
in a University, by its very profession. Lectures are
given on every kind of subject; examinations are held;
prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, phy-
sical Professors ; Professors of languages, of history,
of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of ques-
tions are published, wonderful for their range and
depth, variety and difficulty ; treatises are written, which
carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive
reading or multifarious information ; what then is want-
ing for mental culture to a person of large reading and
scientific attainments.? what is grasp of mind but ac-
quirement.? where shall philosophical repose be found,
but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intel-
lectual possessions }
And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and my
present business is to show that it is one, and that the end
of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or know-
ledge considered in its matter ; and I shall best attain my
object, by actually setting down some cases, which will
be generally granted to be instances of the process of
enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which
are not, and thus, by the comparison, you will be able
to judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, whether Knowledge,
that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the
enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather
something beyond it.
4.
For instance,* let a person, whose experience has
hitherto been confined to the more calm and unpretend-
* The pages which follow are taken almost verbatim from the author's
14th (Oxford) University Sermon, which, at the time of writing this
Discourse, he did not expect ever to reprint.
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learrmig. 131
ing scenery of these islands, whether here or in England,
go for the first time into parts where physical nature
puts on her wilder and more awful forms, whether at
home or abroad, as into mountainous districts ; or let one,
who has ever lived in a quiet village, go for the first
time to a great metropolis, — then I suppose he will have
a sensation which perhaps he never had before. He has
a feeling not in addition or increase of former feelings,
but of something difi"erent in its nature. He will perhaps
be borne forward, and find for a time that he has lost his
bearings. He has made a certain progress, and he has
a consciousness of mental enlargement ; he does not
stand where he did, he has a new centre, and a range of
thoughts to which he was before a stranger.
Again, the view of the heavens which the telescope
opens upon us, if allowed to fill and possess the mind,
may almost whirl it round and make it dizzy. It brings
in a flood of ideas, and is rightly called an intellectual
enlargement, whatever is meant by the term.
And so again, the sight of beasts of prey and other
foreign animals, their strangeness, the originality (if I
may use the term) of their forms and gestures and habits,
and their variety and independence of each other, throw
us out of ourselves into another creation, and as if under
another Creator, if I may so express the temptation
which may come on the mind. We seem to have new
faculties, or a new exercise for our faculties, by this
addition to our knowledge ; like a prisoner, who, having
been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly
finds his arms and legs free.
Hence Physical Science generally, in all its depart-
ments, as bringing before us the exuberant riches and
resources, yet the orderly course, of the Universe, elevates
and excites the student, and at first, I may say, almost
132 Discourse VI.
takes away his breath, while in time it exercises a
tranquilizing influence upon him.
Again, the study of history is said to enlarge and
enlighten the mind, and why ? because, as I conceive, it
gives it a power of judging of passing events, and of all
events, and a conscious superiority over them, which
before it did not possess.
And in like manner, what is called seeing the world,
entering into active life, going into society, travelling,
gaining acquaintance with the various classes of the
community, coming into contact with the principles and
modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races,
their views, aims, habits and manners, their religious
creeds and forms of worship, — gaining experience how
various yet how alike men are, how low-minded, how
bad, how opposed, yet how confident in their opinions ;
all this exerts a perceptible influence upon the mind,
which it is impossible to mistake, be it good or be it
bad, and is popularly called its enlargement.
And then again, the first time the mind comes across
the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and feels
what a novel light they cast upon what he has hitherto
accounted sacred ; and still more, if it gives in to them
and embraces them, and throws off" as so much prejudice
what it has hitherto held, and, as if waking from a
dream, begins to realize to its imagination that there is
now no such thing as law and the transgression of law,
that sin is a phantom, and punishment a bugbear, that it
is free to sin, free to enjoy the world and the flesh ; and
still further, when it does enjoy them, and reflects that
it may think and hold just what it will, that " the world
is all before it where to choose," and what system to
build up as its own private persuasion ; when this torrent
of wilful thoughts rushes over and inundates it, who will
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning. 133
deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or what the
mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods,
with a sense of expansion and elevation, — an intoxication
in reality, still, so far as the subjective state of the mind
goes, an illumination ? Hence the fanaticism of individuals
or nations, who suddenly cast off their Maker. Their eyes
are opened ; and, like the judgment-stricken king in the
Tragedy, they see two suns, and a magic universe, out of
which they look back upon their former state of faith and
innocence with a sort of contempt and indignation, as if
they were then but fools, and the dupes of imposture.
On the other hand. Religion has its own enlargement,
and an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace. It is
often remarked of uneducated persons, who have hitherto
thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning
to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts,
reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and
judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become, in
point of intellect, different beings from what they were.
Before, they took things as they came, and thought no
more of one thing than another. But now every event
has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever
happens to them ; they are mindful of times and seasons,
and compare the present with the past ; and the world,
no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless,
is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an
object, and an awful moral.
5.
Now from these instances, to which many more might
be added, it is plain, first, that the communication of
knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means
of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment, of which
at this day we hear so much in certain quarters : this
134 Discourse VI,
cannot be denied ; but next, it is equally plain, that such
communication is not the whole of the process. The
enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception
into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to
it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action
upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are
rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power,
reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquire-
ments ; it is a making the objects of our knowledge
subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a
digestion of what we" receive, into the substance of our
previous state of thought ; and without this no enlarge-
ment is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless
there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they
come before the mind, and a systematizing of them.
We feel our minds to be growing and expanding theuy
when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what
we know already. It is not the mere addition to our
knowledge that is the illumination ; but the locomotion,
the movement onwards, of that mental centre, to which
both what we know, and what we are learning, the ac-
cumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitates. And
therefore a truly great intellect, and recognized to be
such by the common opinion of mankind, such as the
intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or
of Goethe, (I purposely take instances within and with-
out the Catholic pale, when I would speak of the intellect
as such,) is one which takes a connected view of old and
new, past and present, far and near, and which has an
insight into the influence of all these one on another;
without which there is no whole, and no centre. It
possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of
their mutual and true relations ; knowledge, not merely
considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.
Knowledge viewed m Relation to Learning. 135
Accordingly, when this analytical, distributive, har-
monizing process is away, the mind experiences no
enlargement, and is not reckoned as enlightened or
comprehensive, whatever it may add to its knowledge.
For instance, a great memory, as I have already said,
does not make a philosopher, any more than a dictionary
can be called a grammar. There are men who embrace
in their minds a vast multitude of ideas, but with little
sensibility about their real relations towards each other.
These may be antiquarians, annalists, naturalists ; they
may be learned in the law; they may be versed in
statistics ; they are most useful in their own place ; I
should shrink from speaking disrespectfully of them ;
still, there is nothing in such attainments to guarantee
the absence of narrowness of mind. If they are nothing
more than well-read men, or men of information, they
have not what specially deserves the name of culture of
mind, or fulfils the type of Liberal Education.
In like manner, we sometimes fall in with persons who
have seen much of the world, and of the men who, in
their day, have played a conspicuous part in it, but who
generalize nothing, and have no observation, in the true
sense of the word. They abound in information in
detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things ;
and, having lived under the influence of no very clear or
settled principles, religious or political, they speak of
every one and every thing, only as so many phenomena,
which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing,
not discussing them, or teaching any truth, or instructing
the hearer, but simply talking. No one would say that
these persons, well informed as they are, had attained to
any great culture of intellect or to philosophy.
The case is the same still more strikingly where the
persons in question are beyond dispute men of inferior
136 Discourse VL
powers and deficient education. Perhaps they have
been much in foreign countries, and they receive, in a
passive, otiose, unfruitful way, the various facts which are
forced upon them there. Seafaring men, for example,
range from one end of the earth to the other ; but the
multipHcity of external objects, which they have encoun-
tered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon
their imagination ; they see the tapestry of human life,
as it were on the wrong side, and it tells no story. They
sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in
Europe, now in Asia ; they see visions of great cities and
wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid
the islands of the South ; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar,
or on the Andes ; and nothing which meets them carries
them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself
Nothing has a drift or relation ; nothing has a history or
a promise. Every thing stands by itself, and comes and
goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which
leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near
such a man on a particular occasion, and expect him to
be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs;
but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if
he is perplexed, it is as not knowing what to say, whether
it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove,
while conscious that some expression of opinion is ex-
pected from him ; for in fact he has no standard of judg-
ment at all, and no landmarks to guide him to a conclu-
sion. Such is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one
would dream of calling it philosophy.
6.
Instances, such as these, confirm, by the contrast, the
conclusion I have already drawn from those which pre-
ceded them. That only is true enlargement of mind
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning. 137
which is the power of viewing many things at once as
one whole, of referring them severally to their true place
in the universal system, of understanding their respective
values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus
is that form of Universal Knowledge, of whicti I have on
a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intel-
lect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this
real illumination, the mind never views any part of the
extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recol-
lecting that it is but a part, or without the associations
which spring from this recollection. It makes every
thing in some sort lead to every thing else ; it would
communicate the image of the whole to every separate
portion, till that whole becomes in imagination like a
spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its com-
ponent parts, and giving them one definite meaning.
Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall their
function in the body, as the word " creation " suggests
the Creator, and " subjects " a sovereign, so, in the mind
of the Philosopher, as we are abstractedly conceiving of
him, the elements of the physical and moral world,
sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions,
individualities, are all viewed as one, with correlative
functions, and as gradually by successive combinations
converging, one and all, to the true centre.
To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and
true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can
aspire, in the way of intellect ; it puts the mind above
the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety,
suspense, unsettlement, and superstition, which is the lot
of the many. Men, whose minds are possessed with
some one object, take exaggerated views of its impor-
tance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the
measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and
138 Discourse VL
are startled and despond if it happens to fail them.
They are ever in alarm or in transport. Those on the
other hand who have no object or principle whatever to
hold by, lose their way, every step they take. They are
thrown out, and do not know what to think or say, at
every fresh juncture; they have no view of persons, or
occurrences, or facts, which come suddenly upon them,
and they hang upon the opinion of others, for want of
internal resources. But the intellect, which has been
disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows,
and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven
the dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force
of reason, such an intellect cannot be partial, cannot be
exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot
but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it
discerns the end in every beginning, the origin in every
end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each delay ;
because it ever knows where it stands, and how its path lies
from one point to another. It is the T^TpayiavoQ of the
Peripatetic, and has the " nil admirari " of the Stoic, —
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.
There are men who, when in difficulties, originate at the
moment vast ideas or dazzling projects ; who, under the
influence of excitement, are able to cast a light, almost
as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action
which comes before them ; who have a sudden presence
of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion,
and an undaunted magnanimous bearing, and an energy
and keenness which is but made intense by opposition.
This is genius, this is heroism ; it is the exhibition of a
natural gift, which no culture can teach, at which no
Knowledge viewed in Relatio7i to Learning. 139
Institution can aim ; here, on the contrary, we are con-
cerned, not with mere nature, but with training and
teaching. That perfection of the Intellect, which is the
result of Education, and its bean ideal, to be imparted
to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear,
calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things,
as far as the finite mind can embrace them, each in its
place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is
almost prophetic from its knowledge of history ; it is
almost heart-searching from its knowledge of human
nature ; it has almost supernatural chanty from its
freedom from littleness and prejudice ; it has almost the
repose of faith, because nothing can startle it ; it has
almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contem-
plation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things
and the music of the spheres.
7.
And now, if I may take for granted that the true and
adequate end of intellectual training and of a University
is not Learning or Acquirement, but rather, is Thought
or Reason exercised upon Knowledge, or what may be
called Philosophy, I shall be in a position to explain the
various mistakes which at the present day beset the
subject of University Education.
I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of
all, we must ascend ; we cannot gain real knowledge on
a level ; we must generalize, we must reduce to method,
we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape
our acquisitions by means of them. It matters not
whether our field of operation be wide or hmited ; in
every case, to command it, is to mount above it. Who
has not felt the irritation of mind and impatience
created by a deep, rich country, visited for the first time,
140 Discourse VI.
with winding lanes, and high hedges, and green steeps,
and tangled woods, and every thing smiling indeed, but
in a maze ? The same feeling comes upon us in a strange
city, when we have no map of its streets. Hence you
hear of practised travellers, when they first come into a
place, mounting some high hill or church tower, by way
of reconnoitring its neighbourhood. In like manner, you
must be above your knowledge, not under it, or it will
oppress you ; and the more you have of it, the greater
will be the load. The learning of a Salmasius or a
Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant.
" Imperat aut servit ; " if you can wield it with a strong
arm., it is a great weapon ; otherwise,
Vis consili expers
Mole ruit sua.
You will be overwhelmed, like Tarpeia, by the heavy
wealth which you have exacted from tributary
generations.
Instances abound ; there are authors who are as
pointless as they are inexhaustible in their literary
resources. They measure knowledge by bulk, as it lies
in the rude block, without symmetry, without design.
How many commentators are there on the Classics, how
many on Holy Scripture, from whom we rise up, won-
dering at the learning which has passed before us, and
wondering why it passed ! How many writers are there
of Ecclesiastical History, such as Mosheim or Du Pin,
who, breaking up their subject into details, destroy its
life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about
the parts ! The Sermons, again, of the English Divines
in the seventeenth century, how often are they mere
repertories of miscellaneous and officious learning ! Of
course Catholics also may read without thinking ; and
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning, 141
in their case, equally as with Protestants, it holds good,
that such knowledge is unworthy of the name, knowledge
which they have not thought through, and thought out.
Such readers are only possessed by their knowledge, not
possessed of it ; nay, in matter of fact they are often
even carried away by it, without any volition of their
own. Recollect, the Memory can tyrannize, as well as
the Imagination. Derangement, I believe, has been
considered as a loss of control over the sequence of
ideas. The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth
deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the
victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting
another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a
mechanical process, or some physical necessity. No
one, who has had experience of men of studious habits,
but must recognize the existence of a parallel phe-
nomenon in the case of those who have over-stimulated
the Memory. In such persons Reason acts almost as
feebly and as impotently as in the madman ; once fairly
started on any subject whatever, they have no power of
self-control ; they passively endure the succession of
impulses which are evolved out of the original exciting
cause ; they are passed on from one idea to another and
go steadily forward, plodding along one line of thought
in spite of the amplest concessions of the hearer, or wan-
dering from it in endless digression in spite of his remon-
strances. Now, if, as is very certain, no one would envy the
madman the glow and originality of his conceptions, why
must we extol the cultivation of that intellect, which is
the prey, not indeed of barren fancies but of barren facts,
of random intrusions from without, though not of morbid
imaginations from within } And in thus speaking, I am
not denying that a strong and ready memory is in itself
a real treasure; I am not disparaging a well-stored
142 Discourse VI.
mind, though it be nothing besides, provided it be sober,
any more than I would despise a bookseller's shop : — it
is of great value to others, even when not so to the
owner. Nor am I banishing, far from it, the possessors
of deep and multifarious learning from my ideal
University ; they adorn it in the eyes of men ; I do but
say that they constitute no type of the results at which
it aims ; that it is no great gain to the intellect to have
enlarged the memory at the expense of faculties which
are indisputably higher.
Nor indeed am I supposing that there is any great
danger, at least in this day, of over-education; the danger
is on the other side. I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has
been the practical error of the last twenty years, — not to
load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested
knowledge, but to force upon him so much that he has
rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and
enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of
subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen
branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is,
but enlargement, which it is not ; of considering an ac-
quaintance with the learned names of things and persons,
and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance
on eloquent lecturers, and membership with scientific in-
stitutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform
and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not
dissipation of mind, but progress. All things now are to
be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not
one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without
exertion, without attention, without toil ; without ground-
ing, without advance, without finishing. There is to be
nothing individual in it ; and this, forsooth, is the wonder
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Lear7iing. 143
of the age. What the steam engine does with matter,
the printing press is to do with mind ; it is to act
mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost
unconsciously enlightened, by the mere multiplication
and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the
school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college,
or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the
senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of
this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions.
Wise men have lifted up their voices in vain; and at
length, lest their own institutions should be outshone
and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have
been obliged, as far as they could with a good conscience,
to humour a spirit which they could not withstand, and
make temporizing concessions at which they could not
but inwardly smile.
It must not be supposed that, because I so speak,
therefore I have some sort of fear of the education of the
people : on the contrary, the more education they have,
the better, so that it is really education. Nor am I an
enemy to the cheap publication of scientific and Hterary
works, which is now in vogue: on the contrary, I consider
it a great advantage, convenience, and gain ; that is, to
those to whom education has given a capacity for using
them. Further, I consider such innocent recreations as
science and literature are able to furnish will be a very
fit occupation of the thoughts and the leisure of young
persons, and may be made the means of keeping them
from bad employments and bad companions. Moreover,
as to that superficial acquaintance with chemistry, and
geology, and astronomy, and political economy, and
modern history, and biography, and other branches of
knowledge, which periodical literature and occasional
lectures and scientific institutions diffuse through the
144 Discourse VI.
community, I think it a graceful accomplishment, and
a suitable, nay, in this day a necessary accomplishment,
in the case of educated men. Nor, lastly, am I dis-
paraging or discouraging the thorough acquisition of
any one of these studies, or denying that, as far as it
goes, such thorough acquisition is a real education of
the mind. All I say is, call things by their right names,
and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially
different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a
superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same
thing ; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory
for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view.
Recreations are not education ; accomplishments are
not education. Do not say, the people must be edu-
cated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed,
soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept
from vicious excesses. I do not say that such amuse-
ments, such occupations of mind, are not a great gain ;
but they are not education. You may as well call draw-
ing and fencing education, as a general knowledge of
botany or conchology. Stuffing birds or playing stringed
instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the
idle, but it is not education ; it does not form or cultivate
the intellect. Education is a high word ; it is the prepara-
tion for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge
in proportion to that preparation. We require intellec-
tual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for sight. We
need both objects and organs intellectual ; we cannot
gain them without setting about it ; we cannot gain
them in our sleep, or by hap-hazard. The best telescope
does not dispense with eyes ; the printing press or the
lecture room will assist us greatly, but we must be true
to ourselves, we must be parties in the work. A Uni-
versity is, according to the usual designation, an Alma
K?ww ledge viewed i7i Relation to Learning. 145
Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry
or a mint, or a treadmill.
9.
I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose
between a so-called University, which dispensed with
residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its
degrees to any person who passed an examination in a
wide range of subjects, and a University which had no
professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a
number of young men together for three or four years,
and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is
said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked
which of these two methods was the better discipline of
the intellect, — mind, I do not say which is morally the
better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a
good and idleness an intolerable mischief, — but if I
must determine w^hich of the two courses was the more
successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind,
which sent out men the more fitted for their secular
duties, which produced better public men, men of the
world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I
have no hesitation in giving the preference to that Uni-
versity which did nothing, over that which exacted of its
members an acquaintance with every science under the
sun. And, paradox as this may seem, still if results be
the test of systems, the influence of the public schools
and colleges of England, in the course of the last century,
at least will bear out one side of the contrast as I have
drawn it. What would come, on the other hand, of the
ideal systems of education which have fascinated the
imagination of this age, could they ever take effect, and
whether they would not produce a generation frivolous,
narrow-minded, and resourceless, intellectually considered,
7* 10
146 Discourse VI.
is a fair subject for debate ; but so far is certain, that the
Universities and scholastic establishments, to which I
refer, and which did little more than bring together first
hoys and then youths in large numbers, these institutions,
with miserable deformities on the side of morals, with a
hollow profession of Christianity, and a heathen code
of ethics, — I say, at least they can boast of a succession
of heroes and statesmen, of literary men and philosophers,
of men conspicuous for great natural virtues, for habits
of business, for knowledge of life, for practical judgment,
for cultivated tastes, for accomplishments, who have
made England what it is, — able to subdue the earth,
able to domineer over Catholics.
How is this to be explained ? I suppose as follows :
When a multitude of young men, keen, open-hearted,
sympathetic, and observant, as young men are, come
together and freely mix with each other, they are sure
to learn one from another, even if there be no one to
teach them ; the conversation of all is a series of lectures
to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and
views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles
for judging and acting, day by day. An infant has to
learn the meaning of the information which its senses
convey to it, and this seems to be its employment. It
fancies all that the eye presents to it to be close to it,
till it actually learns the contrary, and thus by practice
does it ascertain the relations and uses of those first
elements of knowledge which are necessary for its
animal existence. A parallel teaching is necessary for
our social being, and it is secured by a large school or a
college ; and this effect may be fairly called in its own
department an enlargement of mind. It is seeing the
world on a small field with little trouble; for the
pupils or students come from very different places, and
Knowledge viewed in Relatioii to Learning. 147
with widely different notions, and there is much to
generahze, much to adjust, much to eHminate, there are
inter-relations to be defined, and conventional rules to
be established, in the process, by which the whole
assemblage is moulded together, and gains one tone and
one character.
Let it be clearly understood, I repeat it, that I am not
taking into account moral or religious considerations ; I
am but saying that that youthful community will con-
stitute a whole, it will embody a specific idea, it will
represent a doctrine, it will administer a code of conduct,
and it will furnish principles of thought and action. It
will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of
time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition,
or a genius loci, as it is sometimes called ; which haunts
the home where it has been born, and which imbues and
forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual
who is successively brought under its shadow. Thus it
is that, independent of direct instruction on the part of
Superiors, there is a sort of self-education in the academic
institutions of Protestant England; a characteristic tone
of thought, a recognized standard of judgment is found
in them, which, as developed in the individual who is
submitted to it, becomes a twofold source of strength to
him, both from the distinct stamp it impresses on his
mind, and from the bond of union which it creates
between him and others, — effects which are shared by
the authorities of the place, for they themselves have
been educated in it, and at all times are exposed to the
influence of its ethical atmosphere. Here then is a real
teaching, whatever be its standards and principles, true
or false ; and it at least tends towards cultivation of the
intellect ; it at least recognizes that knowledge is some-
thing more than a sort of passive reception of scraps and
148 Discourse VL
details ; it is a something, and it does a something, which
never will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set
of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-
communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions which
they dare profess, and with no common principles, who
are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not
know them, and do not know each other, on a large
number of subjects, different in kind, and connected by
no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a
year, or once in three years, in chill lecture-rooms or on
a pompous anniversary.
10.
Nay, self-education in any shape, in the most restricted
sense, is preferable to a system of teaching which, pro-
fessing so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut
your College gates against the votary of knowledge,
throw him back upon the searchings and the efforts of
his own mind ; he will gain by being spared an entrance
into your Babel. Few indeed there are who can dis-
pense with the stimulus and support of instructors, or
Vv^ill do anything at all, if left to themselves. And fewer
still (though such great minds are to be found), who
will not, from such unassisted attempts, contract a self-
reliance and a self-esteem, which are not only moral
evils, but serious hindrances to the attainment of truth.
And next to none, perhaps, or none, who will not be
reminded from time to time of the disadvantage
under which they lie, by their imperfect grounding, by
the breaks, deficiencies, and irregularities of their know-
ledge, by the eccentricity of opinion and the confusion
of principle which they exhibit. They will be too often
ignorant of what every one knows and takes for granted,
of that multitude of small truths which fall upon the
Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning, 149
mind like dust, impalpable and ever accumulating ; they
may be unable to converse, they may argue perversely,
they may pride themselves on their worst paradoxes or
their grossest truisms, they may be full of their own
mode of viewing things, unwilling to be put out of their
way, slow to enter into the minds of others ; — but, with
these and whatever other liabilities upon their heads,
they are likely to have more thought, more mind, more
philosophy, more true enlargement, than those earnest
but ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds
with a score of subjects against an examination, who
have too much on their hands to indulge themselves in
thinking or investigation, who devour premiss and con-
clusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who
hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstra-
tions to memory, and who too often, as might be ex-
pected, when their period of education is passed, throw
up all they have learned, in disgust, having gained
nothing really by their anxious labours, except perhaps
the habit of application.
Yet such is the better specimen of the fruit of that
ambitious system which has of late years been making
way among us : for its result on ordinary minds, and on
the common run of students, is less satisfactory still ;
they leave their place of education simply dissipated
and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they
have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even
to know their shallowness. How much better, I say, is
it for the active and thoughtful intellect, where such is
to be found, to eschew the College and the University
altogether, than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a
mockery so contumelious ! How much more profitable
for the independent mind, after the mere rudiments of
education, to range through a library at random, taking
150 Discourse VL
down books as they meet him, and pursunig the trains
of thought which his mother wit suggests ! How much
healthier to wander into the fields, and there with the
exiled Prince to find " tongues in the trees, books in the
running brooks ! " How much more genuine an educa-
tion is that of the poor boy in the Poem* — a Poem,
whether in conception or in execution, one of the most
touching in our language — who, not in the wide world,
but ranging day by day around his widowed mother's
home, "a dexterous gleaner" in a narrow field, and
with only such slender outfit
** as the village school and books a few
Supplied,"
contrived from the beach, and the quay, and the fisher's
boat, and the inn's fireside, and the tradesman's shop,
and the shepherd's walk, and the smuggler's hut, and
the mossy moor, and the screaming gulls, and the rest-
less waves, to fashion for himself a philosophy and a
poetry of his own !
But in a large subject, I am exceeding my necessary
limits. Gentlemen, I must conclude abruptly ; and
postpone any summing up of my argument, should that
be necessary, to another day.
* Crabbe's Tales of the Hall. This Poem, let me say, I read on its
first publication, above thirty years ago, with extreme delight, and have
never lost my love of it ; and on taking it up lately, found I was even more
touched by it than heretofore. A w^ork which can please in youth and age,
seems to fulfil (in logical language) the accidental definition of a Classic.
[A further course of twenty years has past, and I bear the same witness in
favour of this Poem. J
15^
DISCOURSE VII.
KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PROFESSIONAL
SKILL.
I.
I HAVE been Insisting, in my two preceding Dis-
courses, first, on the cultivation of the intellect, as
an end which may reasonably be pursued for its own
sake ; and next, on the nature of that cultivation, or
what that cultivation consists in. Truth of whatever
kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation
then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate
truth. Now the intellect in its present state, with
exceptions which need not here be specified, does not
discern truth intuitively, or as a whole. We know, not
by a direct and simple vision, not at a glance, but, as it
were, by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental pro-
cess, by going round an object, by the comparison, the
combination, the mutual correction, the continual adap-
tation, of many partial notions, by the employment,
concentration, and joint action of many faculties and
exercises of mind. Such a union and concert of the
intellectual powers, such an enlargement and develop-
ment, such a comprehensiveness, is necessarily a matter
of training. And again, such a training is a matter of
rule ; It is not mere application, however exemplary,
which introduces the mind to truth, nor the reading
^52
DucQiirse VII,
many books, nor the getting up many subjects, nor the
witnessing many experiments, nor the attending many
lectures. All this is short of enough ; a man may have
done it all, yet be lingering in the vestibule of know-
ledge : — he may not realize what his mouth utters ; he
may not see with his mental eye what confronts him ; he
may have no grasp of things as they are ; or at least he
may have no power at all of advancing one step forward
of himself, in consequence of what he has already ac-
quired, no power of discriminating between truth and
falsehood, of sifting out the grains of truth from the
mass, of arranging things according to their real value,
and, if I may use the phrase, of building up ideas.
Such a power is the result of a scientific formation of
mind ; it is an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-
sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical
reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and
repose, — quahties which do not come of mere acquire-
ment. The bodily eye, the organ for apprehending
material objects, is provided by nature ; the eye of the
mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of dis-
cipline and habit.
This process of training, by which the intellect,
instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular
or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession,
or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for
the perception of its own proper object, and for its own
highest culture, is called Liberal Education ; and though
there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is con-
ceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what
intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one
but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at
least look towards it, and make its true scope and
result, not something else, his standard of excellence ;
Knowledge and Professional Skill. 153
and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it,
and secure it to themselves in good measure. And to
set forth the right standard, and to train according to it,
and to help forward all students towards it according to
their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business
of a University.
2.
Now this is what some great men are very slow to
allow; they insist that Education should be confined to
some particular and narrow end, and should issue in
some definite work, which can be weighed and measured.
They argue as if every thing, as well as every person,
had its price ; and that where there has been a great
outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind.
This they call making Education and Instruction
"useful," and " Utility " becomes their watchword.
With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very
naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the
expense of a University ; what is the real worth in the
market of the article called "a Liberal Education," on
the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how
to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands,
or to better our civil economy ; or again, if it does not
at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, aad
that a surgeon ; or at least if it does not lead to dis-
coveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism,
and science of every kind.
This question, as might have been expected, has been
keenly debated in the present age, and formed one main
subject of the controversy, to which I referred in the
Introduction to the present Discourses, as having been
sustained in the first decade of this century by a cele-
brated Northern Review on the one hand, and defenders
154 Discourse VII.
of the University of Oxford on the other. Hardly had
the authorities of that ancient seat of learning, waking
from their long neglect, set on foot a plan for the edu-
cation of the youth committed to them, than the repre-
sentatives of science and literature in the city, which
has sometimes been called the Northern Athens, remon-
strated, with their gravest arguments and their most
brilliant satire, against the direction and shape which
the reform was taking. Nothing would content them,
but that the University should be set to rights on the
basis of the philosophy of Utility ; a philosophy, as
they seem to have thought, which needed but to be pro-
claimed in order to be embraced. In truth, they were
little aware of the depth and force of the principles on
which the academical authorities were proceeding, and,
this being so, it was not to be expected that they would
be allowed to walk at leisure over the field of contro-
versy which they had selected. Accordingly they were
encountered in behalf of the University by two men of
great name and influence in their day, of very different
minds, but united, as by Collegiate ties, so in the clear-
sighted and large view which they took of the whole
subject of Liberal Education ; and the defence thus
provided for the Oxford studies has kept its ground to
this day.
3.
Let me be allowed to devote a few words to the
memory of distinguished persons, under the shadow of
whose name I once lived, and by whose doctrine I am now
profiting. In the heart of Oxford there is a small plot
of ground, hemmed in by public thoroughfares, which has
been the possession and the home of one Society for
above five hundred years. In the old time of Boniface
the Eighth and John the Twenty-second, in the age of
Knowledge and Professional Skill. 155
Scotus and Occam and Dante, before Wiclif or Huss had
kindled those miserable fires which are still raging to the
ruin of the highest interests of man, an unfortunate king
of England, Edward the Second, flying from the field of
Bannockburn, is said to have made a vow to the Blessed
Virgin to found a religious house in her honour, if he
got back in safety. Prompted and aided by his
Almoner, he decided on placing this house in the city
of Alfred ; and the Image of our Lady, which is oppo-
site its entrance-gate, is to this day the token of the
vow and its fulfilment. King and Almoner have long
been in the dust, and strangers have entered into their
inheritance, and their creed has been forgotten, and
their holy rites disowned ; but day by day a memento is
still made in the holy Sacrifice by at least one Catholic
Priest, once a member of that College, for the souls
of those Catholic benefactors who fed him there for so
many years. The visitor, whose curiosity has been
excited by its present fame, gazes perhaps with some-
thing of disappointment on a collection of buildings
which have with them so few of the circumstances of
dignity or wealth. Broad quadrangles, high halls and
chambers, ornamented cloisters, stately walks, or um-
brageous gardens, a throng of students, ample revenues,
or a glorious history, none of these things were the
portion of that old Catholic foundation ; nothing in
short which to the common eye sixty years ago would
have given tokens of what it was to be. But it had at
that time a spirit working within it, which enabled its
inmates to do, amid its seeming insignificance, what no
other body in the place could equal ; not a very abstruse
gift or extraordinary boast, but a rare one, the honest
purpose to administer the trust committed to them in
such a way as their conscience pointed out as best. So,
156 Discourse VI I ,
whereas the Colleges of Oxford are self-electing bodies,
the fellows in each perpetually filling up for themselves
the vacancies which occur in their number, the members
of this foundation determined, at a time when, either
from evil custom or from ancient statute, such a thing
was not known elsewhere, to throw open their fellow-
ships to the competition of all comers, and, in the choice
of associates henceforth, to cast to the winds every per-
sonal motive and feeling, family connexion, and friend-
ship, and patronage, and political interest, and local
claim, and prejudice, and party jealousy, and to elect
solely on public and patriotic grounds. Nay, with a
remarkable independence of mind, they resolved that
even the table of honours, awarded to literary merit by
the University in its new system of examination for
degrees, should not fetter their judgment as electors ;
but that at all risks, and whatever criticism it might
cause, and whatever odium they might incur, they
would select the men, whoever they were, to be children
of their Founder, whom they thought in their consciences
to be most likely from their intellectual and moral
qualities to please him, if (as they expressed it) he were
still upon earth, most likely to do honour to his College,
most likely to promote the objects which they believed
he had at heart. Such persons did not promise to be
the disciples of a low Utilitarianism ; and consequently,
as their collegiate reform synchronized with that reform
of the Academical body, in which they bore a principal
part, it was not unnatural that, when the storm broke
upon the University from the North, their Alma Mater,
whom they loved, should have found her first defenders
within the walls of that small College, which had first
put itself into a condition to be her champion.
These defenders, I have said, were two, of whom the
Knowledge and Professioiial Skill, 157
more distinguished was the late Dr. Copleston, then a
Fellow of the College, successively its Provost, and Pro-
testant Bishop of Llandaff. In that Society, which owes
so much to him, his name lives, and ever will live, for
the distinction which his talents bestowed on it, for the
academical importance to which he raised it, for the
generosity of spirit, the Hberality of sentiment, and the
kindness of heart, with which he adorned it, and which
even those who had least sympathy with some aspects
of his mind and character could not but admire and
love. Men come to their meridian at various periods of
their lives ; the last years of the eminent person I am
speaking of were given to duties which, I am told, have
been the means of endearing him to numbers, but
which afforded no scope for that peculiar vigour and
keenness of mind which enabled him, when a young
man, single-handed, with easy gallantry, to encounter
and overthrow the charge of three giants of the North
combined against him. I beheve I am right in saying
that, in the progress of the controversy, the most
scientific, the most critical, and the most witty, of that
literary company, all of them now, as he himself, re-
moved from this visible scene. Professor Playfair, Lord
Jeffrey, and the Rev. Sydney Smith, threw together
their several efforts into one article of their Review, in
order to crush and pound to dust the audacious contro-
vertist who had come out against them in defence of
his own Institutions. To have even contended with
such men was a sufficient voucher for his ability, even
before we open his pamphlets, and have actual evidence
of the good sense, the spirit, the scholar-like taste, and
the purity of style, by which they are distinguished.
He was supported in the controversy, on the same
general principles, but with more of method and distinct-
1^8 Discourse VIL
ness, and, I will add, with greater force and beauty and
perfection, both of thought and of language, by the other
distinguished writer, to whom I have already referred,
Mr. Davison ; who, though not so well known to the
v/orld in his day, has left more behind him than the
Provost of Oriel, to make his name remembered by pos-
terity. This thoughtful man, who was the admired and
intimate friend of a very remarkable person, whom,
whether he wish it or not, numbers revere and love as
the first author of the subsequent movement in the Pro-
testant Church towards Catholicism,* this grave and
philosophical writer, whose works I can never look into
without sighing that such a man was lost to the Catholic
Church, as Dr. Butler before him, by some early bias or
some fault of self-education — he, in a review of a work
by Mr. Edgeworth on Professional Education, which
attracted a good deal of attention in its day, goes leisurely
over the same gj-ound, which had already been rapidly
traversed by Dr. Copleston, and, though professedly em-
ployed upon Mr. Edgeworth, is really replying to the
northern critic who had brought that writer s work into
notice, and to a far greater author than either of them,
who in a past age had argued on the same side.
4-
The author to whom I allude is no other than Locke.
That celebrated philosopher has preceded the Edinburgh
Reviewers in condemning the ordinary subjects in which
boys are instructed at school, on the ground that they
are not needed by them in after life ; and before quoting
what his disciples have said in the present century, I
will refer to a few passages of the master. " 'Tis matter
* Mr. Keble, Vicar of Hursley, late Fellow of Oriel, and Professoi of
Poetry in the University of Oxford.
Knowledge and Professional Skill. 159
of astonishment.'^ he says in his work on Education,
•' that men of quality and parts should suffer themselves
to be so far misled by custom and implicit faith. Reason,
if consulted with, would advise, that their children's time
should be spent in acquiring what might be useful to
them, when they come to be men, rather than that their
heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash, a great part
v/hereof they usually never do ('tis certain they never
need to) think on again as long as they live ; and so
much of it as does stick by them they are only the
worse for."
And so again, speaking of verse-making, he says, " I
know not what reason a father can have to wish his son
a poet, who does not desire him to bid defiance to all
other callings and business ; which is not yet the worst
of the case ; for, if he proves a successful rhymer, and
gets once the reputation of a wit, 1 desire it to be con-
sidered, what company and places he is likely to spend
his time in, nay, and estate too ; for it is very seldom
seen that any one discovers mines of gold or silver 2>
Parnassus. 'Tis a pleasant air, but a barren soil."
In another passage he distinctly limits utility in edu-
cation to its bearing on the future profession or trade of
the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of
the intellect, simply as such. " Can there be any thing
more ridiculous," he asks, "than that a father should
waste his own money, and his son's time, in setting him
to learn the Roman language, when at the same time he
designs him for a trade, wherein he, having no use of
Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought
from school, and which 'tis ten to one he abhors for the
ill-usage it procured him } Could it be believed, unless
we have every where amongst us examples of it, that a
child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a
i6o Discourse VI L
language, which he is never to use in the course of life that
he is designed to, and neglect all the while the writing
a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great
advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades
indispensably necessary ? " Nothing of course can be
more absurd than to neglect in education those matters
which are necessary for a boy's future calling ; but the
tone of Locke's remarks evidently implies more than
this, and is condemnatory of any teaching which tends
to the general cultivation of the mind.
Now to turn to his modern disciples. The study of
the Classics had been made the basis of the Oxford
education, in the reforms which I have spoken of, and
the Edinburgh Reviewers protested, after the manner
of Locke, that no good could come of a system which
was not based upon the principle of Utility.
" Classical Literature," they said, " is the great object
at Oxford. Many minds, so employed, have produced
many works and much fame in that department ; but if
all liberal arts and sciences, useful to human life., had
been taught there, if some had dedicated themselves to
chemistryy some to mathematics, some to experimental
philosophy, and \{ every attainment had been honoured in
the mixt ratio of its difficulty and utility, the system of
such a University would have been much more valuable,
but the splendour of its name something less."
Utility may be made the end of education, in two
respects : either as regards the individual educated, or the
community at large. In which light do these writers
regard it } in the latter. So far they differ from Locke,
for they consider the advancement of science as the
supreme and real end of a University. This is brought
into view in the sentences which follow.
" When a University has been doing useless things for
Knowledge and Professional Skill. i6i
a long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be
use/id. A set of Lectures on Political Economy would
be discouraged in Oxford, probably despised, probably
not permitted. To discuss the inclosure of commons,
and to dwell upon imports and exports, to come so near
to common life,. would seem to be undignified and con-
temptible. In the same manner, the Parr or the Bentley
of the day would be scandalized, in a University, to be
put on a level with the discoverer of a neutral salt ; and
yet, what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual
labour but usefidness ? And what ought the term
University to mean, but a place where every science
is taught which is liberal, and at the same time useful
to mankind ? Nothing would so much tend to bring
classical Hterature within proper bounds as a steady and
invariable appeal to Utility in our appreciation of all
human knowledge .... Looking ahvays to real lUility
as our guide J we should see, with equal pleasure, a
studious and inquisitive mind arranging the produc-
tions of nature, investigating the qualities of bodies, or
mastering the difficulties of the learned languages. We
should not care whether he was chemist, naturalist, or
scholar, because we know it to be as necessary that
matter should be studied and subdued to the tcse of
man, as that taste should be gratified, and imagination
inflamed."
Such then is the enunciation, as far as words go, of the
theory of Utility in Education ; and both on its own
account, and for the sake of the able men who have
advocated it, it has a claim on the attention of those
whose principles I am here representing. Certainly it is
specious to contend that nothing is worth pursuing but
what is useful ; and that life is not long enough to ex-
pend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles.
7 * II
1 62 Discourse VI L
Nay, in one sense, I will grant it is more than specious,
it is true ; but, if so, how do I propose directly to meet
the objection ? Why, Gentlemen, I have really met it
already, viz., in laying down, that intellectual culture is
its own end ; for what has its end in itself, has its use in
itself also. I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the
culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a
good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke's
question ; for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why
is not a healthy intellect 1 and if a College of Physicians
is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily
health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were
simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and
beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our
nature } And the Reviewers I am quoting seem to
allow this in their better moments, in a passage which,
putting aside the question of its justice in fact, is sound
and true in the principles to which it appeals : —
" The present state of classical education," they say,
*' cultivates the miagination a great deal too much,
and other habits of mind a great deal too little, and
trains up many young men in a style of elegant imbe-
cility, utterly unworthy of the talents with which nature
has endowed them .... The matter of fact is, that a
classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four is a man
principally conversant with works of imagination. His
feelings are quick, his fancy lively, and his taste good.
Talents for speculation and original inquiry he has none,
nor has he formed the invaluable Jiabit of pitsJiing things
tip to their first principles^ or of collecting dry and un-
amusing facts as the materials for reasoning. All the
solid and masculine parts of his understanding are left
wholly without cultivation ; he hates the pain of thinking,
and suspects every man whose boldness and originality
Knowledge and Professional SkilL 163
call upon him to defend his opinions and prove his
assertions."
5-
Now, I am not at present concerned with the specific
question of classical education ; else, I might reasonably
question the justice of calling an intellectual discipline,
which embraces the study of Aristotle, Thucydides, and
Tacitus, which involves Scholarship and Antiquities,
imaginative ; still so far I readily grant, that the culti-
vation of the " understanding," of a " talent for specu-
lation and original inquiry," and of " the habit of pushing
things up to their first principles," is a principal portion
of a good or liberal education. If then the Reviewers
consider such cultivation the characteristic of a usefid
education, as they seem to do in the foregoing passage,
it follows, that what they mean by " useful " is just what
I mean by "good" or '* liberal:" and Locke's question
becomes a verbal one. Whether youths are to be
taught Latin or verse-making will depend on the fact,
whether these studies tend to mental culture ; but, how-
ever this is determined, so far is clear, that in that
mental culture consists what I have called a liberal or
non-professional, and what the Reviewers call a useful
education.
This is the obvious answer which may be made to
those who urge upon us the claims of UtiHty in our
plans of Education ; but I am not going to leave the
subject here : I mean to take a wider view of it. Let
us take " useful," as Locke takes it, in its proper and
popular sense, and then we enter upon a large field of
thought, to which I cannot do justice in one Discourse,
though to-day's is all the space that I can give to it. I
say, let us take "useful" to mean, not what is simply
164 Discourse VI L
good, but what tends to good, or is the instrument of
good ; and in this sense also, Gentlemen, I will show
you how a liberal education is truly and fully a useful,
though it be not a professional, education. " Good "
indeed means one thing, and " useful " means another ;
but I lay it down as a principle, which will save us a
great deal of anxiety, that, though the useful is not
always good, the good is always useful. Good is not
only good, but reproductive of good ; this is one of its
attributes ; nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desir-
able for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the
likeness of itself all around it. Good is prolific ; it is
not only good to the eye, but to the taste ; it not only
attracts us, but it communicates itself; it excites first
our admiration and love, then our desire and our grati-
tude, and that, in proportion to its intenseness and
fulness in particular instances. A great good will im-
part great good. If then the Intellect is so excellent a
portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not
only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself,
but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the
possessor and to all around him ; not useful in any low,
mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or
as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to
the owner, then through him to the world. I say then,
if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be
useful too.
6.
You will see what I mean by the parallel of bodily
health. Health is a good in itself, though nothing came
of it, and is especially worth seeking and cherishing ;
yet, after all, the blessings which attend its presence are
so great, while they are so close to it and so redound
Knowledge and Pjv/essional Skill. 1 65
back upon it and encircle it, that we never think of it
except as useful as well as good, and praise and prize it
for what it does, as well as for what it is, though at the
same time we cannot point out any definite and distinct
work or production which it can be said to effect. And
so as regards intellectual culture, I am far from denying
utility in this large sense as the end of Education, when
I lay it down, that the culture of the intellect is a good
in itself and its own end ; I do not exclude from the
idea of intellectual culture what it cannot but be, from
the very nature of things ; I only deny that we must be
able to point out, before we have any right to call it
useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or
work, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete
end. The parallel is exact : — As the body may be
sacrificed to some manual or other toil, whether mode-
rate or oppressive, so may the intellect be devoted to
some specific profession ; and I do not call this the culture
of the intellect. Again, as some member or organ of
the body may be inordinately used and developed, so
may memory, or imagination, or the reasoning faculty ;
and this again is not intellectual culture. On the other
hand, as the body may be tended, cherished, and exer-
cised with a simple view to its general health, so may
the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its
perfect state ; and this is-its cultivation.
Again, as health ought to precede labour of the body,
and as a man in health can do what an unhealthy man
cannot do, and as of this health the properties are
strength, energy, agility, graceful carriage and action,
manual dexterity, and endurance of fatigue, so in like
manner general culture of mind is the best aid to pro-
fessional and scientific study, and educated men can do
what illiterate cannot ; and the man who has learned to
1 66 Discourse VIL
think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate
and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and formed his
judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not in-
deed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or
a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a
man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a
chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be
placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up
any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to, or
any other for which he has a taste or special talent, with
an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which
another is a stranger. In this sense then, and as yet I
have said but a very few words on a large subject, mental
culture is emphatically useful.
If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Profes-
sional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a
University Education, let me not be supposed, Gentle-
men, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or
arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them.
In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a
University course, I do not mean to imply that the
University does not teach Law or Medicine. What in-
deed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something
particular.? It teaches all knowledge by teaching all
branches of knowledge, and in no other way. I do but
say that there will be this distinction as regards a Pro-
fessor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of
Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that
out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed
and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which
are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physi-
cian, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a Uni-
versity he will just know where he and his science stand,
he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken
Knowledge and Professional Skill. 167
a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance
by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from
them a special illumination and largeness of mind and
freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in con-
sequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs
not to the study itself, but to his liberal education.
This then is how I should solve the fallacy, for so I
must call it, by which Locke and his disciples would
frighten us from cultivating the intellect, under the notion
that no education is useful which does not teach us some
temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some phy-
sical secret, I say that a cultivated intellect, because it
is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace
to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and
enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number.
There is a duty we owe to human society as such, to the
state to which we belong, to the sphere in which we
move, to the individuals towards whom we are variously
related, and whom we successively encounter in life ;
and that philosophical or liberal education, as I have
called it, which is the proper function of a University, if
it refuses the foremost place to professional interests,
does but postpone them to the formation of the citizen,
and, while it subserves the larger interests of philan-
thropy, prepares also for the successful prosecution of
those merely personal objects, which at first sight it
seems to disparage.
7-
And now. Gentlemen, I wish to be allowed to enforce
in detail what I have been saying, by some extracts
from the writings to which I have already alluded, and to
which I am so greatly indebted.
" It is an undisputed maxim in Political Economy,"
1 68 Discourse VIL
says Dr. Copleston, " that the separation of professions
and the division of labour tend to the perfection of
every art, to the wealth of nations, to the general com-
fort and well-being of the community. This principle
of division is in some instances pursued so far as to
excite the wonder of people to whose notice it is for the
first time pointed out. There is no saying to what ex-
tent it may not be carried ; and the more the powers of
each individual are concentrated in one employment, the
greater skill and quickness will he naturally display in
performing it. But, while he thus contributes more
effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he
becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational
being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed
his mental powers and habits become contracted ; and
he resembles a subordinate part of some powerful ma-
chinery, useful in its place, but insignificant and worth-
less out of it. If it be necessary, as it is beyond all
question necessary, that society should be split into
divisions and subdivisions, in order that its several duties
may be well performed, yet we must be careful not to
yield up ourselves wholly and exclusively to the guidance
of this system ; we must observe what its evils are, and we
should modify and restrain it, by bringing into action
other principles, which may serve as a check and coun-
terpoise to the main force.
" There can be no doubt that every art is improved by
confining the professor of it to that single study. But,
although the ai't itself is aclfvanced by this concentration of
mind in its service, the individual who is confined to it
goes back. The advantage of the community is nearly in
an inverse ratio with his own.
" Society itself requires some other contribution from
each individual, besides the particular duties of his
Knoivledge and Professional Skill, 1 69
profession. And, if no such liberal intercourse be estab-
lished, it is the common failing of human nature, to be
engrossed with petty views and interests, to underrate
the importance of all in which we are not concerned, and
to carry our partial notions into cases where they are
inapplicable, to act, in short, as so many unconnected
units, displacing and repelling one another.
" In the cultivation of literature is found that common
link, which, among the higher and middling departments
of life, unites the jarring sects and subdivisions into one
interest, which supplies common topics, and kindles
common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices
with which all professions are more or less infected. The
knowledge, too, which is thus acquired, expands and
enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls those
limbs and muscles into freer exercise which, by too
constant use in one direction, not only acquire an
illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their
native play and energy. And thus, without directly
qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it
enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the
peculiar business of any one office or calling, it enables
him to act his part in each of them with better grace and
more elevated carriage ; and, if happily planned and con-
ducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and
generous education which fits a man 'to perform justly,
skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private
and public, of peace and war.' "*
The view of Liberal Education, advocated in these
extracts, is expanded by Mr. Davison in the Essay to
which I have already referred. He lays more stress on
* Vid. Milton on Lducation.
lyo Discourse VI I ,
the " usefulness" of Liberal Education in the larger sense
of the word than his predecessor in the controversy.
Instead of arguing that the Utility of knowledge to the
individual varies inversely with its Utility to the public,
he chiefly employs himself on the suggestions contained
in Dr. Copleston's last sentences. He shows, first, that
a Liberal Education is something far higher, even in
the scale of Utility, than what is commonly called a
Useful Education, and next, that it is necessary or useful
for the purposes even of that Professional Education whicli
commonly engrosses the title of Useful. The former of
these two theses he recommends to us in an argument
from which the following passages are selected : —
" It is to take a very contracted view of life," he says,
" to think with great anxiety how persons may be
educated to superior skill in their department, compara-
tively neglecting or excluding the more liberal and
enlarged cultivation. In his (Mr. Edgeworth's) system,
the value of every attainment is to be measured by its
subserviency to a calling. The specific duties of that
calling are exalted at the cost of those free and indepen-
dent tastes and virtues which come in to sustain the
common relations of society, and raise the individual in
them. In short, a man is to be usurped by his profession.
He is to be clothed in its garb from head to foot. His
virtues, his science, and his ideas are all to be put into a
gown or uniform, and the whole man to be shaped,
pressed, and stiffened, in the exact mould of his technical
character. Any interloping accomplishments, or a faculty
which cannot be taken into pubHc pay, if they are to be
indulged in him at all, must creep along under the cloak
of his more serviceable privileged merits. Such is the
state of perfection to which the spirit and general ten-
dency of this system would lead us.
Knowledge and Professional Skill, 171
''But the professional character is not the only one
which a person engaged in a profession has to support.
He is not always upon duty. There are services he owes,
which are neither parochial, nor forensic, nor military,
nor to be described by any such epithet of civil regulation,
and yet are in no. wise inferior to those that bear these
authoritative titles; inferior neither in their intrinsic value,
nor their moral import, nor their impression upon society.
As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large ; in
the connections of domestic life ; in the improvement and
embellishment of his leisure, he has a sphere of action,
revolving, if you please, within the sphere of his profes-
sion, but not clashing with it ; in which if he can show
none of the advantages of an improved understanding,
whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other, he
is no more than an ill-educated man.
" There is a certain faculty in which all nations of any
refinement are great practitioners. It is not taught at
school or college as a distinct science ; though it deserves
that what is taught there should be made to have some
reference to it ; nor is it endowed at all by the public ;
everybody being obliged to exercise it for himself in
person, which he does to the best of his skill. But in
nothing is there a greater difference than in the manner
of doing it. The advocates of professional learning will
smile when we tell them that this same faculty which we
would have encouraged, is simply that of speaking good
sense in English, without fee or reward, in common con-
versation. They will smile when we lay some stress
upon it ; but in reality it is no such trifle as they
imagine. Look into the huts of savages, and see, for
there is nothing to listen to, the dismal blank of their
stupid hours of silence ; their professional avocations of
war and hunting are over ; and, having nothing to do,
172 Discourse VI L
they have nothing to say. Turn to improved hfe, and you
find conversation in all its forms the medium of some-
thing more than an idle pleasure ; indeed, a very active
agent in circulating and forming the opinions, tastes, and
feelings of a whole people. It makes of itself a con-
siderable affair. Its topics are the most promiscuous —
all those which do not belong to any particular province.
As for its power and influence, we may fairly say that it
is of just the same consequence to a man's immediate
society, how he talks, as how he acts. Now of all those
who furnish their share to rational conversation, a mere
adept in his own art is universally admitted to be the
worst. The sterility and uninstructiveness of such a
person's social hours are quite proverbial. Or if he
escape being dull, it is only by launching into ill-timed,
learned loquacity. We do not desire of him lectures or
speeches ; and he has nothing else to give. Among
benches he may be powerful ; but seated on a chair he
is quite another person. On the other hand, we may
affirm, that one of the best companions is a man who,
to the accuracy and research of a profession, has joined
a free excursive acquaintance with various learning, and
caught from it the spirit of general observation."
9-
Having thus shown that a liberal education is a real
benefit to the subjects of it, as members of society, in the
various duties and circumstances and accidents of life,
he goes on, in the next place, to show that, over and
above those direct services which might fairly be ex-
pected of it, it actually subserves the discharge of those
particular fiinctions, and the pursuit of those particular
advantages, which are connected with professional exer-
tion, and to which Professional Education is directed.
Knowledge and Professional Skill, 173
" We admit," he observes, " that when a person makes
a business of one pursuit, he is in the right way to emi-
nence in it ; and that divided attention will rarely give
excellence in many. But our assent will go no further.
For, to think that the way to prepare a person for excel-
ling in any one pursuit (and that is the only point in
hand), is to fetter his early studies, and cramp the first
development of his mind, by a reference to the exigencies
of that pursuit barely, is a very different notion, and one
which, we apprehend, deserves to be exploded rather than
received. Possibly a few of the abstract, insulated kinds
of learning might be approached in that way. The ex-
ceptions to be made are very few, and need not be
recited. But for the acquisition of professional and
practical ability such maxims are death to it. The
main ingredients of that ability are requisite knowledge
and cultivated faculties ; but, of the two, the latter is by
far the chief A man of well improved faculties has the
command of another's knowledge. A man without them,
has not the command of his own.
"Of the intellectual powers, the judgment is that which
takes the foremost lead in life. How to form it to the
two habits it ought to possess, of exactness and vigour, is
the problem. It would be ignorant presumption so
much as to hint at any routine of method by which
these qualities may with certainty be imparted to every
or any understanding. Still, however, we may safely
lay it down that they are not to be got 'by a gatherer of
simples,' but are the combined essence and extracts of
many different things, drawn from much varied reading
and discipline, first, and observation afterwards. For if
there be a single intelligible point on this head, it is that
a man who has been trained to think upon one subject
or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even
174 Discourse VIL
in that one : whereas the enlargement of his circle gives
him increased knowledge and power in a rapidly in-
creasing ratio. So much do ideas act, not as solitary-
units, but by grouping and combination ; and so clearly
do all the things that fall within the proper province of
the same faculty of the mind, intertwine with and support
each other. Judgment lives as it were by comparison
and discrimination. Can it be doubted, then, whether
the range and extent of that assemblage of things upon
which it is practised in its first essays are of use to its
power }
" To open our way a little further on this matter, we
will define what we mean by the power of judgment ;
and then try to ascertain among what kind of studies
the improvement of it ma}^ be expected at all.
"Judgment does not stand here for a certain homely,
useful quality of intellect, that guards a person from
committing mistakes to the injury of his fortunes or
common reputation ; but for that master-principle of
business, literature, and talent, which gives him strength
in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables
him to seize the strong point in it. Whether this definition
be metaphysically correct or not, it comes home to the
substance of our inquiry. It describes the power that
every one desires to possess when he comes to act in a
profession, or elsewhere ; and corresponds with our best
idea of a cultivated mind.
" Next, it will not be denied, that in order to do any
good to the judgment, the mind must be employed
upon such subjects as come within the cognizance of
that faculty, and give some real exercise to its percep-
tions. Here we have a rule of selection by which the
different parts of learning may be classed for our purpose.
Those which belong to the province of the judgment
ICnow ledge and Professional SkilL 175
are religion (in its evidences and interpretation), ethics,
history, eloquence, poetry, theories of general speculation,
the fine arts, and works of wit. Great as the variety of
these large divisions of learning may appear, they are all
held in union by two capital principles of connexion.
First, they are all quarried out of one and the same great
subject of man's moral, social, and feeling nature. And
secondly, they are all under the control (more or less
strict) of the same power of moral reason."
" If these studies," he continues, " be such as give a
direct play and exercise to the faculty of the judgment,
then they are the true basis of education for the active
and inventive powers, whether destined for a profession
or any other use. Miscellaneous as the assemblage may
appear, of history, eloquence, poetry, ethics, etc., blended
together, they will all conspire in an union of effect.
They are necessary mutually to explain and interpret
each other. The knowledge derived from them all will
amalgamate, and the habits of a mind versed and
practised in them by turns will join to produce a richer
vein of thought and of more general and practical
application than could be obtained of any single one, as
the fusion of the metals into Corinthian brass gave the
artist his most ductile and perfect material. Might we
venture to imitate an author (whom indeed it is much
safer to take as an authority than to attempt to copy),
Lord Bacon, in some of his concise illustrations of the
comparative utility of the different studies, we should
say that history would give fulness, moral philosophy
strength, and poetry elevation to the understanding.
Such in reality is the natural force and tendency of the
studies ; but there are few minds susceptible enough
to derive from them any sort of virtue adequate to
those high expressions. We must be contented there-
176 Discourse VIL
fore to lower our panegyric to this, that a person cannot
avoid receiving some infusion and tincture, at least, of
those several qualities, from that course of diversified
reading. One thing is unquestionable, that the elements
of general reason are not to be found fully and truly ex-
pressed in any one kind of study; and that he who would
wish to know her idiom, must read it in many books.
" If different studies are useful for aiding, they are still
more useful for correcting each other ; for as they have
their particular merits severally, so they have their
defects, and the most extensive acquaintance with one
can produce only an intellect either too flashy or too
jejune, or infected with some other fault of confined
reading. History, for example, shows things as they are,
that is, the morals and interests of men disfigured and
perverted by all their imperfections of passion, folly, and
ambition ; philosophy strips the picture too much; poetry
adorns it too much ; the concentrated lights of the three
correct the false peculiar colouring of each, and show us
the truth. The right mode of thinking upon it is to be
had from them taken all together, as every one must
know who has seen their united contributions of thought
and feeling expresoed in the masculine sentiment of our
immortal statesman, Mr. Burke, whose eloquence is
inferior only to his more admirable wisdom. If any
mind improved like his, is to be our instructor, w^e must
go to the fountain head of things as he did, and study
not his works but his method ; by the one we may
become -feeble imitators, by the other arrive at some
ability of our own. But, as all biography assures us, he,
and every other able thinker, has been formed, not by
a parsimonious admeasurement of studies to some
definite future object (which is Mr. Edgeworth's maxim),
but by taking a wide and liberal compass, and thinking
Knowledge and Professional Skill,
I i
a great deal on many subjects with no better end in
view than because the exercise was one which made
them more rational and intelligent beings."
10.
But I must bring these extracts to an end. To-day I
have confined myself to saying that that training of the
intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best
enables him to discharge his duties to society. The
Philosopher, indeed, and the man of the world differ in
their very notion, but the methods, by which they are re-
spectively formed, are pretty much the same. The Philoso-
pher has the same command of matters of thought, which
the true citizen and gentleman has of matters of business
and conduct. If then a practical end must be assigned to a
University course, I say it is that of training good mem-
bers of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is
fitness for the world. It neither confines its views to parti-
cular professions on the one hand, nor creates heroes or
inspires genius on the other. Works indeed of genius fall
under no art; heroic minds come under no rule; a Univer-
sity is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors, of
founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of
nations. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or
Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or
Shakespeares, though such miracles of nature it has before
now contained within its precincts. Nor is it content on the
other hand with forming the critic or the experimentalist,
the economist or the engineer, though such too it includes
within its scope. But a University training is the great
ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at
raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the
pubUc mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying
true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to
7* 12
lyS Discourse VI I.
popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to
the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political
power, and refining the intercourse of private life. It is
the education which gives a man a clear conscious view
of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing
them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in
urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are,
to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought,
to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irre-
levant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and
to master any subject with facility. It shows him how
to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself
into their state of mind, how to bring before them his
own, how to influence them, how to come to an under-
standing with them, how to bear with them. He is at
home in any society, he has common ground with every
class ; he knows when to speak and when to be silent ;
he is able to converse, he is able to listen ; he can ask a
question pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably, when
he has nothing to impart himself ; he is ever ready, yet
never in the way ; he is a pleasant companion, and a
comrade you can depend upon ; he knows when to be
serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which
enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious
with effect. He has the repose of a mind which lives in
itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources
for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad. He
has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him
in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar,
and with which failure and disappointment have a charm.
The art which tends to make a man all this, is in the
object which it pursues as useful as the art of wealth or the
art of health, though it is less susceptible of method, and
less tangible, less certain, less complete in its result.
I7Q
DISCOURSE VIII.
KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION.
WE shall be brought, Gentlemen, to-day, to the
termination of the investigation which I com-
menced three Discourses back, and which, I was well
aware, from its length, if for no other reason, would make
demands upon the patience even of indulgent hearers.
First I employed myself in estabHshing the principle
that Knowledge is its own reward ; and I showed that,
when considered in this light, it is called Liberal Know-
ledge, and is the scope of Academical Institutions.
Next, I examined what is meant by Knowledge, when
it is said to be pursued for its own sake ; and I showed
that, in order satisfactorily to fulfil this idea. Philosophy
must be its form ; or, in other words, that its matter
must not be admitted into the mind passively, as so much
acquirement, but must be mastered and appropriated as a
system consisting of parts, related one to the other, and
interpretative of one another in the unity of a whole.
Further, I showed that such a philosophical contem-
plation of the field of Knowledge as a whole, leading, as
it did, to an understanding of its separate departments,
and an appreciation of them respectively, might in con-
sequence be rightly called an illumination ; also, it was
rightly called an enlargement of mind, because it was a
i8o Discourse VIII,
distinct location of things one with another, as if in
space ; while it was moreover its proper cultivation and
its best condition, both because it secured to the intellect
the sight of things as they are, or of truth, in opposition
to fancy, opinion, and theory; and again, because it pre-
supposed and involved the perfection of its various
powers.
Such, I said, was that Knowledge, which deserves to
be sought for its own sake, even though it promised no
ulterior advantage. But, when I had got as far as this, I
went farther, and observed that, from the nature of the
case, what was so good in itself could not but have a
number of external uses, though it did not promise them,
simply because it was good ; and that it was necessarily
the source of benefits to society, great and diversified in
proportion to its own intrinsic excellence. Just as in
morals, honesty is the best policy, as being profitable in
a secular aspect, though such profit is not the measure
of its worth, so too as regards what may be called the
virtues of the Intellect, their very possession indeed is a
substantial good, and is enough, yet still that substance
has a shadow, inseparable from it, viz., its social and
political usefulness. And this was the subject to which
I devoted the preceding Discourse.
One portion of the subject remains :— this intellectual
culture, which is so exalted in itself, not only has a
bearing upon social and active duties, but upon Religion
also. The educated mind may be said to be in a certain
sense religious ; that is, it has what may be considered a
religion of its own, independent of Catholicism, partly co-
operating with it, partly thwarting it ; at once a defence
yet a disturbance to the Church in Catholic countries, —
and in countries beyond her pale, at one time in open
warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance. The
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 1 8 1
history of Schools and Academies, and of Literature and
Science generally, will, I think, justify me in thus speak-
ing. Since, then, my aim in these Discourses is to
ascertain the function and the action of a University,
viewed in itself, and its relations to the various instru-
ments of teaching and training which are round about it,
my survey of it would not be complete unless I attempted,
as I now propose to do, to exhibit its general bearings
upon Religion.
2.
Right Reason, that is. Reason rightly exercised, leads
the mind to the Catholic Faith, and plants it there, and
teaches it in all its religious speculations to act under its
guidance. But Reason, considered as a real agent in the
world, and as an operative principle in man's nature, with
an historical course and with definite results, is far from
taking so straight and satisfactory a direction. It
considers itself from first to last independent and
supreme ; it requires no external authority ; it makes a
religion for itself Even though it accepts Catholicism,
it does not go to sleep ; it has an action and development
of its own, as the passions have, or the moral sentiments,
or the principle of self-interest. Divine grace, to use the
language of Theology, does not by its presence supersede
nature ; nor is nature at once brought into simple concur-
rence and coalition with grace. Nature pursues its course,
now coincident with that of grace, now parallel to it, now
across, now divergent, now counter, in proportion to its
own imperfection and to the attraction and influence
which grace exerts over it. And what takes place as
regards other principles of our nature and their develop-
ments is found also as regards the Reason. There is, we
know, a Religion of enthusiasm^ of superstitious ignorance.
1 82 Discourse VIIL
of statecraft ; and each has that in it which resembles
CathoHcism, and that again which contradicts Catho-
Hcism. There is the Rehgion of a warHke people, and
of a pastoral people ; there is a Religion of rude times,
and in like manner there is a Religion of civilized times,
of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar,
and gentleman. This is that Religion of Reason, of
which I speak. Viewed in itself, however near it comes
to Catholicism, it is of course simply distinct from it ; for
Catholicism is one whole, and admits of no compromise
or modification. Yet this is to view it in the abstract ;
in matter of fact, and in reference to individuals, we
can have no difficulty in conceiving this philosophical
Religion present in a Catholic country, as a spirit in-
fluencing men to a certain extent, for good or for bad
or for both, — a spirit of the age, which again may be
found, as among Catholics, so with still greater sway
and success in a country not Catholic, yet specifically
the same in such a country as it exists in a Catholic
community. The problem then before us to-day, is to
set down some portions of the outline, if we can ascertain
them, of the Religion of Civilization, and to determine
how they lie relatively to those principles, doctrines, and
rules, which Heaven has given us in the Catholic
Church.
And here again, when I speak of Revealed Truth, it
is scarcely necessary to say that I am not referring to
the main articles and prominent points of faith, as con-
tained in the Creed. Had I undertaken to delineate a
philosophy, which directly interfered with the Creed, I
could not have spoken of it as compatible with the pro-
fession of Catholicism. The philosophy I speak of,
whether it be viewed within or outside the Church, does
not necessarily take cognizance of the Creed. Where
K7iowledge and Religious Duty. i '^i
the country is Catholic, the educated mind takes its
articles for granted, by a sort of implicit faith; wherd
it is not, it simply ignores them and the whole subject-
matter to which they relate, as not affecting social and
political interests. Truths about God's Nature, about
His deahngs towards the human race, about the
Economy of Redemption, — in the one case it humbly
accepts them, and passes on ; in the other it passes them
over, as matters of simple opinion, which never can be
decided, and which can have no power over us to make
us morally better or worse. I am not speaking then of
belief in the great objects of faith, when I speak of
Catholicism, but I am contemplating Catholicism chiefly
as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and
I have to do with its doctrines mainly as they are sub-
servient to its direction of the conscience and the con-
duct. I speak of it, for instance, as teaching the ruined
state of man ; his utter inability to gain Heaven by any
thing he can do himself; the moral certainty of his
losing his soul if left to himself; the simple absence of
all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the
presence of the Creator ; the illimitable claims of the
Creator on the service of the creature; the imperative
and obligatory force of the voice of conscience ; and
the inconceivable evil of sensuality. I speak of it as
teaching, that no one gains Heaven except by the free
grace of God, or without a regeneration of nature ; that
no one can please Him without faith ; that the heart is
the seat both of sin and of obedience ; that charity is
the fulfilling of the Law; and that incorporation into
the Catholic Church is the ordinary instrument of salva-
tion. These are the lessons which distinguish Catholi-
cism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects to
which the cultivated intellect will practically be turned : —
1 84 Discourse VIIL
I have to compare and contrast, not the doctrinal, but
the moral and social teaching of Philosophy on the one
hand, and Catholicism on the other.
3.
Now, on opening the subject, we see at once a momen-
tous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on
the pastors of the Church. It is obvious that the first
step which they have to effect in the conversion of man
and the renovation of his nature, is his rescue from that
fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state.
To be able to break through the meshes of that thral-
dom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thou-
sand holds upon the heart, is to bring it, I might almost
say, half way to Heaven. Here, even divine grace, to
speak of things according to their appearances, is ordi-
narily baffled, and retires, without expedient or resource,
before this giant fascination. Religion seems too high
and unearthly to be able to exert a continued influence
upon us : its effort to rouse the soul, and the soul's effort
to co-operate, are too violent to last. It is like holding
out the arm at full length, or supporting some great
weight, which we manage to do for a time, but soon are
exhausted and succumb. Nothing can act beyond its
own nature ; when then we are called to what is super-
natural, though those extraordinary aids from Heaven
are given us, with which obedience becomes possible, yet
even with them it Is of transcendent difficulty. We are
drawn down to earth every moment with the ease and
certainty of a natural gravitation, and it is only by
sudden impulses and, as it were, forcible plunges that we
attempt to mount upwards. Religion indeed enlightens^
terrifies, subdues ; it gives faith, it inflicts remorse, it in-
spires resolutions, it draws tears, it inflames devotion, but
Knowledge and Religious Duty. 1 85
only for the occasion. I repeat, it imparts an inward
power which ought to effect more than this ; I am not
forgetting either the real sufficiency of its aids, nor the
responsibility of those in whom they fail. I am not
discussing theological questions at all, I am looking at
phenomena as they he before me, and I say that, in
matter of fact, the sinful spirit repents, and protests it
will never sin again, and for a while is protected by disgust
and abhorrence from the malice of its foe. But that foe
knows too well that such seasons of repentance are wont
to have their end : he patiently waits, till nature faints
with the effort of resistance, and lies passive and hope-
less under the next access of temptation. What we
need then is some expedient or instrument, which at least
will obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual
enemy, and which is sufficiently congenial and level
with our nature to maintain as firm a hold upon us as
the inducements of sensual gratification. It will be our
wisdom to employ nature against itself Thus sorrow,
sickness, and care are providential antagonists to our
inward disorders ; they come upon us as years pass on,
and generally produce their natural effects on us, in pro-
portion as we are subjected to their influence. These,
however, are God's instruments, not ours ; we need a
similar remedy, which we can make our own, the object
of some legitimate faculty, or the aim of some natural
affection, which is capable of resting on the mind, and
taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it,
and which thus becomes a match for the besetting power
ofsensuahty, and a sort of homoeopathic medicine for the
disease. Here then I think is the important aid which
intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the
victims of passion and self-will. It does not supply re-
ligious motives ; it is not the cause or proper antecedent
1 86 Discourse VI I L
of any thing supernatural ; it is not meritorious of
heavenly aid or reward ; but it does a work, at least
materially good (as theologians speak), whatever be its
real and formal character. It expels the excitements of
sense by the introduction of those of the intellect.
This then is th.Q prima facie advantage of the pursuit
of Knowledge ; it is the drawing the mind off from
things which will harm it to subjects which are worthy
a rational being; and, though it does not raise it above
nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our
Maker, yet is it nothing to substitute what is in itself
harmless for what is, to say the least, inexpressibly
dangerous } is it a little thing to exchange a circle of
ideas which are certainly sinful, for others which are
certainly not so .? You will say, perhaps, in the words
of the Apostle, " Knowledge pufifeth up :" and doubtless
this mental cultivation, even when it is successful for the
purpose for which I am applying it, may be from the
first nothing more than the substitution of pride for
sensuality. I grant it, I think I shall have something to
say on this point presently ; but this is not a necessary
result, it is but an incidental evil, a danger which may
be realized or may be averted, whereas we may in most
cases predicate guilt, and guilt of a heinous kind, where
the mind is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts
without training or law of any kind ; and surely to turn
away a soul from mortal sin is a good and a gain so
far, whatever comes of it. And therefore, if a friend in
need is twice a friend, I conceive that intellectual employ-
ments, though they do no more than occupy the mind
with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special
claim upon our consideration and gratitude.
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 187
4.
Nor is this all : Knowledge, the discipline by which it
is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural
tendency to refine the mind, and to give it an indispo-
sition, simply natural, yet real, nay, more than this, a
disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormi-
ties of evil, which are often or ordinarily reached at
length by those who are not careful from the first to
set themselves against what is vicious and criminal. It
generates within the mind a fastidiousness, analogous to
the delicacy or daintiness Avhich good nurture or a sickly
habit induces in respect of food ; and this fastidiousness,
though arguing no high principle, though no protection
in the case of violent temptation, nor sure in its operation,
yet will often or generally be lively enough to create
an absolute loathing of certain offences, or a detestation
and scorn of them as ungentlemanlike, to which ruder
natures, nay, such as have far more of real religion in
them, are tempted, or even betrayed. Scarcely can we
exaggerate the value, in its place, of a safeguard such as
this, as regards those multitudes who are thrown upon
the open field of the world, or are withdrawn from its
eye and Irom the restraint of public opinion. In many
cases, where it exists, sins, familiar to those who are
otherwise circumstanced, will not even occur to the
mind : in others, the sense of shame and the quickened
apprehension of detection will act as a sufficient obstacle
to them, when they do present themselves before it.
Then, again, the fastidiousness I am speaking of will
create a simple* hatred of that miserable tone of conver-
sation which, obtaining as it does in the world, is a con-
stant fuel of evil, heaped up round about the soul : more-
over, it will create an irresolution and indecision in doing-
1 88 Discourse VIIL
wrong, which will act as a remora till the danger is past
away. And though it has no tendency, I repeat, to
mend the heart, or to secure it from the dominion in
other shapes of those very evils which it repels in the
particular modes of approach by which they prevail over
others, yet cases may occur when it gives birth, after sins
have been committed, to so keen a remorse and so intense
a self-hatred, as are even sufficient to cure the particular
moral disorder, and to prevent its accesses ever after-
wards ; — as the spendthrift in the story, who, after gazing
on his lost acres from the summit of an eminence, came
down a miser, and remained a miser to the end of his
days.
And all this holds good in a special way, in an age
such as ours, when, although pain of body and mind
may be rife as heretofore, yet other counteractions of evil,
of a penal character, which are present at other times, are
away. In rude and semi-barbarous periods, at least in a
climate such as our own, it is the daily, nay, the principal
business of the senses, to convey feehngs of discomfort
to the mind, as far as they convey feelings at all. Expo-
sure to the elements, social disorder and lawlessness, the
tyranny of the powerful, and the inroads of enemies, are
a stern discipline, allowing brief intervals, or awarding a
sharp penance, to sloth and sensuality. The rude food,
the scanty clothing, the violent exercise, the vagrant life,
the military constraint, the imperfect pharmacy, which
now are the trials of only particular classes of the
community, were once the lot more or less of all. In the
deep woods or the wild solitudes of the medieval era,
feelings of religion or superstition were naturally pre-
sent to the population, which in various ways co-operated
with the missionary or pastor, in retaining it in a noble
simplicity of manners. But, when in the advancement
Knowledge and Religious Duty. 189
of society men congregate in towns, and multiply in con-
tracted spaces, and law gives them security, and art
gives them comforts, and good government robs them of
courage and manliness, and monotony of life throws
them back upon themselves, who does not see that
diversion or protection from evil they have none, that
vice is the mere reaction of unhealthy toil, and sensual
excess the holyday of resourceless ignorance ? This is
so well understood by the practical benevolence of the
day, that it has especially busied itself in plans for sup-
plying the masses of our town population with intel-
lectual and honourable recreations. Cheap literature,
libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific
lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings
and gardens to please the eye and to give repose to the
feelings, external objects of whatever kind, which may
take the mind off itself, and expand and elevate it in
liberal contemplations, these are the human means, wisely
suggested, and good as far as they go, for at least parrying
the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies,
not only of the individual soul, but of society at large.
Such are the instruments by which an age of advanced
civilization combats those moral disorders, which Reason
as well as Revelation denounces ; and I have not been
backward to express my sense of their serviceableness
to Religion. Moreover, they are but the foremost of a
series of influences, which intellectual culture exerts
upon our moral nature, and all upon the type of Chris-
tianity, manifesting themselves in veracity, probity,
equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiable-
ness f so much so, that a character more noble to look
at, more beautiful, more winning, in the various relations
of life and in personal duties, is hardly conceivable, than
may, or might be, its result, when that culture is bestowed
190 Discourse VI I L
upon a soil naturally adapted to virtue. If you would
obtain a picture for contemplation which may seem to
fulfil the ideal, which the Apostle has delineated under
the name of charity, in its sweetness and harmony, its
generosity, its courtesy to others, and its depreciation of
self, you could not have recourse to a better furnished
studio than to that of Philosophy, with the specimens of
it, which with greater or less exactness are scattered
through society in a civilized age. It is enough to refer
you. Gentlemen, to the various Biographies and Remains
of contemporaries and others, which from time to time
issue from the press, to see how striking is the action of
our intellectual upon our moral nature, where the moral
material is rich, and the intellectual cast is perfect.
Individuals will occur to all of us, who deservedly attract
our love and admiration, and whom the world almost
worships as the work of its own hands. Religious
principle, indeed, — that is, faith, — is, to all appearance,
simply away ; the work is as certainly not supernatural
as it is certainly noble and beautiful. This must be
insisted on, that the Intellect may have its due ; but
it also must be insisted on for the sake of conclusions
to which I wish to conduct our investigation. The
radical difference indeed of this mental refinem_ent from
genuine religion, in spite of its seeming relationship, is
the very cardinal point on which my present discussion
turns; yet, on the other hand, such refinement may
readily be assigned to a Christian origin by hasty or
distant observers, or by those who view it in a particular
light. And as this is the case, I think it advisable,
before proceeding with the delineation of its character-
istic features, to point out to you distinctly the elemen-
tary principles on which its morality is based.
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 191
5.
You will bear in mind then, Gentlemen, that I spoke
just n(3w of the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind
feels for some kinds of vice, and the utter disgust and
profound humiliation which may come over it, if it
should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them.
Now this feeling may have its root in faith and love, but
it may not ; there is nothing really religious in it, con-
sidered by itself. Conscience indeed is implanted in the
breast by nature, but it inflicts upon us fear as well as
shame ; when the mind is simply angry with itself and
nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of
nature and the depth of its intimations have been
forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted
emotions which ought to lead to God. Fear implies
the transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver
and judge ; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to
swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach
is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fit-
ting and becoming. Fear carries us out of ourselves,
shame confines us within the round of our own thoughts.
Such, I say, is the danger which awaits a civilized age ;
such is its besetting sin (not inevitable, God forbid! or
we must abandon the use of God's own gifts), but still
the ordinary sin of the Intellect; conscience becomes
what is called a moral sense ; the command of duty is
a sort of taste ; sin is not an offence against God, but
against human nature. ^,
The less amiable specimens of this spurious religion
are those which we meet not unfrequently in my own
country. I can use with all my heart the poet's words,
" England, with all thy faults, I love thee still ; "
102 Discourse VIII.
but to those faults no Catholic can be blind. We find
there men possessed of many virtues, but proud, bashful,
fastidious, and reserved. Why is this } it is because
they think and act as if there were really nothing
objective in their religion ; it is because conscience to
them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought to be,
but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more ;
it is because they do not look out of themselves, because
they do not look through and beyond their own minds
to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is
due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own
consistency. Their conscience has become a mere self-
respect. Instead of doing one thing and then another,
as each is called for, in faith and obedience, careless of
what may be called the keeping of deed with deed, and
leaving Him who gives the command to blend the por*
lions of their conduct into a v/hole, their one object,
however unconscious to themselves, is to paint a smooth
and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves
that they have done their duty. When they do wrong,
they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but
remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call them-
selves fools, not sinners ; they are angry and impatient,
not humble. They shut themselves up in themselves ;
it is misery to them to think or to speak of their own
feelings; it is misery to suppose that others see them, and
their shyness and sensitiveness often become morbid. As
to confession, which is so natural to the Catholic, to them
it is impossible; unless indeed, in cases where they have
been guilty, an apology is due to their own character, is
expected of them, and will be satisfactory to look back
upon. They are victims of an intense self-contemplation.
' There are, however, far more pleasing and interesting
forms of this moral malady than that which I have been
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 193
depicting : I have spoken of the effect of intellectual
culture on proud natures ; but it will show to greater
advantage, yet with as little approximation to religious
faith, in amiable and unaffected minds. Observe, Gentle-
men, the heresy, as it may be called, of which I speak,
is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for con-
science in the true meaning of the word ; now this error
may be the foundation of a character of far more
elasticity and grace than ever adorned the persons whom
I have been describing. It is especially congenial to men
of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will
readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more
than the graceful in conduct. Such persons, far from
tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of
religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it
simply gloom and superstition. Rather a philosopher's,
a gentleman's religion, is of a liberal and generous
character ; it is based upon honour ; vice is evil, because
it is unworthy, despicable, and odious. This was the
quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that,
instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the
pleasant, it intermingled other ideas with them of a sad
and painful nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a
cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of
heroism in penance ; that it made the soul tremble with
the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views
and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was
nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The
notion of an All-perfect, Ever-present God, in whose
sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns
to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to
them ; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their
own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but
parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.
7* 13
194 Discourse VIII,
6.
Had I room for all that might be said upon the subject,
I might illustrate this intellectual religion from the history
of the Emperor Julian, the apostate from Christian Truth,
the foe of Christian education. He, in whom every
Catholic sees the shadow of the future Anti-Christ, was
all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue. Weak
points in his character he had, it is true, even in a merely
poetical standard; but, take him all in all, and I cannot
but recognize in him a specious beauty and nobleness of
moral deportment, which combines in it the rude great-
ness of Fabricius or Regulus with the accomplishments
of Pliny or Antoninus. His simplicity of manners, his
frugality, his austerity of life, his singular disdain of
sensual pleasure, his military heroism, his application to
business, his literary diligence, his modesty, his clemency,
his accomplishments, as I view them, go to make him
one of the most eminent specimens of pagan virtue
which the world has ever seen."^ Yet how shallow, how
meagre, nay, how unamiable is that virtue after all, when
brought upon its critical trial by his sudden summons
into the presence of his Judge ! His last hours form a
tmiqiie passage in history, both as illustrating the help-
lessness of philosophy under the stern realities of our
* I do not consider I have said above any thing inconsistent with the
following passage from Cardinal Gerdil, though I have enlarged on the favour-
able side of Julian's cliaracter, " Du genie, des connaissances, de I'habilite
dans le metier de la guerre, du courage et du desinteressenient dans le com-
mandement des armees, des actions plutot que des qualites estimables,
mais le plus souvent gatees par la vanite qui en etait le principe, la super-
stition jointe a I'hypocrisie ; un esprit fecond en ressources eclaire, mais sus-
ceptible de petitesse ; des fautes essentielles dans le gouvernement ; des in-
nocens sacrifies a la vengeance ; une haine envenimee contre le Christianisme,
qu'il avait abandonne ; un attachement passionne aux folies de la Theurgie;
tels etaient les trails sous Icsiiuels on nous preignait Julien." Op. t. x. p. 54-
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 195
being, and as being reported to us on the evidence of an
eye-witness. '' Friends and fellow-soldiers," he said, to
use the words of a writer, well fitted, both from his
literary tastes and from his hatred of Christianity, to be
his panegyrist, " the seasonable period of my departure
is now arrived, and I discharge, with the cheerfulness of
a ready debtor, the demands of nature .... I die with-
out remorse, as I have lived without guilt. I am pleased
to reflect on the innocence of my private life; and I can
afBrm with confidence that the supreme authority, that
emanation of the divine Power, has been preserved in
my hands pure and immaculate ... I now offer my
tribute of gratitude to the Eternal Being, who has not
suffered me to perish by the cruelty of a tyrant, by the
secret dagger of conspiracy, or by the slow tortures of
lingering disease. He has given me, in the midst of an
honourable career, a splendid and glorious departure
from this world, and I hold it equally absurd, equally
base, to solicit, or to decline, the stroke of fate . . .
^' He reproved the immoderate grief of the spectators,
and conjured them not to disgrace, by unmanly tears,
the fate of a prince who in a few moments would be
united with Heaven and with the stars. The spectators
were silent ; and Julian entered into a metaphysical
argument with the philosophers Priscus and Maximus
on the nature of the soul. The efforts which he made,
of mind as well as body, most probably hastened his
death. His wound began to bleed with great violence ;
his respiration was embarrassed by the swelling of the
veins ; he called for a draught of cold water, and as soon
as he had drank it expired without pain, about the
hour of midnight."* Such, Gentlemen, is the final
exhibition of the Religion of Reason : in the insensibility
* Gibbon, Hist., ch. 24.
From the
Library of
196 Discourse VIII.
of conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in
the contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the
simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence,
in the serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction,
we recognize the mere Philosopher.
7.
Gibbon paints with pleasure what, conformably with
the sentiments of a godless intellectualism, was an his-
torical fulfilment of his own idea of moral perfection;
Lord Shaftesbury had already drawn out that idea in a
theoretical from, in his celebrated collection of Treatises
which he has called " Characteristics of men, manners,
opinions, views ;" and it will be a further illustration of
the subject before us, if you will allow me, Gentlemen, to
make some extracts from this work.
One of his first attacks is directed against the doctrine
of reward and punishment, as if it introduced a notion
into religion inconsistent with the true apprehension of
the beauty of virtue, and with the liberality and noble-
ness of spirit in which it should be pursued. " Men
have not been content," he says, " to show the natural
advantages of honesty and virtue. They have rather
lessened these, the better, as they thought, to advance
another foundation. They have made virtue so mer-
cenary a thing, and have talked so much of its rewards,
that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which
can be worth rewarding. For to be bribed only or
terrified into an honest practice, bespeaks little of real
honesty or worth." " If," he says elsewhere, insinuating
what he dare not speak out, " if through hope merely of
reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be inclined
to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill
to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse
Knowledge aitd Religiotis Duty, 197
there is in this case no virtue or goodness whatever.
There is no more of rectitude, piety, or sanctity, in a
creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or
gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and
sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip
. . . . While the. will is neither gained, nor the inclination
wrought upon, but awe alone prevails and forces obedi-
ence, the obedience is servile, and all which is done
through it merely servile." That is, he says that
Christianity is the enemy of moral virtue, as influencing
the mind by fear of God, not by love of good.
The motives then of hope and fear being, to say the
least, put far into the background, and nothing being
morally good but what springs simply or mainly from a
love of virtue for its own sake, this love-inspiring quality
in virtue is its beauty, while a bad conscience is not
much more than the sort of feeling which makes us
shrink from an instrument out of tune. " Some by mere
nature," he says, " others by art and practice, are masters
of an ear in music, an eye in painting, a fancy in the
ordinary things of ornament and grace, a judgment in
proportions of all kinds, and a general good taste in
most of those subjects which make the amusement and
delight of the ingenious people of the world. Let such
gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or
as irregular in their morals, they must at the same time
discover their inconsistency, live at variance with them-
selves, and in contradiction to that principle on which
they ground their highest pleasure and entertainment.
Of all other beauties which virtuosos pursue, poets
celebrate, musicians sing, and architects or artists of
whatever kind describe or form, the most delightful,
the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is drawn
from real life and from the passions. Nothing affects
198 Discourse VI I L
the heart like that which is purely from itself, and
of its own nature : such as the beauty of sentiments,
the grace of actions, the turn of characters, and the
pj'oportions and features of a human mind. This lesson
of philosophy, even a romance, a poem, or a play may
teach us ... . Let poets or the men of harmony deny,
if they can, this force of nature, or withstand this moral
magic .... Every one is a virtuoso of a higher or
lower degree ; every one pursues a grace ... of one
kind or other. The veniLstum, the honestum, the decorimt
of things will force its way .... The most natural
beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth ; for all
beauty is truth."
Accordingly, virtue being only one kind of beauty, the
principle which determines what is virtuous is, not con-
science, but taste. " Could we once convince ourselves,"
he says, " of what is in itself so evident, viz., that in the
very nature of things there must of necessity be the
foundation of a right and wrong taste, as well in respect
of inward character of features as of outward person, be-
haviour, and action, we should be far more ashamed of
ignorance and wrong judgment in the former than in
the latter of these subjects .... One who aspires to the
character of a man of breeding and politeness is careful
to form his judgment of arts and sciences upon right
models of perfection .... He takes particular care to
turn his eye from every thing which is gaudy, luscious,
and of false taste. Nor is he less careful to turn his ear
from every sort of music, besides that which is of the
best manner and truest harmony. 'Twere to be wished
we had the same regard to a rigJU taste in life and
manners .... If civility and humanity be a taste ; if
brutality, insolence, riot, be in the same manner a taste,
.... who would not endeavour to force nature as well
Knowledge mid Religious Duty. 199
in this respect as in what relates to a taste or judgment
in other arts and sciences ? "
Sometimes he distinctly contrasts this taste with prin-
ciple and conscience, and gives it the preference over
them. " After all," he says, " * tis not merely what we
call principle, but a taste, which governs men. They
may think for certain, ' This is right,' or * that wrong ; '
they may believe ' this is a virtue,' or * that a sin ; ' ' this
is punishable by man,' or ' that by God ; ' yet if the
savour of things lies cross to honesty, if the fancy be
florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern
beauties and lower orders of worldly symmetries and
proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter
way." Thus, somewhat like a Jansenist, he makes the
superior pleasure infallibly conquer, and implies that,
neglecting principle, we have but to train the taste to a
kind of beauty higher than sensual. He adds: ''Even
conscience, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline,
will make but a slight figure, when this taste is set
amiss."
And hence the well-known doctrine of this author,
that ridicule is the test of truth ; for truth and virtue
being beauty, and falsehood and vice deformity, and the
feeling inspired by deformity being that of derision, as
that inspired by beauty is admiration, it follows that
vice is not a thing to weep about, but to laugh at.
'' Nothing is ridiculous," he says, *' but what is deformed ;
nor is any thing proof against raillery but what is hand-
some and just. And therefore 'tis the hardest thing in
the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon,
which can never bear an edge against herself, and bears
against every thing contrary."
And hence again, conscience, which intimates a Law-
giver, being superseded by a moral taste or sentiment,
200 Discourse VIII,
which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our
nature, it follows that our great rule is to contemplate
ourselves, if we would gain a standard of life and morals.
Thus he has entitled one of his Treatises a " Soliloquy,"
with the motto, *' Nee te qu^siveris extra ; " and he
observes, " The chief interest of ambition, avarice,
corruption, and every sly insinuating vice, is to prevent
this interview and familiarity of discourse, which is
consequent upon close retirement and inward recess.
'Tis the grand artifice of villainy and lewdness, as well
as of superstition and bigotry, to put us upon terms of
greater distance and formality with ourselves, and evade
our proving method of soliloquy .... A passionate
lover, whatever solitude he may affect, can never be truly
by himself .... 'Tis the same reason which keeps the
imaginary saint or mystic from being capable of this
entertainment. Instead of looking narrowly into his own
nature and mind, that he may be no longer a mystery to
himself, he is taken up with the contemplation of other
mysterious natures, which he never can explain or
comprehend."
8.
Taking these passages as specimens of what I call the
Religion of Philosophy, it is obvious to observe that
there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a
certain sense true ; yet, on the other hand, that almost
every statement is perverted and made false, because it
is not the whole truth. They are exhibitions of truth
under one aspect, and therefore insufficient ; conscience
is most certainly a moral sense, but it is more ; vice
again, is a deformity, but it is worse. Lord Shaftesbury
may insist, if he will, that simple and solitary fear cannot
effect a moral conversion, and we are not concerned to
Knowledge and Religious Duty. 201
answer him ; but he will have a difficulty in proving that
any real conversion follows from a doctrine which makes
virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and
ungentlemanlike.
Such a doctrine is essentially superficial, and such will
be its effects. It has no better measure of right and
wrong than that of visible beauty and tangible fitness.
Conscience indeed inflicts an acute pang, but that pang,
forsooth, is irrational, and to reverence it is an illiberal
superstition. But, if we will make light of what is deepest
within us, nothing is left but to pay homage to what is
more upon the surface. To seem becomes to be ; what
looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil ;
virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains. As well
may we measure virtue by utility as by such a rule.
Nor is this an imaginary apprehension ; we all must
recollect the celebrated sentiment into which a great and
wise man was betrayed, in the glowing eloquence of his
valediction to the spirit of chivalry. " It is gone," cries
Mr. Burke ; " that sensibility of principle, that chastity
of honour, which felt a stain like a wound ; which inspired
courage, while it mitigated ferocity; which ennobled
whatever it touched, and under which vice lost half its
evil by losing all its grossnessr In the last clause of this
beautiful sentence we have too apt an illustration of the
ethical temperament of a civilized age. It is detection,
not the sin, which is the crime ; private life is sacred,
and inquiry into it is intolerable ; and decency is virtue.
Scandals, vulgarities, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts,
are offences of the first order. Drinking and swearing,
squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder,
make up the idea of profligacy : poets may say any
thing, however wicked, with impunity ; works of genius
may be read without danger or shame, whatever their
202 Discourse VIIL
principles ; fashion, celebrity, the beautiful, the heroic,
will suffice to force any evil upon the community. The
splendours of a court, and the charms of good society,
wit, imagination, taste, and high breeding, the prestige
of rank, and the resources of wealth, are a screen, an
instrument, and an apology for vice and irreligion. And
thus at length we find, surprising as the change may be,
that that very refinement of Intellectualism, which began
by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it. Under the
shadow indeed of the Church, and in its due development,
Philosophy does service to the cause of morality ; but,
when it is strong enough to have a will of its own, and is
lifted up with an idea of its own importance, and attempts
to form a theory, and to lay down a principle, and to
carry out a system of ethics, and undertakes the moral
education of the man, then it does but abet evils to
which at first it seemed instinctively opposed. True
Religion is slow in growth, and, when once planted, is
difficult of dislodgement ; but its intellectual counterfeit
has no root in itself : it springs up suddenly, it suddenly
withers. It appeals to what is in nature, and it falls
under the dominion of the old Adam. Then, like
dethroned princes, it keeps up a state and majesty,
when it has lost the real power. Deformity is its abhor-
rence ; accordingly, since it cannot dissuade men from
vice, therefore in order to escape the sight of its deformity,
it embellishes it. It " skins and films the ulcerous
place," which it cannot probe or heal,
" Whiles rank corruption, mining all within,
Infects unseen."
And from this shallowness of philosophical Religion
it comes to pass that its disciples seem able to fulfil certain
precepts of Christianity more readily and exactly than
Knowledge and Religious Duty, 203
Christians themselves. St. Paul, as I have said, gives us
a pattern of evangelical perfection ; he draws the Chris-
tian character in its most graceful form, and its most
beautiful hues. He discourses of that charity which is
patient and meek, humble and single-minded, disinter-
ested, contented, and persevering. He tells us to prefer
each the other before himself, to give way to each other,
to abstain from rude words and evil speech, to avoid self-
conceit, to be calm and grave, to be cheerful and happy, to
observe peace with all men, truth and justice, courtesy and
gentleness, all that is modest, amiable, virtuous, and ol
good repute. Such is St. Paul's exemplar of the Chris-
tian in his external relations ; and, I repeat, the school of
the world seems to send out living copies of this typical
excellence with greater success than the Church. At
this day the " gentleman " is the creation, not of Chris-
tianity, but of civilization. But the reason is obvious.
The world is content with setting right the surface of
things ; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths
of the heart. She ever begins with the beginning ; and,
as regards the multitude of her children, is never able
to get beyond the beginning, but is continually employed
in laying the foundation. She is engaged with what is
essential, as previous and as introductory to the orna-
mental and the attractive. She is curing men and keep-
ing them clear of mortal sin ; she is " treating of justice
and chastity, and the judgment to come:" she is insist-
ing on faith and hope, and devotion, and honesty,
and the elements of charity; and has so much to do with
precept, that she almost leaves it to inspirations from
Heaven to suggest what is of counsel and perfection.
She aims at what is necessary rather than at what is de-
sirable. She is for the many as well as for the few. She
is putting souls in the way of salvation, that they ma}'
204 Discourse VI I L
then be in a condition, if they shall be called upon, to
aspire to the heroic, and to attain the full proportions, as
well as the rudiments, of the beautiful.
9-
Such is the method, or the policy (so to call it), of the
Church ; but Philosophy looks at the matter from a very
different point of view : what have Philosophers to do
with the terror of judgment or the saving of the soul ?
Lord Shaftesbury calls the former a sort of " panic fear."
Of the latter he scoffingly complains that "the saving of
souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits." Of
course he is at liberty, on his principles, to pick and
choose out of Christianity what he will ; he discards the
theological, the mysterious, the spiritual ; he makes
selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful. To
him it matters not at all that he begins his teaching
where he should end it ; it matters not that, instead of
planting the tree, he merely crops its flowers for his ban-
quet ; he only aims at the present life, his philosophy
dies with him ; if his flowers do but last to the end of
his revel, he has nothing more to seek. When night
comes, the withered leaves may be mingled with his own
ashes ; he and they will have done their work, he and
they will be no more. Certainly, it costs little to make
men virtuous on conditions such as these ; it is like
teaching them a language or an accomplishment, to
write Latin or to play on an instrument, — the profession
of an artist, not the commission of an Apostle.
This embellishment of the exterior is almost the be-
ginning and the end of philosophical morality. This is
why it aims at being modest rather than humble ; this
is how it can be proud at the very time that it is unas-
suming. To humility indeed it does not even aspire;
Knowledge a?id Religious Duty. 205
humility is one of the most difficult of virtues both to
attain and to ascertain. It lies close upon the heart
itself, and its tests are exceedingly delicate and subtle.
Its counterfeits abound ; however, we are little concerned
with them here, for, I repeat, it is hardly professed even
by name in the code of ethics which we are reviewing.
As has been often observed, ancient civilization had
not the idea, and had no word to express it : or rather,
it had the idea, and considered it a defect of mind, not
a virtue, so that the word which denoted it conveyed a
reproach. As to the modern world, you may gather its
ignorance of it by its perversion of the somewhat
parallel term " condescension." Humility or condescen-
sion, viewed as a virtue of conduct, may be said to con-
sist, as in other things, so in our placing ourselves in our
thoughts on a level with our inferiors ; it is not only a
voluntary relinquishment of the privileges of our own
station, but an actual participation or assumption of the
condition of those to whom we stoop. This is true
humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low ; not, to
cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low
position. Such was St. Paul's humility, when he called
himself " the least of the saints ;" such the humility of
those many holy men who have considered themselves
the greatest of sinners. It is an abdication, as far as their
own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or
privileges to which others deem them entitled. Now it is
not a little instructive to contrast with this idea, Gentle-
men, — with this theological meaning of the word " con-
descension," — its proper English sense ; put them in
juxta-position, and you will at once see the difference
beween the world's humility and the humility of the
Gospel. As the world uses the word, "condescension"
is a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending for-
200 Discourse VI I L
ward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by
a single inch the seat in which it is so firmly established.
It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while
he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing
nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose
level, in theory, he is placing himself. And this is the
nearest idea which the philosopher can form of the virtue
of self-abasement ; to do more than this is to his mind a
meanness or an hypocrisy, and at once excites his sus-
picion and disgust. What the world is, such it has ever
been ; we know the contempt which the educated pagans
had for the martyrs and confessors of the Church ; and
it is shared by the anti-Catholic bodies of this day.
Such are the ethics of Philosophy, when faithfully re-
presented ; but an age like this, not pagan, but profes-
sedly Christian, cannot venture to reprobate humility in
set terms, or to make a boast of pride. Accordingly, it
looks out for some expedient by which it may blind
itself to the real state of the case. Humility, with
its grave and self-denying attributes, it cannot love ;
but what is more beautiful, what more winning, than
modesty.-^ what virtue, at first sight, simulates humility
so well ? though what in fact is more radically distinct
from it ? In truth, great as is its charm, modesty is not
the deepest or the most religious of virtues. Rather it is
the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant, and
watches continually over its nascent intercourse with the
world about it. It goes the round of the senses ; it
mounts up into the countenance ; it protects the eye and
ear; it reigns in the voice and gesture. Its province is
the outward deportment, as other virtues have relation
to matters theological, others to society, and others to
the mind itself. And being more superficial than other
virtues, it is. more easily disjoined from their company ; it
KnowlecCge and ReCigious Duty. 207
admits of being associated with principles or qualities
naturally foreign to it, and is often made the cloak of
feelings or ends for which it was never given to us. So
little is it the necessary index of humiHty, that it is even
compatible with pride. The better for the purpose of
Philosophy ; humble it cannot be, so forthwith modesty
becomes its humility.
Pride, under such training, instead of running to waste
in the education of the mind, is turned to account ; it
gets a new name ; it is called self-respect ; and ceases to
be the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is
in itself Though it be the motive principle of the soul,
it seldom comes to view ; and when it shows itself, then
delicacy and gentleness are its attire, and good sense
and sense of honour direct its motions. It is no lonsrer
a restless agent, without definite aim ; it has a large field
of exertion assigned to it, and it subserves those social
interests which it would naturally trouble. It is directed
into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obe-
dience ; and it becomes the very staple of the religion
and morality held in honour in a day like our own. It
becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of vera-
city, in high and low; it is the very household god of
society, as at present constituted, inspiring neatness and
decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and re-
fined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and
generosity in the head of the family. It diffuses a light
over town and country ; it covers the soil with handsome
edifices and smiling gardens ; it tills the field, it stocks
and embellishes the shop. It is the stimulating principle
of providence on the one hand, and of free expenditure on
the other; of an honourable ambition, and of elegant en-
joyment. Tt breathes upon the face of the community, and
the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon.
2o8 Discourse VIII,
Refined by the civilization which has brought it into
activity, this self-respect infuses into the mind an intense
horror of exposure, and a keen sensitiveness of notoriety
and ridicule. It becomes the enemy of extravagances of
any kind ; it shrinks from what are called scenes ; it has
no mercy on the mock-heroic, on pretence or egotism, on
verbosity in language, or what is called prosiness in con-
versation. It detests gross adulation ; not that it tends
at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the
flatterer ministers, but it sees the absurdity of indulging
it, it understands the annoyance thereby given to others,
and if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy or the power-
ful, it demands greater subtlety and art in the prepara-
tion. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous
self-conceit, as being checked in its natural eruption.
It teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control
their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the
tone of their judgments. As Lord Shaftesbury would
desire, it prefers playful wit and satire in putting down
what is objectionable, as a more refined and good-
natured, as well as a more effectual method, than the
expedient which is natural to uneducated minds. It is
from this impatience of the tragic and the bombastic
that it is now quietly but energetically opposing itself to
the unchristian practice of duelling, which it brands as
simply out of taste, and as the remnant of a barbarous
age ; and certainly it seems likely to effect what Religion
has aimed at abolishing in vain.
lO.
Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentle-
man to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This
description is both refined and, as far as it goes, ac-
curate. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the
Knoi'oledge and Religions Duty. 20:)
obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed
action of those about him ; and he concurs with their
movements rather than takes the initiative himself His
benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called
comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal
nature : like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their
part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature pro-
vides both means of rest and animal heat without them.
The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids
whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those
with whom he is cast ; — all clashing of opinion, or
collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom,
or resentment ; his great concern being to make every
one at their ease and at home/ He has his eyes on all
his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle
towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd ;
he can recollect to whom he is speaking ; he guards
against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may
irritate ; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and
never wearisome.// He makes light of favours while he
does them, and seems to be receiving when he is con-
ferring. He never speaks of himself except when com-
pelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no
ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing
motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets
every thing for the best. He is never mean or little in
his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mis-
takes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or in-
sinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-
sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient
sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our
enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. He has
too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too
well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to
'7* 14
210 Discourse VI IL
bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on
philosophical principles ; he submits to pain, because it
is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable,
and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in
controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves
him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps,
but less educated minds ; who, like blunt weapons,
tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the
point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, mis-
conceive their adversary, and leave the question more
involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong
in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust ;
he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is
decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, con-
sideration, indulgence : he throws himself into the minds
of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He
knows the weakness of human reason as well as its
strength, its province and its limits. If he be an un-
believer, he will be too profound and large-minded to
ridicule religion or to act against it ; he is too wise to be
a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety
and devotion ; he even supports institutions as vene-
rable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent ;
he honours the ministers of religion, and it contents
him to decline its mysteries without assailing or de-
nouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration,
and that, not only because his philosophy has taught
him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye,
but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling,
which is the attendant on civilization.
Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own
way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his
religion is one of imagination and sentiment ; it is the
embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic.
Knowledge and Religious Duty. 2 ii
und beautiful, without which there can be no large
philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of
God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or
quality with the attributes of perfection. And this de-
duction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes
the occasion of .such excellent thoughts, and the start-
ing-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he
even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From
the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers,
he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those
who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to
others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological
truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a
number of deductions.
Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical charac-
ter, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from
religious principle. They are seen within the pale of the
Church and without it, in holy men, and in profligate ;
they form the beau-ideal of the world ; they partly assist
and partly distort the development of the Catholic.
They may subserve the education of a St. Francis de
Sales or a Cardinal Pole ; they may be the limits of the
contemplation of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon. Basil and
J ulian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens ;
and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the
other her scoffing and relentless foe.
212
DISCOURSE IX.
DUTIES OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE.
I.
I HAVE to congratulate myself, Gentlemen, that at
length I have accomplished, with whatever success,
the difficult and anxious undertaking to which I have
been immediately addressing myself. Difficult and
anxious it has been in truth, though the main subject of
University Teaching has been so often and so ably dis-
cussed already ; for I have attempted to follow out a line
of thought more familiar to Protestants just now than
to Catholics, upon Catholic grounds. I declared my
intention, when I opened the subject, of treating it as a
philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological
question, with an appeal to common sense, not to
ecclesiastical rules ; and for this very reason, while my
argument has been less ambitious, it has been deprived of
the lights and supports which another mode of handling
it would have secured.
No anxiety, no effort of mind is more severe than
his, who in a difficult matter has it seriously at heart
to investigate without error and to instruct without
obscurity ; as to myself, if the past discussion has at any
time tried the patience of the kind persons who have
given it their attention, I can assure them that on no
one can it have inflicted so great labour and fatigue as
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge. 2 1 3
on myself. Happy they who are engaged in provinces
of thought, so famiHarly traversed and so thoroughly
explored, that they see every where the footprints, the
paths, the landmarks, and the remains of former tra-
vellers, and can never step wrong ; but for myself,
Gentlemen, I have felt like a navigator on a strange sea,
who is out of sight of land, is surprised by night, and has
to trust mainly to the rules and instruments of his science
for reaching the port. The everlasting mountains, the
high majestic cliffs, of the opposite coast, radiant in the
sunlight, which are our ordinary guides, fail us in an
excursion such as this ; the lessons of antiquity, the
determinations of authority, are here rather the needle,
chart, and plummet, than great obj ects, with distinct and
continuous outlines and completed details, which stand
up and confront and occupy our gaze, and relieve us
from the tension and suspense of our personal obser-
vation. And thus, in spite of the pains we may take
to consult others and avoid mistakes, it is not till the
morning comes and the shore greets us, and we see our
vessel making straight for harbour, that we relax our
jealous watch, and consider anxiety irrational. Such in
a measure has been my feeling in the foregoing inquiry;
in which indeed I have been in want neither of authori-
tative principles nor distinct precedents, but of treatises
in extenso on the subject on which I have written, — the
fmished work of writers, who, by their acknowledged
judgment and erudition, might furnish me for my private
guidance with a running instruction on each point which
successively came under review.
1 have spoken of the arduousness of my "immediate"
undertaking, because what I have been attempting has
been of a preliminary nature, not contemplating the
duties of the Church towards a University, nor the
2 1 4 Discourse IX,
characteristics of a University Avhich is Catholic, but
inquiring what a University is, what is its aim, what its
nature, what its bearings. I have accordingly laid down
first, that all branches of knowledge are, at least im-
plicitly, the subject-matter of its teaching ; that these
branches are not isolated and independent one of an-
other, but form together a whole or system ; that they
run into each other, and complete each other, and that,
in proportion to our view of them as a whole, is the
exactness and trustworthiness of the knowledge which
they separately convey ; that the process of imparting
knowledge to the intellect in this philosophical way is
its true culture ; that such culture is a good in itself ; that
the knowledge which is both its instrument and result is
called Liberal Knowledge ; that such culture, together
with the knowledge which effects it, may fitly be sought
for its own sake ; that it is, however, in addition, of great
secular utility, as constituting the best and highest for-
mation of the intellect for social and political life ; and
lastly, that, considered in a religious aspect, it concurs
with Christianity a certain way, and then diverges from
it; and consequently proves in the event, sometimes its
serviceable ally, sometimes, from its very resemblance to
it, an insidious and dangerous foe.
Though, however, these Discourses have only pro-
fessed to be preliminary, being directed to the investiga-
tion of the object and nature of the Education which a
University professes to impart, at the same time I do not
like to conchide without making some remarks upon the
duties of the Church towards it, or rather on the ground
of those duties. If the Catholic Faith is true, a Univer-
sity cannot exist externally to the Catholic pale, for it
cannot teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach
CathoHc theology. This is certain ; but still, though it
Duties of the Chicrch Towards Knowledge. 215
had ever so many theological Chairs, that would not
suffice to make it a Catholic University ; for theology
would be included in its teaching only as a branch of
knowledge, only as one out of many constituent portions,
however important a one, of what I have called Philos-
ophy. Hence a . direct and active jurisdiction of the
Church over it and in it is necessary, lest it should be-
come the rival of the Church with the community at
large in those theological matters which to the Church
are exclusively committed, — acting as the representative
of the intellect, as the Church is the representative of the
religious principle. The illustration of this proposition
shall be the subject of my concluding Discourse.
I say then, that, even though the case could be so
that the whole system of Catholicism was recognized and
professed, without the direct presence of the Church,
still this would not at once make such a University a
Catholic Institution, nor be sufficient to secure the due
weight of religious considerations in its philosophical
studies. For it may easily happen that a particular
bias or drift may characterize an Institution, which no
rules can reach, nor officers remedy, nor professions
or promises counteract "VVe have an instance of such
a case in the Spanish Inquisition ; — here was a purely
Catholic establishment, devoted to the maintenance, or
rather the ascendancy of Catholicism, keenly zealous for
theological truth, the stern foe of every anti-Catholic
idea, and administered by Catholic theologians ; yet it
in no proper sense belonged to the Church. It was
simply and entirely a State institution, it was an expres-
sion of that very Church-and-King spirit which has pre-
vailed in these islands ; nay, it was an instrument of the
2 1 6 Discourse IX.
State, according to the confession of the acutest Protes-
tant historians, in its warfare against the Holy See. Con-
sidered " materially I' it was nothing but Catholic ; but
its spirit and form were earthly and secular, in spite of
whatever faith and zeal and sanctity and charity were to
be found in the individuals who from time to time had a
share in its administration. And in like manner, it is no
sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University,
even that the whole of Catholic theology should be pro-
fessed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and
unearthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its
organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits
together its pupils, and superintends its action. The
Spanish Inquisition came into collision with the supreme
Catholic authority, and that, from the fact that its imme-
diate end was of a secular character ; and for the same
reason, whereas Academical Institutions (as I have been
so long engaged in showing) are in their very nature
directed to social, national, temporal objects in the first
instance, and since they are living and energizing bodies,
if they deserve the name of University at all, and of
necessity have some one formal and definite ethical cha-
racter, good or bad, and do of a certainty imprint that
character on the individuals who direct and who frequent
them, it cannot but be that, if left to themselves, they
will, in spite of their profession of Catholic Truth, work
out results more or less prejudicial to its interests-
Nor is this all : such Institutions may become hostile
to Revealed Truth, in consequence of the circumstances
of their teaching as well as of their end. They are em-
ployed in the pursuit of Liberal Knowledge, and Liberal
Knowledge has a special tendency, not necessary or
rightful, but a tendency in fact, when cultivated by
beings such as we are, to impress us with a mere philo-
DuMes of the Church Towards Knowledge, 217
sophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of
Revelation. I have said much on this subject already.
Truth has two attributes — beauty and power ; and
while Useful Knowledge is the possession of truth as
powerful, Liberal Knowledge is the apprehension of it as
beautiful. Pursue it, either as beauty or as power, to its
furthest extent and its true limit, and you are led by
either road to the Eternal and Infinite, to the intimations
of conscience and the announcements of the Church.
Satisfy yourself with what is only visibly or intelligibly
excellent, as you are likely to do, and you will make
present utility and natural beauty the practical test of
truth, and the sufficient object of the intellect. It is not
that you will at once reject Catholicism, but you will
measure and proportion it by an earthly standard. You
will throw its highest and most momentous disclosures
into the background, you will deny its principles, explain
away its doctrines, re-arrange its precepts, and make
light of its practices, even while you profess it. Know-
ledge, viewed as Knowledge, exerts a subtle influence in
throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own
centre, and our minds the measure of all things. This
then is the tendency of that Liberal Education, of which
a University is the school, viz., to view Revealed Reli-
gion from an aspect of its own, — to fuse and recast it, —
to tune it, as it were, to a different key, and to reset its
harmonies, — to circumscribe it by a circle which unwar-
rantably amputates here, and unduly developes there ;
and all under the notion, conscious or unconscious,
that the human intellect, self-educated and self-sup-
ported, is more true and perfect in its ideas and judg-
ments than that of Prophets and Apostles, to whom the
sights and sounds of Heaven were immediately con-
veyed. A sense of propriety, order, consistency, and
2 1 8 Discourse IX.
completeness gives birth to a rebellious stirring against
miracle and mystery, against the severe and the terrible.
This Intellectualism first and chiefly comes into colli-
sion with precept, then with doctrine, then with the very
principle of dogmatism ; — a perception of the Beautiful
becomes the substitute for faith. In a country which
does not profess the faith, it at once runs, if allowed, into
scepticism or infidelity ; but even within the pale of the
Church, and with the most unqualified profession of her
Creed, it acts, if left to itself, as an element of corrup-
tion and debility. Catholicism, as it has come down to
us from the first, seems to be mean and illiberal ; it is a
mere popular religion ; it is the religion of illiterate ages
or servile populations or barbarian warriors ; it must
be treated with discrimination and delicacy, corrected,
softened, improved, if it is to satisfy an enlightened
generation. It must be stereotyped as the patron of
arts, or the pupil of speculation, or the protege of science;
it must play the literary academician, or the empirical
philanthropist, or the political partisan ; it must keep
up with the age ; some or other expedient it must devise,
in order to explain away, or to hide, tenets under which
the intellect labours and of which it is ashamed — its doc-
trine, for instance, of grace, its mystery of the Godhead,
its preaching of the Cross, its devotion to the Queen of
Saints, or its loyalty to the Apostolic See. Let this
spirit be freely evolved out of that philosophical condition
of mind, which in former Discourses I have so highly,
so justly extolled, and it is impossible but, first indiffer-
ence, then laxity of belief, then even heresy will be the
successive results.
Here then are two injuries which Revelation is likely
to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason,
unless the Church, as in duty bound, protects the sacred
Duties of the Church Toivards Knowledge, 219
treasure which is in jeopardy. The first is a simple
ignoring- of Theological Truth altogether, under the pre-
tence of not recognising differences of religious opinion ;
— which will only take place in countries or under govern-
ments which have abjured Catholicism. The second,
which is of a more subtle character, is a recognition indeed
of Catholicism, but (as if in pretended mercy to it) an
adulteration of its spirit. I will now proceed to describe
the dangers I speak of more distinctly, by a reference
to the general subject-matter of instruction which a
University undertakes.
There are three great subjects on which Human Reason
employs itself: — God, Nature, and Man: and theology
being put aside in the present argument, the physical
and social worlds remain. These, when respectively sub-
jected to Human Reason, form two books : the book
of nature is called Science, the book of man is called
Literature. Literature and Science, thus considered,
nearly constitute the subject-matter of Liberal Educa-
tion ; and, while Science is made to subserve the former
of the two injuries, which Revealed Truth sustains, — its
exclusion. Literature subserves the latter, — its corruption.
Let us consider the influence of each upon Religion
separately.
3.
I. As to Physical Science, of course there can be no
real collision between it and Catholicism. Nature and
Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same
Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each
other. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, in matter
of fact, there always has been a sort of jealousy and
hostility between Religion and physical philosophers.
The name of Galileo reminds us of it at once. Not con-
2 20 Discourse IX,
tent with investigating and reasoning in his own province,
it is said, he went out of his way directly to insult the
received interpretation of Scripture ; theologians repelled
an attack which was wanton and arrogant ; and Science,
affronted in her minister, has taken its full revenge upon
Theology since. A vast multitude of its teachers, I fear
it must be said, have been either unbelievers or sceptics,
or at least have denied to Christianity any teaching,
distinctive or special, over the Religion of Nature. There
have indeed been most illustrious exceptions ; some men
protected by their greatness of mind, some by their
religious profession, some by the fear of public opinion ;
but I suppose the run of experimentalists, external to
the Catholic Church, have more or less inherited the
positive or negative unbelief of Laplace, Buffon, Franklin,
Priestley, Cuvier, and Humboldt. I do not of course
mean to say that there need be in every case a resentful
and virulent opposition made to Religion on the part of
scientific men; but their emphatic silence or phlegmatic
inadvertence as to its claims have implied, more elo-
quently than any words, that in their opinion it had no
voice at all in the subject-matter, which they had ap-
propriated to themselves. The same antagonism shows
itself in the middle ages. Friar Bacon was popularly
regarded with suspicion as a dealer in unlawful arts ;
Pope Sylvester the Second has been accused of magic
for his knowledge of natural secrets ; and the geographical
ideas of St. Virgil, Bishop of Saltzburg, were regarded
with anxiety by the great St. Boniface, the glory of
England, the Martyr-Apostle of Gerr^my. 1 suppose,
in matter of fact, magical superstition and physical
knowledge did commonly go together in those ages :
however, the hostility between experin:iental science and
theology is far older than Christianity. Lord Bacon
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge, 221
traces it to an era prior to Socrates ; he tells us that,
among the Greeks, the atheistic was the philosophy most
favourable to physical discoveries, and he does not hesi-
tate to imply that the rise of the religious schools was the
ruin of science.*
Now, if we would investigate the reason of this oppo-
sition between Theology and Physics, I suppose we must
first take into account Lord Bacon's own explanation of
it. It is common in judicial inquiries to caution the
parties on whom the verdict depends to put out of their
minds whatever they have heard out of court on the sub-
ject to which their attention is to be directed. They are to
judge by the evidence ; and this is a rule which holds in
other investigations as far as this, that nothing of an ad-
ventitious nature ought to be introduced into the process.
In like manner, from religious investigations, as such,
physics must be excluded, and from physical, as such,
religion ; and if we mix them, we shall spoil both. The
theologian, speaking of Divine Omnipotence, for the time
simply ignores the laws of nature as existing restraints
upon its exercise ; and the physical philosopher, on the
other hand, in his experiments upon natural phenomena,
is simply ascertaining those laws, putting aside the ques-
tion of that Omnipotence. If the theologian, in tracing
the ways of Providence, were stopped with objections
grounded on the impossibility of physical miracles, he
would justly protest against the interruption ; and were
the philosopher, who was determining the motion of the
heavenly bodies, to be questioned about their Final or
their First Cause, he too would suffer an illogical inter-
ruption. The latter asks the cause of volcanoes, and is
impatient at being told it is " the divine vengeance ;" the
* Vid. Hallam's Literature of Europe, Macaulay's Essay, and the Author's
Oxford University Sermons, IX,
222 Discourse IX,
former asks the cause of the overthrow of the guilty
cities, and is preposterously referred to the volcanic
action still visible in their neighbourhood. The inquiry
into final causes for the moment passes over the exist-
ence of established laws ; the inquiry into physical,
passes over for the moment the existence of God. In
other words, physical science is in a certain sense athe-
istic, for the very reason it is not theology.
This is Lord Bacon's justification, and an intelligible
one, for considering that the fall of atheistic philosophy
in ancient times was a blight upon the hopes of physical
science. " Aristotle," he says, '' Galen, and others fre-
quently introduce such causes as these : — the hairs of
the eyelids are for a fence to the sight ; the bones for
pillars whence to build the bodies of animals ; the
leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and
wind ; the clouds are designed for watering the earth.
All which are properly alleged in metaphysics ; but in
physics, are impertinent, and as remoras to the ship, that
hinder the sciences from holding on their course of
improvement, and as introducing a neglect of searching
after physical causes."'^ Here then is one reason for the
prejudice of physical philosophers against Theology: —
on the one hand, their deep satisfaction in the laws of
nature indisposes them towards the thought of a Moral
Governor, and makes them sceptical of His interpo-
sition ; on the other hand, the occasional interference of
religious criticism in a province not religious, has made
them sore, suspicious, and resentful.
4.
Another reason of a kindred nature is to be found
in the difference of method by which truths are gained
* In Augment., 5.
Duties of the Church 1 awards Knowledge, 223
in theology and in physical science. Induction is the
instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instru-
ment of Theology. There the simple question is, What
is revealed } all doctrinal knowledge flows from one
fountain head. If we are able to enlarge our view and
multiply our propositions, it must be merely by the
comparison and adjustment of the original truths ; if we
would solve new questions, it must be by consulting old
answers. The notion of doctrinal knowledge absolutely
novel, and of simple addition from without, is intole-
rable to Catholic ears, and never was entertained by
any one who was even approaching to an understand-
ing of our creed. Revelation is all in all in doctrine ;
the Apostles its sole depository, the inferential method
its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole
sanction. The Divine Voice has spoken once for all,
and the only question is about its meaning. Now
this process, as far as it was reasoning, was the very
mode of reasoning which, as regards physical know-
ledge, the school of Bacon has superseded by the in-
ductive method : — no wonder, then, that that school
should be irritated and indignant to find that a subject-
matter remains still, in which their favourite instrument
has no office ; no wonder that they rise up against this
memorial of an antiquated system, as an eyesore and an
insult ; and no wonder that the very force and dazzling
success of their own method in its own departments
should sway or bias unduly the religious sentiments of
any persons who come under its influence. They assert
that no new truth can be gained by deduction ; Catho-
lics assent, but add that, as regards religious truth, they
have not to seek at all, for they have it already. Chris-
tian Truth is purely of revelation ; that revelation we can
but explain, we cannot increase, except relatively to our
2 24 Discourse IX.
own apprehensions ; without it we should have known
nothing of its contents, with it we know just as much as its
contents, and nothing more. And, as it was given by a
divine act independent of man, so will it remain in spite
of man. Niebuhr may revolutionize history, Lavoisier
chemistry, Newton astronomy; but God Himself is the
author as well as the subject of theology. When Truth
can change, its Revelation can change; when human
reason can outreason the Omniscient, then may it super-
sede His work.
Avowals such as these fall strange upon the ear of
men whose first principle is the search after truth, and
whose starting-points of search are things material and
sensible. They scorn any process of inquiry not founded
on experiment ; the Mathematics indeed they endure,
because that science deals with ideas, not with facts, and
leads to conclusions hypothetical rather than real ;
" Metaphysics" they even use as a by-word of reproach ;
and Ethics they admit only on condition that it gives up
conscience as its scientific ground, and bases itself on
tangible utility : but as to Theology, they cannot deal
with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw
it and ignore it. Catholicism, forsooth, " confines the
intellect," because it holds that God's intellect is greater
than theirs, and that what He has done, man cannot
improve. And what in some sort justifies them to them-
selves in this extravagance is the circumstance that
there is a religion close at their doors which, discarding
so severe a tone, has actually adopted their own
principle of inquiry. Protestantism treats Scripture just
as they deal with Nature ; it takes the sacred text as a
large collection of phenomena, from which, by an in-
ductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at
just those religious conclusions which approve them-
Duties of the Church Towar as K710W ledge. 12^
selves to his own judgment It considers faith a mere
modification of reason, as being an acquiescence \\\
certain probable conclusions till better are found.
Sympathy, then, if no other reason, throws experimental
philosophers into alliance with the enemies of Catho-
licism.
5.
I have another consideration to add, not less impor-
tant than any I have hitherto adduced. The physical
sciences, Astronomy, Chemistry, and the rest, are
doubtless engaged upon divine works, and cannot issue
in untrue religious conclusions. But at the same time it
must be recollected that Revelation has reference to
circumstances which did not arise till after the heavens
and the earth were made. They were made before the
introduction of moral evil into the world : whereas the
Catholic Church is the instrument of a remedial dispen-
sation to meet that introduction. No wonder then that
her teaching is simply distinct, though not divergent,
from the theology which Physical Science suggests to its
followers. She sets before us a number of attributes
and acts on the part of the Divine Being, for which the
material and animal creation gives no scope ; power,
wisdom, goodness are the burden of the physical world,
but it does not and could not speak of mercy, long-
suffering, and the economy of human redemption, and
but partially of the moral law and moral goodness.
" Sacred Theology," says Lord Bacon, " must be drawn
from the words and the oracles of God : not from the
light of nature or the dictates of reason. It is written,
that 'the Heavens declare the glory of God ;' but we no-
where find it that the Heavens declare the will of God ;
which is pronounced a law and a testimony, that men
7* IS
2 26 Discourse IX,
should do according to it. Nor does this hold only in
the great mysteries of the Godhead, of the creation,
of the redemption. . . . We cannot doubt that a large
part of the moral law is too subhme to be attained by
the light of nature; though it is still certain that men,
even with the light and law of nature, have some notions
of virtue, vice, justice, wrong, good, and evil." * That
the new and further manifestations of the Almighty,
made by Revelation, are in perfect harmony with the
teaching of the natural world, forms indeed one subject
of the profound work of the Anglican Bishop Butler ;
but they cannot in any sense be gathered from nature,
and the silence of nature concerning them may easily
seduce the imagination, though it has no force to per-
suade the reason, to revolt from doctrines which have
not been authenticated by facts, but are enforced by
authority. In a scientific age, then, there will naturally
be a parade of what is called Natural Theology, a wide-
spread profession of the Unitarian creed, an impatience
of mystery, and a scepticism about miracles.
And to all this must be added the ample opportunity
which physical science gives to the indulgence of those
sentiments of beauty, order, and congruity, of which I
have said so much as the ensigns and colours (as they
may be called) of a civilized age in its warfare against
CathoHcism.
It being considered, then, that CathoHcism differs from
physical science, in drift, in method of proof, and in sub-
ject-matter, how can it fail to meet with unfair usage
from the philosophers of any Institution in which there
is no one to take its part .? That Physical Science itself
will be ultimately the loser by such ill treatment of Theo-
* De Augm., § 28.
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge. 227
logy, I have insisted on at great length in some pre-
ceding Discourses ; for to depress unduly, to encroach
upon any science, and much more on an important one,
is to do an injury to all. However, this is not the con-
cern of the Church ; the Church has no call to watch
over and protect Science : but towards Theology she has
a distinct duty : it is one of the special trusts committed
to her keeping. Where Theology is, there she must be;
and if a University cannot fulfil its name and office with-
out the recognition of Revealed Truth, she must be there
to see that it is a bond fide recognition, sincerely made
and consistently acted on.
6.
II. And if the interposition of the Church is necessary
in the Schools of Science, still more imperatively is it
demanded in the other main constituent portion of
the subject-matter of Liberal Education, — Literature.
Literature stands related to Man as Science stands to
Nature ; it is his history. Man is composed of body
and soul ; he thinks and he acts ; he has appetites,
passions, affections, motives, designs ; he has within him
the lifelong struggle of duty with inclination ; he has an
intellect fertile and capacious ; he is formed for society,
and society multiplies and diversifies in endless combina-
tions his personal characteristics, moral and intellectual.
All this constitutes his life ; of all this Literature is the
expression; so that Literature is to man in some sort what
autobiography is to the individual ; it is his Life and Re-
mains. Moreover, he is this sentient, intelligent, creative,
and operative being, quite independent of any extraor-
dinary aid from Heaven, or any definite religious belief;
and as such, as he is in himself, does Literature represent
him ; it is the Life and Remains of the natural man.
2 28 Discourse IX.
Innocent or guilty. I do not mean to say that it is
impossible in its very notion that Literature should be
tinctured by a religious spirit ; Hebrew Literature, as far
as it can be called Literature, certainly is simply theo-
logical, and has a character imprinted on it which is
above nature ; but I am speaking of what is to be ex-
pected without any extraordinary dispensation ; and I
say that, in matter of fact, as Science is the reflection of
Nature, so is Literature also — the one, of Nature physical,
the other, of Nature moral and social. Circumstances,
such as locality, period, language, seem to make little or
no difference in the character of Literature, as such ;
on the whole, all Literatures are one ; they are the
voices of the natural man.
I wish this were all that had to be said to the disad-
vantage of Literature; but while Nature physical remains
fixed in its laws, Nature moral and social has a will of
its own, is self-governed, and never remains any long
vv'hile in that state from which it started into action.
Man will never continue in a mere state of innocence ; he
is sure to sin, and his literature will be the expression of
his sin, and this whether he be heathen or Christian,
Christianity has thrown gleams of light on him and his
literature ; but as it has not converted him, but only
certain choice specimens of him, so it has not changed
the characters of his mind or of his history ; his literature
is either what it was, or worse than what it was, in pro-
portion as there has been an abuse of knowledge granted
and a rejection of truth. On the whole, then, I think it
will be found, and ever found, as a matter of course, that
Literature, as such, no matter of what nation, is the
science or history, partly and at best of the natural man,
partly of man in rebellion.
Duties of the Church Toivards Knowledge, 2 2g
7
Here then, I say, you are involved in a difficulty
greater than that which besets the cultivation of Science ;
for, if Physical Science be dangerous, as I have said, it is
dangerous, because it necessarily ignores the idea of
moral evil ; but Literature is open to the more grievous
imputation of recognizing and understanding it too well.
Some one will say to me perhaps: "Our youth shall
not be corrupted. We will dispense with all general or
national Literature whatever, if it be so exceptionable ;
we will have a Christian Literature of our own, as pure,
as true, as the Jewish." You cannot have it : — I do not
say you cannot form a select literature for the young, nay,
even for the middle or lower classes ; this is another
matter altogether : I am speaking of University Educa-
tion, which implies an extended range of reading, which
has to deal with standard works of genius, or what are
called the classics of a language : and I say, from the
nature of the case, if Literature is to be made a study of
human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature.
It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Litera-
ture of sinful man. You may gather together something
very great and high, something higher than any Literature
ever was ; and when you have done so, you will find that
it is not Literature at all. You will have simply left the
delineation of man, as such, and have substituted for it,
as far as you have had any thing to substitute, that of
man, as he is or might be, under certain special advan-
tages. Give up the study of man, as such, if so it must
be ; but say you do so. Do not say you are studying
him, his history, his mind and his heart, when you are
studying something else. Man is a being of genius,
passion, intellect, conscience, power. He exercises these
230 Discourse IX.
various gifts In various ways, in great deeds, in great
thoughts, In heroic acts, in hateful crimes. He founds
states, he fights battles, he builds cities, he ploughs the
forest, he subdues the elements, he rules his kind. He
creates vast ideas, and Influences many generations.
He takes a thousand shapes, and undergoes a thousand
fortunes. Literature records them all to the life,
Quicquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
Gaudia, discursus.
He pours out his fervid soul in poetry ; he sways to and
fro, he soars, he dives, in his restless speculations ; his
lips drop eloquence ; he touches the canvas, and it
glows with beauty; he sweeps the strings, and they
thrill with an ecstatic meaning. He looks back into
himself, and he reads his own thoughts, and notes them
down ; he looks out into the universe, and tells over and
celebrates the elements and principles of which it is the
product.
Such is man : put him aside, keep him before you ;
but, whatever you do, do not take him for what he is
not, for something more divine and sacred, for man re-
generate. Nay, beware of showing God's grace and its
work at such disadvantage as to make the few whom it
has thoroughly influenced compete in intellect with the
vast multitude who either have it not, or use it ill. The
elect are few to choose out of, and the world is inex-
haustible. From the first, Jabel and Tubalcain, Nimrod
"the stout hunter," the learning of the Pharaohs, and
the wisdom of the East country, are of the world. Every
now and then they are rivalled by a Solomon or a Be-
seleel, but the habitat of natural gifts is the natural man.
The Church may use them, she cannot at her will origi-
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge, 231
nate them. Not till the whole human race is made new
will its literature be p-are and true. Possible of course
it is in idea, for nature, inspired by heavenly grace, to
exhibit itself on a large scale, in an originality of thought
or action, even far beyond what the world's literature
has recorded or exemplified ; but, if you would in fact
have a literature of saints, first of all have a nation of
them.
What is a clearer proof of the truth of all this than,
the structure of the Inspired Word itself.? It is un-
deniably not the reflection or picture of the many, but
of the few ; it is no picture of Hfe, but an anticipation of
death and judgment. Human literature is about ail
things, grave or gay, painful or pleasant; but the
Inspired Word views them only in one aspect, and as
they tend to one scope. It gives us little insight into
the fertile developments of mind ; it has no terms in its
vocabulary to express with exactness the intellect and
its separate faculties : it knows nothing of genius, fancy,
wit, invention, presence of mind, resource. It does not
discourse of empire, commerce, enterprise, learning,
philosophy, or the fine arts. Slightly too does it touch
on the more simple and innocent courses of nature and
their reward. Little does it say* of those temporal
blessings which rest upon our worldly occupations, and
make them easy ; of the blessings which we derive from
the sunshine day and the serene night, from the succes-
sion of the seasons, and the produce of the earth. Little
about our recreations and our daily domestic comforts ;
little about the ordinary occasions of festivity and mirth,
which sweeten human life; and nothing at all about
various pursuits or amusements, which it would be going
too much into detail to mention. We read indeed of the
* Vid. the Author's Parochial Sermons, vol. i. 25.
232 Discourse IX,
feast when Isaac was weaned, and of Jacob's courtship,
and of the rehgious merry-makings of holy Job ; but
exceptions, such as these, do but remind us what might
be in Scripture, and is not. If then by Literature is
meant the manifestation of human nature in human lan-
guage, you will seek for it in vain except in the world.
Put up with it, as it is, or do not pretend to cultivate it ;
take things as they are, not as you could wish them.
8.
Nay, I am obliged to go further still ; even if we could,
still we should be shrinking from our plain duty, Gentle-
men, did we leave out Literature from Education. For
why do we educate, except to prepare for the world .^
Why do we cultivate the intellect of the many beyond
the first elements of knowledge, except for this world ?
Will it be much matter in the world to come whether
our bodily health or whether our intellectual strength
was more or less, except of course as this world is in
all its circumstances a trial for the next } If then a
University is a direct preparation for this world, let it
be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a
Seminary ; it is a place to fit men of the world for the
world. We cannot possibly keep them from plunging
into the world, with all its ways and principles and
maxims, when their time comes; but we can prepare
them against what is inevitable ; and it is not the way
to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have
gone into them. Proscribe (I do not merely say parti-
cular authors, particular works, particular passages) but
Secular Literature as such ; cut out from your class
books all broad manifestations of the natural man ; and
those manifestations are waiting for your pupil's benefit
at the very doors of your lecture room in living and
Duties of tJie Church Toivards Knowledge. 233
breathing substance. They will meet him there in all
the charm of novelty, and all the fascination of genius
or of amiableness. To-day a pupil, to-morrow a mem-
ber of the great world : to-day confined to the Lives
of the Saints, to-morrow thrown upon Babel ; — thrown
on Babel, without the honest indulgence of wit and
humour and imagination having ever been permitted to
him, without any fastidiousness of taste wrought into
him, without any rule given him for discriminating " the
precious from the vile," beauty from sin, the truth from
the sophistry of nature, what is innocent from what is
poison. You have refused him the masters of human
thought, who would in some sense have educated him,
because of their incidental corruption : you have shut
up from him those whose thoughts strike home to our
hearts, whose words are proverbs, whose names are in-
digenous to all the world, who are the standard of their
mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their country-
men, Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because
the old Adam smelt rank in them ; and for what have
you reserved him ? You have given him " a liberty
unto" the multitudinous blasphemy of his day; you
have made him free of its newspapers, its reviews, its
magazines, its novels, its controversial pamphlets, of its
Parliamentary debates, its law proceedings, its platform
speeches, its songs, its drama, its theatre, of its envelop-
ing, stifling atmosphere of death. You have succeeded
but in this, — in making the world his University.
Difficult then as the question may be, and much as it
may try the judgments and even divide the opinions of
zealous and religious Cathohcs, I cannot feel any doubt
myself. Gentlemen, that the Church's true policy is not
to aim at the exclusion of Literature from Secular
Schools, but at her own admission into them. Let her do
234 Discourse IX,
for Literature in one way what she does for Science in
another; each has its imperfection, and she has her remedy
for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all ;
she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates
the whole. Science is grave, methodical, logical ; with
Science then she argues, and opposes reason to reason.
Literature does not argue, but declaims and insinuates ;
it is multiform and versatile : it persuades instead of
convincing, it seduces, it carries captive; it appeals to the
sense of honour, or to the imagination, or to the stimu-
lus of curiosity ; it makes its way by means of gaiety,
satire, romance, the beautiful, the pleasurable. Is it
wonderful that with an agent Hke this the Church should
claim to deal with a vigour corresponding to its restless-
ness, to interfere in its proceedings with a higher hand,
and to wield an authority in the choice of its studies and
of its books which would be tyrannical, if reason and
fact were the only instruments of its conclusions 1 But,
any how, her principle is one and the same throughout :
not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doc-
trines pass under the name of Truth but those which
claim it rightfully.
9.
Such at least is the lesson which I am taught by all
the thought which I have been able to bestow upon the
subject ; such is the lesson which I have gained from the
history of my own special Father and Patron, St. Philip
Neri. He lived in an age as traitorous to the interests
of Catholicism as any that preceded it, or can follow it.
He lived at a time when pride mounted high, and the
senses held rule ; a time when kings and nobles never
had more of state and homage, and never less of per-
sonal responsibility and peril ; when medieval winter was
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge, i^^^
receding, and the summer sun of civilization was bring-
ing into leaf and flower a thousand forms of luxurious
enjoyment ; when a new world of thought and beauty
had opened upon the human mind, in the discovery of
the treasures of classic literature and art. He saw the
great and the gifted, dazzled by the Enchantress, and
drinking in the magic of her song ; he saw the high and
the wise, the student and the artist, painting, and poetry,
and sculpture, and music, and architecture, drawn within
her range, and circling round the abyss : he saw heathen
forms mounting thence, and forming in the thick air : —
all this he saw, and he perceived that the mischief was to
be met, not with argument, not with science, not with
protests and warnings, not by the recluse or the preacher,
but by means of the great counter-fascination of purity
and truth. He was raised up to do a work almost pecu-
liar in the Church, — not to be a Jerome Savonarola,
though Philip had a true devotion towards him and a
tender memory of his Florentine house ; not to be a
St. Charles, though in his beaming countenance Philip
had recognized the aureol of a saint ; not to be a St.
Ignatius, wrestling with the foe, though Philip was termed
the Society's bell of call, so many subjects did he send
to it; not to be a St. Francis Xavier, though Philip
had longed to shed his blood for Christ in India with him ;
not to be a St. Caietan, cr hunter of souls, for Philip
preferred, as he expressed it, tranquilly to cast in his
net to gain them ; he preferred to yield to the stream,
and direct the current, which he could not stop, of
science, literature, art, and fashion, and to sweeten and
to sanctify what God had made very good and man had
spoilt.
And s(? he contemplated as the idea of his mission,
not the propagation of the faith, nor the exposition of
236 Discourse IX.
doctrine, nor the catechetical schools ; whatever was exact
and systematic pleased him not ; he put from him mo-
nastic rule and authoritative speech, as David refused the
armour of his king. No ; he would be but an ordinary
individual priest as others : and his weapons should be but
unaffected humility and unpretending love. AH He did
was to be done by the light, and fervour, and convincing
eloquence of his personal character and his easy conver-
sation. He came to the Eternal City and he sat himself
down there, and his home and his family gradually grew
up around him, by the spontaneous accession of materials
from without. He did not so much seek his own as
draw them to him. He sat in his small room, and they
in their gay worldly dresses, the rich and the wellborn,
as well as the simple and the illiterate, crowded into it
In the mid-heats of summer, in the frosts of winter, still
was he in that lov/ and narrow cell at San Girolamo,
reading the hearts of those who came to him, and curing
their souls' maladies by the very touch of his hand. It
was a vision of the Magi worshipping the infant Saviour,
so pure and innocent, so sweet and beautiful was he ;
and so loyal and so dear to the gracious Virgin Mother.
And they who came remained gazing and listening, till
at length, first one and then another threw off their
bravery, and took his poor cassock and girdle instead :
or, if they kept it, it was to put haircloth under it, or to
take on them a rule of life, while to the world they looked
as before.
In the words of his biographer, " he was all things to
all men. He suited himself to noble and ignoble, young
and old, subjects and prelates, learned and ignorant ;
and received those who were strangers to him with
singular benignity, and embraced them with as much
love and charity as if he had been a long while expect-
Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge. 237
Ing them. When he was called upon to be merry he
was so ; if there was a demand upon his sympathy he
was equally ready. He gave the same welcome to all :
caressing the poor equally with the rich, and wearying
himself to assist all to the utmost limits of his power.
In consequence of his being so accessible and willing to
receive all comers, many went to him every day, and
some continued for the space of thirty, nay forty years,
to visit him very often both morning and evening, so
that his room went by the agreeable nickname of the
Home of Christian mirth. Nay, people came to him,
not only from all parts of Italy, but from France, Spain,
Germany, and all Christendom ; and even the infidels
and Jews, who had ever any communication with him,
revered him as a holy man." * The first families of
Rome, the Massimi, the Aldobrandini, the Colonnas, the
Altieri, the Vitelleschi, were his friends and his penitents.
Nobles of Poland, Grandees of Spain, Knights of Malta,
could not leave Rome without coming to him. Car-
dinals, Archbishops, and Bishops were his intimates;
Federigo Borromeo haunted his- room and got the name
of " Father Philip's soul." The Cardinal- Archbishops of
Verona and Bologna wrote books in his honour. Pope
Pius the Fourth died in his arms. Lawyers, painters,
musicians, physicians, it was the same too with them.
Baronius, Zazzara, and Ricci, left the law at his bid-
ding, and joined his congregation, to do its work, to
write the annals of the Church, and to die in the odour
of sanctity. Palestrina had Father Philip's ministra-
tions in his last moments. Animuccia hung about him
during life, sent him a message after death, and was
conducted by him through Purgatory to Heaven. And
who was he, I say, all the while, but an humble priest,
* Bacci, vol. i., p. 192, ii., p. 98.
238 Discourse IX.
a stranger in Rome, with no distinction of family or
letters, no claim of station or of office, great simply in
the attraction with which a Divine Power had gifted
him ? and yet thus humble, thus unennobled, thus empty-
handed, he has achieved the glorious title of Apostle of
Rome.
10.
Well were it for his clients and children. Gentlemen, if
they could promise themselves the very shadow of his
special power, or could hope to do a miserable fraction
of the sort of work in which he was pre-eminently
skilled. But so far at least they may attempt, — to take
his position, and to use his method, and to cultivate the
arts of which he was so bright a pattern. For me, if it be
God's blessed will that in the years now coming I am to
have a share in the great undertaking, which has been
the occasion and the subject of these Discourses, so far
I can say for certain that, whether or not I can do any
thing at all in St. Philip's way, at least I can do nothing
in any other. Neither by my habits of life, nor by
vigour of age, am I fitted for the task of authority, or
of rule, or of initiation. I do but aspire, if strength is
given me, to be your minister in a work which must em-
ploy younger minds and stronger lives than mine. I am
but fit to bear my witness, to proffer my suggestions, to
express my sentiments, as has in fact been my occupa-
tion in these discussions ; to throw such light upon
general questions, upon the choice of objects, upon the
import of principles, upon the tendency of measures, as
past reflection and experience enable me to contribute.
I shall have to make appeals to your consideration, your
friendliness, your confidence, of which I have had so
many instances, on which I so tranquilly repose; and
• Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge, 239
after all, neither you nor I must ever be surprised, should
it so happen that the Hand of Him, with whom are the
springs of life and death, weighs heavy on me, and
makes me unequal to anticipations in which you have
been too kind, and to hopes in which I may have been
too sanguine.
11.
UNIVERSITY SUBJECTS,
DISCUSSED IN OCCASIONAL LECTURES AND ESSAYS.
J* i6
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
WILLIAM MONSELL, M.P, etc, etc.
My dear Monsell,
I seem to have some claim for asking leave of you to
prefix your name to the following small Volume, since it
is a memorial of work done in a country which you so
dearly love, and in behalf of an undertaking in which
you feel so deep an interest
Nor do I venture on the step without some hope that
it is worthy of your acceptance, at least on account of
those portions of it which have already received the
approbation of the learned men to whom they were
addressed, and which have been printed at their desire.
But, even though there were nothing to recommend it
except that it came from me, I know well that you
would kindly welcome it as a token of the truth and
constancy with which I am,
My dear Monsell,
Yours very affectionately,
JOHN H. NEWMAN.
ADVERTISEMENT.
IT has been the fortune of the author through life,
that the Volumes which he has published have grown
for the most part out of the duties which lay upon him,
or out of the circumstances of the moment. Rarely has
he been master of his own studies.
The present collection of Lectures and Essays, written
by him while Rector of the Catholic University of Ire-
land, is certainly not an exception to this remark.
Rather, it requires the above consideration to be kept in
view, as an apology for the want of keeping which is
apparent between its separate portions, some of them
being written for public delivery, others with the
privileged freedom of anonymous compositions.
However, whatever be the inconvenience which such
varieties in tone and character may involve, the author
cannot affect any compunction for having pursued the
illustration of one and the same important subject-matter,
Avith which he had been put in charge, by such methods,
graver or lighter, so that they v /ere lawful, as successively
came to his hand.
Nov ember y 1858.
UNIVERSITY SUBJECTS.
I. Christianity and Letters. A Lecture read in the School
of Philosophy and Letters, November, 1854 - - 249
IL Literature. A Lecture read in the School of Philosophy
and Letters, November, 1858 ... - 268
III. Catholic Literature in the English Tongue,
1854-8:— 295
§. I. in its relation to Religious Literature - - - 296
§. 2. to Science ..---. 299
§. 3. to Classical Literature . - - - - 307
§. 4. to Literature of the Day ... - 320
IV. Elementary Studies, 1854-6: — - - - - 331
§. I. Grammar ..---- 334
§. 2. Composition ------ 348
§. 3. Latin Writing ------ 362
§. 4. General Religious Knowledge - - - 372
V. A Form of Infidelity of the Day, 1854 : — - - 381
§. I. Its sentiments - - - - - - 381
§. 2. Its policy ------ 392
VI. University Preaching, 1855 - - - - 405
VII. Christianity and Physical Science. A Lecture read
in the School of Medicine, November, 1855 - - 428
VIII. Christianity and Scientific Investigation. A Lecture
for the School of Science, 1855 - - - - 456
IX. Discipline of Mind. An Address delivered to the Evening
Classes, November, 1858 - - . - 480
X. Christianity and Medical Science. An Address delivered
to the Students of Medicine, November. 1858 - - 505
249
CHRISTIANITY AND LETTERS.
A LECTURE IN THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND
LETTERS.
IT seems but natural, Gentlemen, now that we are
opening the School of Philosophy and Letters, or,
as it was formerly called, of Arts, in this new University,
that we should direct our attention to the question, what
are the subjects generally included under that name,
and what place they hold, and how they come to hold
that place, in a University, and in the education which
a University provides. This would be natural on
such an occasion, even though the Faculty of Arts held
but a secondary place in the academical system ; but
it seems to be even imperative on us, considering that
the studies which that Faculty embraces are almost the
direct subject-matter and the staple of the mental exer-
cises proper to a University.
It is indeed not a little remarkable that, in spite of
the special historical connexion of University Institutions
with the Sciences of Theology, Law, and Medicine, a
University, after all, should be formally based (as it really
is), and should emphatically live in, the Faculty of Arts ;
but such is the deliberate decision of those who have
250 Christia7iity and Leiiers.
most deeply and impartially considered the subject*
Arts existed before other Faculties ; the Masters of Arts
were the ruling and directing body; the success and
popularity of the Faculties of Law and Medicine were
considered to be in no slight measure an encroachment
and a usurpation, and were met with jealousy and
resistance. When Colleges arose and became the
medium and instrument of University action, they did
but confirm the ascendency of the Faculty of Arts ; and
thus, even down to this day, in those academical cor-
porations which have more than others retained the
traces of their medieval origin, — I mean the Universities
of Oxford and Cambridge, — we hear little of Theology,
Medicine, or Law, and almost exclusively of Arts.
Now, considering the reasonable association, to which I
have already referred, which exists in our minds between
Universities and the three learned professions, here is a
phenomenon which has to be contemplated for its own
sake and accounted for, as well as a circumstance en-
hancing the significance and importance of the act in
which we have been for some weeks engaged ; and I
consider that I shall not be employing our time unprofit-
ably, if I am able to make a suggestion, which, while
it illustrates the fact, is able to explain the difificulty.
2.
Here I must go back. Gentlemen, a very great way,
and ask you to review the course of Civilization since
the beginning of history. When we survey the stream
of human affairs for the last three thousand years, we
find it to run thus : — At first sight there is so much
fluctuation, agitation, ebbing and flowing, that we may
despair to discern any law in its movements, taking the
* Vid. Iluber.
Christianity a7td Letters, 251
earth as its bed, and mankind as its contents ; but, on
looking more closely and attentively, we shall discern, in
spite of the heterogeneous materials and the various his-
tories and fortunes which are found in the race of man
during the long period I have mentioned, a certain for-
mation amid the chaos, — one and one only, — and ex-
tending, though riot over the whole earth, yet through a
very considerable portion of it. Man is a social being
and can hardly exist without society, and in matter of
fact societies have ever existed all over the habitable
earth. The greater part of these associations have been
political or religious, and have been comparatively
limited in extent, and temporary. They have been
formed and dissolved by the force of accidents or by
inevitable circumstances ; and, when we have enumerated
them one by one, we have made of them all that can be
made. But there is one remarkable association which
attracts the attention of the philosopher, not political
nor religious, or at least only partially and not essentially
such, which began in the earliest times and grew with
each succeeding age, till it reached its complete develop-
ment, and then continued on, vigorous and unwearied,
and which still remains as definite and as firm as ever it
was. Its bond is a common civilization ; and, though
there are other civihzations in the world, as there are
other societies, yet :his civilization, together with the
society which is its creation and its home, is so distinc-
tive and luminous in its character, so imperial in its ex-
tent, so imposing in its duration, and so utterly without
rival upon the face of the earth, that the association may
fitly assume to itself the title of " Human Society," and
its civilization the abstract term " Civilization."
There are indeed great outlying portions of mankind
which are not, perhaps never have been, included in this
252 Christia7i ity and L etters.
Human Society ; still they are outlying portions and
nothing else, fragmentary, unsociable, solitary, and un-
meaning, protesting and revolting against the grand
central formation of which I am speaking, but not unit-
ing with each other into a second whole. I am not deny-
ing of course the civilization of the Chinese, for instance,
though it be not our civilization ; but it is a huge, sta-
tionary, unattractive, morose civilization. Nor do I deny
a civilization to the Hindoos, nor to the ancient Mexicans,
nor to the Saracens, nor (in a certain sense) to the Turks ;
but each of these races has its own civilization, as sepa-
rate from one another as from ours. I do not see how
they can be all brought under one idea. Each stands
by itself, as if the other were not ; each is local ; many of
them are temporary ; none of them will bear a compari-
son with the Society and the Civilization which I have
described as alone having a claim to those names, and on
which I am going to dwell.
Gentlemen, let me here observe that I am not entering
upon the question of races, or upon their history. I have
nothing to do with ethnology. I take things as I find
them on the surface of history, and am but classing phe-
nomena. Looking, then, at the countries which surround
the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, I see them to be, from
time immemorial, the seat of an association of intellect
and mind, such as to deserve to be called the Intellect
and the Mind of the Human Kind. Starting as it does
and advancing from certain centres, till their respective
influences intersect and conflict, and then at length inter-
mingle and combine, a common Thought has been gene-
rated, and a common Civilization defined and established.
Egypt is one such starting point, Syria another, Greece
a third, Italy a fourth, and North Africa a fifth, — after-
wards France and Spain. As time goes on, and as coloni-
Ch ridianity and L etters, 253
zation and conquest work their changes, we see a great
association of nations formed, of which the Roman
empire is the maturity and the most intelligible expres-
sion ; an association, however, not political, but mental,
based on the same intellectual ideas, and advancing by
common intellectual methods. And this association or
social commonwealth, with whatever reverses, changes,
and momentary dissolutions, continues down to this day ;
not, indeed, precisely on the same territory, but with
such only partial and local disturbances, and on the
other hand, with so combined and harmonious a move-
ment, and such a visible continuity, that it would be
utterly unreasonable to deny that it is throughout all
that interval but one and the same.
In its earliest age it included far more of the eastern
world than it has since ; in these later times it has taken
into its compass a new hemisphere ; in the middle ages
it lost Africa, Egypt, and Syria, and extended itself to
Germany, Scandinavia, and the British Isles. At one
time its territory was flooded by strange and barbarous
races, but the existing civilization was vigorous enough
to vivify what threatened to stifle it, and to assimilate to
the old social forms what came to expel them ; and thus
the civilization of modern times remains what it was of
old, not Chinese, or Hindoo, or Mexican, or Saracenic,
or of any new description hitherto unknown, but the
lineal descendant, or rather the continuation, mutatis
muta7zdis, of the civilization which began in Palestine
and Greece.
Considering, then, the characteristics of this great civi-
lized Society, which I have already insisted on, I think
it has a claim to be considered as the representative
Society and Civilization of the human race, as its perfect
result and limit, in fact ; — those portions of the race which
2 54 Christianity and Letters,
do not coalesce with it being left to stand by themselves
as anomalies, unaccountable indeed, but for that very
reason not interfering with what on the contrary has
been turned to account and has grown into a whole. I
call then this commonwealth pre-eminently and emphati-
cally Human Society, and its intellect the Human Mind,
and its decisions the sense of mankind, and its disciplined
and cultivated state Civilization in the abstract, and the
territory on which it lies the orbis terrariim, or the World.
For, unless the illustration be fanciful, the object which
I am contemplating is like the impression of a seal upon
the wax ; which rounds off and gives form to the greater
portion of the soft material, and presents something de-
finite to the eye, and preoccupies the space against any
second figure, so that we overlook and leave out of our
thoughts the jagged outHne or unmeaning lumps outside
of it, intent upon the harmonious circle which fills the
imagination within it.
3.
Now, before going on to speak of the education, and
the standards of education, which the Civilized World, as
I may now call it, has enjoined and requires, I wish to
draw your attention. Gentlemen, to the circumstance
that this same orbis terrariLin, which has been the seat of
Civilization, will be found, on the whole, to be the seat
•also of that supernatural society and system which our
Maker has given us directly from Himself, the Christian
Polity. The natural and divine associations are not
indeed exactly coincident, nor ever have been. As the
territory of Civilization has varied with itself in different
ages, while on the whole it has been the same, so, in like
manner, Christianity has fallen partly outside Civilization,
and Civilization partly outside Christianity ; but, on the
Christianity ajid Letters. 755
whole, the two have occupied one and the same orhis ter-
rarum. Often indeed they have even vaoYQd pari passti,
and at all times there has been found the most intimate
connexion between them. Christianity waited till the
orbis terrarum attained its most perfect form before it
appeared ; and it soon coalesced, and has ever since co-
operated, and often seemed identical, with the Civiliza-
tion which is its companion.
There are certain analogies, too, which hold between
Civilization and Christianity. As Civilization does not
cover the whole earth, neither does Christianity; but
there is nothing else like the one, and nothing 'else like
the other. Each is the only thing of its kind. Again,
there are, as I have already said, large outlying portions
of the world in a certain sense cultivated and educated^
which, if they could exist together in one, would go far
to constitute a second orbis ten^arum, the home of a
second distinct civilization ; but every one of these is
civilized on its own principle and idea, or at least they
are separated from each other, and have not run together,
while the Civilization and Society which I have been
describing is one organized whole. And, in like manner,
Christianity coalesces into one vast body, based upon
common ideas ; yet there are large outlying organizations
of religion independent of each other and of it. More-
over, Christianity, as is the case in the parallel instance of
Civilization, continues on in the world without interrup-
tion from the date of its rise, while other religious bodies,
huge, local, and isolated, are rising and falling, or are
helplessly stationary, from age to age, on all sides of it.
There is another remarkable analogy between Chris-
tianity and Civilization, and the mention of it will
introduce my proper subject, to which what I have
hitherto said is merely a preparation. We know that
Z^6 Ch ristia^i ity and L e iters,
Christianity is built upon definite ideas, principles,
doctrines, and writings, which were given at the time of
its first introduction, and have never been superseded,
and admit of no addition. I am not going to parallel
any thing which is the work of man, and in the natural
order, with what is from heaven, and in consequence
infallible, and irreversible, and obligatory ; but, after
making this reserve, lest I should possibly be misunder-
stood, still I would remark that, in matter of fact, look-
ing at the state of the case historically, Civilization too
has its common principles, and views, and teaching, and
especially its books, which have more or less been given
from the earliest times, and are, in fact, in equal esteem
and respect, in equal use now, as they were when they
were received in the beginning. In a word, the Classics,
and the subjects of thought and the studies to which
they give rise, or, to use the term most to our present
purpose, the Arts, have ever, on the whole, been the
instruments of education which the civilized orbis ter-
rarum has adopted ; just as inspired works, and the
lives of saints, and the articles of faith, and the catechism,
have ever been the instrument of education in the case of
Christianity. And this consideration, you see. Gentle-
men (to drop down at once upon the subject proper to
the occasion which has brought us together), invests
the opening of the School in Arts with a solemnity and
moment of a peculiar kind, for we are but reiterating an
old tradition, and carrying on those august methods of
enlarging the mind, and cultivating the intellect, and
refining the feelings, in which the process of Civilization
has ever consisted.
4-
In the country which has been the fountain head
Christianity and L etters. 257
of intellectual gifts, in the age which preceded or
introduced the first formations of Human Society, in an
era scarcely historical, we may dimly discern an almost
mythical personage, who, putting out of consideration
the actors in Old Testament history, may be called the
first Apostle of Civilization. Like an Apostle in a higher
order of things, he was poor and a wanderer, and feeble
in the flesh, though he was to do such great things, and
to live in the mouths of a hundred generations and a
thousand tribes. A blind old man ; whose wanderings
were such that, when he became famous, his birth-place
could not be ascertained, so that it v/as said, —
" Seven famous towns contend for Homer dead,
Through which the hving Homer begged his bread."
Yet he had a name in his day ; and, little guessing in
what vast measures his wish would be answered, he sup-
plicated, with a tender human sentiment, as he wandered
over the islands of the ^gean and the Asian coasts, that
those who had known and loved him would cherish his
memory when he was away. Unlike the proud boast
of the Roman poet, if he spoke it in earnest, " Exegi
monumentum aere perennius," he did but indulge the
hope that one, whose coming had been expected with
pleasure, might excite regret when he had departed, and
be rewarded by the sympathy and praise of his friends
even in the presence of other minstrels. A set of verses
remains, which' is ascribed to him, in which he addresses
the Delian women in the tone of feeling which I have
described. " Farewell to you all," he says, " and re-
member me in time to come, and when any one of men
on earth, a stranger from far, shall inquire of you, O
maidens, who is the sweetest of minstrels here about,
7* i;
2^8 Christimiity and Letters,
and in whom do you most delight ? then make answer
modestly, It is a blind man, and he lives in steep
Chios."
The great poet remained unknown for some centuries,
— that is, unknown to what we call fame. His verses
were cherished by his countrymen, they might be the
secret delight of thousands, but they were not collected
into a volume, nor viewed as a whole, nor made a sub-
ject of criticism. At length an Athenian Prince took
upon him the task of gathering together the scattered
fragments of a genius which had not aspired to immor-
tality, of reducing them to writing, and of fitting them
to be the text-book of ancient education. Henceforth
the vagrant ballad-singer, as he might be thought, was
submitted, to his surprise, to a sort of literary canoni-
zation, and was invested with the office of forming the
young mind of Greece to noble thoughts and bold deeds.
To be read in Homer soon became the education of a
gentleman ; and a rule, recognized in her free age, re-
mained as a tradition even in the times of her degra-
dation. Xenophon introduces to us a youth who knew
both Iliad and Odyssey by heart ; Dio witnesses that
they were some of the first books put into the hands of
boys ; and Horace decided that they taught the science
of life better than Stoic or Academic. Alexander the
Great nourished his imagination by the scenes of the
Iliad. As time went on, other poets were associated
with Homer in the work of education, such as Hesiod
and the Tragedians. The majestic lessons concerning
duty and religion, justice and providence, which occur in
iEschylus and Sophocles, belong to a higher school than
that of Homer ; and the verses of Euripides, even in his
lifetime, were so famiUar to Athenian lips and so dear
to foreign ears, that, as is reported, the captives of
Christiajiity and Letters. 259
Syracuse gained their freedom at the price of reciting
them to their conquerors.
Such poetry may be considered oratory also, since it
has so great a power of persuasion ; and the aUiance
between these two gifts had existed from the time that
the verses of Orpheus had, according to the fable, made
woods and streams and wild animals to follow him
about. Soon, however. Oratory became the subject of
a separate art, which was called Rhetoric, and of which
the Sophists were the chief masters. Moreover, as
Rhetoric was especially political in its nature, it pre-
supposed or introduced the cultivation of History ; and
thus the pages of Thucydides became one of the special
studies by which Demosthenes rose to be the first orator
of Greece.
But it is needless to trace out further the formation of
the course of liberal education ; it is sufficient to have
given some specimens in illustration of it. The studies,
which it was found to involve, were four principal ones.
Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, and Mathematics ; and the
science of Mathematics, again, was divided into four.
Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music ; making
in all seven, which are known by the name of the Seven
Liberal Arts. And thus a definite school of intellect was
formed, founded on ideas and methods of a distinctive
character, and (as we may say) of the highest and truest
character, as far as they went, and which gradually asso-
ciated in one, and assimilated, and took possession of,
that multitude of nations which I have considered to
represent mankind, and to possess the orbis terrarum.
When we pass from Greece to Rome, we are met with
the common remark, that Rome produced Httle that was
original, but borrowed from Greece. It is true ; Terence
copied from Menander, Virgil from Homer, Hesiod, and
2 6o Christianity and Letters.
Theocritus ; and Cicero professed merely to reproduce
the philosophy of Greece. But, granting its truth ever
so far, I do but take it as a proof of the sort of instinct
which has guided the course of Civilization. The world
was to have certain intellectual teachers, and no others ;
Homer and Aristotle, with the poets and philosophers
who circle round them, were to be the schoolmasters of
all generations, and therefore the Latins, falling into the
law on which the world's education was to be carried on,
so added to the classical library as not to reverse or in-
terfere with what had already been determined. And
there was the more meaning in this arrangement, when
it is considered that Greek was to be forgotten during
many centuries, and the tradition of intellectual training
to be conveyed through Latin ; for thus the world was
secured against the consequences of a loss which would
have changed the character of its civilization. I think it
very remarkable, too, how soon the Latin writers became
text-books in the boys' schools. Even to this day Shake-
speare and Milton are not studied in our course of edu-
cation ; but the poems of Virgil and Horace, as those of
Homer and the Greek authors in an earlier age, were in
schoolboys' satchels not much more than a hundred
years after they were written.
I need not go on to show at length that they have
preserved their place in the system of education in the
orbis terrarum, and the Greek writers with them or
through them, down to this day. The induction of cen-
turies has often been made. Even in the lowest state
of learning the tradition was kept up, St. Gregory the
Great, whose era, not to say whose influence, is often con-
sidered especially unfavourable to the old hterature, wa»
himself well versed in it, encouraged purity of Latinity
in his court, and is said figuratively by the contemporary
Christianity and Letters, 261
historian of his life to have supported the hall of the
Apostolic See upon the columns of the Seven Liberal
Arts. In the ninth century, when the dark age was
close at hand, we still hear of the cultivation, with what-
ever success (according of course to the opportunities of
the times, but I am speaking of the nature of the studies,
not of the proficiency of the students), the cultivation
of Music, Dialectics, Rhetoric, Grammar, Mathematics,
Astronomy, Physics, and Geometry ; of the supremacy
of Horace in the schools, '' and the great Virgil, Sallust,
and Statins." In the thirteenth or following centuries,
of " Virgil, Lucian, Statins, Ovid, Livy, Sallust, Cicero,
and Quintilian ; " and after the revival of literature in
the commencement of the modern era, we find St. Carlo
Borromeo enjoining the use of works of Cicero, Ovid,
Virgil, and Horace.*
5.
I pass thus cursorily over the series of informations
which history gives us on the subject, merely with a view
of recalling to your memory. Gentlemen, and impressing
upon you the fact, that the literature of Greece, con-
tinued into, and enriched by, the literature of Rome, to-
gether with the studies which it involves, has been the
instrument of education, and the food of civilization, from
the first times of the world down to this day ; — and now
we are in a condition to answer the question which there-
upon arises, when we turn to consider, by way of contrast,
the teaching which is characteristic of Universities. How
has it come to pass that, although the genius of Universi-
ties is so different from that of the schools which preceded
them, nevertheless the course of study pursued in those
* Vzd. the treatises of P. Daniel and Mgr. Landriot, referred to in His-
torical Sketches, vol. ii., p. 460, note.
262 Christianity ajid Letters.
schools was not superseded in the middle ages by those
more brilliant sciences which Universities introduced ?
It might have seemed as if Scholastic Theology, Law, and
Medicine would have thrown the Seven Liberal Arts into
the shade, but in the event they failed to do so. I con-
sider the reason to be, that the authority and function of
the monastic and secular schools, as supplying to the
young the means of education, lay deeper than in any
appointment of Charlemagne, who was their nominal
founder, and were based in the special character of that
civilization which is so intimately associated with Chris-
tianity, that it may even be called the soil out of which
Christianity grew. The medieval sciences, great as is
their dignity and utility, were never intended to supersede
that more real and proper cultivation of the mind which
is effected by the study of the liberal Arts ; and, when
certain of these sciences did in fact go out of their pro-
vince and did attempt to prejudice the traditional course
of education, the encroachment was in matter of fact
resisted. There were those in the middle age, as John of
Salisbury, who vigorously protested against the extrava-
gances and usurpations which ever attend the introduc-
tion of any great good whatever, and which attended the
rise of the peculiar sciences of which Universities were
the seat ; and, though there were times when the old
traditions seemed to be on the point of failing, somehow
it has happened that they have never failed ; for the in-
stinct of Civilization and the common sense of Society
prevailed, and the danger passed away, and the studies
which seemed to be going out gained their ancient place,
and were acknowledged, as before, to be the best instru-
ments of mental cultivation, and the best guarantees for
intellectual progress.
And this experience of the past we may apply to the
Christianity and Letters, 263
circumstances in which we find ourselves at present ; for,
as there was a movement against the Classics in the
middle age, so has there been now. The truth of the
Baconian method for the purposes for which it was
created, and its inestimable services and inexhaustible
applications in the interests of our material well-being,
have dazzled the imaginations of men, somewhat in the
same way as certain new sciences carried them away in
the age of Abelard ; and since that method does such
wonders in its own province, it is not unfrequently sup-
posed that it can do as much in any other province also.
Now, Bacon himself never would have so argued; he
would not have needed to be reminded that to advance
the useful arts is one thing, and to cultivate the mind
another. The simple question to be considered is, how
best to strengthen, refine, and enrich the intellectual
powers ; the perusal of the poets, historians, and philo-
sophers of Greece and Rome will accomplish this pur-
pose, as long experience has shown ; but that the study
of the experimental sciences will do the like, is proved
to us as yet by no experience whatever.
Far indeed am I from denying the extreme attrac-
tiveness, as well as the practical benefit to the world
at large, of the sciences of Chemistry, Electricity, and
Geology ; but the question is not what department of
study contains the more wonderful facts, or promises
the more brilliant discoveries, and which is in the
higher and which in an inferior rank ; but simply which
out of all provides the most robust and invigorating
discipline for the unformed mind. And I conceive it is
as little disrespectful to Lord Bacon to prefer the Classics
in this point of view to the sciences which have grown
out of his philosophy as it would be disrespectful to St.
Thomas in the middle ages to have hindered the study
264 Christianity a7id Letters.
of the Summa from doing prejudice to the Faculty of
Arts. Accordingly, I anticipate that, as in the middle
ages both the teaching and the government of the
University remained in the Faculty of Arts, in spite
of the genius which created or illustrated Theology and
Law, so now too, whatever be the splendour of the
modern philosophy, the marvellousness of its disclosures,
the utility of its acquisitions, and the talent of its masters,
still it will not avail in the event, to detrude classical litera-
ture and the studies connected with it from the place which
they have held in all ages in education.
Such, then, is the course of reflection obviously sug-
gested by the act in which we have been lately engaged,
and which we are now celebrating. In the nineteenth
century, in a country which looks out upon a new world,
and anticipates a coming age, we have been engaged in
opening the Schools dedicated to the studies of polite
literature and liberal science, or what are called the
Arts, as a first step towards the establishment on
Catholic ground of a Catholic University. And while
we thus recur to Greece and Athens with pleasure
and affection, and recognize in that famous land the
source and the school of intellectual culture, it would be
strange indeed if we forgot to look further south also,
and there to bow before a more glorious luminary, and
a more sacred oracle of truth, and the source of another
sort of knowledge, high and supernatural, which is
seated in Palestine. Jerusalem is the fountain-head of
religious knowledge, as Athens is of secular. In the
ancient world we see two centres of illumination, acting
independently of each other, each with its own move-
ment, and at first apparently without any promise of
convergence. Greek civilization spreads over the East,
conquering in the conquests of Alexander, and, when
Christianity and Lettei^s. 265
carried captive into the West, subdues the conquerors who
brought it thither. Rehgion, on the other hand, is driven
from its own aboriginal home to the North and West by-
reason of the sins of the people who were in charge of
it, in a long course of judgments and plagues and perse-
cutions. Each by itself pursues its career and fulfils its
mission ; neither of them recognizes, nor is recognized
by the other. At length the Temple of Jerusalem is
rooted up by the armies of Titus, and the effete schools
of Athens are stifled by the edict of Justinian. So pass
away the ancient Voices of religion and learning ; but they
are silenced only to revive more gloriously and perfectly
elsewhere. Hitherto they came from separate sources,
and performed separate works. Each leaves an heir and
successor in the West, and that heir and successor is
one and the same. The grace stored in Jerusalem, and
the gifts which radiate from Athens, are made over and
concentrated in Rome. This is true as a matter of
history. Romie has inherited both sacred and pro-
fane learning ; she has perpetuated and dispensed the
traditions of Moses and David in the supernatural order,
and of Homer and Aristotle in the natural. To separate
those distinct teachings, human and divine, which meet
in Rome, is to retrograde ; it is to rebuild the Jewish
Temple and to plant anew the groves of Academus.
6.
On this large subject, however, on which I might say
much, time does not allow me to enter. To show how
sacred learning and profane are dependent on each other,
correlative and mutually complementary, how faith
operates by means of reason, and reason is directed
and corrected by faith, is really the subject of a distinct
lecture. I would conclude, then, with merely congratu-
266 Christianity and Letters.
lating you, Gentlemen, on the great undertaking which
we have so auspiciously commenced. Whatever be its
fortunes, whatever its difficulties, whatever its delays, I
cannot doubt at all that the encouragement which it has
already received, and the measure of success which it
has been allotted, are but a presage and an anticipation
of a gradual advance towards its completion, in such
times and such manner as Providence shall appoint.
For myself, I have never had any misgiving about it,
because I had never known anything of it before the
time when the Holy See had definitely decided upon its
prosecution. It is my happiness to have no cognizance
of the anxieties and perplexities of venerable and holy
prelates, or the discussions of experienced and prudent
men, which preceded its definitive recognition on the
part of the highest ecclesiastical authority. It is my
happiness to have no experience of the time when good
Catholics despaired of its success, distrusted its expe-
diency, or even felt an obligation to oppose it. It has
been my happiness that I have never been in con-
troversy with persons in this country external to the
Catholic Church, nor have been forced into any direct
collision with institutions or measures which rest on a
foundation hostile to Catholicism. No one can accuse
me of any disrespect towards those whose principles or
whose policy I disapprove ; nor am I conscious of any
other aim than that of working in my own place, without
going out of my way to offend others. If I have taken
part in the undertaking which has now brought us to-
gether, it has been because I believed it was a great
work, great in its conception, great in its promise, and
great in the authority from which it proceeds. I felt it
to be so great that I did not dare to incur the responsi-
bility of refusing to take part in it.
Christianity and Letters. 267
How far indeed, and how long-, I am to be connected
with it, is another matter altogether. It is enough for
one man to lay only one stone of so noble and grand an
edifice ; it is enough, more than enough for me, if I do
so much as merely begin, what others may m^re hope-
fully continue. One only among the sons of men has
carried out a perfect work, and satisfied and exhausted
the mission on which He came. One alone has with
His last breath said " Consummatum est." But all who
set about their duties in faith and hope and love, with a
resolute heart and a devoted will, are able, weak though
they be, to do what, though incomplete, is imperishable.
Even their failures become successes, as being necessary
steps in a course, and as terms (so to say) in a long
series, which will at length fulfil the object which they
propose. And they will unite themselves in spirit, in
their humble degree, with those real heroes of Holy
Writ and ecclesiastical history, Moses, Elias, and David,
Basil, Athanasius, and Chrysostom, Gregory the Se-
venth, St. Thomas of Canterbury, and many others,
who did most when they fancied themselves least
prosperous, and died without being permitted to see
the fruit of their labours.
268
11.
LITERATURE.
A LECTURE IN THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND
LETTERS.
I.
WISHING to address you, Gentlemen, at the com-
mencement of a new Session, I tried to find a
subject for discussion, which might be at once suitable to
the occasion, yet neither too large for your time, nor too
minute or abstruse for your attention. I think I see one
for my purpose in the very title of your Faculty. It
is the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. Now the
question m^ay arise as to what is meant by ** Philosophy,"
and what is meant by " Letters." As to the other
Faculties, the subject-matter which they profess is in-
telligible, as soon as named, and beyond all dispute.
We know what Science is, what Medicine, what Law,
and what Theology ; but we have not so much ease in
determining what is meant by Philosophy and Letters.
Each department of that twofold province needs expla-
nation : it will be sufficient, on an occasion like this, to
investigate one of them. Accordingly I shall select for
remark the latter of the two, and attempt to determine
what we are to understand by Letters or Literature, in
what Literature consists, and how it stands relatively to
Literature. 269
Science. We speak, for instance, of ancient and modern
literature, the literature of the day, sacred literature,
light literature ; and our lectures in this place are
devoted to classical literature and English literature.
Are Letters, then, synonymous with books .? This cannot
be, or they would include in their range Philosophy,
Law, and, in short, the teaching of all the other Faculties.
Far from confusing these various studies, we view the
works of Plato or Cicero sometimes as philosophy, some-
times as literature ; on the other hand, no one would
ever be tempted to speak of Euclid as Hterature, or of
Matthiae's Greek Grammar. Is, then, literature synony-
mous with composition } with books written with an
attention to style 1 is literature fine writing .? again, is it
studied and artificial writing }
There are excellent persons who seem to adopt this
last account of Literature as their own idea of it. They
depreciate it, as if it were the result of a mere art or
trick of words. Professedly indeed, they are aiming at
the Greek and Roman classics, but their criticisms have
quite as great force against all literature as against any.
I think I shall be best able to bring out what I have to
say on the subject by examining the statements which
they make in defence of their own view of it. They
contend then, i. that fine writing, as exemplified in the
Classics, is mainly a matter of conceits, fancies, and pret-
tinesses, decked out in choice words ; 2. that this is the
proof of it, that the classics will not bear translating ; —
(and this is why I have said that the real attack is upon
literature altogether, not the classical only ; for, to speak
generally, all literature, modern as well as ancient, lies
under this disadvantage. This, however, they will not
allow; for they maintain,) 3. that Holy Scripture presents a
remarkable contrast to secular writings on this very point,
270 L iterature.
viz., In that Scripture does easily admit of translation,
though it is the most sublime and beautiful of all writings.
2.
Now I will begin by stating these three positions in
the words of a writer, who is cited by the estimable
Catholics in question as a witness, or rather as an
advocate, in their behalf, though he is far from being
able in his own person to challenge the respect which is
inspired by themselves.
*' There are two sorts of eloquence," says this writer,
" the one indeed scarce deserves the name of it, which
consists chiefly in laboured and polished periods, an
over-curious and artificial arrangement of figures, tin-
selled over with a gaudy embellishment of words,
which glitter, but convey little or no light to the under-
standing. This kind of writing is for the most part
much affected and admired by the people of weak
judgment and vicious taste ; but it is a piece of affecta-
tion and formality the sacred writers are utter strangers
to. It is a vain and boyish eloquence ; and, as it has
always been esteemed below "he great geniuses of all
ages, so much more so with respect to those writers who
were actuated by the spirit of Infinite Wisdom, and
therefore wrote with that force and majesty with which
never man writ. The other sort of eloquence is quite
the reverse to this, and which may be said to be the true
characteristic of the Holy Scriptures ; where the ex-
cellence does not arise from a laboured and far-fetched
elocution, but from a surprising mixture of simplicity
and majesty, which is a double character, so difficult to
be united that it is seldom to be met with in compo-
sitions merely human. We see nothing in Holy Writ
of affectation and superfluous ornament . . . Now, it is
L iteraiure, 271
observable that the most excellent profane authors,
whether Greek or Latin, lose most of their graces when-
ever we find them literally translated. Homer's famed
representation of Jupiter — his cried-up description of a
tempest, his relation of Neptune's shaking the earth and
opening it to its centre, his description of Pallas's horses,
with numbers of other long-since admired passages,
flag, and almost vanish away, in the vulgar Latin
translation.
" Let any one but take the pains to read the common
Latin interpretations of Virgil, Theocritus, or even of
Pindar, and one may venture to affirm he will be able to
trace out but few remains of the graces which charmed
him so much in the original. The natural conclusion
from hence is, that in the classical authors, the expres-
sion, the sweetness of the numbers, occasioned by a
musical placing of words, constitute a great part of their
beauties ; whereas, in the sacred writings, they consist
more in the greatness of the things themselves than in
the words and expressions. The ideas and conceptions
are so great and lofty in their own nature that they
necessarily appear magnificent in the most artless dress.
Look but into the Bible, and we see them shine through
the most simple and literal translations. That glorious
description which Moses gives -of the creation of the
heavens and the earth, which Longinus . . . was so
greatly taken with, has not lost the least whit of its
intrinsic worth, and though it has undergone so many
translations, yet triumphs over all, and breaks forth
with as much force and vehemence as in the original. .
In the history of Joseph, where Joseph makes himself
known, and weeps aloud upon the neck of his dear
orother Benjamin, that all the house of Pharaoh heard
him, at that instant none of his brethren are introduced
272 Literature.
as uttering aught, either to express their present joy
or paUiate their former injuries to him. On all sides
there immediately ensues a deep and solemn silence ; a
silence infinitely more eloquent and expressive than any-
thing else that could have been substituted in its place.
Had Thucydides, Herodotus, Livy, or any of the cele-
brated classical historians, been employed in writing this
history, when they came to this point they would doubt-
less have exhausted all their fund of eloquence in fur-
nishing Joseph's brethren with laboured and studied
harangues, which, however fine they might have been in
themselves, would nevertheless have been unnatural, and
altogether improper on the occasion." *
This is eloquently written, but it contains, I consider,
a mixture of truth and falsehood, which it will be my
business to discriminate from each other. Far be it
from me to deny the unapproachable grandeur and sim-
plicity of Holy Scripture ; but I shall maintain that the
classics are, as human compositions, simple and majestic
and natural too. I grant that Scripture is concerned
with things, but I will not grant that classical literature
is simply concerned with words. I grant that human
literature is often elaborate, but I will maintain that
elaborate composition is not unknown to the writers of
Scripture. I grant that human literature cannot easily
be translated out of the particular language to which it
belongs ; but it is not at all the rule that Scripture can
easily be translated either ; — and now I address myself
to my task : —
Here, then, in the first place, I observe, Gentlemen,
that Literature, from the derivation of the word, implies
* Sterne, Sermon xlii.
Literature, 2^];^
writing, not speaking ; this, however, arises from the
circumstance of the copiousness, variety, and pubHc
circulation of the matters of which it consists. What ii^
spoken cannot outrun the range of the speaker's voice,
and perishes in the uttering. When words are in de-
mand to express a long course of thought, when they
have to be conveyed to the ends of the earth, or perpe-
tuated for the benefit of posterity, they must be written
down, that is, reduced to the shape of literature ; still,
properly speaking, the terms, by which we denote this
characteristic gift of man, belong to its exhibition by
means of the voice, not of handwriting. .- It addresses
itself, in its primary idea, to the ear, not to the eye. We
call it the power of speech, we call it language, that is,
the use of the tongue ; and, even when we write, we still
keep in mind what was its original instrument, for we use
freely such terms in our books as " saying," " speaking,"
"telling," "talking," "calling;" we use the terms "phrase-
ology" and "diction;" as if we were still addressing our-
selves to the ear.
Now I insist on this, because it shows that speech, and
therefore literature, which is its permanent record, is
essentially a personal work. It is not some production
or result, attained by the partnership of several persons,
or by machinery, or by any natural process, but in its
very idea it proceeds, and must proceed, from some one
given individual. Two persons cannot be the authors of
the sounds which strike our ear ; and, as they cannot be
speaking one and the same speech, neither can they be
writing one and the same lecture or discourse, — which
must certainly belong to some one person or other, and
is the expression of that one person's ideas and feelings,
— ideas and feeHngs personal to himself, though others
may have parallel and similar ones, — proper to himself,
7* i8 •
2 74 * Literature.
in the same sense as his voice, his air, his countenance,
his carriage, and his action, are personal. In other
words. Literature expresses, not objective truth, as it is
called, but subjective ; not things, but thoughts.
Now this doctrine will become clearer by considering
another use of words, which does relate to objective
truth, or to things ; which relates to matters, not
personal, not subjective to the individual, but which,
even were there no individual man in the whole world
to know them or to talk about them, would exist still.
Such objects become the matter of Science, and words
indeed are used to express them, but such words are
rather symbols than language, and however many we
use, and however we may perpetuate them by writing,
we never could make any kind of literature out of them,
or call them by that name. Such, for instance, would
be Euclid's Elements ; they relate to truths universal
and eternal ; they are not mere thoughts, but things :
they exist in themselves, not by virtue of our under-
standing them, not in dependence upon our will, but in
what is called the nature of things, or at least on con-
ditions external to us. The words, then, in which they
are set forth are not language, speech, literature, but
rather, as I have said, symbols. And, as a proof of it,
you will recollect that it is possible, nay usual, to set
forth the propositions of Euclid in algebraical notation,
which, as all would admit, has nothing to do with
literature. What is true of mathematics is true also of
every study, so far forth as it is scientific ; it makes use
of words as the mere vehicle of things, and is thereby
withdrawn from the province of literature. Thus
metaphysics, ethics, law, political economy, chemistry,
theology, cease to be literature in the same degree as
they are capable of a severe scientific treatment. And
Literature,
275
hence it is that Aristotle's works on the one hand,
though at first sight Hterature, approach in character, at
least a great number of them, to mere science ; for even
though the things which he treats of and exhibits may
not always be real and true, yet he treats them as if they
were, not as if they were the thoughts of his own mind ;
that is, he treats them scientifically. On the other hand,.
Law or Natural History has before now been treated by
an author with so much of colouring derived from his
own mind as to become a sort of literature ; this is
especially seen in the instance of Theology, when it
takes the shape of Pulpit Eloquence. It is seen too in
historical composition, which becomes a mere specimen
of chronology, or a chronicle, when divested of the
philosophy, the skill, or the party and personal feelings
of the particular writer. Science, then, has to do with
things, literature with thoughts ; science is universal,
literature is personal ; science uses words merely as
symbols, but literature uses language in its full compass,
as including phraseology, idiom, style, composition,
rhythm, eloquence, and whatever other properties are
included in it.
Let us then put aside the scientific use of words, when
we are to speak of language and Hterature. Literature is
the personal use or exercise of language. That this is so
is further proved from the fact that one author uses it so
differently from another. Language itself in its very
origination would seem to be traceable to individuals.
Their peculiarities have given it its character. We are
often able in fact to trace particular phrases or idioms to
individuals ; we know the history of their rise. Slang
surely, as it is called, comes of, and breathes of the per-
sonal. The connection between the force of words in
particular languages and the habits and sentiments of
276 Literature,
the nations speaking them has often been pointed out.
And, while the many use language as they find it, the
man of genius uses it indeed, but subjects it withal to his
own purposes, and moulds it according to his own pecu-
liarities. The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts,
feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him,
the abstractions, the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the
discriminations, the conceptions, which are so original in
him, his views of external things, his judgments upon
life, manners, and history, the exercises of his wit, of
his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these in-
numerable and incessant creations, the very pulsation
and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth, to all
does he give utterance, in a corresponding language,
which is as multiform as this inward mental action itself
and analogous to it, the faithful expression of his in-
tense personality, attending on his own inward world of
thought as its very shadow : so that we might as well
say that one man's shadow is another's as that the style
of a really gifted mind can belong to any but himself.
It follows him about as a shadow. His thought and
feeling are personal, and so his language is personal.
4.
Thought and speech are inseparable from each other.
Matter and expression are parts of one : style is a think-
ing out into language. This is what I have been laying-
down, and this is literature ; not things, not the verbal
symbols of things ; not on the other hand mere words ;
but thoughts expressed in language. Call to mind.
Gentlemen, the meaning of the Greek word which ex-
presses this special prerogative of man over the feeble
intelligence of the inferior animals. It is called Logos :
what does Logos mean } it stands both for reason and for
Literature, 277
speech, and it is difficult to say which it means more pro-
perly. It means both at once : why ? because really they
cannot be divided, — because they are in a true sense one.
When we can separate light and illumination, life and
motion, the convex and the concave of a curve, then will
it be possible for thought to tread speech under foot, and
to hope to do without it — then will it be conceivable
that the vigorous and fertile intellect should renounce
its own double, its instrument of expression, and the
channel of its speculations and emotions.
Critics should consider this view of the subject before
they lay down such canons of taste as the writer whose
pages I have quoted. Such men as he is consider fine
writing to be an addition from without to the matter
treated of,— a sort of ornament superinduced, or a luxury
indulged in, by those who have time and inclination for
such vanities. They speak as if one man could do the
thought, and another the style. We read in Persian
travels of the way in which young gentlemen go to work
in the East, when they would engage in correspondence
with those who inspire them with hope or fear. They
cannot write one sentence themselves ; so they betake
themselves to the professional letter-writer. They con-
fide to him the object they have in view. They have a
point to gain from a superior, a favour to ask, an evil to
deprecate ; they have to approach a man in power, or to
make court to some beautiful lady. The professional
man manufactures words for them, as they are wanted,
as a stationer sells them paper, or a schoolmaster might
cut their pens. Thought and word are, in their concep-
tion, two things, and thus there is a division of labour.
The man of thought comes to the man of words ; and
the man of words, duly instructed in the thought, dips
the pen of desire into the ink of devotedness, and pro-
278 Literature.
ceeds to spread it over the page of desolation. Then the
nightingale of affection is heard to warble to the rose of
loveliness, while the breeze of anxiety plays around the
brow of expectation. This is what the Easterns are said
to consider fine writing; and it seems pretty much the idea
of the school of critics to whom I have been referring.
We have an instance in literary history of this very
proceeding nearer home, in a great University, in the
latter years of the last century. I have referred to it
before now in a public lecture elsewhere * ; but it is too
much in point here to be omitted. A learned Arabic
scholar had to deliver a set of lectures before its doctors
and professors on an historical subject in which his
reading had lain. A linguist is conversant with science
rather than with literature ; but this gentleman felt that
his lectures must not be without a style. Being of the
opinion of the Orientals, with whose writings he was
familiar, he determined to buy a style. He took the
step of engaging a person, at a price, to turn the matter
which he had got together into ornamental English.
Observe, he did not wish for mere grammatical English,
but for an elaborate, pretentious style. An artist was
found in the person of a country curate, and the job was
carried out. His lectures remain to this day, in their
own place in the protracted series of annual Discourses
to which they belong, distinguished amid a number of
heavyish compositions by the rhetorical and ambitious
diction for which he went into the market. This learned
divine, indeed, and the author I have quoted, differ from
each other in the estimate they respectively form of
literary composition ; but they agree together in this, — in
considering such composition a trick and a trade ; they
put it on a par with the gold plate and the flowers and
* *' Position of Catholics in England," pp. loi, 2.
Literature,
279
the music of a banquet, which do not make the viands
better, but the entertainment^ more pleasurable ; as if
language were the hired servant, the mere mistress of the
reason, and not the lawful wife in her own house.
But can they really think that Homer, or Pindar,
or Shakespeare, or Dryden, or Walter Scott, were
accustomed to aim at diction for its own sake, instead of
being inspired with their subject, and pouring forth
beautiful words because they had beautiful thoughts ?
this is surely too great a paradox to be borne. Rather,
it is the fire witfiin the author's breast which overflows
in the torrent of his burning, irresistible eloquence ; it is
the poetry of his inner soul, which reHeves itself in the
Ode or the Elegy ; and his mental attitude and bearing,
the beauty of his moral countenance, the force and
keenness of his logic, are imaged in the tenderness, or
energy, or richness of his language. Nay, according to
the well-known line, " facit indignatio versus ; " not the
words alone, but even the rhythm, the metre, the verse,
will be the contemporaneous offspring of the emotion or
imagination which possesses him. " Poeta nascitur, non
fit," says the proverb ; and this is in numerous instances
true of his poems, as well as of himself. They are born,
not framed ; they are a strain rather than a composition ;
and their perfection is the monument, not so much of his
skill as of his power. And this is true of prose as well as
of verse in its degree : who will not recognize in the vision
of Mirza a delicacy and beauty of style which is very
difficult to describe, but which is felt to be in exact
correspondence to the ideas of which it is the expression ?
■ 5.
And, since the thoughts and reasonings of an author
have, as I have said, a personal character, no wonder that
28o hiteraiure.
his style is not only the image of his subject, but of his
mind. That pomp of language, that full and tuneful
diction, that felicitousness in the choice and exquisiteness
in the collocation of words, which to prosaic writers seem
artificial, is nothing else but the mere habit and way of a
lofty intellect. Aristotle, in his sketch of the magnani-
mous man, tells us that his voice is deep, his motions slow,
and his stature commanding. In like manner, the elocu-
tion of a great intellect is great. His language expresses,
not only his great thoughts, but his great self. Certainly
he might use fewer words than he uses ; but he fertilizes
his simplest ideas, and germinates into a multitude of
details, and prolongs the march of his sentences, and
sweeps round to the full diapason of his harmony, as if
Kvhel'yamv, rejoicing in his own vigour and richness of re-
source. I say, a narrow critic will call it verbiage, when
really it is a sort of fulness of heart, parallel to that which
makes the merry boy whistle as he walks, or the strong
man, like the smith in the novel, flourish his club when
there is no one to fight with.
Shakespeare furnishes us with frequent instances of
this peculiarity, and all so beautiful, that it is difficult to
select for quotation. For instance, in Macbeth : —
" Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And, with some sweet obhvious antidote,
Cleanse the foul bosom of that perilous stuff,
Which weighs upon the heart ? "
Here a simple idea, by a process which belongs to the
orator rather than to the poet, but still comes from the
native vigour of genius, is expanded into a many-mem-
bered period.
Liter aticre, 281
The following from Hamlet is of the same kind : —
" 'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye.
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage.
Together with all forms, modes, shows of grief,
That can denote me truly. '^
Now, if such declamation, for declamation it is, how-
ever noble, be allowable in a poet, whose genius is so far
removed from pompousness or pretence, much more is
it allowable in an orator, whose very province it is to
put forth words to the best advantage he can. Cicero
has nothing more redundant in any part of his writings
than these passages from Shakespeare. No lover then
at least of Shakespeare may fairly accuse Cicero of
gorgeousness of phraseology or diffuseness of style.
Nor will any sound critic be tempted to do so. As a
certain unaffected neatness and propriety and grace of
diction may be required of any author who lays claim to
be a classic, for the same reason that a certain attention
to dress is expected of every gentleman, so to Cicero
may be allowed the privilege of the " os magna sona-
turum," of which the ancient critic speaks. His copious,
majestic, musical flow of language, even if sometimes
beyond what the subject-matter demands, is never out
of keeping with the occasion or with the speaker. It is
the expression of lofty sentiments in lofty sentences, the
*' mens magna in corpore magno." It is the develop-
ment of the inner man. Cicero vividly realised the
status of a Roman senator and statesman, and the
" pride of place" of Rome, in all the grace and grandeur
which attached to her ; and he imbibed, and became,
282 Literature.
what he admired. As the exploits of Scipio or Pompe}-'
are the expression of this greatness in deed, so the
language of Cicero is the expression of it in word. And,
as the acts of the Roman ruler or soldier represent to us,
in a manner special to themselves, the characteristic
magnanimity of the lords of the earth, so do the
speeches or treatises of her accomplished orator bring it
home to our imaginations as no other writing could do.
Neither Livy, nor Tacitus, nor Terence, nor Seneca, nor
Pliny, nor Quintilian, is an adequate spokesman for
the Imperial City. They write Latin ; Cicero writes
Roman.
You will say that Cicero's language is undeniably
studied, but that Shakespeare's is as undeniably natural
and spontaneous ; and that, this is what is meant, when
the Classics are accused of being mere artists of words.
Here we are introduced to a further large question,
which gives me the opportunity of anticipating a misap-
prehension of my meaning. I observe, then, that, not
only is that lavish richness of style, which I have noticed
in Shakespeare, justifiable on the principles which I have
been laying down, but, what is less easy to receive, even
elaborateness in composition is no mark of trick or
artifice in an author. Undoubtedly the works of the
Classics, particularly the Latin, are elaborate ; they have
cost a great deal of time, care, and trouble. They have
had many rough copies ; I grant it. I grant also that
there are writers of name, ancient and modern, who really
are guilty of the absurdity of making sentences, as the
very end of their literary labour. Such was Isocrates ;
such were some of the sophists ; they were set on words,
to the neglect of thoughts or things ; I cannot defend them.
Literahtre, 283
If I must give an English instance of this fault, much as
I love and revere the personal character and intellectual
vigour of Dr. Johnson, I cannot deny that his style often
outruns the sense and the occasion, and is wanting in
that simplicity which is the attribute of genius. Still,
granting all this, I cannot grant, notwithstanding, that
genius never need take pains, — that genius may not im-
prove by practice, — that it never incurs failures, and
succeeds the second time, — that it never finishes off at
leisure what it has thrown off in the outline at a stroke.
Take the instance of the painter or the sculptor ; he
has a conception in his mind which he wishes to repre-
sent in the medium of his art ; — the Madonna and Child,
or Innocence, or Fortitude, or some historical character
or event. Do you mean to say he does not study his
subject ? does he not make sketches ? does he not even
call them " studies" 1 does he not call his workroom
a studio f is he not ever designing, rejecting, adopting,
correcting, perfecting } Are not the first attempts of
Michael Angelo and Rafifaelle extant, in the case of
some of their most celebrated compositions ? Will any
one say that the Apollo Belvidere is not a conception
patiently elaborated into its proper perfection t These
departments of taste are, according to the received
notions of the world, the very province of genius, and yet
we call them arts ; they are the "Fine Arts." Why
may not that be true of literary composition which is. true
of painting, sculpture, architecture, and music .? Why
may not language be wrought as well as the clay of the
modeller } why may not words be worked up as well as
colours .? why should not skill in diction be simply sub-
servient and instrumental to the great prototypal ideas
which are the contemplation of a Plato or a Virgil ?
Our greatest poet tells us,
284 Liierahcre,
"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name."
Now, Is it wonderful that that pen of his should some-
times be at fault for a while, — that it should pause,
write, erase, re-write, amend, complete, before he satisfies
himself that his language has done justice to the
conceptions which his mind's eye contemplated?
In this point of view, doubtless, many or most writers
are elaborate ; and those certainly not the least whose
style is furthest removed from ornament, being simple
and natural, or vehement, or severely business-like and
practical. Who so energetic and manly as Demos-
thenes .'' Yet he is said to have transcribed Thucydides
many times over in the formation of his style. Who so
gracefully natural as Herodotus } yet his very dialect
is not his own, but chosen for the sake of the perfection
of his narrative. Who exhibits such happy negligence
as our own Addison } yet artistic fastidiousness was so
notorious in his instance that the report has got abroad,
truly or not, that he was too late in his issue of an
important state-paper, from his habit of revision and re-
composition. Such great authors were working by a
model which was before the eyes of their intellect, and
they were labouring to say what they had to say, in
such a way as would most exactly and suitably express
it. It is nut wonderful that other authors, whose style
is not simple, should be instances of a similar literary
dih'gence. Virgil wished his ^neid to be burned,
elaborate as is its composition, because he felt it needed
more labour still, in order to make it perfect. The
Literature 28=^
historian Gibbon in the last century is another instance
in point. You must not suppose I am going to recom-
mend his style for imitation, any more than his principles ;
but I refer to him as the example of a writer feeling the
task which lay before him, feeling that he had to bring
out into words for the comprehension of his readers a
great and complicated scene, and wishing that those
words should be adequate to his undertaking. I think
he wrote the first chapter of his History three times
over ; it was not that he corrected or improved the first
copy ; but he put his first essay, and then his second,
aside — he recast his matter, till he had hit the precise
exhibition of it which he thought demanded by his
subject.
Now m all these instances, I wish you to observe,
that what I have admitted about literary workmanship
differs from the doctrine which I am opposing in this, —
that the mere dealer in words cares little or nothing for
the subject which he is embellishing, but can paint and
gild anything whatever to order ; whereas the artist,
whom I am acknowledging, has his great or rich visions
before him, and his only aim is to bring' out what he
thinks or what he feels in a way adequate to the thing
spoken of, and appropriate to the speaker.
7.
The illustration which I have been borrowing from
the Fine Arts will enable me to go a step further. I
have been showing the connection of the thought with
the language in literary composition ; and in doing so
I have exposed the unphilosophical notion, that the
language was an extra which could be dispensed with,
and provided to order according to the demand. But I
have not yet brought out, what immediately follows
286 Literature,
from this, and which was the second point which I had
to show, viz., that to be capable of easy translation is no
test of the excellence of a composition. If I must say
what I think, I should lay down, with little hesitation,
that the truth was almost the reverse of this doctrine.
Nor are many words required to show it. Such a
doctrine, as is contained in the passage of the author
whom I quoted when I began, goes upon the assumption
that one language is just like another language, — that
every language has all the ideas, turns of thought,
delicacies of expression, figures, associations, abstractions,
points of view, which every other language has. Now,
as far as regards Science, it is true that all languages
are pretty much alike for the purposes of Science ; but
even in this respect some are more suitable than
others, which have to coin words, or to borrow them, in
order to express scientific ideas. But if languages are
not all equally adapted even to furnish symbols for
those universal and eternal truths in which Science con-
sists, how can they reasonably be expected to be all
equally rich, equally forcible, equally musical, equally
exact, equally happy in expressing the idiosyncratic
peculiarities of thought of some original and fertile mind,
who has availed himself of one of them t A great
author takes his native language, masters it, partly
throws himself into it, partly moulds and adapts it, and
pours out his multitude of ideas through the variously
ramified and delicately minute channels of expression
which he has found or framed : — does it follow that this
his personal presence (as it may be called) can forth-
with be transferred to every other language under the
sun t Then may we reasonably maintain that Beeth-
oven's piano music is not really beautiful, because it
cannot be played on the hurdy-gurdy. Were not this
Literature, 287
astonishing doctrine maintained by persons far superior
to the writer whom I have selected for animadversion, I
should find it difficult to be patient under a gratuitous
extravagance. It seems that a really great author must
admit of translation, and that we have a test of his excel-
lence when he reads to advantage in a foreign language
as well as in his own. Then Shakespeare is a genius be-
cause he can be translated into German, and not a genius
because he cannot be translated into French. Then the
multiplication-table is the most gifted of all conceivable
compositions, because it loses nothing by translation, and
can hardly be said to belong to any one language what-
ever. Whereas I should rather have conceived that, in
proportion as ideas are novel and recondite, they would
be difficult to put into words, and that the very fact of
their having insinuated themselves into one language
would diminish the chance of that happy accident being
repeated in another. In the language of savages you
can hardly express any idea or act of the intellect at
all : is the tongue of the Hottentot or Esquimaux to
be made the measure of the genius of Plato, Pindar,
Tacitus, St. Jerome, Dante, or Cervantes }
Let us recur, I say, to the illustration of the Fine
Arts. 1 suppose you can express ideas in painting
which you cannot express in sculpture ; and the more
an artist is of a painter, the less he is likely to be of
a sculptor. The more he commits his genius to the
methods and conditions of his own art, the less he will
be able to throw himself into the circumstances of
another. Is the genius of Fra Angelico, of Francia, or
of Raffaelle disparaged by the fact that he was able to
do that in colours which no man that ever lived, which
no Angel, could achieve in wood .? Each of the Fine
Arts has its own subject-matter ; from the nature of the
2 88 Literature,
case you can do in one what you cannot do in another ;
you can do in painting what you cannot do in carving ;
you can do in oils what you cannot do in fresco ; you
can do in marble what you cannot do in ivory ; you can
do in wax what you cannot do in bronze. Then, I
repeat, applying this to the case of languages, why
should not genius be able to do in Greek what it cannot
do in Latin ? and why are its Greek and Latin works
defective because they will not turn into English ? That
genius, of which we are speaking, did not make English ;
it did not make all languages, present, past, and future ;
it did not make the laws of miy language : why is it to
be judged of by that in which it had no part, over which
it has no control ?
8.
And now we are naturally brought on to our third
point, which is on the characteristics of Holy Scripture
as compared with profane literature. Hitherto we have
been concerned with the doctrine of these writers, viz.,
that style is an extra, that it is a mere artifice, and that
hence it cannot be translated ; now we come to their
fact, viz., that Scripture has no such artificial style, and
that Scripture can easily be translated. Surely thei^
fact is as untenable as their doctrine.
Scripture easy of translation ! then why have there
been so few good translators } why is it that there
has been such great difficulty in combining the two
necessary qualities, fidelity to the original and purity in
the adopted vernacular } why is it that the author-
ized versions of the Church are often so inferior to
the original as compositions, except that the Church
is bound above all things to see that the version is doc-
trinally correct, and in a difficult problem is obliged to
Literature. 289
put up with defects in what is of secondary importance,
provided she secure what is of first ? If it were so
easy to transfer the beauty of the original to the copy,
she would not have been content with her received
version in various languages which could be named.
And then in the next place, -Scripture not elaborate !
Scripture not ornamented in diction, and musical in
cadence ! Why, consider the Epistle to the Hebrews —
where is there in the classics any composition more care-
fully, more artificially written ? Consider the book of
Job — is it not a sacred drama, as artistic, as perfect,
as any Greek tragedy of Sophocles or Euripides ? Con-
sider the Psalter — are there no ornaments, no rhythm, no
studied cadences, no responsive members, in that divinely
beautiful book ? And is it not hard to understand ? are
not the Prophets hard to understand ? is not St. Paul
hard to understand t Who can say that these are
popular compositions t who can say that they are level
at first reading with the understandings of the mul-
titude .?
That there are portions indeed of the inspired volume
more simple both in style and in meaning, and that
these are the more sacred and sublime passages, as,
for instance, parts of the Gospels, I grant at once ;
but this does not militate against the doctrine I have
been laying down. Recollect, Gentlemen, my distinction
when I began. I have said Literature is one thing, and
that Science is another ; that Literature has to do with
ideas, and Science with realities ; that Literature is of
a personal character, that Science treats of what is
universal and eternal. In proportion, then, as Scripture
excludes the personal colouring of its writers, and rises
into the region of pure and mere inspiration, when it
ceases in any sense to be the writing of man, of St. Paul
7* 19
2QO Literature,
or St John, of Moses or Isaias, then it comes to belong
to Science, not Literature. Then it conveys the things
of heaven, unseen verities, divine manifestations, and
them alone — not the ideas, the feelings, the aspirations,
of its human instruments, who, for all that they were
inspired and infallible, did not cease to be men. St.
Paul's epistles, then, I consider to be literature in a real
and true sense, as personal, as rich in reflection and
emotion, as Demosthenes or Euripides ; and, without
ceasing to be revelations of objective truth, they are
expressions of the subjective notwithstanding. On the
other hand, portions of the Gospels, of the book of
Genesis, and other passages of the Sacred Volume,
are of the nature of Science. Such is the beginning of
St. John s Gospel, which we read at the end of Mass.
Such is the Creed. I mean, passages such as these are
the mere enunciation of eternal things, without (so to
say) the medium of any human mind transmitting them
to us. The words used have the grandeur, the majesty,
the calm, unimpassioned beauty of Science ; they are in
no sense Literature, they are in no sense personal ; and
therefore they are easy to apprehend, and easy to
translate.
Did time admit I could show you parallel instances of
what I am speaking of in the Classics, inferior to the
inspired word in proportion as the subject-matter of the
classical authors is immensely inferior to the subjects
treated of in Scripture — but parallel, inasmuch as the
classical author or speaker ceases for the moment to
have to do with Literature, as speaking of things
objectively, and rises to the serene sublimity of Science.
But I should be carried too far if I began.
Literature* 291
9-
I shall then merely sum up what I have said, and
come to a conclusion. Reverting, then, to my original
question, what is the meaning of Letters, as contained,
Gentlemen, in the designation of your Faculty, I have
answered, that by Letters or Literature is meant the
expression of thought in language, where by " thought"
I mean the ideas, feelings, views, reasonings, and other
operations of the human mind. And the Art of Letters
is the method by which a speaker or writer brings out
in words, worthy of his subject, and sufficient for his
audience or readers, the thoughts which impress him.
Literature, then, is of a personal character ; it consists in
the enunciations and teachings of those who have a right
to speak as representatives of their kind, and in whose
words their brethren find an interpretation of their own
sentiments, a record of their own experience, and a
suggestion for their own judgments. A great author,
Gentlemen, is not one who merely has a copia verbortim,
whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at
his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling
sentences ; but he is one who has something to say and
knows how to say it. I do not claim for him, as such,
any great depth of thought, or breadth of view, or
philosophy, or sagacity, or knowledge of human nature,
or experience of human life, though these additional
gifts he may have, and the more he has of them the
greater he is ; but I ascribe to him, as his characteristic
gift, in a large sense the faculty of Expression. He is
master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word,
distinct, but inseparable from each other. He may, if so
2Q2 Literature,
be, elaborate his compositions, or he may pour out his
improvisations, but in either case he has but one aim,
which he keeps steadily before him, and is conscientious
and single-minded in fulfilling. That aim is to give forth
what he has within him ; and from his very earnestness
it comes to pass that, whatever be the splendour of his
diction or the harmony of his periods, he has with him
the charm of an incommunicable simplicity. Whatever
be his subject, high or low, he treats it suitably and for
its own sake. If he is a poet, "nil molitur inepte!' If he
is an orator, then too he speaks, not only ''distincte" and
"splendide," but also '' apte!' His page is the lucid
mirror of his mind and life —
" Quo fit, ut omnis
Votivi pateat veluti descripta tabelld
Vita senis."
He writes passionately, because he feels keenly ;
forcibly, because he conceives vividly ; he sees too clearly
to be vague ; he is too serious to be otiose ; he can
analyze his subject, and therefore he is rich ; he embraces
it as a whole and in its parts, and therefore he is
consistent ; he has a firm hold of it, and therefore he is
luminous. When his imagination wells up, it overflows
in ornament ; when his heart is touched, it thrills along
his verse. He always has the right word for the right
idea, and never a word too much. If he is brief, it is
because few words suffice; when he is lavish of them, still
each word has its mark, and aids, not embarrasses, the
vigorous march of his elocution. He expresses what all
feel, but all cannot say; and his sayings pass into
proverbs among his people, and his phrases become
household words and idioms of their daily speech, which
Literature, 293
is tesselated with the rich fragments of his language,
as we see in foreign lands the marbles of Roman gran-
deur worked into the walls and pavements of modern
palaces.
Such pre-eminently is Shakespeare among ourselves ;
such pre-eminently Virgil among the Latins ; such in
their degree are all those writers who in every nation
go by the name of Classics. To particular nations they
are necessarily attached from the circumstance of the
variety of tongues, and the peculiarities of each ; but so
far they have a catholic and ecumenical character, that
what they express is common to the whole race of man,
and they alone are able to express it.
10.
If then the power of speech is a gift as great as any
that can be named, — if the origin of language is by
many philosophers even considered to be nothing short
of divine, — if by means of words the secrets of the heart
are brought to light, pain of soul is relieved, hidden
grief is carried off, sympathy conveyed, counsel imparted,
experience recorded, and wisdom perpetuated, — if by
great authors the many are drawn up into unity, na-
tional character is fixed, a people speaks, the past and
the future, the East and the West are brought into
communication with each other, — if such men are, in a
word, the spokesmen and prophets of the human family,
— it will not answer to make light of Literature or
to neglect its study ; rather we may be sure that, in
proportion as we master it in whatever language, and
imbibe its spirit, we shall ourselves become in our
own measure the ministers of like benefits to others,
294 Literature,
be they many or few, be they in the obscurer or the more
distinguished walks of Hfe, — who are united to us by
social ties, and are within the sphere of our personal
influence.
295
III.
ENGLISH CATHOLIC LITERATURE.
ONE of the special objects which a Catholic Uni-
versity would promote is that of the formation
of a Catholic Literature in the English language. It is an
object, however, which must be understood before it
can be suitably prosecuted ; and which will not be
understood without some discussion and investigation.
First ideas on the subject must almost necessarily be
crude. The real state of the case, what is desirable,
what is possible, has to be ascertained ; and then what
has to be done, and what is to be expected. We have
seen in public matters, for half a year past, * to what
mistakes, and to what disappointments, the country
has been exposed, from not having been able distinctly
to put before it what was to be aimed at by its fleets and
armies, what was practicable, what was probable, in
operations of war : and so, too, in the field of literature,
we are sure of falling into a parallel perplexity and
dissatisfaction, if we start with a vague notion of doing
something or other important by means of a Catholic
University, without having the caution to examine what
is feasible, and what is unnecessary or hopeless. Ac-
cordingly, it is natural I should wish to direct attention
to this subject, even though it be too difficult to handle
in any exact or complete way, and though my attempt
must be left for others to bring into a more perfect shape,
who are more fitted for the task.
Here I shall chiefly employ myself in investigating
what the object is not.
* August, 1854.
2g6
§. I. In its relation to Religious Literature,
WHEN a *' Catholic Literature in the English
tongue" is spoken of as a desideratum, no reason-
able person will mean by " Catholic works" much more
than the "works of Catholics." The phrase does not
mean a religious literature. " Religious Literature"
indeed would mean much more than " the Literature of
religious men ; " it means over and above this, that the
subject-matter of the Literature is religious ; but by
" Catholic Literature" is not to be understood a litera-
ture which treats exclusively or primarily of Catholic
matters, of Catholic doctrine, controversy, history, per-
sons, or politics ; but it includes all subjects of literature
whatever, treated as a Catholic would treat them, and
as he only can treat them. Why it is important to have
them treated by Catholics hardly need be explained
here, though something will be incidentally said on the
point as we proceed : meanwhile I am drawing atten-
tion to the distinction between the two phrases in order
to avoid a serious misapprehension. For it is evident
that, if by a Catholic Literature were meant nothing
more or less than a religious literature, its writers would
be mainly ecclesiastics ; just as writers on Law are
mainly lawyers, and writers on Medicine are mainly
physicians or surgeons. And if this be so, a Catholic
Literature is no object special to a University, unless a
University is to be considered identical with a Seminary
or a Theological SchooL
English Catholic Liierature. 297
I am not denying that a University might prove of the
greatest benefit even to our religious literature ; doubt-
less it would, and in various ways ; still it is concerned
with Theology only as one great subject of thought, as the
greatest indeed which can occupy the human mind, yet
not as the adequate or direct scope of its institution.
Yet I suppose it is not impossible for a literary layman
to wince at the idea, and to shrink from the proposal,
of taking part in a scheme for the formation of a Catholic
Literature, under the apprehension that in some way or
another he will be entangling himself in a semi-clerical
occupation. It is not uncommon, on expressing an
anticipation that the Professors of a Catholic University
will promote a Catholic Literature, to have to encounter
a vague notion that a lecturer or writer so employed
must have something polemical about him, must
moralize or preach, must (in Protestant language)
improve the occasion, though his subject is not at all a
religious one ; in short, that he must do something else
besides fairly and boldly go right on, and be a Catholic
speaking as a Catholic spontaneously will speak, on the
Classics, or Fine Arts, or Poetry, or whatever he has
taken in hand. Men think that he cannot give a lecture
on Comparative Anatomy without being bound to
digress into the Argument from Final Causes ; that he
cannot recount the present geological theories without
forcing them into an interpretation seriatim of the first
two chapters of Genesis. Many, indeed, seem to go
further still, and actually pronounce that, since our own
University has been recommended by the Holy See, and
is established by the Hierarchy, it cannot but be engaged
in teaching religion and nothing else, and must and will
have the discipline of a Seminary ; which is about as
sensible and logical a view of the matter as it would be
2g8 English Catholic Literature.
to maintain that the Prime Minister ipso facto holds an
ecclesiastical office, since he is always a Protestant ; or
that the members of the House of Commons must neces-
sarily have been occupied in clerical duties, as long as
they took an oath about Transubstantiation. Catholic
Literature is not synonymous with Theology, nor does it
supersede or interfere with the work of catechists, divines,
preachers, or schoolmen.
299
§. 2, In Us relaiiofi to Science,
I.
AND next, it must be borne in mind, that when we
aim at providing a Catholic Literature for Catholics,
in place of an existing hterature which is of a marked
Protestant character, we do not, strictly speaking,
include the pure sciences in our desideratum. Not that
we should not feel pleased and proud to find Catholics
distinguish themselves in publications on abstract or
experimental philosophy, on account of the honour it
does to our religion in the eyes of the world ; — not that
we are insensible to the congruity and respectability of
depending in these matters on ourselves, and not on
others, at least as regards our text-books ; — not that we
do not confidently anticipate that Catholics of these
countries will in time to come be able to point to
authorities and discoverers in science of their own, equal
to those of Protestant England, Germany, or Sweden ; —
but because, as regards mathematics, chemistry, as-
tronomy, and similar subjects, one man will not, on the
score of his religion, treat of them better than another,
and because the works of even an unbeliever or idolator,
while he kept within the strict range of such studies,
might be safely admitted into Catholic lecture-rooms,
and put without scruple into the hands of Catholic youths.
There is no crying demand, no imperative necessity,
for our acquisition of a Catholic Euclid or a Catholic
Newton. The object of all science is truth ; — the pure
300 English Catyiolic Literature,
sciences proceed to their enunciations from principles
which the intellect discerns by a natural light, and by
a process recognized by natural reason ; and the experi-
mental sciences investigate facts by methods of analysis
or by ingenious e:?r.pedients, ultimately resolvable into
instruments of thought equally native to the human
mind. If then we may assume that there is an objective
truth, and that the constitution of the human mind is
in correspondence with it, and acts truly when it acts
according to its own laws ; if we may assume that God
made us, and that what He made is good, and that
no action from and according to nature can in itself be
evil ; it will follow that, so long as it is man who is the
geometrician, or natural philosopher, or mechanic, or
critic, no matter what man he be, Hindoo, Mahometan,
or infidel, his conclusions within his own science, accord-
ing to the laws of that science, are unquestionable, and
not to be suspected by Catholics, unless Catholics may
legitimately be jealous of fact and truth, of divine
principles and divine creations.
I have been speaking of the scientific treatises or
investigations of those who are not Catholics, to which
the subject of Literature leads me ; but I might even go
on to speak of them in their persons as well as in their
books. Were it not for the scandal which they would
create ; were it not for the example they would set ;
were it not for the certain tendency of the human mind
involuntarily to outleap the strict boundaries of an
abstract science, and to teach it upon extraneous princi-
ples, to embody it in concrete examples, and to carry it
on to practical conclusions ; above all, were it not for
the indirect influence, and living energetic presence, and
collateral duties, which accompany a Professor in a great
school of learning, I do not see (abstracting from him, I
English Catholic Literature. 301
repeat, in hypothesis, what never could possibly be
abstracted from him in fact), why the chair of Astronomy
in a Catholic University should not be filled by a La
Place, or that of Physics by a Humboldt. Whatever
they might wish to say, still, while they kept to their
own science, they would be unable, like the heathen
Prophet in Scripture, to " go beyond the word of the
Lord, to utter any thing of their own head."
So far the arguments hold good of certain celebrated
writers in a Northern Review, who, in their hostility to
the principle of dogmatic teaching, seem obliged to
maintain, because subject-matters are distinct, that
living opinions are distinct too, and that men are
abstractions as well as their respective sciences. " On
the morning of the thirteenth of August, in the year
1704," says a justly celebrated author, in illustration and
defence of the anti-dogmatic principle in political and
social matters, " two great captains, equal in authority,
united by close private and public ties, but of different
creeds, prepared for battle, on the event of which were
staked the liberties of Europe. . . Marlborough gave
orders for public prayers ; the English chaplains read
the service at the head of the English regiments ; the
Calvinistic chaplains of the Dutch army, with heads on
which hand of Bishop had never been laid, poured forth
their supplications in front of their countrymen. In the
meantime the Danes might listen to the Lutheran
ministers ; and Capuchins might encourage the Austrian
squadrons, and pray to the Virgin for a blessing on the
arms of the holy Roman Empire. The battle com-
mences ; these men of various religions all act like
members of one body : the CathoHc and the Protestant
302 English Catholic Literature,
generals exert themselves to assist and to surpass each
other ; before sunset the Empire is saved ; France has
lost in a day the fruits of eight years of intrigue and of
victory ; and the allies, after conquering together, return
thanks to God separately, each after his own form of
worship." *
The writer of this lively passage would be doubtless
unwilling himself to carry out the principle which it
insinuates to those extreme conclusions to which it is
often pushed by others, in matters of education. Viewed
in itself, viewed in the abstract, that principle is simply,
undeniably true ; and is only sophistical when it is
carried out in practical matters at all. A religious
opinion, though not formally recognized, cannot fail of
influencing in fact the school, or society, or polity in
which it is found ; though in the abstract that opinion
is one thing, and the school, society, or polity, another.
Here were Episcopalians, Lutherans, Calvinists, and
Catholics found all fighting on one side, it is true, with-
out any prejudice to their respective religious tenets :
and, certainly, I never heard that in a battle soldiers
did do any thing else but fight. I did not know they
had time for going beyond the matter in hand ; yet,
even as regards this very illustration which he has
chosen, if we were bound to decide by it the contro-
versy, it does so happen that that danger of interference
and collision between opposite religionists actually does
occur upon a campaign, which could not be incurred in a
battle : and at this very time some jealousy or disgust
has been shown in English popular publications, when
they have had to record that our ally, the Emperor of
the French, has sent his troops, who are serving with
the British against the Russians, to attend High Mass,
* Macaulay's Essays.
English Catholic Literature. 303
or has presented his sailors with a picture of the
Madonna.
If, then, we could have Professors who were mere
abstractions and phantoms, marrowless in their bones,
and without speculation in their eyes ; or if they could
only open their mouths on their own special subject, and
in their scientific pedantry were dead to the world ; if
they resembled the well known character in the Romance,
who was so imprisoned or fossilized in his erudition,
that, though " he stirred the fire with some address,"
nevertheless, on attempting to snuff the candles, he
" was unsuccessful, and relinquished that ambitious post
of courtesy, after having twice reduced the parlour to
total darkness," then indeed Voltaire himself might be
admitted, not without scandal, but without risk, to lecture
on astronomy or galvanism in Catholic, or Protestant,
or Presbyterian Colleges, or in all of them at once; and
we should have no practical controversy with philoso-
phers who, after the fashion of the author I have been
quoting, are so smart in proving that we, who differ from
them, must needs be so bigotted and puzzle-headed.
And in strict conformity with these obvious distinc-
tions, it will be found that, so far as we are able to
reduce scientific men of anti-Catholic opinions to the
type of the imaginary bookworm to whom I have been
alluding, we do actually use them in our schools. We
allow our Catholic student to use them, so far as he can
surprise them (if I may use the expression), in their
formal treatises, and can keep them close prisoners there.
Vix defessa senem passus componere membra,
Cum clamore ruit magno, manicisque jacentem
Occupat.
The fisherman, in the Arabian tale, took no harm from
304 English Catholic Literature.
the genius, till he let him out from the brass bottle in
which he was confined. " He examined the vessel and
shook it, to see if what was within made any noise, but
he heard nothing." All was safe till he had succeeded
in opening it, and " then came out a very thick smoke,
which, ascending to the clouds and extending itself
along the sea shore in a thick mist, astonished him very
much. After a time the smoke collected, and was con-
verted into a genius of enormous height. At the sight
of this monster, whose head appeared to reach the
clouds, the fisherman trembled with fear." Such is the
difference between an unbelieving or heretical philoso-
pher in person, and in the mere disquisitions proper to his
science. Porson was no edifying companion for young
men of eighteen, nor are his letters on the text of the
Three Heavenly Witnesses to be recommended ; but
that does not hinder his being admitted into Catholic
schools, while he is confined within the limits of his Pre-
face to the Hecuba. Franklin certainly would have
been intolerable in person, if he began to talk freely,
and throw out, as I think he did in private, that each
solar system had its own god ; but such extravagances
of so able a man do not interfere with the honour we
justly pay his name in the history of experimental
science. Nay, the great Newton himself would have
been silenced in a Catholic University, when he got
upon the Apocalypse ; yet is that any reason why we
should not study his Principia, or avail ourselves of the
wonderful analysis which he, Protestant as he was,
originated, and which French infidels have developed }
We are glad, for their own sakes, that anti-Catholic
writers should, in their posthumous influence, do as
much real service to the human race as ever they can,
and we have no wish to interfere with it.
English Catholic Literature, 305
3.
Returning^, then, to the point from which we set out, I
observe that, this being the state of the case as regards
abstract science, viz., that we have no quarrel with its
anti-Catholic commentators, till they thrust their persons
into our Chairs, or their popular writings into our read-
ing-rooms, it follows that, when we contemplate the
formation of a Catholic Literature, we do not consider
scientific works as among our most prominent desiderata.
They are to be looked for, not so much for their own
sake, as because they are indications that we have able
scientific men in our communion ; for if we have such,
they will be certain to write, and in proportion as they
increase in number will there be the chance of really
profound, original, and standard books issuing from our
Lecture-rooms and Libraries. But, after all, there is no
reason why these should be better than those which we
have already received from Protestants ; though it is at
once more becoming and more agreeable to our feelings
to use books of our own, instead of being indebted to
the books of others.
Literature, then, is not synonymous with Science ;
nor does Catholic education imply the exclusion of
vv^orks of abstract reasoning, or of physical experiment,
or the like, though written by persons of another or of
no communion.
There is another consideration in point here, or rather
prior to what I have been saying ; and that is, that,
considering certain scientific works, those on Criticism,
for instance, are so often written in a technical phrase-
ology, and since others, as mathematical, deal so largely
in signs, symbols, and figures, which belong to all lan-
guages, these abstract studies cannot properly be said to
7 * 20