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INDIAN MUTINY 
 
 OF 
 
 1857 - 8 . 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/kayesmallesonshi05kaye 
 
KAYE’S AND MALLESON’S HISTORY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 INDIAN MUTINY 
 
 OF 
 
 1857-8 
 
 Edited by COLONEL ^■\LLESON, C.S.I. 
 
 IN SIX VOLUMES 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 By colonel MALLESON, C.S.I. 
 
 
 
 
 THG.’SILVG.^^ 
 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 
 
 
 NE I F /A'/EEESS/OyV 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
 NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 
 1898 
 
 yi// rights reserve d 
 
DS 
 
 /m 
 
 B/BLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. 
 
 Transferred from W. H. Allen 6^ Co. to 
 Longmans, Green, Co., Felruary 1896. 
 Re-issued in Silver Library, August 1897. 
 Re-issued in new style, July 1898. 
 
 BOSTON COLLEGE LIBR^i 
 SEP I97|- 
 46;^909 
 
I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF 
 
 THE LATE 
 
 Sir HENEY MAEION DUEANE, 
 
 K.C.S.I. 
 
 A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL 
 AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS 
 WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS, DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE, 
 AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FALSE. 
 AS WISE IN COUNSEL 
 
 AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION, 
 
 HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE, 
 RENDERING EVER, ALIKE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE, 
 UNSURPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY. 
 
 AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER 
 FORTY-TWO YEARS, 
 
 HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY. 
 
 “HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT THE BEST 
 
 INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN.” 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH VOLUME. 
 
 The present volume concludes the history of the purely military 
 events of the great Indian uprising of 1857. 
 
 The question whether that uprising was simply a military 
 mutiny, or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted 
 the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time, and is 
 to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of 
 this volume I have endeavoured to throw some light on the 
 dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. 
 There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most 
 searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that 
 the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased 
 cartridges ; that it was neither conceived nor designed by the 
 Sipahis. The mutiny was in reality the offspidng of the dis- 
 content roused by the high-handed measures inaugurated, or at 
 least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a 
 climax by the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was 
 the opportune instrument skilfully used by a band of con- 
 spirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of 
 rousing to action the Sipahis, already made disaffected by con 
 secutive breaches of contract and of faith. 
 
 Of these acts — of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard 
 the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an 
 Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample 
 upon prejudices and to disregard obligations — the mutiny was 
 the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive 
 points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in 
 Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the 
 moral power engendered by the possession of force, displaced 
 the former rulers. These places were Dehli and Lakhnao. At 
 the one we were the besiegers, in the other we were besieged. 
 
VI 
 
 PEEFACE. 
 
 DeMi and LakEnao constituted, so to speak, the wings of the 
 rebel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwaliar, gone 
 with the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons 
 I have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the 
 centre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate 
 the bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel 
 line. 
 
 It was after Dehli had fallen and a severe blow had been 
 dealt at Lakhnao that we had to deal with the centre — a 
 centre formidable indeed, but which the loyalty of Sindhia had 
 deprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with, the 
 contest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir 
 Hugh Eose, Sir Eobert Napier, Generals Stuart, Eoberts, Michel, 
 and Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parke, Somerset, 
 Colonel Holmes, Becher, and many others, that the military 
 portion of this volume mainly deals ; and I venture to aflSrm 
 that no part of this history is more remarkable for the display 
 of capacity and daring by the generals, of courage and en- 
 durance by the men. It is a page of history which every 
 Englishman will read with pride and satisfaction — with pride 
 because the deeds it records were heroic ; with satisfaction 
 because many of the actors survive, ready, when they are called 
 upon, to repeat their triumphs in other fields. 
 
 But, important and full of interest as are the military records 
 of this volume, the political action it relates is certainly not less 
 so. There was not a moment of more consequence to India than 
 that in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he 
 would content himself with saving his own Presidency, or, 
 risking everything, would send every available man to the 
 decisive points in the endeavour to save India. Not for a second 
 did that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task 
 of no ordinary pleasure to demonstrate how the daring and 
 generous conduct of the Governor of Bombay vitally affected 
 the interests of England at the most critical period of the 
 struggle. 
 
 Nor have I experienced less gratification in rendering justice 
 to the character of Lord Canning, as that character developed 
 itself, when, in the early part of 1858, he stood unshackled at 
 Allahabad. I have entered in the concluding chapter so full}?- 
 into this point, and into others affecting the judgment passed 
 upon his action in the earlier part of his Indian career, that it 
 is unnecessary to allude to the matter further here. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Vll 
 
 Since the first edition of this volume was published I have 
 received numerous letters from gentlemen who were actors in 
 the several campaigns, and have conversed with many of them. 
 I have enjoyed the opportunity likewise of revisiting India. 
 The result has been that I have been able to render some share 
 of justice to distinguished officers whose deeds were not so fully 
 described as they deserved to be. I may add that I have likewise 
 obtained the fullest information regarding the transactions 
 between the Grovernment of India and the State of Kirwi prior 
 to 1857, and have re-written that portion of the narrative. 
 
 Although I have exerted myself to the utmost to ensure 
 accuracy of detail in all the military operations, I am conscious 
 that there are many other gallant deeds the details of which 
 have not reached me, and which are therefore unnoticed. I 
 have found it impossible, even in a work so bulky as this, to 
 mention every individual who deserved well of his country. 
 When a small body of men attack and defeat a large number of 
 enemies, every man of the attacking party is necessarily a hero. 
 There may be degrees of heroism, but it is difficult to distinguish 
 them. Napoleon, feeling this difficulty, announced to his army 
 after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a 
 soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had 
 fought in that campaign, for the world to recognise him as a 
 brave man. That assurance is certainly not less applicable to 
 the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume, 
 and on whom the campaigns of Malwa, of Central India, of the 
 southern Maratha country, and again of Malwa and Rajputana, 
 have fixed the stamp of heroes. 
 
 The appendix gives the story of Tantia Topi’s career as r( lated 
 by Tantia Topi himself. 
 
 I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations 
 under which I lie to the many gentlemen who have placed their 
 journals and letters, all written at the time, at my disposal. 
 The value of the information I have thus been able t ) obtain is 
 not to be expressed in words. But especially do I desire to 
 acknowledge the benefit I have received from the services of 
 the gifted friend who read the first edition of this volume in 
 proof-sheets, and whose frank and judicious criticisms greatly 
 contributed to the clearness and accuracy of the military nar- 
 rative. 
 
 I may add that there is in the press a sixth volume, which, 
 in addition to an analytical index prepared by my ^friend. 
 
Till 
 
 PKEFACE. 
 
 Mr. Pincott, will contain a reference, taken in the order of the 
 Governorships, Lieutenant-Governorships, and Chief-Commis- 
 sionerships to which they severally belonged, to many of the civil 
 districts throughout India. To this volume has been trans- 
 ferred the narrative of the five civil districts, and the chapter 
 regarding the Indian Navy, which originally appeared in this 
 volume. Although I have taken the greatest pains to ascertain 
 the truth regarding the events in several of these stations, I am 
 conscious that much has been left still to be recorded. In but 
 few cases were journals kept ; many of the actors are dead ; 
 many are old and indifferent. I trust, however, that it will be 
 found that I have succeeded in unearthing many deeds of 
 daring, in rescuing from oblivion more than one reputation, and 
 generally in adding to the interest of the story of the most 
 stupendous event that has occurred in the reign of Queen 
 Victoria. 
 
 G. B. Malleson. 
 
 27, West Cromwell Road, 
 
 Isf July, 1889. 
 
LIST AND SHOKT DESCKIPTION OF IMPOETANT 
 PLACES MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME, AND NOT 
 DESCEIBED IN PKEVIOUS VOLUMES. 
 
 Amjheiba, a Native State in Malwa, within an area of 584 square miles. 
 
 Asirgakh is a fortress in the Nimar district of the Central Provinces, situate 
 on a spur of the Satpura range. It stands at an elevation of 850 feet, 
 and is a place of great strength. It was once taken by Akbar, and 
 twice by the English, to whom it now belongs. It lies 313 miles from 
 Bombay. 
 
 AubangA.bad, a city in the Haidarabad State, which derives its name from 
 the Emperor Aurangzib, who built here a beautiful mausoleum over the 
 remains of his favourite daughter. It lies 215 miles from Bombay, and 
 690 from Madras. 
 
 Balabet, a town in the Gwaliar State, 40 miles to the north-west of Sagar. 
 
 Bandah, chief town of district of same name, now in the Allahabad division, 
 95 miles south-west of Allahabad, and 190 south-east from Agra. 
 
 Banpub, a parganah in the Lalitpur district, Central Provinces, forming the 
 seat of a chief who rebelled in 1857. 
 
 BelgA.on, the chief town of the district of the same name in the Southern 
 Maratha country, situate on the northern slopes of the Bellarf watershed, 
 2500 feet above the sea. It is 318 miles from Bombay. 
 
 Bhopawar, a ruinous town in the Gwaliar State ; 64 miles south-west of 
 Ujjen, and 330 south-west of Gwaliar. 
 
 Burhanpur, an ancient and famous city in the Nimar district of the Central 
 Provinces, was for a long period the capital of Khandesh, and the chief 
 city of the Dakhan under the Mughul emperors. It lies on the north 
 bank of the Tapti. It was founded by Nasir Khan, of Khandesh, and 
 was called after the renowned Shekh Burhanu’din, of Daulatabad. It is 
 famous for its quaint porcelain. It is two miles from the Lalb^gh 
 station of the Great India Peninsula Kailway. 
 
 Chanderi, a town and fortress in the Gwaliar State, described at page 104. 
 
 Charkhari, capital of State of same name in Central India, on the route from 
 Gwaliar to Bandah, 41 miles south-west of the latter. 
 
X 
 
 SHOKT DESCBIPTION OF PLACES. 
 
 Dewas, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with two chiefs, one called 
 Baba Sahib, the other Dada Sahib. The territories of the former have 
 an area of 1378 square miles ; those of the latter, 6197 square miles ; 
 yet the Baba Sahib is the senior of the two. 
 
 Dear, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with an area of 2500 square 
 miles. Its capital is also called Dhar. 
 
 Dharwar, capital of district of the same name in the Southern Maratha 
 country, lies 351 miles from Bombay. Is a great cotton centre. 
 
 Goraria, a village in the Gwaliar State, between Nimach and Mandesar. 
 
 Haidarabad, described in the text, page 80. 
 
 Jabalpur, capital of district and division of the same name in the North- 
 West Provinces. The town is an important centre of trade. It lies 
 700 miles from Calcutta; 202 from Allahabad; 879 from Madras, and 
 674 from Bombay. 
 
 Jalaun, a town in the district of the same name in Jhansi territory. The 
 district has an area of 1469 square miles, and comprises the towns, 
 Kalpi, Kuueh, Jalaun, and Urai (the capital). The chief rivers in the 
 district are the Jamnah, the Betwa, and the Pahuj. 
 
 Jamkhandi, capital of State of same name in Southern Maratha country, 
 70 miles north-east of Belgaon; 68 east of Kolhapur, and 162 south-east 
 of Puna. The chief maintains a force of 57 horse and 852 foot. 
 
 KiRwf, a town, formerly capital of a principality in Bundelkhand, 45 miles 
 from Bandah. 
 
 KolApur, capital of a native State of the same name between the Eetnagm 
 and Belgaon districts, distant 128 miles south-east from Puna; 64 from 
 Satarah, and 220 from Bombay. 
 
 Kuladgi, capital of the district of the same name in the Southern Maratha 
 country, to the north-east of Belgaon. It lies 314 miles from Bombay. 
 
 Ktjnch, a town in the Jalaun district, 19 miles west of Urai, and 42 miles 
 south-west of Kalpi. 
 
 Kurundwad is the capital of two States of the same name in the Southern 
 Maratha country, ruled by two branches of the Patwardhan family. 
 
 Lalitpur, capital of a district in the Jhansi division, as it now is, of the 
 North-West Provinces. The district borders on that of Sugar. 
 
 M ALTEON, a town in the Sugar district, 40 miles north of Sugar. 
 
 Malwa, the name applied to the western portion of the Central Indian 
 Agency. It is a tableland of uneven surface, rising from 1500 to 2000 
 feet above the level of the sea, bounded on the west by the Aravali 
 range ; on the south by the Vindhya chain ; on the east by Bundelkhand, 
 and on the north-east by the valley of the Ganges. It comprises the 
 States of Gwaliar, Indur, and Dhar. 
 
 Malwa (Western) is the westernmost tract of Malwa, and constitutes a 
 subordinate agency of the Central Indian Agency. It comprises the 
 States Jaura, Ratlam, Sdlana, and Sitamau. 
 
 Mandesar, a town in Sindhia’s dominions, on a tributary of the Chambal, 
 80 miles from Ujjen, 120 from Indur, and 328 from Bombay. 
 
SHOET DESCRIPTION OF PLACES. 
 
 XI 
 
 Mehidpue, a town in the Indur State, on the riglit bank of the Sipra, north 
 of Djjen, 432 miles from Bombay. Since 1817, when Sir J. Hislop 
 defeated Mulhar Eao Holkar on the banks of the Sipra, it has been a 
 cantonment for British troops. 
 
 Mir^j, capital of State of same name in Southern Maratha country. The 
 chief is a first-class Sirdar, with a military force of 597 men. 
 
 Mudhal, capital of State of same name in Southern Maratha country, south 
 of the Jamkhandi State. The chief maintains a military force of 
 700 men. 
 
 Nagod, town in the Uchahara district, Central Indian Agency, on the direct 
 route by Rewah from Sagar to Allahabad ; is 48 miles from the first ; 
 43 from the second, 180 from the third, and 110 from Jabalpur. 
 
 Naegund, town in the Dharwar district, 32 miles north-east of Dharwar. 
 The chief lost his possessions in consequence of his conduct in 1857, 
 related in this volume. 
 
 Naesinhpue, a district in the Narbada division of the Central Provinces, with 
 an area of 1916 square miles. Its capital, also called Narsinhpur, is on 
 the River Singri, a tributary of the Narbada. It lies 60 miles to the 
 west of Sagar. 
 
 PuCH, a village in the Jhansi district, on the road from Kalpi to Gunah, 
 55 miles south-west of the former, and 150 north-east of the latter. 
 
 PunA., the ancient Maratha capital, is situate near the confluence of the 
 Muta and Mula, in a plain 2000 feet above the sea. It is 90 miles from 
 Bombay. Adjoining it is the artillery cantonment, Kirki, where 
 Colonel Burr, in 1817, defeated the Peshwa’s army. 
 
 Rahatgarh, a fortified town in a tract of the same name in the Sagar 
 district, 25 miles to the west of the town of Sagar. 
 
 Raipur, capital of the district of the same name in the Central Provinces, 
 177 miles to the east of Nagpur, by the road from that place to 
 Calcutta. 
 
 Rewah, native State in Bundelkhand, having a capital of the same name. 
 It is bounded to the north by the Bandah, Allahabad, and Mfrzapur 
 districts ; to the east by part of the Mfrzapur district and the territories 
 of Chutia Nagpur; on the south by the Chhatfsgarh, Jabalpur, and 
 Mandla districts ; on the west by Maihir, Nagod, and the Kothf States. 
 It has an area of 13,000 square miles. The position of the town is 
 described in the text. 
 
 Sagar, capital of the district of the same name, situated on an elevated 
 position, 1940 feet above the sea, on the north-west borders of a fine 
 lake nearly a mile broad, whence it derives its name (Sagar, Anglice, the 
 Sea). It lies 90 miles north-west of Jabalpur; 185 miles north of 
 Nagpur; 313 miles south-west of Allahabad; 224 miles north-east of 
 Indur, and 602 from Bombay. 
 
 Sangli, capital of the State of the same name in Southern Maratha country, 
 the chief of which is a Sirdar of the first class, with a military force of 
 822 men. It is situate on the River Krishna, to the north-east of 
 Kohlapur. 
 
SHOKT DESCRIPTION OF PLACES. 
 
 xii 
 
 SatAbah, capital of the district of the same name, lies 56 miles south of 
 Puna, at the junction of the Krishna and the Yena. It is 163 miles from 
 Bombay. 
 
 Savanub, capital of State of same name in the Dharwar district; lies 
 39 miles south by east of Dharwar. The Nawab is of Afghan descent. 
 
 Shahgaeh, town in Sagar district, Central Provinces, 40 miles north-east of 
 the town of Sagar. 
 
 SiHOE, a town in the Bhopal State, Central India ; situate on the right bank 
 of the Saven, on the road from Sagar -to Asirgarh, 132 miles south-west 
 from the former, and 152 north-east from the latter; 22 miles from 
 Bhopal, and 470 from Bombay. 
 
 Tal-Bahat, chief town of parganah of same name in Lalitpur district. 
 Central Provinces, stands on a hill, 26 miles north of the town of 
 Lalitpur. 
 
 Tehbi, capital of the Tehri or Urchah estate, to the east of Lalitpur. It is 
 72 miles north-west of Sagar. The Rajah is looked upon as the head of 
 the Bund^as. 
 
 Ujjen, a very important town — more so formerly than now — on the Sipra, in 
 the Gwaliar State. The modern town is six miles in circumference, and 
 surrounded by groves and gardens. The old town lies about a mile to 
 the north of the new town. It is 1698 feet above the sea. It is 40 miles 
 from Indur. 
 
 tlBCHAH, ancient capital of State of the same name, also called Tehri, in 
 Bundelkhand. The State is bounded on the west by the Jhansi and 
 Lalitpur districts ; on the south by the Lalitpur district and Bijawar ; 
 on the east by Bijawar, Charkhari, and Garauli. The town is on the 
 Betwa. 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface v 
 
 List and short Description of Places mentioned in this Volume . . ix 
 
 BOOK XIII.-BOMBAY, CENTKAL INDIA, AND THE DAKHAN. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 LORD ELPHINSTONE, MB. SETON-KARR, AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 Definition of the Bom bay Presidency ...... 
 
 Previous Indian Career of Lord Elphinstone ..... 
 
 His Qualifications for Office in troublous Times ..... 
 
 Prompt Measures taken by Lord Elphinstone on hearing of the Mutiny 
 at Mirath .......... 
 
 Despatches all available Troops to Calcutta ..... 
 
 Noble Response given at the Mauritius and the Cape to his Requisitions 
 Proposes to send a fast Steamer to England ..... 
 
 The Policy of “ Offensive Defence ” ...... 
 
 To carry out this Policy Lord Elphinstone forms a Column under General 
 Woodburn .......... 
 
 Wood burn allows himself to be diverted to Aurangabad . . 
 
 State of Aurangabad ......... 
 
 Woodburn disarms the disaffected Troops. ..... 
 
 Lord Elphinstone continues to urge an Advance on Mau . 
 
 Colonel Stuart succeeds to the Command and moves forward 
 
 Lord Elphinstone sends Troops into Rajputana 
 
 The Southern Maratha Country and Mr. Seton-Karr. 
 
 Effect of the Inam Commission on the landowners of the Southern 
 Maratha Country ......... 
 
 Effect on the same Class of the abolition of the Right of Adoption 
 
 Mr. Seton-Karr tries to soothe the Chiefs 
 
 They learn of the Revolt at Mirath 
 
 General Lester and the military condition of the country . . , 
 
 Influence of Nana Sahib on the Southern Marathd Chiefs . , * 
 
 Mr. Seton-Karr applies for extended powers ... , 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 8 
 9 
 9 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Which he employs most judiciously. ...... 21 
 
 Oeneral Lester and Mr. Seton-Karr foil, by judicious Action, the Plans 
 
 of the disaffected at Belgaon ....... 22 
 
 They punish the Kingleaders of a Plot 22 
 
 Keinforcements arrive, and the Danger, for the Time, passes away . 23 
 
 Review of Mr. Seton-Karr’s Measures 23 
 
 Sketch of previous History of Kolhapur ...... 24 
 
 Mutinous Combination of the Native Regiments at Kolhapur, Belgaon, 
 
 and Dhawar 25 
 
 The Regiment at Kolhapur mutinies 26 
 
 Lord Elphinstone sends Colonel Le Grand Jacob to Kolhapur . . 26 
 
 Before he arrives the Mutiny is suppressed ..... 26 
 
 J acobs disarms the Mutineers 27 
 
 Bombay — General Shortt 28 
 
 Mr. Forjett . 30 
 
 General Shortt, Mr. Forjett, Lord Elphinstone, and the Muharram . 32 
 
 Excitement of the Sipahis at Bombay on the fifth Night of the Mu- 
 harram ........... 33 
 
 Forjett gallops up alone : the sight of him increases their Fury . . 34 
 
 Forjett, by his Courage and Daring, completely dominates them . 34 
 
 His great Services 35 
 
 The Sipahis hatch a new Conspiracy ...... 35 
 
 Which is discovered and baffled by Forjett ..... 36 
 
 Review of Lord Eli^hinstone’s Measures ...... 36 
 
 His Merits never adequately acknowledged 37 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 The Fort and Garrison of Asfrgarh . . _ 
 
 Mutinous Disposition of a Portion of the Garrison .... 
 
 The Mutineers are disarmed 
 
 Stuart’s Column reaches Asirgarh and is joined by Durand 
 Who accompanies it to Mau as supreme political authority. 
 Considerations which induced Durand to defer the Punishment of Hol- 
 
 kar’s mutinous Troops . 
 
 Condition of the towns in the districts — Mandesar .... 
 
 A rising in Central India intended 
 
 Dhar 
 
 Suspicious conduct of the Dhar Durbar . . . 
 
 Durand moves against Dhar, beats the Rebels outside 
 
 And invests the Fort ......... 
 
 The Rebels evacuate it on the eve of the Day fixed for the Storm 
 The Rebels plunder Mehidpur ....... 
 
 By the Capture of Dhar and Amjhera Durand saves the Lines of the 
 
 Narbada , • 
 
 Arrival of the remaining Troops of the Haidar abad Contingent . 
 
 Orr pursues the Rebels, and recovers the Spoils of Mehidpur 
 Durand reaches the Chambal ........ 
 
 Fatuity of the Rebels in not disputing the Passage .... 
 
 39 
 
 39 
 
 40 
 
 41 
 
 41 
 
 42 
 44 
 
 44 
 
 45 
 
 46 
 48 
 
 48 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 51 
 
 52 
 52 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. V. XV 
 
 ' PAGE 
 
 They move on the British before Mandesar and are beaten. • . 53 
 
 Durand threatens alike the Kebels at Mandesar and Nimach . . 54 
 
 Fierce combat at Groraria ........ 55 
 
 The Blow struck there by the British decides the Campaign . . 55 
 
 Durand returns to Indur, and disarms and causes the disarming of Hol- 
 
 kar’s Troops 56 
 
 Interview between Holkar and Durand ...... 57 
 
 Oreat Services rendered by Durand ....... 58 
 
 Officers who distinguished themselves during the Campaign . • 59 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SAGAB AND NARBAdA TEKKITORIES, AND NAGPUR. 
 
 The Sagar and Narbada Territories. ...... 
 
 Sketch of the later History of those Territories ..... 
 
 Mr. Colvin, Captain Ternan, and the Sadr Board of Revenue . 
 
 The introduction of the “ Chapatis” into the Territories 
 
 Captain Ternan detects their hidden Meaning ..... 
 
 His superior officer ridicules Ternan’s solution ..... 
 
 The Government of the North-West Provinces and the Rajah of Dilheri 
 The Blindness and Injustice of the Government contrasted with the 
 Enlightenment of Ternan and the Loyalty of the Rajah 
 Brigadier Sage at Sagar ........ 
 
 Mutiny at Lalitpur ......... 
 
 The Rajah of Banpur rebels ........ 
 
 Major Gaussen’s Sipahis mutiny and join that Rajah 
 Sage moves the Europeans into Sagar Fort, and the 42nd Native Infantry 
 and the 3rd Irregulars mutiny ....... 
 
 The loyal 31st Native Infantry fight with the rebel 42nd Native Infantry 
 Jabalpur and the 52nd Native Infantry ...*,. 
 The Kamthi column reaches Jabalpur ...... 
 
 The 52nd Native Infantry mutiny and murder MacGregor. 
 
 A Column of Madras Troops marches against the 52nd Native Infantry 
 
 And defeats them . , . , 
 
 Death of Colonel Dalyell— the Country still ravaged by Rebels . 
 Ternan and Woolley in Narsinhpur ....... 
 
 Nagod ; mutiny of the 50th Native Infantry ..... 
 
 Willoughby Osborne and Rewah 
 
 Tact and Judgment displayed by Willoughby Osborne . , 
 
 These Qualities save Rewah ........ 
 
 Nagpur and Mr. Plowden 
 
 Plow'den has the Native Levies disarmed ...... 
 
 The Loyalty of the Madras Army saves the Position . . . , 
 
 Credit due to Mr. Plowden 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZAM. 
 
 Haidarabdd and the Dominions of the Nizam . 
 
 The reigning Nizam and Salar Jang 
 
 60 
 
 61 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 64 
 
 65 
 
 65 
 
 66 
 66 
 
 67 
 
 68 
 68 
 
 69 
 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 71 
 
 72 
 72 
 72 
 
 74 
 
 75 
 
 76 
 
 76 
 
 77 
 
 78 
 
 78 
 
 79 
 
 80 
 
 80 
 
XVI 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 Major Cutbert Davidson . ........ 81 
 
 Feeling produced in the Minds of the Population by the News from 
 
 the North-West 82 
 
 Mutinous Outbreak at Haidarabad 82 
 
 Put down by Major Davidson ........ 83 
 
 Bad Effect of the Advent of Adventurers from other Parts ... 84 
 
 The Loyalty of the Nizam the surest Guarantee of Peace ... 84 
 
 jMajor Davidson’s far-sighted Policy ...... 85 
 
 The Rajah of Shorapur displays disloyal Symptoms . ‘ . . . 85 
 
 Major Davidson sends Troops to awe him. ..... 86 
 
 The Rajah’s Troops attack the British . ... . . , 87 
 
 They are totally defeated . . . . . ... 87 
 
 The Rajah commits Suicide ........ 88 
 
 Credit due to the Nizam and Salar Jung ...... 88 
 
 BOOK XIV.— CENTRAL INDIA, KIRWt, GWXLIAR, AND THE 
 SOUTHERN MARATHA COUNTRY. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE IN CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 Sir Robert Hamilton arrives in Calcutta 
 
 His Plan for restoring Order in Central India is accepted . . 
 
 He arrives at Indur and relieves Durand ...... 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose ......... 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose takes Command of the Central India Field Force and 
 Whitlock is appointed to direct the Madras Column . 
 Composition of Sir Hugh Rose’s force ...... 
 
 The Force rests at Mau pending News from Whitlock 
 
 Sir Hugh and the 2nd Brigade then advance on Rahatgarh . 
 
 Siege of Rahatgarh ......... 
 
 The Rajah of Banpur marches to the Relief of the Place . . 
 
 Sir Hugh beats him, whereupon Rahatgarh is evacuated . . 
 
 Sir Hugh again beats the Rajah at Barodia ..... 
 
 Then marches into, and relieves, Sagar . . . . 
 
 Sir Hugh marches against Garhakdta ...... 
 
 Whence he drives the Rebels 
 
 Sir Hugh again waits for News of Whitlock 
 
 Then pushes on towards Jhansi ....... 
 
 Combat at the Mandanpur Pass ....... 
 
 Which Sir Hugh carries, thus turning the Rebels’ Position and forcing 
 them to evacuate very many strong Places. .... 
 
 Meanwhile Stuart and the 2nd Brigade march on Chanderi 
 Storming of Chanderi ... ..... 
 
 Reasons why Lord Canning and Sir Colin Campbell ordered Sir Hugh 
 to abandon, for the time, the March on Jhansi .... 
 
 Sir R. Hamilton takes upon himself the Responsibility of setting aside 
 their orders ; his reasons and his justification .... 
 
 The Fort and City of Jhansi 
 
 90 
 
 91 
 
 92 
 
 92 
 
 93 
 
 94 
 
 95 
 
 95 
 
 96 
 
 97 
 
 97 
 
 98 
 
 99 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 101 
 
 101 
 
 102 
 
 103 
 
 103 
 
 105 
 
 106 
 
 107 
 
 109 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. V. Xvii 
 
 PAGK 
 
 The Siege of Jhansi 110 
 
 Tantia Topi marches to relieve Jhansi . . . . .Ill 
 
 Sir Hugh resolves to maintain the Siege and at the same Time to meet 
 
 Tantia in the open ......... 112 
 
 Sir Hugh attacks Tantia Topi on the Betwa . . . . .112 
 
 Gallantry and Conduct of Stuart . . . . . . .114 
 
 Complete defeat of Tantia Topi ....... 114 
 
 Sir Hugh prepares to storm Jhansi . . . . . . .115 
 
 The Storming of Jhansi . . . . . . . , .115 
 
 The Force rests at Jhansi . . . . . . . .120 
 
 The Councils of the Rani, of Tantia Topi, and of Eao Sahib at 
 
 Kalpi 120 
 
 Sir Hugh and Tantia Topi alike march on Kiinch .... 121 
 
 Preliminaries to the Battle of Kiinch ...... 121 
 
 The Battle of Kiinch ......... 122 
 
 Masterly Retreat of the Rebels ....... 124 
 
 Sir Hugh, pushing on towards Kalpi, reaches Gulauli . . .125 
 
 DifiScult country between Gulauli and Kalpi ..... 126 
 
 Sir Hugh is reinforced by Maxwell on tlie left Bank of the Jamnah . 127 
 
 Battle of Gulauli 127 
 
 Kalpi is occupied by the British 129 
 
 Summary of the Campaign 131 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 KiRWf AND BANDAH. ‘ 
 
 Composition of General Wliitlock's Force. . . . • . 133 
 
 Whitlock reaches Jabalpur on the 6th of February .... 134 
 
 Extreme Caution displayed by Whitlock ...... 134 
 
 The Nawab of Bandah . . . . . . . . . 135 
 
 Combats of Kabrai and of Bandah ....... 136 
 
 Whitlock rests more than a Month at Bandah whilst Sir Hugh Rose is 
 
 clearing the Way to Kalpi 137 
 
 Perversity of Fortune with regard to the Bandah Prize . . .138 
 
 TJie Rao of Kirwi . . . . . . . . ‘ . . 138 
 
 Causes of Complaint against the British Government. . . . 139 
 
 The Rao accords a friendly reception to Whitlock .... 140 
 
 Enormous Treasure which thus devolved upon the British . . . 141 
 
 Reflections on the Transaction 141 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AT GWALIAR. 
 
 . 143 
 
 144 
 . 144 
 
 6 
 
 Apparently desperate Condition of Tantia Topi and his Associates 
 Desperate Remedy suggested— probably by the Rani of Jhansi . 
 The Confederates accept it and march on Gwaliar 
 VOL. V. 
 
XVlll 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The different Keasons affecting the Conduct, at this Crisis, of Maharajah 
 
 Sindhia and his People ........ 145 
 
 Sindhia marches out to meet Tantia Topi ..... 146 
 
 His followers desert him and he is completely defeated . . . 147 
 
 'I'he Kebels liold and administer Gwaliar ...... 147 
 
 Meanwhile Sir Hugh Rose has sent Robertson on the Track of 
 
 Tantia 148 
 
 And subsequently Stuart . . . . . . . .149 
 
 On learning of the Capture of Gwslliar by Tantia he resumes Com- 
 mand ........... 1.50 
 
 Hurries in Pursuit. . 1.50 
 
 Reaches Morar . . . . . . ’ . . . . 151 
 
 Attacks the Rebels at that Place . . . , , . .152 
 
 And defeats them , . . . . . . . . .152 
 
 Brigadier Smith engages the Rebels at Kotah-ki-Sarai . . .153 
 
 Death of the Rani of Jhaiisi ........ 154 
 
 Smith takes up a Position for the Night ...... 155 
 
 He is joined there by Sir Hugh Rose ...... 155 
 
 The reasons which prompted Sir Hugh to assume the Offensive . . 1-56 
 
 Battle of Grwaliar .......... 157 
 
 Sir Hugh Completes the day by the Capture of the City . . . 159 
 
 By the Daring of two Subalterns, Rose and Waller, the Rock Fortress 
 
 is won ........... 160 
 
 Napier pursues the Rebels and catches them at Jaura Alipiir . . 160 
 
 He gains a Victory at Jaura Alipiir. ...... 161 
 
 Recapitulation of the Campaign of the Central India Force . . 162 
 
 The Force is distributed 163 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SOUTHERN MARATHA COUNTRY AND LE GRAND JACOB. 
 
 Colonel Jacob and Mr. Manson relieve Mr. Seton-Karr of his political 
 
 duties in the Southern Maratha Country ..... 164 
 
 Character and Sympathies of Mr. Manson . . . . .161 
 
 Reflections on the Change . . . . . . . .165 
 
 Colonel George Malcolm storms Halgali . . . . . .166 
 
 Despondency and irritation of the Chief of Nargund on learning that 
 
 Manson had replaced Seton-Karr 167 
 
 Influences which work upon him . . . . . . .167 
 
 The refusal of the British Government to allow him to adopt an Heir 
 
 weighs especially with him, and he revolts. .... 168 
 
 Manson, on learning of his Revolt, determines to push on to Nargund . 169 
 
 Clianging his Route, and sleeping in a Village on his Way to join 
 
 Malcolm, he is murdered ........ 170 
 
 Hughes annihilates the Rebels at Kopaldrug ..... 170 
 
 Malcolm beats the Nargund troops and takes Nargund . . . 171 
 
 The Chief flees in Disguise but is captured by Frank Souter . . 171 
 
 Le Grand Jacob pacifies the Country . , . , , ,172 
 
CONTENTS OP VOL. V. 
 
 XIX 
 
 BOOK XV.— THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH AND OF THE 
 NORTH-WEST.— REPEESSION OF OUTBREAKS IN THE 
 PANJAB. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 LORD canning’s ODDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Summary of its Contents and of the Contents of the explanatory Letter 
 
 accompanyini>; it ........ . 173 
 
 Summary of Sir James Outram’s Objections to it . . . . 175 
 
 Lord Canning’s two Replies . . . . . . . .176 
 
 Lord Ellenborough receives the Proclamation without any explanatory 
 
 Letter ........... 177 
 
 Lord Ellenborough arrives at a Conclusion similar to that of Sir James 
 
 Outram ........... 178 
 
 He writes severe and galling Strictures on the Proclamation . . 178 
 
 And publishes these in England ....... 179 
 
 Slight Etfect produced on Lord Canning personally by Lord Ellen- 
 
 borough’s Comments . . . . . . 179 
 
 He receives support from all Sides — even from Lord Derby . . 180 
 
 Lord Canning’s Reply — preliminary ...... 181 
 
 He points out the want of statesmanlike Conduct evinced by the Pub- 
 lication of Lord Ellenborough’s Despatch ..... 181 
 
 He vindicates the Proclamation . . . . . . .182 
 
 Mr. Robert Montgomery succeeds Sir James Outram in Oudh . . 183 
 
 Feelings of the People of Oudh towards their King .... 184 
 
 Their Feelings regarding the British Rule ..... 184 
 
 Tact and Judgment evinced by Mr. Montgomery • . . ,185 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 Position occupied by Sir Hope Grant on the 16th of May . . .186 
 
 He pursues the Rebels ......... 186 
 
 Beats them at Nawabganj . . . . . . , .187 
 
 Position of the rebel parties in Oudh . . . . , .189 
 
 Sir Hope proceeds to relieve Man Singh ...... 189 
 
 Sends Horsford to Sultanpur ........ 189 
 
 Sir Hope joins Horsford and forces the Rebels to evacuate Sultanpur . 190 
 
 The Rebel Leaders in Rohilkhand . ...... 191 
 
 A Force proceeds from Pilibhit to drive the Rebels from Nuriah . 192 
 
 Splendid Daring of Sam Browne ....... 193 
 
 The Rebels in Eastern Oudh ........ 195 
 
 Berkeley captures Dahain, Tirul, and Bhairpur, and touches Hope 
 
 Grant’s Force. ......... 196 
 
 Rowcroft and the Pearl brigade 196 
 
XX 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 Evelegli beats the Rebels at Mohan 197 
 
 Kavanagh and Dawson occupy Sandela ...... 198 
 
 The river Steamers endeavour to clear the Oudh Bank of the Ganges . 198 
 
 The Rebels open the Cold- weather Campaign ..... 199 
 
 Barker, Evelegh, and Seaton give a good Account of tliem. . . 200 
 
 Lord Clyde’s Plan of Pacification ....... 200 
 
 Hope Grant and Wetherall commence Operations .... 201 
 
 Lord Clyde and Grant carry out the Programme .... 201 
 
 The Bareli Column does the same ....... 203 
 
 Hope Grant touches Rowcroft and on one side sweeps the Rebels into 
 
 Nipal ... 204 
 
 Lord Clyde does the same on the other Side ..... 204 
 
 Some Disturbances still continue on the Nipal Frontier , , . 205 
 
 But at last Oudh is at Peace 207 
 
 The new British Title superior to the old one 208 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE PUNJAB AND THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 The Panjab 209 
 
 The alternative Risks one of which Sir John Lawrence was forced to 
 
 accept in July 1857. ........ 210 
 
 Discovery of a plot in the Lower Hazarah . . . . .211 
 
 The inhabitants of the Districts between Labor and Multan rise. . 211 
 
 But are speedily put down . . 212 
 
 Disturbances at Dera Ishmail Khan and Multan .... 213 
 
 The Reader traverses the cis-Satlaj States and the Dehli Districts to 
 
 Itawah ........... 214 
 
 Disturbances in the Itawah District . ...... 214 
 
 Lance, Gordon, and Aljlan suppress them . . . . , .215 
 
 Brigadier Showers at Agra . . 216 
 
 Agra from September 1857 to June 1858 217 
 
 Meade’s Horse is raised . . . . , . . , . . 218 
 
 Sindhia, fleeing from Tantia Topi, reaches Agra . , . . 219 
 
 Sindhia returns to Gwaliar ........ 219 
 
 Showers cuts off Tantia Topi from the north ..... 219 
 
 BOOK XVI.— TANTIA TOPl AND THE QUEEN’S 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE PURSUIT OP TANTIA TOPI. 
 
 Tantia flees in the Direction of Jaipur 221 
 
 Napier’s division and Smith’s Brigade canton at Gwaliar, Jhansi, Sipri, 
 
 and Giinah 221 
 
 Roberts, moving from Nasirabad, covers Jaipur .... 222 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 XXI 
 
 Tantia, baffled, marches on Tonk, followed by Holmes . . . 
 
 Tantia reinforced by the rebels of Tonk, makes, after some Changes of 
 Route, for the Country between Nimach and Nasirabad 
 
 Roberts follows and beats him at Bhilwara 
 
 Tantia is again caught on the Banas . . .... 
 
 Is defeated by Roberts and pursued seventeen Miles. 
 
 Tantia flees to the Chambal, pursued by Parko * *, * , ; 
 
 Parke being deceived by false News, Tantia crosses the Chambal and 
 captures Jhalra Patan . • • 
 
 Thence be endeavours to march on Indui. , ’ « ^ * * • * 
 
 Michel succeeds Roberts and takes Command of the Columns moving 
 
 against Tantia 
 
 Tantia evades Michel near Rajgarh 
 
 But Michel follows and defeats him 
 
 The Story reverts to Napier and Smith . 
 
 Man Singh re voltsagainst Sindhia and seizes Pauri . .^ ; . 
 
 Smith marches against Pauri and has an Interview with Man Singh . 
 He invests the Place ; Napier reinforces him . . 
 
 The rebels evacuate the Place ; Robertson sent in Pursuit. 
 
 Robertson defeats Ijit Singh at Bijapur . • , * ^ * * , / 
 
 The Rainy Season Campaign in Gwaliar closes, and the Story reverts to 
 Tantia, taking^Supplies horn Isagarh, is repulsed by the loyal Kiladar 
 He then marches on Mangrauli followed by Michel, who attacks and 
 Rao Sahib, separating from Tantia, is attacked and beaten by 
 
 Michel . . • • • • ,* * .1 V • * IT XT. ' 
 
 Tantia rejoins Rao Sahib, and they resolve to cross the Line of the 
 
 Narbada . • • ’ . i.-’ 
 
 Michel finds out their Designs, follows in Pursuit, pounces upon lantia 
 
 and destroys his left Wing . . • * . -p ‘ \ 
 
 The right Wing with Tantia and Rao Sahib makes good its Escape and 
 
 crosses the Narbada . • , * 
 
 Xh6 crossing of tho Lino of tliG NnrbRdS', wliicli twGlVG JMontns prG* 
 viously would have been fatal, is even now dangerous. . . 
 
 The people south of the Narbada show no Feeling in Tavour of 
 
 Tantia . * * 
 
 Tantia makes for Barodah . . , • , * • 
 
 Michel divines his Intentions and marches to baffle nim . 
 
 Sutherland crosses the Narbada and comes on Tantia’s Track . 
 Pursues him, brings him to Action and puts him to Flight. _ 
 
 Tantia, fleeing night and day, places the Narbada between himself and 
 his Pursuers, and pushes towards Barodah .... 
 Parke catches him at Chota Udaipur . . . 
 
 Parke beats TMa and cuts him off from Barodah . . . 
 
 Tantia flees to the Banswara Jungles where he is surrounded . 
 
 He deliberates regarding a Surrender, but resolves to fight on . 
 
 Tantia baffles Major Rocke and escapes . * . * * 
 
 Benson beats him at Zirapiir and Somerset beats him at Barod . 
 
 The Story reverts to. the Proceedings of Napier .... 
 
 PAGE 
 
 223 
 
 223 
 
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 249 
 
 250 
 
I 
 
 xxi CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Firuzshah, baffled in Eohilkhand and Oiidh, resolves to join Tantia 
 
 Topi 250 
 
 He crosses into Sindhia’s territory ; Napier follows him . . 251 
 
 Napier’s accm-ate Intelligence is baffled by a misleading Despatch . 252 
 
 But he pursues Firuzshah, outmanoeuvres and crushes him at 
 
 Kandd 253 
 
 Oallantry of Stack ; of Rice . 254 
 
 Firuzshah joins Tantia ; to whom the Story reverts .... 254 
 
 Tantia endeavours to escape to the North-west, but is surprised by 
 
 Shower’s ........... 255 
 
 He tries to meet Marwar, but Holmes catches, and utterly defeats 
 
 ' him 256 
 
 Tantia gives up the Struggle and hides in the Jungles of Pardn. . 256 
 
 Honner defeats Rao Sahib at Kushanf ...... 257 
 
 The rebel Force breaks up ....... . 257 
 
 Tlie fate of the Rebel Leaders is recorded ..... 257 
 
 Napier sees the Importance of gaining Man Singh .... 258 
 
 He sends Meade to Sirsimao ........ 258 
 
 Meade negotiates with the confidential Advisers of Man Singh . . 259 
 
 Napier directs Meade to put Pressure upon the Dewan of Man Singh by 
 
 occupying Sirsimao ......... 260 
 
 The Family of Man Singh surrenders to Meade .... 260 
 
 Man Singh surrenders to Meade ....... 261 
 
 Selfish Considerations begin to act on the lower Nature of Man Singh 261 
 
 He volunteers to accompany a British Force and to aid in the Capture 
 
 of his Uncle Ajit Singh 262 
 
 He finally makes up his Mind to betray Tantia Topi . . . 263 
 
 For a Consideration, even for the Chance of a Consideration . . 263 
 
 Man Singh proceeds with a Party sent by Meade, and surprises Tantia 
 
 Topi asleep .......... 263 
 
 Tantia Topi is tried by Court-martial ; his Defence .... 264 
 
 Validity of the Defence ......... 265 
 
 He is sentenced to be hanged, and is hanged 265 
 
 Will Posterity ratify the Justice of the Sentence? .... 265 
 
 Parallel Points between Tantia Topi and Hofer .... 266 
 
 Tantia Topf s Merits and Demerits as a General .... 266 
 
 The English Commanders in Pursuit of him ..... 267 
 
 The light Columns and long Marches ...... 268 
 
 Tranquillity returns to Central India ...... 268 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLI AND THE QUEEN’S PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Trial and sentence of the King of Dehli 270 
 
 The English Public, requiring a Scape-goat, pronounce the Doom of 
 
 the East India Company 271 
 
 The Queen’s Proclamation ........ 272 
 
 The Proclamation is published throughout India .... 276 
 
 Its enthusiastic Reception 277 
 
 Virtual Conclusion of the Mutiny ...•••• 277 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. V. xxiii 
 
 BOOK XVIL— THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Anxiety displayed, after the Mutiny had been quelled, to discover 
 
 its Cause. .......... 278 
 
 Sir John Lawrence, after an elaborate Argument, can discover no other 
 
 Cause but the Greased Cartridges ...... 280 
 
 The fallacious Character of this Conclusion ..... 280 
 
 The Cause, in the opinion of the thoughtful Natives of India . . 281 
 
 The real Cause of the Mutiny — Bad Faith — and the attempt to force 
 
 Western Ideas on the Eastern People ..... 282 
 
 Bad Faith towards the Sipahis illustrated by the Action of Government 
 
 on the Batta Question ........ 288 
 
 The Discipline of the Army is undermined by the Head-quarter Staff in 
 
 India ......... 284 
 
 Kenewal of Bad Faith towards the Sipahis 285 
 
 The untoward and disastrous Kesult of that Renewal . . . 286 
 
 Wliat Oudh was to the Sipahis before Annexation .... 286 
 
 Oudh was misgoverned according to Western, but not according to 
 
 Eastern ideas ... ...... 287 
 
 The Manner in which the Annexation of Oudh was regarded by the 
 
 Sipahis, illustrated by an Accident ..... . 288 
 
 It deals the last Blow to the Confidence of the Sipahi in his foreign 
 
 Master 289 
 
 How the same Result was arrived at in the Minds of the Princes, Chiefs, 
 
 and Landowners of India ...... . 289 
 
 The System examined of granting a Life Annuity in exchange for a 
 
 Kingdom .......... 289 
 
 Causes which increased the bad Effect of the mere Annexation of 
 
 Oudh 291 
 
 The real authors of the Mutiny — the Maulavi ..... 292 
 
 The Conspirators discover the Cartridge and use it as their Instrument 
 
 to seduce the Sipahis ........ 292 
 
 Examination of the different Modes in which the Provinces which rose 
 
 against us, and those which remained loyal, were administered . 293 
 
 Lord Canning in 1857 . . . . . . ... . 296 
 
 Influence upon him of Lord Dalhousie’s Prestige and Lord Dalhousie’s 
 
 Councillors .......... 296 
 
 Lord Canning, as he stood unshackled in 1858 297 
 
 The real Greatness of his Character is then shown in all its different 
 
 Phases 297 
 
 Lord Elphinstone — his Prescience, his Decision, his high and lofty 
 
 Courage ........... 298 
 
 His generous Confidence towards his Subordinates .... 299 
 
 His Correspondence evidences his Foresight ..... 300 
 
 He is nominated by three successive Secretaries of State to succeed 
 
 Lord Canning in the event of a Vacancy ..... 301 
 
 Lord Harris — his Energy, Foresight, Devotion ..... 301 
 
 England has no Reason to blush for the Englishmen and English- 
 women of the Mutiny . , . , , . , 301 
 
XXIV 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. V. 
 
 appendix a. — M ore detoils about Kfrwi : • • * * 
 
 appendix B.— Tantia Topi’s Story of his Life . . . • 
 
 appendix C. — Trial of the King of Dehli— 
 
 Ca^ The Judge Advocate-General’s summing-up t a, ‘ 
 
 (h) The Letter of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab (Sir John 
 Lawrence) on the Trial and Sentence . . . • 
 
 LISTS OF MAPS. 
 
 Map of the Southern Maratha Country • * „ . ' 
 
 Map to illustrate the Central Inaian Campaign of Sir 
 
 Hugh Rose . • ‘it 
 
 Map to illustrate the final Campaign mOudh . 
 
 Map to illustrate the Pursuit of Tantia Topi 
 
 to face page 
 
 to face page 
 to face page 
 to face page 
 
 PAGE 
 
 303 
 
 304 
 
 311 
 
 350 
 
 14 
 
 162 
 
 186 
 
 322 
 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY. 
 
 BOOK XIII.— BOMBAY, CENTRAL INDIA, AND THE DAKHAN. 
 
 [ 1857 .] 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 LORD ELPHINSTONE, ME. SETON-KAER, AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 The western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long 
 narrow strip of country of varying breadth and ir- * 
 
 regular outline. Including the province of Sindh, S; 
 tne administration of which is subordinate to it it Bombay 
 occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the 
 mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and 
 from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisiir. It is 
 thus bounded on the west by Baluchistan and the Arabian Sea • 
 O'! east by the Madras PresidenoU 
 Haidarabad, Barar, the central provinces, the states forming 
 the central Indian agency, and Rajputana; on the north by 
 Bhawalpur, the Panjab, and Baluchistan. The area ^ 
 
 ol the British portions of the Presidency is one 
 hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and 
 thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabi- 
 tants; but, in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or 
 rather there were in 1857 , native states comprising 
 seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty The native 
 square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The 
 principal of these were Barodah, KAthiwar, Kachh, 
 
 ShaipM. Kohlapur, Sawantwarl, 
 
 VOL. Y. 
 
2 
 
 LOED ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FOEJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 In 1857 Lord ElpMnstone was Governor of Bombay. A man 
 Lord El bin Culture and ability, Lord Elpbinstone bad enjoyed 
 stone. ^ more experience of India than generally falls to tho 
 lot of governors unconnected with the civil or 
 military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 
 to 1842 ; and, although the records of the Madras Presidency 
 throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events 
 within its borders, yet the first Afghan war, with its early, 
 success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the 
 natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise 
 His re ions judgment On the part of the rulers. 
 
 These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently 
 qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He 
 was called, however, to deal principally with administrative 
 details. The manner in which he performed these duties 
 gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for 
 improving the resources of the country, and for establishing 
 means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this 
 day. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh 
 war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 
 inindta.^^ 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late 
 Colonel William Havelock, who had been his mili- 
 tary secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the 
 head-quarters of the British army before Labor. On the trans- 
 fer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, a proceeding following the 
 treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of 
 the party which first visited that famous valley. After a 
 residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladakh 
 by the Husora valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up 
 the Gilgit valley — in those days an utterly unknown country. 
 Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, 
 to renounce this expedition. Lord Elphinstone crossed the 
 Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman 
 by whom that journey had been attempted. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone 
 was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he 
 to that office experience such as few men, 
 post. not trained in the Indian services, could command. 
 
 His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial 
 bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of 
 the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was 
 
1857 .] 
 
 LOED ELPHINSTONE’S ENEKGY. 
 
 invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm 
 and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all 
 with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on every 
 occasion likely to test his action, the possession of a guiding 
 mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct 
 to its aim. Ihe crisis of 1857 was just one of those 
 occurrence.s which Lord Elphinstone was consti- ZZSSZ 
 tutionaliy nttecl to cope with. He at once realised crisis of the 
 its difaculty and its danger, and rose equal to 
 encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of 
 a contemporary writer, generally unfavourable to him, he dis- 
 played “ the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy.” * * 
 
 n T judgment was proved by the action taken 
 
 by Eord Elphinstone when the news reached him of 
 the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath Lord LordEiphin- 
 Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that ?nTe’aring o? 
 event. It happened that General Ashburnham, 
 commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to 
 China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance 
 impress the Governor, so certain did he feel 
 that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met 
 at once by bringing large reinforcements of Euro- 
 pean troops without delay into the country, that he 
 urg^ General Ashburnham to proceed immediately 
 to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the 
 General expeditionary force, to the Governor- 
 
 • ^ circumstance that the war with Persia had 
 
 a successful conclusion. Fortunate, like- 
 wise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of 
 Bombay. Lord Elp^nstone thus felt himself equal to the most 
 
 t at once authorised the Commissioner of 
 bindh, Mr. Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusi- 
 
 to the Panjab. He arranged that 
 the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia 
 should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bom- 
 bay, to Calcu^tta. The more speedily to carry out 
 ns object, he caused vessels to be equipped and on their way- 
 prepared for the reception of these regiments, so 
 
 at on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports 
 
 with refe- 
 rence to 
 General 
 Ashburnham; 
 
 B 2 
 
 * The Friend of India. 
 
4 
 
 LORD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 wRicli were conveying them from Bushir they might be 
 transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and 
 effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport 
 into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to in- 
 re arding the Campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did 
 
 Madras Artii- more. He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a 
 bay company of Madras artillery which happened to be 
 
 on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay 
 artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent 
 instructions to the officer commanding at Disa to hold the 83rd 
 regiment and a troop of horse artillery at that station in readi- 
 ness to march on Ajmir, on the sole condition that, 
 S\ssSt^R ^ in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure 
 pdtana, of the Only European troops in the vicinity of 
 Ahmadabad and Gujrat might be hazarded without 
 the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by 
 the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many 
 European troops as could be collected. Lord Elphinstone char- 
 tered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company, the Pottinger and 
 the Madras, provided them with all necessary stores, 
 and despatched them, under the command of Captain 
 Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the 
 Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Gover- 
 nors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the 
 crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they 
 could spare. 
 
 I may here state that the result of these applications was 
 Result of his might have been anticipated from the cha- 
 
 ap^pHcaSons racters of the men to whom they were addressed, 
 tius^^ Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, 
 
 embarked on board the Pottinger the head-quarters 
 and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carr 3 ^ Not 
 content with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and 
 despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that 
 regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be 
 spared from the treasury of the island. 
 
 Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, ani- 
 mated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately 
 happened that an unusually large force of British 
 regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape 
 Town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them 
 
 and Bends to 
 the Mauritius 
 and the Cape 
 for reinforce, 
 ments. 
 
 and to thft 
 Cape. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 SIR GEORGE GREY. 
 
 5 
 
 -as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay ; the 
 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 
 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he des- 
 patched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently 
 procure. 
 
 The despatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey bad 
 painted the urgency of India’s needs in terms so 
 glowing that that able Governor considered himself Sifty^nobiy 
 justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate assumed by 
 to direct the commanders of the transports conveying 
 the China expeditionary army so far to divert from 
 their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of 
 this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which 
 met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, 
 in every case, to bear up for Calcutta. 
 
 To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord 
 Elphinstone that reinforcements should promptly 
 be sent from England by the overland route — a 
 route till then untrodden by British troops — that, gests sending 
 telegraphic communication being open with Cal- gteSfto 
 cutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the England, ^ 
 propriety of sending to England a special steamer, 
 which he had ready, with despatches, impressing upon the Home 
 Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt 
 that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden 
 steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated 
 the ordinary mail steamer by three or four days at the least. 
 This, too, at a time when the most important events 
 ‘depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord but Lord 
 Canning did not view matters in the same light, 
 
 He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail 
 service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent. 
 
 Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures 
 taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the 
 actual occurrences in the various parts of the prec?utfonary 
 Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment measures 
 to one material result which followed them. Those cordeY^' 
 measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious 
 outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base 
 of operations against central India and Kajputana, and they 
 preserved the line of communication between those provinces 
 and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is difii- 
 
6 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND ME. FOKJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 cult to over-estimate the importance thus gained, solely by the 
 exercise of timely foresight. 
 
 A rather serious breach of the law at Bharoch in the month 
 Lord El bin ^^^7’ Originating in a dispute between the Parsis 
 stone meets^a and the Mubummadans, might have led to im- 
 in^Bharoch^^ portant consequences but for the firmness with 
 which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer 
 commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. 
 The spirit of Lord Elphinstone’s action may be judged from the 
 fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched a 
 hundred and fifty men of the 86th to Siirat — a movement of 
 troops which left only three hundred and fifty European troops 
 of all arms in Bombay itself. 
 
 The riot at Bharoch was, for a time, the only indication of 
 ill-feeling manifested in the western Presidency, 
 poUcy^of^^^ and it was entirely unconnected with the great 
 defence^ revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphin- 
 stone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a 
 single efibrt to carry out the policy which he was convinced 
 was the only sound policy — the policy of offensive defence. 
 Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a con- 
 venient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and 
 hold the great line of road between Bombay and 
 line between Agra. Not Only would the line thus secured form 
 Bombay and ^ base for ulterior operations, but a great moral 
 advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the 
 crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought that 
 any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of 
 folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the 
 approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth 
 and meet it. A column marching towards the 
 north-west would encounter the elements which, 
 having brewed there disturbance, were eager to 
 spread it, and, encountering, would annihilate them. 
 The presence of such a column, marching confidently 
 to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, per- 
 haps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have 
 been engendered in the minds of the native princes 
 Tewforasa states bordered on this line of communica- 
 
 coiumn under tion. For these reasons, then, at a very early period 
 of the crisis, Lord Elphin stone proposed in council, 
 and ordered, the formation of a column, under tho 
 
 and, by ad- 
 vancing to 
 meet the evil 
 coming from 
 outside, to 
 prevent it 
 entering 
 witbin. 
 
 General 
 Woodbum. 
 
1857.] 
 
 THE POLICY OF OFFENSIVE DEFENCE. 
 
 June. 
 
 It is ordered 
 to march to 
 Mau. 
 
 command of Major-General Woodbnrn, to open out communica- 
 tions with central India and the North-West Provinces. 
 
 The column formed in consequence, under the command of 
 Major-General Woodhurn, was but small in numbers. 
 
 It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light 
 Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain column. 
 Woolcombe’s horse-battery of artillery, and a 
 pontoon train. It set out from Puna on the 8th of June, under 
 orders to march with all speed to Mau, with the 
 view to save that place while there was yet time, 
 and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in 
 Malwa, and along the northern frontier of the 
 Bombay Presidency.* 
 
 The state of afiairs at Mau and at Indur was such as to 
 demand the most prompt action on the part of General 
 Woodburn. It was just possible that, making 
 forced marches, he might approach so near to Indur bSe^ ^ 
 as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The 
 dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed 
 their action. j* Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled 
 the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his 
 own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities 
 the necessity for General Woodburn to advance. 
 
 The city of Aurangabad — once the capital of the kingdom of 
 Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite 
 residence of the Emperor Aurangzib — occupies a 
 prominent and important position in the north-western corner of 
 the dominions of the Nizam. The corner of which it was the 
 capital juts like a promontory into British territory. To the 
 east and north-east it touches western Barar and the central 
 provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the 
 northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the 
 northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance 
 of Aurangabad, lies Malwa. 
 
 Disaffection was known to reign in Malwa, and it was of the 
 highest Consequence that that disaffection should not spread 
 southward to Bombay. But at Aurangabad, the capital of the 
 small promontory I have described, almost touching Malwa on 
 one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides. 
 
 Aurangabad. 
 
 * Lord Elphinstone’s letter to General Woodburn 
 t Vide Vol. III. page 137. 
 
8 
 
 LOED ELPHINSTONE AND IMR. FORJETT. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 were quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and 
 Garrison of ^ l>attery of artilleiy, of the Haidarahad Contingent. 
 AuVa^Swd. These regiments, commanded by British officers, 
 were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one 
 of them — the 1st Cavalry — had, in the early part of June, 
 displayed symptoms of disafi'ection. 
 
 Aurangabad is distant from Puna a hundred and thirty-eight 
 miles ; from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, 
 sixty-eight miles. In tbe ordinary course of events. General 
 Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with 
 all speed to Mau, would not have entered the dominions of the 
 Nizam. It happened, however, that the authors of 
 the disafi’ection I have spoken of as prevailing at 
 garrison. Aurangabad proceeded on the 13th of June to more 
 open demonstrations, and in consequence General 
 Woodburn received, not from Lord Elphinstone, instructions to 
 deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and 
 to march upon Aurangabad. 
 
 In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangabad, I 
 may state that a rumour had reached that place that 
 S^disaffeL cavalry regiment stationed there would be 
 
 tion. required to join General Woodburn’s column and 
 
 march with him on Dehli. The rumour was 
 founded upon truth, for it had been intended that the regiment 
 in question should join General Woodburn’s force. But to the 
 minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived 
 under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the 
 Mughul, the idea of fighting against the King of Dehli was 
 peculiarly distasteful.* The^^ showed their dislike on the 
 moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry 
 openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and — it was stated at the 
 time — swore to murder their officers it pressure to march against 
 Dehli were put upon them. Fortunately, the commanding 
 Judicious officer. Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He 
 
 conduct of summoned the native officers to his quarters, and 
 
 AbKt^ discussed the question with them. The native 
 officers declared that, for their own part, they were 
 ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their 
 men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott 
 
 * The splendid manner in which the Haidarabad cavalry atoned for this 
 momentary disaffection will he found recorded in subsequent pages. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 DISAFFECTION AT AUKANGIbAd. 
 
 9 
 
 then, after comnninicating with the Eesident, resolved to adopt 
 a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they 
 would not he required to march on Dehli. In this jg 
 way order was restored. So little confidence, stored, but 
 however, in the stability of the compromise was felt 
 on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade 
 themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry 
 boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the 
 city. 
 
 Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd 
 of June, General Woodburn’s column entered Auran- 
 gabad, marched at once to the ground occupied by ^^rs^Au- 
 the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up langsibM and 
 their arms. With the exception of one troop of the mutineLs!^ 
 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men 
 of that tronp six minutes to consider the course they would 
 pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of sub- 
 mitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In 
 this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some 
 three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, 
 and order was restored. 
 
 General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander- 
 in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of 
 Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangabad had ^toneurgi^' 
 not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation AVoodbum to 
 of the field force from the direct road to Mau. He mIu^ 
 thought that, in the presence of two dangers, that 
 which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay 
 from central India and Malwa was greater even than the 
 disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizam. Forced, 
 however, to accept General Woodburn’s action at Aurangabad, 
 he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Mau. 
 “ I am persuaded,” he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, 
 “ that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising 
 in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort ; 
 and, if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it 
 down speed! 1}^ But I feel confident that it will not happen — 
 at all events, for the present. If you allow the insurrection to 
 come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we 
 shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance you 
 are able to secure Mau you will also, in all probability, 
 save Mehidpiir, Sagar, Hoshangabad,” &c. Lord Elphinstone 
 
10 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND ME. FOKJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception 
 he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same 
 day, to Sir Henry Somerset : “ I am very much obliged to 
 you,” he wrote, “for the perusal of General Woodburn’s letter. 
 I conclude that since it was written he has received his 
 orders to continue his march to Mau with all possible expe- 
 dition.” 
 
 But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to 
 the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25thy 
 howeiCT^e- to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons 
 lap to try his which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at 
 prisoners. Aurangabad. These reasons might, in the presence 
 of the greater danger at Mau, be justly termed trivial. 
 They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his 
 departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four 
 prisoners by court-martial. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged 
 b}^ the general in a very decided manner. “ I wish 
 LordEiphin- you to remember,” he wrote to him on the 27th of 
 June, “ that it was for the object of relieving Mau, 
 nr°es^hfni*^*^^ and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous 
 onwards. regiment at Aurangabad, that the field force was 
 formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it 
 was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am 
 perfectly aware that, in these times, circumstances may occur 
 to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not 
 think they have yet occurred.” He then proceeded in a few 
 forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time 
 upon trials,* and the necessity of disarming regiments which 
 might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the 
 first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after 
 the departure of the British troops. 
 
 This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn 
 on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th 
 OT-"' Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, 
 dered further instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing 
 hiJ^Sngth. of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Puna. This 
 diminution of his available European strength, al- 
 ready extremely small, following immediately upon the departure 
 
 ♦ “ To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the 
 question in these times.’* 
 
1857.] DIFFICULTIES OF ELPHINSTONE’S POSITION. 11 
 
 from the Presidency of General Woodbnrn’s force, and accom- 
 panied by reports received from many district officers to the 
 effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so 
 affected Lord Elphinstone, that for a moment he felt inclined 
 to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangabad. Indeed, 
 on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a 
 letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappoint- SaS^ment, 
 ment at having to request him to give up a measure causes Lord 
 which he believed to be of great importance. But 
 the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning 
 he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme 
 advantage of saving central India. On the 29th, then, he 
 wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that 
 portion of his previous letter which had given him a momenL^’^ 
 authority to defer the projected movement. 
 
 But before this letter could reach General Woodburn that 
 officer had become incapacitated for command by 
 ill-health. The Government promptly replaced him S 
 by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then is replaced 
 commanding the 3rd Kegiment Native Infantry. 
 
 Pending the arrival of that officer^ the command of 
 
 the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Eegiment 
 
 Native Infantry. 
 
 Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had 
 only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to 
 the Commander-in- Chief a letter in which he dwelt Ss woS^' 
 upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangabad in bum’s opi- 
 the then condition of the Nizam’s regiments. More 
 unfortunately still, Major Follett’s representations were strongly 
 supported by the head of the army. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone’s reason and instincts still told him that 
 the further delay thus proposed was the delay of 
 red tape — the natural consequence of the absence LordMpWn- 
 of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in 
 a very difficult position. He was not a soldier. 
 
 And although he would unhesitatingly have regarded the 
 scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he 
 could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to 
 those scruples by the officer who was Commander-in-Chief of 
 the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in 
 deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somer- 
 set, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay. 
 
12 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND ME. FOKJETT. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 July. 
 
 ^?onve?led* mature decision. 
 
 to Lord El- 
 phinsione’s 
 views. 
 
 A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On 
 the 7th of July, Major Follett convicted himself and 
 the chief who supported him of a hasty and pre- 
 On the 7th of July that officer 
 wrote to Lord Elphinstone,* declared that it was per- 
 fectly feasible to leave Aurangabad, and announced 
 his intention to march for Mau on the 10th, leaving 
 a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the 
 Aurangabad cantonment. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset 
 to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous 
 orders. This was, in effect, carried out. 
 
 The force led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, 
 who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangabad on 
 Stuart comes 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Mau 
 
 to command and Indur, but not too late, under the ^guidance of 
 sets mirfor^*^ Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asirgarh, to 
 Asirgarh. restore British authorit}’’ in central India. To the 
 further movements of this column I shall return in 
 a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier 
 was due solely to Lord Elphinstone. j* Had he been unfettered, 
 and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it 
 
 ♦ It is probable that Major FoUett’s change of opinion was due to the receipt 
 of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through 
 the officer commanding at Aurangabad. This letter contained convincing 
 proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing. 
 
 t “ I quite agree with you,” wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 
 27th of July, “ in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the 
 force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, 
 but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, 
 every one of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangabad 
 would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that 
 the mutinous troops shoidd be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered 
 inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the 
 
 whole population was against us. Mr. , the Deputy Commissioner in North 
 
 Barar, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to 
 say how many, armed Musalmans in his district, who would rise the moment 
 
 the column was ordered to move. Colonel , who commands the Madras 
 
 cavalry regiment at , said it was utterly impossible to send half his 
 
 regiment over to Aurangabad, as the people in that neighbom-hood would 
 attack the station.” It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, 
 in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the 
 opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the 
 forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position 
 in India who realised how the mutiny should be met. 
 
1857.] CKEDIT DUE TO LOKD ELPHINSTONE. 13 
 
 would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central 
 India. 
 
 But the despatch of Colonel Stuart’s column to central India 
 was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for 
 the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the 
 splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sindh was 
 denuded for the benefit of the Panjab. Again, the western 
 Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it 
 by Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General’s agent in 
 Eajputana.* The greater part of the garrison of Disa, con- 
 sisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one 
 squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred 
 men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th 
 Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column. Lord 
 and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just 
 then nominated Brigadier- General in Eajpiitana. column at 
 Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this ofcSS^^ 
 arrangement — an arrangement which gave General Lawrence. 
 Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability 
 and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the 
 great Eajput chiefs, f Further, on the 23rd of July, four 
 companies of the 86th Eegiment w^ere sent from Maligaon to 
 join Colonel Stuart’s column on its way to Man. Marching 
 direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that 
 column had arrived at Man. 
 
 Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a 
 policy of aggressive defence alike to keep the evil 
 from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces 
 beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mutiny in the 
 mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head sidSicy^ 
 on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny 
 in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of 
 the columns whose movements I have just recorded. 
 
 The southern Maratha country comprises the territory 
 between Satarah and the Madras Presidency to the southern 
 north and south, and between the Nizam’s dominions Marathii 
 and the western ghats to the east and west. It has 
 an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of 
 about three millions, for the most part of pure 
 Maratha blood. Within this country are the two 
 
 * Vol. III. page 170. 
 
 t Vide pages 171 to 174, Vol. HI. 
 
14 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 collectorates, Belgaon and Dharwar, the native state Kolhapur, 
 and native numerous Small semi-independent states, each 
 
 staters! with an annual revenue rising up to, hut in no case 
 exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the 
 principal of these were Sangli, Miraj, Savamir, Kurandwar, 
 Jamkhandi, Nargund, and Mudhol. 
 
 Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of 
 
 Character of Berkeley Seton-Karr, had 
 
 Mi\ George political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remark- 
 Berkeiey natural abilities, and these had been developed 
 
 by an education which had continued up to the 
 date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the 
 rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to 
 adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs 
 which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless 
 in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of 
 ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm 
 and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest 
 extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimi- 
 dation or violence. 
 
 The internal condition of the southern Maratha country when 
 Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, 
 daiorTofSe" twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of 
 ^uthern brooding discontent. The annexation by the 
 
 coSy! Government of India of Barar and of Oudh had 
 
 been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, 
 py an Act known as Act XI. of 1852, under the operation of 
 which an Inam Commission was empowered to call 
 CommiSon. npon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds 
 of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this 
 Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast 
 mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvi- 
 dent, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that 
 thirty years’ possession conferred an irrefragable title, had 
 failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments 
 of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever 
 existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India 
 subsequent to the death of Aurangzib, had won their estates 
 by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a 
 paper barrier — in that age utterly valueless — but they had 
 transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers 
 who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose 
 
1857.] THE INAm COMMISSION. 15 
 
 aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as 
 without it they were contemptible. In other cases, 
 men who had acquired land in the general scramble The manner 
 which preceded the downfall of the Peshwa’s commSiJn^^ 
 Government, had transmitted their acquisitions affected many 
 to their children, fortified by no better titles than alid^an?-^^^ 
 entries in the village account-books. To both these owners, 
 -classes the Inam Commission had been a com- 
 mission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maratha 
 country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and 
 small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one 
 thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of con- 
 fiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, 
 looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which 
 was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of 
 their impoverished neighbours.^ Can it be wondered at, then, 
 that Mr. Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under 
 these circumstances in May 1856, found the native conTentl^' 
 landowners of the Southern Maratha country in a 
 state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting 
 into open disafiection only by a sense of the utter hopelessness 
 of success ? 
 
 But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, 
 and, by its connection with the religious feelings of 
 all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situa- IdoptiS,^ 
 tion. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu 
 landowmer, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and 
 
 * In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from 
 desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inam 
 Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually 
 possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the 
 Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was 
 demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently 
 dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall 
 of the Peshwa. The Inam Commission rendered substantial justice to these 
 men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed 
 since the dominions of the Peshwa had been brought under British sway, and 
 that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, 
 the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inam Commission had 
 enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had 
 gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any 
 which could he urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. 
 No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inam Commission was an 
 instrument of tyranny. 
 
16 
 
 LORD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by 
 his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to 
 provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so 
 adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordmarily 
 areii io lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his 
 
 rite necessary religion to believe that his own hajDpiness in the 
 Hindli Other woi’ld depends upon the transmission to the 
 adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is 
 ever careful to instil into his. mind that he actually is of the 
 family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its 
 traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless 
 is to the Hindu landowner not blessed with offspring an ever- 
 present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, de- 
 spairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such 
 an heir might even make him reckless. 
 
 But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances. 
 The policy pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of 
 of Lord Dal- absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown 
 no respect for the principle of adoption. Under 
 its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to 
 adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This 
 Serds?of refusal had been extended to the landowners of the 
 this rite to southern Maratha country — amongst others, to the 
 important chief of Nargund. The prohibition pro- 
 duced consternation. The effeminate early training 
 of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary 
 to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a 
 family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The pro- 
 hibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, 
 could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, 
 the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family 
 after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, 
 one and all, that their turn would come ; that their names, too, 
 would perish ; that none would succeed to com- 
 b^^this J^^^orate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, 
 i-rfusai.^ and to appease their manes by yearly celebrations.^ 
 In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, 
 hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced 
 a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was 
 supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. 
 For the moment, indeed, the aggrieved landowners had no 
 thought to combine against the British Government. But 
 
1857 .] 
 
 DISCONTENT OF THE LANDHOLDERS. 
 
 17 
 
 thougli tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which 
 is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil 
 simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The 
 British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. 
 But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering 
 the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that 
 their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair. 
 
 Such was the state of the southern Maratha country when, 
 in May, 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it. 
 
 But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced 
 mind had mastered the causes of the discontent Mar^thiC 
 which he found everywhere prevailing. It was MayVisse. 
 difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy 
 of the Government and who sympathised with the native 
 landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost 
 every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. 
 The influential chief of Nargund had been denied the rights of 
 adoption in terms which — owing to the faultiness of the trans- 
 lation of the original English — added insult to injury. Other 
 landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the 
 country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged fiom their 
 loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted — the Inam 
 Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption — and 
 plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in 
 the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only 
 act which would have restored confidence — to 
 moderate the action of the Inam Commission and powers, in re- 
 to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory grievances' 
 and sympathising as he was, was he more able to restricted;’ 
 reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the ' 
 
 new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. 
 But all that an earnest and high-minded mau could ' 
 
 do he did. He visited every landowner. Their . 
 
 individual characters he carefully studied. To fluence to 
 their complaints he listened with patience. He met dSllraeund. 
 them generally with such explanations of the policy 
 of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its 
 general intention ; whilst in cases of individual 
 hardship — which he was powerless to remedy — he SnSSic^of 
 endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and theiand- 
 injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In 
 this way ho won their confidence. He made the landowners 
 
 VOL. V. G 
 
Effect pro- 
 duced in the 
 Maratha 
 country by 
 the revolt at 
 Mirath, 
 
 18 LORD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FOR JETT. [1857. 
 
 feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real 
 friend. More it was impossible for bim to effect. Eegard for 
 the individual in no wa}^ obliterated resentment at the action 
 of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to 
 
 ranhle in eacb bieast. ^ iv/roTT 
 
 Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st ^ May, 1857, 
 the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dehli reached 
 Belgaon. The effect of this news, and of the worse 
 tidino-s which continued to follow, upon the peoples 
 of the southern Maratha country, was electric. The 
 Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense 
 pitch of excitement. The Hindus, on the other 
 hand, were far more reticent, and for some tin^ concealed their 
 inner feelin^’^s by an impassive exterior. British authority 
 seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to 
 believe that it could be suddenly destroyed. 
 
 Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis 
 The force at Belgaon consisted of one regiment ot 
 The means at infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of 
 
 Mv.seton- artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, 
 
 composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding 
 upwards of four hundred women and children be- 
 longing to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more 
 thal a hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mastered 
 in the place ; whilst between Belgaon and Puna and S^iolapur 
 there were more than two thousand native, and only a hundred 
 and twenty European, soldiers. The defences of Belgaon con- 
 sisted of a^ fort nLdy a mile in circumference, the ramparts of 
 which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in seveial 
 places! In a military point of view the place was, m fact, un- 
 tenable but it had, nevertheless, to be regarded as the sole 
 refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some 
 ^ five hundred including children. _ Belgaon was the 
 
 General head-Quarters of the southern division ol the army, 
 and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 
 11th of May to assune that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once 
 
 placed himself in communication with timeTmu 
 
 Ms direction, such improvements as in so brief a time we e 
 
 •nraoti cable were made to the defences. ^ 
 
 ^ During the week or two following, the unusual 
 
 exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evi- 
 tiie north- effect produced by the had news Irom 
 
 Karr’s dis- 
 posal totally 
 inadequate. 
 
3857.1 
 
 INFLUENCE OF NANA sIhIB. 
 
 19 
 
 Relationship 
 of many of 
 the southern 
 Marathi 
 chiefs to 
 S^hib. 
 
 the north-west But m the early part of June Mr. Seton- 
 Xati discovered that an emissary from that part of India 
 had arrived some days before, and that he had teen in daily 
 coMiiminication with the Muhammadan leaders. Prompt to ac^ 
 in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence 
 * ivr ® accomplished by peaceable 
 means Ml. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be 
 arrested and confined. He did not act one minute 
 too soon. The feipahis, many of them natives of Oudh, had 
 previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. 
 
 tbat they sym- 
 pathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that 
 they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. 
 
 the pern orMrSct displayed itself did 
 
 le pciil ot Ml. Seton-Karr s position increase. It was still 
 
 further augmented by the action of Nana S4hib at KShphr 
 towards ihe end of June. To understand this it is 
 requisite only to remember that Nana Sahib claimed 
 to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually 
 was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwas • 
 and that some of the most important estates in the 
 southern Maratha country— the estates of Sangli, of 
 Jamkhaiidi,y Miraj, and of Kurandwar— were held by branches 
 denenda^'T'** family, the most illustrious of the 
 
 ma^rM t^tbffl Jhe fact that Nana S4hib was 
 
 maiiied to the first cousin of the chief of Sangli; that his most 
 
 himlelf'on the“‘ <=liiefs uncle; and that the chief 
 
 low and Tnt^ majority, had evinced a taste for 
 
 dangm of theToZ^on^ 
 
 formwlbir^’^p discontent was hardly less 
 
 formidable Prominent amongst these were the 
 
 ^ small fortress built on the Jiiedpcon- 
 .m f ^i^^^ratpur, forty-five miles from Belg aon — i>esdf8of 
 a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his 
 
 “ tTt T cTmmissL, who was 
 
 communications "wut Cbat'“ thfces Cr 
 
 chieftain whose family, settled Ir many geneXns 
 amongst the forests which stretch onlards from 
 
 wild po?ulatii"T/th of 
 
 ^ ^ Jf^^igles, and who, in his own person, 
 
 c 2 
 
and of 
 Wantmuri, 
 
 20 LORD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. [1857 
 
 had been reduced to penury by the actwn of the same 
 arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been 
 soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everytlung 
 to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him 
 a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to 
 sever the communications of the British with the sea hot 
 less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Desai of Kittur. 
 
 The retainers of this family, twenty-four years 
 of Kittur, previously, had crowned a rash insni rection by a 
 gallant deface of their fort, only twenty-six /^o^ 
 
 Belgaon, in the siege of which a political agent of that day 
 had^ fallen. The last representative of the^ race was then 
 living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, 
 commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole 
 Lingayat population. He, too, had nothing to l^Dse every- 
 thing to hope, from rebellion. His father-in-law the Desai of 
 ^ Wantmuri, though a cautious and prudent man, 
 
 did not possess the strength of character to resist 
 extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co- 
 reHgionists. Add to these the chief of ^arg^^d copnec ted 
 ^ with some of the most powerful families in the 
 
 also of the southern Maratha country, and known to be 
 
 thoroughly disaffected; add, moreover, that the 
 population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had 
 retained the arms which had all but gained empire for the 
 Marathas; and the reader may gather some idea 
 of the position which, difficult in May, became 
 dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening 
 Rs every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent ot 
 
 ^“po’r long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the 
 ^ resources suggested to him by bis long experience, 
 and by his thorough acquaintance with native 
 character. But as time went on, each post bringing 
 with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the 
 provinces of the north-west, that gentleman deemed 
 it at last his duty to bring the situation of the 
 provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He 
 did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the 
 ^rlt difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of 
 nrmelfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to 
 leLde Bfown Preffaen^^ that he might crush rebellion upon 
 
 causes appre- 
 
 Mr. Seton- 
 Karr applies 
 for extended 
 powers and 
 responsi- 
 bility. 
 
1857.] 
 
 SETON-KAKR’S EXTENDED POWERS. 
 
 21 
 
 its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or 
 other. He merely asked that his own powers might be ex- 
 tended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of 
 meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. 
 It was a noble request ; especially noble at that 
 crisis ; especially noble considering the resources at 
 his disposal — a native regiment in a state of veiled with, 
 rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about a 
 hundred Europeans — to meet the rebellion which might occur 
 at any moment. The request was complied with. 
 
 Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The 
 use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy 
 was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr. Seton- 
 Karr enioyed advantages which would have been He graduaiiy 
 denied to many men. During the year immediately plans 
 preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated 
 friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he 
 had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he 
 now tested — and in the most cases with the happiest results^ 
 Valuable information was placed at his disposal ; the inter- 
 communication of the disaffected was prevented ; a vigilant 
 watch upon their movements was seeured. In this way, and 
 by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing 
 upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was Se confi^^ 
 loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really 
 felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving 
 the British complete master of the situation, Mr. Seton-Karr 
 succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the 
 dreaded explosion. 
 
 Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On the 31st of 
 July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhapur, 
 plundered the treasury, and, after murdering such KoiSpur! 
 officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghats. 
 
 Kolhapur is sixty -five miles from Belgaon. Communications 
 
 between the 27th Eegiment and the 29th at the 
 
 latter place had been frequent. At Dharwar, with*respect 
 
 forty-two miles from Belgaon in a direction opposite 
 
 to that of Kolhapur, the 28th Eegiment had been 
 
 for some time on the very verge of revolt. Mr. Seton-Karr 
 
 was thus occupying a position between one station where the 
 
 garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which 
 
 was on the verge of mutiny — the troops at the central point 
 
22 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. [1857, 
 
 August. 
 
 Mr. Seton- 
 Karr and 
 General 
 Lester adopt 
 plans for pre- 
 venting the 
 spread of 
 mutiny to 
 Belgtlon, 
 
 which 
 
 succeed. 
 
 being also infected. It happened, however, that the native 
 officer of the 29th — the regiment stationed at Belgaon — who was 
 the secret leader of the disaffected, one Thakur Singh, was known 
 to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once, and 
 before the news of the mutiny at Kolhapur was 
 generally known at Belgaon, entered into communi- 
 cation regarding this native officer with General 
 Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a 
 calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to 
 remove him honourably from the station. Such a 
 pretext Avas soon found. Two companies of the 
 29th, that of Thakur Singh being one of them, were 
 ordered on command to Badami, a small town some ninety 
 miles distant, near the south-western frontier of the Nizam’s 
 dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 
 2nd August, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhapur. When 
 the tidings of that mutiny reached the sipahis left behind at 
 Belgaon they were too disconcerted by the absence 
 of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune 
 seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary 
 from Jamkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate 
 outbreak, awed them into still longer inaction. 
 
 The danger, however, was by no 'means removed. Con- 
 currently with the events I have just related, Mr. 
 the Muharn-”^ Seton-KaiT discovered a plot of the Muhammadan 
 madanpopu- population of Belgaon. He soon found that this 
 BdgLn conspiracy had its ramifications at Kohlapur, at 
 Haidarabad, and at Puna, and that its outbreak was 
 to be signalled by the seizure of Belgaon itself. The arrest of 
 one of the chief conspirators at Puna seemed likely to pre- 
 cipitate the outbreak. Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner 
 received information of this event, than he secured 
 is baffled by local leaders at Belgaon, all of whom he had 
 
 Karr.^^^' Carefully watched. The evidence regarding some 
 ' of these proved defective, and they were discharged. 
 But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest 
 evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the 
 emissary from Jamkhandi just spoken of. 
 
 Three da 3 's before this execution — the 10th of August— a 
 small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the 
 authorities at Belgaon. Another detachment went on to pro- 
 duce a similar good effect in Dharwar. General Lester at 
 
1857.] SUCCESS OF ME. SETON-KAKK’S ADMINISTRATION. 23 
 
 The arrival of 
 reinforce- 
 ments 
 enables 
 General 
 Lester to 
 suppress the 
 ill-feeling in 
 Belgaon and 
 Duarwar. 
 
 once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 
 29th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment 
 were tried, one of them was condemned to death, 
 the remainder were transported for life. Taking 
 advantage of the good effect produced by these 
 proceedings, IVlr. Seton-Karr began the work of 
 disarming the district, including the towns of Bel- 
 gaon and Shahpur. On the 24th of August a further 
 reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detach- 
 ment of the 86th Foot. Its presence, combined with other pre- 
 cautionary measures he had taken, enabled Mr. Seton-Karr to 
 steer his state bark through the great Muhammadan festival of 
 the Muharram * without disturbance — and, for a time, the 
 Europeans in the southern Maratha country felt that they could 
 breathe freely. 
 
 Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of 
 firmness and tact, the result of good judgment 
 directing intimate acquaintance with the native 
 character, in guiding the territories committed to 
 his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the 
 mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the 
 chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported 
 by no force, that he had only his own energies upon 
 which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous 
 instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to 
 say that a single false step would have produced the most 
 fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the 
 southern Maratha country in revolt, but it would have kindled 
 a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of 
 the Nizam. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, 
 from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down 
 as his policy ; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open in- 
 surrection by auy unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or 
 had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity 
 would have been inevitable. Unhappily, sub- 
 sequent events proved only too truly the truth of 
 this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be 
 related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was 
 removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those 
 
 Eeview of 
 the success of 
 Mr. Seton- 
 Karr ’s mea- 
 sures and the 
 reason of that 
 success. 
 
 The truth of 
 the argument 
 proved by 
 subsequent 
 events. 
 
 * The “ Muharram ” is the name of the first Muhammadan month, held 
 sacred on account of the death of Husain, son of AU, who was killed by Yazid, 
 near Kufd, in the pashalic of Baghdad. 
 
24 
 
 LOED ELPHINSTONE AND ME. FOEJETT. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the 
 Inam Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did 
 not elapse before the rebellion, no longer controlled by good 
 management, began its c mrse with murder. All honour, then, 
 to the wise and far-seeing officer who kept it within bounds 
 when its outburst would have been far more dangerous.^ 
 
 Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to 
 Koihiipur accompany me for a brief period to Kolhapur. The 
 state of this name, ruled over by the descenrlants of 
 Sivaji, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous dis- 
 order and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded, 
 that in the year I have mentioned the British 
 Government was forced to interfere and to nominate 
 a minister to introduce order and good government. 
 The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a 
 Brahman named Daji Krishna Pandit, to deprive the corrupt 
 party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. 
 This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government 
 assumed the direct administration of the state during the 
 minority of the Eajah. Within this period, which did not 
 expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, 
 and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished ; the native 
 
 * The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr’s great 
 merits. On the 14th of September, 1857, he was informed that “ the Eight 
 Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great 
 anxiety and danger you have displayed a cahnness, an energy, and a foresight 
 which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government.” Again, 
 “ the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future 
 tranquillity of the southern Maratha country.” These and other commenda- 
 tions were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his 
 own hand, in which he alludes to “ the marked ability and success ” with which 
 Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on dis- 
 tinguished services rendered during the mutiny. Lord Elphinstone placed 
 Mr. Seton-Karr’s name third on the list of those who had deserved well of 
 their country. The honour was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning 
 observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight 
 from the fact, that out of the many who had rendered important services in 
 western India he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it 
 may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither 
 honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his 
 proud nature suffering from the immerited slight which had been cast upon 
 him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great 
 service which his country had failed to recognise. 
 
1857.] MUTINY AT KOLHIpI^R. 25 
 
 military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by 
 three English officers, was substituted for it. These 
 measures, especially those tor the disarmament oi the discontent 
 their forts and the disbandment of their native force, 
 though in view of the many previous rebellions 
 absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour 
 by the higher orders in Kolhapur, and had tended not a little 
 to the unpopularity of the paramount power. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny 
 broke out at Mirath. Hopes and wishes similar to 
 those which I have described as actuating the Mfrath 
 Muhammadan population of the Belgaon district, at 
 once took possession of the minds of their neighbours 
 in Kolhapur. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the 
 memories of plunder and corruption, and hating orderly govern- 
 ment, the occasion seemed singularly favourable. The town 
 of Kolhapur is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgaon. It 
 was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, 
 and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of 
 the native force. There were no European troops 
 nearer than Belgaon, and it was impossible to spare any from 
 that place. Satarah was eighty-one miles to the north, and 
 Puna, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one 
 miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhapur was 
 Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native 
 Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps. 
 
 I have already stated* that communications between the 
 27th Native Infantry at Kolhapur, the 29th at 
 Belgaon, and the 28th at Dharwar, had been frequent ^egimen\™ar 
 during the months of June and July. Supported, as the various 
 they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost cSumunSate' 
 openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, 
 these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Con- 
 certed and simultaneous action was only necessary to their 
 success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions 
 at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this 
 essential particular. It would seem that they plan, 
 reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding 
 to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should 
 be set by Kolhapur, and followed at once by Belgaon and 
 
 * Pages 21-2. 
 
26 
 
 LORD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT, 
 
 [1857». 
 
 Dharwar. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 
 31st of July at Kolhapur. But for the telegrajDh the regiment 
 at Belgaon would have received by express intelligence of the 
 movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph 
 forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his 
 priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the 
 calamity from that place. 
 
 But the mutiny at Kolhapur was a reality. During the 
 night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and 
 Kom^pur! detailed parties to attack their officers’ bungalows. 
 
 The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu hawaldar 
 ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to 
 escape from their houses before the Sipahis came up and poured 
 volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to 
 bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. 
 The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned 
 supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were 
 shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge 
 in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near 
 the lines of the Kolhapur local regiment, which happily re- 
 mained loyal.* 
 
 The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and 
 decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand 
 Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in 
 council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just 
 returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian 
 campaign. He was about to start for Piina under 
 the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, when the 
 telegram from Kolhapur was placed in the hands of the Governor. 
 
 Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob ; told him 
 all that had occurred at Kolhapur ; that he would 
 receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take 
 command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was 
 well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, 
 except perhaps the local regiments ; but that he would receive 
 special powers, and was to do the best he could.* 
 
 Lord Elphin- 
 Btone des- 
 patches Le 
 Grand Jacob 
 to Kolhapur. 
 Character of 
 Le Grand 
 Jacob. 
 
 Instructions 
 given to him. 
 
 ♦ Western India before and during the Mutinies, by Major-General Sir 
 George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B. 
 
 f The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, 
 as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram 
 he had sent to Kolhapur. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued. 
 
1857.] JACOB SENT TO QUELL THE MUTINY. 27 
 
 Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief 
 at Puna, pushed on then to Satarah, and found 
 there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The 
 i^ainy season was at its height, the track between 
 batarah and Kolhapur was composed of the black soil in which 
 during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their 
 girths, and wheels to their axles ; there were several 
 rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable Still 
 time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on 
 two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and ridino: 
 forward himself with a few men of the Southern Maratha Horse 
 a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhapur on the 14 th of 
 August, just before midnight. 
 
 How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhapur? 
 Ihere, according to all probabilities, there would 
 have been little to check the victorious progress of 
 the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the 
 pi;ompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened 
 otherwise. The Sipahis, greedy of plunder, went 
 first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. 
 
 Ihen, and then only, did they make their way to 
 M expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel 
 
 Mauglian had closed those gates. The Sipahis, not caring to 
 attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position 
 outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the halah’s 
 horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their 
 position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt 
 made by him to dislodge them. 
 
 It would seem that from this time the greater part of the 
 regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement 
 was probably hastened by the knowledge broue-ht return 
 to the Sipahis by some of their still feSani 
 comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied bv 
 Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the 
 Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant Sipahis 
 were checked ih this way; that the greater number betook 
 
 They were,” writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, “brief and satisfactorv ‘T om 
 
 ^ this, a person oTthe snS 
 
 ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary -^to 
 wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master I^have 
 
 and^reWT,'^ ^ru n, ^ the present emergency 
 
 and rely on my full support. — Western India, by Sir G. Le Jacob. * 
 
 reaches 
 Kolhapur. 
 The muti- 
 neers have, 
 meanwhile, 
 been checked 
 by Colonel 
 Maughan. 
 
28 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FOEJETT. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 themselves to the jungles ; whilst the minority, about forty in 
 number, returning to Kolhapur, reoccupied the outwork close to 
 the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime 
 been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Maratha 
 Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from 
 Satarah — a distance of eighty-one miles — without a halt. The 
 rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their 
 there outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the 
 
 mainderare attack. They uiiade a desperate defence — but, a 
 Mikd secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed 
 
 out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed 
 in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and 
 fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same 
 time. Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the 
 rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair ; but so 
 desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three 
 only escaped wounds or death. ^ 
 
 When, then. Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhapur, he found 
 that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most 
 rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in 
 fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the 
 great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no 
 evidence against any man of it. 
 
 Three days after his arrival. Colonel Jacob was reinforced by 
 the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from 
 nun2t?dis- Satarah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd 
 arm the 2 Vth Europeans from the coast — the same who had so 
 Infantry. Opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a 
 force at his disposal, he felt it would be imj)ossible 
 to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before 
 acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so 
 suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being 
 attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of 
 the mutineers marching away with their ai ms ; on the other, 
 the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local 
 corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their 
 countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. 
 Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I 
 have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the 
 
 * Jacob’s Western India. Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for 
 his conduct on this occasion. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 JABOB DISARMS THE MUTINEERS. 
 
 29 
 
 importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm 
 the men of the 27th Native Infantry. 
 
 He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. 
 Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, 
 with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of 
 the 2nd Europeans ; one hundred and eighty men 
 of the Southern Maratha Horse ; and three hundred and fifty 
 men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to 
 command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the 
 rebels. 
 
 But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. 
 The investigation which followed brought to light 
 many hidden springs of the movement. It had Eemarkson 
 been intended, it was discovered, to delay the 
 mutiny till the 10 th of August; but the action of action of the 
 the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in SiouSand 
 sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and officers, 
 prompted a sudden and ill-matured rising. This 
 premature movement ruined the plot. Acting hurriedly and 
 without concert with their brethren at Belgaon and Dharwar, 
 the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It 
 required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was 
 conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers con- 
 cerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of 
 Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of 
 Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow. 
 
 I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until 
 the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of 
 the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of Bombay, 
 an outbreak in that city. The Superintendent of 
 Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, 
 knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when 
 the news of the massacre of Kanhpur reached 
 Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into 
 the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans. He 
 reasoned justly that, as the Muhammadan population of the city 
 exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to 
 trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police. 
 
 It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was 
 entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon 
 whose conduct depended the safety of the importont town of 
 Bombay at this critical juncture. 
 
30 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. EOR.TETT. [1857. 
 
 The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General 
 General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was 
 
 ShortL^ an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly 
 
 understood the native soldier. He was quick to 
 decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into 
 execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be 
 depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Govern- 
 ment in the crisis which was then impending. 
 
 The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was * one of 
 Mr Forjett most remarkable men brought to the front by 
 
 the events of 1857. I have already stated that he 
 was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out, he 
 was in the very prime of manhood. He was so 
 qukSuenS" thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all 
 the languages of western and southern India, that it 
 was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most 
 astute of natives. Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of 
 this talent immediately prior to his nomination to 
 judgmeat.^'^ fffe office of Superintendent of Police. He had 
 gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and 
 judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern 
 Maratha country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone 
 Lord E^ipWn- Sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence 
 ofTerecTAe^ of the policc in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the 
 office of su- Presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the 
 ofPoUce'^^^^ offer. He at once expressed his willingness to 
 accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone 
 would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him 
 time to find out for himself the true character of the men he 
 had been summoned to command. The request was at once 
 granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a native and 
 went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the 
 son of a subahdar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so 
 completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste 
 invited him to eat with them. He found out the 
 Mr. Forjett’s character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, 
 oS^poiice. in a few days would be his instruments. Nor did 
 he neglect the European police. His experience 
 with some of them was remarkable. Of those whom he tested 
 
 * I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. 
 Forjett still lives in the vigour of healthy life. 
 
1857.] 
 
 ME. FORJETT. 
 
 31 
 
 not one refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fort- 
 night he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up 
 the office. I leave the reader to imagine the con- 
 sternation of his native subordinates when they 
 learned who it was whom they had now to serve. 
 
 But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, 
 represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett’s 
 qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to 
 all appearance, with no great strength, he united the qualities; 
 cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable 
 powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical 
 courage which despises danger ; it was that, and 
 much more. It was a courage set into action by a tuai^ourage ; 
 brain cool and clear — so cool and so clear that there 
 never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which 
 it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest 
 form of intellectual courage. 
 
 I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often 
 tested in the southern Maratha country prior to 
 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dis- enduraS;^^ 
 mounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural 
 products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a 
 bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the 
 stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a 
 similar journey in a similar manner, if to do this 
 day after day be a test of endurance, then Mr. SSr. 
 Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. 
 
 If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a 
 lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader 
 an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay. 
 
 During the two years which had elapsed between his 
 assumption of that office and the outbreak of the 
 mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete Lorf^Sphin- 
 confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those stone’s en- 
 who knew that high-minded nobleman are aware dence?° ' 
 that he never bestowed his trust until he had 
 assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully 
 worthy of it. 
 
 There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so 
 well qualified at the head of the departments regulating 
 order, it would seem that the repressal of disturbance in 
 Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which 
 
32 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND ME. FOKJETT. [1857. 
 
 militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great 
 disparity between the numbers of European and 
 o^ton be-°^ native troops. Whilst there were three native regi- 
 tweenGe- lueiits, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the 
 Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four 
 Forjett. hundred men. The other cause affected the concert 
 between the heads of the two departments. General 
 Shortt believed in the loyalty of his Sipahis but mistrusted the 
 native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what 
 he would with the police, but mistrusted the Sipahis. To use 
 his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the Sipahis as “ the only 
 source of danger.” 
 
 The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character 
 
 September most dangerous of all. It was a religious 
 
 TheMuhar- festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which 
 ram festival increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had 
 
 at Bombay, confided to General Shortt the arrangements for 
 
 preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. 
 Granted one premiss — that the Sipahis were absolutely loyal — 
 those arrangements were perfect. Mr. Forjett, when informed 
 of them, declined, without pledging himself to the 
 ShS^ar contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed 
 rangements. Lord Elpliinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone 
 replied that he was sorry he had not known of his 
 objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. 
 I may here state that the arrangements made by General 
 Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the 
 European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett. The reply 
 made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone’s remark just 
 referred to is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he 
 should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders 
 Sview^vith of Government with respect to the police arrange- 
 LordEipbin- ments, bccauso it was necessary for him to have 
 ^ them in hand in the event of a Sipahi outbreak. “ It 
 
 is a very risky thing,” replied Lord Elphinstone,* “to disobey 
 orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash.” Mr. Forjett 
 construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was 
 doubtless intended. 
 
 * “ Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably 
 for India itself,’’ wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, 
 “that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of 
 Bombay during the period of the mutiny.” 
 
1857 .] 
 
 THE MUHAEKAM. 
 
 33 
 
 The last 
 niKht but one 
 of the Mu- 
 harram. 
 
 A Christian 
 drummer in- 
 sults the 
 Hindus. 
 
 Thn police 
 take him into- 
 custody. 
 
 Five days of tlie festival passed without disorder. The next 
 night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that ‘ 
 night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost 
 produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer 
 
 belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, 
 whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindu 
 divinity which was being carried in procession by 
 some townspeople, and knocked over the divinity. 
 
 Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the 
 drummer into custody. It happened that the 
 
 Sipahis of the native regiments were possessed by 
 an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted 
 by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus 
 imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his sub- 
 ordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of 
 their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering 
 an insult to a Hindu divinity, had been taken into custody hy 
 the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke 
 into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted ^kVibe'^pirt 
 the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to drum- 
 
 their lines. The European constable of the section 
 at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and 
 demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was 
 not onl}^ refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the 
 Sipahis, and, after a conflict in which two of the 
 assailants were left for dead, and others were tTy^Srescue 
 wounded, they were forced to retire. The excite- their com- 
 ment in the Sipahi lines, increasing every moment, 
 received a further impetus from this retirement, and th& 
 Sipahis began to turn out in such numbers that a 
 messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, Forjett is 
 with the information that the native regiments had sent for. 
 broken out. 
 
 This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along 
 dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution 
 possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited 
 sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and 
 massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that 
 the bipahis had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the Europeai^ 
 police to follow him as soon as possible, and 
 galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as Forjett ar- 
 to outstrip all his attendants. He found the 
 
 VOL. V 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 LORD ELPIIIXSTOXE AXD MR. FORJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 Sipahis in a state of tnninlt, endeavouring to force their waj’ 
 out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, 
 keeping them hack. The sight of Mr. Forjett 
 inflamed the Sipah's still more. They called out 
 se&ng him. loudly that this was the man who had wished them 
 all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing 
 how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him 
 in earnest language to go away. The fate of 
 Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at 
 him to retire. this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett. Such are 
 Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls 
 of the officers, the Sipahis would have burst the bonds of 
 discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, 
 alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge 
 of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, 
 facing and defying them, they would not move, but that a 
 retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real 
 outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men 
 Ha refuse: native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the 
 
 former, “ If your men are bent on mischief, the 
 sO'jner it is over the better,” and remained facing them. Two 
 minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed 
 very shortly by fifty -five European policemen — the men he had 
 kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted. 
 
 Forming up and halting his men, he called out, 
 and crushes ‘‘ Throw open the gates ; I am ready for the Sipahis.” 
 mutiny. Again was displayed that complete acquaintance 
 with the Asiatic character which was one of the 
 secrets of Mr. Forjett’s power. The excitement of the SijDahis 
 subsided as if by magic and they fell back within their Knes. 
 Kever had a nobler deed been more nobly done ! 
 
 The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the Sipahis 
 — and that many were evil-disposed subsequent 
 mm^h'^Tfe revelations fully proved — were completely cowed, 
 to Mr. For- Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his 
 oven^ exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of 
 the past, and it was clear that an accident might 
 yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, 
 far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase 
 them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement 
 upon the [ art of the Sipahis would at once become known to the 
 main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at 
 
1857.] 
 
 A NEW CONSPIEACY. 
 
 35 
 
 a, decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, 
 they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, 
 subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, “it was 
 the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak.” The 
 vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by 
 Mr. Forjett.^ 
 
 I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken 
 and to Mr. Forjett’s energetic action, the festival of the 
 IMuharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men 
 amongst the Sipahis still, however, cherished the hope that 
 another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their 
 projects would soon arise. The Hindu festival of the Duali, 
 occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer 
 such an opportunity. During this festival the 
 Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are Tbe Sipahis 
 
 , _ natch a new 
 
 accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room ot conspiracy, v 
 their dwelling, and, assembling, to worship it. The 
 discontented Sipahis resoh^ed, in many a secret council, to break 
 out during the Dnali, to pill ige Bombay, killing all who should 
 oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this 
 
 * Mr. Forjett’s great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th 
 of June, 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value: — “ The 
 Eight Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the 
 devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsi- 
 bilities were imposed during last year.” Eef erring to Mr. Forjett’s “very 
 valuable services” in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same 
 high authority thus wrote : — “ His duties demanded great courage, great acute- 
 ness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed 
 by Mr. Forjett at that trying period.” 
 
 All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion 
 by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from 
 the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the 
 several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay. 
 
 I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and native 
 communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the 
 sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three 
 thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him 
 that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants 
 sent him a handsome address and a purse of fifteen hundred pounds, “ in token 
 of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy 
 had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have 
 become permanently subdued.” In addition, and likewise after he left India, 
 the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. 
 Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen 
 thousand five hundred and eighty pounds 
 
 D 2 
 
36 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FOEJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion 
 would have spread all over the Presidency, and have even 
 reached Madras. 
 
 But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett. 
 That gentleman was informed by a detective that suspicious 
 meetings were being held by disaffected Sipahis at the house of 
 October Ganga Par shad. Attempts to introduce a con- 
 
 wbichisdis- fidential agent of the police into those meetings 
 coveredby having been baffled by the precautions of the 
 ’ Sipahis, Mr. Forjett had Ganga Parshad conveyed to 
 the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a 
 complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subse- 
 ({uently became an eye-witness — by means of holes made in the 
 wall which separated the chamber where the conspiratois 
 assembled from the ante-room — of the proceedings of the 
 Sipahis, a listener to their conversation. More than that, awaro 
 and revealed feeling prevailing amongst the officers regard- 
 
 byhimto ing himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer 
 M^orBar- commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany 
 him, on four different occasions, to the meetings.* 
 The information there obtained was duly reported to General 
 Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his 
 private secretary, by Mr. Forjett. Courts-martial 
 were in due course convened. The proceedings 
 resulted in sentences of death being passed and 
 executed on two, of transportation for life on six, 
 native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected 
 mutiny was nipped in the bud. 
 
 With the story of the measures taken for the safety of 
 December Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the 
 Recapituia-' westem Presidency up to the close of 1857. We 
 tion of events have Seen how, dLplaying at once a rare foresight 
 a om ay. ^ remarkable self-reliance. Lord Elphinstone 
 
 had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order 
 to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high 
 jjosi tion recognised more truly, and applied more conscientiouhly, 
 
 by which 
 means the 
 conspiracy is 
 nipped in 
 the bud. 
 
 * “ Major Barrow’s astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Ganga 
 Parshad’s house was remarkable. He exclaimed, ‘ My God, my own men ! Is 
 it possible ? ’ And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were : ‘ It 
 is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should 
 have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence ; 
 tuch was my confidence in these men' ” — Forjett’s Our Real Danger in India. 
 
1857.] 
 
 PLANS OF LORD ELPHINSTONE. 
 
 37 
 
 the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the 
 'greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. 
 Now, the decisive point of the action in the early 
 days of the revolt of 1857, was not in Bombay. To ^^e-’ 
 
 Lord Elphin stone it v/as clear that Dehli could only 
 be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible an/dedsion.’ 
 he might save central India and Rajputana. Whilst, 
 then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he 
 formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in 
 reality not sufficient for his own needs — one column which 
 should march on Man, another which should restore order in 
 Eajputana. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which 
 threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from 
 without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should 
 penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an 
 aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare 
 courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, defence, 
 and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed 
 himself to the danger, only one degree less, of a rising within 
 the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown 
 in these pages. The southern Maratha country was saved, in 
 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment 
 displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the Kah. 
 energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling 
 and want of concert of the conspirators. How 
 Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen 
 that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the 
 unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in For’ett 
 Mr. Forjett — a man of his own selection — it might 
 have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a 
 greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone’s 
 capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his 
 noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy. In the presence 
 of the massacres of Kanhpur and of Jhansi, of the defence of 
 Lakhnao, and of the siege of Dehli, the attitude of 
 Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less Tbe attitude 
 heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an p^J^ston?' 
 uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the has never yet 
 story of its repression and the deeds of valour Se meed^of 
 attending that repression would have circulated praise, 
 throughout the world. Instead of that, we see only 
 calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying 
 
38 
 
 LOKD ELPHINSTONE AND MR. FORJETT. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, 
 and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it 
 had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, 
 it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which 
 gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of 
 history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the 
 noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made 
 possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated. 
 
1857..1 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 39 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 Asirgarh is a very famous fortress in the Nimar district of 
 the Central Provinces, lying two hundred and ninety - , 
 miles to the north-east of Bombay, one hundred and • 
 
 fifty miles from Maligaon, and ninety-nine miles to the south-east 
 of Mau. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Satpiira 
 rango dividing the valley of the Tapti from that of the Narbada. 
 It has a history which has sent its name through the length 
 and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindu, of the 
 Muhammadan, and of the British overlordship, it has been con- 
 sidered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of 
 masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April, 1819, after a 
 vigorous resistance, to a British force commanded by Brigadier- 
 General Doveton, and it has, ever since, remained in the 
 occupation of a British garrison. 
 
 In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment 
 Gwaliar Contingent, lent by the Bengal Presidency 
 to replace the lyth Bombay Native Infantry, ordered 
 on service to Persia, but which never embarked for 
 that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was 
 Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Fort Adjutant was Lieutenant 
 John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry. 
 
 The hill on the summit of which Asirgarh is perched rises 
 abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. 
 
 Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited 
 by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks. 
 
 The men who formed the garrison of Asirgarh belonged to a 
 contingent which speedily asserted its right to a 
 prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events 
 at Nimach and at Gwaliar speedily convinced the gent^evin^ 
 European residents at Asirgarh that their guardians 
 Vvere not to be trusted. Even before this discovery ° 
 
40 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 had been made, the fort adjutant, distrusting their demeanour, 
 had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, 
 and had charged them with the task of watching the behaviour 
 of the Sipahis. These men are known as Gordon’s Volunteers. 
 
 On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of 
 the mutinies at Nimach and Nasirabad. From that 
 Bad news day almost every post brought them distressful 
 Europeans! tidings. Every precaution was takon by Lieutenant 
 Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a 
 portion of its real enemies, one company of the regiment was 
 detached to Burhanpiir, twelve miles distant. The 
 who send one anxieties of the ladies of the garrison were lessened 
 BurhJnpur! about the saiuc time by the intelligence, verified by 
 a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon, that 
 Captain Keatinge,* the political agent for that part of the 
 country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from 
 Asirgarh. 
 
 From this time till the end of July good and bad news 
 succeeded each other with great rapidity. At times the 
 Europeans were in great danger. The company 
 sent to Burhanpiir mutinied, marched on Asirgarh, 
 and was only prevented from entering it by the 
 hawaldar-major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been 
 appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon. 
 
 The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, 
 The re- without murmuring, the order given to them to 
 
 iiiaiiider are moTch out and encamp below the fort, their places 
 dsarmed. ’^^ithin being taken by Gordon’s Volunteers. The 
 next day a party of Bhil infantry, commanded by Lieutenant 
 B’rch, surprised and disarmed the Burhanpiir mutineers, and 
 carried their arms into Asirgarh. A few hours later that place 
 was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry 
 under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwaliar men out- 
 side the fort — a work performed admirably and without blood- 
 shed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon — completed the 
 necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending 
 the arrival of Colonel Stuart’s column. 
 
 Arrival of That columu, the earlier movements of which 
 
 Stuart’s j Pave recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted 
 SXran^i!'^ Aurangabad for Asirgarh on the 12th of July. 
 
 where it 
 mutinies. 
 
 Now Major-General Keatinge, V.C. 
 
1857.] 
 
 DURAND ARRIVES AT MAU. 
 
 41 
 
 Marching rapidly, it reached Burhanpur on the 21st and 
 Asirgarh on the 22nd idem. Here it was joined by Colonel 
 Durand, who had reached Asirgarh some days previously. 
 
 In another part of this history I have shown how Durand, 
 after the catastrophe of Mau, had fallen back on 
 Sihor ; how, staying there only one day, he had set 
 out for Hoshangabad on the southern bank of the proceedings 
 Narbada in the hope of being able to communicate 
 there with General IVoodburn ; how, learning at 
 Hoshangabad of the safety of Mau he heard also of the attempts 
 made to change the direction of Woodburn’s force from the line 
 of the Narbada to Aagpur; how, not content with simply 
 protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for 
 Aurangabad with the intention of enforcing his arguments there, 
 and, if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay ; how, on his road’ 
 he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn’s column] 
 now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Asirgarh; 
 how^ he had at once hurried to that place. He had the 
 gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of 
 July. From the moment of his joining it, he He assumes 
 assumed his position as the Governor-General’s re- JJ'oVofthr*^' 
 presentative, and became likewise, in everything but column. ^ 
 in name, the real leader of the column. 
 
 The column pushed on for Mau on the 24th with all practi- 
 cable expedition. On the 28th it was joined by the 
 3id Regiment Cavalry, Haidarabad Contingent 
 under the command of Captain S. Orr. On the 31st 
 it ascended the Simrol pass, halted on its summit to 
 allow the artillery to close up, and the following hSSw 
 morning marched into Mau. The weather for the 
 time of the year, the height of the monsoon, had 
 been exceptionally fine; no rain had fallen to hinder the march 
 ot the guns over the sticky black soil. On the night of the 1st 
 01 August, however, the weather changed. Heavy rains set in 
 and continued throughout August and September. 
 
 But Durand was now at Mau, within thirteen and a ^r- 
 
 half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct 
 ?T troops had forced him to retire just, one month before 
 
 Tie had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the 
 guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten. 
 
 * Vol. III. pages 161-2. 
 
42 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857, 
 
 Even before lie bad marcbed into Man, whilst be was yet 
 baited on tbe top of tbe Simrol pass, Durand bad 
 received a message from tbe Indur Durbar. Maba- 
 indiirand rajali Holkar and bis minister sent to inform bim 
 kaT's'troops" tbat tbey were still in a state of alarm as to tbe 
 conduct of tbeir own troops, and to inquire whether 
 • aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that be was 
 ready, if tbe Maharajah wished it, to march with 
 deciJaS^^’^ tbe entire force into Indiir instead of into Mau. 
 
 Apparently, this was not tbe end desired by the 
 Durbar, for the messengers at once withdrew tbeir requisitiou. 
 
 In deciding to march on Mau instead of Indur, Durand was 
 mainly influenced by considerations regarding tbe 
 state of tbe surrounding districts which will be 
 marched on presently adverted to. At tbe moment, indeed, 
 SftnTnS there was another consideration which be bad to 
 take into account. He bad with bim no European 
 infantry.* Four companies of tbe 86tb were indeed marching 
 up by tbe Bombay road, and would join in a few days. But it 
 was desirable, after tbe events which bad occurred, that tbe 
 Indur rabble should see in tbe British force tbe white faces of 
 tbe unvanquisbed foot soldiers of England. Darand marched 
 then on Mau. 
 
 Tbe four companies of tbe 86tb having joined a few days 
 later, tbe propriety of marching on Indur to punish 
 He is joined Holkar’s gnilty troops and tbe townspeople who 
 pan^?s'^86thl bad abetted the revolt again became a question for 
 Durand’s consideration. It was a very difficult 
 question. That Holkar’s troops bad attacked tbe Besidency on 
 tbe first of July was a fact admitted by every one. But Holkar 
 bad asserted tbat this act bad been committed 
 Circum- without bis Sanction or authority. Durand himself 
 never satisfied of this : to the last he regarded 
 induced Holkar as a trimmer, a watcher of the atmosphere : 
 dSS°a1/pro- but officers who bad occiq^ied tbe Mau fort in July, 
 ceedingsjvith notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated 
 Holkar. with the conviction tbat Holkar was innocent, and, 
 in bis letters to Durand, Lord Elpbin stone, the 
 Governor of Bombay, bad insisted on tbe same view. Under 
 
 * The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Cavalry 
 Haidarabad Contingent, one horse battery of European artillery, the 25th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train. 
 
1857.] k^:asoxs which influenced dueand 
 
 43 
 
 these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties 
 presented by the case, deemed it advisable to defer all action, 
 so far as Holkar was personally concerned, until he should 
 become acquainted with the views of the Governor-Genera] 
 regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on 
 the subject to Lord Canning. 
 
 Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand’s 
 action as long as he could. He knew that, in his 
 heart, Durand had thoroughly mistrusted him . reasons for 
 And, although it was well known that, in the 
 excited state of native feeling throughout the 
 country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, 
 and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, 
 yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he 
 inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. 
 Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few 
 months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, 
 and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much-regarded friend, 
 would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the 
 events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly 
 contemn. 
 
 The question of disarming Holkar’s revolted troops, whilst 
 the personal case regarding Holkar was still 
 pending, opened out difficulties of another de- JurSd^drte? 
 scription. The force at the disposal of Durand mines to de- 
 was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the p^riSi^any^'^ 
 revolted troops of Indur, could these be encountered movement 
 en masse, it was scarcely large enough to attack its kaj’rtrwps' 
 several component parts in detail, holding the bulk 
 in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It 
 must always be remembered, writing of this period, that the 
 revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The 
 force before Dehli was almost as much besieged as besieging. 
 The English garrison of the Lakhnao Residency was supposed 
 to be at its last gasp ; Havelock had made no impression upon 
 Oudh ; Bihar was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in 
 central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all 
 these points, they were not only hopeful, but contident, that 
 resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which 
 they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists 
 throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be 
 apprehended that Holkar’s troops, the three arms of which, 
 
44 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were 
 located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong dis- 
 inclination to be disarmed ; and that, morally supported as 
 they were by a large party in the city of Indur, and, as I shall 
 presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts 
 lying between Indur and Nimach, they might ofier a resistance 
 ■certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to 
 cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader 
 when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of 
 Durand,* extremely weak in infantry, he reflects that a rainy 
 season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could 
 be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the 
 bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any 
 military operation against the several cantonments occupied by 
 Holkar’s troops would have to be carried out on a swampy 
 plain, on which, at that season of tlie year, it would be im- 
 possible for the three arms to work together. 
 
 But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with 
 the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels 
 in the districts, of whose aggiessive tendencies I have just 
 spoken. 
 
 Mandesar is a large and important town on a tributary of the 
 Mandesar ^^i^er Cliambal, about a hundred and twenty miles 
 from Indur. In the month of July this place had 
 been occupied by some of Sindhia’s revolted troops, and these 
 had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, 
 by Afghan, Mekrani,and Mewati levies. In August 
 cratr^^ofln insurrection at Mandesar threatened not only 
 
 Burrection, • to embrace all western Malwa, but Nimach as well. 
 
 Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified 
 only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, 
 the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to 
 display an aggressive temper farmore dangerous than 
 fts^nature! the sullen disaffection ot the compromised troops • 
 of Holkar. The more active and daring of the r 
 mutineers of Holkar’s army had proceeded to Gwaliar after the f 
 insurrection of the 1st of July; the less energetic mass t 
 remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain 5 
 extent paralysed, though not controlled, by the English party | 
 in power at Holkar’s court. The progress of the Mandesar J 
 
 ♦ Vide page 42, note. 
 
1857.] 
 
 IKE REBEL FORCES AT MANDESAR. 
 
 45 
 
 insurrection was, however, so rapid, that to uphold British 
 supremacy in B,ajputana and Malwa, and to 
 maintain the line of the Narbada, it became ah- and requiring 
 solutely necessary to check its growth with the prompTat- 
 utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new tentiou. 
 danger, the disarming of Holkar’s troops became, 
 in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt 
 to subdue the lesser evil might have augmented the greater, 
 whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to 
 affect fatally the lesser. 
 
 Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy 
 rains continued. But when, in the beginning of 
 October, the monsoon passed away, and the country The rnins an 
 began to dry up, the Mandesar rebels began to give tlTprom’pT'^ 
 pi oof of the pi^ssessioD, of the aggressive nature with actiun. 
 which I have credited them. 
 
 The leader of the Mandesar insurgents was Firiizshah, a 
 Shahzada or prince connected with the imperial ,, 
 family ot Uehli. it was estimated in September oftheMande- 
 that some fifteen thousand men, with sixteen or 
 eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and 
 this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the 
 actual number. To meet these, Durand, after 
 deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient ftctiv"e^fort^. 
 number of men to guard Man, could not bring into 
 the field more than fifteen hundred men * and nine guns. 
 
 Under these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the 
 aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand ex- 
 pected it. Towards the very end of September 
 he had intercepted letters from Haidarabad from 
 Nagiir, from Siirat, from Ujjen, from Gwaliar, and cent a i India 
 from Mandesar, all telling the same tale. The Jte'in're-^ 
 tale was to the effect that, after the conclusion of volt, 
 the Dasahra festival,! a general rising would take 
 place in Malwa, and that influential personages were coming 
 
 * Thus composed: Artillery, one hundred and seventy; Dragoons, two 
 hundred ; 8Gth, two hundred and thirty ; 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three 
 hundred and fifty ; 3rd Nizam’s Cavalry, three hundred and fifty. 
 
 t A festival of ten days’ duration, nine of which are spent in worship and 
 religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Ganga (the Ganges). 
 Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. 
 The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year. 
 
4.6 
 
 CENTEAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 from Nagpur and Haidarabad for the purpose of giving life and 
 strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra 
 corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The 
 result corresponded with the information Durand 
 had thus obtained. Early in October the Shahzada’s 
 troops, who had previously occupied Dhar and 
 Amjhera, advanced to the Bombay road and 
 threatened to interrupt Durand’s communications 
 with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbada along the 
 Bombay frontier, and to attack Nimach. They sent also a 
 pressing invitation to Holkar’s troops to join them. 
 
 Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand 
 would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. 
 Ti^ vital im- Eailing it, it was quite possible that Nana Sahib, 
 rapid action, wlio at that time was hovering in the vicinity ot 
 Kalpi, might transfer the whole of his troops to 
 central India, and that the Maratha war-cry might raise the 
 entire country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the 
 Peshwa. Seeing the necessity, Dnrand struck. 
 SSes^at October he detached one body of 
 
 Dhar. Haidarabad cavalry to defend Mandlesar on the 
 
 Narbada, threatened by the rebels, and another to 
 the village of Gujri to intercept them on their way. On the 
 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and 
 some dragoons to support this last-named party, and on the 19th, 
 with all the men who could be spared from the garrison of 
 Mau, he marched for Dhar. 
 
 Anand Rao Puar, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the 
 chiefship of Dhar on the death of his brother, cut off 
 DMrimme cholcra on the 23rd of May 1857.* His minister, 
 diateiy pre- Eamchandar Bapuji, a shrewd and intelligent man, 
 eStsof^^ who, from his thorough knowledge of the English 
 1857. and from his large acquaintance with British officers, 
 
 was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, 
 almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a 
 line of policy the very reverse of that which had 
 Disloyalty of been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the 
 policy pursued by the Government of India ever 
 since the settlement of Malwa, to prevent the 
 
 ♦ The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young I 
 chief on the 28th of September, hut he was acknowledged and treated as Rajah ] 
 from the date stated. \ 
 
 The rebels 
 iitienipt to 
 cut olf Du- 
 rand from 
 Bombay. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 dhIr. 
 
 47 
 
 whom, after 
 their plunder 
 of British 
 stations, he 
 receives with 
 honour. 
 
 Captain Hut- 
 chinson re- 
 ports the 
 complicity of 
 the Rifjah’s 
 family, and 
 ol the Durbar. 
 
 employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man 
 began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afghans, and Mekram's. 
 As soon as the news of the Indur rising of the 
 1st of J uly reached Dhar, a party of these mercenaries 
 four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries 
 of the Eajah of Amjhera, and plundered the stations of Bhopaur 
 and birdarpur, burning the hospitals over the heads 
 of the sick and wounded. Eeturning to Dhar with 
 3 their plunder, they were met and honourably 
 received by Bhim Eao Bhonsla, the young Eajah’s 
 uncle, and three of the guns which they had 
 captured were placed in the Eajah’s palace. On 
 the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhar 
 with or without the consent of the Durbar was not 
 certainly known. But on the 15th of October 
 Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported 
 that there was strong reason to believe that the 
 Eaj^ s mother and uncle and the members of the 
 Durbar were the instigators of the rebellion of the 
 Dbar troops, that the conduct of the Durbar was 
 suspicious, that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding: 
 the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous 
 mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that 
 It had received with attention and civility emissaries from 
 Mandesar,^ the centre of the iMuhammadan rising. 
 
 It was this intelligence which decided Durand to 
 dismiss the Dhar agent in attendance on him with 
 a message to the Durbar that its members would 
 be held strictly responsible for all that had happened 
 
 Z attack“ghL^"P^“’* -“I-We troops 
 
 October the British force arrived before Dhar 
 The Arab and Mekrani levies who garrisoned that 
 lort gave a sipal instance of the confidence en- The British 
 gendered by the long compulsory inaction of the SluhTr® 
 British by quitting the protection of their lines of 
 , defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three 
 I brass guns On a hill south of the fort, they extended from that 
 
 I CyigJ nsUr^Ci^r “>1 advanced 
 
 to Kajah in person during the siege ol 
 
 Durand dis- 
 misses the 
 Durbar’s 
 agent with a 
 warning. 
 
48 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 But tlieir confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bomba}’- 
 The action. Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be 
 mentioned, and always with honour, in these pages, 
 led by their most capable commandant. Major Robertson, 
 Gallantry charged the three guns, captured them, and turned 
 of the 25 th the gnus on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, 
 the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, 
 flanked by W oollcombe’s (Bombay) and Hungerford ’s 
 (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the 
 cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under 
 Captain Gall, the left, the Nizam’s cavalry, under 
 Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by 
 the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on 
 their centre, the enemy made a rapid movement to 
 their left, and attempted to turn the British right, 
 donaid. But the dragoons, led by Gall, and the Nizams 
 cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quarter- 
 master-General of the force, charged them so vigorously that 
 they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies 
 areVeSen. cf their Companions on the field. On the British 
 side three dragoons and one native trooper were 
 wounded, a jamadar and a native trooper were killed. 
 
 The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait 
 for the siege guns, expected on the 24th. They 
 invSt^d. arrived on the evening of that day ; the next morning 
 they were placed in position. 
 
 The fort of D liar is entirely detached from the town of the. 
 same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, 
 ?mefort'^ the road runuing between. It is situated on an 
 ofDhtir. eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, 
 and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape, con- 
 forming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are 
 about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen 
 circular and two square towers. 
 
 On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of 
 the fort, armed with one 8-inch howitzer and one 
 8-inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover 
 of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, 
 about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of 
 the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. 
 On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simul- 
 taneously, strong cavalry aud infantry pickets were thrown out 
 
1857 .] 
 
 EEBELS ESCAPE. 
 
 49 
 
 on the north and east faces of the fort, security on the west face 
 being assured by an extensive tank or lake which could not be 
 forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels, seeing them- 
 selves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But 
 although, during the six days the siege lasted, they made many 
 efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing** 
 in the name of the Durbar, under whose orders they rebels 
 professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, terafs^ 
 on the night of the 29th, the breach had been made 
 so large that its practicability was only a question of a day 
 01 ’ two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms 
 which would be granted. “ An unconditional 
 surrender, was the reply, upon which the firing reply, 
 continued. ° 
 
 At sunset on the 31st^ the breach was reported practicable, 
 and that night a storming party was detailed to ^he i 
 assault the place. Never was a task easier. The practicable 
 breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately 
 afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons 
 and irregulars were despatched in that direction 
 the storming party entered the fort. It was evLuSed 
 
 empty."^ evacuated. 
 
 In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort 
 by the mam gate between 9 and 11 o’clock, and escaped in the 
 direction of the north-west. The firing heard on the plain at 
 the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with 
 the rear-guard of the retreating enemy and an out- 
 lying picket of the 3rd Nizam’s cavalry. The main Escapeofthe 
 body had passed by them and the dragoonsf wholly 
 unobserved, and were well away before the alarm could be of 
 any avail. Pursuit, though it could scarcely accom- 
 plish much, was attempted. It resulted, however, SL'S 
 only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers. 
 
 Durand ordered the fort of Dhar to be demolished, the State 
 to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and 
 charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of 
 
 Jievtew. Lowe’s Central India. Priyate 
 
 +1,1 unfortunately happened that the European pickets, which had been 
 
 terT/ri been changed that 
 
 alaL^fpll wi? jamadar of the native picket to give the 
 
 alarm, fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled.— Lowe. ^ 
 
 ‘ E 
 
50 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 the rebellion.* The force then continued its march through 
 western Malwa towards Mandesar, in pursuit 
 Durand demolishes the rebels. These latter, however, had 
 
 towards Mahdesar. by no means renounced their aggressive ten- 
 dencies. On the 8th of November they attacked 
 the cantonment of Mehidpiir, garrisoned by a native contingent 
 of the three arms, officered by English officers. 
 Major Timmins, who commanded the contingent, 
 Mehidpiir, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering 
 opposition, to take up a strong position close round 
 his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their 
 side, di.splayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority 
 eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop 
 of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, 
 and, after making a gallant but ineffective charge, 
 in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their 
 native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of the 
 European officers to Durand’s camp, where they arrived on the 
 9 th. 
 
 Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the 
 rebels to Mandesar, deserve here to be recorded. 
 
 capture and destruction of the fort 
 saved. of Amjhera by a small party of Haidarabad cavalry 
 and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There 
 was, indeed, no opposition ; but the fact of the occupation was 
 satisfactory, as it proved that Durand’s rapid action had saved 
 the line of the Narbada, and had maintained that barrier between 
 the blaziug north and the smouldering south. 
 
 The other action was one in which Major Orr and the 
 Haidarabad Contingent was prominently engaged. 
 
 I have already stated* how one regiment of the Haidarabad 
 Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart’s force on 
 Reinforce- j^s march from Aurangabad. The remaining cavalry 
 
 brought by of the Contingent and a large force of its infantry j 
 
 artillery had, about the same time, been formed | 
 
 gent. at Eldabad, one of the chief outlets of the Dakhan, J 
 
 on the high road to central India. Here they ! 
 remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had 
 
 * Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon M^hich it is unnecessary for me to 
 enter here, they all escaped punishment. To the young Rajah himself merciful 
 consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position, 
 t Vide p. 41. 
 
1857.] OKR DEFEATS THE PLUNDERERS OF MEHIDPtJR. 51 
 
 begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into 
 Malwa, and coercing on their way the refractory zainied^rs 
 ot Pipha* and Raghugarh, reached Durand’s force before Dhar. 
 
 Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the 
 rebels at Mehidpiir, Major Orr, with a small force 
 consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres 
 drawn from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments Nizam’s ^^ehidpur 
 cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The 
 second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched 
 some sixty miles, arrived before Mehidpur. There he learned 
 that the lebels had left the place the same morning, carrying 
 with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which 
 they could lay hand. ^ Orr stopped to water and feed his horses, 
 ^d whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs 
 Timmins, the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who 
 had been unable to effect her escapej with her husband. Having 
 despatched that lady under a sufQcient escort to rejoin her 
 husband, Orr followed the rebels, and, after a pursuit of twelve 
 miles, came up with their rear-guard, about four hundred and 
 htty men with two guns, about 4 o’clock in the 
 afternoon, at the village of Rawal. They were catches 
 prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very 
 formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry their 
 right resting on the village, and their front covered 
 by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this ^heir strong 
 position, they hoped effectually to cover the retreat 
 of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, 
 and the spoils of Mehidpur. But they had not 
 counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr, a^ndfuttfsl^ 
 and his officers, Abbott, Johnstone, Clark Murray fuUy assails 
 and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the 
 nullah, charged the guns, and then fought hand to hand with 
 the enemy The contest was desperate and continued till the 
 sun went down. Then the rebels gave way, and all 
 their guns, eight in number, and stores fell into the 
 hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement 
 may be gathered from the fact that the British lost 
 
 and carries it, 
 though with 
 
 ulSf i?„;s .u ». 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 CENTEAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 nearly a hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter 
 was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The 
 rebels lost a hundred and seventy- five killed, and some seventy 
 taken prisoners. 
 
 When the despatch containing the account of this afiair 
 reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to 
 Satisfaction read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these 
 DraKoons at ^^^n it was heal’d with more than satisfaction, for it 
 Orr’s success, dissipated any doubt which might have been caused 
 by the escape of the garrison of Dhaf. 
 
 Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage carts and the 
 roads would permit him, and on the 19th of Novem- 
 reSesthe reached Hernia on the banks of the river 
 
 Chambai. Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as 
 it was, presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its 
 banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and 
 rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of 
 of the river, basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost 
 entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels 
 only having been obtainaide, and to convey these carts and the 
 artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have 
 described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy 
 task. That the rebels, hitherto so aggressive, should have 
 The rebels neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds 
 foolishly another to the many proofs in which this history 
 Snded^*^' abounds, that, brave as they were in fight, they 
 understood little of the art of war. As it was, 
 nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor 
 was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down 
 the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the 
 opposite bank.^ 
 
 * “ I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when 
 our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with 
 our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks ; the deep flowing 
 clear river, reaching on and on to the far east, to the soft deep -blue tufted 
 horizon ; the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting 
 screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily-laden elephant ; 
 the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river, and up the opposite 
 side ; the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream — neighing 
 and eager for the green encamping ground before them ; and everybody so busy 
 and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds ; and 
 all this in the face, almost, of an enemy, formed a tableau vivant never to be 
 forgotten.” — Lowe’s Campaign in Central India. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 DURAND DEFEATS THE REBELS. 
 
 53 
 
 The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank 
 of the Chanibal, and, inarching early the following 
 morning, encamped four miles south of Mandesar, app?“acheB 
 in a position covered to the front by some rising Maudesar. 
 ground, flanked on the left by a little village and 
 gardens, beyond which again were several large topes, some 
 cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens 
 and trees. On the right of the British position were hills 
 and villages, and between these and the rising ground in 
 front already referred to was an extensive plateau, 
 covered here and there with acres of uncut corn. 
 
 Beyond it, again, the city of Mandesar.* A recon- the rebels, 
 naissance having indicated that all was quiet 
 in front, the camp was pitched and the men went to their 
 breakfasts. 
 
 But the rebels were again in an aggressive humour. Eumours 
 had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British 
 force had been repulsed from Dhar, and, in sheer desperation, 
 was now meditating an attack on Mandesar. The leaders knew 
 better, but they used all their efl’orts to give currency to the 
 story. Consequently, about mid-day on the 22nd, 
 the rebels, confident that they had before them only the 
 
 a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from British force, 
 Mandesar, and, marching gaily, took possession of a 
 village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme 
 left of the British line, and, making that village their extreme 
 right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau con- 
 necting it with Mandesar. 
 
 The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when 
 the news of the rebel movement reached them. 
 
 Instantly they fell in, and the line formed : the which turns 
 dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizam’s horse on ceive them, 
 the extreme left, Hungerford’s and Woollconibe’s 
 batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the 
 Haidarabad the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native 
 Infantry the centre, and the Haidarabad infantry with the 
 Madras Sappers on the left of the Haidarabad guns, opposite the 
 village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once 
 opened fire; and Woollcombe’s guns, pointed by Lieutenant 
 Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very 
 
 * Love 
 
54 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 and beats 
 them. 
 
 Durand inter- 
 poses be- 
 tween the 
 Mandesar 
 and Nimach 
 rebels. 
 
 true,* the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarabad 
 troops converted their wavering into flight. The 
 cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. 
 The remainder escaped into the city. 
 
 The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of 
 the Mandesar river, and encamped to the west of the 
 town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. 
 His object was to gain a position whence he could 
 threaten Mandesar with one hand, and the rebel force 
 which had occupied Nimach,t and which, he had 
 learned from spies, was now hastening to the aid of 
 their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed 
 the Nimach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of 
 Goraria on the high road to that place. 
 
 In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a 
 march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, 
 their right resting on the village, their centre on a long hill, 
 and their left well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken 
 ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud. 
 
 The British guns, opening on the rebels, soon overcame the 
 fire of their five field-pieces, and forced their line to 
 litter fall back. They clung, however, with great per- 
 
 Goraria. tinacity to the village of Goraria, and on this, 
 
 retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very 
 slowly. Whilst the British were endeavouring to drive them 
 from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandesar and 
 attacked their rear. The Nizam’s horse and the dragoons met 
 the assailants boldly, and, after a sharp contest, drove them 
 back with loss. In front, however, the British could make 
 no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 8Cth 
 and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the 
 bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he 
 Desperate countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it 
 with his guns. When night fell the rebels still 
 
 conflict. 
 
 * “Lieutenant Strutt’s shooting was very true. All the while this firing 
 was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, 
 coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line 
 of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful 
 proximity. He occasionally stooped down, but never attempted to run; he 
 then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lisutenant Strutt struck him 
 just before he regained the village.” — Lowe’s CentraX India. 
 t Vol. IV. page 400. 
 
1857.] 
 
 DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE REBELS. 
 
 55 
 
 occupied Goraria. Tlie Britisli loss had been considerable, 
 amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 At 10 o’clock next morning the 18-pounders and the 24- 
 pounder howitzer were brought to within two 
 hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the 
 firing commenced. The place was shelled till it carried, 
 became a mere wreck ; everything that could be 
 burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held on. At last, 
 about mid-day, some two hundred and twenty came out aud 
 surrendered. Those that remained were Eohilahs, and they 
 stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o’clock the 
 Brigadier directed that the firing should cease : the 86th and 
 25th Bombay Native Infantry then stormed the battered ruins. 
 
 The stern defence of the Eohilahs did service to their cause. 
 Whilst the British force was dealing with 
 them the Shahzada and his two thousand 
 Afghans and Mekrams evacuated Mandesar shtiozada to escape, 
 and retreated on Nangarh. The cavalry, 
 worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable 
 to pursue them. 
 
 Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at 
 Goraria was a blow from which there was no rallying. The 
 Afghans and Mekranis, as panic-stricken as they 
 had been bold, fled through the country, avoiding The blow 
 towns and villages, and endeavouring to seek refuge OOTariiTis 
 in the jungles. One party of them, more daring decisive, 
 than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partabgarh. 
 
 The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thakurs, attacked 
 them, killed eighty of them, and drove the rest into flight. 
 The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal 
 between themselves and their conqueror. 
 
 The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out 
 from Mau on the 14th of October had now been 
 accomplished. With a force extremely weak in 
 infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau achievS!*^^^^ 
 of Malwa, thus saving the line of the Narbada, and 
 cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on 
 which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had 
 proved decisive, 'and had vindicated to the letter the prescience 
 of Durand when, resisting every temptation to act otherwise, he 
 resolved to allow Holkar’s troops to rest quiet until he should 
 
CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 66 
 
 [1857. 
 
 have disposed of the Dhar rebels and the mutineers of Mandesar 
 and Nimach. 
 
 He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar’s 
 troops. This he did. Leaving the Haidarahad 
 marcbi Contingent under Major Orr at Mandesar, and con- 
 on indur, stituting Major Keatinge political agent for Western 
 Malwa, he I'eturned by Mehidpiir and Ujjen, and 
 reached the vicinity of Indur on the 14th of December, fully 
 prepared to encounter the troops of the Maharajah should they 
 offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit 
 which had prompted the treacherous attack on the 1st of July 
 quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory 
 over traitors. The Indur troops, held in check during Durand’s 
 campaign by the Man garrison, had been utterly disheartened by 
 the defeat of their sympathisers at Mandesar, and were as humble 
 as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant. 
 Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of 
 disarms December he met and disarmed Holkar’s regular 
 Holkar’s cavaliy, and placed the men under the care of the 
 Svdry Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopal Contingent. He sent 
 likewise to Holkar’s chief minister a letter, in which 
 he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly 
 disarmed. Should this demand not be ccmplied with immediately, 
 he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself. 
 
 The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it 
 and en a es ©^P^’^ssed the intention of the Durbar to disarm the 
 
 Hoikar to infantry at once, and the request that whilst the 
 
 fnfaXy^^ Operation was being carried into effect Durand would 
 
 halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. 
 Durand comi3lied, and Holkar’s infantry, sixteen bundled in 
 number, were quietly disarmed that same evening. 
 
 After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accom- 
 panied by a large body of the officers of the Mau 
 Hoikmt column, called upon the Maharajah in his palace in 
 
 the city of Indiir. It was the first time since the 
 month of June that Durand had seen Hoikar. Regarding him 
 in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the 
 Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all 
 the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and, pending a 
 reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who 
 might possibly be adjudged by the supreme British authority 
 in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Malwa campaign, 
 
DURAND VISITS HOLKAR. 
 
 1857 .] 
 
 57 
 
 Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and 
 infantry, and his minister had promised that a 
 suitable punishment should be meted out to the 
 guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir courtesy. 
 Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not 
 such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required 
 to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious 
 for the visit, and that it should be conducted with a ceremony 
 and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would 
 produce an impression on his people. Durand j^terview 
 acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in between 
 good spirits, expressed himself delighted at the HoSar^^*^ 
 disarming of his troops, and a hope that the act 
 would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his 
 loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that 
 something further was yet required — the punishment of the 
 guilty, whether soldiers or citizens — and stated his confident 
 belief that the British Government and the British people would 
 expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried ont. 
 Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had 
 previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. 
 The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was 
 relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton. 
 
 He had completed a noble task. His personal character had 
 been the mainstay of British authority in central 
 India. Had Durand not been there, the result had “character 
 not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys career^”*^^^ 
 to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words 
 the vast value of his services. He was the representative of 
 political power, and, virtually, the general; the 
 brain and the hand, in a most important part of SpaSty*; 
 India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for 
 everything. He foresaw even — his own despatches and memoirs 
 written at the time show it most clearly — all that was to happn 
 in the few months that were to follow ; how the pacification of 
 the North- W est Provinces would increase the pressure west of 
 the Jamnah ; the action of Nana Sahib and his nephews ; the 
 incursion of I antia Topi. He saw equally clearly 
 the line that should be, and that was, followed. “ If foresight, 
 affairs at Indur are successful!}^ arranged,” he wrote on the 12th 
 of December, “ I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the 
 Mau column to Sihor with the view of concentratino’ Sir H. 
 
58 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 The value of 
 his great 
 achieve- 
 ments. 
 
 In spite of 
 the incapa- 
 city and 
 
 headedness 
 of others, 
 
 Rose’s command, and enabling him to relieve Sagar, clear 
 Bundelkhand, and advance on Jhansi and Gwaliar.” In these 
 lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself 
 have pursued, and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is 
 his actual achievements which call for special commendation. 
 
 In spite of his earnest entreaties, in spite of the 
 pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone, VVoodburn 
 had in June chosen to waste most precious moments 
 at Aurangabad. Had that general not delayed at 
 that Capua, it is more than probable that the insurrection of 
 the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indur. 
 But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had 
 happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn’s column, now 
 commanded by another officer ; he meets it, quickens its move- 
 ments, and brings it to Mau. He finds western 
 Malwa in a state of aggressive insurrection, and the 
 only line whicli had remained a barrier between the 
 Central Provinces and Bombay — the line of the 
 Narbada — sorely threatened. Of all the political 
 officers in central India he alone understands the 
 enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr. Plowden from 
 Nagpur, Major Erskine from the Sagar and Narbada territories, 
 urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by 
 many considerations to disarm Holkar’s troops, he, receiving 
 from no quarter a word of encouragement or support, risks 
 everything to save that important line. Then what do we see ? 
 With a weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and 
 eight hundred natives,* he sets out from Mau, and in five 
 weeks takes a strong fort, fights several cavalry combats, gains 
 three actions in the open field, takes more than 
 forty guns, crushes the Mandesar insurrection, saves 
 the line of the Narbada, and, marching back to 
 Indur, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops 
 of Holkar. In four months he more than counter- 
 acts the evil effected by an army of conspirators. 
 
 It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed, and, like 
 many noble works, left unrewarded. No man has 
 notappre-^^* been more calumniated than its author. No one 
 dated by more bravely fought the battle of life in face of 
 poraries!”^' Calumny. I may add that of no man that ever 
 
 he wins back 
 in four 
 months all 
 that had 
 been lost. 
 
 * Reinforced at Dhar by the Haidarabad troops. 
 
1857.] 
 
 OFFIOEKS UNDEK DURAND, 
 
 59 
 
 lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. 
 Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with 
 the fearlessness the occasion demands, * his countrymen will 
 realise alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, 
 secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalcu- 
 lable evils. They will learn, too, something of the 
 nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt also rivals, 
 to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. beioS^im. 
 They will learn that it is not always the truly great 
 man who occupies the most conspicuous position in the eyes of 
 his contemporaries ! 
 
 Many officers distinguished themselves in this campaign. 
 One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain 
 power was especially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires 
 mention here. “ Much of the success in quelling this in- 
 surrection,” wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of 
 November 1857, “ is due to the judicious daring, the 
 thorough gallantry with which, whenever oppor- men who 
 tunity offered. Major Gall, his officers and men, under 
 
 sought close conflict with the enemy — a bold one, 
 who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major 
 Gall and H.M.’s 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus 
 especially to beg your Lordship’s influence in favour of officers 
 and men who have merited, by conspicuous valour, everything 
 that Her Majesty’s Government may be pleased to confer. 
 They deserve most highly.” Durand also noticed with marked 
 commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain 
 Abbott, and the officers and men of the Haidarabad Contingent 
 and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This 
 regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards 
 Lieutenant-Colonel, Robertson, than whom no one rendered 
 better service to the State. Captain Woollcombe, Lieutenants 
 Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last-named of 
 whom was shot by a bullet in the region of the heart, | also 
 greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others 
 in the same category. The list is too long. 
 
 * This was written in 1879. The life has subsequently been written by his 
 son. 
 
 t Captain Christie recovered from the wound, took part in the subsequent 
 campaign, and was killed by a tiger some years afterwards. 
 
( 60 ) 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 THE SAGAR AND NARBADA TERRITORIES, AND NAGPUR. 
 
 The territories known as the Sagar and Narbada territories 
 formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by 
 and Narbada British districts of Bandah, Allahabad, and 
 
 tfrritories. Mirzapui’ ; on the south by Nagpur and the do- 
 minions of the Nizam ; on the west by Gwaliar and 
 Bhopal. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of 
 Eewah, whose Eaj ah recognised the overlordship of the British. 
 The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Koti, Maihir, 
 Uchahara, and Sohawal, held their lands under grants from the 
 East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, 
 they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, 
 when necessary, of the paramount power. The larger portion 
 of the Sagar and Narbada territories were directly British. 
 This portion comprised the districts of Sagar, Jabalpur, Ho- 
 shangabad, Sioni, Damoh, Narsinhpur, Betul, Jhansi 
 Chanderi, Nagod, and Mandlah. 
 
 When, in 1843, the Gwaliar Durbar commenced those 
 hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of 
 Maharajpur, the chiefs and people of the Sagar and Narbada 
 territories, then ruled by Mr. Fraser, C.B., as Agent 
 latefhibtory^ to the Govemor-General, broke out into open re- 
 of those bellion. This rebellion was due partly to the 
 territories. dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, 
 
 and more particularly to the mode in which they were admin- 
 istered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwaliar Darbar. 
 When, however, the pride of that Durbar had been lowered by 
 the battle of Maharajpur, peace was restored to the Sagar and 
 Narbada territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his 
 Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved 
 
1857.] 
 
 CHANGES IN THEIR ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 61 
 
 abuses, inaugurated the newly gained peaee by making a 
 clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories, 
 and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services, 
 the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. 
 Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in con- 
 tenting the people. When, after a rule of two of three years, 
 he was promoted to be Resident at Lakhnao, he handed over 
 the territories to his successor, Mr. Bushby, in perfect order. 
 Mr. Bushby’s administration for five or six years was 
 characterised by ability and good judgment ; but when, at the 
 close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of 
 Haidarabad, the Sagar and Narbada territories were joined to 
 the North-West Provinces, then ruled by Mr. Colvin, Major 
 Erskine * receiving the appointment of Commissioner of 
 Jabalpur, and becoming Mr. Colvin’s representative in the 
 territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine were, amongst 
 others, Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhansi, and Captain 
 Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsinhpur. 
 
 With their transfer to the North-West Provinces, the Sagar 
 and Narbada territories came under the Sadr Board 
 of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that u£?he 
 venerable Board at once proposed changes in the 
 administration so startling that, if carried out, they of^Revenue, 
 would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. 
 
 Before finally deciding in favour of the proposed changes, 
 Mr. Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion 
 of the officer who had served longest in the ter- poses revSu- 
 ritories, a man of remarkable sense and strength 
 of character. Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain 
 Teman replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules 
 of the Sadr Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, 
 and the certain consequence which would follow 
 any attempt to enforce them. Mr. Colvin, struck On captain 
 by Captain Ternan’s representations, withdrew reprete\fta- 
 nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is to be 
 regretted that he did not withdraw the whole, for the modified, 
 few that he allowed, relating chiefly to the sub- 
 division of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to 
 many agrarian outrages. 
 
 Such was the state of the territories in 1855. The temper of 
 
 * Afterwards Earl of Kellie. 
 
62 THE sXGAR and NARBADA TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 the people, kindled by the cause I have mentioned, had not wholly 
 subsided into its normal conditions of con- 
 sTO^^the temper oVthe tentiiient. The Outbreak in the North-West 
 people. Provinces came 
 
 still more. 
 
 The small station of Narsinhpur on the Singri, sixty miles to 
 the west of Sagar, was garrisoned at the outbreak 
 Teraanat mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras 
 
 Narsinhpur. Native Infantry, under the command of Captain 
 Woolley, an excellent ofScer. The Deputy Com- 
 missioner of the district. Captain Ternan, to whose calm and 
 cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also 
 at Narsinhpur. The district of which this town was the capital 
 w'as largely inhabited by petty chiefs, w^ho had gone into 
 rebellion in 1843, and who had never submitted willingly to 
 British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not 
 wanting indications that some great event w^as looming before 
 the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an 
 opinion as to the form that event would take. It hap|)ened, 
 however, that one evening, in January 1857, Captain Ternan 
 was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kotwal * 
 of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some 
 His first ex chapatis or cakes of unleavened bread. On 
 
 perience of' reaching Ternan, the Kotwal, out of breath and pant- 
 in drcXuon cakes were the remnant of a large 
 
 quantity he had received that morning, with 
 instructions to leave them with the watchmen of every village 
 to be kept till called for ; that he had so distributed them in the 
 neighbouring villages, and that those which he held in his 
 hand constituted the surplus. “ What,” he asked Ternan, 
 “ was he to do with them ? ” 
 
 Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness 
 sharpened by the experience of the rebellion 
 divSes the ^ 842-43, at once divined the truth. In those small 
 mystery, Unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through 
 the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of 
 the people ; that, distributed broadcast as the Kotwal had 
 and reports distributed them in his district, they would indicate a 
 his views to sudden danger that might come at any moment 
 SkLe. upon the people, threatening their caste and 
 
 inopportunely to inflame it 
 
 A Kotwal is generally a chief officer of police. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 TEKNAN AND EESKINE. 
 
 63 
 
 He at once embodied these 
 transmitted forthwith to his 
 
 undermining their religion, 
 ideas in a report, which he 
 official superior, Major Erskine. 
 
 Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book entitled 
 ^ Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal 
 Native Infantry.” That book was a reflex of his ErtL 
 mind. His mind was a mind “ of forms and tables.” 
 
 His mental vision commanded the line of strict and formal 
 routine. Out of that line he saw nothing, he was incapable of 
 seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan’s report 
 and read the conclusions drawn by that officer re- 
 garding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; SSL 
 he considered the idea far-fetched, absurd, impossible Ternan’s 
 He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that 
 
 ^ “a dyer’s vat having gone wrong,” and 
 
 that the^ owner of the vat was propitiating the gods by the 
 distribution of cakes. & & J « 
 
 Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine 
 was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed 
 broadly over the North-West Provinces and in 
 Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857 , these cakes 
 were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is 
 certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh 
 conspirators, of the men made conspirators by the annexation of 
 their country and they were sent to every village for the very 
 object divined by Ternan-the object of unsettling men’s minds 
 . Pi’eparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impres- 
 primSgate^^ receive the ideas the conspirators wished to 
 
 • record here a decision of the Government promulgated 
 
 in the same district a year or two prior to 1857 , and of the 
 remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken 
 tion. E influence which an able and conscien 
 
 ^ always bring to bear upon native 
 . One of the most influential chieftains in the territories 
 Ternan’s supervision was the Rajah 
 of Dilheri, the feudal lord of all the Gond clans. 
 
 I his chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity 
 and good conduct m the trying times of 1842 - 43 , the Govern- 
 ment Pi’^sented him with a gold medal. Like many of the 
 somewhat too profuse in his expenditure 
 and had incurred debts ; but, by exercising a strict economy, 
 
 Ternan’s 
 prescience 
 is justified 
 by events. 
 
 The R^jah 
 of Dilheri 
 
64 THE sXgar and narbadI territories. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 falls under 
 the displea- 
 sure of the 
 Board of 
 Kevenue, 
 
 he had paid off those debts. Such was his condition in 1855, 
 shortly after the Sagar and Narbada territories had 
 been brought under the government of the North- 
 West Provinces. It had been a principle of that 
 government, since the time when it was administered 
 by Mr. Thomason, to discourage large landowners. 
 One morning in that year Captain Ternau received instructions, 
 emanating from Agra, desiring him to inform the Eajah of 
 Dilheri that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold, the title of 
 Eajah and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates 
 ndisdp deprived of both; that his title was 
 
 prived o^f his abolished, and that his property would be distributed 
 estate^^^ among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from 
 the rents ! When this decision was most unwillingly 
 announced to the Eajah by Captain Ternan, the old man drew 
 his medal from the belt in which it was habitually 
 carried, and requested the English officer to return it 
 to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about 
 to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole 
 With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It 
 was generally expected that he would break out 
 into rebellion. He might well have done so, 
 for every member of the clan felt insulted in his 
 person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed 
 on the Government the mistake they had committed 
 and urged them to rectify it. But the Government 
 would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all 
 in his power to save the family from ruin ; but even he could 
 do little. 
 
 Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the old man had 
 died ; his son, too, had died. The next heir took 
 the title — for, however the Government might order, 
 the representative of the family was always Eajah 
 to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. 
 The Narsinhpur district felt its shock. Muhammadans 
 from across the border invaded the district and 
 pillaged the villages. The outlook became every 
 day more gloomy. “ Save yourselves while there is yet time,” 
 said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One 
 morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by 
 a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. 
 Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilheri 
 
 He feels the 
 insult 
 bitterly ; 
 
 district. 
 
 but, despite 
 Ternan’s re- 
 monstrances, 
 the decision 
 is persisted 
 in. 
 
 When the 
 mutiny 
 breaks out, 
 his grandson 
 and his 
 clansmen 
 
1857.] 
 
 BEIGADIEK SAGE AT Si.GAK. 
 
 65 
 
 clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had 
 brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so 
 warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he 
 and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their 
 interlocutor Ter nan admitted them into his drawing-room. 
 The chief replied : “ You behaved kindly to us and fought our 
 battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were 
 abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, 
 and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you 
 as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do ? ” 
 
 Tern an thanked them, accepted their offer, assured g^vic^'to 
 them they should be no losers by their conduct, and Ttm n, and 
 promised to do his utmost to see justice done them, 
 
 The members of the clan remained loyal throughout under every 
 the trying events of 1857-58, resisted the urgent foiduue.° 
 solicitations made to them to join the rebels, and, 
 what was of equal importance, they induced other clans to 
 join them in rendering most valuable service to the British 
 cause. 
 
 I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in 
 which were more purely military stations. 
 
 There were three military stations in the Sagar and Narbada 
 territories — the stations of Sagar, Jabalpur, and 
 Hoshangabad. Sagar was garrisoned by the 31st tifes^garand 
 and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Eegiment 
 Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners ; 
 
 Jabalpur by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangabad 
 by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the 
 Sagar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his head- 
 quarters at Sagar. 
 
 Neither the news of the mutiny at Mirath nor the tidings of the 
 nearer and more horrible events of Jhansi,* affected, 
 according to all appearance, the demeanour of the 
 native troops at Sagar. Indeed, so conspicuous was Siigar. 
 their good conduct, that, early in June, Brigadier 
 Sage, not trusting them, yet unwilling to openly display an 
 opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment, consisting 
 of five hundred infantry, a hundred and twenty-five cavalry, 
 and two 9-pounders, against a Eajah who had rebelled, pro- 
 mising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 • Vol. III. page 126. 
 
 F 
 
66 
 
 THE SIgAR and NARBADA TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 of the said Rajah, dead or alive. A few days later, however, 
 the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing 
 distrust was not likely to answer better in Sagar than in the 
 places where it had been already tried and failed. The station 
 of Sagar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult 
 for a commander with only sixty-eight European soldiers at 
 his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over every part of 
 
 The osition were the fort, the magazine, 
 
 ats£r! and the battering train. At the other end, distant 
 from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding- 
 position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could 
 not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects 
 important as a position, wanted water and storing-room for 
 provisions. There was no question, then, in the brigadier’s 
 mind, as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he 
 laboured under this great difficulty, that the Sipahis guarded 
 the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be 
 surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. 
 In a word, the station seemed to be at their mercy. 
 
 Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June, 
 Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance 
 iStpfin* ill guns from Lalitpur, a station in the Jhansi territory, 
 though bordering upon that of Sagar, garrisoned by 
 three hundred men of the 6th Infantry of the Gwaliar Con- 
 tingent. The brigadier promptly despatched two 9-pounders, 
 escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 
 42nd, and seventy-five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The 
 detachmfmt never reached Lalitpur. The very evening before 
 it left Sagar, the three companies of the Gwaliar regiment at 
 that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the 
 treasury, and had driven the European officers* to flee fur 
 protection to the Rajah of Banpur, who, under the pretence of 
 being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of 
 Lalitpur, exciting the Sipahis to mutiny. 
 
 For a moment I follow the action of this Rajah. Finding 
 that the rebel Sipahis had taken possession of the 
 ofBiSpJr Lalitpur treasury, and were marching off with its 
 rebels. Contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed. 
 
 * Captain Sale, commanding ; Lieutenant Irwin, second in command, his 
 wife and two children ; Dr. O’Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Com- 
 missioner of Chanderi. They were made over to the Rajah of Shahgarh, by 
 whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released. 
 
1857.] 
 
 MUTINY AT MALTHON. 
 
 67 
 
 Thus baffled, be sent off his European guests to the fort of 
 Tehri, there to be confined, and then marched in haste to meet 
 the detachment coming from Sagar, with the view of inducing 
 the Sipahis composing it to join him. 
 
 Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached 
 Malthon, forty miles from Sagar, when he heard of 
 the mutiny at Lalitpur and of the movement of the 
 Banpur Kajah. He at once halted and wrote for re- a detachment 
 inforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending 
 four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. Mdithon. 
 
 The night previous to the day on which those men 
 were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Sagar, and 
 it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. 
 The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by 
 many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense 
 by striking a blow with the few Europeans under his orders, 
 remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the 
 Sipahis should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt. 
 
 The detachment marched the following morning, the 19th of 
 June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd. 
 
 Gaussen then marched with his whole force against 
 the fort of Balabet, held by the rebels, stormed it,^ 
 and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The Sipahi stormers 
 promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the 
 return of the detachment to Malthon, they insisted on their 
 release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, 
 thej^ released the prisoners, and made them over to the Banpur 
 Eajah. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that 
 Bajah entered the British camp, and openly offered the Sipahis 
 a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers 
 and go over to him with their arms and ammunition ! The 
 Sipahis agreed, dismissed their officers, and joined the Rajah. 
 
 The information brought by the returning officers to Sagar 
 decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that, if he 
 were to wait till the rebel Eajah should march on pafes^foVa 
 Sagar, he and his sixty-eight men would be sur- ^o^ement 
 rounded and lost. Accordingly he at once, and in 
 the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first 
 moved the contents of the treasury into the fort ; to the same 
 
 * In blowing open the gate, Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed. 
 Lieutenant Willoughby of the artillery was wounded. 
 
 F 2 
 
^8 THE sAGAR and NARBADA TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 place he next conveyed the contents of the expense magazine 
 and the artillery magazine ; and, last of all, he removed thither 
 the women, the children, and the baggage of the European 
 artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished, he took a 
 guard of Europeans and l elieved the Sipahi guard at the fort 
 gate. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the 
 other with rapidity. Sage gained a place of refuge, secured the 
 contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure. 
 
 The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst 
 the ordinary grand guard-mounting was progressing, 
 He reasons Sage marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who 
 native^^ remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all 
 officers. the native officers, and, frankly telling them the 
 reason of his action, added that they had suffered 
 acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them, and had 
 forfeited their character ; that there was yet one method open 
 to them of regaining it, and that was to have the 
 The 3 rd leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice. 
 and^the^ 42 nd native officers of the three regiments, apj)a- 
 
 Nativein- I'ently very much affected, promised everything. 
 
 next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars 
 mutiny: the and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open 
 Infantry mutiny and plundered the bazaars and the bunga- 
 remains lows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing 
 
 staunch. loyalty ; and on the 7th of July, one of their men 
 
 having killed a trooper who had fired at him, a 
 desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regi- 
 ments. The 31st, being unable to make much impression on 
 the 42nd, who had two guns, sent into the fort to implore as- 
 sistance. Sage despatched to their aid the sixty loyal troopers. 
 A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it, 
 Rattle forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the 
 
 be^tweenthe bulk of the loyal regiment persevered, and, when 
 
 loydsrp^hfs* they sent again to the fort to implore 
 
 assistance in guns. Sage replied that it was too 
 late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring 
 them victory. The disclosure of this message to 
 of the the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their 
 
 Ltives.^^ loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents 
 that during the night they fled, pursued for some 
 miles by the loyal Sipahis and troopers, who captured one of 
 the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that 
 
1857 .] 
 
 JABALPUR. 
 
 69 
 
 whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had 
 remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example, 
 und the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an 
 equal number of the same temper from out-stations. 
 
 The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud 
 fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six 
 months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition, slgar fort^ 
 The able-bodied men of the Christian community 
 were gradually drilled, and, as they numbered nearly sixty, 
 Sage soon had at his disposal a force of a hundred and twenty- 
 three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for 
 the duties were heavy ; there were a hundred and ninety women 
 and children to be guarded, and 'loccasionally parties of Bundehi 
 rebels, into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, 
 made known their presence by a sudden volley. They invari- 
 ably, however, disappeared in the jungles on the first appearance 
 of pursuit. 
 
 The districts — in close vicinity to each other — of Jabalpur, 
 of Sagar, of Chanderi, of Jhansi, and of Jalaun, continued, from 
 this time until the arrival of the relieving force 
 under Sir Hugh Rose, to be over-run by rebels, by^the^ 
 Sipahi and other. These harried the country, cap- nativel 
 tured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with 
 impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were 
 ultimately dealt with, it will, I think, be advisable to clear the 
 ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in 
 this part of India. 
 
 Of Lalitpiir I have spoken. Jabalpur, a hundred and eleven 
 miles south-east from Sagar, has next to be noticed. 
 
 This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd Jabalpur. 
 Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Jamieson. It was the head-quarters likewise of Major Erskine, 
 the chief political officer in the Sagar and Narbada territories. 
 For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Mirath had 
 reached Jabalpur the men of the 52nd showed no sign of dis- 
 affection, but it soon became clear that they, too, were only 
 watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June 
 one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant ; duct onbe°* 
 and, though the man in question was subsequently 
 released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his 
 comrades a little later proved that there had been method in bis 
 madness. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated 
 
70 THE SAgAR and NAEBADi. TERRITOEIES. [1857. 
 
 their officers with patronising familiarity, and declared that 
 they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to 
 disarm them. The folly of retaining the ladies and children at 
 the station — a folly which had been pointed out to Major 
 Erskine, but upon which he had insisted — became then ap- 
 parent. 
 
 The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpur 
 For a time Kamthi would appear to have produced a good 
 
 th?y^do good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval 
 between the period I have referred to and the 
 arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were 
 usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances 
 in the district. The Kamthi movable column — for it was no 
 more — consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry 
 under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native 
 arrives. Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the 
 column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain 
 Jones, and one company Eifles of the Nagpur Irregular Force, 
 under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpur 
 on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the 
 larger portion of it was sent into the neighbouring districts to 
 restore order. Luring its absence an old Rajah of the Gond 
 dynasty, Shankar Shah, his son, and some adherents of his 
 house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the 
 destruction of the English at Jabalpur, and the plunder of the 
 station. On the 18th of September the father and 
 son were blown away from guns, the adherents 
 being reserved for the following day. But little 
 doubt was entertained that the incriminated Rajah 
 and the incriminated son had made many efforts to 
 seduce the men of the 52nd from their allegiance. 
 To allay, then, the excitement which, it was apprehended, their 
 execution might create in the minds of the rank and file. Colonel 
 Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost 
 immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the 
 Rajah and bis son had merely paid the penalty for proved mis- 
 conduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they 
 had removed ail appreljetjsions from their minds. At 9 o’clock 
 that night, however, the entire 52nd regimeut 
 
 Rajah Shan- 
 kar Shah 
 and his 
 son mutiny 
 and are 
 punished. 
 
 The 52n(l 
 Native 
 Infantry 
 mutiny, 
 
 marched quietly out of the station, without noise or 
 alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without 
 a halt to the Tahsildan of Patan. At that place 
 
1857.] 
 
 THE 52nd N. I. MUTINY. 
 
 71 
 
 was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by 
 Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had no 
 intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, 
 and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The Sipahis 
 then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, 
 in which they announced their intention of marching 
 to Dehli, and offered to release MacGregor in ex- 
 change for ten Sipahis left behind in Jabalpur, officers. 
 
 This offer not having been complied with, the 
 
 rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot 
 
 him.* 
 
 But, long before the commission of this atrocity, information 
 of the high-handed action of the 52nd Native Infantry, and 
 orders to return to Jabalpur, had been conveyed to the Madras 
 column in the district. That column, consisting of four hun- 
 dred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, the rifle company 
 of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 
 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned a Madras 
 by European gunners, happened to be at Damoh, marSes 
 sixty-five miles to the north-west of Jabalpur. It Jlnd'^ative 
 started at once, on the 21st of September. On the infantry, 
 night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrampur, about 
 twenty-five miles from its destination. Between this place and 
 Jabalpur, close to a village called Katangi, flows a navigable 
 river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought 
 possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure 
 the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the p 
 grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, thei^ 
 under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 
 4th, under Major Jenkins, left the camp at 2 o’clock in the 
 morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing 
 Katanji, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in 
 front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and 
 almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped thcm.^ 
 it is difficult to imagine. It is, however, a fact, that 
 notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Sipahis, they fought 
 their way through them and reached their men. These were 
 
 * MacGregor’s body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one 
 ball tlirough the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or 
 forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand 
 rupees for his release. 
 
72 THE SlGAR AND NARBADI TERRITORIES. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, there- 
 
 ^ ^ foi'e* drew them up on a hill difficult to 
 
 escalade, and there awaited the arrival of 
 
 the main column. 
 
 To this column, on the point of starting about 6 o’clock in 
 the morning, information arrived, in an exaggerated form, of 
 the events at Katangi. The two European officers were reported 
 killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force. 
 Eager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades, the 
 gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On 
 reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katangi, they found 
 the 52iid had taken up a very strong position, both flanks 
 covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire 
 from the guns, and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet 
 and drove them before them. On reaching Katangi, 
 drfeats^^he^^^ they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The 
 rebels. pursuit was continued beyond that place. In 
 Katangi the body of MacGregor, murdered that 
 morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred 
 and twenty- five dead were actually counted on the field, and it 
 is certain that many more w’-ere wounded. On the side of the 
 victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The 
 column then returned to Jabalpur. 
 
 This was not by any means the only skirmish which took 
 place in the Sagar and Narbada territories during 
 the autumn of 1857. In my stoiy of the trans- 
 actions at Sagar, I have alluded to the conduct of the 
 Banpur Eajah. This rebel chief, still hoping to 
 gain greatly by the downfall of the British, had, 
 after a great deal of promiscuous plundering, taken up a 
 position at Nirauli, about nine miles from Sagar, and had 
 strongly inti enched it. Against this positiim a force was sent 
 from the Sagar fort on the 15th of September, under the 
 command of Lieutentant - Colonel Dalyell, 42nd 
 Native Infantry. The expedition was not success- 
 ful ; for, though the rebels suffered severely from 
 tlie fire of the British guns. Colonel Dalyell was 
 billed and the loss of the attacking party in killed 
 and wounded was very severe. The intrenchment %vas not 
 stormed. 
 
 This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of 
 order. The remnant of the 52nd 1 ative Infantry, numbering 
 
 A force is 
 sent from 
 S^gar gainst 
 tbe Banpur 
 R^jab. 
 
 It is repulsed 
 with tbe loss 
 of its leaner, 
 Colonel 
 Dalyell. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 GALLANT CONDUCT OF TERNAN. 
 
 73 
 
 some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat 
 at Katangi, to ravage the country. Joining the ^ 
 
 adherents of rebel Eajahs, these men took advantage isSm ” 
 of the withdrawal of the Madras column from 
 Damoh to plunder that place and to release the 
 prisoners left there. They then took possession of a strong fort, 
 about thirty miles from Sagar, called Garhakota, situated on a 
 tongue of land in an angle formed by the rivers Sonar and 
 Gadhairi, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder 
 and destroy. In fact, as the year drew to a close, in spite of 
 the fall of Dehli, the daring of the rebels increased, whilst the 
 handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from 
 each other, and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little 
 more than hold their own. Several skirmishes, indeed, occurred, 
 but wdth no decisive result. In one of those, early in November, 
 near Jabalpur, the Madras troops defeated the enemy, but their 
 commander. Captain Tottenham, was killed. In others, the 
 defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappeai ance from one 
 jungle to appear immediately in another. 
 
 In preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the 
 conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsinhpur district. I must 
 devote a few lines to the military operations in that 
 quarter. The garrison of Narsinhpur consisted of 
 four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry 
 under Captain Woolley. These Sipahis, unlike 
 the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued 
 throughout the period of 1857-58 loyal and true. In November 
 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, 
 they restored order in the disturbed parts of the 
 district, co-operating for that purpose with a detachment sent 
 from Sagar under Captain Eoberls of the 31st 
 Bengal N.I. and Captain Mayne of the 3rd irregular 
 cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north 
 of the Narbada were cleared of rebels ; and, in a 
 hand-to-hand encounter with the largest body of 
 them, the rebel leader, Ganjan Singh, a landowner 
 of considerable consequence, was slain, and nearly all his 
 i'ollowers were destroyed. Ternan, who had his horse shot 
 under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon 
 Siughpur, a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan.* 
 
 * The tollowing is the official report of this gallant operation : “ On this 
 occasion Captain Ternan took a party of the Irregular Cavalry (some of the 
 
 Military 
 operations in 
 the Narsinh- 
 pur district. 
 
 Woolley. 
 
 Ternan. 
 
 Roberts. 
 
 Mayne. 
 
74 
 
 THE SAGAR AND NARBADi. TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 and at Ma- 
 danpur. 
 
 His advice was followed, and Dalganjan was taken and hanged. 
 The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the 
 insurgents near Chirapur. When Woolley reached this place it 
 was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing 
 piayed^by^' on a Small party in search of the rebels, succeeded 
 CMnfpur^ in surprising them, and capturing their tents, a 
 4-pounder gun, and many native weapons. This 
 enterprising officer followed up the blow in January 1858 by 
 completely defeating the invading rebels from Rat- 
 garh and Bhopal at Madanpur. By this vigorous 
 stroke Ternan finally cleared Narsinhpur district of 
 all rebels of consequence. 
 
 Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reassert 
 British authority throughout this part of India, it is necessary 
 that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagod. 
 
 Nagod is a military station, in the Uchahara district, distant 
 foi’ty-eight miles from Eewah, a hundred and eighty 
 Xag<5d. from Allahabad, and forty-three miles from Sagar. 
 
 The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal 
 N.I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the 27th of 
 August this regiment had displayed no mutinous 
 symptoms, and the men were regarded by their 
 officers as staunch ond loyal. It happened, however, 
 that at the time that the 52nd Native Infantry de- 
 camped from Jabalpur in the manner already described, a 
 rumour reached ^\ag6d that Kunwar Singh was 
 marching on that place. The men of the 50th were 
 accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that 
 warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, 
 made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and on the 
 date above mentioned marched. They had not, however, 
 reached the second milestone from Nagod when a voice from the 
 ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of 
 the men then told the officers that their services were no longer 
 
 The 60th 
 
 Native 
 
 Infantry 
 
 appear 
 staunch and 
 
 loyal, 
 
 3rd IiTegular Cavalry, known as Taits’ Horse, who had remained loyal) in 
 advance of the rest of the troops, and, coming on Ganjan Singh ” — of Singhpur, 
 also called Dalganjan Singh — “ surrounded by about two hundred armed 
 followers, charged him at once under a sharp fire. The success of the troops 
 w^as most complete. Captain Ternan behaved with much distinction, and his 
 horse was shot under him.” Not a few days afterwards, as Erskine says, but 
 then and there, being completely surrounded, Ganjan Singh and his chief followers 
 were taken prisoners, and the chief himself and several others hanged the next 
 day. Most of the rebels were killed during the action, however. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 KEWAH. 
 
 75 
 
 required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless 
 A few faithful men escorted the officers and their 
 families to Mirzapur, whilst the remainder, returning but they 
 to Nagod, plundered and burned the place, and then “'J' lavage 
 inaugurated in the district a career similar to that tbe district, 
 of their brethren of the 52nd. 
 
 Kewah, I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled 
 by a quasi-independent Eajah, recognising the 
 suzerainty of the British, bound to them by treaties, Rewah. 
 and having a British Resident at his court. In 1857 
 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, 
 an officer of the Madras army, possessing great 
 strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and 
 resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left un- 
 fettered, Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing ; 
 but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed 
 under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at 
 Rewah, he was unfettered. 
 
 The town of Rewah lies little more than midway between 
 Allahabad and Sagar, being a hundred and thirty- 
 one miles south-west of the former, and one hundred 
 aud eighty-two miles north-east of the latter. It is of Rewah. 
 built on the banks of a small river, the Beher, a 
 tributary of the Tons.* Around it runs a high and thick 
 rampart, still nearly entire, flanked by towers, many of which 
 have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar 
 rampart immediately environs the town ; and still further 
 inward a third surrounds the residence of the Rajah. It is a 
 decaying place, and the population in 1857 scarcely exceeded 
 six thousand. 
 
 The residence of a Rajah whose ancestors had been proud of 
 their independence, surrounded by districts in which 
 mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the Glance at the 
 route of the British armies between Calcutta and Suationof 
 the North-West, Rewah, in June and July of 1857, Rewah. 
 seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby 
 Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his 
 efforts was to win the Rajah. His character had, indeed, 
 
 * Vide list of places at the comineucement of this volume. Of the three 
 rivers known as the “ Tons,” that here mentioned is the South-Western Tons, 
 which rises in the state of Maihar. 
 
76 THE SlGAR AND NARBADi TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 Tact and 
 judgment 
 displayed by 
 Willoughby 
 Osborne. 
 
 He gains the 
 Kdjah, 
 
 already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, hut in 
 such times as were then upon them it became neces- 
 sary that the princes of India, especially the small 
 Rajahs, should feel that they had everything to lose, 
 nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. 
 Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into 
 the mind of the Rajah. On the 8th of June he was able to 
 announce that the Rajah of Rewah had placed his 
 troops at the disposal of the Grovernment of India ; 
 that the. offer had been accepted ; and that eight 
 hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to 
 Amarpatan — a place commanding the roads to Jabalpur, Nagocl, 
 ml sends his Sagar — ready to oppose insurgents from any of 
 
 truupYto^ those stations, and to intercept communications witli 
 Srfcts^ the rebellious villages on the Jamnah. He de- 
 spatched, about the same time, eleven hundred of the 
 Rajah’s troops and five guns to the Katra pass, about midway to 
 Mirzapur, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that 
 important commercial city, on Banaras, or on Chunar, as might 
 be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the Rajah’s 
 sanction to send seven hundred troops to Bandah, and he 
 induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any 
 of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their 
 gallantry and loj^alty. 
 
 The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a veiy 
 marked influence on affairs in Bundelkhand. There, 
 Excellent as in the adjacent territories, the smaller chieftains, 
 these mea mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the 
 suresonBun- opportunity too favourable to be lost. They, too, 
 deikhand. revolt. But Osbome was incessantly on the 
 
 watch. By the skilful disposition of the Rajah’s 
 troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he 
 baffled all the earlier elforts of the rebels. By the exercise of 
 similar qualities he kept open the important line of road 
 between Mirzapur and Jabalpur, a necessary part of the avail- 
 able postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few 
 weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the 
 insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanpur and 
 Zorah, then advancing on their stronghold — Maihar — 
 he stormed that city on the 29th of December, 
 pushed on to Jakhani, captured that place, thus 
 opening thirty-six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpur. 
 
 He takes 
 the field 
 against the 
 insurgents, 
 
1857 .] 
 
 nIgp^tr. 
 
 77 
 
 At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, 
 captured the important fort of Bijeraghugarh. Owing solely 
 to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the 
 rebel cause not only found no footing in Bundelk- and performs 
 ■ hand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories. wonders. 
 
 Nagpur, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonsla dynasty, and 
 since that period the chief town in the Central 
 Provinces and the head-quarters of the Chief Com- Nagpur, 
 missioner, is a large straggling city, about seven 
 miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat 
 exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western 
 side, is a hilly ridge running north aud south, known 
 as the Sitabaldi, possessing two summits, one at each 
 extremity, the northern being the higher, the posuion. 
 southern the larger, but both commanding the city. 
 
 Outside of but near the city were the arsenal — containing guns, 
 arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description — 
 and the treasury of the province, containing a large amount of 
 cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr. 
 George Plowden, had, of European troops, one 
 company of Madras artillery, whose head-quarters Howdem^^ 
 were at Kamthi, eleven miles distant. The local 
 native troops at his disposal were thus stationed ; at Kamthi or 
 in Nagpur itself, the head-quarters of the 1st 
 infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the tToop^,^^ 
 Nagpur irregular force ; at Chanda, eighty-five 
 miles south of Nagpur, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment 
 of the 1st, of the same force; at Bhandara, forty miles to the 
 east of Nagpur, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment ; 
 the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at 
 I^'ipur, a hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the 
 same direction ; the remainder of that regiment was 
 at Bilaspur on the Arpa, a town in the same division, of the rjuiar 
 These, I have said, were local troops. Kamthi was 
 likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the 
 Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 
 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd 
 Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. 
 Brigadier H. Prior commanded the Nagpur subsidiary force. 
 
 Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Mirath became 
 known to the native population of the Central Provinces, 
 symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops, 
 
78 THE sIGAR and NARBADA TERRITORIES. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 Ill-feeling 
 amongst the 
 local troops. 
 
 Mr. Plowden 
 and Colonel 
 Cumberlege 
 dii^arm the 
 local troops. 
 
 especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the 
 position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent 
 for physical aid upon a few European gunners and 
 five native regiments, Mr. Plowden could not afford 
 to pass unnoticed even the symptoms of mutiny. 
 Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the 
 intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to 
 set it in action,* were, on the 13th of June, revealed 
 to him. Mr. Plowden then resolved to act, and to 
 act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumber- 
 lege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regi- 
 ment — ^the 4th Light Cavalry — that the troopers of 
 the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. 
 Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and 
 without bloodshed. Mr. Plowden followed up this 
 *re blow by SO Strengthening the two peaks on the 
 
 eventualities. Sitabaldi hill, that they might serve as a refuge for 
 the residents of Nagpur in the event of an outbreak 
 in or about the city. He at the same time converted the 
 Kesidency into a barrack, in which the civil and military 
 officers should congregate during the night. 
 
 These precautions were effective, Notwithstanding serious 
 alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras 
 soldiers remained faithful, and, when a column 
 comprising many of them was despatched to Jabal- 
 pur,! departing men were replaced by others of 
 the same army not less loyal and true. The position 
 at Nagpur was the more difficult in that the province of which 
 it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was 
 used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could 
 be spared for it from their more pressing duties of 
 crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North-West 
 Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. 
 For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most 
 inadequate means, to assure it. Fortunately, Mr. George 
 Plowden, who represented the Government at Nagpur, was a 
 gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without 
 
 Loyalty of 
 the soldiers 
 of the 
 Madras 
 army. 
 
 Isolated 
 position of 
 Nil 
 
 iagpur. 
 
 * The mutiny was to have broken out on the 13th of June; the signal to 
 have been the ascent of three fire-balloons from the city. The confession of one 
 of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local 
 infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot, 
 t Vide page 70. 
 
1857.] MR. PLOWDEN AND Ni.GPfe. 79 
 
 appliances, lie acted as though he possessed them. Left without 
 external resources, he regulated his conduct as 
 though they were abundantly at his command, due to Mr.' 
 And he succeeded. Eventually, when the first 
 fever-heat of mutiny had subsided, he restored their 
 arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than 
 this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is un- 
 armed, to look them calmly in the face, to remain cool and 
 imperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to 
 face disaffection boldly, and by daring self-assertion to force it 
 to inaction, finally to submission — if this be a proof of greatness, 
 then most assuredly Mr. George Plowden deserves to be classed 
 amongst the great men brought to the front by the Mutiny 
 of 1857. 
 
( 80 ) 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZAM. 
 
 It will clear the ground if, before I record the action of the 
 British generals which restored order throughout central India, 
 I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly 
 touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the 
 issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether 
 the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length 
 and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the 
 dominions of the Nizam. 
 
 Those dominions — called after the capital, Haidarabad, 
 the abode of Haidar — occupy a portion of India 
 Haidaribdd. south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about 
 ninety-five thousand three hundred and thirty-seven 
 square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north- 
 east, they extend four hundred and seventy-five 
 SuMarl^ miles to the south-west, and in their widest part they 
 of the ^ give almost a similar measurement. On the north- 
 do^nious. they are bounded by the central provinces, of 
 
 which Nagpur is the capital ; on the south-west by 
 portions of the Madras Presidency ; on the west by the Bombay 
 Presidency ; and on the north-west by a portion of the same 
 presidency, by the dominions of Sindhia, and by the Sagar and 
 Narbada territories. A consideration of this proximity to so 
 many inflammable points will convince the reader how danger- 
 ous would have proved a Haidarabad in arms; how essential 
 it was that tranquillity should be maintained within her 
 borders. 
 
 When the year 1857 dawned, the Nizam was Nasir-iid-daulah. 
 
 This prince died, however, on the 18th of May, and 
 TheNizitm, was succeeded by his son Afzul-ud-daulah. The 
 minister, Salar Jang, nephew of his predecessor, 
 
1857 .] 
 
 THE NIZIm and sIlAR JANG. 
 
 81 
 
 Suraj-ul-Mulk, had held the highest office in the state since the 
 year 1853. He was a man of great ability, great 
 intelligence, devoted to the interests of his country s^iar Jang, 
 and his master. It was his pride to prove that the 
 natives of India can be governed by natives, not only with 
 justice, but with a regard to their habits and modes of thought, 
 such as, he considered was impossible under alien rule. But, 
 holding these opinions, he was, nevertheless, a sincere admirer 
 of the British character ; sensible of the absolute necessity of 
 an overlordship, which, while interfering as little as possible 
 with the internal affairs of a native state, should take from each 
 the power to draw the sword against a neighbour. The British 
 Resident at the Court of the Nizam in the early part of 1857 
 was Mr. Bushby. This able officer, however, died in February 
 of that year. He was succeeded by Major Cuthbert Davidson, 
 an officer of the Bengal army, who had at a previous 
 period held the office temporarily, and who had then 
 shown that he possessed all the qualifications Davidson, 
 necessary for discharging its duties in quiet times. 
 
 Major Davidson took charge of the office of Resident on the 16th 
 of April. In a very short time an opportunity offered for him 
 to show the stuff he was made of. I have already stated that 
 on the 18th of May the Nizam, Nasir-ud-daulah, died. His son, 
 Afzul-ud-daulah, was installed after the necessary tumult on 
 ceremonies. But to the disaffected in Haidar abad the^cces^ou 
 the death of one ruler and the succession of another 
 seemed to offer a mine of promise. The late Nizam 
 had trusted Salar Jang. It was quite possible that his successor 
 might refuse his confidence to that powerful minister. At all 
 events an attempt might be made to discover the actual lay of 
 the situation. Accordingly, when the men of the city of 
 Haidarabad rose on the morning of the 12th of June, they found 
 the walls of the city covered with placards, signed or purport- 
 ing to be signed by orthodox Maulavis, calling upon the faithful 
 to enrol themselves and murder the Europeans. Major David- 
 son was not the last to receive the intelligence. 
 
 Acting promptly and with vigour, he at once 
 requested the general to parade his entire force in Davidson, 
 full marching order, with forty rounds of ammuni- 
 tion per man. This parade impressed the disaffected immensely. 
 On the morning of the 16th a second parade, not less imposing, 
 was ordered. At this the Resident was present, and addressed 
 
 VOL. V. G 
 
82 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZIm. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 the troops.* By that time it had become known that the 
 influence of Salar Jang was not less weighty with the new ruler 
 than it had been with his predecessor. That loyal 
 jang^^ minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled 
 near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and 
 had hoisted there a green flag, sent down a corps of Arab mer- 
 cenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them. Subse- 
 quently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and 
 for the moment the plague was stayed. 
 
 Only, however, for the moment. The information which 
 poured daily from the outer world into the city. 
 Bad feeling often ill an exaggerated form, made every day a 
 thepcjuia-^ deeper impression upon the minds of the more 
 tion by the bigoted of the population. They argued that, whilst 
 their co-religionists had risen for the faith in the 
 west. north-west, it was not becoming in them to sit idle 
 
 in the south. They recalled to the minds of 
 listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatically disposed, that 
 little more than half a century had elapsed since Dehli, the 
 capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the 
 hands of the infidel ; that a supreme effort had now recovered 
 it, and that, if that effort were supported by the entire 
 Muhammadan community of the Dakhan, the recovery would 
 be made complete, the gain would become permanent. These 
 were no idle words. They sank deep into the minds of the 
 people of Haidar abad — a peojDle that had never known European 
 rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders. 
 In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts. 
 
 A little before 5 o’clock on the evening of the 17th of July, 
 five hundred of the Eohilah troops in the service of 
 H^daf the Nizam, supported by some four thousand of the 
 dbdd. mob of Haidarabad, rose in insurrection and marched 
 
 on the Residency, demanding the release of thirteen 
 mutineers and deserters, who, caught red-handed in revolt, 
 had been made over by Major Davidson to Salar 
 wams'ui? Jang. That minister, who was not very well 
 
 Resident. served by his agents, only heard of the outbreak just 
 
 * The garrison at or near Haidarabad consisted of a battalion of artillery, 
 the 7th Madras Light Cavalry ; the 3rd Madras Europeans ; the 1st, 22nd, 24:tli, 
 34th, 41st, 42nd, and 49th Native Infantry. The force, known as “ The 
 Haidarabad Subsidiary Force,” was commanded by Brigadier, afterwards Sir 
 Isaac Coffin. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 DAVIDSON DEFEATS THE MUTINEEKS. 
 
 83 
 
 on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a special 
 messenger to warn the Kesident. Major Davidson, how- 
 ever, in anticipation of some such movement, had improvised 
 defences all round the Eesidency, had mounted guns on the 
 newly-erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, 
 Major Briggs, to arrange the troops at his disposal . 
 
 . in the manner best calculated to meet a sudden Davison’s 
 attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every ^Reparations 
 man in the Eesidency to his post. The insurgents 
 came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with 
 excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so 
 called. A fire of grape from the ramparts sent them reeling 
 back. They came on again, only similarly to be received, and 
 similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception, they were 
 beginning to recover from their mental intoxication, 
 when a charge of the Nizam’s troops decided them 
 to flee in confusion. Many of them then took refuge rebels, 
 in a two-storied house, at the end of a narrow street. 
 
 In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morn- 
 ing. They did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. 
 Mining under the floor, they escaped during the night. In this 
 attack on the Eesidency, several of the rebels were killed ; in 
 their flight from the Nizam’s troops more were taken 
 prisoners. Amongst the latter were the two ring- 
 leaders, Torabaz Khan and Maulavi Alla-ud-din. leaders. 
 
 The former, attempting to escape, was shot dead ; 
 
 the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to the Andaman 
 
 Islands. 
 
 The manner in which this wanton attack terminated pro- 
 duced a very salutary effect on the minds of the 
 Haidarabad population. It showed them very produSd^ 
 clearly that their own rulers, men of their own 
 faith, sided with the British. It needed but one 
 word from Salar Jang to rouse the entire country. Not only 
 was that word not spoken, but the fanatical Muhammadans 
 were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their 
 rising, they would have to deal, not with the British only, but 
 with their own Government as well. 
 
 Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of 
 Haidarabad had ever been filled with military 
 adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from cSaP 
 beyond the sea, and of forming of them regiments 
 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZi.M. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 The effect 
 of rumours 
 
 of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But, in addition to the 
 Arabs, there used to come from every part of India 
 the^^numeroL adventui’OUS spirits to whom the sober ad- 
 
 adventurers ministration of the British gave no avocation. 
 
 From Eohilkhand, from the Panjab, from Sindh, 
 from Dehli, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men 
 of this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, 
 in the autumn of 1857, adventurers more dangerous still. The 
 mutinied and disbanded Sipahis who had been unable to reach 
 Dehli, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindhia, poured in 
 shoals into Haidarabad. Combining with the other 
 inuTthe city, classes I have mentioned, and who gave them a 
 cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of 
 the disaffected and to impart to them a discipline in which the 
 others were lacking. 
 
 The presence of these men added not a little to the dififf- 
 culties of Salar Jang and the Nizam. Every 
 rumour of misfortunes befalling the British arms, 
 which reached the city, roused feelings which might 
 at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that 
 was happening in the North-Western provinces — of the 
 massacre of Kanhpur, of the long siege of Dehli, of the leaguer 
 of Lakhnao, of Havelock’s three retirements, of the events at 
 Agra, at Indur, at Jhansi, at Bandah — we shall understand 
 very easily why this was so. It must be remembered, too, that 
 rumour magnified every skirmish into a battle, every repulse 
 of the British into a catastrophe, whilst it but faintly 
 flamnSbie' whispered, or whispered only to discredit, the 
 peop”? ^ victories gained by the foreigners. When we think 
 of the news of these disasters coming upon an in- 
 flammable people, hating, with the intolerant hate of religion, 
 the dominant infidel, armed to the teeth, and chafing under 
 their forced inaction, we may well wonder how peace was, by 
 any means, preserved. 
 
 But peace was preserved — mainly owing to the excellent 
 understanding between the Government of the 
 Nizam and the British Resident. Whilst the 
 former used all those arts which a powerful native 
 government has so well at command, to check the fanatical 
 ardour of the disaffected, the Resident, acting in 
 Reinforce- concert with the Nizam, applied for a larger force 
 arrive? of European troops to overawe the same class. In 
 
 Loyalty of 
 the Nizam. 
 
1857. 
 
 LOYALTY OF THE NIZIm. 
 
 85 
 
 consequence of these representaticns Davidson received later 
 in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a 
 regiment of infantry, and some artillery. 
 
 Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not un- 
 mindful of another means for employing the trained 
 soldiers of the Nizam — the soldiers of the Haida- 
 rabad contingent, led by English officers — in a 
 manner which might transfer the sympathies of the 
 great bulk of the people, from whose ranks those 
 soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting 
 in concurrence, then, with the Nizam and Salar 
 Jang, and with the full approval of the Government 
 of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade 
 from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in 
 central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 
 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of 
 infantry, and of three field-batteries of artillery. The splendid 
 deeds of these troops will be narrated in their proper place. 
 But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which 
 had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely ac- 
 complished. The successes obtained by these soldiers 
 
 A «/ SuCCGSSful 
 
 elated the relations they had left behind them, and result of 
 these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their 
 own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. 
 
 From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarabad itself. 
 In some parts of the districts the disturbances which arose were 
 eagerly quelled, and, with one exception, no chieftain of rank 
 showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the 
 policy adopted by the Nizam and his minister. 
 
 That exception was the Eajah of Shorapur.* Shorapur is a 
 small territory situated in the south-west angle of 
 the Nizam’s dominions. The Hindu chief who had Shor^pur. 
 ruled it had, fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into 
 pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to 
 fulfil his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizam. 
 
 Gertam arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, antecedent 
 
 followed, which ended, after the death of the Eajah, 
 
 in the administration of the country falling for a 
 
 time into the hands of the British. This arrangement lasted 
 
 * For a most interesting account of the Rajah of Shorapur and the causes 
 which led him to revolt, I refer the reader to the Story of My Life, hy the late 
 Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies. 
 
 Davidson 
 suggests 
 the employ- 
 ment of the 
 troops of the 
 Haidaribdid 
 contingent 
 in central 
 India. 
 
86 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZXm. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 till 1853, when the country was handed over to the native ruler 
 Ch racter ^ very flourishing condition. The young Kajah, 
 
 and'^condiict however, soon dissipated his resources; and, Anally, 
 became so eml^arrassed as to he utterly reckless. 
 He was in this state ot mind when the events ot 
 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the 
 British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to 
 him from a successful rebellion. The Eajah had not 
 troops!^* strength of mind to resist the temptation. 
 
 Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called 
 together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Kohilah 
 and Arab mercenaries. 
 
 Full intelligence of the doings of the Rajah was quickly 
 conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to 
 prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display 
 of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow 
 it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive 
 Acting in concert with Lord Elphinstone, who 
 on this occasion, as on every other, a far-sighted 
 policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up, with the sanction 
 of that nobleman, from the Bombay Presidency a force under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of 
 European troops, the Maratha Horse, the 15th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. 
 This force he located at a point equi-distant between 
 the Shorapur and the southern Maratha country. At 
 the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras 
 Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern 
 frontier of Shorapur, whilst he detached four hundred men and 
 two guns of the Haidarabad contingent, commanded by Captain 
 Wyndham, to occupy Linsugur, ready to act in concert with 
 either of the other forces, as necessity might require. 
 
 Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert 
 Davidson, hoping to save the Rajah from his own 
 folly, despatched to his court, early in January 1858, 
 one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Rose 
 Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his 
 efforts. The Rajah had given himself to the fanatical party. 
 Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties, but he was, it 
 is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of 
 guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain 
 Campbell received an intimation from the Rajah’s 
 
 Davidson 
 
 takes 
 
 decisive 
 
 measures, 
 
 measures. 
 
 displayed 
 
 and sur- 
 rounds the 
 Rajah’s 
 country. 
 
 Despatches 
 Rose Camp- 
 bell to save 
 him, 
 
1857.] THE rAjAH ATTACKS THE ENGLISH. 87 
 
 own relatives and servants that his life was in imminent 
 danger. 
 
 It would have been fruitless to temporise further. Captain 
 Campbell proceeded to Linsiigur and ordered 
 Wyndham to march on Shorapiir. Wyndham Wyndham 
 started at once and reached Shorapur on the 7th of Shorfipur; 
 February. As he approached, the Eajah, as is 
 customary in such cases, sent his own servants to indicate 
 a proper encamping-ground. The servants led 
 Wyndham to the place selected — a narrow valley, a?davow?^ 
 surrounded by lofty hills and rocks. But Wyndham, a snare laid 
 though but a captain, was too old a soldier to SeRSahT 
 fall into the trap. He moved on to an open 
 plain, where he was comparatively safe from danger of 
 surprise. 
 
 That night Wyndham was attacked by a force composed of 
 the clansmen of the Eajah, of Arabs and Eohilahs, 
 estimated at from five thousand to seven thousand 
 strong. The attack continued all night, but its 
 result was never doubtful. Wyndham, aided by 
 Eose Campbell and the medical officer, Dr. Williamson, 
 barricaded the position, and with the guns kept up 
 a continuous fire. At 1 o’clock in the morning he 
 was reinforced by a hundred cavalry of the 
 Haidarabad contingent. The rebels then ceased their attack, 
 and occupied the heights near the town. 
 
 Meanwhile, expresses had been sent to Major Hughes and 
 Colonel Malcolm. Major Hughes, with two com- 
 panies 74th Highlanders and some Madras cavalry, Hughes 
 arrived first, early on the morning of the 8th. the rescue, 
 Joining his troops to those of Wyndham, Hughes 
 at once attacked the rebels. A squadron of the 8th Madras 
 cavalry, commanded by Captain "Newberry, led the attack, and 
 charged a body of Eohilahs. Unfortunately, Newberry and 
 his subaltern. Lieutenant Stewart, better mounted than their 
 men, dashed into the middle of the rebels before 
 their men could follow them. Newberry was killed the 
 and Stewart was severely wounded. The enemy, 
 however, were driven from the heights above the town. The 
 city being very strong, the approaches to it difficult 
 of access, and the walls and bastions crowded with 
 defenders, Hughes thought it advisable to wait for 
 
88 
 
 THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZAM. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 The Riijah 
 flees in the 
 night to 
 Haidar- 
 
 where he 
 is taken 
 prisoner. 
 
 Colonel Malcolm’s force, whicli was expected that night, before 
 attempting anything further. 
 
 But the Eajah did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the 
 failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that 
 reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the 
 game as precipitately as he had en tered upon it, and, 
 accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night 
 towards Haidarabad. Arriving there, ith but two 
 followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to 
 gain the protection of the Arabs. Despairing of a 
 refuge, he was found wandering in the bazaar, was apprehended, 
 and taken to Salar Jang, who made him over to the Eesident. 
 The departure of the Eajah led to the immediate evacuation 
 of Shorapur by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, 
 OTtersSe arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the 
 
 town. town the following morning and found it almost 
 
 deserted. Captain Eose Campbell assumed charge 
 of the administration of the country.* 
 
 So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the 
 tranquillity of the Dakhan.f The preservation of 
 that tranquillity was essential to the maintenance 
 of the British power in India. There can be no 
 question but that the rising of Haidarabad, headed 
 by the Nizam, would have been a blow struck at 
 the heart. The whole of western and southern 
 India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of 
 Holkar, and Eajputana could not have escaped ; and 
 pmnstone more than probable that the communications 
 
 Lord Harris, between Calcutta and the North-West would have 
 
 That this calamity did not occur is 
 The far-sighted and generous 
 policy of Lord Elphinstone did much ; the Governor 
 of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was 
 possible for a man in his high position to contribute. Major 
 
 The tran- 
 quillity of 
 the Dakhan 
 assured in 
 a great 
 measure by 
 
 Lord El- 
 ihinstone, 
 jord Harris, 
 
 Sand’tte'*' teen severed, 
 officers acting flue to many causes. 
 
 under his — - — 
 
 orders. 
 
 * The story of the Kajah’s end is tragical. He was sentenced to death, but 
 the Governor- General commuted the punishment to four years’ imprisonment, 
 after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the Rajah 
 received this news he shot himself, Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally. — 
 Vide Story of My Life, Vol. H. 
 
 t The literal meaning of the term “ Dakhan ” is “ soutn.” Hence the south 
 of India is called “ The Dakhan,” i.e. “ the south.” It is often incorrectly spelt 
 “ Deccan,” “ Dekhan,” “ Dekkan.” 
 
1857 .] 
 
 WISE POLICY OF THE NIZXm. 
 
 89 
 
 Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far 
 above the average ; he was well served by his subordinates : 
 Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their 
 comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to 
 them. But the efforts of these men, great and 
 valuable as they were, would have been utterly un- 
 availing had the Nizam and his minister not 
 seconded them. For three months the fate of India 
 was in the hands of Afzul-ud-daulah and Salar Jang. Their 
 wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a 
 protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the 
 Dehli monarchy under the auspices of revolted Sipahis. 
 
( 90 ) 
 
 BOOK Xiy.— CENTEAL INDIA, KfRWf, GWILIXE, AND THE 
 SOUTHERN MARXTHX COUNTRY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 In a previous chapter of this history* I stated that Colonel 
 Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor- 
 General at Indur in consequence of the departure 
 HarSitS* agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on 
 
 leave. Sir Robert Hamilton, on hearing of the 
 mutiny at Mirath, at once asked permission, though he had 
 been but six weeks in England, to return and join 
 Calcutta? appointment. The application was granted, and 
 
 Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857. 
 
 Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton 
 was called upon by the Government to state the measures 
 which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquillity 
 in central India. There were very many reasons why it was 
 natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views 
 on this important subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very 
 eminent public servant. He had passed the greater 
 Qualifications part of his Career in high official positions in central 
 India. Not only had he traversed every inch of 
 that territory, but he knew the exact distances 
 between village and village throughout it, the lay 
 of the ground, the disposition of the people, the 
 peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a 
 division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained 
 
 of Sir R. 
 Hamilton to 
 advise the 
 Government 
 regarding 
 central India. 
 
 * Vol. HI. page 135. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 SIR ROBERT HAMILTON. 
 
 91 
 
 Hamilton 
 submits a 
 plan for the 
 pacification 
 of central 
 India to the 
 Government. 
 
 from his early youth the hoy who, in 1857, ruled the possessions 
 of his ancestors as Tukaji Eao Holkar. The training and the 
 connection — that between a guardian and a ward — had inspired 
 both with similar feelings, feelings of the warmest regard. 
 More than that — each thoroughly believed in the other. Each 
 would have wagered the possession he most valued on the 
 question of the loyalty of the other. Sir Robert Hamilton was 
 not less acquainted with all the courtiers of his charge, with 
 their character, their dispositions, the influences they exercised. 
 He knew to a scarcely less degree every man of note in the 
 country. 
 
 When, then, the Government of India applied to Sir Robert 
 Hamilton to state the measures which he considered 
 necessary for the restoration of order in central 
 India, they did that which it would have been 
 in the highest degree unwise to omit. Sir Robert 
 Hamilton responded to the call. He drew up a 
 memorandum, which he submitted to the Governor- 
 General. Lord Canning passed it on to Sir Colin 
 Campbell, who was still in Calcutta. 
 
 Sir Robert Hamilton’s plan was as follows. He proposed that 
 whilst one column, coming from the Bomba}' Presi- 
 dency, should make Mau its base of operations, and 
 sweep thence the country between that point and 
 Kalpi on the Jamnah, reconquering Jhansi in its course ; an- 
 other, coming from Madras, should form its base at Jabalpur, 
 clear the line of communication with Allahabad and Mirzapur, 
 and cross Bundelkhand to Bandah. Thus Kalpi and Bandah 
 would constitute the points towards which the two columns 
 would separately be directed. 
 
 This plan was fully discussed between Sir Robert Hamilton, 
 Sir Colin Campbell, and the Chief of the Stafl^ — 
 
 General Mansfield — and, in the end, was, with one 
 slight modification in one of its details, adopted.* 
 
 Sir Robert Hamilton calculated that if no delay 
 were to occur in the formation of the several 
 columns, the points indicated would be reached by the 1st of 
 May, 1858. 
 
 The plan is, 
 with one 
 slight modi- 
 fication, 
 approved of. 
 
 * The modification was immaterial. Sir R. Hamilton had suggested that 
 the two brigades of which the Mau column would he composed should, prior to 
 their advance on Jhansi, effect a junction at Sipii. Sir Colin Campbell 
 substituted Gunah for Sfprf. Gunah is nearer to Jhansi by seventy miles. 
 
92 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to Indur, 
 and arrived there on the 16th of December, 
 SilndSmes 1857, and not only resumed the appointment 
 political charge of the of Govemor-General’s Agent for central India, 
 by^the British l>ut took up likewise the political functions 
 
 in respect of all the chiefs in the Sagar and 
 Narbada territories, which, till then, had been exercised by the 
 Commissioner of those territories. 
 
 The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton 
 greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been 
 nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, 
 having its base at Man, was to work up to the southern bank 
 of the Jamnah. That officer was Major-General 
 Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B."^ Sir Hugh Rose bore, even 
 Hu^Ro^se ^ high character for ability, decision, and 
 
 firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early 
 given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840, the Govern- 
 ment of the Queen decided to detach several British officers 
 to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of 
 the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Rose pro- 
 ceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General. 
 Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment 
 than by his daring courage. In a hand-to-hand encounter 
 in E t with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was 
 wounded. Colonel Rose captured with his own 
 hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for 
 hi in a sabre of honour from the Sultan and the Order of the 
 Nishan Iftihar set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria, too, he 
 was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later 
 he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul-General of Syria. 
 
 When, a few years subsequently, Russia was preparing to 
 make her bid for the inheritance of the “ sick man,” Colonel 
 Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at 
 Constantinople. Later on, just before the storm 
 broke. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to 
 England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as charge d’affaires. 
 Holding that office, he not only penetrated the designs of 
 Russia, but detected that the one means by which England 
 could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, “ One step 
 further constitutes war.” Impressed with this idea, when 
 
 * Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c. 
 
1857.] 
 
 ANTECEDENTS OF SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 93 
 
 Prince Menscliikoff endeavoured to impose upon tlie Sultan 
 terms wRich would have annihilated the independence of 
 Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British charge d'affaires, 
 implored him to give a material pledge of the support of 
 England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters. 
 Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered 
 the fleet, which was then lying before Malta, to Besika Bay. 
 The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the 
 moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked ; and, 
 if she renewed her attack, it was because the same firmness and 
 the same clear-sightedness were not apparent in the conduct 
 of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing 
 to comply with Colonel Rose’s requisition. 
 
 Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He 
 was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of 
 Honour for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly SimL. 
 mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches 
 before Sebastopol, and had two horses shot under him at 
 Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert, then 
 commanding the French army in the Crimea, recommended 
 General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on 
 three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred 
 solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the 
 decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received 
 the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight 
 Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank “ for 
 distinguished conduct in the field.” 
 
 When the mutiny broke out in India, Sir Hugh Rose 
 proceeded at once to that country. He landed in 
 Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on 
 the general staff of the army from that date, and Bombay, 
 was shortly appointed to the command of the force 
 acting in Malwa, the operations of which I have recorded in 
 this volume.* He proceeded accordingly to Indur in company 
 with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then 
 open, that via Bombay. 
 
 Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh 
 Rose to command one of the columns in- 
 dicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the apSe™ dSthe 
 Madras army was nominated to direct the other. Madras column. 
 
 ♦ Vide Chapter ii. of the last Book. 
 
94 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chaptei’. 
 This will be devoted to the operationsof the Man column. 
 
 The force now called the Central India Field Force, of which 
 Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of 
 afS^Hu^h December, _ consisted of two brigades — the first 
 Rose’s force, being at Mau ; the second at Sihor. The brigades 
 were thus formed. The first, under the command 
 of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of 
 a squadron 14th Light dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay 
 light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Haidarabad contingent, 
 two companies of the 86th Regiment,* the 25th Regiment 
 Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry Haidarabad 
 contingent, three light field batteries — one belonging to the 
 Royal Artillery, one to that of Bombay, the third to Haidarabad 
 — and some sappers; the second, commanded by Brigadier 
 Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons, of the head-quarters of the 
 14th Light Dragoons, head-quarters of the 3rd Bombay light 
 cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Haidarabad contingent, 
 the 3rd Bombay European Regiment,t the 24th Bombay Native 
 Infantry, one regiment of infantry Haidarabad contingent, a 
 battery of Horse Artillery, one light field battery, one battery 
 Bhopal artillery, one company Madras sappers, a detachment of 
 Bombay sappers, and a siege-train; this latter was manned, 
 when brought into action, by draughts from the field batteries. 
 
 From the second chapter of the last book the reader will 
 have gathered some idea of the hard work which 
 ^ThTtroopI already devolved upon this force ; he will have 
 composing seen how the men composing it had triumphed over 
 forc?^^ obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved 
 incontestably that they were made of the stuff 
 which required only leading to conquer. They had now once 
 more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger 
 to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that repu- 
 tation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short 
 period of repose which it was necessary that they should take. 
 
 That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out 
 A short period of repose of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with 
 was necessary to enable Sir CoHn Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of 
 ^ocert'^wiSi which a second force, that to be commanded 
 
 * The remainder of the companies of this regiment joined just before the 
 attack on Chanderi. 
 
 t Now the 2nd Battalion, Leinster Regiment 
 
1857.] 
 
 THE CENTRAL INDIA FIELD FORCE. 
 
 95 
 
 by Whitlock, should start from Jabalpur. Until tidings of 
 Whitlock’s movements should be received, Sir Hugh was forced 
 to halt at Mau. 
 
 The time was not thrown away. The two brigades were 
 organized; the country immediately about them 
 was pacified; the line of advance was marked out; uotwSted.^^ 
 the men had time to recruit themselves. The 
 country about Mau and Indur is peculiarly suited to be a 
 resting-place. It abounds with the necessaries of life ; there is 
 plenty of water and of fodder ; the climate at that season is 
 most enjoyable ; the country, hilly and diversified, is pleasant 
 to the eye. The halt there was but short ; it scarcely exceeded 
 three weeks — not too long to satiate the men with their rest, yet 
 long enough to make them glad to be once more on the move. 
 
 On the 6th of January Sir Hugh Rose, accompanied by Sir 
 R. Hamilton, started from Mau to join the 2nd 
 brigade at Sihor. On the 8th the siege-train was enters^upon 
 despatched thither. It arrived on the 15th. On thecam- 
 the following morning Sir Hugh, reinforced by 
 about eight hundred Bhopal levies contributed by the loyal 
 Begam of that principality, started for Rahatgarh, a strong 
 fort held by the rebels. The 1st brigade left Mau on the 10th, 
 and then marched in a line parallel with the 2nd brigade upon 
 Chanderi, a very famous fortress in the territories of Sindhia. 
 I propose first to follow the fortunes of the 2nd brigade. 
 
 Rahatgarh, distant only twenty-five miles from Sagar, is 
 situated on the spur of a long high hill, and 
 commands the country surrounding it. The eastern 
 and southern faces of the fortress are almost perpendicular — the 
 rock being scarped. Round their base runs a deep and rapid 
 river — the Bina — answering the purpose of a wet ditch. The 
 north face is covered by a strong wall, facing a very thick 
 jungle, between which and the wall is a deep ditch twenty 
 feet wide. The western face overlooks the town and the road 
 to Sagar, and its gateway is flanked by several bastions, round 
 and square. Along each face and in the four angles were 
 bastions commanding the only possible approaches. Altogether 
 it was a most formidable position. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose arrived before this place on the morning of 
 the 24th of January. He at once, with small loss, sir Hugh 
 drove the enemy from the outside positions they disposes his 
 had occupied in the town and on the banks of the the^piaS.^^’^^ 
 
96 
 
 CENTEAL INDIA. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting 
 the eastern face he posted the Bhopal troops; facing the 
 northern, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry and the cavalry of 
 the Haidarabad contingent. With the remainder'of the force 
 he occupied the plain across which runs the road to Sagar. He 
 then reconnoitred the ground preparatory to selecting sites for 
 his breaching batteries. 
 
 The enemy, falling back as Sir Hugh advanced, had re- 
 The rebels Occupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the 
 
 make an thick jungle already spoken of, they made thence, 
 
 dSence^ during the 25th, several raids on the camp-followers 
 and baggage animals of the force, and at night even 
 attacked the position held by the Bhopal troops. They were, 
 however, repulsed with slight loss. 
 
 Early the following morning Sir Hugh Eose made a move 
 forward. Crossing the Sagar road with the 3rd 
 Europeans, followed by the 18-pounders, howitzers, 
 and mortars, and the guns of the Haidarabad 
 Contingent, he entered the jungle. But no sooner 
 had he reached a point well within its thick covering, 
 than the enemy, who had been lurking near, fired 
 the jungle-grass on all sides. For a few moments 
 the position was perilous, but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond 
 the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a road for the guns 
 up the height to the north of the town. This operation and the 
 bringing up of the guns occupied the greater part of the day. 
 
 Meanwhile the remainder of the force had 
 occupied the town, and driven the enemy 
 within the fort. 
 
 At 3 o’clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern 
 Sir Hu h’8 gained. Sir Hugh at once 
 
 mortarVt- Selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the 
 on^i^e'fort sappers to work. By 8 p.m. the mortar battery was 
 ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6- 
 pounders of the Haidarabad contingent maintained a constant 
 fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the 3rd Europeans 
 employed their Enfield rifles to kee^D down the matchlock fire 
 of the enemy. At 11 p.m. the mortar battery opened fire, and 
 continued it all night. The breaching batteries were com- 
 pleted by daybreak. 
 
 These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and 
 continued it all that day and the day following. At 10 p.m. on 
 
 The rebels 
 fire the 
 jimgle and 
 force Sir 
 Hugh to 
 change his 
 point of 
 attack. 
 
eXhatgakh is evacuated. 
 
 1857.J 
 
 97 
 
 the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went 
 forward to examine it. They had just returned 
 when a sudden rush of camp-followers and cattle- ^^^auerles 
 drivers from the rear gave intimation that some- open, 
 thing startling had happened. It transpired im- 
 mediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the 
 place. 
 
 It was so indeed. ' The Eajah of Banpiir, whose doings in 
 the vicinity of Sagar I have already recorded,^ was 
 advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a 
 considerable body of revolted Sipahis and other marches to 
 levies. He came on with great boldness, his piice^® 
 standards flying, and his men singing their national 
 hymns. But, if his appearance at this critical juncture was a 
 surprise to Sir Hugh Eose, it was a surprise that did not 
 embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he 
 redoubled it. To deal with the Eajah of Banpiir, he at the 
 same time detached a small force, consisting of a detachment 
 of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse 
 artillery, and the 5th Haidarabad infantry. It did not require 
 extraordinary exertion to efiect this object. The confidence of 
 the Eajah and his followers vanished as they heard 
 the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian vanishes 
 cavalry. They did not wait to be charged, but, on the^^ 
 throwing away their arms and ammunition, made the British 
 off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a troops, 
 few only were cut up. 
 
 The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a 
 strode of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, 
 evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, ^ereupo? 
 and its failure so disheartened them, that they evacuated, 
 silently evacuated Eahatgarh during the night, 
 escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which seemed to 
 preclude the possibility of its being used by man.f Their flight 
 was not on the whole to be lamented, for Eahatgarh was found 
 
 ♦ Vide page 66 and the pages following. 
 
 f “ The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had 
 escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy — and yet down 
 this place, where no possible footing could he seen, they had all gone — ^men and 
 women — in the dead of the night I One or two mangled bodies lay at the 
 bottom, attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have 
 tempted them to have chosen such a way.” — Dr. Lowe’s Central India during 
 the Bebellion of 1857-58 ” — a book to which I am much indebted. 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 CEXTEAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders 
 against numbers greatly superior. 
 
 The rebels were pursued, but without much effect ; they had 
 gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been 
 discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received 
 information that the Eajah of Banpiir, reinforced by the 
 garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodia, 
 about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse 
 The rebels artillery, two o^inch mortars, two guns of the 
 take up reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans, the majority of 
 cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, 
 and went in pursuit. About 4 o’clock he came upon 
 them posted on the banks of the Bind, and prepared to dispute 
 his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked, and, though the rebels 
 fought well, he forced the passage of the river. The country 
 on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took 
 where the ^'^^ry advantage of it. From the river to Barodia 
 
 we^aSackJd Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step, 
 by^sir Hu% without loss. Two officers * 
 
 were killed and six were wounded. The casualties 
 among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however, the 
 rebels were completely defeated, and, though the rebel Rajah 
 was not captured, he owed his safety only to- his acquaintance 
 with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to 
 Eahatgarh about 2 o’clock in the morning. It found there 
 a supply of provisions sent from Sagar escorted by a detachment 
 of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry. 
 
 The fall of Eahatgarh had effected two most important 
 objects. It had cleared the country south of Sagar 
 b^hefau^^ rebels, had reopened the road to Indur, and had 
 of Eahatgarh. made it possible for the general to march to the 
 relief of Sagar, now beleaguered for nearly eight 
 
 months. 
 
 The state of Sagar has been recorded in a preceding chapter 
 of this volume. Its situation remained unaltered. 
 Sf r^der^ Although, during the interval since we left it, the 
 iMt visited garrison had made occasional sallies, more or less 
 successful, it may be stated generally that the rebels 
 had retained possession of the strongholds all over the distiict, 
 
 * One of these was Captain Neville, R.E. He had joined the force only the 
 day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which 
 he greatly distinguished himself. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 sIgae is believed. 
 
 99 
 
 and that, by means of these, they had possessed likewise the 
 •country. The manner in which they had used their usurped 
 power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when 
 the law-enforcing rule of the British should be restored. 
 
 That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Eose marched from 
 Eahatgarh direct on Sagar. He entered that place 
 on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by maiSefon 
 the Europeans, officers and others, who had held the Sagar, 
 fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their 
 deliverers. The 31st Native Infantry was one of 
 the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its 
 arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying 
 period. The greater honour to the 31st, for its Jative^* 
 companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it infantry, 
 had been tempted on all sides. 
 
 Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. 
 Twenty-five miles to the east of Sagar stands, on an 
 elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Gar- The fort of 
 hakota. The eastern face of this fort is washed by Garhakot^. 
 the wide river Sonar;* the western and northern 
 faces by the nullah Gidari, with precipitous banks; the south 
 face possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch 
 twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the 
 parapets of this fort, that when, in 1818, it was attacked by 
 Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was 
 unable, in three weeks, to effect a breach in them, 
 and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the strenSi! 
 place with all the honours of war ! In February 
 1858 it was held by the revolted Sipahis of the 51st and 52nd 
 Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammuni- 
 tion and provisions. 
 
 Sir Hugh Eose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda 
 on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched 
 towards Garhakota. He arrived within sight of it 
 at half-past 3 o’clock on the afternoon of the 11th. riconnoitref- 
 Whilst the men were taking up their assigned 
 positions he made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded 
 
 * The Sonar rises in the Sagar district at an elevation of one thousand 
 nine hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It holds a north-eastern course of one 
 hundred and ten miles, receiving the Bairma on the right, and eight miles lower 
 down falling into the Ken on its left. — Thoenton. (New Edition.) 
 
 H 2 
 
100 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 till 8 p.M. He found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks 
 on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to 
 arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the 
 village of Basari, near the fort, in some force. Notwithstanding, 
 the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from 
 rebels from the positions they held, and occupied Basari ; nor, 
 0^ though during the night the rebels repeatedly 
 attacked him, could they regain the posts they had 
 
 lost. 
 
 The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first 
 caused a breaching battery to be thrown up opposite the western 
 face. A 24-pounder howitzer working all day from this battery 
 soon silenced the enemy’s guns. Lieutenant Strutt 
 effect^o?*^ of the Bomba}^ artillery, already referred to in these 
 Strutt’s fire pages, succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy’s 
 guns which had been worked very successfully 
 against the assailants. It was this shot, “one of the many 
 good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt,” which, in Sir 
 Hugh’s opinion, made the Sipahis reflect on the 
 rSSis^?^ casualties which might befall them. Certainlj^ 
 evacuate the after their experience of Strutt’s correctness of aim, 
 
 ’ they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and 
 determined to escape if they could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh 
 Kose’s force was so small, a great part having been left at Sagar, 
 that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position 
 which would guard the gateway. By this gateway, then, the 
 Sipahis made their way into the country during the night of 
 the 12th. They were, however, pursued early the following 
 morning for twenty-five miles by Captains Hare, with his 
 Haidarabad cavalry, two troops of the 14th Light Dragoons 
 under Captains Need and Brown, and a division (two guns) of 
 horse artillery under Lieutenant Crowe. Hare came 
 pursued by with the rebels at the Bias river, near the village 
 Hare and of Biai’, led liis guns and ^cavalry across it ; opened 
 
 cu up. enemy ; then charged and pursued them 
 
 for some distance, inflicting considerable loss. 
 
 Garhakota was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its 
 western face destroyed, and returned to Sagar on the 17th. 
 
 Jhansi, a hundred and twenty-five miles to the north, was 
 the next point to be aimed at. But between Sagar 
 The road to and Jhansi lay the passes of Malthon and Madanpur, 
 Jhansi. Surahi and of Maraura, the towns of 
 
1857.] 
 
 SIE HUGH SETS OUT FOR JH^NSf. 
 
 101 
 
 ShaRgarli and Banpur.* After overcoming the certain obstacles 
 which these places would probably offer, Sir Hugh would have, 
 before marching on Jhansi, to effect a junction with his 1st 
 brigade under Brigadier Stuart. 
 
 Before setting out on this expedition there were other 
 considerations demanding attention. Sir Hugh 
 could scarcely move from Sagar until he should tions which 
 receive certain information that Brigadier Whitlock’s delay- 
 column had started from Jabalpur for that place. 
 
 Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store 
 supplies. The necessity for this was the more pressing inasmuch 
 as it had been ascertained that the districts through which the 
 force would have to march, still occupied by rebel Sipahis or 
 disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of 
 commissariat. The hot season, too, was setting in, 
 and it was certain that not a blade of grass would us?to which 
 survive a few weeks of its duration. Sir Hugh 
 foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay in 
 laying up supplies. He caused to be collected sheep, goats, 
 oxen, grain, flour, and large supplies of tea and soda water. 
 Much of the grain was sent by the loyal Begam of Bhopal. 
 The sick and wounded men he transferred to the Sagar field 
 hospital, to be sent away or to rejoin as opportunity might 
 offer. He re-supplied the siege-train with ammunition, and 
 strengthened it by the addition of heavy guns, howitzers, and 
 large mortars from the Sagar arsenal. He obtained likewise 
 an additional supply of elephants, and, what was of great 
 consequence, he secured summer clothing for his European 
 soldiers. 
 
 At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpur. Sir 
 Hugh’s preparations were now as complete as they could be 
 made. Accordingly a start was determined upon. 
 
 On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh wwtiockhad 
 detached Major Orr’s column of the Haidarabad 
 contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, takes tL 
 and at 2 o’clock he set out with the remainder of the 
 troops. The following day he took, after some 
 shelling, the fort of Barodia. Pressing forward, he found 
 
 * Maraura lies thirty-seven miles north of Sagar, and twenty -two west by 
 north of Shahgarh. Shahgarh lies forty miles north-east of Sdgar. Banpur is 
 in the Lalitpur district. 
 
102 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Malthon. 
 
 This pass, of great natural strength, had been forti- 
 M^ithon! was now held in force by a mixed army of 
 
 Sipahis and local levies. A reconnaissance having 
 convinced Sir Hugh of the great loss of life which would 
 Sir Hu h inevitably attend a direct attack upon it, ho 
 decide?to determined then only to feign an attack in front, 
 flank march whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain 
 the table-land above the hills by a flank movement 
 through the pass of Madanpur. With this view, early on the 
 Madanpur moming of the 4th of March, he detailed a force,* 
 under Major Scudamore, to menace the pass, whilst 
 with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the 
 Haidarabad troops, he moved on Madanpur. 
 
 The pass leading to this town forms a narrow gorge between 
 two ranges of hills, thickly covered with jungle and 
 pflr pass^^*^' brushwood, and capable of otfering a solid defence. 
 
 The rebels had not only crowned the heights on 
 both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gOT-ge itself, 
 but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skir- 
 mishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass 
 an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the 
 turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles 
 along the foot of the hills, which they then began to ascend. 
 
 Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The 
 crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their 
 British. guns fi’om the gorge poured in a continuous fire. 
 
 Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarabad 
 infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, 
 and returned the enemy’s fire. 
 
 The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as 
 these retired another artillery fire opened from a 
 Determined commanding position at the further end of the pass, 
 the rebels, So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short 
 time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh 
 even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could 
 be done Sir Hugh’s horse was shot under him, and the artillery- 
 men were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell 
 like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased 
 every moment. 
 
 * Consisting of the 24th Bombay N.I., three guns Bhopal artillery, ona 
 howitzer, a detachment 14th light dragoons, and the 3rd Bombay cavalry. 
 
1857.] 
 
 COMBAT AT THE MADANPUR PASS. 
 
 103 
 
 The halt, however was only temporary. The gnns of the 
 Haidarabad contingent coming up at this con- 
 juncture opened with shell on the enemy’s masses to overcome by 
 the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. 
 
 Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd 
 Europeans and the Haidarabad infantry charged. Asiatics can 
 stand anything but a charge of European infantry. They had 
 here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to 
 hold it ; but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into 
 them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the 
 hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and 
 disma 3 ^ They were followed through the pass by their enemy, 
 and only halted to take breath when they found themselves 
 within the town of Mandanpur. 
 
 That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. 
 Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front 
 and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the Sir Hugh 
 rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind, nklwisefrom 
 The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the the town, 
 walls of the fort of Surahi. 
 
 The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the 
 rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the 
 formidable pass of Malthon, the fort of Narhat to 
 the rear of it, the little fort of Surahi, the strong ^'ictory^ 
 fort of Maraura, the fortified castle of Banpur — the 
 residence of the rebel Rajah called after it — the almost im- 
 pregnable fortress of Tal-Bahat on the heights above the lake 
 of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Bin a and 
 the Betwa, with the exception of the fortress of Chanderi, on 
 the left bank of the latter river. 
 
 Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his 
 victory at IMadanpur, I propose to return for a mo- 
 ment to the division of the Haidarabad contingent bogad?.’ 
 left at Mandesar under Majors Orr and Keatinge. 
 
 In a preceding page of this volume I have shewn how 
 Durand, before marching on Indur, had left, for the conservation 
 of peace and order in western Malwa a detachment of the 
 Haidarabad contingent of all arms at Mandesar under Major Orr, 
 with Major Keatinge as political agent and militarj^ 
 governor of the province. There they remained 
 until the arrival at Indur of Sir Robert Hamilton. re-open the 
 That high official at once directed Orr and Keatinge 
 
104 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 to marcL up tlie Agra road, and to restore on it the postal and 
 telegraphic communications which had been destroyed. 
 
 A more interesting march was not undertaken during the 
 entire period of those troublous times. Keatinge and Orr were 
 the first representatives of the British power who had been seen 
 in that part of the country for many months. As they marched 
 up the Agra road huge coils of telegraph wire were brought by 
 night, and placed on the roadside, by people who dreaded lest 
 the wire should be found in their possession. From the centre 
 of haystacks, likewise, postmasters recovered the mail-bags 
 which had been left with them when the outbreak occurred at 
 Indur. The little force, re-establishing the wires as it pushed 
 on, proceeded as far as Gunah, there to await the arrival of the 
 1st Brigade under Stuart on its way to Chanderi. 
 
 To the proceedings of that brigade I must now invite the 
 reader’s attention. 
 
 In pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Kose, Stuart 
 had left Mau on the 10th of January, and marched upon Gunah, 
 the road to which had been cleared by Orr and Keatinge in 
 Chanderi manner jnst described. About seventy miles to 
 
 the east of Gunah lies the important post of 
 Chanderi. Chanderi is a very famous town. Its splendour in 
 the prosperous times of the Mughul empire had made it 
 notorious. “If you want to see a town whose houses are 
 palaces, visit Chanderi,” was a proverb in the time 
 of Akbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it 
 was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand 
 houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, 
 three hundred and sixty caravansaries, and twelve thousand 
 
 Its former 
 splendour. 
 
 mosques. 
 
 Its later 
 decay. 
 
 Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Marathas 
 had worked a great change in its prosperity. In 
 later years, too, its manufactures had suffered from 
 competition with Manchester. But its fort still 
 remained, strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, 
 testifying alike to its prestige and to the valour of its defenders. 
 
 Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by 
 Srength of ^ rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, 
 its fort. the fort of Chanderi, seen by an approaching enemy, 
 looked worthy of its reputation. To this place, in 
 February 1858, flocked the Sipahis beaten in the actions already 
 detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had 
 Bworn to defend it successfully or to perish. 
 
1857.] STUART MARCHES ON CHAND^.RL 105 
 
 Against it Brigadier C. S. Stuart, joined b)’ Orr and Keatinge, 
 marched from Giinah. On the 5th of March he ^ 
 reached a place, Khukwasas, six miles from Chanderi. Lvances 
 Between Khukwasas and Chanderi the road lay 
 through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore sent two 
 companies of the 86th foot and the 25th Bombay Native 
 Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching 
 three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills 
 — a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the 
 surprise of Stuart, no defence was offered. Two 
 miles further, however, the road was found Opposition 
 barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the enemy, 
 barricades ; but they had not worked long before 
 the enem}'- were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching 
 it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage 
 the}^ were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and, the 
 barricades having been removed, the artillery advanced, covered 
 by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the 
 left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire 
 opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about a mile 
 distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this 
 enclosure. One officer of the regiment. Lieutenant 
 Lewis, and the political agent with the force Major £ewis 
 Keatinge,* of the Bombay artillery, outrunning the Keatiuge. 
 men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping 
 down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart 
 pursued his advantage, and did not halt till he had occupied 
 the hills to the west of the fort. 
 
 The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the 
 neighbouring villages, in reconnoitring, and in 
 planting his guns in a commanding position. On 
 the 13th the breaching batteries opened fire, and by storm? 
 the evening of the 16th effected a breach which was 
 reported practicable. Stuart had with him, as I have already 
 stated, but two companies of the 86ih. The remainder were 
 marching to join him, and on the 15th were only twenty-eight 
 miles distant. On the afternoon of that day the officer who 
 commanded them received a despatch from Stuart telling him 
 
 * The same who had accompanied Orr in the opening of the Agra roadi 
 now General Keatinge, V.C. 
 
106 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857, 
 
 that the breach would probably be practicable on the morrow, 
 and, that if he would push on and join him on the 
 mardfof 16th, he, Stuart, would defer the assault to the day 
 
 the 86th. following. The commanding officr set out at once, 
 
 and his men pushed on with so much alacrity, that, 
 though they had already marched fifteen miles that morning, 
 they joined Stuart by 10 o’clock on the 16th. 
 
 Thus reinforced, Stuart, early on the morning of the 17th, 
 
 . sent his stormers, men of the 86th and of the 25 th 
 
 Sndft Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous 
 
 htoseif rush carried all before them. Major Keatinge, who 
 
 accompanied the party, and who led it into the 
 breach, was struck down, severely wounded. But his fall did 
 not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the 
 The storm Parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, 
 and most of them escaped. A letter which the 
 Brigadier had sent the previous day to Captain Abbott com- 
 manding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the 
 north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the 
 place was taken with all its guns.* 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chanderi on the 18th. 
 
 Informed that the garrison had escaped northwards, 
 mar^s^on ^ detachment of the Haidarabad contingent 
 
 jhiinsi. to intercept them. This force came up with a few 
 stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. 
 On the 19th he marched to Chanchanpiir, one march, fourteen 
 miles, from Jhansi. After a rest here of about two hours, he 
 despatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of 
 the 2nd brigade to reconnoitre and invest that place. 
 
 To the fall of Jhansi Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone 
 attached the greatest importance. They regarded 
 that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in 
 central India, the main strength of the formidable 
 rebel force on the Jamnah. It was a place, moreover, 
 in which the slaughter of English men and women 
 had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, 
 and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by 
 acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as 
 was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, 
 that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in 
 
 Great 
 Importance 
 attached to 
 the fall of 
 Jhansi. 
 
 ♦ The casualties in the capture were twenty-nine, including two officers. 
 
1857.] SIK R. HAMILTON SAVES THE CAMPAIGN. 107 
 
 Causes which prompted 
 Lord Canning and Sir 
 C. Campbell to order the 
 diversion of the force 
 from Jhansi. 
 
 central India, should be struck, they were both so little appre- 
 ciative of the enormous value of delivering 
 that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir 
 Hugh Rose’s brigades was yet fresh in the 
 minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve 
 of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer 
 the attack on Jhansi, in order to divert the force elsewhere. 
 From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were 
 saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton. 
 
 I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and 
 horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon 
 of the 20th, to reconnoitre and invest Jhansi. He 
 was about, a few hours later, to follow with his 
 infantry, when an express arrived in camp bear- 
 ing two despatches. One of these was from the 
 Governor-General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the 
 Commander-in-Chief to Sir Hugh Rose. 
 
 The purport of these two despatches was identical. They 
 represented that the Rajah of Charkhari (in Bun- 
 delkhand), a man who, throughout the trying 
 period of 1857-58, had shown unwavering fidelity 
 to his British overlord, was being besieged in his 
 fort by Tantia Topi and the Gwaliar contingent, and they 
 ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, 
 Whitlock’s force not being near enough to effect that purpose. 
 
 Charkhari was about eighty miles from the ground on which 
 Sir Hugh’s force was encamped, on the direct road 
 to Bandah. Jhansi was within fourteen miles. To 
 the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally 
 present itself that the surest mode of saving the 
 lesser and more distant place was to attack at once 
 the more important and nearer fortress ; that to act 
 on the principle indicated in the despatches would be to act in 
 defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it 
 appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a 
 soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he 
 knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it unless the means 
 could be devised of superseding it by authority which he might 
 deem higher and more potential. 
 
 Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. How, I will relate 
 in his own simple words. “ Sir Hugh Rose considered the order 
 of the Commander-in-Chief imperative : there was not anything 
 
 Sir Hugh 
 Rose and Sir 
 R. Hamilton 
 receive 
 despatches 
 
 ordering the 
 former to 
 march on 
 Charkh^rf. 
 
 Reasons why 
 the order 
 appeared 
 devoid of 
 sense to 
 Hamilton 
 and Rose. 
 
108 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 Sir Robert 
 Hamilton 
 takes upon 
 himself the 
 responsibility 
 of ordering 
 the continu- 
 ance of the 
 movement 
 on Jhansi. 
 
 Hamilton’s 
 determina- 
 tion gives a 
 deeded 
 character to 
 the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor-General ; 
 
 it was clear to me it would be a great political 
 mistake to draw ofif from Jhansi, which our cavalry 
 w’^ere investing, and our force within fourteen miles ; 
 moreover, supposing the force moved on Charkhari, 
 it was not possible to march the eighty miles before 
 the rebels had carried the fort, the Eajah having no 
 provisions, and having lost the outworks, according 
 to my intelligence. I, therefore, took on myself the 
 responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhansi, 
 trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy 
 from Charkhari, and so I wrote to the Governor-General.” * 
 
 It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, 
 thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the 
 two highest officials in the country, but under the 
 circumstances it was a responsibility which it was 
 necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to 
 the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry 
 to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken 
 in hand at Mau. 
 
 Freed by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing 
 the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in- 
 mov^rS Chief, Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o’clock on the 
 jhdnsi. morning of the 21st for Jhansi. He arrived before 
 that city at 9 o’clock, and, halting his troops in the 
 open about a mile and a half from the fortress, proceeded with 
 his staff to reconnoitre. He did the work completely, for it had 
 struck 6 p.M. before he returned. 
 
 Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and 
 the town and fortress of Jhansi were the ruined 
 Se^ground bungalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, 
 g^ol, the “ Star ’’fort,! and the Sipahi lines. Near 
 the town were several large temples and topes of 
 tamarind trees. On the right of the halting-ground, stretch- 
 ing to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of hills, 
 through which ran the Kalpi and Urchah roads ; to the left 
 were other hills and the Datia roads ; due north was the 
 fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking the walled-in city.J 
 
 * Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, 
 dated the 20th of March, 1862. 
 t Vol. III. page 122. 
 
 X Lowe’s Central India. 
 
1857.] 
 
 THE FORTRESS OF JHXnSI. 
 
 109 
 
 The great strength of the fort of Jhansi, natural as well as 
 artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among 
 fortresses. It stands on a elevated rock, rising out strSgtii of 
 of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding 
 country. It is built of excellent and most massive 
 masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of 
 granite ; its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. 
 It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid con- 
 struction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery -fire, 
 and loop-holes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for 
 musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort com- 
 manded the country all around. On one tower, called the 
 “ white turret,” then recently raised in height, waved in proud 
 defiance the standard of the high-spirited Rani. 
 
 The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhansi, 
 the west and part of the south face excepted. 
 
 The steepness of the rock protects the west ; the fortified 
 city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running 
 south-east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon, which pro- 
 tects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified 
 by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which 
 was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid 
 masonry. 
 
 The city of Jhansi is about four miles and a half in circum- 
 ference. It is surrounded by a fortified and massive 
 wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in 
 height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous 
 flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop- 
 holes, and with a banquette for infantry.* 
 
 The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand 
 men, composed of rebel Sipahis, foreign mercenaries, 
 and local levies, and they were led by a woman who Garrison of 
 believed her cause to be just, and who, classified ac- fortress.^ 
 cording to Channing’s definition of greatness, was a 
 heroine, though of the third order. 
 
 In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh 
 Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, 
 and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted sir Hugh's 
 the many difficulties presented to the attack, by 
 
 * Sir Hugh Rose’s despatch, dated the 30th of April, 1858, from which this 
 description is taken almost textuaUy. Sir Hugh adds, further on : “ A remarkable 
 feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city.” 
 
110 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 the fort perched on a lofty granite rock, with its three 
 lines of works, its flanking fire, its thick and solid walls. He 
 had discovered that it would he necessary to take the city prior 
 to assailing the fortress, a work involving double labour and 
 double danger. In this reconnaissance, however, he had decided 
 on his plan of attack. That night he was joined by the cavalry 
 of the 1st brigade. The next day he completely invested the 
 city and fortress with his cavalry. In this investment the 
 defenders read the determination of the English general to cap- 
 ture not only the place but its garrison. 
 
 One of the measures taken by the Eani might under, other 
 Difficulties circumstances, have caused considerable embarrass- 
 of suppiiS. nient to the besiegers. She had made the country 
 all about bare. Not a blade of grass was to be seen. 
 Thanks, however, to the loyalty of Sindhia and of the Eajah of 
 Tehri,* the force was throughout the operations abundantly 
 supplied with grass, firewood, and vegetables. 
 
 The cavalry having invested the city on the 22nd, the siege 
 The sie e cn the night of that day. At 9 o’clock a 
 
 beginS!^^ detachment of Madras and Bombay sappers was sent 
 with two 18-pounders, and a company 24th Bombay 
 Native Infantry, to throw up a battery near the Urchah road 
 on the east side of the town wall ; other parties were detached 
 at the same time to positions which the general had selected. 
 Working hard that night, the next day, and the night and day 
 which followed, they made ready on the evening of the 24th 
 four batteries, constituting the right attack. On the morning 
 of the 25th they opened fire. That day, too, the bulk of the 1st 
 brigade came into line. It was at once posted south of the fort, 
 constituting there the left attack. 
 
 The siege now progressed in real earnest. For seventeen 
 Pr ess of fire from the besieging batteries and from 
 
 th'^ege for the walls of the city and fort was incessant. Shot 
 and shell were poured into the city, and the enemy’s 
 guns never ceased to reply. The labour entailed 
 upon the small force of the besiegers was tremendous. During 
 the period of which I have spoken the men never 
 JSSon°of took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled 
 the besiegers except to Water. Nor were the exertions of the 
 
 * Tehri, also called Urchah, is a Bunded. Rajput State, immediately to the 
 east of the Jhdnsi and Lalitpiir districts. Its Rajah is looked upon as the 
 Head of the Bundelds. 
 
1857.] 
 
 THE SIEGE OF JHlNSf. 
 
 Ill 
 
 and the 
 besieged. 
 
 and her 
 
 At length a 
 breach is 
 effected. 
 
 when an 
 army ad- 
 vances to 
 relieve the 
 place. 
 
 less determined. Women and children were seen 
 assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and 
 in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, 
 whilst the Earn constantly visited the troops and 
 animated them to enthusiasm by her presence 
 words. 
 
 For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ 
 only two 18-pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so 
 as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the build- 
 ings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders 
 was, owing to the great strength of the walls, ex- 
 tremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the 
 mamelon bastion were levelled by the fire from the 
 left attack, and the enemy’s guns there rendered 
 useless. The two following days the cannonading continued 
 with great spirit. A breach had been effected, but 
 it was barely practicable ; the courage of the enemy 
 continued unabated ; danger seemed only to increase 
 their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when 
 a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the 
 evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh 
 Eose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief 
 of the fortress ! 
 
 This was the army of Tantia Topi. The career of this able 
 Maratha leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent 
 chapter. Suffice it to say that, after his victory over Windham 
 and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tantia had 
 crossed the Ganges, and subsequently, in obedience 
 to orders from Eao Sahib, the nephew of Nana Sahib, 
 had proceeded to Kalpi. Thence, complying with orders from 
 the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred 
 Sipahis and four guns, moved on Charkhari, and, on the 
 eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty-four 
 guns and three lakhs of rupees, 
 he received a letter from the Eani of Jhansi, begging 
 him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again 
 received the full approval of his superior. His 
 force, by this time, had been increased by the June- JJ*]: 
 tion of five or six regiments of the Gwaliar contin- jh^nsi. 
 gent and the levies of rebel Eajahs to twenty-two 
 thousand men and twenty-eight guns. Leading it himself, he 
 marched on the English camp before Jhansi. 
 
 Tdntid Topi 
 
 Just at this time Srkhlrf. 
 
112 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 The position of Sir Hugh Eose was perilous. Before him 
 was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by eleven 
 Hugh^RoL?* thousand warriors, full of the ardour of battle ; ad- 
 position. vancing against and close to him, an army of more 
 than twenty thousand men led by a chieftain who 
 hated the English, and who bad twice revelled in their defeat 
 at Kahnpur. It was a position which required in a special 
 degree great daring, a resolute will, the power to take respon- 
 sibility. A single false step, a solitary error in judgment, 
 might be fatal. But Sir Hugh Eose was equal to the occasion. 
 
 Eightly believing that to withdraw the troops then 
 maSn the° investing the fortress, for the purpose of meeting 
 siege and to the ncw enemy, would give the besieged all the 
 reH^vSg moral advantages of victory as well as the material 
 army. advantages which they would derive from a virtual 
 raising of the siege, the English general resolved 
 still to press the siege with vigour, whilst at the head of all the 
 troops not engaged in actual duty he should march against the 
 new enemy. The extreme daring of this plan will be realised 
 when the reader reflects that Sir Hugh was unable to assemble 
 more than fifteen hundred men of all arms for this purpose, 
 that of these only five hundred were British, and that the 
 enemy numbered, according to Tantia Topi’s own admission, 
 twenty-two thousand men. Sir Hugh’s preparations* for the 
 engagement were made on the evening of the 31st. He resolved 
 to attack early the following morning. 
 
 Sir Hugh had drawn his covering force from both brigades, 
 the detachment from the first being led by Brigadier C. S. Stuart, 
 that from the 2nd by himself in person. The men slept in their 
 clothes ready for immediate action. The precaution was 
 necessary. At 4 o’clock in the morning of the 1st, Tantia Topi 
 advanced towarde the British encampment. Half an 
 hour later, the falling back of his pickets warned 
 Topf, the English general of his approach. In a few 
 
 minutes the British guns opened fire, and almost 
 immediately those of the enemy answered. But the fire of a 
 few guns was powerless to check the onward march of an 
 enemy whose line overlajDped that of the British on both flanks. 
 
 * The preparations were witnessed with delight by the defenders of Jhansi, 
 who thought the English were marching to certain destruction. They shouted 
 all night in a frenzy of joy. 
 
1857.] 
 
 SIR HUGH ATTACKS tAnTIA TOPI. 
 
 113 
 
 Tantia had but to move straight on to reach with his over- 
 lapping wings the troops besieging the fortress, who would 
 thus, literally, be placed between two fires. Sir Hugh compre- 
 hended the position in an instant, and took measures to meet it. 
 Massing his horse artillery under Captain Light foot on his left, 
 and attaching to it a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, 
 under Captain Prettijohn, he ordered them to attack 
 the enemy’s right, whilst he himself, on the other 
 flank, should direct another squadron and a division cavalry, 
 of guns against their left. On the left, Crowe’s 
 division of two guns was sent forward to enfilade the enemy’s 
 right. This service was performed with great skill and 
 gallantry, for, though one of his guns was disabled, the fire of 
 the other was so rapid and so correct that the enemy’s left was 
 shaken. 
 
 The tactics of Sir Hugh were exactly adapted to che 
 circumstances of the case. The enemy’s centre, which up to 
 that time had been advancing steadily, surprised by the double 
 attack, first halted, and then, as the men composing it discerned 
 a movement on the part of the British infantry, broke up into 
 disordered masses. The movement of the British 
 infantry is easily accounted for. Sir Hugh Rose, Slntry ^ 
 in the moment of charging, had sent orders to his 
 infantry to advance as soon as the cavalry attack 
 should be well pronounced. This order was now obeyed. The 
 infantry sprang to their feet, advanced a few yards, 
 then poured in a volley and charged. The result Jhe 
 was magical. The first line of the enemy at once defeated, 
 broke, and fled in complete disorder towards the 
 second line, abandoning several of their guns. An opportune 
 charge of the Dragoons, in which Prettijohn and Lightfoot, 
 who commanded the field battery attached to the cavalry, 
 greatly distinguished themselves, intensified that disorder. 
 
 The second line, commanded by Tantia in person, was 
 occupying a position upon a rising ground, its front covered by 
 jungle, about two miles in rear of the first line. 
 
 Tantia beheld in dismay the men of the latter 
 rushing helter skelter towards him, followed by the defeats a 
 three arms of the British in hot pursuit ; but he onhe 
 had scarcely realised the fact when another vision enemy, and 
 on his right flank came to add to his anguish. 
 
 Whilst Sir Hugh Rose had been engaged in the manner I have 
 
 VOL. V. I 
 
114 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 described, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, with the detachment of the 
 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on the 
 right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, who 
 were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the line 
 to move off towards Jhansi. Stuart attacked, defeated them, 
 and drove them back, hotly following them. So 
 thrScond close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had no 
 
 line. time to re-form, but fled in confusion, leaving 
 
 gun after gun in the hands of the victors, and 
 numbers of their own men dead or dying on the field. 
 This was the vision that came to add to the dismay of 
 Tantia Topi. 
 
 It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt decision. 
 The day, he saw, was lost, but there was yet time to save the 
 second line and his remaining guns. I have said that the 
 ground upon which he rested was covered to the front by 
 jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled. He at 
 once set fire to it, and under cover of the smol<e 
 and flames, commenced a retreat across the Betwa, 
 hoping to place that river between himself and the 
 His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, his guns 
 covered it. Eight gallantly and skilfully they did it, 
 and he did succeed in crossing the Betwa with his 
 reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first line. But 
 he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse artillery 
 and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the burning jungle, 
 and they were resolved not to cease the pursuit till 
 they had captured every gun that had opened 
 against them. They carried out their programme 
 to the letter. The pursuit did not cease till every 
 been taken. Fifteen hundred rebels were killed or 
 wounded on this day. d’he remainder, with Tantia Topi at 
 their head, fled towards Kalpi.* 
 
 Whilst this battle had been raging, the besieged had 
 redoubled their fire. Mounting the bastions and 
 The besieged wall, they had shouted and yelled, and poured 
 first jubilant,’ down volleys of musketry, seemingly threatening a 
 sortie. Never, hoM'ever, did the besiegers’ batteries 
 
 T^nti4 fires 
 the jungle, 
 
 pursuers. 
 
 and flees. 
 
 pursued 
 across the 
 Betwa by 
 the British. 
 
 gun 
 
 had 
 
 ♦ Tantia states that four or five guns were saved, but these must have been 
 additional to the twenty-eight field-pieces accounted for. He adds that he was 
 followed in his flight by only two hundred Sipahis. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 STOEMING OF JHInsI. 
 
 115 
 
 ply with more vigour or with greater effect. The vision 
 meeting the eye of those who manned the wall, 
 moreover, did not long continue to inspire. Suddenly 
 the yells and the shouts ceased — a sure sign that wards dis- 
 the garrison had recognised that the hour of 
 deliverance had not arrived for them. 
 
 The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its morale 
 strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, 
 resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Kose 
 determined then to take the promptest advantage of the 
 discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tantia 
 Topi could not fail to produce on the minds of the 
 garrison. He poured in, then, a heavy fire all that pouS’i^a 
 night and the day following. On the 2nd the heavy fire 
 breach in the city wall having been reported S the night, 
 practicable, though only just practicable. Sir Hugh 
 determined to storm the place the following morning. He 
 made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a 
 false attack on the west wall with a small detachment under 
 Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons ; as soon as the sound of his 
 guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch 
 from cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it 
 attempts should be made to escalade the wall. The right 
 attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, 
 the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the to'storm.^’^^^ 
 Haidarabad contingent, was divided into two columns 
 and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Liddell, the left by Captain Eobinson — both of 
 the 3rd Europeans — the reserve by Brigadier Steuart, 14th 
 Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town 
 by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Eoyal Engineers, 
 the 68th Foot, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was 
 similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Lowth, 86th Eegiment, was to storm the breach ; the 
 right, led by Major Stuart, 86th Eegiment, to escalade the 
 rocket-tower and the low curtain immediately to the right 
 of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. 
 Btuart. 
 
 At 3 o’clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming 
 parties marched to the positions assigned to them, 
 to await there the signal from Major Gall’s party. 
 
 No sooner was it given than the stormers dashed 
 
 I 2 
 
116 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 to the front. On the left, Lieutenant Jerome, 86th, supported 
 by Captains Darby and Brockman, led the stormers of Colonel 
 Lowth’s column up the breach in the most gallant manner, 
 driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major Stuart 
 attacked the rocket-tower, and though met by a strong opposi- 
 tion, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then collected 
 his men, and despatched a portion of them against that section 
 of the rebel forces which was engaged in opposing the right 
 attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this detach- 
 ment, led most gallantly by Brockman, forced the 
 attack. rebels to let go their hold on the defences, thus 
 greatly facilitating the difficult task of the right 
 attack. With the remainder of his troops, Lowth prepared to 
 march on the Eani’s palace. 
 
 The right attack, on hearing the signal, had marched silently 
 from their cover in three bodies. No sooner, how- 
 attack^^* ever, had the troops composing it turned into the 
 road leading towards the gate which was the object 
 of their assault than the enemy’s bugles sounded, and a very 
 heavy fire opened upon them.* Through this fire the stormers 
 had to march upwards of two hundred yards. Steadily they 
 pushed on, and planted the ladders in three places against the 
 wall. For the moment, however, it was impossible for the 
 stormers to ascend. “ The fire of the enemy waxed 
 ai^^SecLd. stronger, and amid the chaos of sounds of volleys of 
 musketry and roaring of cannon, and hissing and 
 bursting of rockets, stink-pots, infernal machines, huge stones, 
 blocks of wood, and trees — all hurled upon their devoted heads — 
 the men wavered for a moment, and sheltered themselves behind 
 stones.” f 
 
 Notwithstanding this momentary check, the sappers, animated 
 by their officers, kept firm hold of their ladders, and, in spite of 
 the superhuman efforts of the enemy, maintained them in their 
 position against the wall. How long this lasted it is difficult 
 to state. Minutes seemed hours, when, happily. Major Boileau, 
 Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report the state of 
 affairs to the Brigadier, brought up a reinforcement of a hundred 
 
 * “For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which burst a storm of 
 bullets, round shoi; and rockets, destined for our annihilation.” — Lowe’s Central 
 India. 
 
 t Lowe, ibid. 
 
STOEMING OF JHANSI. 
 
 1857.] 
 
 117 
 
 men of tlie 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the 
 
 ladders, led by their engineer officers. Some were 
 
 found too short, others broke down under the men ; 
 
 but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, gained, by too weak! 
 
 means of one of them, the summit of the wall, and, 
 
 fighting against enormous odds, called upon the men to follow 
 
 him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble 
 
 regiment mounted by another, and then boldly 
 
 jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieu- 
 
 tenant Bonus, also of the Bombay Engineers, reached John, 
 
 the wall by a third. The men pressed on from of Bonus, 
 
 behind ; but before they could, in any number, join 
 
 their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall, dying pierced with 
 
 shot and bayonets; Bonus had been hurled down, 
 
 struck in his face by a log or stone ; Fox of the 
 
 Madras sappers, who had also reached the wall, had been shot in 
 
 the neck ; Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But 
 
 the stormers pushed on in streams from some eight The right 
 
 ladders, and at length gained a footing on the 
 
 rampart, dealing and receiving death from the enemy, on the 
 
 who still continued fiercely to contest every point of 
 
 the attack. 
 
 It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack, led by 
 Brockman, who, looking along the wall from the breach which 
 he had won, had seen the failure of the attack and 
 had resolved on the instant to do all in his power to attLk 
 aid his countrymen to repair the momentary damage, 
 made the charge upon the flank and rear of the 
 defenders of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvellous. 
 The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the 
 stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with 
 their comrades. 
 
 The defence having thus given way, the stormers made their 
 way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading 
 the way. The palace had been prepared by the rebels ^arch oTthe 
 for a resistance in the Isst resort. The conflict, as palace, 
 the stormers forced their way through the streets, 
 was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on 
 both sides of the street leading to it had been set 
 on fire, and the heat was fearful. When, too, the ^ dSperat^ 
 courtyard of the palace was reached, it became contest, they 
 apparent that the resistance had only begun. 
 
118 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From 
 chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the 
 bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, 
 however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it 
 was discovered that fifty men of the Rani’s bodyguard 
 JcSie^n the stables attached to the building. These 
 
 stables. men defended themselves to the last before, after a 
 desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But 
 the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd 
 Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by re- 
 capturing a British flag.* 
 
 This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who 
 had been present throughout with the left attack, 
 received information that a body of the rebels, 
 numbering about four hundred, driven from the 
 town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets 
 of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position 
 on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had 
 surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent 
 against the hill the available troops of all arms under 
 Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the 
 hill a detachment of the 24th Bombay Native 
 Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, 
 and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to 
 the summit and there blew themselves up. The 
 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another 
 body of about fifteen hundred who had collected in 
 Sy one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would 
 
 defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same 
 ' time, with a loss of three hundred of their number. 
 
 All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory 
 fighting continued, the enemy being either slaugh- 
 tered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. 
 Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organizing 
 measures for an attack on the fortress. But the 
 Rani saved him further trouble on that score. On 
 the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the 
 fortress, and, hoping that her presence at Kalpi might induce 
 
 The rebels, 
 driven from 
 the town, 
 occupy a 
 strong 
 position 
 outside of it. 
 
 been 
 
 whence they 
 are driven 
 by the 24th 
 Bombay 
 Native 
 Infantry ; 
 
 Desultory 
 
 continues 
 during the 
 night. 
 
 * This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to 
 the grandfather of the Rani’s husband, with the permission to have it carried 
 before him, as a reward for his fidelity.” — Sir H. Rose’s despatch. 
 
1857.] 
 
 PROJECT TO MARCH ON KALPI. 
 
 119 
 
 Tantia Topi once more to aid her, she evacuated the fortress 
 
 with her remaining followers. She rode straight 
 
 for Kalpi, and arrived there the very evening on The R^nf 
 
 which Tantia, who had travelled more leisurely, 
 
 reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavali y force and rTde^^s** 
 
 in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. 
 
 A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up. 
 
 The fortress of Jhansi was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the 
 morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by 
 him during the operations against it, including the 
 action on the Betwa, amounted to three hundred and fortress, 
 forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six 
 were officers. The enemy’s loss was computed at five thousand. 
 One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in 
 Jhansi itself. 
 
 The mode by which Jhansi was captured attests the merits 
 of themoble soldier who planned and carried out the 
 attack. Never was there a more complete com- Credit due 
 bination of daring and skill, of foresight and 
 resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, 
 and of the genius which formed the plan.* 
 
 Sir Hugh’s object now was to march on Kalpi, to drive the 
 rebels from that stronghold on the Jamnah whence 
 they had so constantly menaced the communications 
 of the British. Kalpi was the arsenal of the rebels, KaipS! 
 the head-quarters of the nephew of Nana Sahib, and 
 was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. 
 It lies on the Jamnah, a hundred and two miles to the north-east 
 of Jhansi, and only forty-six to the south-west of Kanhpur. 
 The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch 
 the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell’s army, and, in co-operation 
 with him, to clear the triangle, the angles of which were Jhansi, 
 Kalpi, and Agra — Gwaliar being nearly midway in the line 
 uniting Jhansi and Agra. 
 
 * The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose’s despatch attest the great 
 strength of the town and fortress : “ It was not till Jhansi was taken that its 
 
 great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south 
 curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we 
 saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a 
 massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep 
 tank cut out of the live rock.” 
 
120 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 Sir Hugh 
 halts at 
 Jhdnsi to 
 arrange for 
 a march on 
 Kalpf. 
 
 For seventeen days Sir Hugh’s little army had known no 
 repose. The halt at Jhansi of nearly nineteen days 
 which followed the capture of the place was, 
 however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had 
 to be done in Jhansi itself : the arrangements for a 
 fresh campaign had to be organised, provisions had 
 to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At 
 length all was ready. Leaving at Jhansi a small garrison 
 consisting of the head-quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Euro- 
 peans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, the left 
 wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, a hundred troopers Haidar- 
 abad contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three 
 guns Bhopal contingent — the whole under the command of 
 Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans — Sir Hugh detached, 
 mSe on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment 
 
 thSSilect Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of 
 
 Kota, reported to be at a place called Mau, in the 
 neighbourhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at 
 midnight on the 25th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to 
 follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached 
 with the bulk of the Haidarabad force to prevent the Eajahs of 
 Banpur and Shahgarh and any other rebels from crossing the 
 Betwa and doubling back southwards. 
 
 Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in 
 carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return 
 for a moment to the Eani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi. 
 
 These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, 
 at Kalpi the same day. The first act of the Eani 
 jhln?ut been to implore the nephew of Nana Sahib, known 
 
 Kalpf. as Eao Sahib, “ to give her an army that she might go 
 and fight.” The following morning Eao Sahib ordered 
 a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some 
 regiments of the G waliar contingent, several regiments 
 of the regular native army recruited to nearly full 
 sdhib, strength, the contingents of various rebel Eajahs, and 
 the remnant of the Jhansi garrison. Eao Sahib re- 
 viewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tantia 
 who holds a them against the English. Tantia obeyed, 
 
 review, and, hoping to meet them when possibly all their 
 Snti?Topf forces might not be reunited, marched to Kunch, a 
 to march town forty-two miles from Kalpi on the Jhansi road, 
 ^gSsh?*^* and there took up a strong position, covered by 
 
1857.] 
 
 SIB HUGH MAKCHES ON KUNCH. 
 
 121 
 
 woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each 
 of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up 
 intrenchments. 
 
 Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kunch. 
 Major Gall, harassed by the enemy on his march, 
 had reached the town of Puch, fourteen miles from He marches 
 Kunch, on the 1st of May. Here he was joined the 
 same day by Sir Hugh Eose and the 1st brigade. ofOaii, 
 Major Orr, on his side, had crossed the Betwa, of Rose, 
 attacked the Eajahs of Banpur and Shahgarh at andofOrr. 
 Kotra, and had taken one of their guns. He had, 
 however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had 
 succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and 
 carriage being furnished them by the treacherous Eajah of 
 Jigni. By Sir Hugh’s direction. Major Orr then marched on 
 Kunch. 
 
 The country between Piich and Kiinch was studded with 
 little forts, which, up to the time of which I am 
 writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From ^ncenSIte 
 these they could undoubtedly cause considerable on Kunch. 
 annoyance to small detachments ; but, in the 
 presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, 
 they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at 
 Kunch. 
 
 Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade, strengthened by the 
 71st Highlanders, on the 5th of May. He at once 
 marched on Lohari, ten miles nearer Kunch, thence sends’aaii 
 to put into action the plan of attack which he had LoSn”** 
 matured. But, when he arrived at Lohari, he was 
 informed that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the 
 same name close to it. He immediately detached Major Gall, 
 with a wing of the 3rd Europeans, some artillery and dragoons, 
 to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and 
 some men ; out of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh, 
 meanwhile, had matured his plans. 
 
 An Asiatic army. Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects 
 a front attac*k. He had also noticed that nothing 
 disturbs such an army so much as a turning move- and makes 
 ment. Instead, therefore, of sending his troops 
 against a position which the rebels had carefully turn the 
 prepared. Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march positfon. 
 with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once 
 
122 
 
 CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 facia g the unfortified side of the town of Kunch, and threaten- 
 ing seriously the enemy’s line of retreat from that place to 
 Kalpi. 
 
 With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping- 
 ground early on the morning of the 6th, and, making 
 Se a^sB^^ned ^ Aa-nk march of fourteen miles, brought his force 
 point, into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, 
 forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village 
 of Nagupura; his 2nd brigade, forming the centre, occupied 
 the village of Chumair ; Major Orr’s Haidarabad force, forming 
 the right, occupied the village of Umri. This position was two 
 miles from Kiinch. 
 
 It was 7 o’clock in the morning before the troops sighted 
 the rebels, though still invisible to them. Sir Hugh, 
 adramr™^^ who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered 
 them a dram of rum and some biscuit,^whilst he 
 galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and 
 on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered 
 ®econiS?trer Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, tO’ 
 reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which 
 lay between him and Kiinch, covering that advance by a fire 
 of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege- 
 guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the 
 town. 
 
 Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had re- 
 treated through the wood to the part of it near the 
 S?report, town, having in their rear a body of cavalry ; that 
 the siege-guns had had the effect of driving the 
 rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some 
 outworks were still occupied by them. 
 
 Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the out- 
 works with his infantry, and then to storm the 
 and marches town. Covering his left wing with a wing of the 
 townT™* ^ 86th, and the whole of the 25th Bombay Native 
 Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their 
 flanks with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the 
 wood. Advancing in perfect order, the gallant Sipahis of the 
 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and walled 
 gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to 
 
 * The men had nothing to eat that day till 8 p.m., except the small amount 
 of food they canted in their haversacks. 
 
1857 .] MASTERLY RETREAT OF THE REBELS. 12^ 
 
 their left, carried all the obstacles in their front, and then, 
 bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced, de- 
 spite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through JrlgaS 
 the north part of the town and took the fort, drives the 
 This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove oJus^Stre, 
 the enemy’s right on their centre. 
 
 Meanwhile, Brigadier Steuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, 
 having observed a body of rebel infantry strongly 
 posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of ^nd affords 
 attack of his brigade, marched to dislodge them, aid to the 
 The rebels contested their position with great valour, brigade, 
 and it was not until the 1st brigade, establishing 
 itself in the manner already described, threatened their flank, 
 that they gave way. It had been intended that Brigadier 
 Steuart should then march straight into the town, but, with 
 the view of cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it 
 and missed them. 
 
 Major Orr’s force had, whilst this was 
 going on, advanced through the wood, round Soff^^e reS 
 the town, to the plains traversed by the road 
 to Kalpi. 
 
 Although the operations of which I have given an outline 
 had taken only an hour, and the rebels in that short period had 
 been completely defeated, they managed, nevertheless, to gain 
 with the bulk of their forces the Kalpi road in advance of their 
 pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endea- 
 vouring to restore some sort of order in their masses, 
 so as to check by every means in their power the enemy, 
 ardour of the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Eose, then, gain the 
 emerging from the narrow streets of the town, 
 formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he retreat, 
 beheld the enemy retreating in a long irregular 
 line, covered by skirmishers at close distances, the skirmishers 
 supported by groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions. 
 
 The terrific heat of the day, and the power of the sun, which 
 had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European 
 Infantry soldiers,^ forbade him further to 
 risk those soldiers in a pursuit which could The heat ^ the sun 
 not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable hlTuiiJinfamry!” 
 lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst but he lynches the 
 he launched in pursuit the cavalry of both • 
 
 Many of the Sipahis were also struck down by the sun. 
 
CENTKAL INDIA. 
 
 124 
 
 [1857. 
 
 brigades and of Major Orr’s force,* and the horse artillery and 
 field guns. 
 
 Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which 
 impelled admiration from their enemies. The 
 ritreat^of nianner in which they conducted their retreat could 
 the rebels. not be surpassed. They remembered the lessons 
 which their European officers had well taught 
 
 them. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the 
 rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line 
 of skirmishers was two miles in length, it never wavered in 
 a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving 
 men, and loade^l. The relieving men then fired, and ran back 
 in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the 
 pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring ou 
 
 it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so 
 Prettjohn.^^ threatening that Sir Hugh ordered Prettijohn, 14th 
 Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, 
 an order carried out by that most daring officer with great 
 gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels 
 maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it 
 until many of them had been killed, and all their 
 guns had been captured, that the survivors were 
 driven in on the main body. Then, for the first 
 time, they lost their nerve ; then they crowded 
 into the Kalpi road, a long and helpless column of runaways. 
 But the pursuers were completely tired ; they were unable to 
 move faster than at a walk ; the cavalry horses 
 The 'Victors, 'were knocked up ; and, whilst the guns could not 
 Shaustect approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry 
 could only pick up an occasional straggler. When, 
 
 then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over 
 which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to 
 
 an end. It had produced great results. The rebels 
 lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and 
 stores, and five or six hundred men in killed and 
 The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which 
 covered the retreat, was almost annihilated. The English loss 
 was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in 
 addition to many struck down by the sun. 
 
 The defeat at Kiinch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. 
 The infantry Sipahis taunted the cavalry troopers with having 
 
 ♦ Except a party left to watch the Jalaun road and the rear. 
 
 The rebel 
 covering 
 force is at 
 last driven 
 on the main 
 body. 
 
 the 
 pursuit. 
 
 wounded. 
 
1857.] SIR HUGH PUSHES ON TOWARDS KALPL 125 
 
 abandoned them, and the men of all three arms brought the 
 same accusation against Tantia Topi, who had dis- 
 appeared at Kunch even more rapidly than he had on the reLis 
 galloped away from the Betwa. The Jhansi 
 horsemen, too, came in for their share of abuse, and, 
 when they excused themselves on the plea that they had felt 
 bound to escort their Eani* to a place of safety, they were only 
 vilified the more. To such an extent did the animosities among 
 the several parties who constituted the rebel force proceed, that 
 on the morrow of their reaching Kalpi, the rumour, that Sir 
 Hugh was advancing by forced marches against that place, 
 sufficed to induce them to disperse. It is believed tliat shortly 
 after that rumour arrived there were only eleven Sipahis left 
 in the town and fort of Kalpi. This dispersion was, however, 
 soon remedied in a manner to be hereafter described. 
 
 The report which had so disquieted the rebels at Kalpi was 
 not baseless. Despite the fact that his ammunition 
 was well-nigh exhausted, Sir Hugh, determined to pushes on, 
 give the enemy no breathing time, had pushed on 
 with all practicable speed from Kunch. On the 15th he 
 established himself at Gulauli, on the Jamnah, six 
 miles from Kalpi. Gulauli is not on the direct biishe?*’ 
 road between Kunch and Kalpi, but two reasons himself at 
 had prompted Sir Hugh to march on it in preference Kaip?’ 
 to taking the direct route. In the first place, he 
 had heard from the Commander-in-Chief that Colonel G. V. 
 Maxwell had been detached with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, 
 and the Camel corps, to co-operate with him ; and. 
 
 Maxwell having reached the left bank of the Jamnah 
 opposite Gulauli, Sir Hugh was able to hold out his that route, 
 hand to him at that place. In the second, by 
 marching on Gulauli, Sir Hugh turned the fortifications which 
 had been thrown up to impede his advance, and threatened 
 Kalpi from an unexpected quarter. 
 
 Sir Hugh’s march from Kunch to Gulauli, though unopposed 
 by the enemy, was in all respects most trying. The 
 terrible heat, and the rays of the sun, told upon his dmrSer of 
 men with deadly effect, and admissions to the 
 hospitals and deaths increased at an alarming rate. 
 
 This fact was well known to the rebels, and they did their 
 
 ♦ The Rani fled to Kalpi after the defeat; Tantia Topi to Chirki, near 
 Jaldun, the residence of his parents. 
 
126 
 
 CENTEAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857. 
 
 utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general 
 order by their general- in-chief, issued about this time, directed 
 that no attack should be made upon the European infidels 
 before 10 o’clock in the day, as fi.ghting in the sun either killed 
 them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat 
 Gulauli was reached on the 15th, communications were opened 
 with Maxwell, and Sir Hugh, in accordance with his invariable 
 custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy. 
 
 Who now constituted the enemy ? I have related how, in the 
 panic caused by the rumour of Sir Hugh’s onward 
 march, only eleven rebel Sipahis had been left in 
 the town and fort. A few days later, however, the 
 unexpected arrival of the Nawab of Bandah with 
 two thousand horse, some guns, and many followers 
 — the remnant of the force defeated by General Whitlock at 
 Bandah, in the manner to be told in the next chapter — and his 
 energetic exertions, backed by those of the Eani of Jhansi, 
 produced one of those changes from despair to 
 confiLnce Confidence which mark the Indian character.* The 
 returns. Sipahis who had left returned, and, exhorted by 
 their leaders to hold to the last Kalpi, their only 
 arsenal, and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the 
 infidel English,! declared their resolution to defend it to the 
 last. 
 
 Although as a fortification Kalpi had but little to boast of, 
 its position was unusually strong. It was protected 
 posUion of sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of 
 
 Kalpi. defence, and to its rear by the Jamnah, from which 
 rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort. 
 
 Between the British camp and Kalpi, indeed, existed a 
 most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines, over which 
 artillery and cavalry could make no progress, but 
 between the which furnished an interminable cover of the most 
 anSaipT^ formidable description for infantry. On the, so to 
 speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation 
 of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up intrenchments, 
 and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it 
 impossible that they should be turned. Even should they oe 
 driven out of the intrenchments, it was within the power of the 
 rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples, built, as well as the 
 
 * Sir Hugh Rose’s despatch, the 24th of Maj, 1858. 
 t Intercepted letter, idem. 
 
 T)ie rebels 
 are rein- 
 forced by 
 the Naw^b 
 of Bandah. 
 
1857.] SKIRMISHES BETWEEN THE TWO ARMIES. 127 
 
 walls round them, of the most solid masonry. These temples 
 oonstituted a second line of defence ; the outwork of ravines a 
 third ; the town of Kalpi a fourth ; another chain of ravines a 
 fifth ; and the fort the last. 
 
 On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes 
 occurred between the two armies, the enemy being 
 the attacking party. On all these occasions they bSwee?tL 
 were repulsed, but the British suffered much from two armies, 
 the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, 
 and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery, established on the 
 right front of the British position, opened on the town. On 
 the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell’s 
 brigade, consisting of two companies of the 88th, Mpweii 
 and a hundred and twenty Sikhs, crossed the river, sir Hugh, 
 and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the 
 batteries from Maxwell’s camp opened on the fort and town. 
 On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long-meditated 
 blow. 
 
 Sir Hugh had, from the first, determined that, whilst 
 Maxwell’s batteries should shell Kalpi, he would 
 clear the ravines and the other obstacles and attack 
 the left face of the fort. Resolved to keep his men attack, 
 for this great blow, he had contented himself with 
 simply repulsing the attacks I have mentioned. But when he 
 received information that the rebels were meditating an attack 
 on the 22nd, which should be fatal to one of the contending 
 parties, he, now ready for them, resolved to second their views. 
 
 The rebels had prepared a plan so skilful, that, if carried out 
 with courage and resolution, it had many chances in . 
 its favour. Whilst their right should make, with 
 great demonstrations, a false attack on the British attack, 
 left, they proposed to steal up the ravines with their 
 main body, and try and overwhelm the right, weakened, they 
 hoped, by detachments sent to support the left. 
 
 It must be understood that the British force occupied the 
 ground situated between the river Jamiiah and the road 
 running from Kalpi to Bandah; that its right rested on the 
 ravines near the river ; whilst its left nearly touched 
 that road. In pursuance of their plan, the rebels 
 marched out in masses at 10 o’clock on the 22nd battle, 
 along the Bandah road, and threatened the British 
 left, opening fire simultaneously with their guns on its centre. 
 
128 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [1857, 
 
 Maintaining 
 that attack, 
 
 I hey sud- 
 denly direct 
 their main 
 energies 
 against the 
 British right. 
 
 This attack, headed by the Nawab of Bandah and by Eao 
 Sahib, nephew of Nana Sahib, though intended only as a feint, 
 soon made itself felt, and the British left became 
 the £it£h heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident as to 
 left, the real object of the enem}’^, did not move a man 
 
 from his right. He contented himself with replying 
 to the enemy’s guns with his guns in a style which soon forced 
 the rebels to limber up and fall back. But the 
 ^verfty.^* attack on his left not only continued, but became 
 very real indeed : still Sir Hugh did not move a 
 man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if 
 by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass 
 of fire ; the enemy’s batteries opened, and their 
 infantry, climbing from below, poured in an over- 
 whelming musketry fire on the right of the British 
 line. The suddenness of the attack, the superior 
 numbers of those making it, and the terrible heat 
 of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. 
 Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of the Enfield 
 rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and 
 the men, after a few discharges, had found it very difficult to 
 load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number 
 of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great 
 numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British 
 reply to only feebly, when they saw that each 
 discharge from the thin red line became weaker 
 than that preceding it, they began to gain a con- 
 fidence they had never felt before. They pressed 
 on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they ap- 
 proached the British light field-guns and mortar-battery. Then 
 it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, 
 placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners 
 c”s. Stuart, defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th 
 Native Infantry, in thin extended line, disputed 
 the advance step by step. Still the rebels pressed on,^ 
 
 The confi- 
 dence of 
 the rebels 
 increases. 
 
 * “ Well do I remember,” writes to me a very gallant officer, who greatly 
 distinguished himself throughout this campaign, “ Well do I remember that day. 
 Nearly four hundred of my regiment, ‘ the 86,’ were hors de combat, the native 
 regiment was not much better, and thousands of yelling savages were pressing 
 on, a river in our rear. We were well-nigh beaten, when the Camel corps came 
 up, and about one hundred and fifty fresh troops soon turned the tide, and sent 
 the bhang-possessed enemy to the right-about again. It was the Camel corps 
 
1857.] 
 
 VICTOKY OF THE BRITISH. 
 
 129 
 
 and it seemed as thongli from their very numbers they 
 must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of sjrHugh 
 the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel brings up 
 corps, which had opportunely crossed the river that SrpStlie 
 very morning, at their best pace ; then, dismounting critical 
 the men, and leading them forward himself at the ’ 
 
 double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards 
 of the British guns. For a moment the enemy 
 stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash the fa™ 
 forward from the whole line, and thej’^ went head- 
 long into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the 
 right repulsed, but the victory was gained ! The attack on the 
 left collapsed when it was seen that that on the right had 
 failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels’ flank, inflicted great 
 loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so 
 closely that he cut olf a number of them from Kalpi. The 
 fire from Maxwell’s batteries made those who reached that fort 
 feel that it was no secure place of refuge. They 
 evacuated it accordingly during the night. The 2!?acuS?^ 
 rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery Kaipi. 
 and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, 
 losing all their guns and baggage. Even the Rani of Jhansi, 
 who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree ! 
 
 The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that 
 animated them, are thus graphically described by 
 an eye-witness who, throughout its duration, took whfchSe 
 part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave 
 to the world an eloquent record of the achievements siSctir^ 
 of his comrades. “ This was,” writes Dr. Lowe,* * “ a campai^^^ 
 hard day’s work, and a glorious victory won over 
 ten times our number under most trying circumstances. The 
 position of Kalpi ; the numbers of the enemy, who came on 
 with a resolution and a display of tactics we had never before 
 witnessed ; the exhausted, weakened state of the general’s 
 force ; the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which 
 the men had to endure all day, without time to take food or 
 water, combined to render the achievement one of unsurpassed 
 
 that literally savei 3ir Hugh Rose’s division. The enemy were within twenty 
 yards of our battery and outpost tents, the latter full of men down with sunstroke 
 Another quarter of an hour and there would have been a massacre. Ever since 
 that day I have looked upon a camel with eyes of affection.” 
 
 * Lowe’s Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58. 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 E 
 
130 CENTKAL INDIA. [1857. 
 
 difficulty. Every soul engaged in this important action suffered 
 more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or 
 murmuring <li opped down as though struck by lightning in the 
 endurance, delirium of a sunsti’oke ; yet all this was endured 
 without a murmur, and in the cool of the evening 
 we were speculating upon the capture of Kalpi on the morrow.” 
 
 Before daybreak the following morning, Sir Hugh marched 
 on that place. His 1st brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, 
 he sent through the ravines, following the course of the Jamnah, 
 whilst he led the 2nd himself,* along the Kalpi road. 
 
 Colonel Maxwell’s batteries still continued to shell the fort 
 and the villages in front of it. As the two brigades 
 Kaipfi?^^ advanced, however, these villages were abandoned 
 evacuated. by the rebels, and it soon became apparent that no 
 serious resistance was contemplated. When the two 
 brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united 
 near the town, and advanced into it, they were not opposed ; the 
 rebels had fled, quitting for ever the arsenal which had served 
 them so long and so well.f 
 
 The capture of Kalpi completed the plan of the campaign for 
 the column having its base at Mau, which Sir 
 Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor- 
 compiles General and the Commander-in-Chief towards the 
 Hai^iton’s ^lose of the preceding year. In all respects that 
 plan. plan had been carried out. Marching from Mau in 
 
 November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five months, 
 traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming 
 strong forts, taking many towns, defeating armies vastly 
 superior in numbers, led by men and by a woman whose 
 
 ♦ Brigadier C. Steuart, C.B., commanding the 2nd brigade, had reported 
 sick after the battle of Kiinch, and the command had devolved upon Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders. 
 
 t The following description, given by an eye-witness, proves how the rebels 
 had used the position of Kalpi, and the good stead in which it had stood them. 
 After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass, gun-carriages, 
 gun- moulds, &c., found in the fort. Dr. Lowe adds: — “ The enemy had erected 
 houses and tents in the fort, had their smiths’ shops, their carpenters’ shops. 
 Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect order, clean and well 
 constructed; the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless. . . . 
 In the arsenal were about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, outside it 
 were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion of our own. . . , 
 It would appear. . . . that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here.”— 
 Lowe’s Central India. 
 
SIB HUGH ROSE AS A LEADER. 
 
 1857 .] 
 
 131 
 
 hatred of the British name incited them to efforts not to be 
 surpassed in the annals of the mutiny. He and 
 his gallant comrades had accomplished these 
 great deeds during a season the terrible heat of campaign, 
 which far surpassed the heat of the corre- 
 sponding season of previous years, and under a sun which 
 proved scarcely less deadly than the enemy.* Yet moving 
 steadily onwards, regarding difficulties as only obstacles to be 
 overcome, keeping in view the goal at which he aimed, Sir 
 Hugh had marched from victory to victory. It may 
 be said of him that it was his character which 
 created his success. Careless of himself, he con- “character 
 ducted every reconnaissance, he planned every buccSs.”'^ 
 action, he was foremost in every attack, he courted 
 danger and exposure. At the same time, no leader ever paid 
 greater attention to the soldiers. To look after their comforts, 
 to see, after a hard-fought action, that the wounded were 
 attended to, and, after a long and tedious march, that provisions 
 were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. It was this which 
 endeared him to the troops ; this that made them fight cheerily 
 against numbers, endure the killing rays of the fierce sun. If 
 he demanded all their energies on the battle-field, they saw that 
 their wants were attended to when the battle was over ; that he 
 never spared himself ; that, with all the cares of command upon 
 him, he managed to find time to attend to them. It was that 
 sympathy which evoked the enthusiasm which enabled the 
 soldiers of Sir Hugh Rose to equal the achievements of any 
 warriors of whom history makes record. 
 
 The campaign now appeared over. Its every object had been 
 accomplished. Sir Colin Campbell, sharing that 
 opinion, wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton a letter Campaign 
 explaining the mode in which the several corps of appears^ 
 the Central India Field Force were to be cantoned, concluded. 
 
 * Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of officers and men from the effect, 
 of the sun, when they entered Kalpf. “ Most of the officers and men were sick 
 and the whole force needed rest. The general himself was very ill ; his chief 
 of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C.B., was in a raving fever ; his quartermasters 
 general, Captain Macdonald, was worn out, and among the list of those going 
 away ; the chaplain of the force, the Rev. Mr. Schwabbe, had lost his reason 
 and was apparently sinking fast ; and other officers, wounded or exhausted by 
 their long and arduous duties and disease, brought on by these and the terrible 
 sun, had been ordered to England.” 
 
 K 2 
 
132 
 
 CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 and adding, with regard to Whitlock’s force, that “ it would be 
 otherwise employed as a movable division.” The general who 
 had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and 
 to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health, 
 How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell 
 in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the 
 operations of the other column, which, with Jabalpur as its 
 base, had been directed to move on Bandah, subduing the rebel 
 Kdjahs on its route. 
 
1858.] 
 
 KIRWf AND BANDAH. 
 
 133 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 KIRWi AND BANDAH, 
 
 On the 16th of November, 1857, Brigadier-General Whitlock, 
 of the Madras army, was appointed to the command of a 
 division for service in the Nagpur, Sagar, and Narbada terri- 
 tories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade, com- 
 posed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of 
 foot artillery, with two light field-batteries attached, com- 
 manded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Miller ; of a compoai- 
 cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and tionof 
 the 6 til and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded ufhSock’a 
 by Colonel A. W. Lawrence; of one brigade of 
 infantry, composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 
 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel 
 Carpenter, M.A. ; of a second infantry brigade, composed of 
 the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 
 50 th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff, 
 74th Highlanders. There were also details of sappers and 
 miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpur, and to march 
 thence towards Bandah. 
 
 A small force, previously detached from the Madras presi- 
 dency, or serving in the central provinces, was 
 already at Jabalpur.* This force consisted of six The force at 
 hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native diected*^*^ 
 Infantry, under Colonel Miller ; a hundred and 
 twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant 
 Standen ; a hundred and twenty men of the 1st Nagpur 
 Rifles I ; three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry, under 
 Lieutenant- Colonel Cumberlege ; three hundred men 6th Madras 
 Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Byng; a hundred 
 and fifty men 2nd Nizam’s Cavalry, under Captain Macintire ; 
 
 * Vide page 70 of this volume. 
 
 t The Nagpur local force had been rearmed by Mr. Plowden. 
 
134 
 
 kIrwi and bandah. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 to halt a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and 
 Whitlock's seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column 
 arrival. had orders to halt at Jabalpur pending the arrival 
 of General Whitlock and his force. 
 
 General Whitlock reached Kamthi on the 10th of January. 
 Tie was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till 
 Whitlock 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that 
 
 reaches date, he arrived at Jabalpur on the 6th of February.* 
 Jabalpur. ]3rigade reached on the 6th, the 
 
 remainder a few days later. 
 
 On the 1 7th of February General Whitlock, leaving a small 
 garrison at Jabalpur, soon to be increased by the arrival of 
 Brigadier McDnlf’s brigade to a tolerable strength, set out for 
 Sagar. He moved in the direction of Jakhani, with the object 
 of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Kewali 
 JJj® rpartof district. He reached that place, previously captured 
 his force for by WiUoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there 
 Sigar. loyal Rajah of Urchah. Halting here 
 
 one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there 
 on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this 
 march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged 
 His move- ^7 Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying 
 Saracmrised force, to drive the rebels from the strong places 
 ^Streme they occupied, and from which they still continued 
 caution. harass the districts between Jabalpur and Damoh, 
 
 refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his 
 force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. 
 The result was that, although Whitlock’s column secured the 
 ground on which it encamped, scared into submission the 
 villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, 
 it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels 
 astonished at the regard paid to the latter. 
 
 On the 5th Whitlock rode into Sagar, accompanied by some 
 Whitlock horse artillery and cavalry. Sagar had previously 
 reaches been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it 
 Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two 
 hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by 
 forced marches ; he also detached a small body of Europeans to 
 escort treasure from Jabalpur, whilst the remainder of the force 
 he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier 
 
 ♦ The distance is a hundred and forty-eight miles. 
 
1858.] WHITLOCK MOVES TOWARDS BANDAH. 135 
 
 Carpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on 
 the 12 th. 
 
 On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the 
 Governor- General’s orders to march on Nagod and 
 Panah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid fo the ^eled^tV^ 
 loyal Rajahs of Bundelkhand, notably to the Rajah march on 
 of Charkhari. Lord Canning’s despatch further 
 directed Whitlock to communicate his movement to 
 Sir Hugh Rose, so as to enable that officer to work 
 in concert with him. 
 
 In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the 
 22nd of March, and, entering Bundelkhand, arrived 
 at Panah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently 
 a man of extreme caution, W^hitlock halted here to ob- Panah, and 
 tain information regarding the position oi the enemy information, 
 and the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he 
 refer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise 
 period when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh 
 Rose from his attack on Jhansi in order to succour Charkhari, 
 then besieged by Tantia Topi ; and that activity on 
 the part of General Whitlock was specially desirable, ^utio^ 
 
 But no activity was displayed. The force remained 
 halted at Panah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by 
 that time come to a resolution, marched on it by Marwa Ghat, a 
 route almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So proceeds by 
 difficult was the road that on reaching Mandala, at a difficult 
 the foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three BSidahTSm 
 days to repair damages. Whilst thus halted, he siowiy and 
 received (3rd of April) a despatch from Sir Hugh 
 Rose, directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhansi. 
 Whitlock was unable to leave Mandala till the 6th of April. 
 He then marched, by way of Chatrpur, on Bandah, reached 
 Chatrpur on the 9th, surprised the rebels the follow- and eventu- 
 ing night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhigan, then 
 marched on Mahoba, and thence on Bandah. 
 
 The rebel Nawab of Bandah, was playing the part of an 
 independent prince in the district which took its pheNawfib 
 name from the chief town. The Nawab had been of Bandah 
 well supplied with information regarding Whitlock’s todra^^™ 
 movements, and, judging him to be a man of a 2'atra 
 cautious and anxious temperament, determined to 
 attempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been 
 
136 
 
 KIKWf AND BANDAH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 and succeeds. 
 
 The Nawab’s 
 troops sur- 
 prise the Eng- 
 lish, but the 
 latter, soon 
 recovering, 
 defeat them. 
 
 certified of the advance of the English general than he directed 
 the troops he had stationed at Mahoba, and which consisted of 
 eight hnndred and fifty men of the mutinied 50th Bengal 
 Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, 
 the 2nd Kegiment Irregular Cavalry Grwaliar contingent, and 
 half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a 
 position in ambush at Kabrai, whence they should fall upon 
 English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same 
 time the Nawab took care that Whitlock should be informed 
 that he would encounter no enemy south of Bandah. 
 
 Had the courage of his troops equalled the cleverness of the 
 Nawab, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell 
 into the trap that he believed there were no rebels 
 before him. His troops were actually marching 
 through Kabrai an hour before daybreak, when the 
 enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The sur- 
 prise as but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, 
 the Lancers, and the Haidarabad Irregulars gal- 
 loped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to 
 retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the 
 principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong 
 direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The 
 attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in 
 store for him at Bandah. He pushed on, however, and on the 
 early morning of the 19th found the rebel forces, 
 headed by the Nawab, occupying the plain south 
 of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The 
 Nawab’s forces consisted of seven thousand men, of 
 whom rather more than one-third were regular 
 troops. The position be had taken up was strong. 
 The ground was very much intersected by ravines and water- 
 courses, and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage. 
 
 Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o’clock on the morning 
 Where he is 19th. At 5 o’clock his advance guard, corn- 
 
 attacked by manded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three 
 ' ■ companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein’s 
 
 troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarabad Irregulars under 
 Macintire, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st 
 Madras Native Infantry, came upon the enemy. Apthorp was 
 at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst 
 the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were 
 carried out to the letter. Apthorp’s men had, however, no easy 
 
 The Nawdb's 
 troops take 
 tip a strong 
 position in 
 front of 
 Bandah. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 WHITLOCK’S PATH CLEARED FOR HIM. 
 
 137 
 
 task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. When 
 Ap thorp had carried one ravine he found them in Comeck^’ 
 force in the next. There must have been much in 
 the nature of the ground to screen human life, for Alford, and 
 though the fight lasted seven hours, from 5 o’clock 
 till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only to 
 thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds of 
 heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was the 
 admiration of every one. Young Colbeck, of the 3rd Europeans, 
 met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the first 
 nullah. Captain Macintire, of the Haidarabad cavalry — which 
 lost twenty killed and wounded — greatly distinguished himself, 
 as did likewise Brigadier Miller, Sergeant-Major Alford, of 
 the Madras Artillery, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. At 
 length the position was forced, and the Nawab fled, TheXaw^bis 
 with two thousand followers, to Kalpi, leaving 
 behind him seventeen guns, the town of Bandah, and ® ® • 
 
 a palace filled with property of great value. 'The rebel loss in 
 the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundred 
 men. General Whitlock established his head-quarters in Bandah, 
 to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him. 
 
 The second brigade, under Brigadier Me Duff, reached Jabalpur 
 on the 18th of March, and set out for Sagar on the 
 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers jSd by 
 from heading backwards into the Mirzapiir district, McDuff's 
 Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change 
 its course and to proceed to Nagod. McDuff, therefore, only 
 reached Bandah on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock still 
 halted there. 
 
 Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff ’s brigade, resolved to 
 march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Eose at Kalpi, and had 
 indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. But 
 Sir Hugh Eose, as we have seen, had completely defeated the 
 rebels before Kalpi on the 23rd, and had entered that place on 
 the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in time 
 to change his plans regarding Kalpi. 
 
 The reader who has followed me through this and the pre- 
 ceding chapter, will not have failed to see how, in 
 every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Eose had particular 
 cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. Rogf JfJ 
 It was Sir Hugh, who at Garhakota, and on the Betwa, cleared the 
 had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that, wMtiSk 
 
138 
 
 KfRWf AND BANDAH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Whitlock would have had to deal. The defeat of Tantia 
 Topi on the Betwa alone made it possible for Whitlock to 
 march on Bandah. Yet— extraordinary perversity of Fortune 
 — whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of 
 the campaign, and did by far the most important part of the 
 fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the 
 time of the capture of Bandah, gained all the sub- 
 stantial advantages. The spoils of Bandah, which 
 would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh 
 Rose, were allotted to Whitlock’s force alone ! 
 
 The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse dis- 
 Whitiock is ti’l^utioD of her favours, now set about to perpetrate 
 ordered to another. Whitlock had but just renounced his 
 Smi intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh 
 Rose at Kalpi, when he received orders from Lord 
 Canning to march against the Rao of Kirwi. 
 
 Kirwi, formerly better known as Tiroha, is forty-five miles 
 from Bandah, and seventy from Allahabad. The 
 Rao of Kirwi, Madhava Rao, had succeeded to the 
 throne by adoption, when he was only four years old. 
 When the mutiny broke out in 1857, he was then a boy of 
 but nine years, under the tutelage of Ram Chandra Ram, a man 
 enjoying the confidence of the Government of India, and 
 appointed by it to watch the interests of the young Rao during 
 his minority. The Rao was thus, in equity, the ward of the 
 Government of India. It has been commonly asserted that 
 there were two Raos of Kirwi.* This statement has no founda- 
 tion. There was, indeed, a discarded relative of the immediate 
 predecessor of Ram Chandra Ram, to whom he, Madhava Rao, 
 was required to pay a monthly stipend of two hundred rupees, 
 and to whom the title of Rao was granted by courtesy. But 
 this person, Narayan Rao, was absolutely without position or 
 influence, and he would not have presumed even to whisper an 
 interference in the affairs of the state. 
 
 The situation at Kirwi, then, was simply this : that the Rao was 
 a minor, only nine years old, and the affairs of the principality 
 were practically conducted by Ram Chandra Ram, the nominee of 
 the Government of India. But, though Ram Chandra was the 
 nominee of the Indian Government, and though he practically 
 managed the state of Kirwi, the feeling amongst the landowners 
 
 ♦ I fell into this mistake in the first edition of this work. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 ANTECEDENTS OF KIRWf. 
 
 139 
 
 of the principality, great and small, was, in 1857, inimical to the 
 British. It seems to me very natural that it should have been 
 so. Many years before, in 1827, Amrit Rao, the then ruler, had 
 deposited two lakhs of rupees, at 6 per cent, .interest, in the 
 hands of the Government of India, for the perpetual mainten- 
 ance of charities and temples which he had established in the 
 holy city of Banaras. Ten years later, in 1837, the Govern- 
 ment of India had reduced their rate of interest to 4 per cent., 
 and Yenayak Rao, the son and successor of Amrit Rao, in order 
 that neither the charities nor the temples might feel the loss, 
 and in the view, moreover, of increasing their resources, had 
 then deposited in the hands of the Government three additional 
 lakhs, making a total of five lakhs, the interest of which was to 
 be paid annually for the purposes above stated. The interest 
 was punctually paid during the lifetime of Yenayak Rao, and 
 for three years after his death, when, for some reason which the 
 Government of India has never divulged, the payment of the 
 interest ceased. 
 
 MMhava Rao was then only seven years old, and no 
 suspicion of treason, or felonious intent, attached then to the 
 child ; but his advisers, and other pious Hindus, men 
 of blameless life and integrity of purpose, were so adv/Jer, 
 shocked at the sacrilegious and fraudulent with- 
 holding of the interest on sums deposited for a stimulates 
 special purpose by the Raos of Kirwi, that they paid afectfjn 
 the missing amount out of the estate of the princi- 
 pality. But a very bitter feeling was engendered throughout 
 its broad lands. Princes, priests, and people alike felt that no 
 faith could thenceforward be placed in the promises of the 
 Hupreme Power. 
 
 When, then, the mutiny broke out in the North-West Pro- 
 vinces ; when the Rani of Jhansi, whose cause, judged from 
 the standard of the prescriptive rights of native princes, was 
 eminently a just cause, broke into rebellion ; when the earlier 
 occurrences in the vicinity of Bundelkhand seemed to presage 
 the fall of British rule, it is not surprising that Ram Chandra 
 Ram, noting the outraged feelings of the people, and their 
 sympathy with the leader of the movement in the Duab, the 
 heir of the Peshwa, Nana Sahib, to whom the Rao of Kirwi, 
 was collaterally related, should have found his task 
 more than ordinarily difficult. But, loyal to the 
 British overlord, he did his duty truly and zealously, sfihib. 
 
140 
 
 KIRWf AND BANDAH. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 Causes which 
 prompted the 
 E^o still to 
 hope after 
 Baadah had 
 fallen. 
 
 Up to the third week of May, 1858, the young Rao, himself 
 innocent of mischief, for, it cannot be too often 
 insisted, he was only nine years old, had enjoyed 
 blissful visions of a fortunate future. He did not 
 know that Kirwi had been placed on the list of the 
 places to which a severe lesson was to be adminis- 
 tered, for the discontent of his people had taken a very passive 
 form. For a long time it was covered from danger by the 
 Nawab of Bandah, but, when Bandah fell on the 19 th of April, 
 the young Rao was made to write to Sir Robert Hamilton, 
 professing loyalty to the British, and offering to admit British 
 troops into his capital. 
 
 A little later, when he. Sir Hugh, unaided by Whitlock, 
 had taken Kalpi, and when, on the 2nd of June, 
 Whitlock left Bandah, to march on their palace, the 
 Rao waited till that general had reached Bharatkup, 
 ten miles from Kirwi, and then rode out and tendered 
 to him the welcome only offered to those supposed 
 to be friends. 
 
 Whitlock’s march on Kirwi had been made possible by the 
 annihilation of the forces of the Nawab of Bandah at 
 Kalpi. That chieftain fled from Bundelkhand, never 
 again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. 
 Still, the young Rao had committed no overt act of 
 rebellion ; he was yet virtually a ward of the 
 British Government ; he had surrendered without 
 resistance to the British general ; and there was 
 assuredly no reason why the great disaffection of his people 
 should be punished in his person as though it had been active 
 treason. 
 
 But, at Kirwi, there was an accumulation of treasure. The 
 young Rao was very rich, and it was found not difficult to trump 
 up a case against him. 
 
 For Whitlock, moving from Bandah on the 2nd of June,* had 
 Enormous entered Kirwi without opposition on the 6th. Not 
 amount of a shot had been fired against him, but he resolved 
 at nevertheless to treat the young Rao as though he 
 had actually opposed the British forces. The reason 
 for this perversion of honest dealing lay in the fact that in 
 
 On hearing 
 that Whit- 
 lock is 
 marching on 
 Kirwi they 
 ride out and 
 surrender. 
 
 By this act 
 the spoils of 
 Kirwi 
 devolve, 
 without 
 fighting, on 
 Whitlock’s 
 force. 
 
 ♦ The very day on which, it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh’s columns started 
 to encounter more dangers at Gwaliar. 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE TREASURES OF KfRWf. 
 
 141 
 
 the palace of Kirwi was stored the wherewithal to compensate 
 soldiers for many a hard fights and many a broiling snn. In 
 its vaults and strong rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of 
 priceless value ! 
 
 It was nothing that the young Rao, to whom this wealth 
 belonged, was himself but a lad of nine years, innocent in his 
 own person of treason ; that the Indian Government was his 
 guardian, and, as such, responsible, during his minority for his 
 acts ; that the tutor of the young boy. Ram Chandra Ram, who 
 doubtless had been the interpreter of the outraged feelings of 
 the nobles of Kirwi, had been appointed to his post by British 
 authority. The wealth was coveted, and the wealth was taken 
 — taken as prize money, to be squabbled over by those who took 
 it without firing a shot.* 
 
 The question of the proprietary right in this booty, strangely 
 declared to be prize-money, was ultimately argued 
 before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court 
 the claim of Sir Hugh Rose’s force to share in the 
 prize, which had come into British possession mainly 
 in consequence of his action, was rejected ; the 
 claims of the commanders of other co-operating but 
 independent divisions and columns were rejected ; the claims of 
 the Commander-in-Chief in India and his staff, who were 
 hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not 
 influence the capture, and the claims of the officers 
 and men of General Whitlock’s force, were admitted 
 10 an exclusive right in the prize of Bandah and Kirwi. 
 
 Possibly the reader may feel some interest as to the future of 
 the innocent boy, Madhava Rao, whose property was thus 
 unceremoniously disposed of. A treatment similar to that 
 meted out by the Government of India to another of their 
 wards, Hhulip Singh of the Panjab, was extended to this boy of 
 nine. His estates were confiscated. He was then f “ pardoned 
 in consideration of his youth, and is now being educated at 
 Bareli as a ward of the British Government. A provision of 
 Rs. 30,000 a year has been made for him.” J Wbat became of 
 
 The right 
 to the booty 
 subsequently 
 argued before 
 the High 
 Court of 
 Admiralty. 
 
 Its decision. 
 
 * Vide Appendix A. 
 
 t “ Aitchison’s Treaties,” vol. iii. p. 142 (edition 1863). 
 t The proof that the Government of India were actually the trustees of the 
 Rdo’s estate is to be found in the fact that in 1857 they were actually regulating 
 the property, making all-important appointments and authorising all the 
 expenditure, through the Administrator-General of Bengal and his officers. 
 
142 
 
 KlRWf AND BANDAH. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 him subsequently to 1863 I have been unable to ascertain. It 
 is to be hoped that the guardianship announced in the record 
 from which I have quoted has been more faithfully administered 
 than was the first. 
 
 After the capture of Kirwi, Whitlock’s 101X56 was distributed 
 so as to maintain order in the Bundelkhand and Jamnah districts. 
 A portion was sent to Kalpi on the requisition of Sir H. Eose ; 
 one was left at Kirwi, other portions were sent to Mohaba, 
 Jalaun, Bandah, Kirka, Sagar, Damoh, and Hamirpur. The 
 general’s headquarters were fixed at Mahoba. Here we must 
 leave him, to return to Tantia Topi and Sir Hugh Eose. 
 
 It is a recognised law, that the malfeasances of agents appointed by a trustee 
 are not to be attributed to the ward. 
 
1858.3 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWAliAr. 
 
 143 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Movements ' 
 of Tantia 
 Topi, the 
 Rani of 
 Jhdinsi, and 
 Rao Sahib 
 after the 
 fall of Kalpf. 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWALIIr. 
 
 It has already been related that Tantia Topi, after his defeat at 
 Kunch, had fled to Chirki — about four miles from 
 Jalaur — where his parents resided. He remained 
 there during Sir Hugh Rose’s march to Kalpi, and 
 during the events which led to the capture of that 
 place. Learning that Rao Sahib and the Rani of 
 Jhansi had fled, after their defeat at Galauli, towards 
 Gopalpur, forty-six miles south-west of Gwaliar, Tantia girded 
 up his loins and joined them at that place. 
 
 Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their 
 hold on central India, on the Sagar and Narbada 
 territories and on Bundelkhand, but their enemies 
 were closing in on every side ; Roberts had already their affairs, 
 detached from Rajputana a brigade under Colonel 
 Smith to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose ; the force under that 
 officer was at Kalpi, about to be distributed in the territories 
 west of the Jamnah ; Whitlock had conquered Bandah and 
 plundered Kirwi. On three sides, then, on the south, east, and 
 the west, they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the 
 north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the 
 capital of Maharajah Sindhia, overlooked by a wall- by enemtes. 
 girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindhia was not 
 less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of 
 the fortunes of the British, at a time when hostility seemed to 
 promise him empire, Sindhia had remained faithful to his over- 
 lord. It was not to be thought of, nor was it thought possible, 
 that in the mid-day of their triumph he would turn against 
 them. 
 
 The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. 
 But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies ; 
 and a remedy which, on first inspection, might well 
 eeem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one suggested. 
 
144 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWIliIr. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 of the confederates. To which one it is not certainly known. 
 But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their 
 antecedents — Rao Sahib, the Nawab of Bandah, Tantia Topi, 
 and the Rani of Jhansi — we may at once dismiss the two first 
 from consideration. They possessed neither the character nor 
 the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring. Of the 
 two who rem^iin, we may dismiss Tantia Topi. Not that he 
 was incapable of forming the design, but — we have his memoirs 
 — and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most 
 successful act with which his career is associated. The fourth 
 probably by conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the de- 
 the Rani of spair necessary for the conception of great deeds. She 
 was urged on by hatred, by desire of vengeance, by 
 a blood-stained conscience, by a determination to strike hard 
 whilst there was yet a chance. She could recognise the possi- 
 bilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow 
 were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed ; 
 she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one at 
 least of her companions — the Rao Sahib. The conjecture, then, 
 almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which 
 the confederates decided to execute at Gopalpur was suggested 
 and pressed upon her comrades by the daring Rani of Jhansi. 
 
 The plan was this. To march on Gwaliar by forced marches, 
 to appeal to the religious and national feeling of 
 Sind Ilia’s troops, to take possession of his capital, by 
 force if it were necessary, and then from the precipitous rock of 
 the Gwaliar fortress to bid defiance to the British. 
 
 The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon. Emis- 
 Thecon- saries proceeded in advance of the column to tamper 
 with and, if possible, to gain over Sindhia’s troops ; 
 ar^^march the column followed more leisurely, yet with a 
 onGw^iidr. celerit}^ adapted to the occasion, and reached the^ 
 Morar cantonment, formerly occupied by the contingent, in 
 close vicinity to Gwaliar, during the night of the 30th of 
 May. 
 
 Maharajah Sindhia was informed that night of the arrival of 
 Mah^r^jah his dangerous visitors. Probably no prince had ever 
 Sindhia. been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation 
 than was Jaiaji Rao Sindhia during 1857—58. The descendant 
 by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous 
 Madhaji Rao, of the Daolat Rao who had fought for the posses- 
 sion of India with the two Wellesleys ; he was still the most 
 
 Her plan. 
 
1858.] THE REASONS WHICH GUIDED SINDHiX. 
 
 145 
 
 considerable chief of the Maratha race, and his word, g* 
 
 if spoken for religion and race, would have found a 
 response all over central and western India. For four months 
 he had probably the fate of India in his hands. For four 
 Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehli must 
 have been raised, Agra and Lakhnao would have ofindia^^ 
 fallen ; it is more than probable that the Panjab 
 would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing 
 strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, 
 Sindhia should have remained loyal, is most weighty testimony 
 to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appre- 
 ciation by the greater princes of India. That Sindhia was greatly 
 influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd probable 
 minister, Eajah Dinkar Eao, and by the appeals from reasons for 
 the fort of Agra of the able British representative at loyalty- 
 his court. Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But 
 neither Sindhia nor Dinkar Eao liked the English personally. 
 Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent 
 Gwaliar. But, though they did not like the English personally, 
 they had great respect for the English character. Eecollecting 
 the state of north-western and central and western India prior 
 to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the 
 English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers 
 and their fathers’ fathers never possessed. They had, at least, 
 secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside 
 would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been 
 molested. The question, then, would rise — and it was in 
 answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson 
 came most beneficially into play — “ Granting that, by joining 
 the mutineers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would 
 Gwaliar gain by their expulsion ? It is doubtful : there would 
 be many competitors for supremacy, and — who knows? The 
 King of Dehh might, with the aid of Sipahis, become supreme 
 or the Sikhs of the Panjab, or Nana Sahib, or perhaps even 
 Holkar. The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, 
 we shall be safe in the end.” 
 
 In some such manner reasoned Sindhia and Dinkar Eao. 
 They argued the question in the light of the interests of 
 Sindhia, and in that light, held ever before them by the steady 
 hand of Charters Macpherson, they cast in their lot with the 
 British. 
 
 But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families 
 
 VOL. V. L 
 
146 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWIliIr. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 The same 
 reasons do 
 not affect the 
 bulk of the 
 Mar^tha 
 people, 
 
 of Gwaliar, the bulk of the army and of the people. 
 These men could recognise only what was passing 
 before their eyes. Their eyes looked back with 
 longing to the past when the empire was dangling 
 before the Maratha race, and they never attempted 
 even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 
 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity 
 offering itself to their master such as the great Madhaji would 
 have given half his years to have clutched. They could not 
 understand their Maharajah’s inaction, his attempts to befriend 
 the British in the hour of their adversity. They had sympa- 
 who, in thised with the men of his contingent when they 
 conse^quence, revolted and murdered their officers. The higher 
 diSwntenton and more influential amongst them assailed Sindhia 
 Sindhia. with persuasions and entreaties; and, when they 
 found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and 
 setting up another ruler in his place. 
 
 The fall of Dehli, the British successes in Lakhnao and in 
 north-western and central India, had by no means changed 
 these sentiments. The irritation caused by lost opportunities 
 had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to 
 mend the situation or to be rid of it. 
 
 Such was the state of general feeling in Gwaliar when, on 
 the night of the 30th of May, information was 
 brought to the Maharajah that Tantia Topi, the 
 Eani of Jhansi, and other chieftains, with a force 
 estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand 
 cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Morar. No one knew 
 better the general state of feeling about him than the Maharajah, 
 and resolves never wavered. The conviction of the 
 
 to do battle ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger 
 with him. within him than at this apparently inauspicious 
 moment, and, notwithstanding the ill-concealed hostility of 
 many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered 
 opportunity and do battle with the rebels. 
 
 Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out 
 He marches took up a position about two miles to the east- 
 
 tomeet ward of Morar. He had with him six thousand 
 infantry, about fifteen hundred cavalry, his own 
 bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he 
 ranged in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited 
 for the attack. About 7 o’clock in the morning the rebels 
 
1858 .] 
 
 SINDHIA IS COMPLETELY DEFEATED. 
 
 147 
 
 iidvanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels 
 earrying guns of small calibre. As they approached, Sindhia’s 
 eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge 
 had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers 
 closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, 
 charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simul- 
 taneously with their charge Sindhia’s infantry and cavalry, his 
 bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a 
 position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel 
 cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, 
 with which was Sindh ia himself. A portion of the guardsmen 
 defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not 
 cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. 
 
 But, as it became more and more apparent every 
 moment that it was useless to continue the un- 
 equal contest, Sindhia turned and fled, accompanied by a very 
 few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached 
 Agra. 
 
 The first part of the Kani’s bold plan had thus succeeded. 
 She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out 
 to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwaliar, 
 took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the enter 
 arsenal and the town, and began at once to form a Sid^forma 
 regular government. Nana Sahib was proclaimed 
 as Peshwa, and Eao Sahib as governor of Gwaliar. ^ ’ 
 Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the 
 Gwaliar troops as to those who had come from Kalpi. Earn 
 Eao Govind, one of the Sindhia’s disgraced courtiers, was 
 appointed prime minister. The royal property was 
 declared confiscated. Four Maratha chiefs, who had hoiK^ 
 been imprisoned by Sindhia for rebellion, were re- place and the 
 leased, clothed with dresses of honour, and sent into SSes!^^ 
 the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in 
 any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The com- 
 mand of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was 
 entrusted to the Eani of Jhansi. Those within the town obeyed 
 the orders of Tantia Topi. Letters were at once despatched 
 to the rebel rajahs still in the district, notably to the Eajahs of 
 Banpur and Shahgarh, to join the new government at Gwaliar. 
 
 The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise 
 reached Kalpi on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action 
 taken by Sir Hugh Kose, it is necessary that I should state 
 ' L 2 
 
148 
 
 SIK HUGH KOSE AND GWXliIr. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 txirnftoSir^' exact positions of the various portions of the 
 HughKose. forcG with which he had conquered Kalpi on the 
 24th of May. 
 
 As soon as, by the occupation of Kalpi on the 24th of May, 
 His action Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the 
 defeat of the parties to discover the line they 
 
 rebels at had taken. Information was soon brought to him 
 
 Kaipf. that, whilst a few had crossed the Jamnah into the 
 
 Duab, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the 
 same course by Colonel Riddell,* the main body had bent their 
 steps in almost a south-westerly direction to Gopalpur. To 
 pursue these latter he at once organised a column composed of 
 the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, 
 and a hundred and flfty Haidarabad cavalry, and despatched it, 
 under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the 
 rebels. 
 
 Robertson set out from Kalpi on the 25th of May, the rain 
 Robertson falling heavily. This rain, which continued 
 pushes on in throughout that day and the day following, much 
 rebels.*' impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as 
 fast as possible, and, traversing Mahona and Indurki, 
 found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At 
 Ira wan, reached on the 29 th, supplies ran short, and, as none 
 were procurable in the district, the column had to wait till 
 they could be sent up from Kalpi. On the 2nd of June Robert- 
 son received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th 
 light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. 
 The following day he reached Moharar, flfty-five miles from 
 Gwaliar. Here he was startled by information of the attack 
 made by the rebels on Gwaliar and of its result. 
 
 An express from Robertson, sent from Irawan, and which 
 reached Kalpi on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first in- 
 
 ♦ Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamnah with 
 the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander’s Horse, and two guns, caught sight of a 
 body of the rebels escaping from Kalpi, a few miles above that place, on the 
 south bank of the river, on the 25th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans 
 across, who captured their camp equipage, the enemy not waiting to receive 
 them. Colonel Riddell’s force had previously had several skirmishes with 
 detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to 
 Kalpi in boats, joining th( re Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened 
 by a numerous body of rebels near Bhijalpiir. Lieutenant Sherriff, who com- 
 manded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels, and < 
 raptured four guns. 
 
1858.] STUAET GOES TO SUPPOKT KOBERTSON. 
 
 149 
 
 formation that the rebels had taken the road to 
 Owaliar. Instantly Sir Hugh despatched General the rebels 
 Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting 
 of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the and at once 
 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal stS^bri- 
 native infantry, one squadron 1 4th light dragoons, gade in that 
 No. 4 light field battery, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch 
 howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson and to march on 
 Gwaliar. Stuart reached Atakona on the 3rd — the day on 
 which Robertson had reached Moharar — and there he too re- 
 ceived the first information of the startling occurrences at 
 Gwaliar. 
 
 The order which had sent Stuart to Gwaliar was dictated by 
 a sound military instinct. But no one, not even Sir 
 Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to divined that 
 which the Rani of Jhansi would carry her audacious fjj® 
 plans. The rebels might march on Gwaliar, but no 
 one believed they would carry it by a coup-de-main. 
 
 It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to 
 be kept there till Stuart’s force should fall on their rear. 
 
 How the “ impossible ” happened has been told. The inform- 
 ation of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, of 
 
 after he had resigned his command and applied for its success 
 leave on medical certificate. In a moment he real- HuSi^Rose 
 ised the full danger of the situation. Gwaliar had 
 fallen into the hands of the rebels at the time of year most 
 unfavourable for military operations. Another week and the 
 monsoon rains would render the black soil untraversable by 
 guns, and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, 
 the transport of siege-guns, in the absence of pontoons, whicli 
 Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not im- 
 possible. He realised, moreover, the great danger gg j.gg^jj,gg 
 which would inevitably be caused by delay. No SeSrmous 
 one could foresee the extent of evil possible if 
 Gwaliar were not promptly wrested from rebel 
 hands. Grant them delaj^ and Tantia Topi, with the immense 
 acquisition of political and military strength secured by the 
 possession of Gwaliar, and with all its resources in men, money, 
 and material at his disposal, would be able to form a new army 
 on the fragments of that beaten at Kalpi, and to provoke a 
 Maratha rising throughout India. It might be possible for 
 him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl 
 
150 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWIliXr. 
 
 [1858, 
 
 He resumes 
 b is command 
 
 and sets out 
 for Gwdlidr. 
 
 The Com- 
 mander-in- 
 Chief places 
 other columns 
 at Sir Hugh’s 
 disposal. 
 
 the Peshwa’s banner in the southern Maratha districts. Those 
 districts were denuded of troops, and a striking success in 
 central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pro- 
 nounce in favour of the cause for which their fathers had fought 
 and bled. 
 
 Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, 
 that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once 
 resumed the command which he had laid down,* 
 and, leaving a small garrison at Kalpi, set out on 
 the 5th of June with a small forcef to overtake 
 Stuart’s column. 
 
 With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwa- 
 liar, the Commander-in-Chief placed at his disposal, 
 by telegraph. Colonel Riddell’s column previously 
 referred to, and Brigadier Smith’s brigade of the 
 Rajputana field force. The only other troops of 
 which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself 
 were those composing the small garrison of Jhansi, 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks of the artillery, and the 
 Haidarabad contingent, commanded by Major Orr. 
 
 The Haidarabad contingent, after their hard and splendid 
 service, had received orders to return home. They 
 Iiuct'o? thT' had already started ; many of them, indeed, were 
 Sntingen^^ far advanced on their road. But the moment 
 the intelligence of the events passing at Gwaliar 
 reached them they one and all expressed their earnest desire 
 to take part in the operations of their old commander. 
 
 Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches 
 to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to 
 pia^of^pera- Paniar, on the road between Sipri and Gwaliar, to 
 cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south, and 
 Brigadier Smith, who was near Chandm, to march 
 with his biigade direct to Kotah-ki-sarai, about five miles to 
 the south-east of Gwaliar. To Colonel Riddell, escorting a 
 large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with 
 his column by the Agra and Gwaliar road. He hoped that all 
 
 * It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely 
 reprimanded by Sir C. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the 
 previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. But there are circumstances 
 which require that strict routine must be laid aside ; and this was one of them. 
 
 t 1st troop Bombay horse artillery ; one squadron 14th light dragoons ; one 
 squadron 3rd Bombay light cavalry ; Madras sappers and miners. 
 
BATTLE OF MOKIR. 
 
 1858.] 
 
 151 
 
 overtakes 
 Stuart and 
 reaches 
 Morar ; 
 
 There he 
 
 is joined by 
 
 General 
 
 Napier; 
 
 the columns of operations would be at their posts by the 19th 
 of June. 
 
 Setting out, as I have said, on the 6th of June, and making 
 forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally sir Hugh 
 rose to a hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, 
 
 Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indurki on the 12th, 
 and, still pushing on, reached Bahadurpur, five miles 
 to the east of the Morar cantonments, on the 16th. 
 was joined by Brigadier- General Robert Napier, 
 whom he last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and 
 who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.* 
 
 Sir Hugh had reached Bahadurpur at 6 o’clock in the morning 
 of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott with 
 his Haidarabad cavalry to reconnoitre Morar. On reconnoitres 
 receiving Abbott’s report that the rebels were in the rebel 
 force in front of it. Sir Hugh galloped forward him- 
 self to examine the position. He noticed that the side of the 
 cantonments fronting the British position was occupied by 
 strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the right by guns, supported 
 by infantry in considerable numbers. 
 
 The position offered strong temptations to a commander who 
 knew the value of time and promptitude in war, and Reasons 
 who considered that minor difficulties must give way which decided 
 when a chance should present itself of overcoming a attack, 
 
 great obstacle. I shall tell in his own words the effect pro- 
 duced on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position of 
 the rebels before Morar. 
 
 “ My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the sun 
 had been up for some time. Four or five miles’ more 
 march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would 
 be a great trial for the men’s strength. On the 
 other hand, Morar looked inviting with several good buildings 
 not yet burnt ; they would be good quarters for a portion of 
 the force ; if I delayed the attack until the next day, the enemy 
 were sure to burn them. A prompt attack has always more 
 effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I therefore 
 countermanded the order for encamping and made the following 
 arrangements to attack the enemy.” j* 
 
 told in his 
 own words. 
 
 * Only a small portion of this brigade was present, the bulk of it having been 
 left at Kalpf. 
 
 t Despatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 13th of October, 1858 
 
]52 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWIlIAR. [1858. 
 
 He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and 
 gnns on his flanks, and the infantry in the centre, 
 he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the 
 way, with the view of coming upon the road leading 
 to cantonments, and the occupation of which would have turned 
 The uide rebels. Sindhia’s agent, however, 
 
 loses his way, who had promised to lead the troops to this road, 
 lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a 
 debouches^n niasked battery in the enemy’s centre. This at once 
 the wrong opened upon the assailants, and its fire was rapidly 
 ’ followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both 
 
 sides of it. Sir Hugh answered with his guns, at the same 
 time pushing forward his infantry to gain the required turning 
 position on the right. This once gained, he formed 
 to the front, and, reinforcing his left, which bore 
 for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, 
 pushed forward. The advance was decisive. The 
 enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides. 
 The gallant Abbott with his Haidarabad men had 
 meanwhile galloped across the nullahs further to the 
 right, and, dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly 
 point, endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the 
 broken ground he had had to traverse had enabled these to take 
 their guns across the stone bridge which spans the river at the back 
 of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main 
 the (SntesUn enemy, driven through the cantonments, 
 
 a village, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks, running- 
 round a village, which they had also occupied. Here 
 they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the 
 British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely. Lieuten- 
 ant Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded ; 
 
 nor was it till the nullah was nearly choked with 
 dead that the village was carried. On this occasion 
 carried; Lieutenant Rose of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry 
 greatly distinguished himself. The victory was 
 and the vie- completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by 
 pi^edbyT Captain Thompson, 14th Light Dragoons, with a 
 ^ureuu of the regiment. The wing of the rebel force 
 
 ^ which he destroyed had been turned by Abbott’s 
 advance already spoken of ; Thompson, following 
 up the rebels, caught them in the plains and made a great 
 slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded 
 
 but, by a 
 masterly 
 movement, 
 gains a firm 
 position. 
 
 The rebels 
 fall back. 
 
1858.] 
 
 STK HUGH DRIVES BACK THE REBELS. 
 
 153 
 
 Brigadier- 
 Smith ad- 
 vances from 
 the south- 
 east, 
 
 during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Light- 
 foot. 
 
 The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh’s daring. Not 
 only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, 
 but he had gained a most important strategical ba?tfe! 
 point. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose’s success was speedily followed by an exploit 
 on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in im- 
 portant consequences. That gallant soldier, coming 
 up from the south-east, had to make his way through 
 the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwaliar 
 before he could reach Kotah-ki-sarai. Picking up 
 on his way the small field- force from Jhansi, he reached Antri, 
 with his brigade,* on the 14th of June, and was joined there the 
 following day by Major Orr and his Haidarabad men. Under 
 orders from Sir Hugh Rose, Smith marched from Antri early on 
 the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah- 
 ki-sarai, five miles to "the south-east of Gwaliar, 
 at half-past seven o’clock that morning. 
 
 Smith had met no opposition in marching into Kotah-ki- 
 sarai, but on reaching that place he observed masses 
 of the enemy’s horse and foot occupying the hilly 
 ground between himself and Gwaliar. As these 
 masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, 
 and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage. Smith did 
 not regard his position as a very secure one, he determined to 
 take the initiative. Reconnoitring the ground in 
 front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected nature of the 
 with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He ground before 
 discovered, moreover, that the enemy’s guns were in 
 position about fifteen hundred yards from Kotah-ki-sarai, and 
 that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road 
 to Gwaliar. Notwithstanding this. Smith deter- 
 mined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to to attack. 
 the front, and silenced the enemy’s guns, which 
 limbered up and retired. This accomplished. Smith sent his 
 infantry across the broken ground, led by Raines of the 95th. 
 Raines led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about 
 
 and reaches 
 Kotah-ki- 
 sarai ; 
 
 discovers the 
 rebels massed 
 between him 
 and Gwaliar. 
 
 * The brigade was thus composed : a wing 8th Hussars, a wing Bombay 
 Lancers, H. M.’s 95th Foot, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of 
 Bombay Horse Artillery. 
 
154 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWIliIr. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 Raines leads 
 the infantry 
 to the front, 
 
 and, after 
 overcoming 
 many ob- 
 stacles. 
 
 gains the in- 
 trenchment 
 abandoned by 
 the enemy. 
 
 Meanwhile 
 Smith moves 
 forward the 
 cavalry. 
 
 fifty yards from the enemy’s works, when the 
 skirmishers made a rush — the rebels falling hack 
 as they did so. Kaines then found himself stopped 
 by a deep ditch with four feet of water, and 
 having banks so steep that it was with difficulty 
 the men could cross in single file. The rebels took 
 advantage of the delay thus caused to move off 
 with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across 
 the hills. Eaines found them so retiring when, after sur- 
 mounting the difficulty I have recorded, he gained 
 the abandoned intrenchment. Whilst he was con- 
 tinuing his advance across the broken and hilly 
 ground. Smith moved his cavalry across the river 
 Umrah, close to Kotah-ki-sarai. He had hardly 
 crossed when his men came under fire of a battery 
 which till then had escaped notice. At the same 
 time a body of the enemy threatened the baggage at Kotah-ki- 
 • sarai. Matters now looked serious. But Smith 
 natSfofthe back a detachment to defend the baggage 
 
 aS,ion. and rear, and pushed forward with the rest of his 
 troops. The road, before debouching from the 
 hills between his position and Gwaliar, ran for several hun- 
 dred yards through a defile along which a canal had been 
 excavated. As he entered this defile, and during his march 
 through it, he encountered considerable opposition. At length 
 he bore it down, emerged from the further end, 
 .lengh joined Raines, then, keeping his infantry halted to 
 
 victorious, hold the defile, he ordered a cavalry charge. This 
 
 was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 
 8th Hussars, led by Colonel Hicks and Captain Heneage. The 
 rebels, horse and foot, gave way before them. The 
 ajd drives Hussars captured two guns, and continuing the 
 before him. pursuit through Sindhia’s cantonment, had for a 
 moment the rebel camp in their possession. 
 
 Amongst the fugitives in the rebel rauks was the resolute 
 Death of the ^oman who, alike in council and on the field, was 
 
 Rinf of the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a 
 
 Jh&nsi. mounted on horseback, the Rani of Jhansi 
 
 might have been seen animating her troops throughout the 
 day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through 
 the defile, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the 
 Hussars to charge, the Rani of Jhansi boldly fronted the British 
 
1858.J 
 
 DEATH OF THE RANI OF JHANSf. 
 
 155 
 
 horsemen. When her comrades failed her, her horse, in spite 
 of her efforts, carried her along with the others. With them 
 she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal 
 near the cantonment, stumbled and fell. A hussar close upon 
 her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down. She 
 fell to rise no more. That night her devoted followers, deter- 
 mined that the English should not boast that they had captured 
 her even dead, burned the body. 
 
 Thus died the Rani of Jhansi. My opinion of her has been 
 recorded in a preceding page. Whatever her faults in British 
 eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever believe that she 
 was driven by ill-treatment into rebellion ; that her cause was- 
 a righteous cause ; and that the treatment she received at the 
 hands of Lord Dalhousie was one of the main causes of the dis- 
 affection in Bundelkhand and Central India in 1857-8. Ta 
 them she will always be a heroine.* 
 
 The charge of the 8th Hussars was the last effort of Smith’s 
 force. “Upon the return of the squadron, 
 the officers and men were so completely ex- Smith fails back for the 
 hausted and prostrated irom neat, latigue, and defile, 
 great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in 
 their saddles, and were, for the moment, incapable of further exer- 
 tion.”! But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening. Smith 
 then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the 
 road, and the adjoining hills for the night. He drew back his 
 cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage. The enemy 
 held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal. 
 
 The position thus taken up by Brigadier ^mith left much to 
 be desired. It left his left and rear threatened, 
 his baggage within range of the enemy’s guns, 
 and his whole force cramped. Sir Hugh, on 
 receiving an account of the action, with cha- 
 racteristic promptitude despatched Colonel 
 Robertson, with the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three troops 
 14th Light Dragoons, and four guns, to reinforce him. 
 
 The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced, and his 2nd brigade, 
 commanded by Robert Napier, brought to its Th 9 h h i h • • 
 full strength by the arrival of the Kalpi Kr Huth^who 
 garrison. This arrival left him free to act. 
 
 Dangerous nature of 
 his position. 
 
 Sir Hugh reinforces 
 him. 
 
 with the 
 
 * Tide pages 110, 139, of this volume, and pages 120-1 of Vol. III. 
 t Brigadier Smith’s report. ' 
 
156 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWXliIr. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Leaving Napier in Morar witli the troops lie could spare,* 
 Rose marched in the afternoon vdth the rest of the force 
 to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the 
 march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men 
 Harassing 86th were struck down by the sim.l Never- 
 
 natureofiiis theless. Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for 
 march. night ou the rock}^ ground between the river 
 
 ?ommSiica- ^iid Smith’s position. 
 
 g^ns^with The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on recon- 
 ' noitring the folhming morning was the possibility 
 
 of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwaliar by 
 forcing their left ; the next, the extremely cramped 
 and dangerous nature of his own position. Tho 
 rebels, too, showed every indication that they 
 intended an attack, for with the early dawn they 
 began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst mass-s 
 of their infantry were seen moving to positions from 
 which they could manoeuvre with advantage against the British 
 position. On the principle, then, that when one is disadvan- 
 tageously posted an attack is often the best defence, Sir Hugh 
 resolved to become the assailant. 
 
 The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights 
 separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. 
 That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early 
 hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the 
 view of assailing the weakest point of the British line, the left. 
 The sun had not risen very high when Sir Hugh received an 
 express from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received 
 certain information that the rebels certainly intended to attack 
 him that day. There was no time for further consideration. 
 
 Resolves to 
 anticipate 
 the rebels’ 
 attack and 
 to cut them 
 off from 
 Gwdlidr. 
 
 * These were — One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light 
 dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarabad 
 cavalry, 3rd Haidarabad cavalry, two squadrons Meade's horse, 21st company 
 Royal Engineers, wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay 
 native infantry, three guns Haidarabad artillery. 
 
 t Of these men. Sir Hugh reports that they “ were compelled by sun -sickness 
 to fall out and go into doUs. These same men, the next day, immindful of 
 their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of 
 Gwaliar.” These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed 
 British army, an army never surpassed by any other in the world. A “ doli,” 
 generally but incorrectly spelt “ dhooley ” — for it is ignorant of the letter “ h ” 
 and possesses but one “ o ” and no “ y ” — is an inferior kind of palanquin. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 BATTLE OF GWIlIAR. 
 
 157 
 
 Sir Hugh at once directed Brigadier Stuart to move 
 with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th gend^sSart 
 Bombay Native Infantry, across the canal, to crown 
 the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the rebels, ^ 
 left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favour of 
 this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment 
 from his right front, across the canal in skirmishiog 
 order over the shoulder of the hill on which a 
 division of the rebel force was in an intrenched diversion, 
 position, covered by guns. This movement was 
 supported by the 10th Bombay Native Infantry. Sir Hugh at 
 the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery, 
 supported by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, to the entrance of 
 the pass towards Gwaliar. The remainder of the force he dis- 
 posed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence 
 of the camp from the rear. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with 
 the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. 
 
 These fell back rapidly on the battery ; while the fttaTk^ 
 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand 
 even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally. 
 Brockman’s company, led by that gallant officer, 
 
 ^ ^ ^ * SUCCGGQS 
 
 then only a lieutenant, dashing with a cheer at the 
 parapet, crossed it and took the guns which defended the ridge 
 two 6-pounders and a 9-pounder. Brockman, with Brockman 
 great smartness, turned one of these guns on the captures 
 rebels, and was engaged in turning the other, when 
 Raines, advancing with the 95th, came up, took command, and 
 completed the operation which Brockman* had so 
 well begun. Raines com- 
 
 Meanwhile the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, led operation, 
 by Lieutenant Roome, moving up in support of the 
 95th, and protecting the right of the assailing force, found itself 
 exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on 
 the enemy’s extreme left. Roome was equal to the occasion. 
 Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in 
 
 * For his splendid services, Brockman obtained his brevet majority as soon 
 as he got his company, though not until after another officer, whose name 1 
 will not mention, had attempted to “ annex ” his services. The fraud was, 
 however, discovered and rectified with the full sanction of Lord Strathnairn 
 (Sir Hugh Rose). 
 
158 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWALIAR. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 Room°e and^ skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared 
 theiothBom- the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and cap- 
 SantryJ^ tured two brass field-pieces and three mortars which 
 were in the plain below. 
 
 The day was now won, the heights were gained ; Gwaliar 
 lay, as it were, at the feet of the British. “ The 
 Sthe^feet^of writes Sir Hugh, “ was interesting. To our 
 
 the British, right was the handsome palace of the Phulbagh 
 with its gardens, and the old city, surmounted by 
 the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of 
 extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of 
 Gwaliar. To our left lay the Lashkar, or new city, with its 
 spacious houses half hidden by trees.” In the plain between 
 the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces, 
 just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of 
 panic, endeavouring to seek a refuge in one or other of the 
 walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were 
 moving. 
 
 Sir Hu h sight of these men at once suggested to Sir 
 
 resolves to Hugh that it would be possible to complete his 
 dT^at once that day. “ I felt convinced,” he wrote in his 
 
 Cl y a o c . “that I could take Gwaliar before sunset.” 
 
 He at once, then, ordered a general advance. Covering his 
 extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay Horse 
 general^ Artillery and a troop of the 8th Hussars, he ordered 
 advance. Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay Lancers, to 
 descend the heights to the rear, make his way into 
 the road which led through the hills to the south, and thence 
 attack the grand parade and the new city. Covering his ad- 
 vance, then, with No. 4 Light field-battery, and two troops 
 14th Light Dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the 
 left, the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right. 
 
 This prompt advance completely paralysed the rebels. Their 
 guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry 
 seemed to be to escape. The British infantry were 
 Sr approaching the plain, when Owen’s Lancers, who 
 
 Lashkar. had gained the point indicated, charged across the 
 grand parade, and, carried away by their ardour, 
 followed the rebels into the Lashkar. In this charge a gallant 
 officer. Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart. Eaines 
 followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground 
 with two companies of the 59 th, and took two 18-pounders and 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE CITY IS GAINED. 
 
 159 
 
 two small pieces. The British line pushing on, the rebels re- 
 treated through the town. Before sunset, as Sir Hugh had 
 divined, the Lashkar, or new city, was completely in his pos- 
 session. That night, too, Sir Hugh rested in the regained 
 palace of Sindhia. 
 
 Meanwhile, Brigadier Smith had taken the garden palace, 
 the Phulbagh, killing great numbers of the rebels. 
 
 He then, in pursuance of orders, followed up the the paUce^of 
 retreating enemy, and continued the pursuit long PhuiMgh. 
 after dark, inflicting great loss on them and cap- 
 turing most of their guns. 
 
 As soon as it was clear the day was won. Sir Hugh sent an 
 express to General Eobert Napier, directing him to sir Hugh 
 pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could. 
 
 How this order was carried out I shall have to N^?e?to 
 relate presently. pursue, 
 
 The Lashkar and palace occupied. Sir Hugh, ever careful 
 even of the vanquished, made arrangements for the 
 security of the city. This task he found compara- arranges for 
 tivel}’’ easy, for the shopkeeping class had always of the dtyT 
 been on the side of its best paymaster, the British. 
 
 Thus, on the night of the lyth of June, Sir Hugh had, with 
 a loss of eighty-seven men killed and wounded, re- 
 gained all Gwaliar, the formidable fortress alone J^Sress^ 
 excepted . But the exception was a grave one. The defies him. 
 rock fortress, completely isolated, having a length 
 of a mile and a half, and a breadth at its broadest part of three 
 hundred yards, its face presenting a perpendicular precipice, 
 might, if well defended, still give some trouble. The guns 
 from its ramparts had maintained, during the operations of the 
 19th, a continuous, though not very efiective, fire on the British 
 troops. The fire recommenced on the morning of the 20th. It 
 was then, early on that morning, that two officers of the Indian 
 army and their Bombay Sipahis performed a deed of unsurpassed 
 daring. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th, Lieutenant Eose, 25th Bombay 
 Native Infantry, was in command, with a detach- 
 ment of his regiment, of the Kotwali, or police- Lkutenants^ 
 station, not far from the main gateway of the rock 
 fort. As the guns from its ramparts continued to 
 fire, Eose proposed to a brother officer. Lieutenant Waller, who 
 commanded a small party of the same regiment near him, that 
 
160 
 
 SIK HUGH KOSE AND GWIlIAK. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 they should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint 
 parties, urging that, if the risk was great, the honour would be 
 still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the 
 rsmau**^^ two ofiScers set off with their men and a blacksmith, 
 
 following, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the 
 
 service. They crept up to the first gateway unseen, 
 then the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open, and so 
 with the other five gates that opposed their progress. 
 Sorm^h^ time the sixth gate had been forced the 
 
 fortress, alarm was given, and, when the assailants reached 
 the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by 
 the fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. 
 Dashing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily 
 engaged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The 
 fight was desperate, and many men fell on both sides ; but the 
 gallantry of Eose and Waller and their men carried all before 
 nd succeed Eose especially distinguished himself. Just 
 
 an 8UCC e . hour of victory, however, as he was inciting 
 
 his men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a 
 musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The 
 is dlmmed^^ uian who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Bareli, 
 of Rose^^^*^ then rushed out and cut him across the knee and 
 wrist with a sword. Waller came up and despatched 
 the rebel ; too late, however, to save his friend.* But the rock 
 fortress was gained. 
 
 I have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain 
 he sent a despatch to Brigadier-General Eobert Napier re- 
 questing him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he 
 could. 
 
 Napier started on this service at 9 o’clock on the morning of 
 the 20th with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom 
 
 * Sir Hugh Eose, in his despatch, thus alludes to this officer: “But the 
 gallant leader, Lieutenant Eose, who has been twice specially mentioned by 
 me for good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing 
 his early career by taking the fort of Gwaliar by force of arms.” 
 
 His brigadier. Brigadier C. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade 
 orders : “ Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the 
 death of Lieutenant Eose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, who was mortally 
 wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwaliar, on duty with his men. 
 The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring 
 the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who 
 knew him could fail to appreciate.” 
 
NAPIEK’S VICTORY AT jIurI-AlIPUR 
 
 1858.] 
 
 161 
 
 sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot’s battery of artillery, and, 
 pursuing tbe rebels rapidly, came up with them, 
 about twelve thousand strong, at Jaura-Alipur, 
 shortly after sunrise on the 21st. Napier, recon- 
 noitring, found them drawn up in two lines. The 
 first, consisting of infantry and a bullock battery 
 of six guns, had its right resting upon Alipur ; the 
 second, composed of cavalry and horse and field 
 artillery, rested on a village in rear of the front 
 line. They were the entire remnants of the Kalpi 
 army, with additions picked up at Gwaliar. 
 
 Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain 
 Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, 
 about three hundred yards from them, and to enfilade them. 
 He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, 
 which afforded partial concealment, ready to act 
 as soon as the fire from Lightfoot’s guns should be line, 
 felt. 
 
 This soon happened. Lightfoot’s horse artillery, escorted 
 by Abbott’s cavalry, dashed at a gallop towards the 
 enemy’s left, and opened fire at the distance indicated 
 by Napier. Alter a lew discharges the ranks ol the to waver, 
 rebels wavered, then they began perceptibly to thin. 
 
 Then Lightfoot limbered up and again pushed on at a gallop, 
 whilst the 14th Light Dragoons, led by Prettijohn, and the 
 Haidar abad cavalry, led by Abbott, dashed into their ranks. 
 
 The result was decisive. Prettijohn’s distinguished valour 
 and Abbott’s gallant leading were especially con- 
 spicuous. The dash of Lightfoot’s horse artillery Charged, 
 was superb to look at. “You cannot imagine,” 
 writes an eye-witness, a cavalry officer, “the dash 
 of the artillery : it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up 
 with them.” But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero : each 
 vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels 
 broke and fled, hotly pursued.^ They lost twenty-five guns. 
 
 Napier, 
 receiving 
 Sir Hugh's 
 order to 
 pursue, 
 
 pursues, and 
 finds the 
 rebels at 
 Jdiurd- 
 Alipfir. 
 
 * An officer who served with great distinction throughout this campaign 
 writes me : “ The courage of General Napier in ordering this attack, and the 
 dash and vigour with which it was delivered, so surprised the enemy, that, as we 
 afterwards ascertained, they believed us to he but the advanced guard of a strong 
 force coming up. Just after the action General Napier received a despatch from 
 Sir Hugh Rose ordering him not to attack in consequence of the strength of the 
 enemy.” 
 
 VOL. V 
 
 M 
 
162 
 
 SIR HUGH ROSE AT GWXliXr 
 
 [1858. 
 
 aU their ammuiiition, elephants, tents, carts, and baggage, and 
 had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more 
 complete.* 
 
 The capture of Gwaliar and the dispersion of the rebel army 
 closed the campaign which will for ever be associated 
 caSpa^gS'^ with the name of Sir Hugh Rose. In a previous 
 chapter I have alluded to the personal character, 
 strong and firm as iron, and 3’et singularly sympathetic, which 
 had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful 
 campaign . I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitu- 
 tionTf its^' been accomplished in a period 
 
 results; falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th 
 of January, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose had left Indur; on 
 the 24th he laid siege to Rahatgarh ; on the 28th he defeated in 
 the field the Rajah of Banpur ; on the 29th he took Rahatgarh ; 
 on the 3rd of February he relieved Sagar ; on the 1 3th he took 
 the strong fort of Garhakota ; on the 4th of March he forced 
 the pass of Madanpur ; on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the 
 fort of Chanderi ; on the 22nd he invested Jhansi ; on the 31st 
 he defeated Tantia Topi on the Betwa ; on the 3rd of April he 
 stormed Jhansi ; on the 6th of May he defeated Tantia Topi 
 and the Rani of Jhansi at Kunch ; on the 23rd he beat the 
 rebels at Galauli, near Kalpi, and occupied that fort the follow- 
 ing day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed 
 of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwaliar by the rebels, 
 he pursued them with unremitting vigour, and stayed not his 
 hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily 
 gained. In every undertaking he was successful, 
 and he was successful, because, careless of himself, 
 success. he thought of the great end he had in view, and 
 spared no means to attain it. 
 
 After the victory at Gwaliar, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to 
 Sir Hu h Bombay to assume command of the army of that 
 proceeds to Presidency. f The force with which he had won so 
 Bombay, many victories was, to a great extent, broken up. 
 
 * Tantia Topi, who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair : 
 “ We reached Jaura-Alipiir and remained there during the night. The next 
 morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five 
 shots and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our 
 guns.” 
 
 t The following farewell order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose : 
 “ The Major-General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE FORCE IS DISTRIBUTED. 
 
 163 
 
 The 95tli reo:imeiit was ordered to occupy tlie rock fortress. 
 The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, with detachments of cavalry and ar- 
 tillery, remained at Morar. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to 
 Jhansi. Of these troops the command devolved upon Brigadier- 
 General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith’s brigade 
 was distributed in three portions, respectively at regiments 
 Gwaliar, at Sipri, and at Gunah. It seemed as 
 though they were about to enjoy the rest they had distriSed. 
 so gloriously earned. But appearances were de- 
 ceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the Rani of Jhansi, had 
 disappeared, there had escaped another, not less im- 
 placable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than prospects of 
 that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, 
 that other adversary had never despaired. Not 
 many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the 
 jungles of Central India once more resounded with the name of 
 Tantia Topi. 
 
 of the Puna division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India 
 Field Force ; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he com- 
 manded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwaliar. The Major- 
 General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades 
 in arms — the Rajputana brigade under General Smith — stormed height after 
 height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, 
 taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwaliar. Not a man in these forces 
 enjoyed his natural health or strength ; an Indian sun and months of marching 
 and broken rest had told on the strongest ; but the moment they were told to 
 take Gwaliar for their Queen and country they thought of nothing but victory. 
 They gained it, restoring England’s true and brave ally to his throne, putting to 
 rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, 
 exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and 
 ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwaliar, reckoned the strongest 
 in India. The Major-General thanks sincerely Brigadier-General Napier, C.B., 
 Brigadier Stuart, C.B., and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, 
 for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he 
 attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once 
 more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better auspices than those of the 
 victory of Gwdlidr.” 
 
164 
 
 THE SOUTHERN MAEIthI COUNTRY. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SOUTHERN MARATHA COUNTRY AND LE GRAND JACOB. 
 
 In the first chapter of this volume I have brought tlie record of 
 affairs in the southern Maratha country up to the 
 spring of 1858. In Belgaon and the neighbouring 
 couuiry. districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only 
 the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory 
 rule to ensure that it should never return. 
 
 It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1858) 
 that Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, exhausted by the double 
 Mr^Seton- labours which had devolved upon him, applied to 
 ing^toTe*^* the Government of Bombay to be relieved of a 
 TpSon^of of his overwhelming duties. Mr. Seton-Karr 
 
 his duties, had. Unquestionably, reason to believe that the 
 Government, should it accede to his request, would 
 grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would 
 relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to 
 the administration. But he was mistaken. The 
 trS2\h? Government, in sanctioning Mr. Seton-Karr’s request, 
 political desired him to retain in his own hands the civil 
 Mr^Manson administration of the territory, and to transfer the 
 charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr. 
 Charles Manson. 
 
 Than Mr. Manson there was not a more high-minded, a more 
 generous, or a more earnest officer in the Bombay 
 Mn^MaSo^n. Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession, he 
 gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. 
 He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. 
 But — he had been employed on the detested Inam Commission 
 — and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one 
 essential point from that of which JMr. Seton-Karr 
 ?hichMr ^ leader. The reader wdll have already dis- 
 
 ^ton-Karr covered the title of that school. Mr. Seton-Karr was 
 belonged. strongly in favour of the maintenance of the native 
 
1858.] COLONEL JACOB ASSUMES POLITICAL COMMAND. 165 
 
 aristocracy, an npholder of tlie rights and customs held and 
 enjoyed by native landowners at the time they came under 
 British rule. He believed that, so long as the British respected 
 those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ 
 force ; that persuasion and management would effect the re- 
 quired end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that 
 policy 1 have already shown. The success had proved to him 
 its efficacy. Mr. Man son belonged to a more modern 
 school. In one of the letters which Mr. Seton-Karr Mr. 
 
 addressed to him before the transfer of the political 
 duties, he is jestingly referred to as “ an admirer of 
 Lord Dalhousie.” This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such 
 as that which was then prevailing, he gave his preference to 
 measures stronger than those which Mr. Seton-Karr deemed 
 suited to the occasion, 
 
 Mr. Seton-Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of 
 the Government, but the reason adduced by that 
 Government was one to which he could take no ex- 
 ception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole the Bombay 
 of the southern Mai atha country should be placed 
 under the control of one officer as Commissioner, and, change, 
 in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it 
 further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now 
 Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in 
 one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had 
 suppressed a mutiny in Kolhapur, and had, by his firmness and 
 strength of character, impressed the Bombay Gov- 
 ernment with the conviction that he was peculiarly £??? Jacob 
 qualified to wield political power in troublous times, is appointed 
 Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the pouSi 
 new arrangement a similar authority in the other agent for the 
 part, with Mr. Manson as political agent under him. 
 
 If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient 
 in that it cast no slur upon Mr. Seton-Karr, it did not the less 
 cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for. Reasons why 
 knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that 
 a change would create suspicion in their minds, a au'gJred ill of 
 change more especially which transferred political change, 
 action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the 
 Inam Commission, and that, if that change were followed by a 
 tension of the tie which bound them to the suzerain power, it 
 might even produce a catastrophe. 
 
166 
 
 THE SOUTHEKN MARATHA COUNTRY. [1858, 
 
 Kerr and 
 La Touche 
 attack 
 Halgalli. 
 
 Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political 
 duties of the Belgaon districts, Mr. Seton-Karr had been 
 gradually engaged in disarming the country — a work in which 
 he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George 
 Coione^i Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maratha Horse, 
 Malcolm. and holding military charge of the southern Maratha 
 territory. It would be difficult to over-estimate the 
 services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment 
 mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous 
 chapter I have referred to his services at Shorapiir. Prior to 
 that event, on the 29th of November, 1857, he had 
 led his cavalry, supported by one company 28th 
 Native Infantry, against the fortified village of 
 Halgalli, which had become the head-quarters of 
 the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been 
 held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, 
 subsequently reinforced by La Touche, of the same regiment. 
 These officers had, by spiiited charges, driven the enemy into 
 the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the 
 streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. 
 His men at once dismounted, and assisted by the 
 Sipahis of the 28th Native Infantry, scrambled over 
 the flat-roofed houses of the village, dashed upon the 
 rebels, and decided the victory. The country, how- 
 ever was still uneasy. Both above and below the 
 ghats British authority had met with resistance, but, 
 except that in some cases the guns and the arms 
 had not been entirely delivered up, the danger from such dis- 
 turbances was considered to have passed away when Colonel 
 Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, 
 however, a new peril appeared in another quarter. 
 
 Of the chief of Nargund I have spoken in the first chapter of 
 this volume.^ That this chief was thoroughly dis- 
 affected there can be no doubt. Mr. Seton-Karr had 
 even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the 
 Pressure chief of Shorapur.j' But up to May 1858 he had been 
 cxe^sed managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure 
 exercised by Mr. Seton-Karr, sent in a correct list of 
 Karr and the guns and ammunition he possessed, and some- 
 what later, urged by Mr. Manson, had even begun 
 
 Malcolm 
 arrives and 
 the place is 
 stonned. 
 
 State of the 
 
 country 
 
 generally. 
 
 Nargund. 
 
 Manson. 
 
 * Vide pages 16 to 28. 
 
 t Vide page 86. 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE CHIEF OF NARGUND. 
 
 167 
 
 The chief 
 hears that 
 Seton-Karr 
 has been 
 replaced by 
 Manson. 
 
 Eeasons why 
 the chief of 
 Niirgund 
 dreaded Mr. 
 Manson. 
 
 to despatcli them to Dharwar. Those who are aware of the 
 reverence and affection with which a native chief regards his 
 guns will realise the sacrifice which the Rajah made to meet 
 the expressed wishes of the Government. 
 
 Matters were thus progressing, the chief doubtless secretly 
 disaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure 
 with the orders of the Bombay Government, when, 
 about the 25th of May, intelligence reached him 
 that Mr. Seton-Karr had been removed from the 
 political charge of his country, and that Mr. Manson 
 had been gazetted his successor. 
 
 This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the 
 chief of Nargund. Although he did not personally 
 dislike Mr. Manson, he regarded him as the living 
 representative of the hated system of Inam ex- 
 amination — a system which, as I have said, had 
 worked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of 
 the Southern Maratha country. At that moment, too, Mr. 
 Manson was specially obnoxious to him, for, only a few weeks 
 previously, whilst still serving under Mr. Seton-Karr, he had 
 arrested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the 
 chief of Jamkhandi.* The conviction at once took possession of 
 him that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be 
 arrested, as his friend had been arrested, and thrown 
 into a dungeon.j In his fear and trepidation, the chief He fears to 
 sent a confidential agent to Dharwar to inquire of arrested, 
 the magistrate the meaning of the portentous change. 
 
 But, before he could receive an answer, those about him had 
 begun to work on a nature constitutionally timid 
 and nervous. His habitual advisers and companions wSch^work 
 had not even then despaired of receiving a summons oJ^^r^Ond 
 to join the victorious standard of the heir of Peshwa. ° 
 
 All seemed yet possible. Tantia Topi was confronting the 
 British in Bundelkhand, Kalpi was yet held, and one good 
 victory might give them all they desired. These men took 
 advantage of the consternation caused in the chiefs mind by 
 Mr. Manson’s appointment to inspire him to resist, to cast 
 
 * Only a short time previously the Rajah of Nargund had met Mr. Manson at 
 the chief of Jamkhandi’s house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms. 
 
 t So penetrated was he with this idea, that he despatched that day a letter to 
 his half-brother at Raradrug, in which occurs the passage : “ I had rather die 
 than be arrested as Janikhandi was.” 
 
168 THE SOUTHEKN MAEIthI COUNTRY. [1858. 
 
 defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted 
 themselves and their brethren. 
 
 These men were not alone in their endeavours. The chiefs 
 wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty 
 years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes 
 of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance 
 of her possessing power after her husband’s death 
 rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive 
 mother of a reigning boy. And, the British Govern- 
 ment having refused to the chief the right to adopt, 
 this prospect was possible only in the event of the 
 British rule being supplanted by that of the 
 Maratha. This favoured counsellor added, then, 
 her entreaties to those of the chief’s companions. 
 
 The chief of Nargund gave way. That day he recalled the 
 guns which had progressed only a few miles on the 
 road to Dharwar, began to store provisions, and on 
 the 27 th of May, possessing only three obsolete 
 rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with 
 all the formalities used by the Marathas, against the 
 British Government ! 
 
 Mr. Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 
 Mansonhas 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had 
 Bet out for remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapur, trans- 
 acting business with him. On the 26th he set out 
 for the northern states of the territory, with the 
 view of judging for himself of the state of the country, and of 
 using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had 
 set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, com- 
 manding at Belgaon, stating that an insurrection had broken 
 out near to Dharwar, and that the Nargund chief was believed 
 to be supporting it, as he had recalled some of his 
 guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once 
 sent a horseman with this news to Manson, inform- 
 ing him also that he had telegraphed to the general 
 to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to 
 Nargund, and recommending him to return to 
 
 The greatest 
 influence of 
 all, 
 
 produced by 
 the refusal 
 of the 
 
 Government 
 to allow the 
 chief to 
 adopt an 
 heir. 
 
 The chief of 
 Nargund 
 submits to 
 those in- 
 fluences and 
 revolts. 
 
 when Jacob 
 hears of the 
 revolt. 
 
 He sends 
 to warn 
 Manson. 
 
 Kohlapur. 
 
 Jacob’s messenger reached Manson at Kiirundwad. English- 
 men in India are so accustomed to authority, and to all the 
 incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, 
 they judge men and affairs, not as they are, but as, to their 
 
1858 .] 
 
 MANSON STOPS AT A VILLAGE TO SLEEP. 
 
 169 
 
 complacent minds, they wish them to he. Now, Manson had 
 always been on the most friendly terms with the 
 chief of Nargund. He had no adequate conception ia 
 
 of the depth of bitterness and the dread his comiec- himself, 
 tion with the Inam Commission had roused in the 
 mind of that Maratha noble. It was not possible, then, that he 
 should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control 
 of political affairs, in place of Mr. Seton-Karr, would rouse the 
 chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the 
 friendly professions of the Eaiah, and in the per- determines 
 suasive power oi his mnuence over him, he sent toNiirgund, 
 back word to Jacob that from Kurundwad he could 
 reach Nargund by a cross road ; that he would arrive there in 
 time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended 
 mischief ; but that, if too late to prevent such development, he 
 was confident of being able to prevent the chief’s half-brother, 
 the lord of Eamdrug, from joining the rebellion. Having 
 despatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to 
 Eamdrug, and sent off* by a horseman a letter to 
 Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaladji, ^aicol^for 
 requesting him to push on to Eamdrug with a body military aid. 
 of his regiment, the Southern Maratha Horse. 
 
 But, before this missive reached Malcolm, that able and daring 
 ofi&cer had taken the field with two hundred and 
 fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had meanwhile, 
 already plundered the treasury of one of the district 
 stations of Dharwar. Mr. Manson, then, though he 
 rode hard, reached Eamdrug to find it unoccupied. He had 
 with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied 
 him from Kohlapur, and these were as fatigued as ^^ches 
 he himself was. There he learned from the chief Klmdnig, 
 the treason of his half-brother ; he read the com- 
 promising letters from the latter, urging the Eamdrug chief 
 to follow his example ; and, entreated by that chief and resolves 
 not to pursue his journey to Nargund, he resolved 
 to join the force in the field under Malcolm. 
 
 Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, 
 escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he 
 taken his rest at Eamdrug and made the journey to 
 Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day’s 
 work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o’clock 
 at a temple near a little village on the way and slept. 
 
 to endeavour 
 to join 
 Malcolm. 
 
 He sets out 
 that evening 
 
 and, tired, 
 stops, near a 
 temple, to 
 sleep. 
 
170 
 
 THE SOUTHEKN MAEATHA COUNTRY. 
 
 [ 1858 , 
 
 The chief of 
 Nfirgund 
 is made 
 acquainted 
 with 
 
 Manson’s 
 
 movements, 
 
 and has him 
 murdered. 
 
 A report of all Manson’s movements had been duly carried to 
 the chief of Nargund. When the news reached him 
 of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as an un- 
 tutored Asiatic will always reason. His enemy was 
 in his power ; he would slay him.* He conceived 
 that, having declared war against the British, he 
 had a perfect right to destroy the members of that 
 nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly, about mid- 
 night, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and, 
 approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the 
 sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the 
 sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his 
 revolver at bis assailants, but he was immediately 
 overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body 
 thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by 
 his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, 
 the chief returned with Manson’s head to Nargund, and sus- 
 pended the bloody trophy over a gate way. f 
 
 Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, 
 had marched southwards and joined Bhim Rao, the 
 chief of Kopuldrug. There the}^ were attacked by 
 a Madras force from Ballari, under Colonel Hughes, 
 already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at 
 Shorapur, and who, in daring and manly qualities, 
 in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations, yielded 
 to none who came to the front in the mutiny. 
 This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy 
 surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I 
 have said, at Kopuldrug, and stormed the place, 
 killing Bhim Eao, the chief of Hembaji, and many of the 
 defenders. 
 
 Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nargund was 
 in revolt than he felt that a moment’s delay would 
 hufri?8^ provoke the rising of the entire Maratha country, 
 towards With Only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his 
 disposal he marched, then, immediately against the 
 
 One body 
 of the 
 insurgents 
 marches to 
 Kopuldrug, 
 
 where they 
 are attacked 
 and beaten 
 by Hughes. 
 
 Nargdnd. 
 
 * It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, whose conduct was 
 infinitely more treacherous. 
 
 t Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob’s Western India before and during 
 the Mutinies. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests 
 entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating 
 in a well. 
 
MALCOLM CAPTURES NlEOtoD. 
 
 fS58.'] 
 
 171 
 
 place, assisted by fbe wily Brabman officials, who believed he 
 was marching on destruction. 
 
 At the same time he wrote to Belgaon, asking for some 
 infantry and some guns. The authorities there sent 
 him two companies of Europeans, one of native reLforcedby 
 infantry, and two guns under Captain Paget, infantry and 
 Biding on with these, only five days after the 
 insensate declaration of war, Malcolm appeared before Nargund. 
 He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him 
 that the rebels were marching to attack him. His 
 heart bounded with joy. “ I have them now,” he attack him. 
 said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, 
 he went to the front. It was true, they were advancing. But 
 when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they 
 hesitated, then halted, and, in the manner of natives, 
 began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, Lfeat?them, 
 they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected 
 his men. Biding at their head, he charged, overthrew the 
 rebels — who, however, fought well in groups— drove them back, 
 followed them up into the town, and forced the and captures 
 surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort. the town. 
 
 There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so 
 strong, that, if defended, it would have defied the efibrts of the 
 small assailing force. But Malcolm knew the natives well. 
 “ Give them a quiet night,” he said, “ and they will 
 save us the trouble.” He was right. On the morning Jv^cuSf^ 
 of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern tjefortin 
 Maratha country was found deserted. ^ ^ 
 
 The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers,, 
 attempted, in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the 
 fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had Slmpte to 
 recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit escape in 
 which, they soon learned, had been instituted after 
 them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr. 
 Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not 
 permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with crptmed 
 ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on 
 the night of the Srd.j 
 
 * Afterwards Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay. He 
 died in 1887. 
 
 t The chief of Nargund was tried at Belgaon on the 11th of June. He 
 
172 
 
 THE SOUTHERN MARATHI COUNTRY. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 On learning of Mr. Manson’s death, Colonel Jacob bad taken 
 Colonel promptest measures to control the northern 
 
 Jacob states of the territory. He forced the chief of 
 
 coSntry.^^^ Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to 
 give a pledge of his fidelity by surrendering his 
 ammunition. Shortly afterwards, the death of General Lester 
 led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier-General in 
 military command in the southern Maratha country. 
 
 Under General Jacob’s firm rule the country above the ghats 
 Measures soon subsided inti) quiescence, but below the moun- 
 taiceii^by him tains, along the Goa frontier, the Sawant rebels still 
 fication^^^^' Continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bom- 
 bay, and Portuguese troops, regular and irregulai-, 
 in tbe field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted 
 from the action of troops serving under commanders independent 
 one of the other. Eventually, in November, the 
 withth?*^ Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General 
 
 Viceroy of Jacob, Consented to place the whole of his field 
 
 detachments under the command of the officer who 
 should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agree- 
 ment Brigadier-General Fitzgerald of the Madras 
 army took command of the united forces, and an 
 organised plan was arranged. This was to hem in the tract 
 occupied by the rebels, and to inform them that unless they 
 surrendered by the 20th November they would be 
 hunted down without mercy. On that date the band 
 had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. 
 These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of 
 that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported 
 to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor. 
 
 Thenceforward the peace of the Southern Maratha country 
 was assured. 
 
 pleaded guilty, and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had 
 caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed, in the presence of all 
 the troops and of a large number of natives, on the 12th. It remains only to 
 add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief’s mother 
 were found in the Malparba river on the night of the 3rd. Sir G. Le Grand 
 Jacob states, in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves, 
 unable to bear up against the disgrace. 
 
1858.] LORD CANNING’S OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 173 
 
 BOOK XV.— THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH AND THE NORTH- 
 WEST. REPRESSION OF OUTBREAKS IN THE PANJAB. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 LORD canning’s OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 In the preceding volume * I referred to the proclamation 
 
 issued by Lord Canning regarding the talukdars of 
 
 Oudh, and of its reception in the victorious camp of 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell ; and I promised to deal with the subject 
 
 more fully later on. I proceed now to redeem that promise. 
 
 The Oudh proclamation, despatched by Lord Canning to Sir 
 James Outram in his capacity of Chief Commissioner 
 of Oudh, with a letter bearing date the 3rd of March, 
 
 1858, directing that it should not be published until 
 Lakhnao should have fallen, or, at least, 'until that city ciamafion" 
 should lie at the mercy of the British commander, 
 was at once a sentence, a warning, and a threat addressed to 
 the inhabitants of the rebellious province. That proclamation 
 announced that Lakhnao, after defying and resisting the power 
 of the British for nine months, now lay at the mercy of the 
 conqueror ; that in that defiance and resistance the mutinous 
 soldiery who had begun the revolt had been greatly aided by 
 the inhabitants of the city and the province, even by those who 
 owed their prosperity to the British Government ; but that the 
 hour of retribution had now arrived. Acting on the principle 
 that, before pronouncing sentence on the guilty, it was just and 
 proper to reward the innocent, the proclamation proceeded to 
 name six men — three of whom were rajahs, two zamindars. 
 
 * Vol. IV. pages 285-7. 
 
174 LOKD CANNING’S OUDH PKOCLAMATION. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 and one a taliikdar — who had remained faithful 
 Rewards it amid great temptations, and who were not only 
 
 promises 
 
 the innocent, declared “the sole hereditary proprietors oi the 
 lands which they held when Oudh came under 
 British rule,” but were promised additional rewards. Eewards 
 and honours in proportionate measure were likewise promised 
 to others in whose favour similar claims should be established 
 to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with 
 these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of 
 remainder. the province was confiscated to the British Govern- 
 ment, which would dispose of that right in such 
 manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, talukdars, and 
 ^ ^ landowners, however, who should make immediate 
 
 Conditions of... • ii* 
 
 commutation suDinission, Surrendering their arms and obeying 
 ment°^^^' Orders of the Chief Commissioner, the procla- 
 
 mation promised the safety of their lives and of 
 their honour, provided that their hands were “ unst fined with 
 English blood murderously shed.” For any further indulgence, 
 the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in 
 which such men might thereafter be placed, “ they must throw 
 themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Govern- 
 ment.” The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those 
 amongst the classes referred to who should come forward 
 promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the 
 restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would 
 be large, and that the Governor-General wouldjbe 
 murder of ready to view liberally the claims which they might 
 and^E^gTish- acquire to the restoration of their former rights, 
 
 women to Further, that while participation in the murder of 
 mer^y.^ Englishmen and Englishwomen would exclude those 
 who had participated in it from all mercy, those, 
 on the other hand, who had protected English lives 
 would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency. 
 
 In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the 
 Mr Edmon Proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr. G. F. 
 stone’s ' Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful 
 fn^Ttter^* down that it should not be published until 
 
 Lakhnao should have been conquered or should lie 
 at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, 
 when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to 
 the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to 
 the mutinous Sipahis. It expressed likewise the conviction of 
 
1858 ] LOED CANNING’S OIJDH PKOCLAMATION. 
 
 175 
 
 Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which charac- 
 terised the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the 
 annonnceraent in snch a state paper of a liberal and forgiving 
 spirit would be open to misconstruction, and it added 
 that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was fUe 
 merciful and even lenient, in that it promised that underlies 
 exemption, almost general, from the penalties of Sverf^S^*^ 
 death and imprisonment to the rajahs, talukdars, 
 and zamindars, who had fought and conspired ciamL?o^n. 
 against the Government ; that even the confiscation 
 of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severer 
 punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter con- 
 cluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the 
 manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with 
 mutineers of varying grades of guilt. 
 
 Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation 
 on the 5th of March. Beading the latter by the 
 light of its actual contents, apart from the com- 
 mentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a tiie piuciama- 
 conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that differeiTt 
 which Lord Canning had endeavoured to impress that intended 
 upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the canning 
 proclamation, had said in so many words, by the 
 mouth of his Foreign Secretary, “ Do not judge the 
 proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern 
 justice to conquered revolters. Bather, looking at the measure 
 of punishment which those revolters have brought upon them- 
 selves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, 
 except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of 
 punishment, capable of still further mitigation.” But Outram, 
 disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without 
 sufficient reference to the circumstances which had 
 made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to demSt. 
 the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March, he 
 declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners 
 in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted 
 the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but 
 few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed in a letter, 
 by the Governor-General ; he expressed his con- 
 viction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public 
 nearly all the chiefs and talukdars would retire to their domains 
 and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to 
 
176 
 
 LOKD canning’s OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 urge extenuating circumstances for those who had revolted, by 
 declaring his opinion — which, it must be admitted, was founded 
 on fact — that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in 
 the land-settlement after the annexation ; that, apart from this, 
 their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circum- 
 stances, only natural ; that it was not until the British rule in 
 Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that 
 the rajahs and talukdars had sided against the Government ; that 
 they ought to be treated rather as honourable enemies than as 
 rebels ; that they would be converted into relentless enemies if 
 their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war, which 
 would “ involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, 
 disease, and exposure ” ; but that, if their lands were secured to 
 them, they would at once aid in restoring order, and would so 
 co-operate with the paramount power as, before long, to render 
 unnecessary the further presence of the large army then 
 occupying Oudh. 
 
 To this letter Lord Canning replied, on the 10 th, in a brief 
 despatch, the nature of which renders still clearer 
 Canning’s really merciful intentions of his proclamation, 
 
 first reply Referring to the promise of safety of life and honour 
 to the talukdars, chiefs, and landholders, unstained 
 with English blood murderously shed, who should surrender at 
 once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Lord 
 Canning authorised Sir James to amplify it by an addition 
 which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible 
 the merciful intentions of the Governor-General, 
 merctfui in- “ To those amongst them,” ran this addition, “ who 
 tentions still gRall promptly como forward and give to the Chief 
 Commissioner their support in the restoration of 
 peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the 
 Governor-General will be willing to view liberally the claims 
 which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former 
 rights.” 
 
 Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to 
 Outram’s remarks. In Mr. Edmonstone’s despatch, 
 SidmSe^ dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted 
 letter^^*^ that the people of Oudh occupied a position, with 
 respect to their allegiance to the British Government, 
 differing widely from that of the inhabitants of the provinces 
 which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor- 
 General’s opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground 
 
1858.] LOKD CANNING’S OUDH PROCLAMATION. 177 
 
 for treating the chiefs and talukdars in the lenient manner 
 suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the 
 letter of the 3rd of March, he again insisted that, 
 in the presence of a great crime, exemption from 
 death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and 
 that to have otfered more lenient terms would have been to 
 treat the rebels — not, as Outram contended, as honourable 
 enemies — but as enemies who had won the day. With respect 
 to Outram’s contention that the injustice of the land -settlement 
 after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel. Lord 
 Canning simply declined to recognise the hypothesis. Ad- 
 mitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of 
 village settlement in place of the old settlement under talukdars 
 might not have been altogether wise. Lord Canning declined to 
 believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect 
 the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct 
 rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of 
 the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised ; to a dimi- 
 nution of their importance by being brought under 
 equal laws; and to the obligation of disbanding 
 their armed followers and of living a peaceful and ciamation. 
 orderly life. For these reasons Lord Canning ad- 
 hered to his proclamation. 
 
 That Sir James Outram did not at once realise the statesman- 
 like nature and the really merciful tendencies of 
 Lord Canning’s proclamation may at once be admitted, ^^narity 
 The end of the two men was really the same ; the in the 
 difference was in the manner by which that end ^^^ichYord 
 should be attained. Sir James would have carried Canning and 
 leniency to a point at which leniency would have aiike^Smed. 
 missed its aim. Lord Canning, maintaining the 
 right to be severe, was prepared to be as merciful as Outram 
 whenever the exercise of mercy should be politically desirable. 
 
 The real character of Lord Canning’s statesmanship at this 
 period might have remained long generally unknown but for 
 the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then 
 President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ellen- 
 borough. That nobleman had but recently taken 
 over the seals of that ofQce from his predecessor, a recerves^^'^^ 
 member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith, canning’s 
 In due course he received, about the 20th of March, proclamation 
 a copy of Lord Canning’s proclamation, unaccom- 
 
 VOL. V 
 
 N 
 
178 LORD canning’s oudh proclamation. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 without the 
 letter 
 addressed 
 to his 
 
 predecessor, 
 
 explanatory 
 of the 
 
 which 
 justified it.i 
 
 Lord 
 
 Ellenborough 
 arrives at a 
 conclusion 
 similar to 
 that formed 
 by Outram, 
 
 panied by any explanatoiy document. In point of fact, Lord 
 Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to 
 Mr. Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and 
 who, in his belief, still held the office of President 
 of the Board of Control, a letter in which he stated 
 that the proclamation required an explanatory 
 despatch which he had not had time to prepare. 
 Unfortunately, Mr. Vernon Smith neglected to pass 
 on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed 
 Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation 
 stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and 
 was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy. 
 
 It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this 
 way. Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion 
 not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James 
 Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to, 
 and personal communication with. Lord Canning, had 
 been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise 
 such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification 
 almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose 
 views, however, he was ignorant. Lord Ellenborough believed 
 that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British 
 took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and 
 had been the chief cause of the general and national character 
 of the disaffection in that province. He concluded — agreeing 
 in this also with Outram — that the people of Oudh would view 
 with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation, 
 from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and 
 would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than 
 before against a government which could adopt such a course of 
 policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views 
 and in a despatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in 
 
 a delpadch. the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of 
 Directors, added to them an argument — also an 
 argument of Sir James Outram — to the effect that the people of 
 Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies rather than 
 as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words : 
 “ Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming 
 resistance, have excepted a few persons as still 
 Concluding clesei’ving of punishment, but have, with a generous 
 
 paragraphs 
 
 of this policy, extended their clemency to the great body 
 
 of the people. You have acted on a different 
 
 despatch. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S COMMENTS. 
 
 179 
 
 principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special 
 favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as 
 the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the 
 country. 
 
 “We cannot but think that the precedents from which you 
 have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of 
 wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you 
 have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in 
 practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you 
 have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see 
 British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a 
 contented people : there cannot be contentment where there is 
 general confiscation. 
 
 “ Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a 
 country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense 
 of wrong ; and, if it were possible so to maintain it, it would 
 not be a consummation to be desired.” 
 
 Lord Ellenborough submitted this despatch to the Cabinet of 
 which he was a member. It received an approval which was 
 unanimous. Three weeks later he showed it to Mr. Bright with 
 the view of its contents being made known to the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the mistakes he 
 committed — the penning of an acrimonious despatch 
 vdthout waiting for an explanation, and the dis- when^nown, 
 closure of its contents to Mr. Bright with a view to compels Lord 
 its being presented to the House of Commons — were to re°igm^° 
 fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having 
 come under the cognizance of the House of Commons, and having 
 become the subject of a debate which at the outset seemed 
 likely to terminate the existence of the Government, Lord 
 Ellenborough took upon himself the sole responsibility of the 
 despatch, and resigned his office. 
 
 Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the 
 despatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at 
 Allahabad on the 13th of June. Before its contents Effect 
 became known, rumours circulated that the Govern- 
 ment of I.ord Derby had written a disagreeable des^patchon 
 letter to the Governor-General. “ I asked him,” canning, 
 wrote, at the time, one deeply in his confidence, “ if 
 it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He 
 said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent ; but he 
 
 N 2 
 
180 
 
 LOKD canning’s OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 did not care much ; he would answer what they wrote.” He 
 then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. 
 The next day, when the despatch had been read by others, the 
 prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively 
 impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding 
 sentences — those which I have quoted — of which the writer was 
 evidently proud. But, above all, there arose a 
 feeling of indignation that a despatch so insulting 
 in the minds should have been published for the benefit of the 
 entouraffe. natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as 
 of the Anglo-Indians. 
 
 But Lord Canning had, at this crisis, a support not less grate- 
 ful than the confidence of the friends about him. 
 Lord Canning The Same mail brought him a copy of a resolution 
 Eng^iSnot™ of the Court of Directors expressing continued 
 to resign. confidence in their Governor-General. Letters were 
 received from Mr. Sidney Herbert, from Lord Gran- 
 ville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from many other leading men, 
 expressing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord 
 Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy 
 calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling 
 him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. 
 He had^no jjg regarded Lord Ellenborough’s despatch as Achilles 
 doing so. would have regarded a javelin “hurled by the 
 feeble hand of Priam,” and, far from allowing it to 
 disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a 
 vindication of his policy. 
 
 Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication had been 
 drafted and despatched — on the 27th of June — Lord 
 ?fet2rSom banning received a long private letter from Lord 
 Lord Derby, Derby himself on the subject of the point of differ- 
 ence. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general 
 confidence in Lord Canning’s policy ; he attributed Lord Ellen- 
 borough’s despatch to the conduct of Mr. Vernon Smith in with- 
 holding the covering private letter which accompanied the 
 Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that 
 further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby con- 
 cluded by virtually asking, almost pressing, Lord 
 virtually Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of 
 to stay on? Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one 
 in Lord Canning’s position such a letter from the 
 chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a 
 
1858 .] 
 
 LOED CANNING’S VINDICATION. 
 
 181 
 
 member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that 
 his policy was vindicated by his enemies. 
 
 Lord Canning’s own vindication was dated the 18th of June. 
 It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the 
 fact that the despatch censuring himself had been canning’s 
 made public in E i gland three weeks before it 
 reached his hands, and that in a few days it would 
 be read in every station in Hindustan. Dwelling then upon 
 the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of 
 Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the 
 publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that 
 no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, 
 would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of 
 public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in 
 the government of India at that time, taking place under 
 circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy 
 pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the 
 pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief 
 that that policy had been from the first merciful without 
 weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of 
 the Government ; that it had made manifest to the 
 people of reconquered districts all over India, in- reimmary. 
 eluding Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit 
 and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large ; 
 and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with 
 that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring 
 peace to that province on a stable footing. 
 
 Stating, then, in dignified language, that although in a time 
 of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay 
 down of his own act the high trust which he had the honour to 
 hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his p . 
 policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to with- 
 hold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful 
 yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of 
 Governor-General, Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord 
 Ellenborough’s strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which 
 his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested. 
 
 With respect to the former. Lord Canning referred to the 
 extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough’s 
 despatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as 
 if they were fighting in a righteous cause — a manner borough, 
 quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but 
 
182 
 
 LOED CANNING’S OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England, who 
 herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to 
 discuss the policy which, in 1855-56, had dictated the aijnexa- 
 tion ; it was not his act, nor had he ever been empowered to 
 undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to 
 ou?the"^^ point out the disastrous results which might follow, 
 mischief his should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such 
 mighthave reasoning as that contained in the despatch, to 
 Sdia^^ continue their resistance. At the actual moment, 
 the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh 
 were united neither by a common plan nor by a common 
 sympathy, but, he added, if it should become manifest that the 
 British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to 
 possess Oudh, the Begam, as the representative in the field of 
 the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the 
 sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would 
 merge in hers. 
 
 Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by 
 stating that he had early in the year proceeded to 
 TO- Allahabad chiefly that he might be able to investigate 
 
 ciamation. the State of Oudh ; that he soon determined to 
 make a difference in the measures to be adopted for 
 the pacification of the country, between the mutinied Sipahis 
 and the Oudh rebels ; that the latter should not be put to death 
 for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had 
 committed actual murder ; that the general punishment for 
 rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates, a punish- 
 ment recognised by Native States as the fitting consequence of 
 ihe offence, and one which in no way affected caste, nor the 
 honour of the most sensitive Brahman or Rajput ; a punishment 
 which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or 
 lightness of the offence ; which would enable the Government 
 to reward friendly talukdars and zamindars, and which, in point 
 of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive 
 justice — many of the talukdars having acquired their estates by 
 spoliation of the village communities ; that, as a matter of 
 a^istract justice, it would only be right to restore those estates 
 to the village communities ; but that, as there would be insu- 
 perable difficulties to such a course, it would be better to take 
 the forfeited estates of the rebellious talukdars as Government 
 property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might 
 be rewarded. 
 
1858.] MR. MONTGOMERY IS SENT TO OUDH. 183 
 
 With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by 
 Lord Ellenhorough’s basty act. The result was to seat 
 Lord Canning, in the presence of a ministry of an 
 opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to Snningof 
 give him greater strength to carry out the policy 
 which he believed to he adapted to the circum- letter 
 stances. In another way his hands had been 
 strengthened at this crisis. 
 
 The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council 
 enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province 
 a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry 
 out his policy with the vigour arising from conviction. 
 
 The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr. Robert Mont- 
 gomery.* Mr. Montgomery was a man who, wiih a 
 thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, Mon^omeJy. 
 combined great decision of character, a sound judg- 
 ment, and a thorough knowledge of native character. He had 
 been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the 
 Panjab, had been the firm advocate of those resolute ^dantece-^*" 
 measures which made the fall of Dehli possilde, dems. 
 and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir 
 John Lawrence was absent from Labor, had himself directed 
 the measures for disarming the native troops, wliich, carried out 
 in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions 
 of administrative policy, Mr. Montgomery, as I have said, agreed 
 in principle with Lord Canning. 
 
 Such was the man to whom, in the month May 1858, Lord 
 Canning entrusted the carrying out of the policy 
 towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation, ^r. Mont- 
 Mr. Montgomery, without ignoring the proclama- 
 tion, did not put it into rough action. He used it regarding 
 rather as a lever, by the judicious employment ot ciamation. 
 which he could bring about the results at which the 
 Governor-General professedly aimed. The situation was, for 
 the first three months of his tenure of office, in 
 many respects remarkable. The larger number of 
 the relations, adherents, and dependants of the 
 deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, 
 by family association extending over many years, to the 
 
 * Afterwards Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., and till recently a member 
 of the Council of India. He died in 1887. 
 
184 
 
 LORD CANNING’S OUDH PROCLAMATION. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 Lakhnao. 
 
 The 
 
 provinces. 
 
 Feeling of 
 the people 
 towards the 
 king. 
 
 city of Lalilmao. Considering the part which 
 that city, and more especially the classes of its 
 inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion, 
 it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict super- 
 vision. In the provinces an entirely different feeling 
 prevailed. There the rule of the king of Oudh had 
 planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion. Alien in 
 religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh, 
 the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first, 
 because they were there, and, secondly, because they 
 had exercised no strict supervising power, but had 
 been content to be the nominal rulers of the great 
 landowners, permitted to carry on, very much in 
 accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule. The central 
 power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh, had interfered to put 
 a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and 
 oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore the 
 evil would have produced a national rising. The sentiment 
 felt, then, by the great body of landholders towards the royal 
 family of Oudh was not loyalty ; it was not affection ; it was 
 not sympathy ; it was scarcely contentment. Perhaps the term 
 that best describes it is the term toleration. They had been 
 content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of normal 
 suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked. 
 
 Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the 
 civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, they entertained a different feeling. In 
 British rule strong Contrast with the selfish sway of the Muham- 
 madan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself 
 felt in every corner of the province. The reforms it had intro- 
 duced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that 
 an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the 
 very hostile, landowners that it was not to be endured. If the 
 King of Oudh had been King Log, the British rule 
 was the rule of King Stork. The landowners of Oudh, then, 
 had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed 
 dynasty, but from hatred of its successor. Indifferent as they 
 were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings, 
 they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them. 
 
 When, then, Lakhnao had fallen, the talukdars and the land- 
 owners generally were as far as they had ever been from sub- 
 mission to the British authority. Could the Begam show a 
 
1858 .] 
 
 MONTGOMERY’S TACT AND JUDGMENT. 
 
 185 
 
 strong front, they might yet combine with her h v 
 
 for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the no centra/'^* 
 person of one of its members. But, as there did 
 not appear in the field any force suificiently strong 
 to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought 
 each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would 
 accrue to him out of the general turmoil. 
 
 This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Mont- 
 gomery might otherwise have had to encounter had 
 there been one fixed purpose and concentration of 
 action among the malcontents. But still the task 
 before him was no light one. He met it with all 
 the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might 
 have been expected from so experienced a ruler of 
 men. He exhausted every means of persuasion at 
 the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the 
 landowners the fixed determination of the British 
 Government. He was thus able to restore in some 
 few districts the lapsed British authority. To reor- 
 ganise that authority in those deaf to his persuasions, 
 he was content to wait until the forcible measures 
 inaugurated by his military coadjutor. Sir Hope 
 Grant, should produce their natural results. 
 
 What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter 
 
 This fact 
 diminishes 
 Mont- 
 gomery’s 
 difficulties, 
 which are, 
 nevertheless. 
 
 He meets 
 them ; 
 
 restores 
 British 
 authority 
 in some 
 districts. 
 
186 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 When I last referred to General Hope Grant,* he was marching- 
 Ho e Grant Jalalabad near Lakhnao. The date 
 
 was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter 
 that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Com- 
 mander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into 
 Lakhnao to consult with Mr. Montgomery, the recently appointed 
 Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the 
 Kanhpur road was again endangered by Beni Madhu, an influ- 
 ential talukdar, who had likewise caused proclamations to be 
 distributed in Lakhnao, warning the inhabitants to quit that 
 city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, 
 Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd Foot instead of the 38th, 
 and substituting Mackinnon’s battery for Olpherts’s, returned 
 to .Jalalabad, and started thence in pursuit of Beni Madhu on 
 the 25th of May. 
 
 For some time Beni Madhu was invisible. Hope Grant fol- 
 lowed him to Jasanda, eight miles from Banni, where 
 Sni^ddhu. been reported to be “with a force of eighty- 
 
 five thousand men” ; but the talukdar and his m^ 
 had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh Rajah of Kapiirthafa 
 joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 
 6-pounders. 
 
 Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Banni bridge, 
 and, leaving the pursuit of Beni Madhu, marched 
 against a body of rebels, less fabulously numerous, 
 but more really formidable — being fifteen thousand 
 strong — who had taken up a strong position at 
 Nawabganj, on the Faizabad road, eighteen miles 
 from Lakhnao. Grant’s division was tolerably strong. f 
 Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawabganj, 
 
 Then, 
 leaving the 
 pursuit, 
 marches 
 against a 
 rebel force 
 at Nawib- 
 ganj. 
 
 ♦ Vol. IV. page 349. 
 
 t It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions Rifle Brigade, the 5th Panjdb 
 
1858.] 
 
 COMBAT OF NAWABOANJ. 
 
 187 
 
 on the Kanhpur road, he marched on Chinhat. There he 
 found another column, twelve hundred strong, under Colonel 
 Purnell. Placing his baggage under charge of that officer, 
 he quitted Chinhat at 11 o’clock on the night of the 12th 
 of June to march against the rebels. 
 
 These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong. 
 They occupied a large plateau, covered on three 
 sides by a stream crossed by a bridge at a little 
 distance from the town. On the fourth side was ihl’rSSil 
 jungle. ^ ^ Grant halts 
 
 Hope Grant, having with him a trustworthy 
 guide, led his force across the complicated country 
 between Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reached 
 the bridge mentioned about half an hour before daybreak. He 
 halted his column to allow his men to rest and get their break- 
 fast, and then marched on the rebels. His plan was to turn 
 their right and interpose between them and the jungle. His 
 men would do the rest. 
 
 At daybreak Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on the 
 rebels. He took them completely by surprise. Their 
 forces, divided into four parts, each commanded by 
 a separate leader, had no time to concentrate, and 
 had made no plan to act with unanimity. Hope Grant had 
 struck at their centre, and this move had greatly contributed 
 to their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. “ A large 
 body of fine daring zamindari men,” wrote Sir Hope in his 
 journal,* * “ brought two guns into the open and attacked us in 
 rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many 
 brave fellows fighting with a determination to SieSeis,^^ 
 conquer or die, but 1 never witnessed anything 
 more magnificent than the conduct of these zamindaris.” They 
 attacked Hodson’s Horse, who could not face them, and by their 
 unsteadiness imperilled the two guns attached to their regiment. 
 Grant at once ordered up the 7th Hussars, and directed one of 
 the batteries to open on the zamindaris. The fire from four 
 
 Infantry, five hundred Hodson’s Horse under Lieutenant-Colonel Daly ; one 
 hundred and fifty Wale’s Horse, under Prendergast ; two hundred and fifty 
 Bruce’s Horse Police, under Hill ; the 7th Hussars, under Colonel Sir WiUiain 
 Kussell; two squadrons Queen’s Bays; Mackinnon’s Horse Artillery; and 
 Gibbon’s and Carleton’s batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded by 
 Colonel Hagart. 
 
 * Incidents of the Sepoy War, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys. 
 
[1858. 
 
 188 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, but 
 who after a force them to retire. After the guns had 
 
 desperatr ^ played upon them some time, the 7th Hussars came 
 Sated up, and, charging through them twice, forced them 
 to give way. The fact that round the two guns 
 of Hodson’s Horse there lay, after the combat was over, a 
 hundred and twenty-five rebel corpses, testifies to the valour of 
 these gallant levies. After three hours’ fighting, the rebels fell 
 back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dead. 
 The British lost sixty-seven in killed and wounded. In addition, 
 thirty-three men died from sunstroke, and two hundred and 
 fifty were taken into hospital. 
 
 I’his victory had very important results. The rebels had 
 from all sides been flocking to Nawabganj to swell 
 an isperse. formidable column already there. But Hope 
 
 Grant struck dismay all around. The defeat was so crushing 
 that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lakhnao, each of the four 
 parties taking a different direction. The concentrating move- 
 ment was thus effectually stopped. 
 
 Sir Hope left his force at Nawabganj and returned to Lakh- 
 nao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victory 
 had allowed for the first time to breathe freely, 
 rejjeve Mdn From Lakhnao he was ordered by Sir Colin Camp- 
 bell, in the third week of July, to march to the 
 relief of Man Sing, a famous Rajah,* who, having at one time 
 taken part with the rebels, had listened to the advice of Mr. 
 Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance. For this he had 
 been denounced by his former associates, and at the moment 
 was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousand 
 strong with twenty guns. 
 
 It being of great importance to retain the adherence of so 
 powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once despatched 
 the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Bra- 
 theorder syer’s Sikhs, Mackinnon’s troop of horse artillery, 
 and four hundred cavalry to Nawabganj to supply 
 the place of the troops he should take on thence, and with these 
 latterf he set out on the 22nd of July. 
 
 * Vol. in. page 267. 
 
 t The 1st Madras Europeans, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1st 
 Panjah Infantry, the 7th Hussars, five hundred Hodson’s Horse, twelve light 
 guns, and a train of heavy guns. 
 
1858.] 
 
 HOPE GRANT MOVES ON FAIZAbXd. 
 
 189 
 
 Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be 
 convenient to the reader to realise as far as possible osition 
 
 the exact position at the moment of the several rebel of theTeVei” 
 parties in Oudh. Of these, counting as one the 
 forces of the Begam and her alleged paramour, 
 
 Mamu Khan, there were nine of great and many of smaller 
 dimensions. The nine greater divisions disposed at the time of 
 sixty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns. 
 More than half of these were said to have their head-quarters 
 under the command of the Begam and Mamu Khan at Chauka 
 Ghat, on the Gaghra, not far from Faizabad; but a considerable 
 body of them were besieging Man Singh. The remainder — led 
 by such men as Rambakhsh, Bahunath Singh, Chandabakhsh, 
 Gulab Singh, Narpat Singh of Ruiya notoriety, Bhopal Singh, 
 and Firuzshah — were scattered all over the province, never long 
 at the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them 
 victory or plunder. 
 
 Hope Grant, urged by letters from Man Singh to the effect 
 that, unless speedily relieved, he could not answer 
 for the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, JbanSn the 
 indeed, that tlie rumour of his advance had all, or leasuer'of 
 almost all, the effect of the advance itself. When Shiihganj 
 Within a lew days journey ot Man Singh s strong- approach, 
 hold of Shahganj, he learned that the besieging 
 force had melted away ! 
 
 It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army 
 was advancing by rapid marches, the besiegers took 
 fright, and broke up into three divisions. One of u"*\nto three 
 these fled towards Gondah, a second to Sultanpur, divisions, 
 on the Gumti, a third to Tanda on the Ghagra. 
 
 Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, on Faizabad ; 
 thence he proceeded to the ghat of Ajudhia, and 
 found a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in 
 boats to the o[)posite side of the river. He opened FaizjibM, 
 on these and sank all but one. The crews for the 
 most part escaped. The next day he had an interview with 
 Rajah Man Singh. 
 
 But he did not rest idle at Faizabad. Sultanpur having been, 
 indicated to him as the next point of attack, Hope 
 Grant detached thither a column composed of the 
 1st Madras Fusiliers, the 5th Panjab Rifles, a detach- to Suitanpfir. 
 ment of 7th Hussars, three hundred Hodson’s Horse, 
 
190 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. [1858. 
 
 and a troop of Horse Artillery under the command of Brigadier 
 Horsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on 
 the 7 th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within 
 four miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sai. 
 
 Horsford, having ascertained by means of a reconnaissance 
 that the enemy were in force, that the river was 
 peculiarly favourable for defence, and that his pas- 
 the^r^beis at would be disputed, reported that state of affairs 
 
 Suitiinpur, to Hope Grant. Almost simultaneously with the ar- 
 rival of that repoi t, Hope Grant received a telegram 
 from the Command er-in-Chief informing him that the Sultan- 
 pur rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had 
 fifteen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce 
 Horsford with the Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Harya- 
 abad, and, taking the Rifles with him, pressed for- 
 on'to aid^^ Ward to reinfoi’ce Horsford. He reached that officer 
 Horsford. on the 24th of August, and, at once changing the 
 position of the Bi itish camp, resolved to cross the 
 following morning. The remainder of that day he employed 
 in making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, 
 he sent over the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 5th Panjab in- 
 fantry, then, though with great difficulty and after one or two 
 mishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9-pounder guns. 
 Colonel Galwey, who commanded, then gallantly attacked and 
 carried two villages in his front, at a point where the river 
 forms a bend and where the rebels had a picket. The Rifles 
 were sent over in support of this advanced party. 
 
 It was not till the 27th of August that the 
 main body had completed the passage of the river, 
 and even the n the heavy guns, artiller y park, 
 hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the 
 further bank. Nor did the British force even then 
 attack. On the evening of the 28th, however, the 
 rebels becam e the- assailants, but, after a sharp fight, 
 they were repulsed and fled, abandoning Sultanpur 
 to the conqueror. 
 
 It is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous 
 The marches couiitei’-marches. But few of the old 
 
 and counter- Sipahis, the men who had been the backbone of the 
 "he reb?y ^ mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating 
 numbers were composed almost entirely of the ad- 
 
 After 
 
 ci ossing the 
 river, 
 
 and a series 
 of combats, 
 the rebels 
 abandon 
 Sultanpur. 
 
1858.] 
 
 ROHILKHAND. 
 
 191 
 
 herents and vassals of the taliikdars and landowners of the 
 province, aided by the scum of the population, the refuse of the 
 gaols. Their movements were extremely irregular. One day 
 they appeared to retire into Amethi, a fort twenty-five miles 
 from Sultanpur, seven miles in circumference, composed of mud 
 walls and surrounded by a jungle, the residence of Lai Madhu 
 iSingh, a young chief determined in his hostility to the British : 
 then they were heard of near Muzaffarnagar, then 
 at Eampur Kasia. It became evident to Sir Hope 
 that nothing would drive them to submission but 
 force, and he had full instructions to use it. The 
 season, however, was unhealthy, and, when he en- 
 tered Sultanpur, he resolved, with the concurrence 
 of Sir Colin Campbell, to postpone further operations 
 till the middle of October. 
 
 Whilst the gallant soldiers of Sir Hope Grant’s force are 
 waiting with anxious hearts for the period of re- 
 newed action, it may not be inopportune to take a 
 rapid glance at the events which had been occurring Rowikhand. 
 in the meanwhile in other parts of the disturbed 
 province. 
 
 In the last volume^ I recorded the close of the Rohilkhand 
 campaign and the death of the Maulavi, the daring Ahmad 
 Ulla of Faizabad ; but, although the campaign was terminated, 
 some time elapsed before the border lands of Oudh and of Rohil- 
 khand were completely pacified. Many landowners on both 
 sides of the border resented the conduct of the Rajah of Powain, 
 and took up arms to punish, if they could, an act which they 
 regarded as treachery in its basest form. It soon appeared, 
 however, that the rebels could not agree amongst themselves, 
 and they soon began to act independently of each other. One 
 leader, named Nizam Ali Khan, with a considerable 
 following, threatened the station of Pilibhit. Then 
 there appeared in the field the whilom pseudo-vice- 
 roy of the province, the treacherous pensioner Khan Bahadur 
 Khan, with about four thousand followers ; the 
 Nawab of Farrukhabad with five thousand; and Bahiidur 
 Walayat Shah with about three thousand. The 
 authorities, however, were on their guard. They parmkhdbad 
 sent a small force, including the cavalry com- Nawdb. 
 
 Sir Hope 
 Grant 
 determines 
 to postpone 
 further 
 operations 
 till after the 
 rainy season. 
 
 * Vol. IV. pages 380-7. 
 
192 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. [1858. 
 
 manded by the gallant De Kantzow, to protect 
 Powain, and they urged the corpulent Rajah of that 
 place to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant 
 training. This measure saved Powain ; but in other parts of 
 Rohilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder. To- 
 wards the end of August, indeed, Ali Khan Mewati, acting in 
 concert with the Nizam Ali Khan above alluded to, 
 approached so near Pilibhit as to menace Nuriah, 
 Nuriah. a large village ten miles only from that British 
 military post. 
 
 The force at Pilibhit was commanded by Captain Robert 
 Larkins, 17th Panjab infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjab 
 cavalry under Captain Sam Browne,^ the 17th Panjab infan- 
 try! under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjab pioneers^ under 
 Ensign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kuinaun levies under 
 Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the 
 chief civil officer, Mr. Malcolm Low, considered that 
 men under the Occupation of Niiriah by the rebels was at all 
 homhe*^^ hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly de- 
 
 viiiage. tached a hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one 
 
 hundred 2nd Panjab cavalry, under Lieutenant 
 Craigie, to hold that village, Mr. Low accompanying the party. 
 
 Craigie — who, as senior officer, commanded — reached Nuriah 
 on the 28th of August. On the following morning the rebel 
 chiefs 1 have named came down with three guns, 
 encounters hundred infantry, and a hundred cavalry to 
 
 the rebels, attack the place. Craigie made excellent dispositions 
 to meet them outside the town, and checked their 
 advance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that, when 
 nineteen of their cavalry met in a hand-to-hand encounter a 
 party of the 2nd Panjab cavalry under Risaldar Hakdad Khan, 
 fourteen of the nineteen were killed fighting. This 
 'themt™fau ^(ccurred on the left flank. On the right flank 
 back. Craigie repulsed them in person. They then fell 
 
 back on Sirpurah, three miles distant. 
 
 Larkins, hearing at Pilibhit the enemy’s fire, thought it 
 advisable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed a 
 hundred and fifty 2nd Panjab cavalry, and a hundred 
 
 * Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B. 
 t Now the 25th Native Infantry, 
 i Now the 32nd Native Infantry. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 GALLANTRY OF SAM BROWNE. 
 
 193 
 
 Kumaim levies to proceed at once, under tlie orders 
 of Captain Sam Browne, to Nuriali. Browne set 
 off at once, and reached Niiriah at 4 o’clock that 
 evening. 
 
 He at once reconnoitred the rebel position. It was 
 ground or mound, amid the debris of the ruined 
 village of Sirpurah, separated from Nuriah by an 
 inundated tract of country nearly a mile in width, 
 the inundating water varj^ing from one to two feet, 
 side Browne saw that it was impossible to attack. 
 
 It was possible, however, to assail the position from 
 the other side. The energetic magistrate, Mr. 
 
 Malcolm Low, having procured him guides in the 
 persons of an old woman and a boy, Browne started 
 at midnight to make the detour necessary for the 
 his plan. 
 
 Taking with him two hundred and thirty Panjab cavalry, a 
 hundred and fifty 17th Native Infantry, a hundred 
 24th pioneers, and a hundred Kumaun levies. He gains a 
 Browne worked round the enemy’s right flank, thfirf^rear 
 and by daybreak reached a position on his left rear of the rebels, 
 admirably adapted for his purpose. The fatigue had discovered, 
 been great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to 
 refresh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered 
 him, and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing 
 three 9-pounders to bear on his advance, and posting 
 one on their proper right flank. There was no SvSs. 
 time for further rest, so Browne at once moved 
 forward. 
 
 Covering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict 
 orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed 
 his infantry forward through some grass jungle which served 
 to screen their movements. Very soon, however, 
 the enemy’s guns began to play on his cavalry on ann^iig 
 the left, which were marching on the open road, the advance, 
 Browne, who was with that cavalry, seeing the 
 effect which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards, was. 
 producing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly, 
 and at once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with 
 the gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till 
 the skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy, 
 who attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his 
 
 VOL. y. 0 
 
 Browne is 
 sent to 
 reinforce 
 Craigie. 
 
 on a rising 
 
 Browne 
 
 reconnoitres. 
 
 From that 
 
 and resolves 
 to make a 
 detour and 
 attack the 
 rebels. 
 
 success of 
 
:94 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 and is 
 
 severely 
 
 wounded, 
 
 but gains 
 his point. 
 
 object. He did prevent the working of tbe gnn 
 ThTrgesthe skirmisbers came up and relieved him. In 
 
 gunners, the figbt, however, he was first wounded on the knee; 
 
 immediately afterwards his left arm was severed 
 at the shoulder. As he received this terrible wound, his horse, 
 struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him. Just then 
 the Wirdi-major of his regiment, followed by two or three 
 others, rushed in, and, though the former was 
 severely wounded, they kept the rebels at bay, 
 and saved their commanding officer. Immediately 
 afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted the 
 gunners, and secured the gun which Browne had 
 
 captured.* 
 
 To go back for a moment. Whilst Browne was thus engaging 
 the gunners, the skirmishers had advanced steadily 
 thrSTaSy without firing a shot until close to the position, 
 push on. when a body of the enemy’s infantry lying in the 
 grass jumped up and fired. On this the skirmishers, 
 firing a volley, dashed on, secured the gun, and, aided by the 
 supports and reserve, carried the position. 
 
 The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, pushing on, had, 
 simultaneously with their comrades on the left, 
 d2t of\he Q'llo.cked the enemy’s flank, and captured one gun. 
 rebels. This Completed their discomfiture. They broke 
 and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it was 
 possible to follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their loss 
 had been heavy, amounting to three hundred men killed, 
 their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores. ^ The two 
 rebel leaders escaped, though one of them, Nizam Ali Khan, 
 had been wounded. 
 
 In eastern Oudh, near Allahabad, there were about this time 
 
 * Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war. Mr. 
 Malcolm Low, who was near Browne at the time, considered the daring act of 
 prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading and 
 firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the w^hole action. Sir 
 William Mansfield stated that in his opinion and in that of Sir Colin, the affair 
 was “ very brilliant,” and as “ quite one of the best things we have seen of the 
 sort, the attack by you having been made in a most soldierly manner and 
 secundum artem." Captain Browne received the Victoria Cross for his daring. 
 The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct had 
 already been made, and he had subsequently shown himself as qualified to 
 conduct large operations in tho field as he was willing to risk his life in the 
 cause of duty. 
 
1858.] 
 
 EVENTS IN EASTEEN OUDH. 
 
 195 
 
 Eastern Oudh. 
 
 Surdon is 
 sacked by 
 the rebels. 
 
 A British 
 force is sent 
 under 
 
 Berkeley to 
 clear the 
 district. 
 
 many bold and daring talubdars, tbe men who bad 
 already caused trouble to Longden at Azamgarb, and 
 wbo were at tbis time exerting themselves to tbe utmost to 
 stimulate opposition to tbe British. They went so far, indeed, 
 as to threaten with condign punishment any member of their 
 class who should submit to or accept the friendship of the 
 common enemy. On these threats they acted. Babu Eampar- 
 shad Singh, a talukdar of Suraon who had displayed British 
 sympathies, was attacked by some of these con- 
 federated rebels, who burned his house, sacked the 
 town, and took himself and his family prisoners. 
 
 On the intelligence of this outrage reaching Allaha- 
 bad Lord Canning hastily organised a small force, to be de- 
 signated the Suraon field force, composed of two 
 hundred and sixty of the 32nd foot, eighty of the 
 54th foot, the 7th Panjab infantry, seventy men 
 Brasyer’s Sikhs, fifty-two troopers 6th Madras light 
 cavalry, sixty sabres Labor light horse, detachments 
 of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and 
 mortars, and placed them under the command of Brigadier 
 Berkeley, C.B., with directions to reassert British authority in 
 that part of the country. 
 
 Berkeley crossed the Ganges on the 12th of July, and on the 
 14th came in sight of a body of rebels at Dahain. 
 
 Dahain was not properly a fort. It was rather a 
 large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall 
 and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis. In the centre of 
 the enclosure was a square brick-house. On Berkeley’s approach 
 the rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British to 
 occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition. 
 Berkeley awaited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and then 
 opened fire ; but the result, owing to the dense nature of the 
 jungle, not being satisfactory, he sent on his infautry to storm. 
 The result was entirely successful. About two 
 hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the 
 alone ; as many more, chased through the jungle, 
 were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery. 
 
 Resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the 
 fort of Tirul, seven miles north of Suraon. He found Description 
 this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny ofsur^on. 
 jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions only 
 known to the natives of the place ; and it had walls, bastions, 
 
 0 2 
 
 rB+pb is captured 
 alien by Berkeley. 
 
196 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1855 
 
 Under 
 
 pressure 
 
 ditches, escarps, like a miniature fortress, with a stronghold in 
 the centre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely 
 pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, hut the 
 walls were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle 
 around that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of 
 the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to em- 
 ploy his mortars and a 24-pounder before sending 
 in his infantry. This plan succeeded. The enemy evacuated 
 the place during the night, leaving behind them 
 Sacuat^eU. their three guns and their gun-ammunition. The 
 fort was then destroyed. 
 
 By a somewhat similar train of operations, Berkeley captured 
 and destroyed a fort at Bhairpur. Having thus completed the 
 work entrusted to him, he returned with his field 
 force to Allahabad. After a brief interval, he was 
 again sent out to demolish other forts in Oudh 
 at distances accessible from Allahabad. In this 
 manner he extended his force as far as Partab- 
 garh. Pushing on, then, to Sultanpur, he touched 
 Hope Grant’s force, and they united the line 
 of posts direct from Allahabad to Lakhnao. 
 
 The force under Eowcroft, and the Pearl brigade acting with 
 Rowcroft’s lender Captain Sotheby, whom we left at Amorha 
 for^^and^ at the end of April, had fallen back on Captainganj. 
 
 In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting. 
 On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, 
 led by Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Tumour, 
 and some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym, marched on 
 Amorha, where, it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husen had 
 arrived in force. Cox divided his detachments into two parts ; 
 one led by himself, the other — to which were attached the 
 sailors and marines — by Major J. F. Eichardson. Setting out at 
 2 o’clock in the morning, and arriving at daybreak within a 
 mile of Amorha, they were suddenly met by a 
 heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. 
 Pym and the marines drove these in : Cox then 
 opened fire with his guns. Then, foiling an attempt 
 made to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place. 
 
 Nine days later a larger detachment of Eowcroft’s force again 
 and HarM attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four 
 thousand men at Harha, and inflicted on him a 
 defeat so crushing that he fled from that part of the country. 
 
 Berkeley 
 clears the 
 forts of Oudh 
 as far as 
 Partdbgarh, 
 
 and touches 
 Hope Grant’s 
 force at 
 Sultdnpur. 
 
 the Pearl 
 brigade 
 
 defeat the 
 r^ebels at 
 Amorha 
 
1858.] 
 
 EVELEGH DEFEATS THE REBELS. 
 
 197 
 
 A little later Eowcroft moved with his force to Hir, Rowcroft 
 in the Gorakpiir district, to guard the frontier until 
 the advance of Sir Hope Grant in force should sweep Hfr. 
 the districts below him. 
 
 Isolated actions in the more western part of the province 
 produced results not less beneficial. It happened 
 that on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance 
 of the force of the rebel Firuzshah, attacked the Mohan, 
 station of Mohan, on the river Sai, seventeen miles 
 from Lakhnao on the road to Fathgarh. Mohan was one of the 
 places in which British rule had been re-established, and was at 
 the time the head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the 
 district, Mr. Pat Carnegy, already mentioned in these pages.* 
 At Mr. Carnegy’s disposal was a native police battalion. The 
 river Sai, close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge. On the 
 evening of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, num- 
 bering two hundred infantry and a hundred and fifty cavalry — 
 the advance guard of a larger force — drove in the police pickets, 
 crossed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the 
 town the following morning. 
 
 Information of this attack reached Colonel Evelegh, C.B., 
 commanding at Nawabganj, at 5 o’clock on the 
 morning of the 8th. An hour later Evelegh set off marches 
 with three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two ^hem^^ 
 horse-artillery guns, twenty-five gunners mounted to 
 support the guns, and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot, 
 mounted on limbers, and reached a point three miles from 
 Mohan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance 
 the rebels would acquire information of his approach, Evelegh 
 turned off from that point to the village of Husenganj — a village 
 between Mohan and Rasulabad, the general headquarters of 
 Firuzshah, and the occupation of which would cut the rebels’ 
 line of retreat. His foresight was justified; for, on coming 
 within a mile of Husenganj, he perceived the rebels falling back 
 on that place from Mohan. He immediately pur- 
 sued them with his small force, but, finding that his 
 guns could not travel fast enough to overtake them, 
 he pushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was 
 satisfactory. Godby laid low forty-five of the rebels and cap- 
 
 ♦ Vol. IV page 237 
 
THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 198 
 
 [185g. 
 
 tured their only gun, a brass 3-pounder, together with one 
 elephant and two camels.* 
 
 Nearer to Lakhnao, between the Eohilkhand frontier and that 
 city, a gallant deed performed by the Kavanagh whose immortal 
 heroism was recorded in the last volume,']’ tended greatly to the 
 pacification of the district in which it occurred. 
 
 Of the district of Maliabad, twelve miles north-west of the 
 capital, Mr. Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioner., 
 and Dawson Eighteen miles further to the north-west, lay the 
 SandeM town of Sandela, occupied chiefly by Pa than s, possess- 
 ing many brick-built houses and a small mud fort, and 
 situated in a level plain. The Pathans of this place had dis- 
 played a determined hostility to the British, and had lost no 
 opportunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their com- 
 munications. It occurred to Kavanagh, a daring man, fertile 
 in resources and full of the love of adventure, that it would be 
 possible to put an end to these excesses by the capture of the 
 town. He proposed, therefore, to Captain Dawson, commanding 
 one of the new police levies, to attack Sandela. Daws m 
 agreeing, they stormed the place on the 30th of July, and drove 
 out the rebels. Thenceforward the town remained in the 
 occupation of the British. Kavanagh displayed great daring on 
 this occasion. Nor was his tact inferior to his courage. By a 
 ready display of that quality, he won over several zamindars 
 to the British cause, and even engaged them to maintain 
 a number of matchlockmen at their own expense for its 
 support. 
 
 The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so far down as Alla- 
 habad, required during these three months of July, 
 banks'of'the September, very close watching. They 
 
 Ganges. were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom 
 pillaged the villages in Oudh ; others, crossing the 
 river, attacked and plundered those in British territory. To 
 remedy this evil, river steamers were employed during the 
 rainy season, when the river was navigable. On one occasion^ 
 towards the end of July, information having reached the au- 
 thorities that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, 
 whenever a favourable opportunity should offer, to cross inta 
 
 * This action had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts- 
 of Unao and Malaun. 
 t Vol. IV. page 116. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE REBELS ATTACK SANDELI. 
 
 199 
 
 British territory, a force of a hundred and twenty Sikhs and 
 two guns were despatched in a steamer to destroy the boats. 
 They did destroy some twenty boats, but the forts which the 
 rebels occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked. 
 The expedition against these was deferred, but on several oc- 
 casions in August and September small detachments were sent 
 up the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and 
 in most cases this object was accomplished. 
 
 At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September 
 1858, the position occupied by the British in Oudh 
 was very peculiar. They held a belt of country in Oudh 
 right across the centre of the province, from east to the'reb^is^^ 
 west ; whilst the districts north and south of that 
 belt were either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by 
 them. North of the belt were the Begam, Mamu Khan, Firuz- 
 shah, Narpat Singh, and leaders less notorious, with their 
 followers ; south of it were Beni Madhu, Hanmant Singh, 
 Harichand, and others. Besides these, in the north-eastern 
 corner of the province, near the Nipal frontier, Nana Sahib and 
 his adherents were believed to be actively intriguing. 
 
 In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of 
 troops again possible. The rebels were the first to 
 take advantage of the change of season. On the 
 third of October Harichand, with six thousand men SandeM, 
 and eight guns, crossed the Gumti ten miles north 
 of Sandela. His force, increased by the junction of several 
 zamindars and their following to twelve thousand men and 
 twelve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the 
 morning of the 4th. Sandela was occupied by the Captain 
 Dawson already spoken of, with his newly-raised 
 police battalions and other infantry levies, fourteen are held in 
 hundred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry Dawson, 
 levies. On the approach of the rebels in such over- 
 whelming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud 
 fort, and sent his cavalry to Maliabad. He kept the rebels at 
 bay till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a 
 detachment of the 88th foot, two 9-pounder guns, by MayS, 
 two 2J-inch mortars, two hundred and fifty police 
 cavalry, and six hundred police foot, joined him, taking up the 
 five hundred cavalry on the way. Maynard at once attacked 
 the rebels and drove them to Panu, about four miles distant, 
 where they took up a very strong position. On the evening of 
 
200 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 tlie 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sandela with a strong 
 column,* attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, 
 after a desperate battle, completely defeated them. His loss, 
 and com however, was severe, being eighty-two of all ranks 
 
 pletely killed and wounded. Major Seymour, Queen’s Bays, 
 
 B^rker*^ Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death 
 with talwars when in the thick of the fight, and 
 Seymour^ Lieutenant Green, of the Kifle Brigade, who received 
 of Maynard thirteen wounds, including the loss of his left arm 
 and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distin- 
 of Green. guished themselves on tMs occasion. The rebels 
 lost a large number of men, especially in the pursuit, which 
 promptly followed on the victory. A few days later, after a 
 hard day’s fight, accompanied by manj casualties, the victors 
 stormed the fort of Birwah. 
 
 About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Evelegh 
 defeated the rebels at Mianganj, between Lakhnao 
 Successes of ^^d Kanhpur, took two guns, and placed about two 
 and Saton. hundred of them hors de combat ; and on the 8th 
 Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by 
 intercepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near 
 Shahjahanpur, killing three hundred of them and taking three 
 guns. The same day an attack upon Powain was repulsed by 
 the Eajah of that place, with trifling loss. 
 
 These were the small actions which indicated the re-opening 
 of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which 
 LordC^iyde’s Commander-in-Chief, now become Lord Clyde, 
 pacmcation had drawn up during his stay at Allahabad, came 
 into operation only on the 15th of October. This 
 plan was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all 
 the districts simultaneously, so that, driven out of one district, 
 the rebels might not be able, as they had pre\ iously, to take 
 refuge in another. Thus, by Lord Clyde’s plan, one column 
 was drawn from Kohilkhand for operations in the north-west of 
 Oudh, clearing Mohamdi, Naiirangabad, and similar 
 places of importance, and proceeding then to esta- 
 blish itself at Sitapur. For operations in the Baiswara country, 
 four brigades were detailed. Another column was posted to 
 
 * Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen’s Bays, six hundred and seventy 
 native cavalry sabres, two hundred and fifty 88th Foot, one hundred 3rd battalion 
 Kifle Brigade, nine hundred police battalion. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE WINTER CAMPAIGN BEGINS. 
 
 201 
 
 guard the Duab ; another to guard the Kanhpur road ; whilst 
 other smaller columns, starting from Lakhnao, Nawahganj, Dar- 
 yahad, and Faizabad, were ordered to be kept movable. 
 
 The reader will at once conceive the general purport of the 
 plan. The brigades detailed for duty in the Bais- 
 wara country would occupy the whole of the Faiza- 
 bad district between the Ganges and the Ghaghra. detail. 
 Pushing then northward, they would reconquer the 
 country between the Ghaghra and the Rapti, holding out a 
 hand to Rowcroft’s force, on their right, in the Gorakhpur 
 district. Simultaneously the Rohilkhand force would reconquer 
 Sitapur and the places in the Khairabad division. Then, with 
 his right firmly fixed, as a pivot, at Balrampur and a point 
 beyond the Rapti, Lord Clyde would wheel his main force round 
 to the right till its left point should touch the Rohilkhand 
 column, when the whole, sweeping onwards, would clear the 
 northernmost parts of the province, and drive the surviving 
 rebels, who should refuse to surrender, into the jungles of the 
 kingdom of Nipal. 
 
 On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde despatched instructions 
 in the same spirit to Sir Hope Grant. That officer 
 was directed, in co-operation with Brigadiers Pinck- se?t^to*H<f^ 
 ney and Wetherall, to make a circuit, moving up the Grant, 
 Gumti as far as Jagdispur, then, turning sharp to his 
 left and moving^ southward by Jais, place himself between Par- 
 shadapur and Amethi, dispersing any rebels on his way. The 
 brigadiers mentioned received at the same time detailed in- 
 structions as to their action, so as to make it co-operate with 
 Sir Hope’s movement, and thus ensure the success of the general 
 plan. 
 
 Hope Grant, in obedience to these instructions, started im- 
 mediately, arranging with Brigadier Wetherall, 
 who was marching up from Sariam to join him on ScS on 
 the 4th of November, and attack the fort of Rampur 
 Kasia, held by an active partisan named Ram 
 Ghulam Singh. But Wetherall, reaching the vicinity of 
 Rampur Kasia on the morning of the 3rd, resolved, despite of 
 the orders he had received to wait for Sir Hope, to assail the 
 place at once. Fortune greatly favoui ed him. Rampur Kasia 
 was in very deed a stronghold. Its outer fortifications, formed 
 of mud ramparts, had a circumference of three miles. Within 
 this area, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle, 
 
202 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Wetherall 
 lights upon 
 an unguarded 
 point and 
 takes the 
 place. 
 
 another fort, and within this again a stone building. 
 So much for the interior. But beyond, and sur- 
 ofth”piacl rounding the outer ramparts, there was again a 
 dense jungle in every direction save in that of the 
 north-west ; and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis. 
 The ditch was deep but narrow, and there were rifle-pits in the 
 part which, in fortification, would correspond to the berme.* 
 It happened, however, that on one side the ditch and ramparts 
 had not, for a very small space, been completed, and 
 it fortunately happened that Wetherall lighted on 
 this particular spot. At any other point he would 
 certainly have been repulsed, but at this he eff’ected 
 an entrance, and carried the place and its twenty- 
 three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed 
 and wounded. The rebels lost about three hundred men. 
 
 Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall’s success on the afternoon 
 of the 3rd. He at once joined him at Eampiir Kasia. Thence, 
 
 AmetM pursuance of his instructions, he proceeded to 
 
 su^ounded Amethi. This fort likewise was almost covered by 
 Sitigh garrisoned by four thousand men, 
 
 fifteen hundred of them Sipahis, and thirty guns. 
 Grant arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at 
 2 o’clock on the afternoon of the 7th of November. A recon- 
 naissance, promptly made, assured him that the rebels were 
 bent on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he 
 found a messenger from Lord Clyde, stating that he was 
 encamped three miles to the east of the fort. The 
 Commander-in-Chief, in effect, having failed to 
 induce the Kajah of Amethi to come to terms, had 
 marched from Partabgarh on the 6th, to bring him 
 This active measure succeeded. The Eajah rode 
 into camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submis- 
 sion, yielding his stronghold. 
 
 Amethi taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde, 
 proceeded to Shankarpiir to attack it from the north, 
 whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on 
 the east and south, and Evelegh on the west. In 
 performing his part of the combined movement, 
 Evelegh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of 
 the rebels. He defeated these on the 8th at Moramau, and on 
 
 surrenders 
 to Lord 
 Clyde. 
 
 to reason. 
 
 Shankarpur 
 is invested 
 on three 
 sides. 
 
 Sir Hope Grant’s Incidents in the Sepoy War. 
 
1858.] ImETHI SUKRENPERS TO LORD CLYDE. 
 
 203 
 
 the 9th he took the fort of Simri, hut these operations so delayed 
 him that he "^as unable to arrive in time to take up a position 
 to cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpur and his 
 followers. 
 
 The chief was no other than Beni Madhu, and he had with 
 him a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief, anxious to avoid blood- su^reis, 
 shed, had offered him veiy favourable terms if he 
 would surrender. Beni Madhu had returned the proud reply 
 that he would yield his fort as he could not defend 
 it, but that he would not yield himself as he 
 belonged to his King ! That night he and his 
 followers evacuated the fort by its uninvested face. 
 
 Not, however, with the freedom from molestation 
 they had hoped for. Fleeing hastily to Dundia 
 Kb era, they were encountered on the way by Evelegh, 
 and defeated, with the loss of three of their guns. 
 
 Shankarpur was at once occupied by Grant, who then marched 
 on the Ghaghra, which he crossed in face of the 
 rebels, led by the Rajah of Gondah and Mehndi Converging 
 Husen, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy of Grant, 
 twenty-four miles, and captured four guns. March- 
 ing thence towards Rai Bareli, he beat the rebels again at 
 Machhligaon on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached 
 the fort of Banhasia, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th, 
 Gondah on the 9th, and Balrampiir on the 16th. Lord Clyde, 
 meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by 
 Beni Madhu, took Evelegh’s brigade with him, ^ 
 
 marched on Dundia Khera, and attacked and completely defeated 
 that chief on the 24th of November, taking all his guns. Beni 
 Madhu, howmver, escaped. The other columns had 
 by this time formed a complete cordon round the 
 circumference of eastern Oudh. They now closed columns, 
 in, and inarching from their different points of 
 departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole terri- 
 tory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and re-establishing the 
 civil power as they advanced. 
 
 Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Bareli column, 
 commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts 
 to bring about a similar result on the western side. 
 
 Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of 
 October, Troup advanced on Sitapiir, dispersed the talukdars 
 
 but Beni 
 
 Madhu 
 
 escapes, 
 
 and is 
 
 encountered 
 and beaten 
 by Evelegh 
 on his 
 retreat. 
 
204 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 takes u Its attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of 
 
 posfuon^in^ that place, captured Mithauli on the 8th, and gave 
 ingiinT^^^' ^ final defeat to the rebels at Mehndi on the 18 th of 
 * ’ November. Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon, 
 
 and sweeps Carmichael, and Horsford, were engaged in clearing 
 chiefs the country south of the Ghaghra, and before these 
 
 e ore 1 . irreconcilable chiefs, men of the stamp of Beni 
 
 Madhu, and Beni Madhu himself, fell back. 
 
 Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balrampur on thg 16th 
 of December. There he learned that Bala Kao, 
 brother of Nana Sahib, had taken refuge in the fort 
 Rowcroft,! of Tulsipur, twelve miles distant, with a number of 
 followers and eight guns, and that he had been 
 joined there by Muhammad Husen and his adherents. Grant 
 at once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hir, 
 and, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack 
 Tulsipur. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn 
 up to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could 
 not pursue them from want of cavalry. Hope Grant, fearing 
 lest the rebels should escape into the Gorakhpur country, then 
 took up the pursuit himself, and, cutting off Bala 
 Rao from Gorakhpur, ascertained that he had 
 into Nip^i. retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns 
 along the margins of the jungle to a place near 
 Kandakot, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence 
 of two rivers. Manoeuvring with great skill, and placing his 
 columns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but 
 Nipal was impossible. Grant moved against them on the 4th of 
 January, 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all 
 their guns. 
 
 Whilst Grant was thus engaged. Lord Clyde, sending Evelegh 
 to the west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country 
 from the points occupied by his troops, towards the 
 On his SI e, frontier. Moving on to Sikrora, with Grant’s 
 
 force forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft’s 
 force on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the 
 pivot. Lord Clyde drove the Begam and Nana Sahib 
 before him from Bondi and Bahraitch ; then ad- 
 vancing on Nanpara, cleared the country between it 
 and the Ghaghra; then marching on Banki, close 
 to the Nipal frontier, he surprised the camp of the 
 rebels, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them 
 
 Lord Clyde 
 sweeps the 
 remaining 
 rebels into 
 Nipdl. 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE NIPIl frontier. 
 
 205 
 
 into Nipal. This action and that of Hope Grant at Tdlsipur, 
 referred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared Oudh of the 
 last remnants of the rebels. Sir William Mansfield 
 wrote that he considered the mutiny crushed out, 
 and Lord Clyde, sharing that opinion, left the 
 province under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, command to 
 instructing him to keep the frontier of the border 
 of Nipal closely shut up, so as to prevent, if pos- 
 sible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country. 
 
 The spirit, however, which had animated the rebel 
 chieftains to sustain against the British a struggle S^th?r”bei8 
 which, during six months at least, had offered not 
 a single ray of success, was not entirely extin- 
 guished. 
 
 Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander-in-Chief, 
 proceeded to join Brigadier Horsford’s force on the Rapti. An 
 incident had occurred just before his arrival, which ^ ^ 
 showed the great care required in attempting to fording 
 ford Indian rivers. Horsford had driven a strong; ipdiau 
 rebel force across that river, and, in fording it in 
 pursuit of them, many men of the 7th Hussars and the 1st 
 Panjab cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current 
 and lost. Amongst these was Major Home, of the 7th Hussars. 
 After some search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his 
 hands having a fast grip of two of the rebels, whilst the bodies 
 of two troopers who perished with him were found, each with 
 his hands clutching a rebel sawar ! * 
 
 From one side only, from the side of Nipal, was further 
 danger to be apprehended. On this side the frontier 
 had a length of about a hundred miles, formed of 
 mixed hill and jungle ; and with such a frontier it 
 was always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both 
 sides, the strictest precautions would be evaded. 
 
 At this crisis the real ruler of Nipal, the Maharajah Jang 
 Bahadur, behaved with the loyalty that had 
 throughout characterised his dealings with the 
 British. Not only did he inform the armed rebels Bahadur, 
 who had crossed the border that he would afford 
 them no protection, but he allowed British troops to cross the 
 border to disarm any considerable body there assembled. Under 
 
 Grant’s Incidents in the Sepoy TFar. 
 
206 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 A few more 
 hardened 
 
 this permission, Brigadier Horsford, early in the year, entered 
 the Sonar valley, and, crossing the Eapti at Sidonia Ghat, came 
 upon a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns ; and, later 
 Gradual Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender 
 
 dispersion of of six guns, after having chased the rebels with 
 the rebels. great loss Under the hills. Under the pressure thus 
 exercised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into 
 Nipal, one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their 
 homes, trusting they would be allowed to settle down un- 
 molested. 
 
 A few, more hardened in crime, and therefore more hopeless 
 of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of 
 these — the regiments which had perpetrated the 
 Kahnpiir massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th 
 Native Infantry, led by Gujadar Singh, a rebel whose hate to 
 the British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when 
 fighting against them — succeeded in crossing the border, in 
 invade Oudh ^^^^hing on Siki’ora, and filching thence two 
 elephants, and finally, when pursued from that 
 place by Colonel Walker and the Queen’s Bays, with two guns, 
 in taking up a position at Bangaon, a small dilapidated fort on 
 the river Nadi, at the entrance of the Ghungle jungles. There, 
 at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced 
 by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 
 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated 
 them. 
 
 Notwithstanding that the hot weather had set in. Sir Hope 
 Grant deemed it of pressing importance to drive the 
 remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning 
 that the last remnant of their disorganised forces 
 was at the Serwa pass. Grant moved against them 
 in person, dislodged them by a turning movement, 
 and then pursued them across the hills. The pur- 
 suit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion 
 to which the rebels had been reduced. Without 
 food and without arms, without money and without 
 artillery — for they lost here their last two guns — 
 they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, 
 and Grant contented himself with posting troops at different 
 points along the frontier as a precautionary measure. His only 
 regret now was that Nana Sahib and his brother Bala Rao 
 had found refuge in Nipal. To the very last the former had been 
 
 and are 
 defeated. 
 
 Grant 
 drives the 
 remainder 
 of the 
 rebels from 
 the jungles. 
 
 State of 
 destitution 
 to which 
 they had 
 been reduced. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 OUDH FINALLY AT PEACE. 
 
 207 
 
 defiant and daring as became his assumed position. Bala Eao, 
 on the other hand, had expressed penitence, and denied partici- 
 pation in the Kanhpur massacre. 
 
 At last, then, Oudh was at peace. The province had become 
 British by a right far more solid and defensible than 
 the pretext under which it had been seized in 1856. 
 
 Then, the country of the ruler who had ever been British, 
 true to his British overlord was, in disregard of 
 treaty, seized in the dead of the night, against the wishes alike 
 of the sovereign and the people. Fifteen months’ 
 experience of British rule, administered by doctrin- 
 aires who preferred the enforcement of their own title, 
 theories to considerations of justice and policy, far 
 from reconciling the people to their new master, had caused 
 them to regret the sovereigns whom the British had expelled 
 because of their misgovernment of that very people. They 
 hailed, then, the opportunity, ingeniously fomented 
 by the more influential of their countrymen, which quence?' 
 seemed to promise them a relief from regulations 
 which perplexed and from changes which irritated them. They 
 joined in the revolt inaugurated by their brethren the Sipahis 
 — the majority of them Oudh men — and fought for independence. 
 How pertinaciously they waged the contest has been told in 
 these pages. No other part of India gave an example of a 
 resistance so determined, so prolonged, as did Oudh. Through- 
 out the struggle, the sense of the injustice perpetrated in 1856 
 steeled the hearts of its people and strengthened their resolution. 
 If on some occasion they too precipitately fled, it was in the 
 hope of renewing the struggle with some chance of success 
 another day. When, finally, the sweep made over Oudh by 
 Lord Clyde forced the remnant of the fighting class to take 
 refuge in the jungles of Nipal, the survivors often preferred 
 starvation to surrender.* The agricultural popu- 
 lation, the talukdars, the landowners, the traders, SS better, 
 accepted the defeat when, after that long struggle, 
 they felt that it was final. Thenceforward Great Britain 
 
 * “ Further on,” wrote Sir Hope Grant, describing his last pursuit, “ we dis- 
 covered two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their 
 wounds and from starvation. It was sad to see many of the poor wives of the 
 Sipahis, who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the 
 bare ground,” and more to the same effect. 
 
208 
 
 THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 possessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had 
 set up in 1856, the title of conquest. She holds it now on a 
 that of the ^^sis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a 
 post-mMtmY people whom she has conciliated, and of a territorial 
 be8t°of aiL aristocracy whose rights, whilst defining, and in some 
 
 instances curtailing, she had made inalienable. 
 
1857 .] 
 
 THE PANJIb and THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 209 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE PANJAB AND THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 Before proceeding to recount the other great military measure 
 with which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary 
 that I should ask the reader to accompany me to the Pan-^b 
 Panjab to see how the fall of Dehli, made possible by a j . 
 the noble self-denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border 
 province. From the Panjab the reader will return through the 
 pacified provinces of the north-west to Agra, in close vicinity 
 to that Gwaliar but just reconquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In 
 the succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode 
 in the history — the pursuit, from many starting points and by 
 many independent columns, of the famous Tantia Topi. 
 
 The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the 
 end of July 1857 to denude the Panjab of troops in 
 order to reinforce General Wilson’s army before LawrSice’s 
 Dehli, had not been formed without most serious position 
 and anxious consideration. On the one side, he had gepTeSber 
 had before him General Wilson’s letter announcing i857. 
 that unless he were reinforced from the Panjab he 
 would not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault 
 the city ; and the jnner certainty that if General Wilson were 
 to raise the siege of Dehli the Panjab would rise in insurrection. 
 On the other, he had the knowledge that the efiective force of 
 Europeans at his disposal, including the sick and convalescent, 
 but not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed 
 four thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient 
 to maintain order in the Panjab, even whilst the general feeling 
 of the Panjabis should remain loyal; most insufficient should a 
 striking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of 
 Dehli, turn the Punjabis against him. He had before him, in 
 fact, a choice of two risks — the risk of a general rising in th ,0 
 Panjab, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced 
 ki the minds of the Panjabis by a retreat from Dehlf ; and the 
 TOL. V. p 
 
THE PANJIB and THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 210 
 
 [ 1857 . 
 
 Comparison 
 of the two 
 risks, one of 
 
 risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjab had 
 been denuded of British. 
 
 Of the two risks, the second was undoubtedly really the 
 lesser. To a nervous man, to a man fearing re- 
 sponsibility, however, the second risk would present 
 dangers affecting to such a degree his position, that 
 Siged^to^^ he would certainly shrink from incurring them. A 
 run. man of that stamp, charged with maintaining British 
 
 rule beyond the Satlaj, would have argued that his 
 primary duty was to protect the Panjab, and that he dare not, 
 for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehli, risk 
 the safety of that province. “ True,” he would have said, “ true 
 it is that, if the march of Nicholson’s column enable Wilson to 
 take Dehli, our situation will be ameliorated. But Wilson 
 might be repulsed ; Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss-up 
 whether he will succeed or whether he will fail. And, if he 
 fail, the situation of the Panjab without Nicholson’s column 
 will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it. 
 
 Everything, then, depends upon a very doubtful ‘ if ’ ; 
 and, responsible for the Panjab as I am, I dare not 
 incur the risk.” But Sir John was not a nervous man, 
 and he had no fear of responsibility. He saw 
 clearly that the one chance of preventing the further 
 spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart. That 
 heart palpitated at Dehli. Every risk, then, which strengthened 
 the blow to be struck at Dehli was a prelude to safety. 
 
 How Nicholson’s column successfully worked out the great 
 result aimed at has been already recorded in these pages. Dehli 
 fell. But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the 
 other risk of which I have spoken. Nicholson’s 
 departure at the end of July had left in the Panjab 
 about four thousand European troops, including 
 those sick and convalescent. Of these, three regi- 
 ments were in the Peshawar valley, but so reduced 
 by sickness, that for the active work of a campaign they could 
 not muster more than a thousand bayonets ; one regiment, the 
 24th, held Labor; one, sent from Sindh, held 
 Multan and Firuzpur; another furnished detach- 
 ments to hold Eawalpindi, Amritsar, and Jalandhar. 
 Sir John at once made preparations to meet the 
 new situation. He first formed a movable column. 
 For this pui’pose he drew from the 24th Foot from 
 
 Reasons for 
 his decision 
 in favour of 
 the bolder 
 policy. 
 
 The Panjab 
 when 
 Nicholson 
 left it at the 
 end of July. 
 
 How Sir 
 Jobn pre- 
 pared to 
 encounter 
 the possible 
 evlL 
 
1857.] 
 
 DISAFFECTION IN HAZIkAH. 
 
 211 
 
 two to three hundred men, and joined with them four hundred 
 Panjab infantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded 
 to being required for the purpose of watching, as at Peshawar, 
 the frontier, and elsewhere, the disarmed native troops, eighteen 
 thousand strong, this column really constituted the only force 
 which could he used in the event of an insurrection provoked by 
 the hopes which the march of Nicholson’s column might inspire 
 in the minds of the disaffected. 
 
 The doubts which Sir John Lawrence had entertained re- 
 garding a prolonged continuation of the loyalty of 
 the Panjabis were quickly justified. Nicholson had in the lower 
 crossed the Satlaj on the 30th of July. Early in 
 September it was discovered that the inhabitants of 
 the lower Hazarah country had conspired to revolt. Mostly 
 Muhammadans, the people of that tract and of the adjoining 
 hills had been tempted by the long successful resistance of 
 Dehli to plot the downfall of their English masters. They had 
 evidently been close observers of the state of affairs, for they 
 had arranged that their continued loyalty should depend on 
 the turn affairs should take at Dehli. If that royal city 
 should not fall before the 10th of September, on that day 
 they would revolt. 
 
 In this case to be forewarned was suificient. Lady Lawrence, 
 who was then at the hill station at Marri, received 
 the first intimation of the intended revolt. She J^^jJgcovered 
 quickly entered into communication with Mr. and baffled. 
 Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Rawalpindi. 
 
 That gentleman concerted at once with the other officials to 
 baffle the conspirators. In a few hours their leaders were 
 arrested, and the plot was thus nipped in the bud. 
 
 A few weeks later, a conspiracy of a similar nature actually 
 came to a head in the country between Labor and 
 Multan. On the evening of the 14th of September, ^'fcouMry 
 the very day on which the assault of Dehli was ^S^^d 
 delivered, a Muhammadan official of the postal de- Muiun. 
 partment arrived at Labor from Gughaira, and, 
 making his way to Sir John Lawrence, reported “ with some- 
 what of a malicious twinkle of the eye,”* that all the wild 
 tribes inhabiting the jungle country between Labor and Multan 
 had risen. Questioned further, he declared that the insurgents 
 
 p 2 
 
 * Fdnjah Military Report, page 16. 
 
212 
 
 THE PANJAB AND THE NOKTH-WEST. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Sir John 
 meets 
 
 and sup- 
 presses it. 
 
 Dumbered a hundred and twenty-five thousand. Though Sir 
 John knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, yet, well 
 aware of the wild and reckless character of the tribes, to whom 
 the tale referred, he felt certain that a rising of a formidable 
 character had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which 
 it was necessary to take prompt and decided action. Within 
 three hours, then, of the receipt of the message, he 
 had despatched one company of European infantry, 
 two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns to the 
 headquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, 
 cotally inadequate to deal with any large body of rebels, the 
 celerity with which it had been organised and despatched 
 tompensated for every disadvantage. The very rumour of its 
 advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at 
 once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles 
 which formed their normal habitation. Their re- 
 treat did not in the least relax Sir John’s endeavours to crush 
 them. He sent reinforcement after reiuforcement to his small 
 column, and very speedily ensured the submission of the dis- 
 affected tribes. 
 
 This was the last attempt made by any portion of the 
 Thenceforth pop^^-l^fion of the Panjab to rise in revolt. The fall 
 order^^ ’ of Dehli occuiTed about the same time to convince 
 th^Pa^db most disaffected that the star of England 
 
 was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that 
 followed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The 
 relief of Lakhnao, the capture of that place, followed by the 
 reconquest of Eohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir 
 Hugh Rose’s splendid campaign in Central India, came as proof 
 upon proof that the power which had won India was resolved 
 to maintain it. In the latter half of the year 1858 
 one or two disturbances occurred which, by their 
 exception to the general rule and by their easy 
 suppression, served to prove the real tranquillity of the province. 
 
 In July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjab infantry, stationed 
 at Dera Ishmail Khan on the Indus, planned a 
 mutiny. The portion referred to was composed of 
 Sikhs, known as the Malwai Sikhs, and numbered 
 about a hundred. For some cause unknown they 
 proposed, it was said, to murder their officers, 
 to seize the magazine and the fort, and to re-arm the 39th 
 egiment native infantry, which had been disarmed some time 
 
 is disturbed 
 but slightly. 
 
 First at 
 Der^ Ishmail 
 Khdn. 
 
1858.] DISTUKBANCES AT DEE V iS M 'iL KHAN. 213 
 
 previously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was 
 discovered. Major Gardiner of the 18th Panjab native 
 infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, pro- 
 oeeded at 10 o’clock in the evening of that day, oLdiner. 
 to the lines of the regiment and summoned two of 
 the Malwais. One, a Sipahi, came out at once, when Major 
 Gardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he 
 ran off, pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the 
 guard had reached him a Malwai Jamadar rushed out, cut down 
 one man and wounded another, and fled with the Sipahi. A 
 few days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which 
 they had been the ringleaders, was suppressed. 
 
 At Multan an attempt made, the following month, to dispose 
 quietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded 
 regiments, terminated in bloodshed. At that station 
 there were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native 
 troop of horse artillery. These men were a source of great 
 embarrassment to the authorities, for it was con- 
 sidered unsafe to re-arm them; whilst, disarmed, mTilTcaustd 
 they required European troops to guard them. It authoritiea 
 was resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by there by the 
 fractions, and allow them to depart quietly to their ^egi^nts 
 homes. The Sipahis acquiesced in the decision when 
 the decision was made known to them. Subsequently, however, 
 they conceived the impression that it was intended to attack and 
 destroy them piecemeal on their way home. Imbued with this 
 idea, they rose in revolt. When the mid-day gun fired on the 31st 
 of August, they seized clubs and whatever else they 
 could find in the shape of weapons, and rushed to which, under 
 attack the European and Sikh troops. Those troops skmSr^' 
 consisted of a hundred and seventy artillerymen, a they are 
 wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, the 11th Panjab m^iSlcrel^ 
 Infantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry. The men rise in 
 of this small force who happened to be on guard 
 were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to 
 death with clubs. Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay 
 Fusiliers, who came up at the moment, was dragged from his 
 horse and killed in the same manner. As soon, however, as the 
 bulk of the Europeans and Panjabis realised the 
 state of affairs, they came up in strength, and of the rCTo?t. 
 showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th 
 Panjabis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack. 
 
214 
 
 THE PANJAb and THE NOKTH-WEST. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Of tlie thirteen hundred men who made it, few lived to return 
 to their na'tive land. 
 
 Passing 
 
 The reader 
 traverses 
 the loyal 
 Cis-Satlaj 
 states 
 
 Dehlf 
 
 districts, 
 
 to Itdwah. 
 
 downwards through the territories of the loyal 
 chieftains of the Cis-Satlaj states — of the Eajah of 
 Patiala, who, at the very outset, cast in his lot with 
 the British, protected the stations of Amhalah and 
 Karnal when the British army marched on Dehli, 
 guarded the grand trunk road from Karnal to Philur, 
 co-operated with Van Cortlandt in Hisar, and maintained a 
 contingent of five thousand troops for service with the British ; 
 
 of the Eajah of Jhmd, who, emulating his brother 
 and the Eajah in loyalty, left his own country undefended 
 to march against Dehli, and in many other ways 
 rendered assistance to the good cause ; and of the 
 Eajah of Nahha, who aided in holding Lodiana, supplied an 
 escort for the siege-train, gallantly opposed the Jalandhar 
 mutineers, and performed various other excellent services — the 
 reader will traverse the pacified Dehh territory till 
 he reaches the district of Itawah. Here he will 
 make a short sojourn before proceeding to Agra. 
 
 The Itawah district had, in common with other districts in 
 the Jamnah Duab, been included in the brigade 
 command assigned to Sir Thomas Seaton.* The 
 attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more 
 constantly directed to the side of Eohilkhand than to the more 
 peaceful districts to the south of him. In those districts he 
 had restored order and had generally re-established the civil 
 administration. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance 
 in them arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from 
 the country west of the Jamnah endeavouring to restore the 
 fortunes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little- 
 guarded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the 
 Itawah district. 
 
 The defeat of Sindhia’s rebellious troops at Gwaliar by Sir 
 Hugh Eose had let loose on the country a number 
 by'Sbeis of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the 
 the^amnS sought refuge in the ravines of the 
 
 Jamnah. Prominent among these was an adventurer 
 named Eiip Singh. This man, followed by a few soldiers of the 
 regular Gwaliar contingent, a certain number of the fugitives 
 
 * Vol. IV. page 218. 
 
1858.] DISTURBANCES IN THE ITIwAH DISTRICT. 215 
 
 of Sindhia’s army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamnah and 
 made his appearance at Ajitmal, twenty-five miles from Itawah, 
 in the month of July. Though he was routed by a force sent 
 from Itawah and forced to fiee, he did not abandon the district. 
 And, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated 
 by similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivalled 
 him in his endeavours to harass and plunder the newly pacified 
 territories. Amongst all these marauders, however, 
 
 Riip Singh maintained the pre-eminence. Often 
 beaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers. During long 
 periods he was not heard of. But during those periods daily 
 accounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamnah 
 reached the authorities. It was then discovered 
 that Rup Singh had taken possession of a fort at ap<ihis 
 Barhi, near the junction of the Chambal with the piracy. 
 Jamnah, and that from this place he levied contri- 
 butions on travellers by land and water. 
 
 The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him 
 reached at last so great a height that, in the month ^ 
 of August, a small force, five hundred and fifty men proSs 
 of all arms,^ was despatched from Itawah to destroy 
 or disperse them. This force, commanded by Lieu- 
 tenant Lachlan Forbes, of the 2nd Grenadier N. I., accompanied 
 by Lieutenant Gordon of the Madras Engineers, in command 
 of his sappers, and by Mr. Lance, the able and energetic 
 magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceeded 
 down the river towards Barhi. It had reached Garha Kudur, a 
 fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in the 
 boats, when Rup Singh attacked it. Gordon’s men at once dis- 
 embarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels, re- 
 embarked, dropped down to Barhi, and took the place. 
 
 After destroying three of the bastions of the fort 
 and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed 
 on to Chakarnagar, the resort of another rebel chief, com- 
 pletely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that 
 place as the headquarters of a small detachment 
 to control the country. In these operations Lance uagar. 
 was greatly assisted by Lieutenant Forbes. This 
 
 * During 1858-9, the force at Itawah commanded by Lieutenant Lachlan 
 Forbes, consisted of six companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry, and three 
 guns, called “ the Itawah Yeomanry Levy ” ; also four companies of infantry 
 and one troop of cavalry, styled “ the Itawah Military Police Battalion.” 
 
216 
 
 THE PANJAB and THE NOKTH-WEST. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 energetic officer raised, drilled, and led the local levies, and on 
 more than one occasion during the trip down the Jamnah, when 
 the fire was most severe, he landed with a few of his men, drove 
 off the rebels, and thus enabled Lieutenant Gordon and his 
 Madras sappers to pass unscathed. Mr. James Collett, an 
 engineer on the East India Eailway, and who volunteered to 
 work a gun on board Lance’s boat, displayed likewise great 
 courage and great skill. He was badly wounded. The opera- 
 tions thus gallantly carried on for a time pacified the districts. 
 But in October Eup Singh reappeared on the Kuari* with a 
 following of four hundred men, and attacked a British picket 
 on the Itawah side of that river. Captain Allan, in 
 RfipVngh command of a few levies — a hundred and forty 
 infantry and twenty-five sawars — happened to be at 
 the moment at Sahson, not very far from the point 
 of Eup Singh’s action. He at once went in pursuit of him, 
 caught him near the village of Kiiari, completely 
 banT defeated him, and captured all his camels and 
 
 disperses. pack-cattle. The band of the rebel leader then 
 dispersed, and from that time the Itawah district 
 was undisturbed. 
 
 In Agra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters 
 had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 
 1858 Brigadier Showei s had been sent to command 
 the district and to perform in its vicinity the work 
 which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehli districts 
 after the capture of the imperial city.f One of Showers’s first 
 acts was to work vengeance on some local rebels who had 
 plundered the town of Bah and murdered the authorities. This 
 was done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long 
 night-march, surprised the rebels at Kachrii and captured the 
 ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to 
 Sate^onhe civil authorities in the fort was long and diffi- 
 
 districts. cult. Not Only were the districts swarming with 
 small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the 
 
 Showers at 
 Agra, 
 
 * The Kuarf rises about sixty miles to the north-west of the fort of Gwaliar, 
 flows first to the north-west, subsequently east, and finally south-east. Its 
 course is semicircular in its general outline and has a length of one hundred and 
 eighty-five miles. The route from Agra to Gwaliar crosses it at Hingona, and 
 that from Itawah to Gwaliar, near a village also called Kuarf, forty-five miles 
 above its mouth, 
 t Vol IV. p. 75. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 COLONEL FRASER — MR. E. A. READE. 
 
 217 
 
 country west of the Jamnali was in a state of complete insur- 
 rection. Gwaliar lies but sixty-five miles from Agra, and it 
 is no exaggeration to state that, until the capture of Gwaliar by 
 Sir Hugh Rose in June 1858, the influence of Maharajah Sindhia 
 over his own people was not to be counted upon, and that Agra 
 was at any moment liable to an attack in force from any 
 number of rebels. 
 
 This situation was entirely appreciated in Agra. The guns 
 of the fort remained pointed at the native town — 
 the focus of a rebellion which might at any moment Apprehen- 
 break out. Every precaution was, indeed, taken to Agra, 
 prevent, or rather to ward ofi*, such an event; but 
 the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns 
 of the fort felt his life secure for a moment shows how deep 
 was the impression that a revolt was a mere question of oppor- 
 tunity. The slightest event might bring it on. The news of a 
 disaster in the Duab or in central India, the appearance on the 
 Jamnah of a mutinied contingent or of Tantia Topi — any 
 one of these eventualities would most certainly precipitate a 
 catastrophe. 
 
 Throughout this crisis the civil authorities at Agra — Colonel 
 Eraser, Mr. E. A. Reade, and their colleagues — ■ ^ ^ 
 
 displayed a coolness of judgment and a readiness of Sase? 
 resource which left nothing to be desired. The 
 self-denying energy with which they devoted them- 
 selves to the task of reorganising where reorganisation was 
 possible, of meeting great and pressing wants from exhausted 
 resources, of providing all the military and civil requirements 
 day by day, and of infusing their own brave spirit into those 
 whose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far 
 longer and a fuller notice than I am able to give 
 them in these pages. The history of the occupants 
 of Agra is the history of men who, deprived of the stimulus of 
 action, of the excitement of the camp, of the joyous sound of 
 the clash of arms, devoted all their energies to their country, and 
 deserved fully the credit and the glory always assigned to deeds 
 more showy but not more meritorious. 
 
 Amongst the useful measures carried out during the period of 
 which I am writing was the raising of a corps of 
 cavalry, subsequently known as Meade’s Horse. At Hor£'^ 
 the end of the year 1857 the^ want of native troopers 
 and mounted orderlies at Agra had been greatly felt, and as 
 
218 
 
 THE PANJXb and THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had deprived 
 of their employment, it was considered advisable to raise a 
 regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it was, in 
 December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade. 
 
 This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous figure towards 
 the close of the next chapter, had been for some 
 K^cLMeade. ye^rs brigade-major of the Gwaliar contingent, and 
 in that office had won the confidence of the officers 
 under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough acquaint- 
 ance with the language of the people, and he invariably gave 
 all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would have 
 been impossible for a general in command to have had under 
 his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry into 
 execution the orders he received. 
 
 A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjabi Muhammadans formed '* 
 rocess of nucleus of this new regiment. To them Meade 
 
 foimationof added some forty odd Eurasians and native Chris- 
 H^e'^ tians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken from 
 the disbanded native regiments. These were ulti- 
 mately increased to eighty-five, and were formed into a Christian 
 troop. As none of these men had ever previously crossed a 
 horse, some of Meade’s difficulties may be imagined. 
 
 At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accession of 
 forty-five mounted Jats, sent from Rohtak under a Jamadar of 
 good family by Mr. J. Campbell, collector of that district ; and 
 a little later the new commandant induced Baldeo Singh 
 Thakur of Jhara to raise, from men of his class in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen. In 
 this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, in a 
 short time, able to form it into six class troops.^ The labour 
 of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride may be 
 imagined when it is considered that none of the men had served 
 in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessantly 
 himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C., of 
 the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commission in 
 the 16th; by Cockburn, whose gallantry has been referred to 
 in a previous volume ; and by others, Meade was 
 i?fonned?^^^ able, by the beginning of March, to show a fair 
 proportion of his regiment fit for service. Brigadier 
 
 * 1. Sikhs ; 2. Panjabi-Muhammadans ; 3, Jats ; 4. Christians ; 5. Gwalidr 
 Thakurs; 6. Mixed. 
 
1858.] SHOWERS BARS THE NORTH TO tXnTIA TOPI. 219 
 
 Showers, who inspected them during that month, expressed 
 himself well satisfied alike with men and horses. 
 
 From this time up to the beginning of June Meade’s Horse 
 were constantly employed in maintaining order in 
 the neighbourhood of Agra, and it would be difiicult goo/servS 
 to exaggerate the services they rendered in this in the 
 respect to the administrative and military autho- Agra!*^^ 
 rities in the place. 
 
 But in June the aspect of Agra suddenly changed. How on 
 the 1st of that month Maharajah Sindhia was attacked and 
 driven to flight by the rebels under Tantia Topi, I have re- 
 corded in a previous chapter. The Maharajah, abandoned by 
 all but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpur, intending to push 
 on to Agra. The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded 
 him. Showers instantly despatched a squadron of 
 Meade’s Horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with hSsSatf^’^ 
 all honour into the capital of the north-west provinces, ^corted 
 
 The Maharajah, who reached Agra on the 2nd of ° 
 
 June, remained there till the 14th, and left it that day escorted 
 by two squadrons of Meade’s Horse to Dholpur, thence to proceed 
 to join Sir Hugh Bose, expected to reach Morar on the 16th. 
 News of Sir Hugh’s arrival on that day having reached the 
 Maharajah, he set out on the morning of the 17th, still escorted 
 by the two squadrons, and made tfc march, fully sixty-five 
 miles, within twenty-four hours. The events which followed 
 have been recorded in the preceding book. 
 
 Returning to Agra, I have only to record the fact that on the 
 defeat of Tantia Topi on the 17th and 19th of June, at Morar 
 and at Gwaliar, Brigadier Showers sent out a 
 detachment, consisting of the 3rd Europeans and Showers 
 a battery of guns, to cover Bharatpiir, upon which Jl-evenr 
 place he believed the rebels to be marching. The 
 demonstration was successful, inasmuch as the northward.^ 
 presence of the detachment induced Tantia Topi 
 to bend his steps southwards. As soon as his march in that 
 direction was definitely ^known, the detachment returned by 
 way of Fathpur Sikri to Agra. Thenceforward that 
 city and the districts east of the Jamnah experienced Agr?by\h? 
 the full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a 
 point so close to the British districts, of the one ‘ ‘ 
 
 chieftain whose name up to that time had been a beacon of 
 hope to the marauder. 
 
220 
 
 THE PANJAB and THE NORTH-WEST. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 Tantia Topi had fled from Sir Hugh Rose at Gwaliar ; had 
 fled from Napier at Jaora Alipiir; hut whither? All that was 
 known was that when he had fled from the last-named battle- 
 field he had taken a southerly direction. Who could say how 
 long he would maintain that direction ? It is time now that 
 we should follow him, and recount in some detail the measures 
 adopted by his pursuers to overtake him. 
 
1858.3 
 
 THE PURSUIT OP tInTIA TOPL 
 
 221 
 
 * ; BOOK XYI.— TANTIA top! and the QUEEN’S 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 f 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTIA TOPf. 
 
 Tantia Topi, accompanied by Rao Sahib and the Nawab of 
 Bandah, had fled from the field of J aura Alipiir on 
 the 22nd of June. The information which had baffled 
 induced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to sLwersf 
 cover Bharatpur was perfectly correct, for Tantia, 
 as soon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had 
 turned his steps north-westwards. On reaching Sarmathura, 
 however, he learned the dispositions made by 
 Showers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly 
 westwards, hoping to gain Jaipur, in which city he Jaipur, 
 believed a strong party was prepared to rise in 
 his favour. 
 
 On this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the 
 positions taken up by the several British columns upon which 
 the pursuit of him was to devolve. 
 
 I have already shown how on the 29 th of June Sir Hugh 
 Rose made over the command of his force to Brigadier-General 
 Robert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command 
 of the army of that presidency. The season for active military 
 operations on the black and spongy soil of central 
 India had now passed away, and Napier hoped 
 before the country should harden he would be able at Gwiiii^r, 
 to afibrd some rest to his overworked soldiers. With 
 this object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a 
 portion of them at Gwaliar itself. Here he quartered three 
 squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, Meade’s Horse, a wing 
 of the Tlst Highlanders, the 86th Foot, the 25th Bombay 
 
222 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF TANTIA TOPf. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Smith's 
 brigade 
 occupies 
 Sipri and 
 Gunah. 
 
 Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Artillery, a company 
 of tbe Koyal Engineers, and a Light Field Battery. To rest at 
 and to hold Jhansi he detached a squadron of the 
 JWnsV l^ih. Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bombay 
 Cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Sappers, and 
 three guns of the late Bhopal Contingent. Brigadier 
 Smith’s brigade — which, it will be remembered, took 
 an active part in the operations against Gwaliar — 
 consisting of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two 
 of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 95th Foot, the 
 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse 
 Artillery, marched to occupy Sipri, whilst Mayne’s Irregular 
 Cavalry took up their position at Gunah. 
 
 But these were not the only troops which in the month of 
 July 1858 occupied positions overlooking the area 
 on which only it was likely Tantia Topi would act. 
 field force In a previous page I have recorded how General 
 Koberts, commanding the Eajputana field force, had 
 detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to aid 
 in the operations of Sir Hugh Eose. Eoberts’s force, diminished 
 by the departure of that column, still consisted of the 83rd 
 Foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, wings of the 12th and 
 13th Bombay Native Infantry, two squadrons 8th Hussars, two 
 at Nasirab^ Bombay Lancers, three hundred Biluchi 
 
 Horse, a light field battery, and a siege-train of six 
 pieces. At the end of June Eoberts lay with this force at 
 Nasirabad. 
 
 Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugitive 
 Roberts leader. On the 27 th of June Eoberts learned from 
 mSe^sto Captain Eden, the political agent, that Tantia 
 ja^L Topi had sent emissaries to the disaffected party 
 in Jaipur assuring them that he was marching on 
 that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join him. 
 Eoberts took his measures accordingly. On the 28th of June 
 he set out from Nasirabad, and marching rapidly, reached 
 Jaipur before Tantia. 
 
 Tantia, again foiled, turned southwards, and made a raid on 
 Tonk, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes.* The 
 
 * Consisting of cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and two 
 hundred of the 72nd Highlanders. 
 
1858.J 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tINTIX TOPI 
 
 223 
 
 Nawab of this place, Wazir Mubammad Khan, was 
 
 by no means disposed to submit to the dictation 
 
 of a Maratha fugitive with English troops at his 
 
 heels. He, therefore, shut himself in his citadel ughrSiumn. 
 
 with the men he could depend upon. The remainder 
 
 of his force, with four guns, he left outside with orders to face 
 
 the rebels. But, instead of facing them, this force 
 
 received them as brethren, and made over to them four guns at 
 
 the four guns. With this addition to his army 
 
 Tantia started off southwards to Madhupiira and 
 
 Indragarh, forty-five miles north-east of Kota, still pursued by 
 
 Holmes, and at a longer interval by Roberts. 
 
 The flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains, 
 which fell during this month with remarkable force, 
 so much so that the river Chambal, swollen to a baffled by 
 torrent, barred Tantia’s passage from Indragarh to {JeChambai 
 the south-eastward. Changing his course, then, he moves 
 took a south-westerly course to Biindi, capital of the 
 native state of the same name. The Maharao of 
 Bundi, Ram Singh, had more than once displayed a disposition 
 to strike for independence, but even he was not prepared to 
 link his fortunes with those of Tantia Topi. He shut, there- 
 fore, the gates of Bundi in the face of the fugitives. Tantia, 
 , pursued, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use 
 force, but marched a few miles southward, then, making a 
 sudden tour westward, crossed the Bundi hills by 
 the Kinah pass, and made for the fertile country 
 between Nasirabad and Nimach, a country which 
 had already been the scene of warlike operations, 
 and the larger towns in which had more than once 
 shown a disposition to favour the rebellion. Tantia was able 
 to change his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes, 
 for on leaving Biindi he had loudly asserted his intention to 
 continue his course due south, and he counted that inform- 
 ation thus disseminated would deceive his pursuers. 
 
 Pushing on, then, Tantia took up a position between the 
 towns of Sanganir and Bhilwara, both in the Udaipur state, 
 on the Nasirabad and Nimach road.* Roberts, meanwhile, 
 had been obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the 
 
 * Sanganir is seventy-four miles north of Nimach, sixty-nine south of Nasir^- 
 bdd, and eighty miles south of Ajmir ; Bhilwara is more than a mile from it. 
 
224 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF T^NTli. TOPI. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 heavy rain, to halt at Sarwar, an elevated plateau about thirty 
 miles from Ajmir. On the 5 th of August, however, the roads 
 having been reported passable, Eoberts broke up and marched 
 towards Nimach. On the 7th, when at Dabla,. 
 foi^ws^n miles from Sanganir, he received information 
 
 his track, regarding the position taken up by Tantia close to 
 
 that place. 
 
 The town of Sanganir is on the left bank of the little river 
 Kotaria. On the other side, and more than a mile up the 
 stream, is the town of Bhilwara, in the front of which Tantia 
 lay encamped.* Eoberts was well aware that all his cavalry 
 and a portion of his infantry under Holmes were following 
 reaches and track of the rebels. He himself was in 
 
 determines front of them. The opportunity was too good to 
 to^ttack thrown away. He resolved, though he had no 
 
 cavalry, to attack. 
 
 The rebel infantry and guns had taken up a position in front 
 of Bhilwara. Their horse, however, were thrown 
 occupied by fo^’ward on the left, across the Kotaria up to San- 
 xkE ganir, and on the right to the other side of that 
 town, the whole forming a horseshoe figure of about 
 a mile and a half, connected by skirmishers. Their elephants 
 and baggage were in the rear on the line by which they must 
 retire if beaten. 
 
 Eoberts advanced his infantry, covered by skirmishei’s a 
 short distance in front, cleared Sanganir of the few 
 Stocks^ rebels who had penetrated within it, forced the 
 rebel horse across the river, and, bringing his guns 
 to the river-bank, opened on the enemy’s right. Under this 
 fire his infantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crossed 
 the river, and took up a position on a rising ground, their 
 right on a village, their left on a small tank. The guns then 
 were sent across. Seeing this, Tantia attempted 
 Wm further resistance ; he withdrew his guns and 
 
 retreat, infantry, massing his cavalry on the intervening 
 plain to cover the retreat. He retEed unscathed, 
 except by the guns, for Eoberts had no cavalry to send after 
 
 * Blackioood's Magazine, August 1860. This number contains an admirably 
 written account of the operations of Generals Eoberts and Michel against Tantia 
 Topi. It is difficult to exaggerate the obligations under which the author lies 
 to the writer of this article, himself an actor in the scene. 
 
THE PUESUIT OF tInTII TOPf. 
 
 1858.] 
 
 225 
 
 him,* and proceeded to a village called Kotra in the Udaipur 
 country. 
 
 The next day Eoberts was joined by his much-required 
 cavalry, which had made a march of thirty miles, 
 
 He then set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing joined by^is 
 twenty miles daily till, on the afternoon of the cavalry, and 
 13th, he came up with their advanced guard at 
 Kankrauli,! a town seventy-nine miles to the north-west of 
 Nimach and a hundred and seventy-one to the 
 north-east of Uisa, situated on a lake not far from overtakes 
 the Aravali hills. On driving in the rebel outposts, Xfintiii. 
 Eoberts learned from prisoners and villagers that 
 their main force was occupying a position on the Banas river, 
 seven miles distant. 
 
 Tantia Topi, who was, according to his lights, a religious 
 man, had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to 
 the shrine of Nathdwara,J reputed one of the most 
 sacred in India. On his return at midnight he 
 heard for the first time of the close vicinity of the 
 English. Dreading an attack, he determined to 
 decamp at once. But his infantry refused to move. 
 
 They said that they were worn out by the long 
 marches, and must rest ; that they would march 
 in the morning, and the guns should march with 
 them; that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under 
 
 Tilntia loses 
 an important 
 dav in 
 religious 
 exercises. 
 
 His infantry 
 refuse to 
 move. 
 
 * Tantia merely records of this action: “We were there” (Bhilwara) “at- 
 tacked by the English force, and I fled during the night accompanied by my 
 army and guns.” 
 
 t The excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in 
 more than one instance, to traverse the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had 
 gone round by the arc. The method employed by Roberts to obtain this accurate 
 information is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in Blackwood, 
 already referred to. “ The method which General Roberts adopted for obtaining 
 information was to have about twenty cavalry in advance, close to the rebels, 
 'fhey left connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up 
 the chain of communication. The advance party was composed, half of Baluch 
 horse, who had no sympathy with the rebels, but could not communicate very 
 weU with the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the Rajah of Jaipur, 
 who were supposed, as Rajputs, to be on good terms and able easily to com- 
 municate with the villagers, but not to be very warm partisans of the British. 
 By this mixed party correct and immediate intelligence was constantly supplied.” 
 
 X Nathdwara is a town in the tJdaipur State, situate on the Ban^s river, 
 twenty-two miles from Udaipur. The shrine there attracts countless multitudes 
 of pilgrims. 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 Q 
 
226 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tAnTIX TOPf. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Roberts 
 
 attacks. 
 
 defeats, 
 
 these circTimstances, Tantia had no other alternative hut to 
 fight. 
 
 At daybreak, then, he ranged his men as skilfully as the 
 nature of the ground would allow. His position was 
 a stiSg^ "P strong. In front of him flowed the Bands, which, 
 position. covering his centre, then made a bend which 
 protected his right; his left rested on some steep 
 hills. The ground he occupied was a low, steep ridge, which 
 formed the bank of the river. Before him, on the opposite 
 bank, was an open plain, eight hundred yards wide, across 
 which his enemy must march. 
 
 At 7 o’clock on the morning of the 14th Eolerts marched 
 across it. In vain did Tantia’s four guns, well pro- 
 tected by a natural parapet, sweep that plain. In 
 spite of the effect they produced— and it was con- 
 siderable — the British and Native infantry reached the left 
 bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the enemy’s 
 left and centre. The right, where the guns were posted, being 
 thus left unsupported, abandoned the pieces under 
 a volley from the 13th Bombay Native Infantry. 
 The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor, then dashed across the 
 stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the plain. 
 Naylor pursued them for two miles his men dealing and re- 
 ceiving death. He then formed up his men, and, under orders 
 from the general, kept up a steady and orderly pursuit for 
 fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing three 
 elephants and a quantity of baggage. Two miles 
 him for further on, the rebels, having reached a village 
 surrounded by jungle, determined to make a stand. 
 Naylor, finding that the number of men whom he 
 could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty, and 
 that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this aban- 
 doned the pursuit.* 
 
 Tantia Topi, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, now 
 -without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Chambal 
 tow^rds^th? ^oi’dable, and to place that river between himself 
 Chambal, and the English. Eoberts, divining his intention, 
 followed in the same direction, and the fourth day 
 
 * Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860. Tantia Topi writes thus of this 
 action : “ The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, after proceeding about 
 one mile, the English army arrived and an action took place. We left our four 
 guns and fled.” 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF TANTIA TOPI 
 
 227 
 
 after tlie action readied Puna, a town nortli of Chitor, not far 
 from the high road between Nimach and Nasirabad. Here he 
 met Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nimach 
 brigade, who, some days before, had started from 
 that place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tantia 
 from the south. Roberts now made over to him the 8th 
 Hussars and the Baluchis, and begged him to continue the 
 pursuit. 
 
 Parke set out at once, but, some of the horses of the 8th 
 Hussars being knocked up, he deviated from the 
 exact course followed by Tantia to proceed to Ni- aSer™e?c? 
 mach, where he knew he could obtain about fifty 
 fresh horses. Here he was met by conflicting news h?rses, 
 regarding the fugitives. On the one side he was 
 assured by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tantia 
 could cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that 
 he was bent on pushing southwards; on the other. Captain 
 Showers, the political agent at Udaipur, who was then at 
 Nimach, had received information from the spot that Tantia 
 was determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, 
 
 Parke believed the experts. Proceeding to Morasa, deceived by 
 fifteen miles from Nimach and thirty from the formation 
 Chambal, he halted there a few hours to obtain 
 more exact information. When it came it told him that the 
 informant of Captain Showers was right, and that Tantia was 
 attempting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached 
 the river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but 
 rising rapidly, to see “ a few disabled ponies stand- . 
 ing on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing quencrof 
 among some mango-trees in the west horizon.” which Tdntiii 
 Tantia had escaped. Parke returned to Nimach to 
 refit.* 
 
 Tantia, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for 
 Jhalra Patan, thirty miles distant. Jhalra Patan is 
 a handsome town in the Jhalawar State, ninety 
 miles to the east of Nimach and two hundred and Jh^ira Patan. 
 sixteen to the north of Sagar, built on the model of 
 Jaipur. The Rana of that state, Prithi Singh, great- 
 grandson of the fam(ms Zalim Singh, the founder Sish, ^ 
 of the principality, was loyal to his British over- 
 
 Q 2 
 
 ♦ Blackwood's Magazine^ August 1860. 
 
228 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF tInTIA TOPf. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 b *hStroo s yielding without a struggle ; 
 
 y 18 troops. troops, when drawn up to repel the Maratha 
 
 invader, behaved precisely as Sindhia’s troops had behaved 
 at Gwaliar on a similar occasion — they fraternised with the 
 rebels. Tantia at once took possession of the Hand’s 
 Tdntid takes guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, 
 jh?ir?SL bullocks and horses, and surrounded the palace. 
 heavy'cStri- next morning he visited the Edna, and de- 
 
 bntion. manded a contribution in money. The Ednd offered 
 five lakhs ; but, this sum not being deemed sufficient, 
 Edo Sdhib, acting as representative of the Peshwd, sent for him 
 and demanded twenty-five. Ultimately the Ednd agreed to 
 give fifteen. Of these he actually paid five, but, having been 
 insulted and ill-treated, he escaped that same night and fled to 
 Mdu, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and 
 family to blow themselves up if threatened with insult.* 
 
 Tdntid, freed by the rising of the Chambal from all chance 
 of immediate pursuit, halted five days at Jhdlra 
 Patan. He states that he employed the money 
 taken to issue three months’ pay to his troops, at 
 the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, 
 and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so 
 halting, he and his comrades, Edo Sdhib and the Nawdb of 
 Bandah, conceived a very bold idea. This was no less than to 
 march on Indur, and summon Holkar’s troops to join the re- 
 presentative of the liege lord of the Mardthds. Could he 
 succeed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body 
 of troops which the naws of his approach would probably bring 
 to the same spot from Mdu, the fraternisation would be certain, 
 and the result would spread to all Holkar’s subjects. Impressed 
 with this idea, Tdntid marched with his army, now 
 reinforced by the Jhdldwar levies and all the Ednd’s 
 
 T^ntisi 
 conceives 
 the idea of 
 marching on 
 Indur, 
 
 and tries to 
 earry it out. 
 
 guns,| nearly direct south to Edjgarh.J 
 
 * This account is taken mainly from Tantia’s memoirs. The writer in Black- 
 wood states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds, 
 whilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property. 
 As Jhalra Patan was a very rich town, this was very likely the case. 
 
 f Tantia says eighteen, but as he had no guns when he arrived, and as three 
 were abandoned and twenty-seven captured a few days later at Kajgarh, he 
 must have taken all. 
 
 X There are thirteen well-knqwn towns of this name, and probably many 
 more. The Kajgarh referred to in the text is in Malwa. 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF TANTll TOPf. 
 
 229 
 
 But, whilst Tantia had been resting at Jhalra Patan, the 
 officer commanding in Malwa, Major-General Michel, had, as if 
 reading his thoughts, despatched from that place a force,* under 
 Colonel Lockhart, to cover Ujjen, due north of 
 Indiir. Lockhart, proceeding further northwards, J^o^es^ontho 
 reached Susnir, a place about seventeen miles to the I'ne on which 
 west of Eajgarh. Not believing himself strong advand^i. 
 enough to attack Tantia, he intrenched himself, to 
 await the arrival of a small reinforcement, under Colonel Hope, 
 coming from Mau. He met this reinforcement at Nalkerah, 
 about three miles to the south of Susnir. At the very time of 
 this junction Tantia was marching on Eajgarh, within a few 
 miles of him. 
 
 At this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place 
 in the personnel of the British command. Major- 
 General Eoberts, who had up to that time com- 
 manded in Eajputana, was transferred to the military Eoberts. 
 and political control of the Gujrat division. His 
 place was taken by Major-General Michel of the Eoyal army, 
 commanding in Malwa, a command which he was now to hold 
 in conjunction with that in Eajputana. Michel was a zealous, 
 active, resolute, and capable officer, thoroughly impressed with 
 the necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without 
 cessation. 
 
 Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at 
 Nalkerah. He had no information regarding Tantia 
 Topi, but a vague rumour prevailed that he was J(f^mandat 
 moving in a north-easterly direction. Marching Ndikerah, 
 was, in every sense of the word, difficult. Although 
 the month of September had arrived, heavy rain, the precursor 
 of the break-up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated 
 cotton soil of Malwa resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was 
 necessary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction. 
 With great difficulty he transported his little army to Chapaira, 
 about midway to Eajgarh. The following day, the rain having 
 ceased, Michel pursued his march towards that place. 
 
 The heat was so great and the sun’s rays were so pureuing, 
 terrible that some of the artillery horses dropped 
 
 ♦ Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 19th 
 Bombay Native Infantry, one squadron Bombay 3rd Light Cavalry, and two 
 guns Le Marchand’s battery Bengal Artillery. 
 
[1858. 
 
 230 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF tInTIA TOPI. 
 
 finds Tdntid 
 at Rdjgarh. 
 
 dead in tlie traces. Still Michel pushed on, and, about 5 o’clock 
 in tbe afternoon, baiting on a rising ground, be bad 
 tbe gratification of beholding Tantia Topi’s army 
 encamped near tbe walled town of Kajgarb. 
 
 To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at tbe approach 
 of night, to attack with a tired army a fresh body of men in 
 tbe position they bad chosen, was not for a moment to be 
 thought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning; but, when 
 morning dawned, Tantia and his men had disap- 
 Michel at once sent his cavalry on their 
 track. This track was distinguished, first, by the 
 marks of the gun wheels and the elephants, then, more decidedly 
 by three guns lying abandoned on the road. A 
 MicheUracks little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn 
 him’ again, up in two lines, the second on higher ground than 
 the first, and the guns on ground above both. The 
 cavalry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and 
 guns. 
 
 The infantry and guns did not let Michel wait long. A& 
 soon as they came up the action began with an 
 let 1 artillery fire from both sides. Then the English 
 dSts him. infantry, deploying, went at the rebels. The latter 
 did not wait the conflict, but gave way and fled. 
 Getting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into inextric- 
 able confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward 
 in alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating^ 
 masses, whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced 
 them to incline towards the north.* In the pursuit, twenty- 
 seven guns were taken. 
 
 Tantia, driven towards the north, wandered about for some 
 time in the jungly country on both sides of the 
 pursuers Betwa, and eventually made for Siionj — in an 
 gather round easterly direction. But, whilst thus seeking a place 
 Tinti^. security, new enemies were gathering round him. 
 
 * Of this action, Tantia writes : “ On reaching Kajgarh the English armj 
 came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled.” It would be incredible, 
 were it not true, that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand, with 
 thirty guns, should allow itself to he defeated by less than one-sixth of its 
 number in men and gims, without drawing a drop of blood. Yet so it was. It 
 is the more strange, as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by 
 Europeans ; their guns were effective pieces of larger calibre than the English 
 9-pounders, their muskets bore the Tower mark, and their swords were excellent^, 
 yet not one man of the British force was killed or wounded I 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE STORY REVERTS TO NAPIER. 
 
 231 
 
 To Brigadier Parke, who had left Nimach on the 5th of Sept- 
 ember, was entrusted the duty of covering Indur and Bhopal, 
 thus leaving Michel’s force to follow Tantia from the west, 
 whilst Smith’s brigade should advance from the north, and the 
 Jhansi column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east. 
 
 With this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The 
 defeat of Tantia Topi near Rajgarh almost coincided 
 in time with the conclusion of the rainy season ; for, reverts^to 
 although rain continued for some days to fall, further 
 operations had become possible. We are now 
 entering upon the cold weather campaign. In this new actors 
 appear upon the scene. The Central India field force once more 
 invites the attention of the public. It seems fitting, then, that 
 before describing the events of that cold-weather campaign I 
 should trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier 
 Smith from the period when we left them up to the middle of 
 September. Meanwhile we must suppose Tantia Topi to be 
 making the best of his way, by circuitous paths, from Bajgarh 
 to Sironj. 
 
 At the beginning of July we left General Napier’s division 
 at Gwaliar and Jhansi, Brigadier Smith’s brigade 
 at Sipii, and Mayne’s Irregulars at Gunah, all 
 resting after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure 
 of the Central India campaign. To the superficial 
 glance, order had been restored in Sindhia’s dominions. The 
 Maharajah, grateful to the English, more fervent than at any 
 previous period in his desire for their success, was doing his 
 utmost to forward the views of the army administrators for the 
 success of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located at Gwaliar, 
 was engaged in re-establishing political relations with the 
 petty states around. The situation was full of promise; and 
 yet, all the time, it was hollow and unsound. 
 
 During the whole of July the European troops had rest. 
 The comparatively trifling matters which required 
 attention in the districts were easily disposed of by Msin singh, 
 the employment on detached duty of the men of 
 Meade’s Horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation. 
 
 But on the 2nd of August an incident occurred which led to 
 very serious complications. A chief of Sindhia’s territory, 
 named Man Singh, Rajah of Narwar, had quarrelled with his 
 liege lord. To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had 
 been inflicted upon him by Sindhia, and which will presently 
 
232 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF tXnTIX TOPI. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 He 
 P^uri. 
 
 be related, and encouraged possibly by Tantia’s action in the 
 south, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand 
 strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong 
 fort of Pauri, eighty-three miles by the Sipri road 
 south-west of Gwaliar, and eighteen to the north- 
 west of Sipri, but recently supplied with six months’ provisions 
 and ammunition. Now, Smith’s brigade was at Sipri. On 
 the 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by 
 Man Singh. On the 5th he started from Sipri with 
 fr™m Sipri ^ a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th 
 the Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, a wing of the 
 
 95th, and three field guns ; and, marching as rapidly 
 as the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Pauri early 
 on the morning of the 7th. On apjDroaching the place, Man 
 Singh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to 
 assure him that he had no quarrel with the English ; that his 
 contention was with the Maharajah alone, and to supplicate 
 earnestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw 
 Interview chief that day. In an earnest manner, totally 
 
 devoid of pretension, Man Singh told his story to the 
 sSnVngh brigadier. He and his family, he said, had ever 
 been loyal servants to the Maharajah. During the 
 lifetime of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good 
 feeling which had previously existed. But, on his father’s 
 death, the Maharajah had insulted and robbed him 
 ?hTiatten^ refusing to recognise his right to succeed to the 
 principality of Nai*war^ and the estates adjacent. If 
 was to recover these, or, at all events, to avenge himself on the 
 Maharajah, that he had drawn the sword and seized Pauri, 
 which formed a part of his ancestral possessions, but, he added 
 earnestly, “ I have no connection with the rebels, and no quarrel 
 with the English.” The j^lea, though true, and 
 convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a 
 nature which, in those times, could be accepted by 
 an English commander. Smith was responsible for 
 of the country near Sipri ; that peace had been 
 
 Smith 
 rejects his 
 
 the 
 
 peace 
 
 violated by Man Singh, and Smith had but one plain duty. 
 
 * Nanvar is a very important place, with an interesting history. It lies forty- 
 fom miles south of Gvraliar. In iSI-t Narwar, with the lands pertaining to it, 
 was assessed hy the Gwaliar Government at 2,250,000 rupees annually. Little 
 wonder, then, that the despotic ruler of the native State in which it lay should 
 covet it. 
 
233 
 
 1858.] NAPIEK MARCHES ON PlURf. 
 
 to see tliat the violators were punished and that 
 peace was maintained. He informed Man Singh of to 
 this necessity. Man Singh was obstinate, and ex- p^uri. 
 pressed his determination to resist. 
 
 Pauri was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammuni- 
 tion, and its garrison, originally only two thousand, 
 had been increased during the few days since the 
 capture to nearly double that ^ number. Amongst p^urf. 
 the new-comers was a chief, Ajit Singh by name, 
 uncle of Man Singh. Smith’s force amounted only to eleven 
 hundred men of all arms, and his three pieces were field-pieces. 
 He was thus far too weak to undertake a siege ; and the place 
 was too strong to be carried by a coup-de-main. Under these 
 circumstances he deemed it prudent to maintain his 
 position near the place, while he sent to Gwaliar an toGwiiidr 
 earnest request for reinforcements. On receiving 
 this requisition Napier felt the enormous importance 
 of settling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples 
 of that sort in a country long under Maratha rule are apt to be 
 contagious, and there was every probability that, if Man Singh 
 were allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of 
 the British, chieftains more powerful than he might follow hm 
 example. Napier, then, determined to take the matter into his 
 own hands. He started accordingly on the 11th 
 with five guns and four mortars, escorted by six 
 hundred horse and foot, reached Sipri on the 17th, 
 and joined Smith on the 19th of August. He began him. 
 operations the next day. For twenty-four hours he 
 poured a vertical fire into the fort from his mortars, and then 
 began to use his breaching batteries. This demonstration quite 
 satisfied Man Singh. On the night of the 23rd he, Ajit Singh, 
 and their followers evacuated Pauri, and made their way 
 southwards through the juugles. Napier entered 
 Pauri, the following morning, then equipped a light 
 column under Robertson,25th BombayNative Infantry the place. 
 
 an officer whose gallantry and soldierlike conduct 
 
 have often been mentioned in these pages — and sent him in 
 pursuit of the rebels. Napier himself having 
 destroyed the fortifications of Pauri and burst pursues, 
 the guns, retired to Sipri to make arrangements for 
 the further pursuit of Man Singh should Kobertson fail to 
 capture him. 
 
234 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tInTII TOPf. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Robertson 
 
 ojvertakes 
 
 Ajit 
 
 Singh’s 
 
 troops at 
 
 Bijdpur, 
 
 That zealous officer left Pauri on the 26th of August, on the 
 track of Man Singh. He had with him a squadron of the 
 8th Hussars, a squadron of Meade’s Horse, two 9-pounders, one 
 6-pounder, one 5J-inch howitzer, a hundred men of the 86th, a 
 hundred and twenty of the 95th, two hundred 10th Bombay 
 Native Infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay Native Infantry. 
 Pushing on by forced marches through the jungles, crossing 
 difficult rivers, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on 
 the 3rd of Septemb^er ascertained that the rebels 
 were at Bijapur, near Gunah, twenty- three miles 
 distant. His determination was instantly taken. 
 Leaving the bulk of his troops to guard the camp 
 and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels 
 seventy-five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and 
 a hundred each of the 10th and 25th Native Infantry, and with 
 these and fifty men of the 8th Hussars, and a hundred and fifty 
 of Meade’s Horse, he set out that night. At daybreak the 
 following morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a 
 rising ground on the opposite bank of the Parbati river. They 
 had no scouts, and, the light being still grey, 
 Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived 
 and to send his cavalry round to take up a position 
 in rear of the rebel camp. These movements were executed 
 with so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were 
 taking up the position indicated, the rebels were actually 
 stripping to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning 
 meal. The surprise was complete. Of organised 
 resistance there was none; but the casualty list 
 showed that the rebels, though taken unawares, 
 defended themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett, 95th, was 
 killed ; Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 1 8th Hussars, 
 and Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade’s Horse, were 
 wounded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded 
 amounted to eighteen. 
 
 It was discovered after the action that it was not Man Singh’s 
 but Ajit Singh’s band which had been routed. The 
 of Se°routed Singh, on learning that he was pursued, 
 
 force? had divided his partisans into three divisions, with 
 
 instructions to traverse separate roads and to com- 
 bine at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six 
 hundred strong, and composed, as was ascertained after the 
 action, of men from the Maharajah’s bodyguard, from the 
 
 surprises 
 
 them, 
 
 and cuts 
 them up. 
 
1858.] THE STOBY EEVEKTS TO TANTli. TOPI. 
 
 235 
 
 Gwaliar contingent, and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and 50th 
 regiments native infantry which had been encountered. They 
 were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks. About 
 three-fourths of them were killed,* but Ajit Singh escaped. 
 
 Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gunah, where 
 he arrived the middle of September. With this 
 march may be said to terminate the campaign of the close of the 
 rainy season in the districts to the west and south- 
 west of Gwaliar bordering on Rajputana. It is now 
 fit that we should follow the various columns in the cold- 
 weather campaign against Tantia Topi and his allies. Of these 
 that against Tantia Topi demands precedence. 
 
 I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly country 
 on both sides of the Betwa towards Sironj. He xhe story 
 duly reached that place about the middle of Sept- reverts to 
 ember, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest ^iinti^ Topf, 
 of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all 
 fear — for the heavy rain that was falling would, they Sronj!^*^ 
 well knew, make the roads impassable to their 
 enemy — set them on their legs again, and even restored to them 
 their former audacity. On the conclusion of that period, the 
 raius having ceased, Tantia led his men, with the four guns he 
 had taken at Sironj, against fsagarh, a town with a fort, be- 
 longing to Sindhia, in the hilly and difficult country south of 
 Sipri. Here he demanded supplies ; but, the towns- 
 people refusing them, Tantia stormed and plundered aM sufSs 
 the place, and took seven guns. He and his 
 associates halted there for a day to consider their 
 further plans. Their deliberations then culminated in a deter- 
 mination to divide tbeir forces, Tantia jDroceeding with the bulk 
 of them and five guns to Chanderi, the Rao Sahib with six 
 guns and fewer followers making his way to Tal Bahat by 
 Lalatpur : this plan was carried out. 
 
 What Chanderi was, the reader will recollect who has 
 followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose’s central 
 Indian campaign.j It was now held for Sindhia by repuised^t 
 a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with Chanderi, 
 
 * The number of killed is often exaggerated, but on this occasion between 
 four and five hundred dead bodies were actually counted on both sides of the- 
 river. 
 
 t Pages 103-5. 
 
236 
 
 THE PUKRUIT OF TInTII TOPI 
 
 [1858. 
 
 rebels. He repulsed, then, Tantia Topi’s appeals, and when 
 the Maratha chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed 
 his attacks. Tantia wasted three days in an attempt to gain 
 a place the possession of which would have been of incal- 
 culable use to him, and then, baffled though not 
 dispirited, made for Mangrauli, on the left bank of 
 gr^uii. the Betwa, about twenty miles south of Chanderi. 
 
 He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, 
 for the English were to meet him there ! 
 
 I must now return to his pursuers. I have already stated 
 the position of the several English columns; how 
 ofhfs^^^ Brigadier Parke was covering Indur and Bhopal; 
 pursuers. how Colonel Liddell with the Jhansi force was 
 covering the country to the north-east. I have now 
 only to add that Brigadier Smith, released by the capture of 
 Pauri, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner 
 part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these 
 columns. General Michel was acting. 
 
 Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the 
 cessation of the heavy rains, to act freely, Michel, 
 marches on believing he should find Tantia in the Betwa 
 Mangrduii. valley, went in pursuit of him in a north-easterly 
 direction. As he marched, he heard of the various 
 depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he 
 should find him. On the 9th of October, marching towards 
 Mangrauli, information reached him that Tantia had occu- 
 pied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for 
 him. 
 
 Tantia had arrived there that very morning. He had not 
 sought a battle, but as the ground was favourable he 
 resoiiesto resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and 
 
 risk an the five guns he had placed in the front of his line 
 
 ‘ commanded the ground along which the English 
 must advance. When, then, Michel sent his men forward, 
 Tantia’s guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by 
 despair, Tantia at the same time sent his cavalry to menace 
 both fianks of the few assailants. For a moment 
 Possibilities the position of these seemed critical, the more so as 
 some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between 
 the main body and the rear-guard. But whilst 
 they still hesitated to come on, to risk a hand-to-hand encounter, 
 the British troops advanced steadily, and, gaining the crest, 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTli. TOPf. 
 
 237 
 
 charged the guns. Then all was over. Tantia and who, how- 
 his men abandoned their guns and fled. The want beaten, and 
 of sufficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue 
 
 them. * 
 
 Tantia crossed the Betwa and fled first to Jaklaun, and 
 
 then, next day, to Lalitpur, where he rejoined Eao Sahib, who, 
 it will be remembered, had six guns. Tantia re- 
 mained here, but Kao Sahib, with the bulk of the T^ntMand 
 troops and the guns, set off the following day, and 
 marched in a south-easterly direction. Michel mean- then separate, 
 while, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the 
 
 Betwa, followed Kao Sahib, and, making his way with great 
 difficulty through the dense Jaklaun jungle, came suddenly 
 upon him at Sindwaha, about thirty miles east of the Betwa. 
 Warned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British 
 camp, Kao Sahib had time to draw up his men on a rising 
 ground, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost 
 similar to that at Mangrauli. The English, threatened 
 on both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when totally 
 the rebels flee. In their flight, however, they were, 
 on this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangrauli. 
 
 Michel had his cavalry handy ; the ground, too, was unfavour- 
 able for rapid flight. In a pursuit which covered 
 twelve miles, the rebels then suffered severely. 
 
 Eao Sahib, however, escaped. The English lost escapes.’ 
 five officers and twenty men in killed and wounded. 
 
 Kao Sahib rejoined Tantia at Lalitpur, and again the two 
 held counsel as to the future. The country north of 
 the Narbada seemed about to close on them. The The rebel 
 circle was gradually lessening, and in a few days chiefs unite 
 they would be in the folds of the destroyer. They to cross the 
 saw this clearly, saw that their only chance was to 
 break through the circle and march to the south, 
 putting the enemy, if possible, on a false scent. This was the 
 difficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to 
 attempt it. 
 
 It is impossible to withhold admiration from the pertinacity 
 with which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lalitpur, 
 
 * Of this action Tantia writes : “ On onr march to Mangrauli we met the 
 English army. Shots wea’e fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and 
 
 fled.” 
 
238 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tInTIX TOPI. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Retreat 
 of Tjinti^ 
 towards the 
 Narbad^. 
 
 Jlichel learns 
 that T^ntici 
 is marching 
 southwards 
 and follows 
 in pursuit. 
 
 Tantia and the Rao, whose design was to escape southwards, 
 marched to Kajuria, with the intention of recross- 
 ing the Betwa near that place and turning thence 
 southward. But, the ford being guarded by Colonel 
 Liddell, Tantia turned north-eastward, and made 
 once more for Tal Bahat. There he halted to rest his men. The 
 following day, moving direct southwards, he penetrated into 
 the Jaklaun jungles, still to the east of the Betwa. He halted 
 one day at Jaklaim, and the next at Itawah (in the Sagar dis- 
 trict). There he heard that the English army was on his track, 
 so he at once broke up and pushed on towards Kurai.* 
 
 Whilst he is making that march I must return to General 
 Michel. From the field of Sindwaha that general 
 had marched to Lalitpur, keeping always to the 
 westward of Tantia with the view of baulking the 
 intention he believed he might entertain of breaking 
 through to the south. On reaching Lalitpur, however, 
 a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with 
 the information that Tantia had been met marching southwards, 
 and had probably gained the west side of the general. No time 
 was to be lost. Michel, sending off an express to warn Parke, 
 and pressing southwards by forced marches, came upon Tantia 
 by a cross road just as that chief was approaching 
 the village of Kurai. Instantly the battle joined. 
 The British cavalry separated from one another 
 the two wings of the rebels’ forces. But, whilst 
 the British were engaged in annihilating the left 
 wing, the right, with which were Tantia and Rao 
 Sahib, favoured by the jungle, managed to escape 
 westward. JNot that the left wing fought to save 
 their comrades ; they had fied in the direction from 
 which they had advanced, and the whole of Michel’s force had 
 pounced upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tantia 
 and Rao Sahib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice 
 of one-half of their followers.! 
 
 This happened on the 25th of October. Tantia pushed on to 
 Rajgarh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod,J by 
 
 Catches him 
 at Kurai. 
 
 Whilst he 
 annihilates 
 Tiintid’s 
 left wing, 
 the right 
 wing escapes. 
 
 * Itawah lies thirty-eight, Kurai thirty- two, miles to the north-west ^of Sagar. 
 t Tantia writes of this action : “ The English force came up in the morning 
 and our army became separated, I accompanied the Rao Sahib,” &c. Not a word 
 about the sacrifice of the wing. 
 
 X Bagrod lies thirty-nine miles to the north-west of Sagar. 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE LINE OF THE NARBADI. 
 
 239 
 
 Colonel Charles Becher, one of the most gallant 
 officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of molested on 
 a newly-raised regiment,* did not hesitate to attack 
 his whole force. Becher inflicted considerable loss 
 (upwards of forty men killed), but Tantia pressed on, and, 
 proceeding via Bajgarh, crossed the Narbada into the 
 N agpur territory at a point about forty miles above 
 Hoshangabad. 
 
 Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplished a 
 movement which, carried out twelve months earlier, 
 would have produced an effect fatal for the time to Effect which 
 British supremacy ; a movement which would have teen^prU^^ 
 roused the whole of the western Presidency, have ducedbythe 
 kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizam, and 
 have, in its working, penetrated to southern India, earlier. 
 
 It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphin- 
 stone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so suc- 
 cessful, which Durand had exerted all his energiena, h&d used 
 entreaties of the most urgent character with the Government of 
 India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to him, 
 to hinder. And now it was accomplished ! The nephew of the 
 man recognised by the Marathas as the lawful heir of the last 
 reigning Peshwa was on Maratha soil with an army ! 
 
 I have said that, had that event occurred but fifteen months 
 previously, British authority in western India would, 
 for the time, have succumbed. As it was — the 
 event happening in October 1858, when the sparks even in 
 of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh 
 excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in 
 Oudh, they were being surely trampled out — the event caused 
 alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bombay 
 and Madras. Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a re- 
 markable degree, a true appreciation of the character of the 
 rebellion and of the manner in which it should be Bombay 
 met, even he could not view without grave concern 
 the arrival of Tantia Topi and Kao Sahib in the country of the 
 Bhonslas, that country the annexation of which but a few years 
 previously had moved the Maratha heart to its core. He could 
 not but remember that a large proportion of the population of 
 the Bombay Presidency was Maratha, and he could not foresee — 
 
 * Now one of tlie regiments Central Indian Horse. 
 
240 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF tAnTII TOPI. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 who, indeed, could foresee ? — the effect which might he produced 
 on the easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the 
 presence of the representative of the man whom many amongst 
 them regarded as their rightful ruler. 
 
 Nor could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of 
 In Madras 1857-58, had shown himself prompt to meet every 
 difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings 
 that the Maratha leader had crossed the Narbada. True it was 
 til at the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now 
 chosen by Tantia as his campaigning-ground by the vast terri- 
 tories of the Nizam. True it was that the Nizam, guided by his 
 able and far-seeing minister Salar Jang, had displayed to the Brit- 
 ish a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar. 
 The population of the Nizam’s territories was to a very consider- 
 able extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before, as in the case 
 of Sindhia, of a people revolting against their sovereign when 
 that sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was 
 impossible not to fear lest the army of Tantia should rouse to 
 arms the entire Maratha population, and that the spectacle of a 
 people in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible 
 force on the people of the Dakhan. 
 
 Fortunately, these fears were not realised. Six years’ ex- 
 perience of British rule had produced a remarkable 
 effect upon the feelings of the Central Provinces. 
 Whatever might be the feelings of the landowners, 
 of the courtiers, and of those Brahmans who, by 
 means of their influence in a court where Brah- 
 manical influence was supreme, were able to live a 
 life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without 
 having recourse to industry and toil, this at least is 
 certain, that the peasantry had no desire to recur to their old 
 masters. In this respect the Central Provinces presented a re- 
 markable contrast to Oudh and Bundelkhand. With all its 
 faults, the people of this part of India preferred the substantial 
 justice of the rule of their alien lords. It is, indeed, a remark- 
 able fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindhia and in the 
 principalities governed by Kajpiit princes, Tantia and his 
 followers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always 
 obtained from them, without pressure and without payment, 
 supplies in abundance, in the Maratha country beyond the 
 Narbada the peasantry regarded them as pests in whose face 
 Uie doOr was to be closed and tho gates were to be barred. 
 
 The people 
 of the 
 Central 
 Provinces 
 manifest a 
 marked 
 antipathy to 
 T^ntii ^ind 
 his followers. 
 
1858.] THE SOUTH AND WEST BARRED TO tInTIA. 241 
 
 finds 
 the country 
 to the south 
 and west 
 barred 
 against him. 
 
 who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, if it 
 could he managed without injury to themselves, no supplies 
 at all. 
 
 To return to the story. Tantia, crossing the Narbada forty 
 miles above Hoshangahad, proceeded via Fathpur to Multai * 
 in the direction of Nagpur, but, learning that a British force 
 from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp westward, 
 hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an unguarded 
 pass in the hills. He found this impossible, for 
 Brigadier Hill of the Haidarabad contingent was 
 watching at Melghat and Asirgarh ; further west- 
 ward, Sir Hugh Eose had made preparations to 
 prevent Tantia from crossing into Khandesh, and, 
 further westward still. General Koberts was bring- 
 ing up troops to bar Gujrat against him. Nothing could have 
 been more tantalising, for south of the Tapti river, from the 
 banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Satpura 
 range, lay the country to which Nana Sahib laid claim as his 
 rightful inheritance.! Across this, under the circumstances, 
 Tantia dared not venture. Shut out, then, from further pro- 
 gress west or south, Tantia made a turn north-westwards into 
 Holkar’s possessions, south of the Narbada, hoping to recross 
 the Narbada un perceived and to penetrate thence into the 
 territory of the Gaikwar. On the 19th November he reached 
 Kargun, a decayed town in Nimar. Here was stationed a de- 
 tachment of Holkar’s troops, consisting of two troops of cavalry, 
 a company of infantry, and two guns. These Tantia forced to 
 join him, and then pushed on westward. On the 
 23rd he crossed near Than, the great high road from 
 Bombay to Agra, just as it was being traversed by 
 carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the 
 English. Plundering these, taking with him the 
 natives who had been escorting the carts, and de- 
 stroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, 
 feeling confident of success if only he could reach 
 the Narbada before the English, whom he believed he had out- 
 manoeuvred, should molest him. 
 
 He turns to 
 the north- 
 west with the 
 intention of 
 recrossing 
 the Narbadi 
 and marching 
 on Barodah. 
 
 * Multdi is a town in the Betul district, twenty-eight miles east of Bednur, 
 its chief attraction is a large tank which is reverenced by the natives as the 
 source of the river Taptf. 
 t Blackwood'' 8 Magazine, August 1860. 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 R 
 
242 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF TInTII TOPf. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 But Fortune did not favour him. Michel, indeed, after 
 Michel defeating Tantia at Kurai, had pushed on in pursuit, 
 though not on the same track, and, with his cavalry, 
 had reached Hoshangahad on the 7th of November. There he 
 joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet him. 
 
 Leaving Parke at Hoshangahad, Michel crossed the 
 inforaa^ioD Narbada and found himself in the wild country 
 about Betul, with no accurate maps, no information 
 of his own regarding the movements of the rebels, with no 
 prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities. Left 
 thus to the resources of his own intelligence, Michel came 
 to the conclusion that the roads to the south and 
 TEST’S in west would Certainly be barred to Tantia, and 
 
 tentions, that, although there was but little prospect of his 
 attempting to recross the Narbada, yet that it would 
 not be wise on his part to move too far from that river. Im- 
 pressed with this idea, he ordered Parke to cross the 
 s?^8to^baffle Hoshangabad, to march in a direction 
 
 ^ ^ south-west by west, and take up a position at 
 Charwah, eighty miles south-east from Indur, a 
 town forming the angle nearest the Narbada of a triangle of 
 which Melghat and Asirgarh, both occupied by British troops, 
 formed the other angles. In that direction, though more 
 slowly, he moved himself. 
 
 Whilst General Michel was making these preparations south 
 of the Narbada, the British authorities at Mau, to 
 The British ^lie north of it, were receiving disquieting rumours 
 Mdu regarding the continued and persistent movements 
 
 of Tantia westward. Dreading lest that chief should 
 get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies, and 
 destroy the telegraph wires, Sir Eobert Hamilton and Brigadier 
 Edwards, who commanded at Mau, deemed it advisable, before 
 Tantia had pillaged the carts in the manner already 
 to wS'uie related, to post two small infantry detachments to 
 fords onhe watch the fords above Akbarpur. A day or two 
 
 ^ ' later, when intelligence was received that the 
 
 westerly movement was being prolonged. Major Sutherland, 
 who commanded one of these detachments, consisting of a 
 hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred of the 
 4th Bombay Eifles, received instructions to cross the river at 
 Akbarpur and keep clear the grand trunk road. Sutherland 
 obeyed his orders, and passing through Than — the village 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTll TOPf. 
 
 243 
 
 Sutherland 
 crosses the 
 Narbadcl to a 
 point below 
 that tra- 
 versed by 
 Tcioti^. 
 
 already spoken of — seventeen miles from Akbarpur, 
 proceeded to Jilwanab, thirteen miles further on, 
 nearer to Bombay. There he was when, on the 
 afternoon of the 23rd of November, Tantia and 
 his troops passed through Than, plundered the 
 carts and cut the telegraph wires, as already de- 
 scribed. 
 
 Tantia having taken the precaution to carry off with him all 
 the men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some 
 hours ignorant of this occurrence. He had been reinforced on 
 the morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels 
 from Mau. The evening of that day, the report regarding the 
 plundering reached him. The next morning, taking with him 
 a hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, 
 riding alternately on camels, Sutherland proceeded 
 to Than, and inspected as far as possible the damage 
 done.* Learning there that the rebels had taken a 
 westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in 
 sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rajpur, 
 nearly midway between Than and the Narbada. Pushing on, his 
 men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the 
 enemy’s stragglers and the quantities of abandoned 
 baggage and baggage-animals, Sutherland, in half 
 an hour, had approached near enough to force a 
 battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount ; but the delay 
 thus caused gave Tantia an opportunity, of which he availed 
 himself, to retire. Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit, 
 he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear-guard — the 
 men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire for 
 combat, had marched at a great pace. Keeping the whole 
 of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the 
 pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with Resumes the 
 the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky Pursuit, 
 ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the 
 
 Sutherland 
 learns the 
 vicinity of 
 Tantia and 
 pursues him. 
 
 Catches him 
 only to see 
 him retire. 
 
 ♦ “ The road for eight miles was strewed with articles, taken bj the rebels 
 the previous day from some merchants’ carts on the main road ; several carts 
 had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired. The soldiers 
 filled their water-bottles with port or sherry, of which there was enough to have 
 ftocked a large cellar, but not a man got intoxicated. A cart-load of books had 
 been opened by the rebels during a halt — the contents were torn up and strewed 
 in a circle, with a Walker’s Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle.” — 
 Blackwood, August 1860. 
 
244 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTIA TOPt. 
 
 l1858. 
 
 Slnf fJimed Holkar found at Kargun, pointing down the 
 
 in order of I’oad. Tantia had with him from three to four 
 battle, thousand men. Sutherland had just two hundred. 
 
 After a little skirmishing, the smaller number charged the 
 larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape, they 
 captured the guns. Lieutenant Humfries, adjutant of the 92rjd, 
 receiving a sword-cut from their commandant, who 
 pats^them^ was killed at his post. The rebel infantry then 
 to flight fled. The casualties on both sides were trifling.^ 
 Sutherland, whose men were too tired to pursue,, 
 encamped on the ground he had gained. 
 
 The presence of the two guns with Tantia’s force had neces- 
 sitated that slow march over rough ground which 
 lievedofhis had allowed Sutherland to Overtake him. Now that 
 resumes theguns were lust his men were able to display that 
 ’ ’ capacit}' for rapid marching in which the natives of 
 
 India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled, by any 
 troops in the world. So quickly did they cover the ground 
 that, when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached the- 
 banks of the Narbada, he beheld the rebel force comfortably 
 encamped on the opposite bank. Between him and 
 th^NSadii their camp flowed the waters of the Narbada, at 
 between him- that point flve hundred yards broad, its banks high 
 pOTsuem^*^ and difBcult. To cross it in the face of an enemy 
 twenty times his stretigth would have been an 
 impossibilit 3 ^ even for the troops he commanded. 
 
 That Tantia had been able to cross the Narbada can only be 
 accounted for by the fact that he had marched the 
 tharxSd previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, and 
 bad^been^abie had thus at least twelve hours’ start of his pursuers.. 
 NarbTdV ^ It was well for him that he had that start. When 
 he reached the left bank of the Narbada Tantia had 
 beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sawars under 
 an officer. f Under ovher circumstances the sight of these men 
 might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherland 
 
 * Regarding this action, Ta'ntia writes (after referring to the capture of the 
 carts) ; “ We then left the high road and proceeded w^estward. The next day 
 we were surprised by the English force, and, leaving our two guns, we fled and 
 reached the Narbada.” 
 
 t So states Tantia himself, and I have usually found his statements corro- 
 borated by other writers. But I have been unable to ascertain who were thete 
 troopers or who was the officer. Probably he was a native officer. 
 
1858.] THE PUKSUIT OF tAnTIA TOPf. 245 
 
 was behind him. He, therefore, plunged boldly in. The sawars 
 then took to flight. 
 
 At midnight Tantia, having plundered a village called 
 Chikla, broke up his camp on the Narbada, and 
 marched in the direction of Barodah. It was his 
 last chance, but it was a great one could he but Barodah 
 arrive before the English. Barodah was the seat of 
 a Maiatha dynasty, and it was known that a large party at the 
 court sympathised deeply with Nana Sahib. There were in the 
 city only one company of Europeans and two native regiments, 
 besides the troops of the Gaikwar, who were almost sure to join 
 the rebels. Full of the hope raised by the prospects hope 
 
 before him, Tantia pushed on rapidly, marching 
 from the banks of the Narbada thirty-four miles straight on 
 end. He halted at Rajpura, took three thousand nine hundred 
 rupees and three horses from the chief, of that 
 place, and marched the next day for Chhota Udaipur,^ Sty miles of° 
 enly fifty miles from Barodah and connected with Barodah. 
 it by a road. Could he arrive at and quit that 
 place unmolested, his future, he thought, would be assured. 
 
 But his pursuers were too many. I left General Michel and 
 Brigadier Parke, in the second week of November, 
 nt Charwah, south of the Narbada, confident that discovers 
 Tantia’s progress to the south was barred, and that Steuttons 
 he would endeavour to seek some means of recrossing 
 into Malwa. Some days elapsed before an accurate account of 
 his movements reached Michel. That able officer displayed 
 then not a moment’s hesitation as to the course to be followed. 
 Kecrossing the Narbada at the Barwani ford, he marched 
 himself on Mau, while he despatched Parke with a 
 hying column of cavalry, mounted infantry, and two despatches 
 guns, to pursue Tantia with the utmost speed that s^t'oVh^im!^^ 
 was possible. 
 
 Parke carried out these instructions, to the letter. Marching, 
 in nine days, two hundred and forty-one miles, catches 
 
 for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread T^nti^ at 
 his way through a dense jungle, he came up with §dSpdr. 
 Tantia on the morning of the 1st of December, at 
 
 * Chhota Udaipur is a state in the Rewa Kantha district, the chief of which 
 pays an annual tribute to the Gaikwar. It possesses an area of about eight 
 hundred and seventy -three square miles. 
 
246 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF TANTll TOPI. 
 
 [185& 
 
 Chhota Udaipur, just an hour or two after he had reached 
 that place. Considering the climate, the nature of the country, 
 and the other difficulties of the route, this march must he con- 
 sidered as rivalling any of which history makes record. 
 
 The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9-pounder 
 guns Bombay Artillery, fifty men 8th Hussars, fifty of the 
 2nd Bombay Cavalry, a party of the Maratha horse 
 Parke.^^^^^ Under Kerr — which, after having disarmed the 
 southern Maratha country, had been sent from the 
 west to join Michel — Moore’s Aden Horse, a hundred of the 
 72nd Highlanders, mounted on camels, and a hundred and 
 twent^^-five Gujrati Irregular Horse. For the last twenty miles 
 before reaching Chhota Udaipur, this force had, as I have 
 stated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skilfully 
 piloted by Moore with his Aden Horse. On emerging 
 from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels. He 
 force. instantly surprised their outlying picket. The 
 
 ground beyond the jungle was covered with large 
 trees, brushwood, and tents still standing,* and was so broken 
 as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery. As 
 Ws^forcffn troops debouched on to it, he deployed his 
 
 battle array, force, placing some of the 8th Hussars, of the 
 Maratha Horse and the Aden horse on his right; 
 the rest of the Maratha Horse, under Kerr, on his left, the 
 72nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre ; the 
 remainder of the cavalry in the rear. His whole front scarcely 
 covered two hundred yards. The rebels meanwhile, roused to 
 action, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They 
 numbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the 
 T^nti^’s British force on both sides. Tantia fii st endeavoured 
 
 aggressive to tum the British left, but Kerr, changing his 
 
 SSd! front, charged with great impetuosity, and, driving 
 the rebels from the field, pursued them for a con- 
 siderable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt 
 on the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry 
 stationed there, Bannerman, of the Southern Maratha Horse, 
 greatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his 
 own hands. In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal 
 Irregulars, borne by the rebels, was captured. Whilst the 
 wings were thus engaged, the two British guns had kept up 
 
 * Tdntia admits that he was surprised on this occasion. 
 
1858.J 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF TANTll TOPf. 
 
 ‘247 
 
 T^ntiii de- 
 feated and 
 cut off from 
 barodah. 
 
 Flies to the 
 
 Banswdr^ 
 
 jungles. 
 
 a heavy fire on the centre. But it was not long 
 needed. With the repulse of the flanking attacks 
 the action terminated. A pursuit along the whole 
 line then followed. 
 
 This engagement was fatal to Tantia’s hopes regarding 
 Barodab. Leaving his route to the westward, he 
 fled northwards into the jungles of Banswara, the 
 southernmost principality of Rajputana. These 
 jungles, extremely dense in their character, are 
 inhabited principally by Bhils, a wild and uncivilised race, 
 much given to plunder. Hemmed in on the south by the 
 Narbada, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrat, 
 now completely guarded by General Roberts, and on the 
 north and east by difficult ranges which separate it from 
 Udaipur and Sirohi, and the passes across which are few and 
 difficult, Tantia might have been excused if he had despaired 
 of escape. But he did not despair. Rao Sahib was 
 now his only companion, the Nawab of Bandah having 
 in November taken advantage of the Royal Pro- 
 clamation to surrender.* But these two men were, 
 in this hour of supreme danger, as cool, as bold, as fertile 
 in resource, as at any previous period of their 
 careers. 
 
 And yet the British commanders had done their 
 utmost to hem in Tantia. They really believed that at last they 
 had him. The troops of Roberts’s division were ^he cordon 
 echeloned along the roads and paths and passes about them 
 leading from Banswara to the west. On that side comp^iete^*^^ 
 escape was impossible. A force detached from 
 Nimach under Major Rocke guarded the passes to the north and 
 north-west. Another column sent from Mau, under Colonel 
 Benson, commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, 
 watched the passes leading eastward and south-eastward, whilst 
 Tantia was cut off from the south by his recent pursuers, 
 greatly strengthened by flying detachments, fro n Burhanpur 
 and from Khandesh. To add to his difficulties, the Bhil 
 inhabitants of the jungles of Banswara, far from aiding him, 
 followed his track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, 
 anxious for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb. 
 
 But, undaunted, Tantia pressed deeper into the jungles. On 
 
 Desperate 
 position of 
 Tslntiii and 
 Riio Sahib. 
 
 They remain 
 undaunted. 
 
 * To be hereafter referred to. 
 
248 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tAnTII TOPf. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 marches to 
 
 surprise 
 
 Udaipur, 
 
 Titntid after Deogarli Bai ia * he found that hut a small 
 
 many move- poi’tion of his forcG was with him. He halted there 
 two days, to allow his men to reunite. This result 
 having been obtained, he, on the 10th of December, 
 entered Banswara. Here he halted a day, his men plundering 
 sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth from Ahmadabad. He 
 probably would have halted here longer but that informa- 
 tion reached him that Colonel Somerset’s brigade was closing 
 up from Eatlam.j' Disturbed by this information, 
 he marched in a nearly north-westerly direction to 
 Salumba, an isolated fort belonging to the Eana of 
 Udaipur, encircled by hills, in the heart of the 
 Aravali range. ^ It was a strong position, commanding the 
 approaches to Udaipur. Here Tantia obtained some supplies, 
 of which he was greatly in need, and set off the following day 
 in the hope of surprising Udaipur. But the British had received 
 information of his movements, and Major Eocke’s 
 Rocke column had taken up a position at Bhansror, whence 
 
 Bhinsror, it would be easy for him to cover Udaipur or to fall 
 
 on Tantia as he emerged from the northern passes. 
 Discovering this obstacle before he had committed himself too 
 far, Tantia turned sharply to the north-east and took up a 
 position at the village of Bhilwara,| in the densest 
 part of the jungle. Here, it is said, Tantia and his 
 followers debated the advisability of surrendering. 
 But the intelligence which reached them during 
 their deliberations that Man Singh was at hand, and 
 that Prince Piruzshah was advancing to their assist- 
 ance, induced them to persevere in their resistance, 
 to give one more chance to Fortune. 
 
 Tantia halted two days at Bhilwara and then made for 
 Partabgarh, the capital of the Eajah of the state of 
 that name. His probable line of route had been 
 well divined by the English general. But he, too, 
 had received information of Firuzshah’s movements, 
 and it was necessary to arrange to meet him also. 
 For this purpose, Somerset had been despatched with 
 
 moves back 
 into tbe 
 jungles, and 
 deliberates 
 regarding 
 surrender. 
 
 Decides 
 against it. 
 
 The English 
 movements 
 somesvhat 
 disarranged 
 by the news 
 of the ap- 
 proaf'h of 
 Eiruzslidh. 
 
 * De'ogarh Baria is the capital of a state of the same name as Eewa Kantha, 
 in the province of Gujrat. 
 
 t Ratlam lies fifty miles to the west of Ujjen. 
 
 X Not the town of the same name on the road between Nimach and Nasir- 
 ahad 
 
1858.] 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF TANTll TOPI. 
 
 249 
 
 a light column to Agra, Eocke had been moved to take his 
 place at Partahgarh, whilst Parke, plunging into the jungles 
 from the westward, was rapidly foUowing on the track of the 
 fugitives. 
 
 It thus happened that when, at 4 o’clock in the afternoon of 
 the 25th of December, Tantia and his followers 
 emerged from the jungles close to Partahgarh, he from 
 
 found himself face to face with Major Eocke. That the jungles, 
 officer, not having a sufficient number of men at his 
 disposal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about 
 two miles from the jungles, whence ^he could march to any 
 point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided 
 he had any information of their movements. On this occasion 
 he had no such information. His force, too, was, as 1 have 
 said, small, consisting only of two hundred infantry, two guns, 
 and a handful of native cavalry. He had no chance, 
 however, of assuming the offensive. Tantia marched 
 straight at him, and kept him engaged for two 
 hours, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to 
 clear the pass. Seeing this result gained, Tantia, and marches 
 who had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped towards Mau- 
 from the trap, marched in the direction of Mandesar, lirJp^r ^ 
 and halted for the night within six miles of that 
 place. Thence he marched very rapidly — in three days — to 
 Zirapiir, a hundred miles east-south-east of Nimach, thus 
 rdturning to the part of the country almost directly south of 
 'Owaliar. 
 
 But the English were at his heels. Benson, who had resumed 
 command of the Mau column, had received excellent inform- 
 ation regarding Tantia’s movements from Captain Hutchinson, 
 one of the assistants to Sir Eobert Hamilton. He pushed on 
 after Tantia, then, marching thirty-five miles a day, 
 caught him up at Zirapur the very day he had ^a^tcheshim 
 arrived there. Tantia, completely surprised, fled atzirjipur. 
 without fighting, leaving six of his elephants 
 behind him, and pushed northwards to Barod. 
 
 Here another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached 
 Zirapur the morning after Tantia had left it. Pie had two 
 horse artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the 
 -ammunition wagons, he attached them to Benson’s two guns. 
 With these four guns, and the ammunition contained in the 
 limber, Somerset started at once, and, marching seventy miles 
 
250 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF TANTli. TOPI. 
 
 [185&. 
 
 is caught forty-eight hours, came upon Tantia at Barod. 
 
 thereby After an action fought in the usual Tantia Topi 
 Sdt^a^en. rebels fled to Nahargarh in the Kota 
 
 territory. Here Tantia was fired at by the Kiladar.* 
 Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Eao Sahib 
 then sent a messenger to summon Man Sing, the chief to 
 whom I have referred in an earlier portion of this chapter as 
 having rebelled against Sindhia, who had appointed to meet 
 him at this place. On Man Singh’s arrival the 
 rebels moved to Paron, where they halted two days. 
 They then pushed northwards towards Indragarh. 
 On reaching the banks of the Chambal, Man Singh, for some 
 unexplained reason, left them. On the 13th of January they 
 reached Indragarh, f where Firuzshah, with ^ his bodyguard and 
 the mutinied 12th Irregulars, met them. To 
 F?razshih. ascertain how this had been possible, I must return 
 to the movements of General Napier and the Central 
 Indian force. 
 
 I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, 
 at the end of September, expelled Man Singh from 
 the Gwaliar territory. His detached parties still 
 continued to operate in the districts to the west and 
 south-west of Gwaliar, bordering on Eajputana, and 
 the work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful 
 character. In this manner passed the months of October and 
 November, but in December Gwaliar was invaded by a new 
 enemy. 
 
 The pseudo-prince, Firuzshah, already mentioned in these 
 pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandesar by 
 Durand in November, 1857, proceeded with his 
 followers to Eohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in 
 that quarter. Expelled from Eohilkhand by Lord Clyde, he 
 entered Oudh, and cast in his lot with the irre- 
 Oudh^and concilables who, to the last, refused submission to 
 
 Eohilkhand, the paramount power. It was only when the 
 native cause was absolutely lost in that province 
 that Firuzshah, reading the glowing accounts of his achieve- 
 ments which Tantia Topi regularly transmitted from the 
 
 The story 
 reverts to 
 General 
 Napier. 
 
 Finizshilh, 
 
 * Kiladdr — the commandant of a fort. 
 
 t Indragarh is a fort and town in the Bundi state, forty-five miles north-east 
 Kota. 
 
1858.] 
 
 NAPIEK PURSUES FIRUZSHIh. 
 
 251 
 
 Chambal and tlie Narbada, determined to march to 
 
 the assistance of one whom he could not but consider xlntik 
 
 as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at xopf ; 
 
 this resolution he was at a place called Bisuah, not 
 
 far from Sitapur. Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed 
 
 the Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph wire on 
 
 the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he 
 
 was about to proceed north-westwards. Instead of 
 
 that, he took the road to Itawah, baffled a gallant pursuit, 
 
 attempt made by Lieutenant Forbes,* accompanied 
 
 by Mr. Hume and Captain Doyle — who lost his life — to stop 
 
 him at Harchandpiir, out-marched a column led by Brigadier 
 
 Herbert from Kanhpur to pursue him, crossed the 
 
 Jamnah on the 9th, and moved off in the direction fnfo^^sindhia's 
 
 of Jhansi. He marched with such speed that on the country. 
 
 17th he had arrived in the vicinity of Eanod, a 
 
 large town fifty miles north-east of Giinah. It was here ho 
 
 encountered his first check. 
 
 General, now become Sir Eobert, Napier, had received timely 
 intimation regarding the course pursued by Firuz- 
 shah, and he had sent out detachments to watch the is in^ 
 
 roads which that chieftain would probably follow, movements, 
 On the morning of the 12th of December he 
 received from the commander of one of these, Captain 
 McMahon, 14th Light Dragoons, located near the confluence 
 of the Jamnah, Chambal, and Sind rivers, information to the 
 effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district of 
 Kuchwaghar, a tract of country often under water. Believing, 
 from this, that their course would be up the jungles 
 of the Sind river, Napier marched at 2 o’clock that ^n^pursues 
 day with a lightly-equipped force,| intending to 
 proceed to Dabra on the Jhansi road, thence, according to the 
 information he might receive, to intercept the enemy. 
 
 * For his services in the Itawah district Lieutenant Forbes received the 
 thanks of the Governor-General, published in General Orders. At the close of 
 the war he was gazetted to he major if as soon as he should attain the rank of 
 captain. 
 
 t Two Bombay light field-hattery guns, Capt. G. G. Brown ; a hundred and 
 fifty men 14th Light Dragoons, Major Prettijohn; a hundred men 2nd Gwaliar 
 Marathd. Horse, Captain Smith ; a hundred and seventeen men 71st Highlanders, 
 Major Rich ; fifty men 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Forbes ; forty^ 
 camels, Gwalidr Camel Corps, Captain Templer. 
 
252 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTli. TOPl 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Napier 
 
 Napier’s 
 accurate con- 
 ceptions re- 
 garding the 
 enemy’s 
 movements 
 
 halted that evening at Antri. At 2 o’clock the 
 following morning, however, he was roused by an 
 express message from the political agent at Gwaliar, 
 Charters Maepherson, to the effect that information 
 he had received led him to believe that the rebels 
 would pass by Gohad, north of Gwaliar. Instead, 
 then, of pushing on to Dahra, Napier halted till the 
 post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for the 
 belief expressed bj Maepherson. He did well not to act upon 
 it without due caution, for at half-past 10 o’clock the tahsildar 
 of Antri came to him to state that he had just ridden in from 
 Dahra, and had seen there the smoke of the staging 
 bungalow which the rebels were then burning, and 
 that they were taking a south-westerly direction. 
 The express from Gwaliar had just come in time to 
 baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier’s brain, for, 
 had it not arrived, he would have caught them at 
 the very spot he had selected. 
 
 There was nothing for it now but to march southwards. 
 
 Leaving Antri, then, immediately, Napier proceeded 
 with great rapidity in that direction. At Bitaur, 
 which he reached on the 14th, he learned the rebels 
 were only nine miles in front of him. He pressed 
 forward, then, and at that place, the Gwaliar 
 Maratha Horse, for the first time under fire, came in contact 
 with the rear-guard of the enemy, and greatly distinguished 
 
 are baffled 
 for the mo- 
 ment by a 
 despatch 
 from the 
 political 
 agent. 
 
 Napier 
 pursues 
 and ap- 
 proaches 
 the rebels. 
 
 themselves. 
 
 Napier continued the pursuit through Narwar, and leaving 
 there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artillery, 
 who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirty- 
 eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalry, 
 including twenty-five of the Balandshahr horse he found 
 halted at Narwar, and, proceeding with the utmost 
 S^RdSd^^™ speed, reached Ranod on the morning of the 17th 
 before the rebels had arrived there. His divination 
 that they would make their way through the jungles of the 
 Sind river had proved to be perfectly accurate. 
 
 Firuzshah, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous and 
 F ruzshiih difficult road through the jungles to the easier but 
 ignorant that more Open route followed by Napier. Naturally he 
 wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effect, 
 with an unbeaten force, the contemplated junction 
 
1858.] NAPIEE OUTMANCEUVEES AND DEFEATS HIM. 253 
 
 with Tantia Topi. As it was, he had marched on a line almost 
 parallel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only 
 the temptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Eanod which 
 had saved him from an attack the previous day. But Napier 
 had now reached Eanod before him, and the sacking 
 of the place was likelj’- to he more difficult than he “at^pSce!^ 
 had anticipated. Full, however, of confidence, and 
 utterly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firuzshah 
 marched on that eventful morning against Eanod, guided by a 
 zamindar of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass 
 extended in a front of nearly a mile. 
 
 Napier had scarcely time to form up the 14th Light 
 Dragoons, when the rebels were within a few yards 
 of him. The Gwaliar Maratha horse had been 
 impeded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding- 
 camels, and were a little behind. The force actually engaged 
 consisted of a hundred and thirty-three 14th Light Dragoons 
 under Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Maratha Horse under 
 Captain F. H. Smith, and thirty-eight of the 71st Highlanders 
 under Captain Smith, mounted on camels, and guided by 
 Captain Templer. 
 
 As soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance, 
 Prettijohn and his hundred and thirty- three light 
 dragoons dashed into their midst. The blow Prettijohn 
 completely doubled them up. Though individuals them, and 
 amongst them fought bravely, the mass made no 
 stand whatever. Their one thought seemed to be to try and 
 escape. They were in full flight before the Maratha 
 Horse could come upon the scene, in time only dXat?^^ 
 to participate in the pursuit. That pursuit was 
 continued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants, 
 several horses and ponies, and many arms. They left a hundred 
 and fifty dead bodies on the ground before Eanod, includiog 
 those of some native officers of the 12th Irregulars, the murderers 
 of the gallant Holmes. Prettijohn having been 
 severely wcmnded before the pursuit began, the 
 command of the dragoons devolved on Captain 
 Need, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the 
 pursuit at three hundred. On the British side the wounded 
 amounted to sixteen ; one of these died subsequently of his 
 wounds. 
 
 Firuzshah led the fugitives in the direction of Chanderi. 
 
254 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TANTli. TOPI. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 Firtizsh^ 
 makes for 
 the Ardnl 
 jungles. 
 
 Gallantry 
 of Stack. 
 
 Learning, however, that one British force * * * § had 
 moved towards Eanod from Jhansi, and another f 
 from Lalitpiir to Chanderi, he suddenly turned 
 westward, passing fsagarh and Piichar, and made 
 for the jungles of Aroni. Passing near Eampiir, between Griinah 
 and Sironj, he came suddenly upon forty men of the 1st Bombay 
 Lancers, under Lieutenant Stack, escorting clothing and re- 
 mounts to Brigadier Smith. He at once attacked 
 the leading files of those forty men. His followers 
 had in fact captured the clothing and made prisoner 
 of one trooper, when Stack gallantly brought up the rest of his 
 men, and, skirmishing with the rebels, carried the remainder of 
 his charge to Gunah. The rebels then pushed on to Aroni. 
 Rice marches Captain W. Eice, 25th Bombay Native 
 
 from Gunah Infantry, a noted tiger-slayer, had been ordered 
 FkuzsMh with a small column J from Gunah to intercept 
 their retreat. At Barod, on the 22nd of December, 
 he learned from a horse-dealer, who had been robbed by them, 
 that the rebels were encamped near the village of Sarpiir, 
 eleven miles distant. Leaving his camp standing under charge 
 of forty-two men, Eice set ofi" that night, and, outmarching the 
 guns with his infantry, surprised the enemy at 
 himoff.^^* 11 P.M. The surprise was so complete that the 
 rebels made no resistance, but ran ofi* at once, 
 leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and much 
 clothing. From this point Firuzshah made the best 
 of his way, unmolested, to Eajgarh, hoping to meet 
 there Tantia Topi. He lingered there for a few 
 days waiting for his ally, but, learning that Brigadier 
 Smith was on his track, he made for Indragarh, 
 where, on the 13 th of January, he effected the 
 junction in the manner already related. § 
 
 I left Brigadier Somerset at Barod, having, after his march 
 of seventy miles in forty-eight hours, driven Tantia 
 of ih?British place. Brigadier Smith, who had been 
 
 coiumue” posted at Sironj, had, after Napier had driven Firuz- 
 shah southwards, moved in pursuit of him from that 
 
 Firuzshah 
 then naakes 
 for Indra- 
 garh, where 
 he joins 
 Tantia Topi. 
 
 * Under Brigadier Ainslie. 
 
 t Under Colonel Liddell. 
 
 j Two 9-pounders, ninety Royal Engineers, fifty-five 86th Foot, a hundred 
 and fifty 25th Native Infantry, a hundred and forty Meade’s Horse. 
 
 § Page 250. 
 
1859.] 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF tInTII TOPf. 
 
 255 
 
 place, and liad been near Bared wben Somerset beat Tantia 
 there. He was now moving on Indragarh in pursuit of 
 Firuzshah. General Michel was at this time — early in J anuary 
 1859 — at Chapra, ten or twelve miles due north of Barod. 
 Thence he directed Colonel Becher to join him with all the 
 cavalry under his command. He had previously ordered 
 Brigadier Honner, commanding the Nasirabad brigade, to march 
 in a north-easterly direction towards Indragarh, watching 
 whilst he did so the fords between that place and Kota. To 
 complete the investment of the rebels. Brigadier Showers, 
 moving with a light column from Agra, had taken up a position 
 at Kushalgarh, north-east of the Bands river. 
 
 Escape now seemed absolutely impossible. Hemmed in by 
 Napier on the north and north-east,* Showers on 
 the north-west, Somerset on the east. Smith on the 
 south-east, Michel and Benson on the south, and the rebels. 
 Honner on the south-west and west, how was it 
 possible for the man who had so long defied pursuit to break 
 through the net closing around him ? It did, in very deed, 
 seem impossible. It will be seen, nevertheless, that the resources 
 of the rebel leader were not yet entirely exhausted. 
 
 Tantia had joined Firuzshah at Indragarh on the 13th of 
 January. But Indragarh was no safe resting-place. 
 
 He had sure information that two English columns knotfrig 
 were marching on it. Strange it was, however, himself to 
 that, whilst he received the fullest details regarding surrouSed, 
 the movements of the various columns which had 
 so long pursued him, and of Napier’s troops, he had heard not a 
 word of Showers’ movement. Believing, then, that 
 a way of escape in a north-westerly direction lay toSeep out 
 before him, he made a forced march to Dewasa, a by a north- 
 large fortified town about midway between Jaipur 
 and Bharatpur. 
 
 Showers heard of Tantia’s arrival at Dewasa as soon as the 
 speed of his scouts could convey the news. A „ 
 
 ^ ^ 1 Showers sur- 
 
 message to the same enect was conveyed over a prises Mm at 
 longer distance to Honner. Both brigadiers set out 
 
 * Amongst those who penned him in was a flying column under Colonel 
 Scudamore, consisting of two guns, one squadron 14th Light Dragoons, fifty 
 men of Meade’s Horse, and a hundred men of the 86th, commanded by the 
 daring Brockman. This column scoured the jungles for three weeks, chasing, 
 but never coming up with, Tantia Topi or M^n Singh. 
 
256 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF tInTII TOPI 
 
 [ 1859 . 
 
 immediately ; but Showers, starting from Kusbalgarb and 
 having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showers 
 entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tantia, 
 Eao Sahib, and Firuzshah were holding a council of war. 
 How they escaped was a miracle — they were completely sur- 
 prised. “ The English force surprised us there,” writes Tantia 
 in his journal. About three hundred of his followers were 
 killed or disabled, the remainder succeeded in escaping. 
 
 Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them. But the 
 English columns from the south-west closing too 
 Tdnti^ avails rapidly on Dewasa, had just left one opening — the 
 onTioop^oie Opening which, turning as it were the Jaipur terri- 
 to escape tory, led into Marwar. Of this Tantia and his 
 followers availed themselves, and marched with all 
 the speed of which they were callable towards the city which gives 
 its name to the principality. Passing by Alwar they turned 
 toSikar westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st. They 
 were encamped there that night when Holmes, who 
 had been sent from Nasirabad with a small party of the 83rd 
 and the 12th Bombay Native Infantry and four guns, fell upon 
 them, after marching fifty-four miles through a 
 where Sandy country in twenty-four hours. The surprise 
 
 StcheYand Complete. The rebels abandoned horses, camels, 
 
 defeats him. and even arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. A 
 few days later six hundred of them surrendered to 
 the Eajah of Bikanir. 
 
 This defeat inaugurated the break-up of Tantia’s army. On 
 that very day Firuzshah and the 12th Irregulars separated 
 from him. Since his wanderings in the Banswara jungles, 
 Tantia had been on very bad terms with Eao Sahib, and the 
 day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. “ I told 
 him,” writes Tantia, “ that I could flee no longer, and that, 
 whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would do 
 so.” Some Thakurs related to Man Singh had joined Tantia 
 that morning, and with them Tantia left the force to proceed 
 in the direction of Paron, having as followers only “two pandits 
 to cook his food, and one sais^ (groom), two horses and a pony.” 
 In the Paron jungle Tantia met Eajah Man Singh. “ Why did 
 yon leave your force ? ” asked the Eajah. “ You have not acted 
 right in so doing.” Tantia replied, “ I was tired of running 
 
 • “ The groom,” adds Tantia, “ left me and ran off after coming two stages.’ 
 
1859.] tInTIA is “TIRED OF RUNNING AWAY.” 
 
 257 
 
 away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right 
 or wrong.” In fact, after the long chase, he felt that he was 
 beaten. 
 
 Meanwhile, Rao Sahib, still with some three or four thousand 
 followers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached 
 Kushani, west of Ajmir, about eighty miles east of Jodhpur, on 
 the 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track. 
 Honner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dewasa, had, 
 after some inevitable delay, discovered the route they had 
 taken. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very 
 rapidly, reached Kushani on the morning of the 10th, having 
 accomplished a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. 
 Finding Eao Sahib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing 
 about two hundred of his followers. Rao Sahib fied southwards 
 to the Chhatarbuj Pass and reached it on the 15th. Somerset, 
 coming from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same 
 day. Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and 
 many precious hours were spent in reconnoitring, hours which 
 the Rao utilised in threading the pass. Finding, however, that 
 the British were still close to him, the Rao turned down to the 
 Banswara jungles, closely pursued. Finding the passes leading 
 to the south and east closed, the Rao then moved to the north-east 
 and passed by Partabgarh, where Tantia had encountered Major 
 Rocke only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, 
 who followed closely on his track, there occurred a 
 great diminution of his followers. Like Tantia, Jreak^^^and 
 these were “ tired of running away.” The majority disperse?* 
 of them fell out of the line during the retreat, threw 
 away their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. 
 Some of them, Muhammadans from Kanhpur and Bareli, about 
 two hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and 
 the other irreconcilables made their way to the Sironj jungles, 
 where, sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as 
 marauders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers. Organised 
 opposition to the British Government had disappeared. 
 
 Of the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in 
 whose fate the reader is naturally interested. These 
 five were Rao Sahib, Firuzshah, Man Singh, and 
 Ajit Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of 
 the drama, the Maratha Tantia Topi. Rao Sahib wandered 
 from place to place till the year 1862. * In that year he was 
 arrested in the hills north of the Panjab, disguised as a pilgrim 
 
 VOL. V. s 
 
258 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF tINTIA TOPf. 
 
 [1859. 
 
 and was sent down to Kanlipnr. There lie was tried and fonnd 
 guilty on four separate charges of instigating, and having been 
 accessory to, the murder of Europeans, and on a fifth of having 
 been a leader of the rebellion. He was hanged on the 20th of 
 August of the same year. Firuzshah was more successful in 
 FirnzsMh eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, for he fled, 
 * ‘ in the disguise of a pilgrim, to Kurbehla, where, ten 
 
 years ago, he was still living. The fate of the other two differed 
 in some respects from theirs ; their case constitutes in itself an 
 episode. 
 
 The Paron jungles, in which Tantia Topi and Man Singh 
 were hiding, constituted a portion of the large 
 an mg . estates of Narwar, of which Sindhia had un- 
 
 justly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolutely, 
 so long as each should remain true to the other, for no mere 
 retainer of Man Singh would betray his master or his master’s 
 friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Eobert Napier had 
 recognised this fact the moment he received the 
 Sir Robert report that the two chiefs in question had separated 
 ?oure^to g^n* themselves from their army and taken refuge in the 
 Mdn Singh, jungles. He had at once felt certain that to capture 
 Tantia Topi the preliminary step was to gain Man 
 Singh. No star of lesser magnitude would suffice. Now, there 
 were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to 
 gain Man Singh. He was a chief of ancient lineage, of lofty 
 birth, born to great possessions. To avenge himself on Sindhia 
 for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost every- 
 thing except the affection of his dependants and the ground on 
 which he slept ; he had imperilled his head. Thenceforward, 
 so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord, there was 
 no prospect in the present — no hope in the future. On such a 
 man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an out- 
 cast, what might not be the effect of an offer of free and absolute 
 pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindhia for the 
 restoration of some portion of his property ? 
 
 Impressed with this idea, Napier resolved to try the experi- 
 ment. It happened that on the 27th of February 
 Meade Sir Eobert had directed Meade, of Meade’s Horse, 
 sirsirado who then Commanded a detachment* at Bijraon, to 
 
 * A hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, a hundred men 9th Bombay Native 
 Infantry, a hundred men 24th Bombay Native Infantry, fifty men Meade’s Horse. 
 
1859.] MEADE NEGOTIATES WITH HIS CONFIDANTS. 259 
 
 finally proceed to Sirsimao, to dislodge thence any party of 
 rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications with 
 Gunah, and, in conjunction with Major Little’s force at Para- 
 want, to clear the roads to Amroa, Agar, Thanah, 
 
 Eajgarh, and Sipri. Napier further instructed him to open the 
 to attack Man Singh and Tantia Topi, then wander- Jungles, 
 ing in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer. 
 
 Meade reached Sirsimao on the 3rd of March, found the place 
 deserted, opened a communication that evening with 
 Little, and, in co-operation with him, was engaged 
 from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a road- dence of an 
 way up the rugged and densely-wooded pass. But, 
 before leaving Sirsimao, Meade had ascertained that Man singh. 
 the old thakur who held that village, Naraiyan Singh 
 by name, was connected with Man Singh, and possessed much 
 influence in the neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th 
 this man and his followers came to a village some four or five 
 miles distant from the pass up which the English troops were 
 working, and showed an evident desire to communicate with 
 Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtaining the 
 submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the village, 
 reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and alarmed, 
 by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to return to 
 Sirsimao with his followers. He saw the thakur again that 
 evening at the village, and drew from him a promise to bring 
 the diwan or confidental agent of Man Singh to him within two 
 or three days, and to do all in his power to induce Man Singh 
 himself to surrender. 
 
 The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a long 
 interview with the diwan. Through him he offered 
 to Man Singh the conditions he was empowered to 
 offer — a guarantee of life and subsistence. He fur- Mdn Singh, 
 ther requested the diwan to find out the Eajah’s 
 family and household, to invite them to come to his camp, to 
 promise them, should they comply, to do everything in his 
 power for their comfort, to assure them that they should not be 
 molested by the officials of the Gwaliar Durbar or by any one 
 else. With the diwan he likewise sent one letter assures 
 addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation him of safety 
 and his promise, and another addressed to Kajah JJrAisfSy. 
 Man Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He 
 impressed, moreover, upon the diwan the primary necessity of 
 
 s 2 
 
260 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tInTIX TOPf. 
 
 [1859, 
 
 tringiug in the ladies first, feeling sure that the Eajah would 
 follow. 
 
 It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Robert 
 Napier comes in. That officer, acquainted with 
 Meade’s proceedings in the matter just described, 
 and fully approving of them, had become naturally 
 impatient when day followed day and no result issued from a 
 beginning so promising. He waited a week after the interview 
 with the diwan, and when, at the expiration of that time, no 
 tidings had been received regarding the Ranis or the Rajah, he 
 determined to put greater pressure upon the latter. He wrote, 
 then, on the 18th of March to Meade, directing him to leave his 
 road- work, as “it is of great importance that the pressure upon 
 Man Singh should not be relaxed till he comes in. 
 Your letter of the 11th inst. gave hopes of certain 
 parts of Man Singh’s family coming in, but, as your 
 letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject, the Brigadier 
 General concludes that the proposals have not been renewed.” * 
 
 Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meade had no 
 information on the subject, he had grounds for believing that 
 Man Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the British 
 force ; that he had frequented places called G aria, Hatri, Bhir- 
 wan, and Mahudra ; that he had been supplied with provisions 
 from the last-named place. He accordingly directed Meade to 
 to ut res Agar, and to make a road up the Mushairi 
 
 sure'oifMln Pass through the jungles from that place by Garla 
 and Hatri to Mahudra ; and at the same time to 
 exercise pressure upon the diwan at Sirsimao by 
 threatening to quarter his force there. 
 
 In conformity with these instructions Meade marched to the 
 Mushairi Pass. He found the people in that part of the country 
 extremely hostile to the British. Not a man would give him 
 information. His surprise was great, then, when, on the 25th 
 M^n Singh’s March, the Rajah’s diwan and his own confidential 
 family sur- Servant conducted into camp the ladies of the Rajah’s 
 MeaS^ household and their attendants, some seventy per- 
 sons. Meade received them kindly, and sent them 
 on to one of the Rajah’s villages near Sipri. His servant like- 
 wise informed him that he had seen Man Singh four times, and 
 
 Singh’s 
 
 dfwiin. 
 
 * From Assistant Adjutant- General to Captain Meade, dated 18tli March, 
 1859. 
 
1859 .] 
 
 Mi.N SINGH SURKENDEES. 
 
 261 
 
 Mdn Singh 
 af^rces to 
 Meade’s 
 conditions, 
 
 that he had expressed liis intention to give himself np in two 
 or three days — a statement which was confirmed by the diwan. 
 
 Meade continued his march to Mahudra, sending a party of 
 horse in front of him with the Eajah’s diwan and a 
 munshi,* whom he instructed to open at once a 
 communication with Man Singh. On the 31st he 
 received at Mahudra the Rajah’s final offer to sur- 
 render on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined 
 to agree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following 
 conditions : — 1st, that he should be met at some distance from 
 the camp by a native of position — a ceremony the omission of 
 which is, to a native of rank, an insult ; 2nd, that he should 
 not be made over to the Gwaliar Durbar, but should remain in 
 the English camp ; 3rdly, that, after staying two or three days 
 in camp, he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Mauri, 
 near Sipri, whither the females of his family had 
 gone, to re-equip himself in a manner befitting his 
 rank. On the 2nd of April Man Singh entered the 
 British camp. 
 
 d'antia Topi was still at large; but Tantia, without Man 
 Singh, Man Singh reconciled to his enemies, was 
 u,ssailable. Now had arrived the time to play upon 
 the more selfish instincts of the Rajah. He had life, 
 and security for his life , but what was life to a 
 born feudal chieftain without consideration, without 
 esteem, without position ? What was life to a vassal lord of 
 Sindhia, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The firs' 
 feeling of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to 
 such a man in such a position would become a burden. But 
 could not the position be ameliorated ? Yes — a signal service - 
 a deed for which men would be grateful — that would remove 
 
 Feelings 
 which coursed 
 through the 
 mind of Mdn 
 Singh. 
 
 the still remaining ob‘-'tacles to a return to his position among 
 the nobles of his country. 
 
 On feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill. 
 In many conversations which he had with the Rajah 
 during the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to Meade works 
 perioi-m some service which should entitle him to feelings, 
 consideration. His reasoning had so much effect, 
 that when, at 11 o’clock on the night of the second day — the 
 
 * A “ munshi ” is, literally, a writer or secretary. It is often used in India 
 to signify a tutor, an instructor. Here it is used in its literal sense. 
 
262 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF TANTIX TOPf. 
 
 [1859, 
 
 3rd — information, reached Meade that the nncle of Man Singh, 
 Ajit Singh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band 
 of men, fifteen miles distant, in the jungle, Man 
 wiunTee?s to Singh volunteered to accompany the force of a hun- 
 M^de^inTn fifty men, at the head of- which Meade 
 
 attempt"^° immediately started. The little force reached at 
 daybreak the place where Ajit Singh had been 
 marked down, only to discover that he and his band 
 had moved off during the night. Meade pushed on in search of 
 him, some seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was 
 so dense that cavalry were useless. Ajit Singh and his men 
 were actually in this jungle, but, before Meade could surround 
 them, they became aware of the presence of enemies, and suc- 
 The uncle needed in getting away.* No one was more mortified 
 escapes! to than Man Singh. Ajit Singh was his uncle ; Ajit 
 mSiSion been his comrade on the battlefield, his 
 
 abettor in his revolt against Sindhia, and, although 
 in his fury at Man Singh’s apostasy, as he regarded it, in sur- 
 rendering to the English, he had threatened to take his life, 
 yet he stood to Man Singh in a relation than which 
 i^^momide^ there can scarcely be a closer between man and man 
 basement. — friend. Comrade, uncle, — and yet Man Singh 
 grieved bitterly that this man had not been cap- 
 tured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral debasement 
 — a prelude to one still lower ! 
 
 During the three days which followed, close observation 
 satisfied Meade that Tantia Topi was in the Paron jungles, and, 
 working daily on Man Singh’s longing desire for restoration to 
 his former position,']' he persuaded him to acknow- 
 second ]^g knew where Tantia was. From this- 
 
 moment he had made up his mind to betray him. 
 His only anxiety now was lest Tantia should slip through his 
 fingers. At that very time, to his knowledge, Tantia was de- 
 bating whether or not he should rejoin Firuzshah. Tantia had 
 
 * Ajit Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they 
 marched seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other 
 rebels near Sironj. 
 
 t “ I have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urge him ta 
 establish, by so signal an act of service” (the betrayal of Tantia Topi)j “his 
 claim to the consideration of Government, promised him by Sir E. Hamilton in 
 his telegram of the 27th ultimo.” — Major Meade to Sir R. Napier, the 8th of 
 April, 1859. Sir R. Hamilton’s telegram was to the effect that, if Man Singh 
 lurrendered, his life would be spared and his claims would receive consideration.. 
 
1859.] 
 
 THE BETEAYAL OF TANTli. TOPf. 
 
 2()3 
 
 even sent his emissaries to Meade’s camp to consult him on 
 the subject. Were Tantia to go, the chance would 
 he lost. No thought of old comradeship, of the ties 
 of honour, weighed with him for a moment. He TantiiTopi, 
 would at once betray him, if 
 
 Yes, — if he could himself recover his position. That was his 
 one thought. “In the course of this forenoon” (the 7th of 
 April), wrote Meade, “ I learnt from Pribhii Lai that he thought 
 Man Singh would do as I v/ished, but that he was desirous of 
 having Sir E. Hamilton’s general assurance of ‘ consideration ’ 
 for such a service reduced to some specific promise, 
 and that his ambition was to have Shahabad, Pauri, deraUonT' 
 or some other portion of the ancient raj of Narwar, 
 guaranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend 
 Tantia Topi being successful.” 
 
 It was quite out of Meade’s power to make any such promise ; 
 he could only assure him that he “ might rely on any claim 
 he might establish being faithfully considered by 
 Government.” Unable to extract more, Man Singh cSce of 
 clutched at the prospect which this vague promise 
 offered, and consented to betray his friend. 
 
 Then came Meade’s difficulty. To seize such a man as Tantia 
 Topi great caution was required. Tantia had many 
 spies in the British camp, and to have sent a Euro- fpartVof^^ 
 pean on such a duty would have been sufiicient to Sipahisaccom- 
 warn the victim. Eventually Meade decided to send SSn^singh. 
 a party of the 9th Bombay Kative Infantry on the 
 service, under an intelligent native officer. The orders he gave 
 to this native officer were simply to obey the directions of Man 
 Singh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point 
 out. The name of Tantia Topi was not mentioned, and 
 the men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were 
 proceeding. 
 
 Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Man Singh, Tantia 
 Topi had lain quiet in the Paron jungles. Shortly 
 after his arrival there, and some days before Man aiuheS^’ 
 Singh had surrendered, Tantia had, with the ap- nposesabso- 
 proval of that Eajah, sent to obtain information IviSi^singh? 
 regarding the position of his old comrades. The 
 reply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine 
 thousand men they were in the Sironj jungles ; that Kao Sahib 
 had left them, but that Eiruzshah, the Ambapani Nawab, and 
 
264 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF tInTIA TOPI. 
 
 [ 1859 . 
 
 M^n Singh 
 surprisHS 
 Tantia asleep, 
 
 and conveys 
 him to 
 Meade’s 
 camp. 
 
 Imam All, Wirdi-major of the 5th Irregulars, were there. The 
 last-named also sent him a letter begging Tantia to join them. 
 It was on the receipt of this letter that, on tlie 5th of April, 
 Tantia sent to consult Man Singh as to the course he should 
 adopt. Tantia was well aware that Man Singh had surren- 
 dered, yet he trusted him implicitly. He had placed himself 
 quite in his power, and had chosen his actual hiding-place on 
 the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Man Singh 
 had consigned him with these words : “ Stop wherever this man 
 takes you ! ” 
 
 To Tantia’s message Man Singh replied that he would come 
 in three days to see him, and that then they would 
 decide on Ihe action to he taken. Man Singh more 
 than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, 
 the 7 th of April, he came to the hiding-place — 
 followed at a distance by the Bombay Sipahis. 
 Tantia was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly 
 awakened, and conveyed to Meade’s camp. He 
 arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th. 
 
 Meade marched him into Sipri nnd tried him by court-martial. 
 
 He was charged with having been in rebellion and 
 waged war against the British Government 
 courf-martiai. between June, 1857, and December, 1858, in certain 
 specified instances. No other charge was brought 
 against him. 
 
 His defence was simple and straightforward. It lan thus : 
 
 “ I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my master’s 
 orders, i.e.^ the Nana’s orders, up to the capture of 
 Kalpi, and, afterwards, those of Rao Sahib. I have 
 nothing to state, except that I have had nothing to do with the 
 murder of any European men, women, or children ; neither had 
 I, at any time, given orders for any one to be hanged.” 
 
 The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very common 
 among the Marathas. To many of these men the 
 descendant of the Peshwa was their real lord : they 
 knew no other. Tantia Topi was born and bred in 
 the household of Baji Rao, who had been Peshwa of 
 the Marathas. From his earliest childhood he had 
 been taught to regard the adopted son of Baji Rao, 
 Nana Sahib, as his master, his liege lord, whose 
 every order he was bound to obey. Of the English 
 he knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had robbed 
 
 Tantid’s 
 
 defence. 
 
 Position, in 
 his own eyes 
 and in the 
 eyes of the 
 natives of 
 India, of 
 Tdntia Topf, 
 with respect 
 to the Eng- 
 lish. 
 
1859.] 
 
 tIntiI is sentenced to death. 
 
 265 
 
 his earliest master of the country he had ruled, and his son 
 of the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his an- 
 cestral dominions. To them he was bound by no ties. The 
 English Government, by depriving the heir of the Peshwa’s of 
 the income that had been allotted to his father by adoption, had 
 forced that heir to be a conspirator, and had compelled all his 
 dependants to be free-lances. 
 
 Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put before 
 the court, and which probabty did not present itself .g 
 
 to the minds of any of its members, Tantia Topi sentenced to 
 was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was and^fsTanged 
 carried into effect at Sipri on the 18th of April. 
 
 Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence, 
 but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity 
 will confirm that verdict. Tantia Topi was no Sie^seJtencr 
 born servant of the English rule. At the time of 
 his birth — about the year 1812 — his master was the independent 
 ruler of a large portion of western India. He was under no 
 obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which had 
 robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally by 
 any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering the 
 territories of the Peshwa, Tantia Topi, who was his musdhih^ 
 liis companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes. He 
 declared that he committed no murder. He was not charged 
 with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex- Peshwa’s family, 
 was charged with fighting against the English.* Doubts 
 On that charge alone he was convicted and hanged, whether a 
 Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the posterity will 
 punishment was greater than the offence. The 
 clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons. 
 
 ♦ Since the first edition appeared, Mr. G. Lance, late Bengal Civil Service 
 and formerly Magistrate of Kanhpur — himself a distinguished actor in the 
 mutiny (pages 215-6) — has written to inform me that in the records of the 
 Magistrate’s Court at Kanhpur there exists ample evidence to show that Tantia 
 Topi was one of the most bloodthirsty advisers of Nana Sahib, and that, if he 
 did not first plan the massacre of the garrison, he assisted in it, by posting his 
 men in ambush at the Sati Chaora Ghat, or by giving orders to that effect to 
 Jawala Parshad. Further, that by his presence on the spot he excited the 
 ardour and fanaticism of the assassins. Although the fact stated by Mr. Lance 
 is sufficient to prove that Tantia Topf fully merited the penalty that was meted 
 out to him, it yet does not justify the sentence referred to in the text. No 
 charge relative to the massacre of the Europeans at Kanhpur was brought 
 against Tantia Topi on his trial. He was simply charged ivith waging war 
 against the British. On that charge alone he was convicted and sentenced to he 
 
266 
 
 THE PUKSUIT OF TANTli. TOPI. 
 
 [ 1859 . 
 
 Posterity lias condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to be 
 shot. There is considerable analogy between the 
 and^HoS.^^ cases of Hofei' and Tantia Topi. Neither was born 
 under the rule of the nation against which he fought. 
 In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugated 
 by a foreign race. In both cases the insurrection of the subdued 
 race was produced by causes exterior to its own immediate 
 interests. In both cases the two men cited rose to be the 
 representatives of the nationality to which each belonged. In 
 both — Hofer in the one, Tantia Topi in the other — they resisted 
 the dominant race in a manner which necessitated the calling 
 forth of extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader was 
 a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is still a 
 hero to the world. The other, the Maratha — well — who knows 
 that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chambal^ 
 the Narbada and the Parbati, his name, too, is not often men- 
 tioned with respect, with enthusiasm, and with affection ? 
 
 One word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character as 
 a general. For nearly nine months, from his defeat 
 Jaura Alipiir by Sir Eobert Napier, to his capture 
 by an officer serving under that general, Tantia 
 Topi had baffled all the efforts of the British. During that 
 period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Eaj- 
 putana and Malwa, two countries possessing jointly an area of 
 a hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred square miles, 
 had crossed the Narbada, and had threatened the more vul- 
 nerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displayed 
 would have been admirable, had he combined with them the 
 hiB merits- Capacity of the general and the daring of the 
 aggressive soldier. His marches were wonderful ; 
 he had a good eye for selecting a position and he had a mar- 
 bis demerits ''^cllous faculty for localities. But, when that has 
 been said, everything has been said. Unable to 
 detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took ad van- 
 
 hanged. And it is this sentence, which, I believe, posterity will not confirm. 
 But little evidence regarding his participation in the Kanhpur massacres existed 
 at the time. “ Though there was some,” writes Mr. Lance, “ more was after- 
 wards elicited by me when trying numerous cases connected with the Kanhpur 
 atrocities.” That eventually he would have been hanged seems certain. But it 
 would have been better that he should have been punished for being a murderer 
 than that, by a premature and scarcely merited sentence, he should have gained 
 the martyr’s crown. 
 
1859 .] 
 
 THE ENGLISH COMMANDERS. 
 
 267 
 
 tage of their mistakes or their too great daring; he never 
 exposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the 
 field. On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always 
 superior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that 
 further pursuit by them would have been impossible. With a 
 little more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst 
 retreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear 
 of ^ his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their 
 camp-followers. But he never attempted anything of the sort. 
 Provided he could escape from one place to harass them in 
 another, with the chance of striking at Indur, at Barodah, at 
 Jodhpur, or at Jaipur, a blow similar to that which he had 
 struck successfully at Gwaliar, he was satisfied. 
 
 Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him 
 were English sufficed, no matter how small their ^he fact that 
 numbers, to scare him. A striking proof of this his enemies 
 occurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with ^ared^hfm^^ 
 two hundred men, three-fifths of whom were High- 
 landers. Tantia had a strong position, two guns, and three or 
 four thousand men. Had the natives been well led, their 
 numbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to 
 Tantia. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, 
 content to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the 
 lives of his followers he cared nothing. 
 
 Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded 
 to^ the English generals and officers who conducted 
 tlie pursuit. Sir Robert Napier, first defeating leaLrs^®^ 
 Tantia, drove him into Eajputana and then shut Napier; 
 him out from the north. Roberts, then in Eajputana, i^oberts- 
 and later, Michel, in Eajputana and Malwa, pur- 
 sued him in a circle, bounded on the south by the 
 Nizam’s territory or by Khandesh, and on the west by Gujrat. 
 His attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by 
 General Hill, by Sir Hugh Rose, and by General Roberts. 
 Finally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he 
 broke away to the north and penetrated once more into the 
 territories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The 
 English officers who pursued him showed, on more 
 than one occasion, that they could march as quickly 
 as he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier 
 Parke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days; 
 of Brigadier Somerset, two hundred and thirty 
 
268 
 
 THE PUESUIT OF tXnTII TOPI 
 
 [1859. 
 
 of Somerset, 
 of Holmes, 
 of Honner. 
 
 Daring of 
 Becher and 
 Sutherland. 
 
 miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles 
 in forty-eight hours; of Holmes, fifty-four miles 
 through a sandy desert in little more than twenty- 
 four hours ; and of Honner, a hundred and forty- 
 five miles in four days. Becher’s daring, too, in assailing 
 Tantia’s whole force with a newly-raised regiment 
 of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious 
 act, vying in daring with Sutherland’s attack above 
 referred to. 
 
 But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out 
 markedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in 
 this pursuit. Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a 
 contrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to 
 the skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which 
 cut them off from the great towns, and which forced them to 
 seek the jungles as their hiding-place. This result 
 Michel's li ht Michel accomplished in Eajputana and 
 
 columns. ' Malwa, by distributing his forces in lightly equipped 
 columns at salient points in those two divisions, 
 with orders to pursue the rebels without intermission.* It has 
 been calculated that the whole distance they were pursued 
 between the 20th of -lune, 1858, and the 1st of March, 1859, 
 exceeded three thousand miles ; that Michel himself marched 
 seventeen hundred and Parke two thousand. f There can be no 
 doubt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the 
 cause of the break-up of the rebel army. When Honner beat 
 it at Kushani on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was 
 taken up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign 
 was virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their 
 standards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood 
 that these rapid pursuits were made without tents. These 
 followed in the rear under charge of a small guard. They did 
 not often come up for days, during which time the troops had 
 to bivouac under trees. 
 
 withthesur To return. Tranquillity was restored. With the 
 render of Surrender of Man Singh the rebellion collapsed in 
 Central India. So long as he was at large and 
 returns to hostile, the entire population held aloof from the 
 the country. q^]^0 rebels could always find security in 
 
 * Blackivood's Magazine, August 1860. 
 
 t Captain Flower’s troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke the whole time. 
 
1859.] TEANQUILLITY RESTORED TO CENTRAL INDIA. 269 
 
 jungles in whicli they could not be tracked. The sense they had 
 of security was so great, that at one time Tantia Topi and Man 
 Singh remained for days within five miles of the English 
 army, then searching for them, their position known to the 
 natives, not one of whom would betray them. But with the 
 surrender of Man Singh an entire change was inaugurated. 
 The people of Central India surrendered with him.* 
 
 * For Tantia Topi’s diary of the events of the campaign, vide Appendix B. 
 
270 
 
 THE TKIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLL 
 
 [1858. 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLl, AND THE QUEEN’s 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 The capture of Man Singh and Tantia Topi produced all over 
 western and southern India an effect similar to that realised 
 by the pacification of Oudh in the north-western Provinces. 
 The mutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier 
 had to give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the 
 statesman. 
 
 Some months before the final blow had been struck, when 
 the rebels had lost every stronghold and been 
 pr^ciamaUon. driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the 
 dense jungles which abound alike on the northern 
 frontier of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen 
 had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian 
 subjects, a message of mercy to those who still continued to 
 lesist, of promise to all. Before referring more particularly to 
 this proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the 
 events which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly 
 advisable. 
 
 The titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehli, had been 
 Trial and brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of 
 sentence of the palace, the Diwani-Khass, on the 27th of January, 
 Delu™®^^ 1858. Four charges were brought against him. 
 
 The first accused him, when a pensioner of the 
 British Government, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting the 
 Sipahis in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State ; 
 the second, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and 
 other inhabitants of Dehli and the north-west Provinces of 
 India, to rebel and wage war against the State ; the third, of 
 having proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of 
 India, and of assembling forces at Dehli, and of encouragiug 
 others to wage war against the British Government ; the 
 fourth, of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of 
 having been accessory to, the death of forty-nine people of 
 
1858 .] 
 
 DOOM OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. 
 
 271 
 
 European and mixed European descent, aud of having subse- 
 quently abetted others in murdering European officers and 
 other English subjects. After a trial conducted with great 
 patience, and which extended over forty days, the king was 
 found guilty of the main points in the charges, and sentenced 
 to be transported for life. Eventually he was taken to Pegu, 
 where he ended his days in peace.* 
 
 Meanwhile it had been necessary in England to find a scape- 
 goat for all the blood which had been shed in 
 crushing the mutiny — an event, which, though it 
 seemed at first to give a shock to the prestige of 
 England, had been the means of displaying a power greater and 
 more concentrated than that with which the world had credited 
 her. The reconquest of India is, indeed, the most marvellous 
 military achievement of any times, ancient or modern. If 
 India had at that time been under the rule of the Crown, the 
 natural scape-goat would have been the Ministry of the day. 
 As it was, the blow fell upon the grand old Company which had 
 nursed the early conquests on the eastern coast of Hindustan 
 until they had developed into the most magnificent empire 
 subject to an alien race which the world has ever seen. The 
 East India Company had not deserved its fate. 
 
 Its rule had been better and purer, more adapted 
 to the circumstances of the great dependency pany, 
 than would have been possible had its acts and 
 orders been subject to the fluctuations of party feeling. True, 
 it had committed some faults ; but it is a remarkable fact, 
 especially in later years, that it had been driven into the com- 
 mission of those faults by the Ministry of the day. 
 
 This remark especially applies to the “ crime,” so to Suiis^she^ 
 speak, of the mutiny. I call it a crime, because the 
 Court of Directors were summoned before the bar of shared in by 
 public opinion to answer for it, and were condemned Sthe^ay"^^ 
 upon it. Now, if, as I believe, the mutiny was due 
 in a great measure to the acts of the Government of Lord 
 Dalhousie, to the denial of the right to adopt, to the shock to 
 public morality caused by the annexation of Oudh and especially 
 by the manner in which that annexation was carried out, then, 
 the Government of England was equally guilty with the Court 
 
 * For report of the statement made for the prosecution at the trial and Sir John 
 Lawrence’s report, vide Appendix C. 
 
272 
 
 THE QUEEN’S FEOCLAMATION. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 of Directors, for it was that Government which more than 
 sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which I 
 have referred. But in times of excitement justice almost always 
 sleeps. The scape-goat was of the very kind which suited the 
 public humour. He was old-fashioned, pursy, and defenceless. 
 Against him every interest was arrayed. The Ministry, which 
 wanted his patronage ; the outsider, who saw an opening to 
 the ‘ covenanted ’ services ; the doctrinaire, on whose mind the 
 idea of a double government grated harshly ; these 
 and other classes combined to cast stones at him. 
 The great Company was unable to withstand the 
 pressure. It fell, but it fell not without regret and 
 with an honoured name. On the 2nd of August 1858 
 the Queen signed the Act which transferred its functions to the 
 Crown. 
 
 No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolved 
 upon the first Minister of the Crown, the late Earl 
 of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen a 
 proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majesty 
 in Council, in which should be set forth the prin- 
 ciples on which the administration of India should 
 in the future be conducted. The circumstances 
 which followed the preparation of the first draught of the pro- 
 clamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on the 
 highest authority in a work which has brought home to every 
 Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss sus- 
 tained by the country in the premature death of the illustrious 
 prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so gracefully 
 records.* There were expressions in that draught 
 which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albert 
 in one case to invert, in another to express feebly, 
 the meaning they were anxious to convey. In the 
 Pri^e Albert! memorandum with which the objections to these 
 points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majesty 
 in noble language the sentiments by which she was 
 animated towards the great people of whom she was about to 
 become the Empress, Empress in reality, though not then 
 actuallj^ in name. “ The Queen would be glad,” continued the 
 memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to the 
 original draught of the proclamation, “ if Lord Derby would write 
 
 is made that 
 scape-goat, 
 
 and doomed 
 to death. 
 
 Lord Derby 
 draws up a 
 proclamation 
 for submis- 
 sion to the 
 Queen. 
 
 Objections 
 taken to the 
 original 
 draught by 
 the Queen and 
 
 * Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv. page 28f . 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE queen’s PKOCLAMATION. 
 
 273 
 
 it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is 
 a female sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions 
 of Eastern people on assuming the direct government over 
 them, and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her 
 future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her 
 government. Such a document should breathe feelings of 
 generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out 
 the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed 
 on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the 
 prosperity following in the train of civilisation.” 
 
 Before the memorandum containing these noble words had 
 reached Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a Those ob'ec 
 telegram from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance tions antid-' 
 on the Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied 
 with the proclamation, had turned his attention to 
 the draught, and discovering in it instinctively the faults which 
 had been noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had recast it. 
 In its amended form it met every objection, and corresponded 
 entirely to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was 
 to be issued to the people of India. 
 
 The proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as 
 follows : — 
 
 “Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United 
 Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the tion. 
 Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, 
 
 Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith. 
 
 “ Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by 
 and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
 Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, to take upon 
 ourselves the Government of the territories in India, heretofore 
 administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India 
 Company ; 
 
 “ Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare 
 that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon 
 ourselves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our 
 subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear 
 true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit 
 themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter 
 from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government 
 of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf. 
 
 “ And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, 
 ability, and judgment, of our right trusty and well-beloved 
 
 VOL. V. T 
 
274 
 
 THE QUEEN’S PROCLAMATION. 
 
 [ 1858 . 
 
 cousin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do 
 hereby constitute and appoint him, the said A^iscount Canning, 
 to be our First Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our 
 said territories, and to administer the government thereof in 
 our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, 
 subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to 
 time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of 
 State. 
 
 “ And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and 
 military, all persons now employed in the service of the 
 Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, 
 and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted. 
 
 “We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all 
 treaties and engagements made with them by or under the 
 authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us 
 accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained ; and we look for 
 the like observance on their part. 
 
 “We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions ; 
 and, while we will permit no aggressions upon our dominions or 
 our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no 
 encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, 
 dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire 
 that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that 
 prosperity and that social advancement which can only be 
 secured b}^ internal peace and good government. 
 
 “We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian 
 territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all 
 our other subjects ; and those obligations, by the blessing of 
 Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. 
 
 “ Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and 
 acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim 
 alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any 
 of our subjects. We declare it to be our Eoyal will and 
 pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or 
 disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but 
 that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of 
 the law ; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who 
 may be in authority under us that they abstain from all inter- 
 ference with the religious belief or worship of any of our 
 subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure. 
 
 “ And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our 
 subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially 
 
1858 .] 
 
 THE QUEEN’S PKOCLAMATION. 
 
 275 
 
 admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may 
 he qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to 
 discharge. 
 
 “We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which 
 the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from 
 their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights 
 connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the 
 State ; and we will that, generally, in framing and adminis- 
 tering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, 
 and customs of India. 
 
 “We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been 
 brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have 
 deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into 
 open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression 
 of that rebellion in the field ; we desire to show our mercy by 
 pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but 
 who desire to return to the path of duty. 
 
 “ Already in one province, with a view to stop the further 
 effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian 
 dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the 
 expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of 
 those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty 
 of offences against our Government, and has declared the 
 punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes 
 place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and 
 confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and 
 do further announce and proclaim as follows : — 
 
 “ Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and 
 except those who have been or shall be convicted of having 
 directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. 
 
 “With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the 
 exercise of mercy. 
 
 “ To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, 
 knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or 
 instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed ; but, 
 in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration 
 will be given to the circumstances under which they have been 
 induced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will 
 be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated 
 in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by 
 designing men. 
 
 “ To all others in arms against the Government we hereby 
 
 T 2 
 
276 
 
 THE queen’s proclamation. 
 
 [1858. 
 
 promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all 
 offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on tbeir 
 return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. 
 
 “It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and 
 amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their 
 conditions before the first day of January next. 
 
 “ When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity 
 shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the 
 peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility- 
 and improvement, and to administer its Government for the 
 benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity 
 will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in 
 their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power 
 grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to 
 carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.” 
 
 On the 1st of November, 1858, this noble proclamation was 
 published to the princes and people of India.^ At 
 Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombay, at Labor, at Agra, 
 at Allahabad, at Dehli, at Rangiin, at Lakhnao, at 
 Maisur, at Karachi, at Nagpur, and at every civil 
 and military station in India it was publicly read 
 on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendour 
 which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of the 
 natives. Translated into all the languages and many of the 
 dialects of India, it was, at the same time, trans- 
 mitted to all the native princes, and was distributed 
 by thousands for the edification of those of lower 
 rank and position. The first Viceroy of India used all the 
 means in his power to acquaint the native princes 
 and people that, transferred to the suzerainty and 
 rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict 
 observance of all engagements entered into with 
 them by the Company ; that her Majesty desired no extension 
 of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honour, and 
 the dignity of the princes of her empire ; that, while their 
 religion would not be interfered with, the ancient rights, 
 customs, and usages of India would be maintained ; that neither 
 caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service. 
 
 Lord Canning took every care, at the same time, 
 and to the that the rebels still in arms should have cognizance 
 of the full and gracious terms offered them, terms 
 which practically restored life and security to all 
 
 The procla- 
 mation pub- 
 lished 
 throughout 
 India, 
 
 and distri- 
 buted. 
 
 Communica- 
 tions made to 
 the native 
 princes, 
 
 rebels still in 
 arms. 
 
1858.] THE PEOCLAMATION PUBLISHED IN INDIA. 
 
 277 
 
 Its reception 
 in India 
 by princes 
 and land- 
 owners ; 
 
 The natives 
 draw up loyal 
 addresses 
 expressive of 
 their grati- 
 tude. 
 
 those who had not taken part in the murder of British sub- 
 jects. 
 
 The proclamation was received by all classes throughout 
 India with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes 
 .and landowners especially regarded it as a charter 
 which would render their possessions secure, and 
 their rights — more especially the right, so precious 
 to them, of adoption — absolutely inviolate. The 
 people in general welcomed it as the document which closed 
 up the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, in effect, that 
 bygones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there 
 should be one Queen and one people. Many of the 
 rebels still in the field — all, in fact, except those 
 absolutely irreconcilable — took advantage of its provisions to 
 lay down their arms and to submit to its easy 
 conditions. In the great towns of India, natives of 
 every religion and creed, the Hindus, the Muham- 
 madans, the Parsis, met in numbers to draw up loyal 
 addresses expressive of their deep sense of the 
 beneficent feelings which had prompted the procla- 
 mation, of their gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty 
 to the person of the illustrious Lady to whose rule they had 
 been transferred. 
 
 With the issue of the proclamation the story of the mutiny 
 should fitly close. But those who have accompanied 
 me so far will have seen that in Oudh and in central 
 India the work of warfare was prolonged for six 
 months after its promulgation. In this there is, 
 however, only a seeming misplacement. In the 
 jungles on the Oudh frontier and of central India 
 there survived for that period men who were more marauders 
 than soldiers — men whose continual rebellion was but remotely 
 connected with the original cause of the mutiny, who had 
 offended too deeply to hope for forgiveness. In one notable 
 instance, indeed, that of Man Singh, the quarrel was in no sense 
 a consequence of the mutiny. It was a quarrel between a baron 
 and his feudal lord. Yet it was that quarrel, not the mutiny, 
 nor any fact connected with the mutiny, which kept the 
 dominions of Sindhia in continual disturbance for more than 
 six months. When Man Singh surrendered, those disturbances 
 •ceased. 
 
 As far as related, then, to the actual mutineers, with but a 
 
 The mutiny 
 had really 
 terminated 
 when the 
 proclamation 
 appeared. 
 
[ 185 ^. 
 
 278 THE QUEEN’S PKOCLAMATION. 
 
 few exceptions to the Sipahis, and to all the landowners in 
 The rocia British territories, the proclamation of the Queen 
 matiSn^the' was, in Very deed, the end and the beginning — the 
 end of a conflict which had deluged the country 
 with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope, 
 alike for the loyal and the misguided, for the prince and the 
 peasant, for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class 
 and for every creed. 
 
 One word more. The history of military events has neces- 
 sarily almost entirely monopolised the pages of a work the 
 object of which was to record the rise, the progress, and the 
 suppression of the Great Mutiny. In the course of the narrative 
 I have followed so closely the movements of the military 
 combatants that I have been unable to devote to occurrences in 
 districts purely civil the attention which the heroic officers who 
 maintained those districts deserved. The time has arrived 
 when this defect should be remedied. In the volume which 
 follows this, then, will be found a record of the events which 
 occurred, so far as I have been able to ascertain them, in the 
 several divisions and districts which formed the provinces under 
 the rule of the several governors, lieutenant-governors, and 
 chief commissioners who held office in 1857-8. 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 279 
 
 BOOK XYII. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 Even before the last embers of the mutiny bad been trampled 
 out, the question which had from the first puzzled 
 every man, from the Governor-General in Council 
 to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the 
 question as to the original cause of the mutiny became the 
 burning question of the day. It was a question which required 
 a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganisation 
 was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of re- 
 organisation a knowledge of the circumstances which had 
 caused the collapse of the system to be reorganised was in- 
 dispensable. 
 
 On this question the opinion of no man was looked forward 
 to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I 
 may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of 
 the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish opinion of 
 policy had made possible the storming of Dehli. It Lawrence, 
 was very natural that this should be so. Few men 
 had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawrence ; 
 few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core 
 the national character, and few men possessed a 
 more complete power of mental analysis. People, should be, 
 for the most part, did not stop to remember that, 
 with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the partisan 
 of a school — a school opposed to the tenure of land 
 by great families; that he had favoured Lord mighTnotbe. 
 Dalhousie’s policy of annexation ; and that, although 
 he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the agri- 
 
280 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 sound. 
 
 He attributes 
 the mutiny 
 to the 
 
 greased car- 
 tridges only. 
 
 cultural class, lie contemned those of the large proprietors, 
 and that he knew little of the Sipahis. Further- 
 more, and especially, that he possessed no personal 
 knowledge of Oudh and of its people. 
 
 It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of 
 Sir John Lawrence was published it gave satisfaction only to 
 the heedless many, none at all to the thinking few. 
 After an exhaustive argument. Sir John Lawrence 
 arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due 
 to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cart- 
 ridges only. The public applauded a result so 
 beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. It 
 chimed so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the 
 trouble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are 
 mainly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully 
 Reasons wh accepted. With them it remains still the un- 
 the^TOuciu-^ answerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian 
 be accepted They did not stop to consider that to declare 
 
 that the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was 
 in all respects similar to the declaration of a man who, if asked 
 what causes a gun to discharge, should reply — the powder. 
 True it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the 
 bullet: but who ignites the powder? That the greased 
 cartridges were the lever used in many instances to excite the 
 Sipahis is incontestable ; they were explosive substances. But, 
 though explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the 
 minds of the Sipahis not been prepared to act upon them in 
 the same manner that the percussion-cap acts upon gunpowder. 
 
 It should never be forgotten that the greased 
 cartridges were not the only instrument employed 
 to create discontent in 1856-7. Before a greased 
 cartridge had been issued the chapatis had been 
 circulated by thousands in many rural districts. 
 The chapati was, it is true, a weapon far less 
 perfect than the greased cartridge. It was, nevertheless, 
 sufficiently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom 
 it was addressed — the class given to agriculture. To minds, 
 simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive 
 ideas, the chapati acted as a warning of an im- 
 pending calamity. A Hindu can conceive nothing 
 more dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. 
 The conclusion was a foregone one. The receipt of the 
 
 The greased 
 cartridges 
 not the only 
 instrument 
 employed to 
 create dis- 
 content. 
 
 The ch4- 
 patis. 
 
THE REAL CAUSE OF THE MUTINY. 281 
 
 chapatis foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset 
 the national religion. 
 
 Though we might even grant, then, for the sake of argument, 
 that the greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless, 
 yet the chapatis certainly were so. But it was these harmless 
 chapatis which stirred up the rural populations, 
 especially those in Oudh and in Bundelkhand, to 
 participate in the rebellion. What becomes, then, of theSpStiB 
 Sir John Lawrence’s conclusion ? It simply vanishes. 
 
 The greased cartridges became dangerous only when end. 
 used by others as a means to an end. Before the 
 plans of the leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and 
 the chapatis were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a 
 magazine. When the opportune moment arrived, when the 
 minds of the Sipahis and the agricultural classes had been 
 instructed to receive any ideas, however absurd, then the cart- 
 ridges and the chapatis were rammed into them, and were 
 exploded. 
 
 But what was it that made the minds of the Sipahis, what 
 was it that made the minds of the agricultural 
 classes prone to conceive suspicions alike regarding 
 the greased cartridges and the chapatis ? The mutiny, 
 answers to these two questions will bring us to the 
 real cause of the mutiny. Sir John Lawrence’s conclusions 
 were not pushed to their legitimate issue. He named only one 
 of the means. I must go back to the cause. 
 
 Before I express my own opinions on the matter I think it 
 only proper that I should state the views of some 
 thoughtful and well-educated natives, with whom I opinion as to 
 have had the opportunity of discussing the subiect. 
 
 1 may premise that it is not an easy matter to obtain 
 the real opinions of native gentlemen on matters regarding 
 which they know, not only that those opinions would be dis- 
 tasteful to the listener, but that his ignorance of aught but the 
 superficial life of a native of position, his absolute want of 
 knowledge regarding the religious obligations which affect 
 every thought of his life, act as a bar to comprehension. There 
 are few Englishmen, for instance, even amongst those who have 
 served long in India and who have obtained credit there for 
 understanding the native character, who will not be amazed at the 
 revelation regarding the origin of the mutiny, or rather of the 
 causes which led up to it, which I am about to place on record 
 
282 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 as the real opinion of thoughtful and educated natives of India, 
 That it is their real opinion I, who enjoyed special opportunities 
 of conversing with them without restraint, and who possessed 
 their confidence as far as an Englishman can possess it, know 
 most certainly. And, what is more, there are living men, 
 Englishmen, whose opportunities have been even greater, and 
 who have communicated to me impressions absolutely con- 
 firming my views on the subject. From one of these gentlemen, 
 a perfect linguist, and whose opportunities have been unrivalled, 
 I have received the following reply to my query as to the cause 
 to which the educated Hindus with whom he was in the habit 
 of associating attributed the mutiny. “ In the opinion of the 
 educated natives of India,” was his answer, “ the gross wrongs 
 inflicted on Nana Sahib; the injustice done to Kunwar Singh; 
 the inj uries inflicted on the Eani of Jhansi ; the seizure of the 
 kingdom of Oudh ; the fraudulent embezzlement perpetrated 
 with regard to the Eao of Kirwi, and the scores of lesser wrongs 
 done in reckless insolence to the landowners under the adminis- 
 tration of the north-west provinces. Were Indians ever' to 
 write their account of the causes of the mutiny, it would astonish 
 many in this country.” 
 
 These views may be disputed. Indeed, I am confident that 
 not one ex-Indian official among a hundred will read them with 
 aught but a contemptuous smile. It requires that a man shall 
 have lived with the educated natives as intimate friends associate 
 together in Europe that he should be able to understand it. 
 There is too little of such intercourse in India. In fact, it is 
 only those officers who have enjoyed the opportunity of a long 
 residence at a native court to whom the chance of such inter- 
 course is available. 
 
 In the first edition of this volume I expressed as my own an 
 opinion in entire conformity with the general views 
 I have just quoted as the views of the natives of 
 India as to the origin of the great outbreak. I wrote 
 — and I may say that time, and a subsequent visit to 
 India, have confirmed my view — “ The real cause of 
 the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form 
 in two words — bad faith. It was bad faith to our 
 Sipahis which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was 
 our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the per- 
 mission to adopt, with them, a necessary religious rite ; of 
 suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex 
 
 Bad faith, 
 and the 
 attempt 
 to force 
 •western 
 ideas on an 
 eastern 
 people. 
 
THE BEEACH OF FAITH TO THE SIPIhIS. 
 
 28 a 
 
 rules to wEicli they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the 
 Sagar and Narbada territory, and in Bundelkhand, and our 
 breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which 
 roused the large landowners and the rural population against 
 the British i^e.” This was my opinion then, and it is, if 
 possible, more strongly my opinion now. I shall proceed to 
 support it by examples. 
 
 The bad faith towards the Sipahis goes back so far as the 
 period immediately succeeding the first Afghan war. 
 
 In that war the Sipahis had behaved splendidly ; ^^arSthe 
 they had fought well, they had suffered privations sipahis ; 
 without a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness 
 absence from their country and their families, in a cause which 
 was only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign masters. 
 I recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahabad a political officer 
 whose conduct during his mission at Herat can never be men- 
 tioned without admiration — the late D’ Arcy Todd. Speaking to 
 me of the difficulties of his position at Herat, D’ Arcy 
 Todd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and tioa whe^ 
 the fidelity of the few Sipahis who were with him 
 he could not have stayed at Herat ; he added, 
 
 “ When properly treated the Bengal Sipahi will go anywhere 
 and do anything.” Well, these men returned from Afghanistan. 
 Immediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Bengal 
 Sipahis were sent to garrison a country then notoriously un- 
 healthy. How were they treated ? The time- 
 honoured rule which provided that they should fauh^towards 
 receive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding them in the 
 to certain localities was rescinded, in one instance q^esifon. 
 after the men had reached one of the indicated 
 localities, in another instance when the regiment was in full 
 march to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbled 
 and then actually refused to march? They committed no 
 violence. They simply said, “ You are guilty of 
 bad faith ; we contracted to enter your service The Govem- 
 and to perform all the duties entrusted to us on Srs^pE^ 
 certain conditions, of which the payment to us of 
 food allowance under certain circumstances was contract 
 one. We have fulfilled our share of the contract, Gov^nmen 
 and now you refuse to fulfil your share. We decline bad broken." 
 to work until you fulfil it.” In equity the Sipahis 
 were right ; but the Government, instead of soothing them^ 
 
284 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 acted in a high-handed manner, disbanded one regiment and 
 severely punished the men of another. 
 
 This COD duct produced a very bad effect throughout the 
 Bad effect Indian army. It was felt in every regiment that 
 pnodSedon the woi'd of the Government could no longer be 
 the Indian depended upon. Nevertheless, no open indignation 
 was manifested. The Satlaj campaign ensued, and 
 again the Sipahis fought well. The annexation of the Panjab 
 followed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence — a period 
 during which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang 
 up, and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the 
 discipline of the Indian army. 
 
 The natives of India serve a master well when once he has 
 shown himself capable of wielding authority. But 
 GraduEfi^pro- should that authority slacken, or, worse still, should 
 w’^^akening^ they find out that the Government they serve has 
 the power of placed at their disposal the means not only of shaking 
 
 command- p ® 
 
 ing officers. Dut even 01 upsetting it, then the nominal master 
 wielding it ceases to be their real master ; the 
 substance of his power vanishes ; the shadow only remains. 
 The occurrences in the Indian army during the several years 
 immediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion. 
 In former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, 
 and even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was 
 'supreme in all matters of discipline. Eesponsible immediately 
 to his divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, 
 he could punish. But, as time passed on, men were appointed 
 to the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became 
 clouded and whose brains became turned by the air of the new 
 regions to which they had been transferred. Forgetting their 
 own regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine 
 system which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to 
 obey the law, no matter by whom administered, is not applicable 
 to a regiment composed of Asiatics bred to obey the man in 
 whose hands they see authority centred and him only, these 
 men began, step by step, to introduce the British system into 
 the native army. It would take too long to tell how gradually 
 the real power of the commanding officer was undermined ; how 
 the Sipahi was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a 
 superior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, 
 peculiarly liable to err, and against whose lightest exercise of 
 authority he had the right to appeal to the one central power, 
 
THE DEMOKALISING OF THE NATIVE ARMY. 285 
 
 the Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say that this process of 
 sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to so 
 great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny 
 the Sipahis had lost all respect for the authority he J^g^uftXthis 
 only nominally wielded. Nor had the Sipahi im- policy, 
 bibed for the Comtnander-in-Chief the feeling which 
 he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer. To 
 him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name ; he was a lay 
 figure, living in the clouds of the Himalayas, rarely, often never, 
 seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy 
 his own colonel and to set discipline at nought! minLthe 
 The extent to which this interposition was exercised ^ 
 
 before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme. It 
 succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all the 
 regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline of 
 the army. 
 
 I have said that the refusal of the Government of India in 
 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the 
 Sipahis sent to occupy Sindh had been felt through- onfemoSi-* 
 out the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to sation be- 
 that event, the process of undermining the powers ST 852 .^^ 
 of commanding officers had made swift progress. 
 
 When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly again 
 attempted another breach of contract, the Sipahis, demoralised 
 by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined to 
 resent it. 
 
 The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manner. 
 With the exception of six or seven regiments the 
 Sipahis of the Bengal army were enlisted for 
 service in India only ; they were never to be re- ments of the 
 quired to cross the sea. But with the view of Sonl^eSed 
 supplying the necessities of the state in Arakan for service 
 and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regi- sea. 
 ments had been specially raised for general service, 
 and these regiments were invariably despatched thither by sea 
 whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousie, 
 however, who had ridden roughshod over so many native 
 customs, considered that he might set aside this one also. Ac- 
 cordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to send 
 an additional regiment to Burmah, instead of despatching a 
 
 g eneral service regiment or of inviting a regiment to volunteer, 
 e ordered a regiment stationed at Barrackpiir to proceed 
 
286 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 Lord Dal- 
 housie at- 
 tempts to 
 break con- 
 tract with 
 the Sipihis. 
 
 thither. The men of the regiment refused to go. “ You ask 
 us,” they said, “ to embark upon a service for which 
 we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard 
 as imperilling our caste. We will not do it.” Lord 
 Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very 
 angry, but there was no help for it. 
 
 But the result on the minds of the Sipahis was most disas- 
 The result time in the history of India 
 
 moL^disas- the Orders of the Governor-General had been suc- 
 ciphne^ cessfully resisted. It was little to the purpose to 
 argue that the Governor-General had exceeded his 
 powers : the blow to the discipline of the native army was not 
 the less deadly. 
 
 The minds of the Sipahis were under the influence of this 
 blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter 
 uon of oS. staff they were becoming more and more released 
 from the bands of discipline towards their own 
 oflScers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this 
 affected them I shall state as briefly as possible. 
 
 A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal Presidency, 
 and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay 
 Presidency, were recruited from the kingdom of 
 Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there 
 was not a single agricultural family in that country’- 
 which was not represented by at least one of its 
 members in the Indian army. Service in that army, 
 in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the 
 subjects of the king of Oudh. It made them clients, 
 and favoured clients, of the paramount power. Every Sipahi 
 was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lakhnao by the 
 British Resident. His commanding officer was authorised to 
 frank any petition he might present addrebsed to the Resident, 
 and the fact that the Resident had received such petition en- 
 sured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner at the 
 hands of the coui’t of Lakhnao. Eveiy one familiar with the 
 workings of a native court will at once recognise the value at 
 which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of 
 Oudh. By accepting such service they obtained an all-powerful 
 advocate to plead their cause whenever their property might be 
 threatened, or their civil rights endangered. 
 
 The Nawabs and Kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren 
 Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be 
 
 Reason why 
 8 rvice in the 
 Company’s 
 army was 
 popular with 
 the men of 
 Oudh, when 
 Oudh had 
 her own 
 king. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDH. 
 
 287 
 
 surpassed. During tlie Afghan disasters, the Gwaliar cam- 
 paign, the battles on the Satlaj and in the Panjab, 
 
 Oudh had been the milch-cow of the paramount 
 power. She had lent that power money, she had 
 given her her best sons as soldiers, she had done 
 all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the 
 relations between the prince independent only in 
 his own country and the paramount overlord. 
 
 “ But,” exclaimed the advocates for annexation, “ she has mis- 
 governed.” Misgovernment is a relative term.* 
 
 There can be no question but that in the English 
 sense of the term there had been no good govern- 
 ment in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system 
 had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the 
 Sipahis, after the term of their service under the British flag 
 had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, 
 after the natives of Oudh had had one year’s ex- 
 perience of British government as administered by 
 Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins, 
 they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for 
 the native government which had been superseded. 
 
 It is necessary to take all these circumstances into con- 
 sideration when one analyses the effect which the 
 annexation of Oudh produced upon the Sipahis of 
 the Bengal army. In my belief that annexation 
 gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the 
 occurrences, already adverted to, of 1843-4. It was 
 the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in 
 British honesty. That belief had been greatly shaken by the 
 proceedings of Lord Dalhousie with respect to Karauli, the 
 dominions of the Bhonsla, and Jhansi. The annexation of Oudh 
 pressed them still more closely. It made them ready to become 
 the tools of any adventurer. 
 
 It was not only that they beheld in that annexation a lower- 
 ing of their own position as men represented at their sovereign’s 
 court by a British Resident, though that was a blow under 
 
 Persistent 
 loyalty to 
 the para- 
 mount power 
 of the 
 
 Nawilbs and 
 Kings of 
 Oudh. 
 
 The plea of 
 misgovern- 
 ment one not 
 to be sus- 
 tained 
 
 as a justifica- 
 tion for 
 annexation. 
 
 Disastrous 
 eff ct pro- 
 duced on the 
 minds of the 
 Sip^Lhis by 
 that annex- 
 ation. 
 
 * We ask the attention of the reader to the recent exposure of bribery and 
 corruption by officials appointed by Government made in the year 1888-9 by the 
 Crawfurd Commission. If this had occurred under a native administration, it 
 would have been called “ misgovernment.” By what euphonious term Lord Reay 
 characterises it I have not yet heard. 
 
288 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 They re- 
 garded it as 
 another 
 breach of 
 faith. 
 
 which the Indian army yet reels, for it accounts for the difficulty 
 of procuring recruits, which subsequently embarrassed 
 the Government. They beheld in that act, and in 
 the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate 
 infringement of promises the}’- had ever looked upon 
 as sacred — a repayment for the good services of 
 nearly a century, such as even the most abandoned amongst 
 their own princes would have hesitated to enforce. 
 
 These are not statements made at random. I was myself an 
 eye-witness to the effect produced upon the Sipahis 
 Sip^hisVta- order to annex Oudh. It devolved upon me, 
 
 tioned at as Commissariat Officer of the Kanhpur division, to 
 wS^utram supply Carriage and provisions for the force which, 
 CTos^esmto under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the 
 amexit. end of 1855. Over my house and office, which were 
 in the same compound, was a Sipahi guard — a 
 hawaldar’s party. Contrary to custom and to departmental 
 instructions, no written orders were given to me for the requi- 
 sitions. The expedition was to be a secret, I was told, and I 
 must obey verbal orders. But, in spite of this mystery, the 
 destination of the force became known before it set out to every 
 Sipahi in the cantonment — to every native in the town. The 
 effect was alarming. The natives had no doubt whatever as to 
 the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in 
 the memory of man an English regiment was about to march 
 on Lakhnao, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnao 
 with but one object. The agitation of the Sipahis 
 Theauthori- of my guard was most marked. It was with the 
 warned, greatest difficulty that I was able to control them. 
 
 Had they had any warning of the intended move- 
 ment they would, I am confident, have broken out then and 
 there. The subordinates of the Commissariat Department, 
 themselves greatly moved, assured me that a similar feeling 
 was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. I made 
 no secret of these manifestations. I reported them in the 
 proper quarter. I communicated them even to one of the 
 officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high 
 post in Oudh, but my warnings found no more 
 credence than did the warnings of Cassandra. They 
 were remembered afterwards. 
 
 The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in 
 which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which 
 
 but in vain. 
 
LOKD DALHOUSIE’S ANNEXATION POLICY. 289 
 
 broke the trust of the Sipahis in their English masters. The 
 perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to 
 receive and to believe any matter, however absurd atio/o”^^' 
 in itself, which mi^ht betoken English perfidy. 
 
 How their minds were played upon I shall show last remnant 
 presently. Meanwhile, it is necessary that I should 
 indicate how it was that the landowners and agri- 
 cultural classes of India became impressed with the “ bad faith ” 
 of their rulers. 
 
 The internal annexation policy inaugurated by Lord Dal- 
 housie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal 
 to recognise a right which the Hindus hold as an 
 essential part of their religion — the right to adopt princes, 
 an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten, f^iid^^ners 
 In the early part of this volume I have spoken of of India lost 
 the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English Ifr^sh! 
 which this policy produced in the southern Maratha 
 country. Carrying out this principle. Lord Dalhousie had 
 annexed the territory of the Bhonslas; he had annexed the 
 state of Jhansi, he had endeavoured to annex the state of 
 Karauli, and had only been prevented by the interference of 
 the Home Government on a threatened motion in the House of 
 Commons. Still he continued to hold the principle in terrorem 
 over the heads of the princes and chiefs of India, and the fact 
 that the policy of “ grab all ” was the policy, the paramount 
 power, and might, on the occurrence of death without natural 
 heirs, be applied to any coveted territory, produced, it is not 
 too much to say, “ a terror ” in the minds of the Hindu pjrinces 
 throughout India. 
 
 But in another and a far more guiltless manner the Govern- 
 ment had sown the seeds of hatred in the minds of 
 the representatives of great families whose ancestors 
 they had deprived of their dominions. Two in- life^Ln^uity^ 
 stances of the action .of this policy will occur at once j-or^akmg!® 
 to the reader — Nana Sahib and the Eao of Kirwi. dom, 
 
 Nana Sahib was indubitably the lawful representa- 
 tive, according to Hindu law, of the last of the Peshwas. When, 
 in June, 1818, Baji Eao surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, the 
 Court of Directors considered that an annuity of eighty thousand • 
 pounds was more than an adequate compensation for the loss of 
 an empire. Baji Eao lived in the enjoyment of this pension 
 nearly thirty-five years. When he died, in Januaiy 1853, Lord 
 V OL. V. u 
 
290 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 to Hindd 
 ideas. 
 
 DalhoTisie refused eitlier to recognise liis adopted son or to 
 continue the pension. 
 
 According to European ideas this ruling was perfectly just. 
 
 Total! strictly canded out the agreement as understood 
 
 repugnant hy Sir John Malcolm in 1818 . But neither Baji Rao 
 nor his retainers had so understood it. Such a settle- 
 ment would have been so repugnant to the ideas and 
 customs of the races of Hindustan, that they could not be ex- 
 pected to understand it. As the son of Baji Eao would have 
 succeeded that prince as Peshwa had he remained Peshwa, so 
 would he succeed naturally to all the rights for which Baji Eao 
 had exchanged the dignity of Peshwa. With them it was a 
 point of honour to recognise in the son, whether begotten or 
 adopted, the successor to the titles and estates of his father. 
 Whether the English recognised him or not, Nana Sahib was 
 still Peshwa in the eyes of every true Maratha.* The refusal 
 to recognise him and the stoppage of the pension 
 forced the heir of the Peshwa to conspire. It can 
 easily be conceived how readily such a man, occu- 
 pying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontier, 
 would hail and encourage the discontent which the 
 nefarious annexation of Oudh, as the natives considered it, could 
 not fail to produce. 
 
 The story of the Rao of Kirwi,f whilst reflecting still more 
 disadvantageously on the conduct of the British Government, is 
 similar in character and in application. 
 
 We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs of 
 
 That prin- 
 ciple made 
 Sdhib 
 a conspi- 
 rator. 
 
 * I recollect well, when T was at Banaras in 1851-52, the Governor-General’s 
 agent. Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that there 
 was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzapur jungles, near Banaras, a 
 man recognised by the natives as the lineal descendant of Cheit Singh, Eajah of 
 Banaras, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the natives 
 salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the ruler of Banaras. 
 
 t Vide page 138-42, and Appendix A. I may he permitted to note here 
 another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unjust 
 principle. When in 1848-49 a war broke out with the Sikhs, the King of Labor 
 was a minor, under the guardianship of the British Government, and in no respects 
 responsible for the occmrences which led to the war. Yet, although his irre- 
 sponsibility was officially admitted, he, the ward of the British Government, a 
 guiltless child, was treated as though he was in aU respects the guilty party. 
 The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange some kind of pro- 
 vision, which up to this day has never been clearly defined. The matter has 
 only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent. Most of the 
 nobles of the Pan jab, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, were 
 
WESTERN IDEAS FORCED UPON AN EASTERN RACE. 291 
 
 India in possession, and aU the chiefs not in pos- 
 session, were predisposed to view with at least in- 
 difference any troubles which might assail their pushed to its 
 British over-lord. Incidents like that of the Eajah extreme 
 of Dilheri,* of Kunwar Singh of Jugdispur, driven Eastern race 
 into revolt by the action of a revenue system which 
 he did not understand, came at uncertain intervals to add to the 
 general mistrust. Such incidents affected alike chieftain and 
 retainer, noble and peasant, for, in almost every part of the 
 countrj^ the retainers considered their interests as bound up 
 with those of the former. 
 
 It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that the 
 annexation of Oudh— of Oudh which had ever been 
 faithful, always true and loyal — came to startle them atioifS? Oukh 
 still more. It is just within the bounds of possibility JouS^^^odious 
 that, if the system introduced by the English into 
 Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner, the 
 result might have been similar to that which was produced in a 
 few years in the central provinces. But the Englishmen to 
 whom the administration of the newly-annexed 
 province was intrusted were men with fixed ideas, 
 which they rode to death ; the slaves of a system 
 which had sown disaffection all over the North- notions on 
 Western provinces and in Bundelkhand, and which 
 they carried out without regard to the feelings and 
 previous habits of those with whose lands and property they 
 were dealing. In less than twelve months the result was dis- 
 affection and dismay ; the new settlement made every man in 
 Oudh an enemy to British rule. 
 
 With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the At the close 
 teiTitorial interest doubting and trembling, with the ciVsSs afe 
 Sipahis alienated and mistrustful, there needed but ready for the 
 one other element to produce insurrection. The 
 country, the army, the newly-annexed province were spirators. 
 alike ready for the machinations of conspirators. 
 
 secured in the possession of their estates, and their position, under English rule, 
 has become trebly secure. But Maharajah DhuKp Singh, who was, I repeat, a 
 mere child, innocent of intrigue, and the ward of the British Government, was 
 granted in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues, and for his large 
 private estates, a life annuity only. Can we wonder that treatment of this sort, 
 when fully realised by him, should upset the equilibrium of his mind to the 
 extent recently witnessed by the world ? 
 
 ♦ Page 63-4. 
 
 U 2 
 
292 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 The Maulavi 
 of Oudh. 
 
 The conspirators, too, were ready. Who all those conspirators 
 were re ay never certainly be known. Most of them 
 died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact be- 
 mutiny. bcyond question that the Maulavi of Faizabad — the 
 man who was killed at Powain — was one of them. 
 I have already given a sketch of the previous career of this 
 remarkable man.* I have shown how, after the annexation of 
 Oudh, he travelled over the north-western provinces 
 on a mission which was a mystery to the Europeans, 
 how he was suspected even then of conspiring. 
 Abundant proofs were subsequently obtained that a conspiracy 
 had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in the 
 interval between the annexation and the outbreak of the 
 mutiny. Of this conspiracy the Maulavi was undoubtedly a 
 leader. It had its ramifleations all over India — certainly at 
 Agra, where the Maulavi stayed some time — and almost cer- 
 tainly at Dehli, at Mirath, at Patna, and at Calcutta where the 
 ex-King of Oudh and a large following were residing. 
 
 For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirators 
 — the means, the instrument — with which to kindle 
 to action the great body of their countrymen. 
 Especially were they at a loss how to devise a 
 scheme by which the minds of the Sipahis serving 
 throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simul- 
 taneously affected. They were in this perplexity 
 when they heard of the new cartridge — a cartridge 
 smeared with animal fat and which they were told 
 was to be bitten. 
 
 The one 
 thing want- 
 ing to the 
 success of 
 the con- 
 spiracy 
 
 is found in 
 the greased 
 cartridge. 
 
 It 
 
 easy for them to make this discovery. Their spies 
 were everywhere. The cartridges were openly 
 manufactured at Damdamah. Eagerly looking out 
 for a novelty to be introduced from Europe into the 
 native army, they were the most likely men of all 
 to detect the instrument they required in the greased cartridge. 
 
 When the 
 cartridge is 
 found 
 
 They had 
 responded 
 
 the chap^tfs 
 are cir- 
 culated. 
 
 no sooner found it than they realised that it cor- 
 exactly to their hopes. It was the weapon they 
 wanted. Instantly the chapatis were distributed 
 by thousands to the rural population, whilst means 
 were employed to disseminate in every military 
 station in Bengal suspicion regarding the cartridge. 
 
 * Vol IV p 379. 
 
THE PKOVINCES WHICH ROSE AGAINST US. 293 
 
 To tell a body of Hindus, already suspicious of their foreigr 
 master, that they would be required to bite a cart- 
 ridge smeared with the fat of their sacred animal, 
 and to tell Muhammadans that they would be re- * 
 
 quired to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of Suhammi 
 an animal whose flesh was forbidden to them, was dan Sipiihis. 
 tantamount to tell them that their foreign master 
 intended to make them break with their religion. Certainly 
 that result was produced. When the new cartridges were 
 issued, suspicion and calumny had done their work. The 
 Sipahis even believed that cartridges made of paper had been 
 feloniously tampered with ; and, when they were issued to 
 them, they broke into revolt. 
 
 In this lesser sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridges 
 produce the mutiny. They were the instruments 
 used by conspirators ; and those conspirators were tiyg^oniy 
 successful in their use of the instruments only be- 
 cause, in the manner I have endeavoured to point 
 out, the minds of the Sipahis and of certain sections of the 
 population had been prepared to believe every act testifying to 
 bad faith on the part of their foreign masters. 
 
 I have said that the mistrust of the British faith had, towards 
 the year 1857, become as great in the minds of the 
 princes and chiefs and landowners of India as in the tions^Jhlch 
 minds of the Sipahis. There were, however, a few 
 exceptions, and, when the country rose, those ex- 
 ceptions saved us. I will briefly refer to the most prominent 
 amongst them. 
 
 In four great provinces of our empire — in Oudh, in Eo- 
 hilkhand, in Bundelkhand, and in the Sagar and 
 Narbada territory — the great bulk of the people vmce^^which 
 rose against British rule. In western Bihar, using against 
 that geographical expression as inclusive of the 
 districts subordinate to the Commissioner^ of Patna; in many 
 districts of the Allahabad division, of the Agra division, and in 
 many parts of the Mirath division, the risings of the people and 
 the Sipahis were almost simultaneous in point of time. Had 
 the revolt been universal, had the chiefs, the people, and the 
 Sipahis risen at one and the same moment, India 
 could not have been held. Fortunately for British J?sindE^ 
 interests, the great prince who occupied the most 
 central position in India, and whose action, had he risen, 
 
294 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 would have been felt to the extremities of western India, wasy 
 throughout the crisis, loyal to his suzerain. Throughout the 
 period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September, 1857, 
 Sindhia held the fate of India in his hands. 
 
 In another volume * I have described very briefly how it 
 was that, in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the people 
 with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindhia did 
 remain loyal. I have shown that the loyalty did 
 His loyalty not proceed from affection towards the English. 
 Sd Von His minister and confidant, Dinkar Kao, had no love 
 for our nation. Sindhia’s people were, almost to a 
 as a people, man, against us. Yet Dinkar Kao used all his 
 great influence in favour of a loyal policy, and his 
 representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able re- 
 presentative of the British power at the court of Sindhia, 
 Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentiment, 
 the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstra- 
 tions of the people. The importance of the result to English 
 interests cannot be over-estimated. Sindhia’s loyalty alone 
 made possible Havelock’s march on, and the retention of, 
 Kanhpur. It acted at the same time on the rebels 
 Yet it saved wedge which pierces the centre of an army, 
 
 dividing the wings, and preventing concentrated 
 action. Nor, when, after the back of the rebellion had been 
 broken, Sindhia’s army revolted against himself, was the effect 
 much lessened. Sindhia’s great influence was still used for the 
 English. 
 
 In considering Sindhia’s loyalty in connection with the risings 
 of others — of all, or almost all, the rajahs and 
 talukdars, of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bundelkhand, 
 in the Sagar and Narbada territory, in the southern 
 Maratha country, and in western Bihar — it is im- 
 possible to shut our eyes to the fact that there had 
 been a marked difference in the behaviour of the 
 British Government towards Sindhia on the one 
 side, and towards the rajahs and landowners of the countries 
 mentioned on the other. Uhder circumstances of a peculiarly 
 tempting character. Lord Ellenborough had behaved with the 
 greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindhia in 1844. 
 The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The 
 
 The loyalty 
 really based 
 on the fact 
 that we had 
 dealt faith- 
 fully and 
 generously 
 with him. 
 
 * Vol. HI. pp. 100-1. 
 
THE PHASES OF KULE INFLUENCE NATIVE CONDUCT. 295 
 
 The remark- 
 able in- 
 stances in 
 which the 
 behaviour of 
 the people of 
 India corre- 
 sponded to 
 the faith we 
 had kept 
 with them. 
 
 reader of this volume will see that towards the rajahs and 
 landowners of the other provinces mentioned the British 
 Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance. In 
 some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarcely 
 necessary to point the moral. 
 
 It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which the 
 rulers of India at the present moment would do well 
 to bear in mind, that in the several provinces and 
 districts traversed by our troops in 1857-8-9, the 
 behaviour of the people corresponded to the character 
 of our rule. Thus, in the central provinces, to 
 which the regulation system had never penetrated, 
 the people were loyal and contented, and refused all 
 aid to Tantia Topi. In the Sagar and Narbada 
 territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on 
 that province, in the Agra division — in all of which the British 
 hand had been heav}^ and the British acts opposed to the 
 national sentiment — the people showed a spirit of opposition, 
 a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a de- 
 testation of their masters, such as no one would before have 
 credited. Cases similar to that of the Eajah of Dilheri, referred 
 to in the earlier part * of this volume, had sown far and wide 
 the seed of disaffection and revolt. 
 
 If these facts are, as I believe them to be, correct, we have 
 not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny 
 of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I 
 have named were the natural consequences of an 
 attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according 
 to purely Western ideas. 
 
 The civilisation, over-refined though it might be, of thousands 
 of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, 
 scorning sentiment, regarded utilitarianism as its 
 foundation-stone. The governing members of that 
 race failed to recognise the great truth upon which 
 their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that 
 the Western race can gain the confidence of the 
 Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long-cherished 
 customs of the latter, and impresses upon it the conviction that its 
 word is better than its bond. This is just the conviction which, 
 during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856, the 
 
 The mutiny 
 the result of 
 a rude 
 attempt 
 
 to govern an 
 Eastern 
 people 
 according to 
 pure Western 
 ideas. 
 
 Page 63. 
 
296 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 new to India, 
 
 majority of tlie Hindus and Muliammadans of India had been 
 gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost. 
 
 If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 1857 
 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed the 
 
 Canning general serenity were part of an organised plot, he 
 would, I believe, have at once taken measures to 
 meet the difficulty. Not that, at any time in 1857, he could 
 have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made better 
 arrangements to meet one. I am far, however, from imputing 
 any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had but 
 recently arrived in India. His predecessor, when making over 
 to him charge of the empire, had expressed his conviction that 
 never had the country been in so satisfactory a 
 condition. All the time the ground was undermined, 
 the train was being laid, the miners were at work. But how 
 was Lord Canning to know this? He inherited 
 Lord Dalhousie’s councillors. They were as satisfied, 
 
 X^&1doiisi 6 S • t/ ' 
 
 councillors. and as ignorant of the real state of the country, as 
 was Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie had quitted 
 India in a blaze of glory ; and the new Governor-General, un- 
 used to the currents of Indian thought, could for some months 
 only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helped 
 to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far-reaching and seemingly 
 well deserved. 
 
 But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descend 
 with so startling a surprise as upon the councillors 
 
 Ss of Lord' Lord Canning. They could not comprehend it. 
 
 Canning. Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could bring 
 themselves to believe that it was anything more 
 than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having no 
 concert and no connection with the other. The Home Secre- 
 tary’s assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding its 
 nature were “ a passing and groundless panic,” that “ there is 
 every hope that in a few days tranquillity will be restored 
 throughout the presidency,” testify to the ideas that filled the 
 minds of these men. The admission at least is due to them that 
 they were honest — thej^ believed what they said. 
 Jnorance^of those sayings betrayed a complete ignorance 
 
 of the country and of the situation. This ignorance, 
 this blindness to the fact that it was more even than 
 a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a 
 series of isolated revolts, with which they had to cope, was 
 
 the India 
 
 outside 
 
 Calcutta. 
 
LORD CANNING IN 1858. 
 
 297 
 
 illustrated in a thousand ways, but in none more strongly than 
 in the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to be 
 mutinous. The consequences of this refusal were most serious. 
 In the case of the regiments at Danapur, the reader will have 
 seen that it brought revolt into western Bihar, added enor- 
 mously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperilled 
 Calcutta. 
 
 How great Lord Canning really was, how small were his 
 councillors, was shown when, having completely 
 shaken off their influence, he stood alone and un- 
 shackled at Allahabad in the early part of 1858. A 
 different man was he then from the Lord Canning he^tood^n^'^ 
 of April and May 1857. His nature then displayed 
 its real nobility. His grasp of affairs, at Calcutta ap- 
 parently so small, excited at Allahabad the admiration of all who 
 came in contact with him. He showed a truer insight into the 
 military position than the Commander-in-Chief himself. It was 
 entirely owing to Lord Canning’s insistance that the campaign in 
 Eohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lakhnao. Sir 
 Colin Campbell would have postponed it. But Lord Canning was 
 too convinced of the danger of allowing a province to continue 
 to flaunt rebellion, unchecked, in the face of the Government, to 
 permit the delay. He insisted with all the determina- 
 tion of a man whose resolution, based on the logic 
 of facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Can- ^ 
 ning at Allahabad who sent Lord Mark Kerr to Azamgarh ; 
 who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to the 
 generals engaged against Tantia Topi ; and if, in one respect, 
 to which I have adverted, his judgaient was faulty, his com- 
 panion in error was the Commander-in-Chief, and the error was 
 a solitary one. 
 
 Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurated 
 at Allahabad to heal the wounds caused — he must 
 then have seen — in a great measure by the mistakes Jon^n?egard 
 of his predecessor. His Oudh proclamation, despite to Oudh. 
 of the apparently harsh terms which it promulgated, 
 was intended as a message of mercy, and, in its application, 
 was a message of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oudh 
 a title better, safer, more valid, than the title he had lost. It 
 insured mercy to all except to those who by their crimes had 
 forfeited all right to it. Interpreted, as Lord Canning meant 
 it to be interpreted, by one of the ablest administrators in 
 
298 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 India, it became the charter upon which the position now 
 occupied by the people of Oudh has been built up and 
 secured. 
 
 Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning’s character 
 more completely displayed than when the galling 
 S^Lor?Ei-°° strictures of Lord Ellenborough’s despatch were 
 published to the world. At the moment the insult, 
 the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in the 
 fear lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from so 
 high a quarter should afford encouragement to the rebels or 
 weaken the attachment of the native tributaries. As soon as 
 he ascertained that the despatch had not produced that result ho 
 was calm. He could not help seeing that it was designedly im- 
 pertinent, that it was intended to provoke him to resign. Con- 
 scious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness of 
 his views, he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In his 
 calm and statesmanlike answer he sought neither revenge nor 
 triumph. But both soon came to him. The news that Lord 
 Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receipt 
 of Lord Derby’s almost imploring letter not to resign, followed 
 the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling. ' 
 
 Towards the men who served under him. Lord Canning dis- 
 played generosity, kindness, and forbearance. He 
 towaM^hff knew that in many departments he had been badly 
 colleagues^ Served, yet he would rather bear the burden himself 
 ' than dismiss the incapable minister. But so low 
 did he rate the abilities of the men about him, that 
 when he had resolved to appoint Mr. Edmonstone, till then his 
 Foreign Secretary, to be Lieutenant-Governor of the North- 
 West Provinces, he cast his eyes far from the men surrounding 
 him to select a successor to that official. He had actually re- 
 solved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publica- 
 tion by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused him 
 to reconsider his resolve. For the moment he was cast back 
 upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirable 
 choice in Colonel Durand. 
 
 Judging Lord Canning’s conduct after his arrival at Allah- 
 abad, it is difficult to find a fault in it. He was 
 then the lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained 
 and skilful statesman. Every day made it more 
 clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta period, 
 mistakes which have been fully recorded in these 
 
 The lofty- 
 
 minded 
 
 English 
 
 gentleman, 
 
 the trained 
 
 statesman. 
 
LOKD ELPHINSTONE. 
 
 29 ^ 
 
 voluines, were due to tlie inexperience of a generous nature 
 guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as masters 
 of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignorant 
 and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this him- 
 self was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after the 
 mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to express 
 very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857. 
 
 But, if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of his 
 arrival at Allahabad, Lord Elphinstone deserves 
 the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to Elphinstone 
 him from the very first. Lord Elphinstone possessed 
 this advantage over Lord Canning — his previous experience in^ 
 India had given him a thorough knowledge of the country and 
 the people. When the mutiny broke out at Mirath 
 he saw it as it really was ; he saw that it was no 
 isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and fuii extent of 
 parcel of an organised rebellion which had its main 
 roots, indeed, in the North West Provinces, but the very outset, 
 development of which, especially in the direction 
 of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopped. 
 The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruited 
 from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration of 
 Maratha states, was in a peculiar degree susceptible. Lord 
 Elphinstone understood the situation at once. He dealt 'with 
 it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lofty 
 courage, of clear intellect, and of far-seeing views. The idea 
 of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, it 
 ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejected. To 
 mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of the. 
 scene of action — that Napoleonic motto became at once his 
 guiding principle. For that purpose he denuded 
 his own Presidency, highly sensitive as it was, of 
 European troops, and despatched them, as fast as he defence, 
 could force them to move, to the threatened points 
 outside of it. He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues im 
 his government, but here again his previous experience saved 
 him from the mistakes which marred Lord Canning’s adminis- 
 tration during the first seven months of the mutiny. Knowing 
 his counsellors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy — 
 but he acted on his own convictions. To the men who were 
 the instruments of his policy he gave the most complete and 
 generous confidence. How large was his trust when he once- 
 
300 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 gave it Mr. Forjett is a living evidence. Mr. Frere in Sindh, 
 The enerous ^eton-Karr and afterwards Colonel Le Gr. Jacob 
 confidenre^he in the Southern Maratha country, Mr. John Rose 
 SiT^rdi^aS Satarah, and Colonel Malcolm, are instances of 
 a similar import. When, in spite of all his measures 
 to keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive 
 defence, the poison crept in and infected the regiments of the 
 regular army in the southern Maratha country, how vigorous, 
 how decided is his policy ! We see here none of 
 the hesitation, of the half-heartedness, the halting 
 between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous 
 regiments of Danapur to disturb all the plans of the Govern- 
 ment and to imperil the safety of the empire. Promptly, 
 without an hour’s delay. Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest 
 man at his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapur and at all 
 costs quell the mutiny. Le Grand Jacob went and disarmed 
 the rebellious Sipahis. How Lord Elphinstone was occasionally 
 thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been 
 shown in the case of Woodburn. But his firmness was proof 
 even against opposition of this description, and, after some 
 vexatious delay, he carried out his policy. 
 
 Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his 
 Hiscorre- voluminous Correspondence during 1857-58 can 
 spondenS form an idea of the remarkable perspicacity which 
 characterised Lord Elphinstone’s views on every 
 point connected with the stirring events of those 
 jT-ears. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true 
 policy to be pursued, the proper time for putting it in action, 
 when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the reasons for 
 withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous 
 language in his letters. Reading them after the event, it 
 seems marvellous how a man standing alone should have 
 judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements 
 which tended to the pacification of the country had their first 
 inspiration from Lord Elphinstone, and the smallest of the 
 tardy tributes that can be paid him is this — that no man in 
 India contributed so much as he contributed to check the 
 mutiny at its outset ; no man contributed more to dominate it 
 after it had risen to its greatest height. 
 
 In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well-merited 
 rewards for military services, the great deserts of Lord Elphin- 
 stone received but small notice from the public. But it is a 
 
LORD HARRIS. 301 
 
 remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence 
 he was nominated by three successive Secretaries of 
 State — by Mr. Vernon Smith, by Lord Ellenborough, 
 and by Lord Stanley — to be successor to Lord 
 Canning in the event of a vacancy occurring in 
 the office of Governor-General. It now becomes 
 the duty of the historian to place him on the lofty 
 pedestal to which his great services and his pure 
 and noble character entitle him. 
 
 The southern Presidency was never invaded by the mutinous 
 spirit. But not the less is a large share of credit Harris 
 due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility 
 which weighed upon this nobleman was very great indeed. 
 The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of the 
 Nizam, and, at the outset, the Nizam had much to apprehend 
 from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis that 
 Lord Harris denuded his own Presidency to send troops to 
 Haidarabad, and it cannot be doubted but that their opportune 
 arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizam’s 
 dominions. The formation of the Kamthi column, of Whitlock’s 
 force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kanhpur, 
 the despatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept 
 open the grand trunk road in western Bihar and 
 which afterwards co-operated against Kunwar Singh, Tud deTo^tS. 
 of the troops who rendered good service in Chutia 
 Nagpur, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of the 
 Governor of Madras. He used all the resources of his Presidency 
 to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated within 
 his own borders. 
 
 Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of the 
 rebellion I have written in the body of this history, 
 not always, perhaps, in as full detail as their 
 splendid services demanded, but, I would fain hope, men in the 
 in full proportion to the scope and requirements of issils-a. 
 the work intrusted to me. It may be that some 
 incidents have escaped me. I shall regret it much should such 
 prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render full 
 justice to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, however 
 ineffectively the History of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny 
 may have been told, the character of our countrymen must be seen 
 to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857-58 in a form that would 
 gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nation, 
 
 Lord Elphin- 
 stone is 
 appointed by 
 three succes- 
 sive Secreta- 
 ries of State 
 to succeed 
 Lord 
 Canning. 
 
302 
 
 THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY. 
 
 
 accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in our 
 history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, the fortitude and 
 manliness of our countrymen of all ranks, been more con- 
 spicuous — often in the face of death itself, and under circum- 
 stances which would have seemed to justify despair. But with 
 life they never despaired. They endured all that had to be 
 endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpassed, 
 and sought victory when it was possible with a determination 
 before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in aU 
 this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomen, 
 who, in positions and under trials to which few gently-nurtured 
 women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and most 
 lovable aspects of woman’s character. The History of the 
 Indian Mutiny is, in fact, a record of the display of all the 
 qualities for which Englishmen have been famous — of the 
 qualities which have enabled the inhabitants of a small island 
 in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empire 
 in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired in 
 their descendants, will enable them still to maintain it. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 803 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 (Pages 138-42.) 
 
 In addition to the fact stated at page 138 that Madhava Eao, Eao of 
 Kirwi, was only nine years old when the mutiny broke out, and that the 
 money paid for the maintenance of the Banaras Temples had been alienated 
 Before he sat on the gadi, and therefore never formed part of his estate and 
 could not be liable to seizure, whatever he might do, it may be added that 
 at the time of the Mutiny the Government of India appointed a Special 
 Commissioner, Mr. F. 0. Mayne, to inquire into the conduct of Madhava 
 Eao, and that that Commissioner fully absolved him from all blame 
 {vide his report, dated September 8, 1858). 
 
 Not only so, but the same gentleman gave a special certificate to the 
 Eegent of Kirwi (who was also trustee of the Banaras Temples), dated 
 February 4, 1859. A copy of that document, now before me, states : 
 
 Earn Chandra Earn, Paindsay, has always borne a high character for 
 loyalty and respectability during the Mutiny of 1857. Being a relation 
 of the Kirwi Peshwa, he was placed in a difficult position, and discharged 
 his duty both towards the British Government and towards his master 
 most faithfully, at the risk of his life, and with frank and open loyalty to 
 Government. It was he who saved the life of Mr. Cockerell, joint 
 magistrate of Kirwi. Though he has at present frankly refused any 
 reward for his loyal and faithful services, yet he must be well paid 
 whenever he stands in need.” This was signed by Mr. F. 0. Mayne. Yet 
 the reward Earn Chandrd, Earn received was the pillage of the Banaras 
 Temples of which he was trustee. 
 
 There is thus complete evidence that a Special Commissioner exonerated 
 Mddhava Eao from all blame, and gave a certificate of loyalty to his 
 adviser : we have the non-age of the Eao, and the fact that the Temple 
 money had been seized by the Government two years before the Mutiny ; 
 and yet we are asked to believe that aU these seizures took place in con- 
 sequence of the Eao’s rebellion. 
 
 With reference to the statement made in the first edition that General 
 Whitlock found in the palace-yard of Kirwi more than forty pieces of 
 cannon, an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder, &c., a friend, who 
 has investigated the subject of the Kirwi tragedy, writes me as follows : 
 “ As to the statement made by Whitlock and repeated by you about the 
 active gun factories and powder mills and stands of arms, the whole is a 
 shameless lie put forward to warrant the grant of prize money. That 
 * lucky ’ column had a keen scent for booty. Listen to a few words of 
 
304 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 truth. On the death of Venayak Eao, the 6th July, 1853, Mr. Ellis, the 
 Eesident, went to Kirwi, disbanded all the forces there, and carried away 
 all the weapons of war. A prudent, though despotic, use was made of the 
 change of raj to disarm this petty native State. The agent to the 
 Government of India had full information of all that was going on at 
 Kirwi up to the outbreak of the Mutiny. Is it consistent with common 
 sense to suppose that a petty State like Kirwi could establish gun 
 foundries and powder manufactories during the short period of the Mutiny ? 
 Ko money, however vast, and no hatred, however bitter, could possibly 
 create such things, without the time necessary for their establishment. 
 Your military knowledge will make the monstrous impudence of 
 Whitlock’s assertion more apparent to you than it can be to me. He 
 probably scraped together a few old relics and curiosities, with a few 
 mutineers’ guns and belts — ^hundreds of which must have been available at 
 such a time — and on the like trumpery the lie must have been built up.” 
 
 I give this statement for what it is worth. To me it seems that there 
 was, at least, great exaggeration in Whitlock’s narrative ; and that there 
 were no grounds whatever for treating the Eao of Kirwi as an enemy to 
 be plundered. 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 ' (Page 269.) 
 
 Translation of Tantid Topi’s Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken in 
 Camp Mushairi on the 10th of April, 1859, in presence of Major 
 Meade, commanding Field Force. 
 
 My name is Tantia Topi ; my father’s name is Pandurang, inhabitant of 
 Jold-Parganah, Patoda-Zillah, Nagar. I am a resident of Bithiir. I am 
 about forty-five years of age, in the service of Nana Sahib in the grade of 
 companion or aide-de-camp. 
 
 In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kanhpur sent a note of the 
 following purport to the Nana Sahib at Bithiir, viz. that he begged him 
 (the Nana) to forward his wife and children to England. The Nd,n^ 
 consented to do so , and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him to 
 bring his troops and guns with him from Bithiir (to Kanhpiir). I went 
 with the Nana and about one hundred Sipahis and three hundred match- 
 lockmen and two guns to the collector’s house at Kanhpiir. The collector 
 was then in the intrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word to 
 remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collectoi 
 came in the morning and told the Nana to occupy his own house, which 
 was in Kanhpiir. We accordingly did so; we remained there four days, 
 and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the 
 Sipdhis had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the general 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 305 
 
 in our behalf. He did so, and the general wrote to Agra, whence a reply 
 came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men. Two 
 days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cavalry 
 surrounded us and imprisoned the Nana and myself in the Treasury, and 
 plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, 
 leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the Sipahis made over two 
 lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Nana, keeping their own sentries 
 over it. The Nana was also under charge of these sentries, and the Sipahis 
 who were with us also joined the rebels. After this the whole army 
 marched from that place, and the rebels took the Nana Sahib and myself 
 and all our attendants along with them, and said, “ Come along to Dehli.” 
 Having gone three coss from Kanhpur, the Nand Sahib said that, as the 
 day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on the 
 following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning the 
 whole army told him (the Nana) to go with them towards Dehli. The 
 Nand refused, and the army then said, “ Come with us to Kanhpur, and 
 fight there.” The Nana objected to this ; but they would not attend to him, 
 and so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kanhpur, 
 and fighting commenced there. The fighting continued for twenty-four 
 days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the fing of peace, 
 and the fighting ceased. The Nana got a female who had been captured 
 before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the Sipdhis 
 would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Ndnd) would 
 get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as far 
 as Allahabad. An answer came from the general that he approved of this 
 arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Nana something 
 over one lakh of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount. The 
 following day I went and got ready forty boats, and, having caused all the 
 gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off 
 to Allahabad. In the meanwhile the whole army, artillery included, 
 having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The Sipahis jumped into 
 the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, 
 and set the boats on fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats. One, how- 
 ever, escaped as far as Kola Kankar, but was there caught and brought 
 back to Kanhpur, and all on board of it destroyed. Four days after this 
 the Nana said he was going to Bithur to keep the anniversary of his 
 mother’s death ; they (the Sipahis) allowed him to go, and some of them 
 also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they’- brought him 
 back to Kanhpur, and they took for their pay the money they had first 
 made over to the Nana’s charge, and made arrangements to fight against 
 Husan Fathpur, where they heard some Europeans had arrived from 
 AllahabM, and they told the Nana to accompany them there. TheNand, 
 refused. I and the Nana remained at Kanhpur, and sent Jawala Parshad, 
 his (the Nana’s) agent, along with them to Fathpiir. Having arrived 
 there and been defeated, they retreated to Kanhpur, and the aforesaid 
 European force pressed them the whole way to Kanhpur, when there was 
 a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, and 
 VOL. V. X 
 
306 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 ran away from Kd-nlipdr. Under these circumstances the Ndnd and I fled 
 to Bithur, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed us. 
 The next morning the Nand, taking some cash, &c., with him, went to 
 Fathpur. The rebel army followed, and looted the place. The Ndnd, 
 Bala Sahib, Rao Sahib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Ganges 
 in boats, and arrived at Fathpur in the Lakhnao territory, and put up with 
 the Chaodri Bhopal Singh. Some days passed, when the 42nd Native 
 Infantry arrived at Sheorajpur, and wrote to the Nana to send them some 
 one to take them to him. I went and told them that the Nana had sent 
 for them. In the meanwhile the English army arrived, and the said 
 42nd regiment Native Infantry went to Bithur, and fought there. I ac- 
 companied the said regiment, and, having been defeated, we fled from 
 Bithiir and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Nana. Some days after, 
 I received orders from the Nand to go to Gwaliar, and to bring back with 
 me to fight the English such of the contingent as were at Mordr. Accord- 
 ing to his order, I went to Morar, and brought back the contingent with 
 me to Kalpl. The Nana had sent his brother, the Bdla Sahib, to Kalpi, 
 and, according to his order, I went with the army to fight against Kanhpur, 
 leaving a small force and magazine at Kalpi. Having arrived at Kanhpur, 
 there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the rebel 
 army was defeated, and we all rah away. The next day after this we 
 fought at Sheorajpur, and there also, having been defeated, we ran away, 
 having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun). I and the 
 Bdla Sahib and the Rao Sahib, who had been sent by the Nana to Kanhpur, 
 all crossed the Ganges at Nana Mau-ki-Ghat. We remained at a place 
 called Kherd for the night. I got orders from the Rao Sahib to go and 
 take charge of the small force and magazine left at Kalpi, in obedience to 
 which I went there. After my arrival at Kalpi, I received orders from 
 the Nana to go and attack Chirkhari, and that the Rao Sahib should be 
 sent after me. Accordingly I, with nine hundred Sipdhis, two hundred 
 cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkhari, and fighting commenced. Four 
 days afterwards the Rao Sahib came to Kalpi. I fought at Chirkhdri for 
 eleven days, and took it. I took twenty-four guns and three lakhs of 
 rupees from the Rajah. The Rajahs of Banpiir and Shahgarh, and Dewdn 
 Despat and Daolat Singh, the Kuchwdya Kharwala, and a great gathering 
 of people joined me there at this time, I received a note from the Queen 
 of Jhansi to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, and 
 begging me to come to her aid. I reported the news to the Rdo Sahib at 
 Kalpi. The Rao came to Jaipur, and gave me permission to go to the 
 assistance of the Queen of Jhansi. Accordingly I went to Jhansi, and 
 halted at Barua Sagar. There Rdjah Man Singh came and joined me. 
 The next day, about a mile from Jhansi, the whole of our army had a 
 fight with the English army. At this time we had twenty-two thousand 
 men and twenty-eight guns. In this battle we were defeated. A part of 
 the rebel army, with four or five guns, fled to Kalpi, and I went to the 
 same place, via Bhanderi and Kunch, with two hundred Sipdhis. The 
 Queen of Jhansi ariived there the same evening as myself, and begged 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 307 
 
 the Edo Sdhib to give her an army that she might go and fight. The 
 following morning the Edo Sdhib ordered a parade of all the troops, and 
 told me to accompany the Queen to battle. Accordingly I, with a force, 
 accompanied the Queen, and there was a battle at Kiinch which lasted 
 till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to “Chirki,” 
 which is about four miles from Jalaur, and where my parents were. The 
 Queen of Jhansi and the force which fled with her arrived at Kalpi. The 
 Eao had a battle afterwards at Kalpi and was defeated, and he and 
 his whole army arrived at Gopalpiir ; we all marched thence towards 
 Gwaliar. We had one day’s flght with Maharajah Sindhid, and defeated 
 him. Three days afterwards all Sindhia’s army joined the Eao Sahib, and 
 having procured from the Gwaliar treasury, through Amarchand Batid (the 
 Mahdrdjah’s treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to the 
 army. Edm Edo Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards the 
 English army arrived at Gwdlidr from Kalpi, and a force also came from 
 Sirpur. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five days, 
 during which the Jhdnsi Edni was killed. Earn Edo Govind had her 
 corpse burnt, and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty-five guns 
 with us. We reached Jdurd-Alipur and remained there during the night. 
 The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a half. 
 We fired five shots, the English army fired four shots, and we then ran 
 off, leaving all our guns. We crossed the Chambal, and reached Tonk via 
 Sirimuthia. The Nawdb of Tonk fought with us, and we took four guns 
 from him. With these guns we proceeded to Bhilwdrd via Mahdipur and 
 Indragarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I fled 
 during the night, accompanied by my army and guns. At that time I 
 had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all pro- 
 ceeded to a village called Kotra (about four miles from Nathduwara) and 
 halted there for one night. The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, 
 after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived, and an action 
 took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitives. 
 (The Nawab of Bandah, who had come with us from Kalpi, and the Nawab 
 of Kumona, who had joined us at Indurki, were both with us.) On our 
 arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the Eajah of that 
 place; we conquered, and got possession of all the Eajah’s guns and 
 magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was. The next day I 
 went and told the Eajah to give some money to pay the expenses of my 
 army. He said he could give me five lakhs of rupees, but not more. I 
 returned and told the Eao Sahib this. The next day the Eao Sahib sent 
 for the Eajah and demanded twenty-five lakhs from him. The Eajah 
 declared he could not give more than five lakhs ; but, after some discussion, 
 it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs. The Eajah said he would 
 go to his palace and send this sum. He went accordingly, and sent two 
 and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow. By 
 the next day he had paid up five lakhs. 
 
 Imdm All, Wirdi-major 5th Irregular Cavalry, ill-treated the Edjah 
 very much, and the latter fied during the night. We remained there five 
 
 X 2 
 
308 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 days, and issued three months’ pay to our troops at the rate of thirty 
 rupees each sawdr, and twelve rupees to each foot-soldier per mensem. 
 
 We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us. On reach- 
 ing Kajgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our 
 guns and fled, and reached Sironj via Nija Kila. We halted at Sironj 
 eight days, and, having taken four guns from the Tonk Nawab’s agent at 
 Sironj, we proceeded thence to tsaghar. On arrival there we demanded 
 supplies; hut the Isagarh people would not give them. We therefore 
 attacked Isagarh, and plundered it. The following day we halted, and 
 the Eao Sahib told me to go to Chanderi, and that he would come round 
 by Tal Bahat. I accordingly went to Chanddri, and the Kdo Sahib 
 came to Ldlitpur from (or by) Tal Bahat. On my reaching Chanderi, 
 four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked and 
 fought with Sindhia’s agent. After three days we marched from 
 Chanderi towards Mangrduli, taking with us eleven guns, viz., seven 
 which we had brought from Isagarh and the four we had got from Sironj. 
 On our march to Mangrauli, we met the English army. Shots were fired 
 for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven guns 
 five were with me and six with the Rao Sahib. I lost my five in this 
 fight, but the Rao kept his six). 
 
 (Note. — It would appear that the Rao was not in this action.) 
 
 I reached Jakldun, and the next day went to Sultanpur, where the Rdo 
 S^hib also arrived. After three days the English force arrived, and the 
 Rao Sdhib took his army to Jaklaun (about five miles from Lalatpiir), and 
 some firing took place there. I was not present in this fight. The Rdo 
 Sahib returned to Lalitpiir, and the following day proceeded to Kajuria 
 (ten miles from Sultanpur) and halted there. The next day the English 
 army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenced 
 which lasted an hour and a half. We then left all our guns and fled, and 
 reached Tal Bahat. We halted there, and the following day went to 
 Jaklaun, and thence to a village called Itawah, twelve miles distant, where 
 we stopped. We there heard that the English army was coming to sur- 
 prise us, and marched at night. The English force came up in the morn- 
 ing, and our army became separated. I accompanied the Rdo Sahib, and 
 we proceeded, via Rajgarh, and crossed the Narbada, and got to Kagdon 
 Batis via KanduU. The troops who were with us burned the Govern- 
 ment thana * and bungalow at Kanduld. The Eao Sahib forbad their doing 
 so, but they w ould not obey him. This was about four months ago. At 
 Kaugdon Batis there were some of Holkar’s troops — one hundred and forty 
 sawars, one company of infantry, and two guns. These we forced to join 
 us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towards 
 Gujrat, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran. The Sipdhis 
 broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the road 
 proceeding with Government property towards Gwaliar, and seized the 
 
 ♦ “Thin^,” a station.— G. B. M. 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 309 
 
 chaprdsis and chaukidars * who were with the hackeries, and took them 
 with them. Some of the chaukidars belonging to the chauki were hanged 
 by them. We there left the high road and proceeded westward. The 
 next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two 
 guns, we fled, and reached the Narbada. An officer, with a hundred men, 
 was on the opposite bank. Our force commenced to cross, and this officer 
 and party of sawars ran off. We plundered a village there called Chikla, 
 and marched thence at midnight. After proceeding thirty-four miles, we 
 halted at Rajpura. The next day we took three thousand nine hundred 
 rupees and three horses from the Rajah of that place, and from it went on to 
 Chota Udaipur. The following day the English force surprised us ; some 
 of them were killed, and some of ours. From Chota Udaipur we went on 
 to Deogarh Bari, and our army became separated. There was jungle at 
 that place, and I halted there two days. Our troops having been collected 
 again, we started, and went to Banswara. Our men plundered there 
 sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth (some of Ahmadabad) belonging 
 to a mahajan f which they found there. We thence went to Salomar, and 
 I called on Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipur Rajah, to furnish us with 
 supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with 
 the intention of going to Udaipur. However, route we received tidings 
 of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhilwara. We remained 
 there two days, and then proceeded to Partabgarh, where we fought for 
 two hours with a body of English troops which had come from iS imach. 
 About 8 o’clock p.m. we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east 
 of Mandesar, and halted there. We then went on to Zirapur, making 
 three stages en route. An English force surprised us there, and we were 
 again surprised by another force at Chapi a Bared. We fled thence to 
 Nahargarh, the agent of the Kota Rajah, at which place nine shots were 
 fired at us from guns. We moved out of range, and halted there during 
 the night; and the Rao Sahib sent Risaldar Nannii Khan to call Rajah, 
 Man Singh. The Rajah came and accompanied us — i.e. the Rao Sahib, 
 myself, and our force — to a place about two miles from Paron, where we 
 halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place 
 about eight miles beyond Kilwari, whose name I do not remember. 
 Rajah Man Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed 
 en route., and then left us. We made two stages thence to Indragarh : and 
 Firuzshih, with the Khas Risala (bodyguard) and 12th Irregulars, met us 
 there. The next day we went on, making two stages to Dewas, which is 
 fourteen miles from Jaipur. The English force surprised us there ; some 
 men on both sides were killed, and, flying thence towards Marwar, we 
 reached a village about thirty koss from Marwar, whose name I do not 
 remember. At 4 o’clock that night we were surprised by the English 
 force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Rdo Sahib’s army. 
 
 * “ Chaprasi,” a belted attendant or messenger. “ Chaukidar,” a watch 
 man. “ Chauki,” a post, in this sense ; also a chair, 
 t “ Mahajan,” banker, merchant.— G. B. M, 
 
310 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 The next day Thdkur Narayan Singh, Ajit Singh, uncle of Edjah Min 
 Singh, and Thdkur Grangi Singh joined us at that place (? to which the 
 Kio’s army had fled). They were coming in this (the Paron) direction. 
 
 I had been quarrelling with the Eao Sahib all the wav from DeogarhBari, 
 and told him I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an oppor- 
 tunity for doing so, I should leave him. The opportunity for doing so here 
 ojBfered, and I left him and accompanied the (three) above-named parties 
 in this (the Paron) direction. When I left the Edo Sahib he had about 
 six thousand men with him. But three men (two Pandits to cook my 
 food and one sais) and three horses and one tattii accompanied me. The 
 names of the two Pandits were Earn Edo and Narayan. The sdi’s name 
 was Gobind, but he left me and ran off after coming two stages. We 
 reached the Paron jungle and met Eajah Man Singh. Ajit Singh took 
 leave of Eajah Man Singh, and went to his home. Nardyan Singh and I 
 remained with Eajah Mdn Singh. The Edjah said, “ Why did you leave 
 your force ? You have not acted right in so doing.” I replied that I was 
 tired of running away, and that I would remain with him whether I had 
 done right or wrong. I heard after this that the Eao Sahib’s army had 
 gone to Patan, and thence towards Sironj. I told Eajah Mdn Singh I 
 would send a man to get intelligence of them, and he approved of my doing 
 so. I sent accordingly, and got information that the Edo Sahib was not 
 there ; but Imdm Ali, Wirdi-major, Firuzshdh, and the Ambapani-wdld 
 Nawab, Adil Muhammad, were there with eight or nine thousand men. 
 Imdm Ali, Wirdi-major of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, wrote to me to come 
 and join them. I had lost my master’s (the Nana’s) seal, and had another 
 made up at Paron. 
 
 When I heard, as above, from the Wirdi-major, I sent a man to Edjah 
 Man Singh, who was at Mahiidid in Major Meade’s camp (he had then been 
 there three days), to inform him that I had received a note of this purport, 
 and to ask him if I should go or remain. Edjah Mdn Singh had consulted 
 me before giving himself up to Major Meade, and had left one of his men 
 with me, saying, “ Stop wherever this man takes you.” Edjah Mdn Singh 
 replied to my message that he would come in three days to see me, and we 
 should then settle what to do. 
 
 He came accordingly on the third day, at night, and spoke a great deal 
 to me, and told me that he had met Major Meade, and that his disposition 
 was good. When I asked him what he advised — whether I should go or 
 remain — he said he would reply in the morning. I then went to sleep, 
 and during the night some of the Sipdhis of the Government came and 
 seized me, and took me to Major Meade’s camp. 
 
 Signature of Tantid Topi, 
 
 Agent of the Naud Sdhib. 
 
 Question by Major Meade . — Have you made this statement of your own 
 free will and without compulsion ? and has any promise been made, or hope 
 held out to you, to induce you to give it ? 
 
 Answer . — I have, of my own free wiU, caused this statement to be 
 
APPENDIX C. 311 
 
 written ; and no one has forced me to do so, or held out hope or promise of 
 any sort to induce me to do so. 
 
 Signature of Tantid Topi, 
 
 Agent of the Ndnd Sdhib. 
 
 Signature of Witnesses, 
 
 (Signed) Granga-Parshad Munshi, Meade’s Horse. 
 
 Kuhhuldl Naih-Kaindar of Sipri. 
 
 The above deposition or statement was made by the prisoner Tantia Topi 
 in my presence on the 10th of April, 1859, at Camp Miishairi, of his own 
 voluntary act and without compulsion of any sort, or promise made, or hope 
 held out to him as an inducement to make it. 
 
 (Signed) E. J. Meade, Major, 
 
 Commanding Field Force. 
 
 Certified that the above is a true and correct translation of the original 
 deposition or confession of Tdntia Topi appended hereto. 
 
 (Signed) J. J. M. Gibbon, Lieutenant, 
 
 Adjutant Meade’s Horse. 
 
 (True copy) 
 
 (Signed) R. Meade. 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 (Page 271.) 
 
 Trial of the ex-King of DEHLi. 
 
 The Judge- Advocate-General then addressed the Court as follows : — 
 
 Gentlemen, — It will be my object, in the present address, to collect 
 the different facts which have been elicited in the course of these proceed- 
 ings, and to furnish them to you, as far as possible, in the order in which 
 they originally occurred. Our investigation has involved inquiry over a 
 period of several months, when rebellion was rampant in this city ; and I 
 trust we have succeeded in tracing, with considerable minuteness, many of 
 the different events as they evolved themselves during the time to which 
 I have referred. Our labours, indeed, have not had this limit, or we 
 should only have accomplished what might, I think, be termed the least 
 important part of our duties. In immediate connection with the facts 
 elicited are the charges on which the prisoner has been arraigned ; and, 
 though his former rank and royalty will doubtless add somewhat of tem- 
 porary importance to the verdict which you will this day be called upon to 
 record, yet whether it be one of acquittal or conviction, it must, 1 imagine, 
 
312 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 prove light in the balance when weighed against those more monstrous 
 points to which so much attention has been, and for a long time will still 
 be, directed. I, of course, allude to the causes, either remote or 
 immediate, which gave rise to a revolt unparalleled in the annals of 
 history, either for the savagery which has been its distinguishing feature, 
 or for the suddenness with which elements, hitherto deemed utterly dis- 
 cordant on the score of religion, have united themselves in a common 
 crusade against a faith which, as regards the inhabitants of this country, 
 whether Muhammadan or Hindu, was certainly a most unaggressive one. I 
 fear, however, the subject is still but imperfectly elucidated, and I may, 
 perhaps, be in error in attributing to a religious influence a movement 
 which, after all, may prove to have been merely a political one ; a struggle 
 of the natives for power and place, by the expulsion from the country of a 
 people alien in religion, in blood, in colour, in habits, in feelings and in 
 every thing. Whatever the final opinion on this subject may be, the 
 questions which, as far as I am aware of, have not as yet found a satisfac- 
 tory solution, are, by what circumstances was this most atrocious revolt, 
 with its series of massacres, brought about, and who were its prime 
 original instigators? I feel sure the members of this Court will join with 
 me in deeming that our proceedings do not furnish a full and complete 
 answer to such questions ; and why do they not ? I believe it is simply 
 owing to the circumstance that any merely local investigation must be in- 
 adequate to collect evidence from the different quarters and sources, which 
 are no doubt available elsewhere. We may still, however, hope that our 
 efforts on this point have not been fruitless or unavailing ; if we cannot 
 congratulate ourselves on an entire success, we may perhaps be allowed 
 credit for a near approach to it. Few, I imagine, will peruse these volu- 
 minous proceedings without coming to the conclusion that intrigues and 
 conspiracy have long been rife at this fostering court of Dehli. Insignifi- 
 cant and contemptible as to any outward show of power, it would appear 
 that this possessor of mere nominal royalty has ever been looked upon by 
 Muhammadan fanaticism as the head and culminating star of its faith. In 
 him have still been centred the hopes and aspirations of millions. They 
 have looked up to him as the source of honour, and, more than this, he 
 has proved the rallying point not only to Muhammadans, but to thousands 
 of others with whom it was supposed no bond of fanatical union could 
 possibly be established. To throw the fullest light on a subject like this 
 is not the work of a day or of a month. Time, the great revealer of 
 secrets, will doubtless, sooner or later, lay bare the springs from which a 
 stream of so much evil and misery has flowed ; but, till then, we must be 
 content with such views as our present investigation affords. That we 
 have been able to unravel many of the secret workings of the conspirators 
 will, I believe, be conceded; but let me not anticipate. This is a point of 
 our inquiry on which I purpose to offer some observations hereafter ; but 
 a concise narrative of events will perhaps best suit the commencement of 
 this address. 
 
 I may state, then, that 85 men, non-commissioned officers and troopers 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 313 
 
 of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who were tried by general court-martial at 
 Mirath in May last, for refusing their cartridges, had their sentence read 
 to them and were ironed on the parade-ground early on the morning of the 
 9th of May, and that the mutiny of the three native regiments at Mirath 
 first openly developed itself at about half-past six o’clock on the evening of 
 the 10th of May, during which interval of nearly 36 hours there were, of 
 course, plenty of opportunities for interchange of communications between 
 the native troops who first rebelled at Mirath, and those who joined them 
 at this station. To travel from one place to another by coach used 
 ordinarily to take about five hours ; and that the mutineers availed them- 
 selves of this facility of mutual intercourse has, I think, been clearly 
 established by the evidence of Captain Tytler. It appears, from his state- 
 ment, that a coach full of these Mirath mutineers, came on Sunday 
 evening to the fines of the 38th Native Infantry, doubtless to prepare the 
 Sipahis of this station for the arrival and suitable reception, on Monday 
 morning, of their rebel comrades; and, although we may not possess 
 positive evidence to the fact, yet it may fairly be presumed that Sunday 
 evening was not the first occasion that these plotters of evil held their 
 secret and sinister councils together. Indeed we have it on record that, 
 even before the Court, which tried the mutinous cavalry at Mirath, had 
 come to any decision on their case, a compact had been entered into to the 
 effect that, if the use of greased cartridges was persisted in, the troops at 
 Mirath and Dehli would unite, and at once unfurl the standard of revolt ; 
 and so fully had this arrangement been perfected and agreed on, that it is 
 related that the Sipdhi guards at the gate of the palace on Sunday evening 
 made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly among themselves of 
 what they expected to occur on the morrow. To understand the merits 
 and demerits of the whole transaction, it must be recollected that, at the 
 time when these resolutions were arrived at, there was not a single greased 
 cartridge in the magazines of either of the three native regiments at 
 Mirath, nor, as far as I have been informed, of those at Dehli either. It 
 must be further borne in mind that the native soldiers themselves were the 
 persons who were perhaps the best informed on these points; that the 
 cartridges for practice had, from time immemorial, been manufactured in 
 the regimental magazines by persons of their own colour, creed, and 
 religious persuasion ; that it was absolutely impossible to palm off on them 
 a spurious article; that the regimental khalasis, who were employed in 
 making these cartridges, must have at once discovered their impurity, if 
 such had really existed ; that, in fact, objectionable cartridges (I mean 
 such as would affect the religious prejudices of either Musalmdn or 
 Hindu), could not possibly have been made in their regimental magazines, 
 as in such case the very men to be employed in their manufacture would 
 have refused their work ; but, more than this, let it be remembered that 
 the Muhammadan has no caste, that even the hybrid such as the Muham- 
 madan of Central India has become, half Musalmdn and half Hindu, does 
 not pretend to a loss of religion, even from touching pork. Who is there 
 amongst us that has not and does not almost daily witness these Muhamma- 
 
314 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 dans, in the capacity of table servants, carrying plates and dishes which 
 openly contain the very substance which, in reference to the cartridges, 
 has been made the pretence and the stumbling block of their offence? 
 Even if we were to admit that all the cartridges were thoroughly saturated 
 with pig’s and with cow’s fat, still what real valid objection on the score of 
 their religion could the Muhammadan Sipdhis have had in using them ? 
 Their brothers and other relatives in the private service of oflScers never 
 hesitate to handle or cook the dishes which they are required to bring to 
 our tables. The objections of the Muhammadan Sipahis on this head are 
 so transparently false, that it can hardly be a matter of wonder that not one 
 man of sense or respectability among them appears ever to have come for- 
 ward to seek information or satisfy himself as to the truth or falsity of 
 rumours so industriously circulated about these cartridges that were to be 
 the means of depriving them of their faith. Some few — very few — 
 honourable exceptions have certainly held aloof from and openly repudiated 
 the conduct of their brethren ; but such men have wanted neither 
 guarantees nor explanations in regard to a matter which was patent to all, 
 but have come to their own conclusions on a subject where error had no 
 abiding place and mistake is incredible. That neither Musalman nor 
 Hindu had any honest objection to the use of any of the cartridges at 
 Mirath or at Dehli is sufSciently proved by the eagerness with which they 
 sought possession of them, and the alacrity with which they used them, 
 when their aim and object was the murder of their European ofiGcers, or 
 when, united under the banners of the prisoner at your bar, they for 
 months constantly went forth to fight against the power to which they 
 owed fealty and allegiance. Among the very numerous petitions which 
 have been brought under your notice during these proceedings, it may 
 have struck the Court as very strange that there is not a single one in 
 which the slightest allusion is made to what the Sipahis would have us 
 believe to be their great and particular grievance. We have had upwards 
 of 180 petitions before the Court, written on all possible subjects, from the 
 tinkering of a cooking pot to the recovery of a mule or a crack in a horse’s 
 hoofs ; and each thought worthy of the sign manual of royalty ; but in the 
 free indulgence of such correspondence, when they evidently unburthened 
 their minds to their adopted sovereign, and were certainly not restrained by 
 any delicacy of language or of feeling from venting their acerbity against 
 their quondam European masters, we can find no trace of the original sin, 
 no grease spot staining these effusions of disloyalty. How instructive is it 
 that, among themselves, and when applying to us such language as 
 damnable, hell-doomed infidels,” they apparently forego the first specific 
 offence, which they would have us believe has led them to mutiny and 
 rebellion, and the perpetration of crimes at which humanity shudders. 
 When with each other, and, as they conceived, safe from the intrusion and 
 inquiries of British officers, that insurmountable obstacle to their fidelity 
 and allegiance, the greased cartridge, is apparently altogether lost sight of. 
 Not a whisper is heard of a grievance which, if a substantial one, must 
 ever have been uppermost in the memories of all j must have been con- 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 315 
 
 tinually rankling in their minda and embittering their thoughts ; must 
 have influenced them in their blood-thirstiness ; and to themselves have 
 been their only extenuation for crimes such as may well exclude them from 
 mercy. What a contrast this to their speeches when uttered with a 
 prospect of reaching European ears. Greased cartridges are then always 
 brought forward ; the use of them forms the one continuous night-mare of 
 the Sipahi’s existence. Really, if we reflect seriously on this — if we 
 remember that in reality there was not a single greased cartridge among 
 either of the three regiments which first broke out into mutiny, murdering 
 not only men, but unoffending women and children, and that the Sipdhis 
 were perfectly aware of this ; when we call to mind that, even if greased 
 cartridges had existed, and the use of them been required at the hands of 
 these miscreants, not one of the Muhammadans at any rate could possibly 
 have been injured thereby in any caste prejudice, or placed even in tem- 
 porary difficulty with regard to his religious tenets — when to this we add, 
 what is well known to every one in India, whether Hindu, Muhammadan, or 
 European, viz., that the native soldier has but to ask for his discharge, and 
 that in time of peace it is at once granted to him, without inquiry or diffi- 
 culty of any kind, it seems beyond the bounds of reason to imagine that 
 these men were drawn into acts of such revolting atrocity by any 
 grievances either real or imagined. Let the chimeras, the disturbed dreams 
 of fanaticism, of wickedness, or of folly have been what they may ; let the 
 instigations to evil have been as industrious as possible, and then allow 
 that the Sipdhis to be worked upon were as credulous as the grossest 
 ignorance could make them, still, if the greased cartridge had been the only 
 weapon the tamperer had to work with, but the one envenomed shaft in 
 their quiver, how easy was the remedy. It required no depth of know- 
 ledge, no philosopher to inform them that they could at once escape from 
 every possible perplexity by simply applying for their discharge. I know 
 not, gentlemen, what conclusion you may arrive at on this much-vexed 
 question, but, after pondering it in every way in which my reason has pre- 
 sented it to me, I am obliged to infer that something deeper and more 
 powerful than the use of greased cartridges has been resorted to. 
 
 The machinery that has set in motion such an amount of mutiny and 
 murder, that has made its vibrations felt almost at one and the same 
 moment from one end of India to the other, must have been prepared, if 
 not with foreseeing wisdom, yet with awful craft, and most successful and 
 commanding subtlety. We must recollect, too, in considering this subject, 
 that in many of the places where the native troops have risen against their 
 European officers there was no pretext even in reference to cartridges at 
 all; numbers of these mutinied, apparently, because they thought there 
 was a favourable opportunity of doing so ; because they were a hundred to 
 one against those in authority, and fancied that they might pillage, plunder, 
 and massacre, not only with impunity, but with advantage. Is it possible 
 that such fearful results as these could have at once developed themselves 
 had the native army, previous to the cartridge question, been in a sound 
 and well-affected state ? Can any one imagine that that rancorous, wide- 
 
316 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 spread enmity, of whicli we have lately had such terrible proofs, has been 
 the result of feelings suddenly and accidentally irritated ? Does it appear 
 consistent with the natural order of events that such intense malignity 
 should start into existence on one single provocation ? Or can it be recon- 
 ciled with the instincts, the traditions, or the idiosyncrasies of the Hindus, 
 that they should recklessly, without inquiry, and without thought, desire 
 to imbrue their hands in human blood, casting aside the pecuniary and 
 other advantages that bound them to the cause of order and of the Govern- 
 ment ? Or, more than this, can it be imagined that the three regiments at 
 Mirath, even when joined by those at Dehli, could have conceived an idea 
 so daring as that of overthrowing, by themselves, the British Government 
 in India ? 
 
 I think, gentlemen, every one must allow that if we had no other 
 evidence of a plot, no testimony indicative of a previous conspiracy, the 
 very nature of the outbreak itself must have convinced us of the existence 
 of one. In the moral, as in the physical world, there must be cause and 
 effect; and the horrible butcheries of the past year would remain an 
 anomaly and a mystery for ever, could we trace them to nothing more 
 occult and baneful than a cartiidge of any kind. It will be observed, that 
 this point of the cartridges, so openly and frequently insisted on, at Mirath 
 and elsewhere, before the 10th of May, gradually becomes more and more 
 indistinct as the plot gathers strength and matures itself, and, after furnish- 
 ing the mutineers with their first war cry at Dehli, it seems to have 
 answered its purpose, and thenceforward was allowed to sink into disuse 
 and neglect. With little or no vitality at starting, it soon died a natural 
 death, and was succeeded by a reality of purpose, and a fixedness of resolve, 
 that would have been worthy of a better cause. If we review the actions 
 and whole conduct of these mutineers, we shall soon see that, from the very 
 commencement, they bear the impress of cunning and of secret combina- 
 tion. For instance, 85 of their comrades were ironed before them and sent 
 off to jail in their presence on the morning of the 9th of May ; but this 
 occasioned no outbreak of fury. Not a sound or tone of dissatisfaction 
 escaped from the men, who, then and long before, must have had rebellion 
 in their hearts ; no gesture indicative of sympathy with the culprits was 
 exhibited by any; in fact, as far as appearances could be trusted, the 
 infantry regiments at Mirath, and the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry, 
 were as obedient and loyal as could possibly be desired : and this deception 
 was successfully resorted to till their plans were matured, and the moment 
 for open revolt had arrived. The night of the 9th of May, twelve hours 
 after the imprisonment of the 3rd Cavalry mutineers had taken place, was 
 as favourable an opportunity as the night following, for a march upon the 
 nearest magazine; but there had not then been time for preparing the 
 Dehli Sipahis for a movement which the progress of events at Mirath had 
 doubtless precipitated sooner than their first calculations had led them to 
 expect. Hence the necessity for communicating afresh with Dehli, and 
 acquainting the Sipdhis there with the drama that was to be enacted on 
 Monday the 11th. That such was done is established by the evidence of 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 317 
 
 Captain Ty tier ; for it would be difficult to assign any other motive for a 
 carriage full of Sipdbis coming over from Miratb on Sunday evening, and 
 driving straight into the lines of the 38th Native Infantry. 
 
 Again, we can perceive, in the very hour chosen for the outbreak at 
 Miratb, the same evidence of cunning and of craft. The plan, too, of the 
 Mirath cantonments gave considerable facilities for carrying out their plot. 
 The native lines are so completely separated from that portion of the can- 
 tonments where the European troops reside, that the disturbance and 
 uproar attendant even upon open mutiny could not be heard, or even 
 known, from one to the other until specially communicated. Officers may 
 naturally have been too intent on quelling the rebellion of their men to 
 think of officially reporting it. Be this as it may, there would be some 
 delay in turning out and supplying the Europeans with cartridges, 
 assembling their officers, and marching down a distance of not less than 
 two miles : so that, taking one delay with another, the mutineers might 
 fairly calculate, considering it was an utter surprise to all, on IJ hours of 
 safe and uninterrupted progress, and, as the outbreak commenced at half- 
 past six, this would have secured them darkness and comparative security 
 for their further operations. This was what, in effect, actually took place. 
 On the Europeans reaching the native lines, it was already dark ; no Sipahis 
 were to be seen, and no one could tell whither they had gone. Subsequent 
 inquiry revealed that, guided by the instinct of cunning, the rebels had not, 
 at first, taken the direct or main road to Dehli, neither had they left 
 Mirath in military formation, but, as dusk set in, had gone forth in parties 
 of five, six or ten, to their fixed place of assembly. Tffis was judicious for 
 their departure from Mirath, but would have been highly impolitic for 
 their eiitry into Dehli, where there were no European troops to avoid. 
 Something more imposing and demonstrative was required here, and 
 accordingly we find them crossing the bridge simultaneously massed in 
 columns, and in complete military array, with a portion of the cavalry sent 
 forward as a regular advanced guard. 
 
 It is on this occasion that we first prove the mutineers in immediate 
 connection with the prisoner at your bar. The first point to which they 
 turn, the first person to whom they address themselves, is the titular 
 majesty of Dehli. This circumstance has much significance, and, at any 
 rate, tends to show that previous concert existed between them. The 
 prisoner’s complicity, however, was, immediately after, openly to com- 
 mence. Scarcely had the very serious nature of the outbreak had time to 
 develop itself, than his own special servants — in the very precincts of his 
 palace— and almost, as it were, before his own eyes, rush to imbrue their 
 hands in the blood of every European they can meet with ; and, when we 
 remember that two of these were young and delicate women, who could 
 have given no offence, whose sex and age might have tamed any hearts 
 less pitiless than those of the human demons who destroyed them, we are 
 able to realise some slight portion of the horribly unnatural influences that 
 appear innate to Muhammadan treachery. How otherwise was it possible 
 that education, the pride of royal ancestry, a life of tranquil ease and com- 
 
318 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 parative refinement should not have exempted this old and grey-headed 
 man from all connection with deeds which seem too barbarous for the very 
 outcasts of humanity, or even for the untamed but less savage denizens of 
 the jungle ? 
 
 We stop to inquire whether it has been proved in this court, and will be 
 repeated in after years, that the last king of the imperial house of Taimur 
 was an accomplice in this villany. The circumstances shall now be fairly 
 stated. These murders were committed in the broad glare of day, before 
 dozens of witnesses, and without the slightest attempt at concealment, 
 d'hey were perpetrated, as has been already stated, by the prisoner’s owu 
 retainers and within the limits of his palace, where, be it remembered even 
 under the Company’s Government, his jurisdiction was paramount. I shall 
 not, however, attempt to infer that these murders must have been pre- 
 viously sanctioned by the prisoner ; mere inferences on such a point can- 
 not be accepted in a court of justice. I prefer to quote from the evidence. 
 It is Ahsan Ulla Khan, the physician, who is speaking, and who says, that 
 at the time referred to, he and Ghulam Abbas, the attorney in court, were 
 with the king, when it was told them that the troopers had killed 
 Mr. Fraser, and had gone up to Captain Douglas to kill him, and that this 
 was instantly confirmed by the return of the palki bearers, who told them 
 that they had witnessed Mr. Fraser’s murder ; that his body was in the 
 gateway, and that the troopers had ascended to the upper building for the 
 purpose of murdering those there. Why the witness suppresses all men- 
 tion of the prominent part the king’s own servants took in these massacres 
 can easily be imagined. In a subsequent part of his examination he even 
 asserts that he never heard that any of the king’s servants joined in these 
 murders, nay, more, that it was not generally known who committed them. 
 Such is the evasion of the king’s own physician, who doubtless was aware 
 of the importance that would necessarily attach to this point. It was not 
 generally known who committed these murders, and yet, at this lapse of 
 time, we have had no difficulty in tracing the individuals, and ascertaining 
 their names. It was not generally known that the king’s own servants 
 were the murderers, and yet we find this very circumstance prominently 
 and specifically mentioned at the time in the native newspapers of the 
 city. I need not, after this, recapitulate the evidence of all those who 
 have clearly and satisfactorily proved that the king’s servants were the 
 murderers ; for their testimony stands unshaken and unrefuted. It will 
 amply suffice if I quote the statement of one of them, and which is as fol- 
 lows : “ At this time Mr. Fraser remained below trying to suppress the dis- 
 turbance, and while thus engaged, I noticed that Haji, lapidary, cut him 
 down with a talwar, and almost at the same instant, some of the king’s 
 servants cut at him with swords till he was dead. One of Mr. Fraser’s 
 murderers was an Abyssinian. After this they m.ade a rush to the upper 
 apartments, when I immediately ran round by another door and closed the 
 door at the top of the stairs. I was engaged in shutting all the doors, 
 when the crowd found entrance by the southern stair, and, having forced 
 one of the doors on that side, came and gave admission to the men who 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 319 
 
 had assisted in murdering Mr. Fraser. These immediately rushed into the 
 apartments where the gentlemen, viz., Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchinson 
 and Mr. Jennings, had retired, and attacking them with swords, at once 
 murdered them and the two young ladies. On this I ran down the stair- 
 case. As I got to the bottom, I was laid hold of by one Mundoh, a bearer 
 in the service of the king, who said, ‘ Tell me where Captain Douglas is ; 
 you have concealed him.’ He forced me upstairs with him ; I said, ‘ You 
 have yourselves killed all the gentlemen already ; ’ but, on reaching the 
 room where Captain Douglas was, I saw that he was not quite dead. 
 Mondoh, perceiving this also, hit him with a bludgeon on the forehead, and 
 killed him immediately.” Having now established that the murderers of 
 these ladies were the special servants of the prisoner, it will be well to 
 revert to the testimony of the physician, Ahsan Ulla Khan, and to ascer- 
 tain from him the steps the prisoner took on the murders being reported to 
 him. The only order he gave on this occasion appears to have been to 
 close the gates of his palace; and we naturally inquire whether this was 
 for the purpose of preventing the escape of the murderers. The evidence 
 distinctly proves that it was not. The physician, being further interro- 
 gated, is obliged to confess that the prisoner took no steps whatever either 
 to discover, to secure, or to punish the guilty, and attributes it to there 
 being much confusion at the time ; but if the king’s authority had actually 
 been set aside, and by his own servants too, this would have been the most 
 forcible of all reasons for immediately re-establishing it, by at once bring- 
 ing the offenders to justice.. That this was not done we have been already 
 informed, and we can only account for it on the supposition that these acts 
 of the prisoner’s servants, if not instigated by himself, had yet actually 
 anticipated his wishes. W e are thus perfectly prepared for what is to 
 follow, viz., that no servant was ever dismissed, and not the slightest 
 investigation or inquiry was ever instituted ; in fact, in the words of the 
 question put to the witness, the king continued these murderers both in 
 his pay and in employment, and this too, as we have seen, when the very 
 newspapers of the day gave information against them. After this, is it 
 necessary to question whether he adopted these deeds as his own or not ? 
 [ need not quote what may be the law of the land on such a point, for 
 there is a yet higher law which must acquit or condemn him, the law of 
 conscience and of sense ; that law which every one who hears me can 
 apply, and which carries with it a verdict more terrible than that which is 
 pronounced in mere conformity to legal codes or military legislation : it is 
 a law that does not depend upon local constitutions, upon human 
 institutes, or religious creeds : it is a law fixed in the heart of man by his 
 Maker ; and can it now here be set aside ? 
 
 Perhaps it may now be time to turn our attention to what was doing at 
 the magazine, and to trace the further steps of the mutineers in that direc- 
 tion. Captain Forrest has told us that it was about 9 o’clock in the morn- 
 ing when the main body of the native troops from Mirath was passing over 
 the bridge in military formation (that is, in subdivisions of companies), 
 with fixed bayonets and sloped arms, the cavalry being in front. It waF 
 
320 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 actually in less than one hour after this that a suhahdar of the 38th Native 
 Infantry, who was commandino; the magazine guard outside the gate, in- 
 formed them that the King of Dehli had sent a guard to take possession of 
 the magazine, and to bring all the Europeans there up to his palace, and 
 that, if they did not consent to this, none of them were to be allowed to 
 leave the magazine. Captain Forrest adds that he did not see the guard at 
 this time, but that he saw the man who had brought this message, and he 
 was a well-dressed Musalman. Nor was this all, for, shortly alter the 
 above, a native officer in the king’s service arrived with a strong guard of 
 the king’s own soldiers in their uniform, and told the above-mentioned 
 subadar and the non-commissioned officers that he was sent down by the 
 king to relieve them of duty. 
 
 We thus see with what alertness and despatch this most important 
 object, the seizure of the magazine, was attempted. Is it, however, to be 
 believed that such was the ready, immediate, and, as it were, impulsive 
 decision of the king, or of those who formed the court ? To attribute to 
 them anything of this nature would be to give them credit for a coolness 
 of calculation, combined with a quickness of apprehension, such as pertains 
 only to the more gifted of mankind. The scope and entire progress of the 
 scheme speak loudly of a plan previously arranged, and of deliberations 
 long matured by the counsels of many. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive 
 that any one, not previously initiated in the secret, could, on the moment, 
 so promptly and so effectually have entered upon and adopted the details 
 necessary for carrying it out. You will recollect the extreme importance 
 of the decision, the magnitude of the interests at stake. You will call to 
 mind the cogent reasons and the numerous arguments that would naturally 
 array themselves against adopting so headlong and precipitate a measure. 
 It was, in fact, an invitation to a king to league himself with ruffians and 
 with cut-throats. Any inducement or prospective advantage that they 
 could hold out to him was faint and almost imperceptible, compared with 
 the open risk which he was to encounter. By embarking in so forlorn a 
 cause he imperilled everything ; his own life, and those of all belonging to 
 him, and for what ? The distant glimmer of a crovm, which common 
 reason, or the slightest consideration, would have convinced him was a 
 mere ignis fatuus — a mockery of a sceptre, that would evade his grasp. 
 Are we to imagine that it was under such circumstances that this weak 
 and tremulous old man seized and improved his occasion, and with all the 
 rapid instinct of determination directed his own troops upon the magazine, 
 to establish himself there as the one point of primary and most vital im- 
 portance ; and this too in the first moment of a surprise when nothing but 
 riot and disorder reigned supreme ? Or are we to suppose that there was 
 a secret and a deeper knowledge of what the other portions of the army 
 were already ripe for, and that the five or six regiments to commence with 
 were but the instalments of those that were to follow ? Or, if such pre- 
 vious understanding and collusion did not exist either with the king or any 
 of those immediately about him, are we to attribute to superstition and the 
 pretended revelation of dreams, circumstances which scarcely admit of 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 321 
 
 satisfactory solution by any more sober process ? We have all heard, in 
 this court, of the vision of a hurricane that was to arise from the west with 
 a great flood of water, devastating the whole country, but bearing up on 
 its surges this descendant of ancient royalty, and that this vision, as inter- 
 preted by Hasan Askari, the priest, signifled annihilation to the English 
 infldels by the power of the King of Persia, who was to restore sovereignty 
 to the heirs of the throne of Hindustan. Was it a reliance upon this that 
 expedited the otherwise tardy movements of these Asiatics, and gave 
 breadth and boldness to their decisions ? I am aware that under other 
 circumstances, and in any but an eastern land, such unmeaning flights of a 
 bewildered imagination would be too trivial to dwell upon, too unsubstan- 
 tial for the gravity of comment ; but here, in seriously considering the 
 nature and progress of an extensive military revolt, they obtrude them- 
 selves on the mind as subjects capable of influencing for evil the destinies 
 of thousands. 
 
 These observations have been elicited by the marked and unusual energy 
 displayed in making the magazine the point of instant attack. It seems to 
 me that such cannot be accounted for by conspiracy among the Sipahis 
 alone, for it was the king’s own troops who were the first to seek posses- 
 sion, and the military and systematic way in which this was done betrays 
 the authority by which the orders were issued. There was no confusion 
 here, no attempt at pillage : non-commissioned officers were appointed to 
 the separate guards for the different gates of the magazine, while another 
 guard superintended the labourers who were removing the stores that hap- 
 pened to be outside. How could such decision, such instant transformation 
 from chaos to system and to order, have resulted had not the king or some 
 of his officials been intrusted with a sort of programme of events ? How, 
 in fact, could the king’s troops have been in readiness and preparation for 
 such work without warning of some kind ? 
 
 If 1 have not succeeded in tracing to the king himself a foreknowledge of 
 the leading events that were to take place on Monday the llth of May, I 
 trust it has been made obvious that the secret was in the possession of 
 some influential inmates of the palace. The babbling garrulity of the 
 prince Jawan Bakht sufficiently indicates this, for such is his joy at the 
 anticipation of murdering the English, that he is unable to restrain his 
 expressions of it. My chief object, however, has been to render clear what 
 I believe to be the truth, viz., that the conspiracy, from the very com- 
 mencement, was not confined to the Sipahis, and did not even originate 
 with them, but had its ramifications throughout the palace and the city : 
 and do not the murders which we have already adverted to tend to 
 corroborate this fact ? We have evidence that the mutineers of the llth 
 and 20th regiments of Native Infantry, before the magazine was exploded, 
 proceeded to attack and escalade it, and it is then, for the first time, that 
 we find the king, through his troops, acting in open alliance with these 
 traitors to their government. From that moment there is no further dis- 
 guise, and no attempt at concealment. Fairly laimched into the stream of 
 sedition, he is hurried onward by the swollen flood, which was not, however, 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 Y 
 
322 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 to bear him, as he imagined, to the throne of Hindustan, but to leave him 
 in its ebb a mere helpless wreck upon the sands. 
 
 I would here pause for a second, to refer to Lieutenant Willoughby, and 
 to the brave men under him, who for so long a time held, against unnum- 
 bered odds, the magazine intrusted to them. One hardly knows which to 
 admire most, the penetration and sagacity which, at a glance, foresaw the 
 possible necessity for its destruction, and made arrangements accordingly ; 
 or the undaunted resolution with which the final sacrifice was accom- 
 plished. To do justice to such heroism will be the pleasing duty of the 
 historian. I can merely give it a passing notice, having to dilate on other 
 matters more immediately connected with the proceedings before us. 
 
 With the explosion of the magazine at Dehli, every hope of stemming 
 the torrent of rebellion seems to have vanished ; resistance had been there 
 protracted to its utmost possible extent ; the sacrifice was a final one ; and 
 thenceforward the European community, if, in isolated spots, still preserv- 
 ing the appearance of government authority, were left without one vestige 
 of real power, so that it soon became a duty to the state and to themselves 
 to save their lives by a timely retreat. Dehli was consequently abandoned 
 to the miscreants who had, in the short space of 24 hours, stained them- 
 selves with crimes which can scarcely be equalled in all the catalogues of 
 bygone iniquity. It is now that we find the king coming personally for- 
 ward as the chief actor in that great drama which had more than England 
 and Europe for its spectators, the progress of which was watched with such 
 absorbing interest everywhere by the antagonistic powers of civilisation 
 and of barbarism. The evidence shows that on the afternoon of the 11th 
 of May, the king, having entered the hall of special audience, seated him- 
 self in a chair, when the soldiery, officers and all, came forward one by 
 one and bowed their heads before him, asking him to place his hands on 
 them. The king did so, and each then withdrew, saying whatever came 
 into his mind. The witness, viz., Ghulam Abbas, the prisoner’s attorney 
 in court, informs us that this ceremony of the king putting his hands on 
 the heads of the soldiery was equivalent to accepting their allegiance and 
 services ; and he further states, that though he is not aware of any regular 
 proclamation having been made in Dehli in reference to the king assuming 
 the reins of govei'nment, yet that such may have been done without his 
 hearing of it; but that on the very day of the outbreak the king’s 
 authority was established, and that night a royal salute was fired of about 
 21 guns. 
 
 These matters bring us to the charges against the prisoner, and it may 
 perhaps be as well now to consider them, not so much in regard to dates 
 as the sequence in which they have been drawn up. The first charge against 
 Muhammad Bahadur Shah, ex-king of Dehli, is : “ For that he, being 
 a pensioner of the British G-overnment in India, did, at Dehli, at various 
 times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encourage, aid, 
 and abet Muhammad Bakht Khdn, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, 
 and divers others, native commissioned officers and soldiers unknown, of 
 the East India Company’s Army, in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion 
 

 : V 
 I*' 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 323 
 
 against the State.” I am not going to weary the Court by repeating even 
 a tenth part of the evidence which has been brought forward to establish 
 these charges, but it is perhaps necessary to show that proof of them has 
 been recorded. Mr. Saunders, Officiating Commissioner and Agent to the 
 Lieutenant-Governor, has explained under what circumstances the prisoner 
 became a pensioner of the British Government in India, viz., that his 
 grandfather, Shah Alam, after having been kept in rigorous confinement 
 by the Marathas, on their defeat by the English in 1803, applied to the 
 British Government for protection. This was accorded, and from that 
 moment the titular kings of Dehli became pensioned subjects of the British. 
 It will be seen, then, that, as far as this family is concerned, there was no 
 wrong to be complained of, and nothing but benefits to be remembered. 
 The prisoner’s grandfather, Shah Alam, had not only lost his throne, but 
 had his eyes put out, and been subjected to every species of indignity, and 
 was still kept in most rigorous confinement, when the English, under Lord 
 Lake, appeared as his deliverers, and, with generous sympathy for his mis- 
 fortunes, bestowed on him rank and pension which, continued to his 
 successors, have maintained them in honour and in influence, till, like the 
 snake in the fable, they have turned their fangs upon those to whom they 
 owed the very means of their existence. The evidence that connects the 
 prisoner with Muhammad Bakht Khan, subahdar of the artillery, and which 
 of itself will be sufficient to establish the charge, is a document from 
 beginning to end in the prisoner’s own handwriting : 
 
 “ To the especial Slave, the Lord Governor, Muhammad BaTcht 
 Khan Bahadur. 
 
 “ Keceive our favour, and understand that, whilst the Nimach force 
 have reached Alapur, its baggage is still here, and that you are therefore 
 directed to take 200 troopers and five or seven companies of infantry, and 
 have all the baggage alluded to, such as tents, &c., together with commis- 
 sariat supplies, conveyed by the gharis to Alapur. You are further directed 
 not to allow the infidels staying near the Idgah to advance. Be it known 
 to you further, that if the army returns without victory, and divested of 
 its appliances of war, the consequence must be disastrous. You have been 
 premonished, and you are to consider these orders stringent.” 
 
 It is true there is no date to this communication, but the allusions in it 
 leave no possible doubt as to its having been written within the period em- 
 braced by the terms of the first charge. 
 
 Perhaps this will be the best place for the few observations I have to 
 offer on the defence. The prisoner, like every other that we have tried, 
 has, according to his own showing, been the mere victim of circumstances ; 
 declares that he had no intelligence on the subject previous to the out- 
 break ; that the mutinous soldiery surrounded him completely, and placed 
 sentries on all sides ; and that, fearing for his life, he kept quiet, and went 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 to his own private apartments ; that the mutinous soldiery kept the men, 
 women, and children prisoners ; that he twice saved their lives by entreaty 
 and persuasion, and that the third time he did all in his power to save them, 
 but that the rebellious soldiery would not heed him, and eventually carried 
 out their purpose of slaying those poor people against his orders. Now the 
 chief objection to all this is, that it is not only unsupported by evidence, 
 but is directly in the teeth of all the testimony, whether oral or written, 
 and whether given by his own servants or by others. The entire defence 
 indeed is a mere tissue of denials of guilt ; assertions of his not having been 
 a free agent ; and an endeavour to put the onus of his misconduct upon 
 others. He cannot challenge the authenticity of the documents against 
 him, or the evidence of his own handwriting, or his own seal ; and his only 
 expedient consists in asserting, that what he wrote was by compulsion, 
 and that his seal was affixed in the same way. The only dilemma that he 
 appears unable to extricate himself from, to his own satisfaction, in this 
 way, is the going out to Humayun’s tomb, and coming in again. It was, 
 of course, necessary to state that the last was by his own choice and free 
 will ; and this would scarcely have been possible had his going out been 
 represented as compulsory ; for, if the Sipahis had forcibly taken him out, 
 they would hardly allow him voluntarily to return, so we are treated with 
 the following curious account : — “ When the revolted and rebellious troops 
 prepared to abscond, finding an opportunity, I got away secretly under the 
 palace windows, and went and stayed in Humayun’s mausoleum.” One 
 would have thought that if he wished to separate himself from the 
 rebellious troops, his best plan would have been to have stayed in 
 Dehli, when they were preparing to abscond, instead of secretly planning 
 to go out with them. However, I do not mean to take the defence, 
 paragraph by paragraph, and thus refute it. My best reply to it, I believe, 
 will be by showing how fully and completely the charges have been proved, 
 and to this task I now again address myself, and proceed to the considera- 
 tion of the second count, which is, if possible, still more fully established 
 than the first. It runs as follows : — “ For having at Dehli, at various 
 times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encouraged, aided 
 and abetted Mirza Mughul, his own son, a subject of the British Govern- 
 ment in India, and divers others unknown, inhabitants of Dehli, and of the 
 North West provinces of India, also subjects of the said British Govern- 
 ment, to rebel and wage war against the State.” The documents and 
 other evidence in support of this charge are so numerous that it would be 
 tedious even to reckon them. The newspapers speak of the appointment 
 of Mirza Mughul to the office of commander-in-chief ; of his investiture 
 with a dress of honour ; and other matters relating thereto. The oral 
 testimony is very strong on the same subject, while the discovered 
 correspondence shows that Mirza Mughul, the son, was perhaps, next to his 
 father, the leading chief of the rebels in Dehli. I shall for form’s sake give 
 a short extract from a petition of Maulavi Muhammad Zohar Ali, police- 
 officer of Najafgarh. It is as follows ; — 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 325 
 
 “ To the King ! Shelter of the World ! 
 
 “Respectfully sheweth, — That the orders of the royal missive have been 
 fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chaudharis, Kandugos, and Patwdris 
 of this township of Najafgarh, and that the best arrangements have been 
 established. Further, that, agreeably to your Majesty’s injunctions, steps 
 are being taken to collect horsemen and footmen, and it is explained to 
 them, that their allowances will be paid from the revenue of this division 
 of the district. Your slave’s assurances on this point, however, will not 
 be believed till some Ghazis, recently engaged, shall have arrived. As 
 regards Nagli, Kakraula, Dachau Kalan and other a-ijacent villages, 
 your slave has to represent that, unrestrained by the dread of consequences, 
 and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commence^ 
 plundering travellers.’’ 
 
 This might, I think, be sufficiently conclusive as to the words of the 
 charge in reference to “ aiding and abetting in rebellion Mirza Mughul, his 
 own son, and divers other unknown inhabitants of Delhi, and of the North 
 Western Provinces of India, inasmuch as the petition from which I am 
 quoting bears the autograph order of the prisoner referring it to his son 
 Mirza Mughul, and directing him quickly to send a regiment of infantry 
 with its officers to Najafgarh, in accordance with the wishes, and for the 
 purpose of aiding and abetting the petitioner’s schemes of raising horsemen 
 and footmen to fight against the English. But there is another petition, 
 which has not yet been submitted to the Court, having only lately come to 
 hand, and which may appropriately be introduced here. It is from Amir 
 Ali Khan, son of the Nawab of Khurajpura, and is dated 12th of July. It 
 runs as follows : — 
 
 “ To the King ! Shelter of the World ! 
 
 “ Respectfully sheweth, — That your petitioner has come to your royal 
 court, at which Darius might have served as a doorkeeper, having left his 
 house animated by the ambition to stake his life in your Majesty’s cause, 
 and laments that he has lived to see the day when the accursed English 
 have presumed to direct their cannon against your royal dwelling, the 
 guardians of which are the angels of heaven. From the first dawn of 
 the powers of discernment, your petitioner has been trained, like the lion, 
 to conflicts and war, and has not, like the fox, been concerned for his 
 life — 
 
 “ Leopards destroy their prey on the summits of mountains. 
 Crocodiles devour theirs on the banks of rivers.” 
 
 “ Your petitioner submits that if his prayer is accepted, and the plans 
 and stratagems necessary in this war are entrusted to his judgment, aided 
 by your Majesty’s august auspices, he will, in three days, totally extermi- 
 nate these people with white skins and dark fortunes. It was necessary, 
 
326 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 audf have therefore submitted it. (Prayers for the prosperity of the 
 reig^, and curses in bitter and filthy language against those who may wish 
 it harm.) Petition of the slave Amir Ali Khan, son of Nawab Dulel Khan, 
 son of Nawab Najabat Khan, chief of Khurajpura.” 
 
 Autograph Order of the King, in Pencil. 
 
 “ Mirza Zohuruddiu will make inquiries, and will give the 
 petitioner service.” 
 
 The third charge is — “ For that he, being a subject of the British Grov- 
 ernment in India, and not regarding the duty of his allegiance, did at 
 Dehli, on the 11th May, 1857, or thereabouts, as a false traitor against the 
 State, proclaim and declare himself the reigning king and sovereign of 
 India, and did, then and there, traitorously seize and take unlawful 
 possession of the city of Dehli ; and did moreover at various times between 
 the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, as such false traitor aforesaid, 
 treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirza Mughul, his own son, 
 and with Muhammad Bakht Khan, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, 
 and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make insurrec- 
 tion, rebellion, and war against the State ; and, further to fulfil and perfect 
 his treasonable design of overthrowing and destroying the British Govern- 
 ment in India, did assemble armed forces at Dehli, and send them forth to 
 fight and wage war against the said British Government. 
 
 That the prisoner was a pensioned subject of the British Government in 
 India has been already shown in treating of the first charge ; and as the 
 British Government neither deprived him nor any member of his family of 
 any sovereignty whatever, but, on the contrary, relieving them from misery 
 and oppression, bestowed on them largesses and pensions aggregating many 
 millions of pounds sterling, the duty of their allegiance will, I think, be 
 readily admitted; yet, as we have already seen, this traitor rushes to seize 
 the first possible opportunity of overthrowing and destroying the govern- 
 ment of his benefactors. On the afternoon of the very first day of the 
 outbreak in the hall of special audience, he receives the obeisances of the 
 revolted Sipahis and by laying his hands on their heads unites with them 
 in a common brotherhood of infamy. It is perhaps difficult to realise such 
 a scene. An enfeebled tremulous old man striving with palsied hand to 
 reach a sceptre far too powerful for his puny grasp, and, while bent by age 
 and infirmity, inducting a monarch’s garb, to give, as it were, a benison 
 and a blessing to the cause of the foulest treachery and murder ! Dead to 
 every feeling that falls honourably on the heart of man, this shrivelled 
 impersonation of malignity must have formed no inapt centre-piece to the 
 group of ruffians that surrounded him ! 
 
 There are several witnesses who speak to the circumstance of the 
 prisoner having been proclaimed. It is variously stated as occurring on 
 different days, and it is more than probable that such was actually the 
 case. One or two proclamations would hardly be sufiffcient to carry the 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 327 
 
 information through, all the suburbs of so large a city as Dehli. The 
 prisoner’s attorney allows that the king’s authority was established on the 
 11th of May; and Gulab, messenger, being asked, “Was the king pro- 
 claimed as the reigning sovereign immediately after the outbreak?” 
 answered, “ Yes, the proclamation was made by beat of drum on the very 
 day of the outbreak, about three in the afternoon, to the effect that it was 
 now the king’s Government ; ” while Chuni, pedlar, another witness, 
 declares that, “ On the 11th of May, about midnight, some 20 guns were 
 fired in the palace. I heard the reports at my house ; and next day, at 
 about noon, a proclamation was made by beat of drum that the country 
 had reverted to the possession of the king.” The next paragraph in the 
 charge is in reference to traitorously seizing and taking unlawful possession 
 of the city of Dehli ; but this is a point that I need not quote evidence to 
 establish. It is difficult to turn our eyes in any direction without having 
 convincing proofs of it. The charge then goes on to assert that the 
 prisoner “did at various times, between the 10th of May and 1st of 
 October, 1857, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirza Mughul, 
 his son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khan, subahdar of the regiment of 
 . artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make 
 insurrection and war against the State.” Mirza Mughul was publicly 
 appointed commander-in-chief, and a special state procession in honour of 
 his being so took place a few days after the outbreak. The witness who 
 deposes to this is Chuni Lai, pedlar; but he is unable to specify the exact 
 date on which he witnessed it. Mirza Mughul’s authority after this seems 
 to have been uncontrolled, at any rate in all matters immediately relating 
 to the army, until Subahdar Bakht Khan, of the artillery, arrived, and was 
 appointed both Lord Governor-General and Comrnander-in-Chief. The 
 date of his arrival was the 1st of July, and after that some jealousy and 
 clashing of authority between the two Commandors-in-Chief is observable, 
 for, on the 17th of July, Mirza Mughul writes and informs his father, that 
 on that day he had formed up the army and taken it outside the city to 
 attack the English, when General Bakht Khan interfered, and for a long 
 time kept the whole force standing inactive, wanting to know by whose 
 orders it had gone out, and, saying it was not to proceed without his 
 permission, caused it to return. Mirza Mughul adds, “ that having his 
 orders reversed cannot but cause vexation to any officer, high or low, and 
 begs that definite instructions may be given as to whom the real authority 
 over the army belongs.” There is no order on this letter, nor have we 
 any intimation what decision was come to, but that some better arrange- 
 ment was the consequence is evident, for on the very next day, the 18th 
 of July, we find Mirza Mughul and General Bakht Khan acting in concert, 
 as the following letter from Mirza Mughul to his father will show. Ir is 
 dated the 19th of July, and runs as follows: — “Since yesterday the 
 arrangements have been completed for carrying on active offensive opera- 
 tions both by night and day. If aid could be afforded now from the 
 direction of Alapur, with the divine blessing, and through the influence of 
 your Majesty’s ever-during prestige, a final and decisive victory, it is to be 
 
328 
 
 APPENDIX C, 
 
 expected, would soon be obtained. I therefore pray that positive orders 
 may be issued from the throne to the Bareli general to afford the aid in 
 question ; that is, that he be directed to proceed with troops to Alapur, 
 and to make an attack on the infidels from that direction, while your 
 slave, with his division of the army, makes another on this side, so that the 
 two forces co-operating in the fight may in one or two days consign all the 
 damnable hell-doomed infidels to hell. Moreover, it is to be expected that 
 the force going to Alapur will cut off the enemies’ supplies. It was 
 necessary, and has therefore been submitted.” On this letter there is an 
 autograph order of the king to the following effect : “ That Mirza Mughul 
 will make whatever arrangements may be proper ;”and also an after order, 
 apparently by Mirza Mughul, — “ That an order be written to the Bareli 
 general.” I think this is conclusive of the three conspiring, consulting, 
 and agreeing together ; but it may be as well to enter here two documents 
 which have not as yet been submitted to the Court. One is a proclamation 
 from General Muhammad Bakht Khan, dated 12th of July, and is to the 
 following effect. It has, I should observe, been extracted from the “Dehli 
 Urdu News” : — “Let it be generally known to the persons living in the 
 city and country, such as chiefs of freeholds, pensioners, landholders of 
 rent-free estates, &c., that if, from anxiety for their incomes, they have 
 hitherto continued on the side of the English, and have in any way colluded 
 with them by conveying intelligence or furnishing them with supplies, 
 their having done so will not be considered inexcusable. It is accordingly 
 now proclaimed, that all those who have been alluded to are to cherish 
 full confidence that when final and complete victory shall have been 
 obtained, provided their title-deeds, former and recent, shall on inspection 
 be fully verified, they will have the present provisions in their favour 
 continued to them, and that they will also receive compensation in full for 
 the entire period during which their incomes may have been suspended 
 owing to the present disturbances ; but if, after receiving knowledge of 
 these orders, any person shall, notwithstanding, forward intelligence or 
 furnish supplies, &c., to the English, he will be severely punished in the 
 waj’ Government may determine. The chief police officer of the city is, 
 therefore, ordered to have the signatures of all chiefs of freeholds, of rent-free 
 estates, and pensioners residing in his jurisdiction, written on the reverse 
 of this notification to them in this mattei-, in acknowledgment of their 
 having been duly informed, and then to send the notification immediately 
 to his Excellency.” The other document is an order from the king, dated 
 the 6th of September 1857, and is addressed to the chief police officer of 
 the city. It runs as follows: — “You are directed to have proclaimed 
 throughout the city by beat of drum, that this is a religious war, and is 
 being prosecuted on account of the faith, and that it behoves all Hindu 
 and Musalman residents of the imperial city, or of the villages out in the 
 country, as well as those natives of Hindustan who are arrayed against us 
 on the ridge, or are anywhere employed on the side of the armies of the 
 English, whether they be men of the eastern provinces, or Sikhs or 
 foreigners, or natives of the Himalaya Hills or Nipalis, to continue 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 329 
 
 true to their faith and creeds, and to slay the English and their servants ; 
 and you are directed to have it further proclaimed, that those who are 
 now present with the English force on the ridge, whether they be people 
 of Hindustan, or foreigners, or hillmen, or Sikhs, or whatever country 
 they may be natives of, or whether they be Muhammadans, or Hindus born 
 in Hindustan, they are not to entertain any fears or dread of the enemy. 
 Whenever they come over to this side, kind provision will be made for 
 them, and they will be allowed to continue in their own creed and religions. 
 You are directed to have it proclaimed further, that all who will join in 
 the attacks on the enemy, whether they be or be not servants, will be 
 allowed to keep themselves whatever property they may take from the 
 English in plunder, and that they will beside receive additional rewards 
 from his Majesty, and will be amply provided for.” This paper, which I 
 have just perused, is an office copy, and was found recently among other 
 documents in the office of the king’s chief police station. It bears the 
 seal of that office, and is actually attested as a true copy by the signature 
 of Bhao Singh, assistant to the King’s chief police officer. A more trust- 
 worthy and convincing document could hardly be laid before a Court. 
 It seems to me fully to complete the proof of the third charge, and 
 to render further quotation from the numerous other documents 
 unnecessary. It also tends to establish the latter portion of the fourth 
 charge. 
 
 To this charge I will now turn my attention. It accuses the prisoner 
 "'‘of having, at Dehli, on the 16th of May, 1857, or thereabouts, within 
 the precincts of the palace at Dehli, feloniously caused and become 
 accessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and children of 
 European and mixed European descent.” As far as the murder of these 
 poor victims is concerned, I have nothing to allege ; the facts have been 
 detailed before the Court in all their horrid minuteness, and they are not 
 such as to be easily forgotten. The cold-blooded, hardened villany that 
 could revel in leading women and young children to the shambles, and 
 this, too, without the miserable apology of imagined wrong, or to the 
 mistaken zeal of religious frenzy, is something so inhuman that the mind 
 might well refuse to accept it as truth, did not all the force of concurrent 
 ideas, of direct testimony, of circumstantial proof, and elsewhere repeated 
 reactings of the same dreadful tragedies, enforce it upon our convictions. 
 It is not, then, such admitted facts as the above that I am here called upon 
 to establish. They are unhappily but too prominently and painfully 
 shaped forth to require further illustration. It remains, however, to show 
 how deeply the prisoner stands implicated in this revolting butchery, and 
 whether, as averred in the indictment, he did “ feloniously cause and 
 become accessory to the murder of these 49 persons.” I shall not, in so 
 doing, attempt to avail myself of that law which makes all persons joining 
 in insurrection and sedition individually responsible for every act of violence 
 that may be committed by those with whom they stand leagued in illicit 
 combination, even though such acts may have been against their wishes 
 or without their cognisance. I mean, however, separately to consider each 
 
330 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 fact connecting the prisoner with the deaths of these women and children. 
 I will revert to the evidence of their capture, the place of their imprison- 
 ment, the fearful privations to which they were subjected, and the more 
 than cruel treatment which they experienced from the commencement of 
 their confinement, all of which were but too prophetic of the ultimate 
 doom that awaited them. The first person whose testimony I shall have 
 to quote is Ahsan Ulla Khan, the physician. When asked — “ How was it 
 that so many English women and children were brought to the palace and 
 placed in confinement? ” he replied — “ The mutineers took them in and 
 about the city, and, having established their own quarters in the palace, 
 they brought their prisoners in with them too.” Being further interrogated, 
 he declares that the mutineers did not retain the custody of their 
 prisoners, but, as each successive one was brought in, reported the circum- 
 stance to the prisoner, and were told to take the Europeans to the kitchen, 
 and keep them confined there. Being again questioned, he asserts that the 
 king himself appointed the kitchen as the place of their confinement, and 
 observed at the time that it was a large, capacious building ; so that it 
 appears that the prisoner not only fixed upon the building himself as the 
 place for herding indiscriminately together men, women and children, but 
 from its being in his own palace, and from his volunteering a description of 
 it, it is evident that he had some personal knowledge of what it was like. 
 He terms it a large, capacious building, but these are not very definite 
 terms, and when used in reference to different objects may relatively have 
 widely different meanings. To obviate any misconception on such a point, 
 I have, since Ahsan Ulla Khan gave this evidence, visited the place 
 myself, and taken its measurements and description. The building is 
 40 feet long, 12 broad, and about 10 high. It is old, dirty, and dilapidated, 
 and without the vestige of plaster ; but it is worse than this, for it is dark, 
 has no made flooring, no windows, and is entirely without the means of 
 ventilation or of light. There is but one aperture to it, a miserable, 
 small wooden door ; but I will now let Mrs. Aldwell describe it in her own 
 words : — “ We were all confined in one room, very dark, with only one 
 door, and no windows or other opening. It was not fit for the residence of 
 any human being, much less for the number of us that were there. We 
 were very much crowded together, and in consequence of the Sipahis, and 
 every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the children, 
 we were obliged frequently to close the one door that we had, which thus 
 left us without light or air. The Sipahis used to come with their muskets 
 loaded, and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent to 
 become Muhammadans and also slaves, if the king granted us our lives ; 
 but the king’s special armed retainers, from whom the guard over us was 
 always furnished, incited the Sipahis to be content with nothing short of 
 our lives, saying we should be cut up in small pieces, and given as food to 
 the kites and crows. We were very indifferently fed, but on two occasions 
 the king sent us better food.” Such was the return made by this traitor 
 for the millions of pounds sterling bestowed by the English on himself and 
 on his family I Having, as one of the witnesses has specifically stated^ 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 831 
 
 “ abundance of room where these English women and children would have 
 been safe in the apartments occupied by the females of his own establish- 
 ment,” where, it is said, “ there are secret recesses in which 500 people 
 might be concealed, and where, even had the rebels dared to violate the 
 sanctity of the zenana, all search would have been fruitless ; ” and there 
 being, according to another witness, no scarcity of vacant buildings in the 
 palace in which the ladies and children could have been kept in confine- 
 ment, and in which they might have had every comfort ; this minion of 
 English generosity preferred to select for them the very den set apart for 
 culprits and for felons, and where they even received far worse than a 
 felon’s treatment, for they were crowded into a small space, and were daily 
 exposed to the insult and cruelty of all who chose to molest them. Such 
 was the requital to the English for a princely pension and an imperial 
 palace! It will be observed, from the statements of Ahsan Ulla Khan and 
 Mrs. Aldwell, that both agree in attributing these measures personally to 
 the king ; and when we recollect the trifling matters which were, on every 
 occasion, referred to him, and which, as has been fully demonstrated in 
 this Court, received not only his attention but were endorsed by his own 
 autograph instructions, is there any room left for doubt, that the more 
 important concerns were under his special control also ? Indeed, the con- 
 current testimony of many witnesses, and the irrefutable evidence of his 
 own handwriting, incontestably prove that such was the case. It is thus 
 we find the king appointing the prison; that the king’s special armed 
 retainers were always on guard over the prisoners ; that it is the king 
 who supplies them with their very indifferent food, and on two occasions 
 sends them some of better quality ; and thus, too, the Sipahis asked them 
 whether they would consent to become Muhammadans and slaves if the 
 king granted them their lives ; and who, on perusing even thus much of 
 the evidence, can doubt that he had the power of doing so ? Has there 
 been one single circumstance elicited that shows that the prisoner even 
 wished to save them, or that he even extended to them one act of common 
 courtesy or kindness ? Very far from it ; for, whilst no check was given 
 to those who showed the prisoners every species of unmanly brutality, the 
 ordinary charity of giving food and water to a Christian was severely 
 punished, and a Muhammadan woman, simply on this account, was actually 
 immured with the prisoners. Can the bitterness of rancour go further 
 than this ? Or is it possible to contemplate the place and nature of the 
 confinement fixed for these tender women and children, without coming to 
 the conclusion that a cruel death was from the first moment reserved for 
 them, and that, in the words of the witness, Mukund Lai, “ they were but 
 bein<i collected ? ” Indeed the edge of the sword seems to have been but a 
 merciful deliverance from the lingering death which confinement in so 
 loathsome a den, at such a season of the year, must eventually have 
 inflicted on all exposed to it. 
 
 Might I not here stop, and confidently on this point await the decision 
 of the Court against the prisoner ? The proof, however, swells in volume 
 as it proceeds, and I mean to leave no portion of it untraced. Gulab, a 
 
332 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 cliaprdsi or messenger, lias distinctly stated that, a couple of days before 
 the massacre took place, it was known that the Europeans would be killed 
 in two days, and that, on the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great 
 crowds of people were flocking to the palace. Every witness to the scene 
 who has spoken of it in Court has alluded to the crowds assembled, both 
 as spectators and actors, on the morning in question ; and, as this was at 
 the early hour of between eight and nine, there seems no doubt that 
 previous information of what was to take place must have been given. 
 Nothing indicates that an outburst of fury, either on the part of the 
 populace or military, in any way led to a catastrophe so awful. On the 
 contrary, the witness distinctly says that without orders it could not have 
 happened, and that there were but two sources from which such an order 
 could have emanated, viz,, the king and his son, Mirza Mughul ; adding, 
 that he does not know which of them gave the order. He, however, 
 distinctly states that he was present at the murder of these European 
 prisoners, and that he saw them all standing together, surrounded on all 
 sides by the king’s special armed retainers, or what you may term his 
 body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers ; and that, though he did 
 not observe any signal or order given, yet, on a sudden, the men just 
 mentioned drew their swords, simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and 
 continued cutting at them till they had killed them all. A second witness, 
 viz., Chuni Lai, the news-writer, when asked by whose orders these 
 Europeans were murdered, distinctly replies that “ it was done by the 
 king’s order : who else could have given such an order ? ” He and other 
 witnesses concur in stating that Mirzd Mughul, the king’s son, from the 
 top of his house which overlooked the court-yard, was a spectator on this 
 occasion, this Mirza Mughul being at that time second only to the king 
 himself in authority. Is it credible, then, under such circiunstances, that 
 the king’s own body-guard, his special armed retainers, could have dared 
 to perpetrate this frightful butchery without his order and against his 
 wishes ? Tf a doubt could be entertained on such a subject, it would, I 
 think, be speedily dissipated on a perusal of the writings evidently approved 
 by the prisoner, in which bloodthirstiness and sanguinary ferocity against 
 the English are so glaringly conspicuous. In reference to the presence of 
 Mirza Mughul, and in further proof that it was by the king’s own orders 
 that these unhappy women and children were massacred, I shall quote the 
 testimony of the king’s own secretary, Mukund Lai. To the question, 
 “By whose order were the ladies and children that were prisoners in the 
 palace murdered ? ” he replies, “ These people were being collected for three 
 days ; on the fourth day, the infantry and cavalry soldiers, accompanied 
 by Mirza Mughul, came to the entrance of the king’s private apartments, 
 and requested the king’s permission to kill them. The king was at this 
 time in his own apartments. Mirza Mughul and Basant Ali Khan went 
 inside, while the soldiery remained without. They returned in about 20 
 minutes, when Ba«ant Ali Khan publicly, and in a loud voice, proclaimed 
 that the king had given his permission for the slaughter of the prisoners, 
 and that they could take them away. Accordingly, the king’s armed 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 333 
 
 retainers, in whose custody the prisoners had been, took them from the 
 place of confinement, and, in connexion with some of the mutinous soldiery, 
 killed them.” It appears, then, Mirza Mughiil had just come from the 
 prisoner’s presence, and was armed with his authority for carrying out this 
 most hideous deed of blood. It may seem almost superfluous to add any- 
 thing to the above; but the proof furnished by the extract from the 
 prisoner’s diary is so important and convincing that I feel bound to quote 
 it. The evidence of the physician, Ashan Ulla Khan, regarding it, is as 
 follows : “ Was a Court diary of occurrences at the palace kept by order 
 
 of the king during the rebellion ? ” — Answer, “ The Court diary was 
 kept up as usual, according to the custom which had long preceded the 
 outbreak.” Question. “ Look at this leaf, and see whether you can 
 recognise the handwriting on it ? ” — Answer. “ Yes ; it is in the hand- 
 writing of the man who kept the Court diary, and this leaf is a portion 
 of it.” 
 
 Teanslation of an Extract from the Court diary, for the 16th of 
 May, 1857. 
 
 “ The king held his court in the Hall of Special Audience ; 49 English 
 were prisoners ; and the army demanded that they should be given over 
 to them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, ‘ The army 
 may do as they please,’ and the prisoners were consequently put to the 
 sword. There was a large attendance ; and all the chiefs, nobles, officers, 
 and writers presented themselves at court, and had the honour of paying 
 their respects.” 
 
 Here, then, we have oral as well as most unimpeachable written testi- 
 mony, all concurring on this point, and it would seem nearly impossible 
 to make the proof clearer, had we not the prisoner’s written confession of 
 the crime. I do not mean in his defence, which is simply a document 
 framed for this Court, and is but a mere tissue of false denials, without an 
 effort at refuting what stands so prominently against him. I allude, of 
 course, to his long letter to his son, Mirza Mughul, in which he actually 
 makes merit of the slaughter of his Christian prisoners, and urges it as a 
 reason why the soldiery should be more attentive to his commands. After 
 this, to prolong any argument on the subject would be improper. There 
 is, then, but the last portion of the fourth charge uncommented on ; and 
 to establish it we have copies of circulars addressed from the King to Kao 
 Bhara, the Kuler of Kach Bhuj, to Eanjit Singh, Chief of Jasalmir, and 
 to Kajah Gulab Singh, of Jammu. The following extracts will be 
 sufficient, viz. : — 
 
 To Bao Bhara, Ruler of Kach. 
 
 “ It has been reported that you, ever-faithful one, have put the whole 
 of the infidels to the sword, and have thoroughly cleansed and purified 
 your dominions of their unclean presence. We have been extremely 
 gratified to hear of such conduct on your part, and you are therefore 
 
334 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 honoured with this address, to the intent that you will institute such 
 arrangements through your territory as that none of the creatures of God 
 may in any way be aggrieved or oppressed. Further, should any number 
 of the infidels reach your dominions by sea, you will have them slain. 
 In doing this you will act entirely in accordance with our pleasure and 
 wishes.” 
 
 To Ranjit Singh^ Chief of Jasalmlr. 
 
 “It is clear to our belief that throughout your dominions the name 
 and trace of these ill-omened infidels, the English, must not have remained ; 
 if, however, by any chance or possibility some have escaped till now by 
 keeping hidden and concealed, first slay them, and after that, having made 
 arrangements for the administration of your territory, present yourself at 
 our court with your whole military following. Considerations and friend- 
 liness a thousand-fold will be bestowed on you, and you will be distin- 
 guished by elevation to dignities and places which the compass of your 
 quahfications will not have capacity to contain.” 
 
 To Rajah Guldb Singh, Euler of Jammu. 
 
 “ I have been made acquainted, by your petition, with all the particulars 
 of the slaughter throughout your territory of the accursed unbelieving 
 English. You are considered worthy of a hundred commendations. You 
 have acted in this matter as all brave men ever acquit thenoselves ; may 
 you live and prosper.” Again : “ Come to the royal presence, and slay the 
 accursed, unbelieving English, and all other enemies, wherever you ma}'- 
 find them on the way. Whatever may be your hopes and expectations, 
 the dignity and elevation to which you will be promoted amongst your 
 equals will surpass all that you may be able to imagine ; and you will 
 further be rewarded and dignified with the title of Edjah.” On one of the 
 petitions to the king from a duffadar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, boasting 
 of having murdered his officers at Mazaffarnagar, the order for an appoint- 
 ment in return is in the prisoner’s own handwriting. 
 
 “ I herewith conclude my observations on the charges, and it will now 
 remain, gentlemen, for you by your verdict to determine whether the 
 prisoner at your bar, in retirement and seclusion, may yet claim the respect 
 due to deposed majesty, or whether he must henceforth rank merely as one 
 of the great criminals of history. It will be for you to pronounce whether 
 this last king of the imperial house of Taimur shall this day depart from 
 his ancestral palace, bent down by age and by misfortune, but elevated, 
 perhaps, by the dignity of his sufferings and the long-borne calamities of 
 his race, or whether this munificent hall of audience, this shrine of the 
 higher majesty of justice, shalfthis day achieve its crowning triumph in a 
 verdict which shall record to this and to all ages that kings by crime are 
 degraded to felons, and that the long glories of a dynasty may be for ever 
 effaced in a day. 
 
 “ The consideration of the specific charges against the prisoner being now 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 335 
 
 closed, I trust it may not be thought presumptuous if I offer some observ- 
 ations on the evidence elicited as to the cause of the late rebellion, and of 
 the existence of previous conspiracy. I have, in a former part of this 
 address, argued that if the native regiments, previous to the cartridge 
 question being mooted, had been in a sound and well-aifected state, such 
 a frightful and all but universal revolt could not have occurred ; that there 
 must have been some other and more latent power at work to have thus 
 operated on a whole army scattered in different cantonments from Calcutta 
 to Peshawur. 1 think that such could not have been accomplished without 
 some secret mutual understanding, and some previous preparation, the 
 establishment of which may appropriately be termed conspiracy. I have 
 stated also that it seems as if it was not owing to a cartridge of any kind 
 that such an amount of mutiny and murder has solely to be attributed, 
 but I should be more than blind to all that has appeared on these proceed- 
 ings and elsewhere if I failed to recognise in the cartridge question the 
 immediate means or instrument adopted for bringing about a much-desired 
 end. It seems to have been the spark, not accidentally shot forth, but 
 deliberately chosen to explode a mine previously prepared. In alluding 
 then, to the existence of a conspiracy, I do not mean to imply that we 
 have come upon traces of a particular gang of men, specially banded 
 together for the fixed definite object of causing the late rebellion in the 
 native army, in any manner similar to that in which we have seen it 
 developed, but such evidence as we have been able to obtain does appear 
 to me to point out that, for a considerable time antecedent to the lOth of 
 May, agitation and disaffection to British rule among the Muhammadans 
 was more than ordinarily prevalent, and that such disaffection had been 
 stimulated by active and designing men, who have most craftily taken 
 advantage of every circumstance that could be made suitable for such a 
 purpose. The annexation of Oudh to British rule was, perhaps, one of 
 these. It seems to have been particularly displeasing to the Muhammadans, 
 as annihilating the last throne left to them in India ; and, for some other 
 reasons, it would appear to have been almost equally unpalatable to the 
 Hindu Sipahi. It may, perhaps, have interfered with his position there as 
 a privileged servant of the Company : for, instead of having to rely on the 
 influence and prestige of the British Government in dealings or disputes 
 with the native landholders of that province, he found himself brought at 
 once under direct European control. One of the witnesses, Jat Mall, 
 draws a marked distinction between the Hindu Sipahi and the Hindu 
 tradesman in reference to their feelings for the British Government ; and 
 perhaps the annexation of Oudh, with other causes, may tend to account 
 for it. Being asked whether there was any difference between the 
 Muhammadans and Hindus in this respect, he replies, “ Yes, certainly, the 
 Muhammadans as a body were all pleased at the overthrow of the British 
 Government, while the merchants and respectable tradesmen among the 
 Hindus regretted it.” He, however, says that the general feeling throughout 
 the army was the same both among the Hindus and Muhammedans, and 
 that they were both equally bitter ; and this view of the case is, I think. 
 
336 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 supported by our experiences of both. The great bulk of the infantry 
 portion of the native army was undoubtedly Hindu, but we have not found 
 this any check or restraint upon their revolting barbarity ; arid, as far as 
 the army has been concerned, Hindus and Muhammadans appear to have 
 vied with each other only in the enormity of their crimes. But, apart from 
 the army, the revolt has perhaps assumed many of the features of a Musal- 
 man conspiracy, and it is, I think, probable that to Musalman intrigue 
 may eventually be traced those false and fabricated rumours which, 
 adroitly mixed up with some small portion of truth, have been so instru- 
 mental in effacing the last vestiges of fidelity in an army whose faithful- 
 ness was at one time perhaps its very chiefest pride and boast. It does 
 not belong to such an occasion as this to revert to past years, and step by 
 step to trace the causes which have combined to destroy the reliance once 
 placed upon those who are now so notorious for their perfidy. Some of 
 these causes doubtless have been beyond Grovernment control, and were, 
 perhaps, inherent to a state of continued progress on the one side, and an 
 inveterate priestly opposition to it on the other. It will be sufficient if I 
 here merely allude to several previous occasions, not of very distant date, 
 when some regiments of the native army showed how little they were to 
 be depended on. On those occasions also it was evident that a unity of 
 purpose and a singleness of feeling were in a short time organised by some 
 process not immediately patent to their European officers; a mutual 
 correspondence either by emissaries or letters was perhaps then initiated, 
 and the lesson thus learnt was not easily forgotten. I do not mean to 
 argue that from that time the native Indian army became one large 
 debating society ; very far from it ; I believe that in their own fashion 
 most of the Sipahis were good and well-meaning servants of the Govern- 
 ment. I say, in their own fashion, because it appears to me they are 
 always deficient in natural firmness, and have no idea of strong moral 
 rectitude ; their fidelity, as long as it exists, is more of a habit than of 
 a principle, upheld by superstition, but wanting the sustaining power of 
 true religion. Among such a body as this there must always be some 
 discontented intriguers ; and who that knows anything of Asiatic character 
 will not readily admit, especially with reference to Hindus, that the few 
 are more potent for evil than the many for good ? Let but three or four 
 leaders come forth in all the open audacity of crime, or mix themselves up 
 in the secret intrigues^of sedition, and the rest, if not immediately panic- 
 struck, never think it their duty to check or oppose them. They may 
 excuse themselves for a time, by holding aloof from what they do not 
 approve, but active interference, even in prevention of mutiny and murder, 
 seems to form no part of their creed, either religious or political. The 
 most serious crimes are thus passively encouraged; and, temporary im- 
 munity securing proselytes, all are eventually engulfed in the same depths 
 of infamy : thus the crimes of a few lead to the ruin of many. That 
 these influences have been vigorously at work in extending the late rebel- 
 lion I think few will be inclined to deny. I am aware that no correspond- 
 ence, and perhaps little direct evidence to such a point has been brought 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 337 
 
 before tbe Court ; indeed, in reference to the Sipahis, we have not been in 
 a position to obtain either one or the other ; still, if, as has been currently 
 and, I believe, truly reported, that the number of letters passing among 
 our native soldiers, for a month or two prior to the outbreak was very 
 considerably larger than usual, this circumstance, combined with such 
 facts as have come under our notice, would lead almost irresistibly to the 
 conclusion that some sinister agitation had been extensively at work, and 
 that increased disaffection and subordination would necessarily be the 
 result ; moreover, that in such a state revolt would reduce itself to a 
 mere calculation of time. In the above remarks I have attributed much 
 of what has occurred to the pernicious influence of evil intriguers, and it 
 may naturally be inquired why these should have had greater effect at the 
 present juncture than at any former one. Some of the causes I have 
 already hinted at, such as the annexation of Oudh and the progress of 
 European civilisation, outstriding, and in its natural course threatening to 
 sweep away the puny barriers upraised by priestly cunning for the preserv- 
 ation of the grossest ignorance, and thus commencing the subversion of 
 religions that are unable to bear the lights of even natural science. I 
 believe, too, that the propagandists of sedition may artfully have availed 
 themselves of some recent acts of the Government to spread panic and 
 alarm in reference to future forcible interference with caste prejudices. I 
 allude to the agitation about the remarriage of Hindu widows, the enlist- 
 ment for general service, the cartridges, &c. I do not mean in this to 
 offer the slightest apology for men whose conduct excites nothing but 
 loathing and disgust. Pampered in their pride and besotted in their 
 ignorance, they had as a body become too self-suf6cient for military 
 subordination and unhesitating obedience. Experienced, as they were, in 
 mutual combination, they appear again easily to have entered into schemes 
 for dictating to the Government their views in reference to imagined 
 grievances ; but that open, defiant mutiny had been generally resolved 
 upon by the army — or, at any rate, by the Hindu portion of it, prior to 
 the trial of the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers — is more, I think, than has 
 been established. Up to that time there was, no doubt, a feeling of 
 uneasiness, a restless apprehension, and an air of respectful mutiny per- 
 vading the native ranks. The Sipahis in many instances appeared to 
 imagine that disobedience to military command was scarcely criminal if 
 accompanied by a salute and a submissive demeanour. Habituated to 
 combination, and well aware of the strength of numbers, they latterly had 
 seldom lost an opportunity of bringing forward their grievances, not 
 individually, but in masses. On such points there was no difference 
 between Musalman and Hindu ; they could both readily unite, and had 
 already done so, for the purposes of insolent dictation. Indeed, if we 
 search back into history, I believe we shall find that this has ever been 
 what I may term the normal condition of Asiatic armies; and it is, 
 perhaps, the necessary result of giving unity and power to large bodies of 
 men without the checks furnished % education, loyalty, and religious 
 principle to control them : military discipline without these auxiliaries is 
 VOL. V. Z 
 
338 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 but a dangerous weapon, and one that lias frequently been turned against 
 those who have sharpened and prepared it. As a corollary to this, it may 
 be observed that rebellion and insurrection among the unarmed and 
 untutored people of Asia is rare indeed ; even the forcible conversion of 
 the Hindus to Muhammadanism under former emperors of India seems to 
 have been insufficient to rouse them to resistance. It is, then, the attempt 
 at domination by the Sipahi alone that has to be guarded against. The 
 distinctions of caste may, to a certain extent, at former periods have 
 proved serious obstacles to any very extensive combination of men of 
 different sects, either for political or other purposes, but we should 
 remember that this very circumstance of caste companionship has neces- 
 sitated the existence of a number of distinct self-governing societies, has 
 habituated the people of Hindustan to meetings among themselves where 
 publicity is avoided, and thus, giving them their primary lessons in uniting 
 for particular objects, has endowed them with a natural facility for more 
 exteaded combinations, of a secret and sinister character. Under these 
 circumstances, there wanted but the means and the occasion for carrying 
 them out ; and who does not perceive that the native aimy afforded the 
 one, and a variety of incidents have favoured the other ? Brahman and 
 Musalman here met, as it were, upon neutral ground ; they have had in 
 the army one common brotherhood of profession, the same dress, the same 
 rewards, the same objects to be arrived at by the same means. They 
 frequently joined each other in their separate festivals, and the union 
 encouraged by the favour of the Government was finally resorted to as a 
 measure to subvert it. I do not, however, intend to dwell on all of the 
 many influences which may have assisted in bringing about the recent 
 catastrophe ; such a discussion in this place might not be approved of. 
 
 It seems to me, however, apparent that it was not and could not have 
 been the greased cartridges alone that effected it. There was previous 
 preparation among the Sipahis ; and there was also a general unsettling 
 of men’s minds throughout the country, and among the Muhammadans in 
 particular. I believe, indeed, that the facts elicited on this point may be 
 ranged appropriately under the head of “ Muhammadan conspiracy,” the 
 chief object of which seems to have been to spread disaffection and distrust 
 of British rule, and, by the dissemination of lalse and evil reports, and by 
 fabrications of the most insidious kind, to prepare all the people for change 
 and insurrection. As far as can be traced, the commencement of this 
 must have originated with the prisoner, or with some of those such as 
 Hasan Askari and others, who were admitted to his most secret and 
 confidential councils. Be this as it may, there cannot, I imagine, be a 
 doubt that in sending Sidi Kambar to Persia and Constantinople as an 
 ambassador with letters to the sovereign of that country, sohciting aid and 
 elevation to a throne, the prisoner became the principal in a conspiracy 
 which indirectly, at any rate, must have been auxiliary to the recent 
 frightful outbreak and its attendant horrors. It is worthy of particular 
 notice, as connecting the two together, that this Sidi Kambar’s departure 
 took place, according to the most reliable account, just two years before 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 339 
 
 May 1857, and that his promised return, with the aid sought for, was 
 fixed for the time when the outbreak actually took place. Coupling this 
 with the prophecy among the Muhammadans that English sovereignty in 
 India was to cease 100 years after its first establishment by the battle of 
 Plassey in 1757, we are able to form something more than conjecture as 
 to the causes which have given to Muhammadan fanaticism its delusive 
 hope of recovering all its former prestige. I have already alluded to the 
 dream of Hasan Askari the priest, and its interpretation so plausibly 
 contrived to correspond with the wishes of the king, and of those about 
 him. The circumstance may seem trivial to us, but it was doubtless a 
 means well calculated to make a deep impression upon the superstitious 
 minds of those to whom it was addressed, and to cause expectation and 
 belief in what was predicted by one said to be possessed of miraculous 
 powers, and accredited with holding direct communication with Heaven, 
 We learn too from the petition of Muhammad Darwesh to Mr. Colvin, 
 the Lieutenant-Governor, dated 27th of March, 1857, that Hasan Askari 
 had, at this time, assured the King of Dehli that he had certain informa- 
 tion that the prince royal of Persia had fully taken possession of and 
 occupied Bushir, and that he had entirely expelled the Christians, or, 
 rather, had not left one alive there, and had taken away many of them 
 prisoners, and that, very soon indeed, the Persian army would advance by 
 the way of Kandahar and Kabul towards Dehli. He, moreover, adds, 
 “ That in the palace, but more especially in that portion of it constituting 
 the personal apartments of the king, the subject of the conversation 
 night and day was the early arrival of the Persians. Hasan Askari has, 
 moreover, impressed the king with the belief that he has learned, through 
 a divine revelation, that the dominion of the King of Persia will to a 
 certainty extend to Dehli, or rather over the whole of Hindustan, and 
 that the splendour of the sovereignty of Dehli will again revive as the 
 sovereign of Persia will bestow the crown on the king.” The writer 
 goes on to say that throughout the palace, but particularly to the king, 
 this belief has been the cause of great rejoicing, so much so that prayers 
 are offered and vows are made, while, at the same time, Hasan Askari has 
 entered upon the daily performance, at an hour and a half before sunset, 
 of a course of propitiatory ceremonies to expedite the arrival of the Persians 
 and the expulsion of the Christians. It has been arranged that every 
 Thursday several trays of victuals, wheat-meal, oil, copper money and 
 cloth should be sent by the king in aid of these ceremonies, and they are 
 accordingly brought to Hasan Askari.” 
 
 We thus see how early and how deeply the priesthood interested and 
 engaged themselves in this matter, and how completely and exclusively 
 Muhammadan in character was this conspiracy. If we could but have 
 stepped behind the scenes, and witnessed these ceremonies at which super- 
 stition presided, and have beard these prayers and vows offered up for the 
 arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians, we should 
 doubtless have had depicted to us the foreshadowings of those dreadful 
 tragedies which, to all time, will render the past year so painfully memo- 
 
 z 2 
 
340 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 rable. We may imagine and faintly conceive to ourselves some portion of 
 the rancour of these Muhammadans, when we recollect not only their deeds, 
 but the concentrated hatred which breathes through their petitions, and 
 does not stop with this world, but rejoices in the idea of eternal torments 
 for us hereafter. One cannot help inquiring whether there are really many 
 millions of human beings in Hindustan imbued with these feelings for 
 Europeans. I will leave those who hear me to form their own opinions 
 on this subject without venturing to proffer mine. We learn, however, 
 from Mrs. Aldwell that during the Muharram festival she heard the 
 Muhammadan women praying and teaching their children to pray for the 
 success of their faith, and these prayers were generally accompanied by 
 execrations against the English. Nor did even accomplishing the cruel 
 death and sufferings of helpless women and children tend in any way to 
 abate the ferocity of their malignity, or to waken one chord of mercy or 
 commiseration in their breasts, for we find from the local newspapers that 
 at the time this most hideous massacre was being perpetrated about 
 200 Musalman were standing at the reservoir, uttering the coarsest 
 abuse against the prisoners. Were it not too well attested, such demoniac 
 malignity would scarcely be credible. 
 
 The next point to which I shall advert, is the circulation of the 
 chapaties, in the form of ship biscuits. Now, whether they were sent 
 round under the fiction of a Government order, signifying that in future 
 there should be but one food and one faith, or whether, according to 
 another interiiretation, they were meant to sound a note of alarm and 
 preparation, giving warning to the people to stand by one another on any 
 danger menacing them, the contrivance was a most insidious one, and 
 calculated to breed distrust and suspicion in the hearts of many who were 
 strangers to such feelings before. That it created no stronger impression 
 on the native mind than it did, is perhaps attributable only to the early 
 check it received at the hands of authority, and it would doubtless he 
 both interesting and important if we could discover how and by whom 
 such a proceeding was initiated. This and the false rumour about mixing 
 ground bones with the flour had doubtless one common origin, and it is 
 not going beyond the bounds of fair indication or reasonable inference to 
 attribute both one and the other to the unceasing wiles of Muhammadan 
 conspiracy. We perceive that the Hindu Sipahis, under the impulse of a 
 first reaction in their feelings, reproached the Muhammadans with mis- 
 leading them, and it is a most significant fact on these proceedings, that 
 though we come upon traces of Musalman intrigue wherever our investi- 
 gation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the 
 Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmans 
 and priests had been preaching a crusade against Christians. In their 
 case there has been no king to set up, no religion to be propagated by the 
 sword. To attribute to them, under such circumstances, the circulation 
 of these chapaties or the fabrications about ground bones in the flour, 
 would be to ascribe to them acts without a meaning, and a criminal 
 deception without any adequate motive. A very marked feature in this 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 341 
 
 Muhammadan conspiracy is the activity and persistence with which it has 
 been carried out ; the circulation of the chapaties having been early pro- 
 hibited by authority, and thus rendered non-effective for the purpose of 
 oxtensive sedition, some other expedient was necessary to replace it, and 
 we at once find the tale of the “ bone-dust mingled with flour ” very 
 adroitly selected as the substitute. It was, in fact, still adhering to the 
 material of chapaties, and continning the symbol of “ one food, one faith.” 
 It was indeed the chapaty without its form, and without its inconveniences. 
 The schemers had apparently learnt that the chapaty was too specific and 
 too tangibly open to European interference to be largely availed of as an 
 agent for evil, and hence its transformation into flour, the bone-dust being 
 added to the one as the equivalent of the form of the ship biscuit to the 
 other. To give out, then, that such was the nature of the flour stored at 
 all the depots of supplies along the Grand Trunk Eoad, for from them, 
 during their marches, the Sipahis are in a manner compelled to get their 
 food, was to attain the very object the conspirators must have most 
 desired. If true, the Government had already commenced what would be 
 deemed forcible conversion to Christianity. If they could, then, but 
 establish a firm and general belief in this, their game was in their own 
 hands ; and that they did succeed in doing this to a very great extent is, 
 I imagine, undeniable. I must own that to me this apparently natural 
 transition from the chapaties to its component parts seems a master stroke 
 of cunning, and evidenced most able leadership in the cause the con- 
 spirators were embarked in. 
 
 To prove, moreover, that no mean order of talent was at work, and that 
 all the appliances that craft and treachery could avail themselves of were 
 resorted to, we have only to refer to the extracts from the “ Authentic 
 News,” and also to the other native publications of that period, and we shall 
 perceive with what steadfast consistency the ulterior aim is always kept 
 in view. The chapaties, the bone-dust in the flour, the greased cartridges, 
 were all most appropriate for the Hindus ; but a different pabulum was 
 requisite for the Musalmans, and we shall now see with what subtlety it 
 was administered. The first paper commences by announcing that the 
 King of Persia had ordered a concentration of most of his troops at 
 Teheran, and then, declaring it to be currently reported that such a demon- 
 stration against Dost Muhammad Khan was only a strategic move to cloak 
 the King of Persia’s real design of fighting against and conquering the 
 English, the editor makes certain that, at any rate, some change of feeling 
 has taken place amongst the three powers. The next extract is dated the 
 26th of January, 1857, and commences by asserting that all the news- 
 papers agree in declaring that the King of France and the Emperor of 
 Turkey had not as yet openly avowed themselves the allies of either the 
 English or the Persians, but that their ambassadors were secretly visiting 
 and presenting their gifts to both belligerents. “ Some people,” says the 
 editor, “ think that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey will 
 not mix themselves up in the quarrels between the Persians and the 
 English ; but most people,” he adds, “ say that they will both side with 
 
342 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 the Persians. As for the Eussians, however, they make no secret of the 
 readiness with which they are assisting, and will continue to assist, the 
 Persians, whether it he with funds or with forces. It may be said that 
 virtually the Russians are the cause of the war, and that, using the Per- 
 sians as a cloak, they intend to consummate their own designs regarding 
 the conquest of Hindustan. It is to be believed that the Russians will 
 soon take the field in great force.” Here, then, we have not only Persia 
 and Russia advancing immediately upon India with immense armies, but 
 France and Turkey to assist them, while the forsaken and devoted 
 English are represented as by no means sure even of the alliance of the 
 Afghans under Dost Muhammad. Well might the editor, after announc- 
 ing such formidable coalitions, somewhat dramatically exclaim, “ Let the 
 readers of the ‘Authentic News’ be prepared to see what the veil of 
 futurity will disclose.” Accordingly, in the next extract, we perceive 
 that “ the King of Persia had solemnly promised to his courtiers the 
 governorships of the difierent presidencies and places: one is to get 
 Bombay, another Calcutta, and a third Puna, “ while the crown of 
 Hindustan is plainly spoken of as reserved for bestowal on the King of 
 Dehli, this very prisoner before us. You will recollect, gentlemen, that 
 several copies of this paper, the “ Authentic News,” used to be sent to 
 the palace, and one can imagine the joy and exultation with which such 
 ])assages must have been perused, especially when added thereto is the 
 assertion that the Emperor of Russia had sent an effective and thoroughly 
 appointed army of 400,000 men with abundant munitions, to assist the 
 King of Persia in his hostile designs upon India. But it was not in the 
 palace, and by the princes alone, that such paragraphs were read with 
 avidity ; the whole population was intent on them. Sir Theophilus 
 Metcalfe has told us that the subject of the advance of the Persians 
 upon Herdt was much discussed among the natives, and frequently in 
 connexion with the idea of Russian aggression upon India, every news- 
 paper having at this time its correspondent in Kabul. Nor indeed did 
 the discussion and interest excited by these concocted hostile movements 
 cease here, for the same witness declares that agitation about this time 
 prevailed among the Sipahis and that about five or six weeks before the 
 outbreak it was currently reported in their lines, and much discussed 
 among them, that 100,000 Russians were coming from the north, and that 
 the Company’s government would be destroyed, and in fact that the idea 
 of a Russian invasion was universally prevalent. The venom and virus 
 of these false publications were then taking their intended effect, and it 
 would seem a mere perversion of reason longer to blind ourselves with the 
 idea that the outbreak was fortuitous, or that a greased cartridge occa- 
 sioned it. In a former article of the “Authentic News,” we have seen 
 Dost Muhammad alluded to as but a doubtful ally of the English. In 
 this one, however, as events progress, he is spoken of as being secretly 
 in league with the King of Persia, and, that superstitious aid may not be 
 lost sight of, it is remarked how wonderfully four distinct unexpected 
 coincidences had impelled the King of Persia to declar war against the 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 843 
 
 English. The first was that Herat, in another place described as the key 
 of India, had so easily fallen into his possession ; the second, the unfore- 
 seen coming of the Kussians to assist him ; the third, the nobles of Persia 
 unanimously counselling an advance on India, and predicting that God 
 would bestow victory ; and the fourth, the simultaneous rising and as- 
 sembling of the whole of Persia for the prosecution of a religious war. 
 Portents and miracles were likewise brought forward still further to excite 
 the Muhammadan mind, as the following extract from the “Authentic 
 News,” dated 15th of September, 1856, will sufficiently prove. It is 
 headed — 
 
 “ Local News from the Hansi District. 
 
 “ A man just come from the country tells the editor that, unlike other 
 places, the Hull is being burnt there at this season of the year, and the 
 saturnalia attending the festival are now going on. The man who states 
 this ascertained, on inquiry, that the reason for the unseasonable observ- 
 ance of this festival is, that three girls were born at a birth, and the 
 three spoke immediately. The first said : ‘ The coming year will be one 
 of great calamities; various calamitous visitations will afflict the nation:’ 
 the second said : ‘ Those who live will see;’ and the third, in an impres- 
 sive and forcible tone, said : ‘ If the Hindus burn the Hull in the present 
 season, they will escape all these evils. God alone is omniscient.’ ” 
 
 It is too much, I am afraid, the case, with persons accustomed to Euro- 
 pean habits of thinking to view such statements and articles as these 
 merely in reference to the impression they would be likely to make on 
 themselves. The taking of Herat, the predictions of the nobles, &c., and 
 the fabulous prophecies of these girls would, in that case, receive hardly 
 passing attention. But we should commit a grievous and most fatal error 
 if we were to gauge Asiatic thoughts and nnderstandings by the same 
 measure that would be applicable to our own. If, avoiding this mistake, 
 we proceed to consider the above editorials in relation to the people they 
 were written for, we shall find that they are not only most insidiously 
 worked up to meet their peculiar prejudices, but are also made to bear a 
 striking affinity to the fulfilment of their prophecies; to the dreams of 
 Hasan Askari ; to the negotiations of Sidi Kambar, and to the ancient 
 traditions of Muhammadanism. Are we, then, to suppose that in all this 
 there was no connexion between the palace and the press ? Were 
 all these concurrences fortuitous? Can it be that the dreams of the priests, 
 the plots of the court, and the fabrications of the newspapers worked 
 accidentally together ? We have already seen the decoys by which the 
 Hindu Sipahis were to be gained; and is it not the same spirit of evil 
 that we can recognise here ? Are the circumstances appealing to Muham- 
 madan pride, to their superstitious bigotry, to their lust for religious war, 
 and to their hatred for the English, dwelt upon with a less perfect know- 
 ledge of their peculiar inherences ? In an extract from the ‘ Authentic 
 News,’ dated the 19th of March, it is stated that 900 Persian soldiers, 
 with some officers of high rank, had entered India, and that 500 more 
 
344 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 were then staying in Dehli itself in various disguises. It is true that this 
 is given out on the authority of one Sadik Khan, a person whose identity 
 not being established, was evidently in disguise even to his name; but 
 this very circumstance was no doubt a part of the scheme. It gave an 
 air of greater mystery to the announcement of the paper, and seems to 
 have been purposely contrived to let the imagination of the readers supply 
 an exaggerated idea of his real rank and importance. How, it may be 
 asked, even under this cloak of a false name, could such a statement be 
 given forth in the leading newspaper of the city without some deep and 
 idterior object ? It not only assigns deep conspiracy to the Persians, but, 
 if false, as we know it to have been, is proof of conspiracy in the editor 
 and those who employed him. This name of Sadik Khan, be it remem- 
 bered, was the one attached to the proclamation purporting to be from 
 Persia, and put up in the Jammi Masjid. The proclamation, then, and the 
 assertion about these 900 Persian soldiers, were evidently parts of one and 
 the same scheme, and seem to have been thus linked together that the 
 one might, in a measure, support the other. If, for instance, any ques- 
 tioned the authority of the proclamatirm, there was the answer ready that 
 the bringer of it was actually in the city with 500 other Persians also in 
 disguise, and vice versa. If the advent of the Persians was disbelieved, 
 was not the proclamation a voucher for its reality ? The same depth of 
 artifice is apparent everywhere ; and the more we consider the subject the 
 more fully convinced we shall be of the wiles and stratagems so system- 
 atically resorted to. For instance, what would such a proclamation as 
 that attributed to the King of Persia have been without some demonstra- 
 tion, feigned or real, to support it ? The sword depicted on one side, and 
 the shield on the other, would have been equally meaningless but for the 
 story of the men in disguise, and the officers of high rank who evidently 
 must have been deputed to carry it through. The proclamation, so evi- 
 dently false, is, for that very reason, one of our truest and most reliable 
 expositors of conspiracy, and of Musalman conspiracy too. It is, in fact, 
 impossible to account for it under any other hypothesis. Who, then, waa 
 it that designed and wrote the proclamation? This question, I believe, 
 could be answered in every detail by the editor of the paper, who has 
 recurred to it so frequently. It is evidently a pet subject of his, one on 
 which he seems to be thoroughly at home. He has the exact transcript 
 of it, is able to epitomise it, and no doubt was equally well informed as 
 to the preparation of it. 
 
 I do not mean to wade through and to quote all the extracts from the 
 newspapers that bear out the fact of a Muhammadan conspiracy. That 
 appears to me unnecessary, for I believe I shall have no difficulty in esta- 
 blishing it by other testimony. However, there is one other extract, which 
 it would be wrong to leave unnoticed. It bears date the 13th of April, 
 and must have been the origin of the report that Sir Theophilus Met- 
 calfe alludes to, when he says that, about fifteen days before the outbreak, 
 it was currently reported that an anonymous petition had been pre- 
 sented to the magistrate, stating, “ that the Kashmir gate would be 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 345 
 
 ^aken from tke English. This being the chief stronghold in the city and 
 main connexion with the cantonments of Dehli, it would naturally be the 
 first point seized in any attempt at insurrection in the city, and, being the 
 only gate at which there was any military guard, the importance of it, in 
 n, strategical point of view, must have been obvious to all.” Sir Theo- 
 philus Metcalfe proceeds to say, “that this petition was never received ; 
 but that the current report about it was indicative of what was then occu- 
 pying the thoughts of many of the natives.” So, no doubt, it was ; but 
 it was also much more than this, for it was the real exposition of an 
 .article which the editor dare not, without disguising it, put into print. 
 With what ingenuity and craft the idea is worked out, so as to become 
 intelligible only to those who were meant to understand it, must now be 
 obvious to all. The editor says several petitions have been given into 
 the magistrate’s court, and in these it is also mentioned that “ a month 
 hence from this date an overwhelming attack will be made on Kashmir, 
 •of the salubrity and beauty of which a poet has said, ‘ that should a 
 parched and burnt-up soul reach Kashmir, though, he might be a roasted 
 fowl, he would recover his wings and feathers,’ and that this cool and 
 heavenly country will come into the possession of the writers of the 
 petition.” How, it may be asked, were the writers of the petitions given 
 into the magistrate’s court at Dehli to take Kashmir, and who does not 
 now perceive that the Kashmir gate of the city of Dehli was thus 
 indicated by the country from which it derives its name, and that the 
 salubrity and beauty of the former were to represent the importance, and 
 its fitness for their objects, of the latter ? I shall not here pause to con- 
 sider whether, under the simile of a parched and burnt-up fowl, the 
 prisoner before us was intended. He no doubt expected to recover some 
 of his lost plumage by seizing the gate, and with it was meditating a 
 flight to a higher elevation. In declaring, on the 13th of April, that in 
 one month from that date, an overwhelming attack would be made on 
 this very point — for it was here the officers were shot down — the editor of 
 the “Authentic News” was either the confidant and accomplice of con- 
 spiracy, or had soared into the regions of actual prophecy. 
 
 The coincidence of the above cautiously worded announcement of the 
 editor, and the indiscreet revelations of Jawan Bakht, are certainly start- 
 ling. The doubly foretold attack took place on the 11th of May, and, after 
 what has been proved in regard to Muhammadan treachery, is there any 
 one who hears me that can b^elieve that a deep-planned and well-concerted 
 conspiracy had nothing to do with it ? 
 
 The proofs of the intimate connexion of the prisoner with it do not, 
 however, rest here, for Mujud, the Abyssinian, who was not merely in the 
 service of the king, but was his private special attendant, and was always 
 near his person, takes Mr. Everett aside and tells him that he had better 
 leave the Company’s service, and, with his troop, go over to the king, as 
 this hot weather the Kussians would be all over the place. Mr. Everett 
 seems to have laughed at this, and to have thought it but the man’s 
 foolishness; but we have now direct proof that it was something far 
 
346 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 deeper than that ; for at their next meeting, which occuiTed about a month 
 after the outbreak had been accomplished, Mujud says to him, “ Did I 
 not tell you to come away ? ” And then, as it were in explanation of the 
 warning, proceeds to reveal to him the whole of the Sidi Kambar trans- 
 action: how, two years before, he had been sent to Constantinople as 
 ambassador from the King of Dehli ; how he had started on the pretence 
 of going to Mekka, and how he had promised that he would return when 
 the two years had expired. This explanation seems to be a very remark- 
 able one. It shows clearly that it was not merely on the basis of an 
 expected disturbance at Mirath that such a proposal was made, but that 
 a far wider web of sedition was weaving. Who can now believe that none 
 of the Muhammadan native officers and men of the regiments at Dehli 
 and Mirath had been tampered with ? Mr. Everett, as a Christian, was 
 surely one of the last the conspirators would apply to. It should be 
 remembered likewise, that Mr. Everett had none of his regiment with him 
 at Dehli, and that, had there been any Musalman officers of the corps 
 present, they would doubtless have been preferred to a Christian. At the 
 time too when the application was made to him the sentence of the 
 Mirath court-martial must have been unknown in Dehli. It was not, 
 then, as a consequence of, but as an addition and an adjunct to, what was 
 anticipated at Mirath, that preparation was being made here ; and by 
 whom was this being done ? Could a mere private servant and personal 
 attendant, however great and favourite he might be, offer service to a 
 risaldar and a whole troop of cavalry, withdrawing their allegiance from 
 the Government, without any authority for so doing from his master ? 
 Who could have given the king’s service to so large a body but the king 
 himself ? I would beg those who hear me, seriously to consider these 
 questions, and then determine whether the answers to them do not bring 
 home personal complicity in compassing the rebellion, to the prisoner in 
 Court. We have been informed, too, by Mukund Lai, the secretary, that 
 it is now about three years since some infantry soldiers stationed at 
 Dehli became disciples of the king, and that, on that occasion, the king 
 gave each of them a document detailing the names and order of those who 
 had preceded him in the direct line of disciples to each other, himself 
 included, together with a napkin dyed pink as an emblem of his blessing. 
 Now, three years ago from the present date is about the time of Sidi 
 Kambar’s embassy to Persia, and of the apparent first commencement of 
 Muhammadan conspiracy ; and it certainly is a somewhat instructive fact 
 to find that the occasion chosen for such an unwonted manifestation of 
 piety on the one hand, and such an unusual display of kingly condescen- 
 sion on the other, was precisely that in which intimate relations between 
 them of a more political character were beginning to be thought of. The 
 Agent of the Lieutenant-Governor, of course, put a stop to these exhibitions ; 
 but from that day, adds the -witness, it may be said that a sort of under- 
 standing was established between the army and the king, I think it will be 
 conceded, that in addition to the charges five facts have been established, 
 viz., the concerted dreams and predictions of Hasan Askari, the priest; 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 347 
 
 the mission to Persia and Constantinople of Sidi Kambar, the Abyssinian ; 
 a deliberate continuous plan of exciting distrust and revolt among the 
 Hindus ; a similar plan, by the fabrications of the native press, for incit- 
 ing the Musalmans to a religious war ; and lastly, by these means and 
 others, an indirect, and also a personal, tampering with the fidelity of the 
 Hindus and Musalmans of the native army. Has or has not a guilty 
 participation in all these five points been traced to the prisoner ? If the 
 question (as I believe it will be) should be answered in the affirmative, 
 there will still remain another to be responded to, of perhaps still greater 
 importance, viz., Has he in these transactions been the leader, or the led ? 
 has he been the original mover, the head and front of the undertaking, or 
 has he been but the consenting tool, the willing instrument in the hands 
 of others ; the forward, unscrupulous, but still pliant puppet, tutored by 
 priestly craft for the advancement of religious bigotry ? Many persons, I 
 believe, will incline to the latter. The known restless spirit of Muhammadan 
 fanaticism has been the first aggressor, the vindictive intolerance of that 
 peculiar faith has been struggling for mastery, seditious conspiracy has 
 been its means, the prisoner its active accomplice, and every possible 
 crime the frightful result. It was, however, rather as the head of the 
 Muhammadan religion in India than as the descendant of a line of kings 
 that I believe the prisoner’s influences were desired ; the one indeed is so 
 inseparable from the other that it is difficult to say where the difference 
 commences. It was the union of the two, the religious and the political, 
 that gave such importance to the prisoner as one of the abettors of 
 conspiracy. 
 
 Thus the bitter zeal of Muhammadanism meets us everywhere. It is 
 conspicuous in the papers, flagrant in the petitions, and perfectly demoniac 
 in its actions. There seems, indeed, scarce any exemption from its conta- 
 gious touch. The Prince Mirza Abdulla, robbing his confiding visitor 
 and former friend, and then sending his uncle to compass her death, 
 seems no exaggerated instance of it. It is again represented by the 
 Muhammadan officer Mirza Taki Beg, at Pashawar, who, while in high 
 employment and pay by the British Government, complacently quotes from 
 his books that a change will take place, and that the British rule will 
 soon be overthrown. It finds a still more unmistakable disciple in Karim 
 Baksh, of the Dehli Magazine, who, while drawing English pay, avails 
 himself of his scholarship and knowledge of Persian to send circulars to 
 the native regiments to the effect that the cartridges prepared in the 
 magazine had been smeared with a composition of fat, and that the Sij ahis 
 were not to believe their European officers if they said anything in con- 
 tradiction of it. It will be recollected how active in his enmity this man 
 proved when the king’s troops were attacking the magazine ; how he kept 
 up a secret communication with them, and how completely he identified 
 himself, from the commencement, with the conspirators. Can there be a 
 doubt that he was one of those who had been successfully tampered with ; 
 that, while ostensibly serving the English, he was, in reality, in the pay 
 and confidence of those seeking their destruction ? 
 
348 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 But why multiply instances of this sort ? I would gladly cite some of 
 a different tendency, and the petition of Muhammad Darwesh, in his ad- 
 mirable letter to Mr. Colvin, must not he passed over. It is one noble 
 instance of faithfulness from a Muhammadan to the British. I am sorry I 
 cannot class with it the petition purporting to be from Xabi Baksh Khan 
 to the king, pronouncing it unlawful to slay women, and calling for a 
 decree to that effect from the doctors of the Muhammadan religion ; for since 
 1 delivered the paper into Court considerable doubt has been thrown on 
 its having been written at the time indicated, and it seems by no means 
 improbable that it was fabricated after the capture of Dehli, for the pur- 
 pose of obtaining rewards and other advantages. Indeed, a further atten- 
 tive perusal of it has convinced me that it is so ; for no one in the 
 situation of Nabi Baksh Khan would have dared to advise or propose to 
 the king to let the soldiery first wreak their rage ou his own royal person, 
 as Nabi Baksh Khan pretends to have done. There are certainly a few 
 instances in which the Muhammadans have behaved with kindness to the 
 English, and not the less pleasing on account of the humbie grades in 
 which these instances occur. We may, perhaps, deduce from this, that 
 the teachings such as are prescribed by their prophet have no softening 
 -effects on the hearts of his followers ; nay, more, that education in such 
 doctrines leads to ferocity and revolting crime, and is utterly incompatible 
 ’uuth feelings of even ordinary humanity. 
 
 In the course of this address I have dwelt, long and frequently, upon 
 those circumstances which appear to demonstrate that to Musalman in- 
 trigue and Muhammadan conspiracy we may attribute the dreadful calami- 
 ties of the year 1857. I have endeavoured to point out how intimately 
 the prisoner, as the head of the kluhammadan faith in India, has been 
 connected with the organisation of that conspiracy, either as its leader or 
 its unscrupulous accomplice. I have alluded to the part taken by the 
 native press and Muhammadans, in general, as preparing the Hindus for 
 insurrection, and the native army, in particular, for revolt ; and perhaps, 
 in further corroboration of such facts, it may be as well to advert to the 
 share that may be assigned to the Muhammadans in getting the cartridges 
 refused on the parade ground of the 3rd Light Cavalry. Out of these 
 85 troopers the far larger moiety was Muhammadan. These men had no caste, 
 and to them it could not possibly have mattered whether pig’s and cow’s 
 fat was smeared on the cartridges or not. Captain Martineau tells us that 
 at the Ambalah depot, as far as the cartridge question was concerned, the 
 Muhammadan Sipahis laughed at it, and we thus perceive that these men 
 initiated open mutiny without one pretext for so doing, or the shadow of 
 an excuse. They had not even the extenuation of a pretended grievance ; 
 yet they at once leagued themselves in rebellion against us, and induced 
 the Hindus to join them, by speciously exciting them on that most vul- 
 nerable of points, the fear of being forcibly deprived of their caste. I 
 say, induced the Hindus to join them, for such is the evidence before us, 
 and this too on a pretext in which the Muhammadans could have had no 
 possible sympathy with them. Nor indeed were the Hindus long in dis- 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 34:9 
 
 covering this, for as a witness, who has been frequently quoted, informs 
 us, “ immediately after the battle of the Hindan they spoke with much 
 regret of the turn that affairs had taken, reproached the Muhammadans 
 for having deceived them, and seemed to doubt greatly that the English 
 Government had really had any intention of interfering with their caste. 
 Great numbers of the Hindu Sipahis at this time declared that, if they 
 could be sure their lives would be spared, they would gladly go back to 
 the service of the Government ; but the Muhammadans, on the contrary, 
 used to assert that the king’s service was much better than that of the 
 English ; that the nawabs and rajahs would supply the king with large 
 forces, and that they must eventually conquer.” If we now take a re- 
 trospective view of the various circumstances which we have been able 
 to elicit during our extended inquiries, we shall perceive how exclusively 
 Muhammadan are all the prominent points that attach to it. A Muhammadan 
 priest, with pretended visions and assumed miraculous powers— a Muham- 
 madan King his dupe and his accomplice — a Muhammadan clandestine 
 embassy to the Muhammadan powers of Persia and Turkey resulting — 
 Muhammadan prophecies as to the downfall of our power — Muhammadan 
 rule as the successor of our own — the most cold-blooded murders by Muham- 
 madan assassins — a religious war for Muhammadan ascendancy — a Muham- 
 madan press unscrupulously abetting — and Muhammadan Sipahis initiating 
 the mutiny. Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented ; 
 if it be brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its ever-aggres- 
 sive neighbour. 
 
 The arguments in reference to a Muhammadan conspiracy are now closed. 
 I do not mean that many others might not be deduced from the pro- 
 ceedings before us, for I have selected only those that appeared to me the 
 most prominent. I would wish, however, before sitting down, to quote 
 one question and answer from Captain Martineau’s evidence : “ Did you 
 ever hear any of the Sipahis speak complainingly of the efforts of English 
 missionaries to convert natives to Christianity ? ” Answer. — “No, never 
 in my life, I don’t think they cared one bit about it.” I believe there is 
 no officer whose duties have given him much experience of the Sipalh 
 character or any insight into his feelings and prejudices but will readily 
 confirm the correctness of this opinion. There is no dread of an open 
 avowed missionary in India. It is not the rightful conversion to Chris- 
 tianity that either Sipahis or natives are alarmed at. If it be done by the 
 efforts of persuasion, of teaching, or of example — the only means by 
 which it can be done — it offends no caste prejudice, excites no fanatical 
 opposition. A candid, undisguised endeavour to gain followers to Christ 
 has never, that I am aware of, been viewed with the slightest sign of 
 disapprobation by any portion of the natives, and, were it more constantly 
 before their eyes, who can doubt that it would remove this present dark 
 and debasing error that Christianity is itself a caste, and its only distin- 
 guishing tenet the privilege of eating everything ? If this degrading idea 
 were removed, the chief fear of the Hindus would vanish with it. Let 
 them see that it is impossible to make converts to Christianity by force, 
 
350 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 and you deprive the seditious of their most potent weapon of mischief. 
 Christianity, when seen in its own, pure light, has no terrors for the natives. 
 It is only when kept in the shade that its name can he perverted to an 
 instrument of evil. But I may, if I proceed further, he trenching on 
 questions of State policy. I heg, then, to tender my thanks to the Court 
 for the patient hearing they have given me, and to Mr. Murphy, the 
 interpreter, for the able assistance he has, in that capacity, afforded me on 
 this and the other State trials. His very high attainments as an Oriental 
 scholar have been most conspicuous. In the fluency of viva voce examin- 
 ations ; in the quick readiness with which all kinds of papers, in difl’erent 
 hands, have been deciphered and read ; and in the correctness and spirit 
 of the written translations of documents of no ordinary difficulty his com- 
 plete knowledge both of Urdu and Persian has been thoroughly attested. 
 The notes appended to many of these papers are valuable in themselves, 
 and speak more forcibly than I can do of Mr. Murphy’s very high profi- 
 ciency as an interpreter. I should be wanting, both to him and myself, 
 if I did not thus record my obligations to him. 
 
 Finding. — The Court, on the evidence before them, are of ojiinion that 
 the prisoner Muhammad Bahadur Shah, ex-King of Dehli, is guilty of all 
 and every part of the charges preferred against him. 
 
 M, Dawes, Lieut.-Colonel, President. 
 
 Dehli, 9th March, 1858. F. J. Harriott, Major, 
 
 Deputy Judge Advocate-General. 
 
 Approved and confirmed. 
 
 N. Penny, Major-General, 
 
 Commanding Meerut Division. 
 
 Camp Saharan, 2nd April, 1858. 
 
 COPY of a Letter of the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab for- 
 warding to the Governor-General of India the Proceedings on 
 the Trial of the King of DehlI. 
 
 From E. Temple, Esq., Secretary to Chief Commissioner of the Panjab to 
 G-. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government of India with the 
 G-overnor-General. 
 
 Labor, 29 April, 1858. 
 
 Sir, — I am now directed to forward for submission to the Eight Honourable 
 the Governor-General, the proceedings* and papers in the trial of 
 
 See Parliamentary Paper, No. 162 of Session 1859. 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 351 
 
 Muhammad Bahadur Shah, ex-King of Dehli. As a supplement to the 
 above, I am also to transmit translation of evidence of Ahsun uUa 
 Khdn, late confidential physician of the ex-King, taken before the 
 Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. It will be in the recollection of his 
 Lordship that the physician’s life was guaranteed on the condition of his 
 answering satisfactorily such questions as might be put to him. 
 
 2. The trial was commenced on the 27th January, 1858, and was 
 concluded on the 9th of March, 1858. The proceedings are very voluminous, 
 and have only recently been received from the Greneral commanding 
 Mirath division. The evidence relates not only to the specific charges on 
 which the prisoner was arraigned, but also to the origin and character of 
 the outbreak ; and it lays bare the policy of the king’s government and 
 the internal economy of the rebel army during the siege of Dehli. On the 
 whole, it is deeply interesting and instructive, whether viewed practically, 
 politically, or historically. 
 
 3. In brief terms, it may be said that the documentary evidence com- 
 prises the system in which the general government was conducted ; the 
 raising of loans ; military arrangements ; the communication with foreign 
 powers and neighbouring chiefs; the passages in the native newspapers 
 relating to the w^ar between the English and the Persians. There are also, 
 of course, many papers of a miscellaneous character. The oral evidence 
 describes the occurrences of the outbreak, and the sad circumstances 
 connected with the massacre of the Christians in the palace ; it also throws 
 some light on the origin of the mutiny and the rebellion. The general 
 effect of the evidence, documentary and oral, is to present to the mind a 
 wonderfully vivid picture of all that happened at Dehli during the eventful 
 months between the 12th May and 20th September, 1857. 
 
 4. The papers referring to the system of the king’s government exhibit 
 in a remarkable manner the active personal share which the king himself 
 took in the conduct of affairs. However wrongly he had assumed his 
 position, it must be admitted that his orders were not unworthy of the 
 situation. He did make some effort to preserve order in the city, to 
 repress rapine and murder in the villages, to check malversation, to restrain 
 the excesses of the soldiery; but it is clear, from first to last, he was 
 unable to establish an administration either within or without the city. 
 In the tracts nominally ruled by the king there was scarcely the semblance 
 of authority ; nor was there any protection for life or property. In but 
 few cases did the king’s agents succeed in collecting revenue from the 
 districts. From its own records, the Mughul rule, while it lasted, seems to 
 have been a reign of terror, and a period of intolerable anarchy to the 
 people. Then the papers show the financial straits to which the king was 
 driven, and the numerous forced loans and other contributions exacted 
 from the moneyed classes in Dehli. The military papers do not materially 
 elucidate the plan of the operations, but they show that the mutinous army 
 was utterly insubordinate to the government it had set up, and that its 
 discipline was entirely relaxed. The papers comprising the correspondence 
 with other powers indicate the deputations despatched by the King of 
 
352 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 Dehli to the Shah of Persia ; but they do not show an actual connexion 
 between these intrigues and the Bengal mutinies. Whether, in the 
 absence of any proof, there is reason to infer such connexion will be con- 
 sidered presently. The correspondence with Indian chiefs proves that the 
 chiefs round Delhi were in sulojection to the king ; but there is nothing to 
 show that any considerable number of princes gave in their adhesion, nor 
 that any sovereign or powerful prince intrigued with the king. The 
 extracts from the native newspapers at Dehli certainly breathe a hostile 
 spirit to the British, and abound with absurd stories of the successes of 
 the Persians in the war then waging, and their probable advance upon 
 India. 
 
 5. The oral evidence goes far to show, that while the troops at Dehli 
 were prepared for the outbreak, and the palace retainers were in some 
 measure ready for mischief, yet the king himself and his counsellors had 
 not contemplated taking the lead in so serious a movement. Consequently, 
 when the mutineers first arrived, the king’s conduct was most vacillating. 
 He asked them why they had come to him, for he had no means of 
 maintaining them. They replied that, unless he joined them, they could 
 not make head against the English. He immediately yielded, however ; 
 and by his subsequent behaviour he identified himself with the cause of 
 the rebels, and made their acts his own. As regards the massacre of forty- 
 nine Christians within the palace walls, it is probable that the king 
 himself was not a prime mover in that dreadful deed, and that, if left to 
 his own devices, he would not have had the prisoners murdered. There is 
 little doubt that he could have saved them had he been so minded. It is 
 quite certain that he made no effort to do so, and, from his own subsequent 
 letters, it is clear that he was a consenting party to the murder. 
 
 6. Upon all this evidence, the Court have found the prisoner guilty of 
 four charges, which may be thus epitomised : 
 
 1st. Aiding and abetting the mutinies of the troops. 
 
 2nd. Encouraging and assisting divers persons to wage war against tho 
 British Government. 
 
 3rd. Assuming the sovereignty of Hindustan. 
 
 4th. Causing and being accessory to the murder of the Christians. 
 
 Concurring in the justice of the verdict, and considering the prisoner to 
 nave been guilty of these grave felonies, the Chief Commissioner has to 
 recommend, that the said prisoner shall be dealt with as a felon, regard 
 only being had to the guarantee of his life, which was granted to him at 
 the time of his capture. And the Chief Commissioner has arrived at the 
 deliberate opinion of the prisoner’s guilt, after having carefully examiped 
 the evidence adduced at the trial, and after having tested it by all the 
 information which he has obtained since the commencement of the 
 outbreak, and by his personal knowledge of the character both of the 
 prisoner and of the Muhammadan population of Dehli. 
 
 7. After the above brief analysis of the proceedings in this most re- 
 markable trial, I am now to submit the Chief Commissioner’s opinions on 
 the real causes and origin of the mutiny and rebellion. A right under- 
 
APPENDIX 0. 353 
 
 standing of this matter is of the last importance to the future stability 
 of the empire. 
 
 8. In the first place, it is to he observed that the prisoner was not 
 charged with any offence previous to the 11th May, 1857. Whatever may 
 have been the king’s participation in the events subsequent to that date, 
 nothing has transpired on the trial, or on any other occasion, to show that 
 he was engaged in a previous conspiracy to excite a mutiny in the Bengal 
 army. Indeed, it is Sir John Lawrence’s very decided impression that 
 this mutiny had its origin in the army itself; that it is not attributable to 
 any external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was after- 
 wards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own 
 ends ; and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing 
 else. Sir John Lawrence has examined many hundreds of letters on this 
 subject from natives, both soldiers and civilians. He has, moreover, 
 conversed constantly on the matter with natives of all classes, and he is 
 satisfied that the general, and indeed almost the universal, opinion in this 
 part of India is to the above effect. 
 
 9. It may be true that discontented Sipahis worked upon the minds of 
 their less guileless comrades, and persuaded them that a sinister but 
 systematic attempt was about to be made on their ceremonial religion ; and 
 that in many regiments the majority was misled by designing individuals. 
 But, as a body, the native army did really believe that the universal 
 introduction of cartridges destructive of their caste was a matter only of 
 time. They heard (and believed as they heard) that the measure had 
 been resolved on, and that some Sipahis had been punished even by death 
 for refusing to use the objectionable cartridges. They thought, therefore 
 that their only chance of escape was to band together, to refuse the 
 cartridges, and to resist if force should be attempted by the Government ; 
 and the incendiary fires at the different stations were intended by the 
 Sipahis as a warning to their officers and to their Government of the 
 ieelings which had taken possession of the native army. Such truly was 
 the origin of the mutiny ; and this, I am to repeat, is the one circumstance 
 which has forced itself upon the Chief Commissioner’s conviction in all 
 that he has seen and heard. This is the one fact which stands out 
 prominently in all the native letters which he has examined, in all the 
 statements of the natives whom he has cross-questioned, and in all the 
 conversations between the natives themselves which have been reported by 
 our spies in Dehli and elsewhere. 
 
 10. As against the above conclusion, it might perhaps be urged that 
 the mutiny first broke out at Mirath, where the new cartridges had never 
 been used ; and it is no doubt true that the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry 
 had never been asked to use the new cartridges, and were imprisoned for 
 refusing cartridges of the old description, and perfectly unobjectionable. 
 But the Chief Commissioner has always understood that the cartridges 
 which these men did refuse happened to be enveloped in paper of a colour 
 different from that generally used before, and he believes that this un- 
 fortunate circumstance would account for the bitter mistrust which was 
 
 VOL. V. 2 A 
 
354 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 excited in their minds. Indeed, a similar circumstance produced the 
 same effect upon the 19th Native Infantry and other regiments in 
 Bengal. Any person conversant with native character can understand 
 how easily such a thing might be misinterpreted by men whose imagina- 
 tion and feelings had been wrought up to the belief that an attempt was 
 in contemplation to injure them in so vital a point as that of caste and 
 religion. Again, it has been said that the Sipahis after the mutiny fired 
 off some of these impure cartridges against our loyal troops during the 
 siege of Dehli ; hut it is very doubtful whether this really took place. If 
 it did, however, still the men might have escaped the fancied pollution 
 by the refraining from biting the cartridges, or they might have had the 
 cartridges remade in a manner which would obviate the supposed im- 
 purity ; or the cartridges might have been used only when the mutineers 
 were becoming desperate, as their final defeat drew near. On the whole, 
 the Chief Commissioner considers that neither of the above arguments is 
 at all sufficient to weaken a conclusion so strong upon other grounds. 
 
 11. As an instance of the evidence which might be produced in favour 
 of the above conclusions, I am to mention an important and interesting 
 conversation which the Chief Commissioner and Brigadier General 
 Chamberlain recently held at Ambalah with a jamadar of the 3rd Panjab 
 Native Infantry. This man, a Bhajpuria Kajput by caste, and a native 
 of Hindustan, was at Ghazipur on furlough when the mutiny broke out ; 
 he and his two brothers joined an English indigo planter, and during seven 
 months were of great use to that gentleman on several occasions of 
 difficulty and disturbance. He was on his way thence to rejoin his 
 regiment in the Panjab when he met the Chief Commissioner’s camp at 
 Ambalah. Though holding a certificate of his good conduct and services 
 at Ghazipur, he still, even at Ambalah, seemed doubtful of the reception 
 he would meet with. He was reserved at first, and it was only during a 
 lengthened examination that he by degrees described what he had heard 
 and seen. In this conversation he affirmed that there was a general belief 
 among the Hindustani Sipahis that the destruction of their caste and 
 religion ha,d been finally resolved on by the English. “ So strong was 
 this belief” he said, “that when I talked with the relations and friends of 
 Sipahis, and endeavoured to combat their views, I ended in almost 
 believing that they were right. Then, again, when I talk to you and hear 
 what you say, I see how foolish such ideas were.” He added that the 
 English officers little knew how strong this impression had become in the 
 native army ; that more than five years ago the belief had existed, and 
 had nearly brought on an emeute ; that the caravansarais for travellers and 
 the supply depots (sarais and bardashtkhanas) erected by Government on 
 the Grand Trunk Road were said to be devised with the object of de- 
 stroying castes, and that before long impure kiuds of food would be 
 prepared in them which the people would be forced to buy and eat. 
 
 12. Such was the prevalent belief in the native army before the 
 outbreak. The first excitement, according to the Chief Commissioner’s 
 belief, the first feeling of disaffection, arose among the high caste Hindus, 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 355 
 
 Brahmans, and Kajputs of both the infantry and the cavalry; this 
 disaffection then spread to the Muhammadans of the same regiments. With 
 them also the feeling was at first a desire to resist the infringement of 
 their caste and religion. Then, when they saw that the mutiny, which 
 had now settled deep in the minds and hearts of the Hindu, might be 
 expanded into a political movement calculated to subserve Musalman 
 interests, they sedulously fanned the flame. But, while thus the Hindus 
 and Muhammadans of the line had united to mutiny, the Chief Com- 
 missioner’s imjiression is, that in the first instance the Hindustani 
 Irregular Cavaliy did not join in the combination. While the regular 
 army chiefly came from Oudh and the districts surrounding it, the 
 irregular troopers were drawn from the districts within a circle of a 
 hundred miles round Dehli. They had, therefore, no personal connexion 
 with the line; and, except the mutual bond of religion, they had little or 
 nothing in common even with the Muhammadans of the regular cavalry. 
 In the many native letters which he examined at the outset of the 
 disturbances the Chief Commissioner found nothing to implicate the 
 irregulars, though the misconduct of the 10th Irregular Regiment at 
 Naushahrd is a grave exception to what has been said above in regard to 
 this branch of the service. But, of course, when Dehli had been seized by 
 the mutineers, and when rebellion spread to the very districts whence 
 the irregulars came, then very many of them also joined the movement. 
 From that time the Muhammadan soldiers and the Muhammadan popidation 
 became more actively hostile than the Hindus. This, indeed, it is easy 
 to understand, fanaticism and ferocity being especially inculcated by the 
 tenets of their religion. 
 
 13. But although stories against the British were fabricated and circu- 
 lated by persons with ulterior designs; although individual intrigues were 
 rife within and without the army ; though the Muhammadans very 
 frequently breathed a spirit of fanatic ferocity against the British, yet ail 
 their influences could not could not have drawn our native army from its 
 allegiance, if it had not been already penetrated by that unfortunate belief 
 about the cartridges. Nor would such an ill-feeling have so speedily 
 arisen, nor would it have produced such a desperate disaffection, if the 
 army had not been in an unsound and unsatisfactory state for some years 
 past. That this state of things actually existed can now be ascertained 
 from the natives themselves. At the time it would have been extremely 
 difficult to discover as much from them, owing to their extraordinary 
 reticence on matters which they fear to reveal. It is only by attentive 
 observation, by study of their character and their conduct, and by the 
 collating of their casual remarks, that their real opinions and feelings on 
 such subjects can be discerned. It were needless to allude to the several 
 causes which brought about this condition. There is, however, one 
 essential and original cause which cannot be too prominently mentioned, 
 nor too attentively considered. This cause was, that the Sipahis were 
 imbued with a sense of their own strength and of our weakness; and that 
 our system consequently placed in their way temptations which en- 
 
356 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 couraged them to revolt. They were, as they themselves said in their 
 ovTi phrase, the right arm, the hands and feet of the British Government. 
 Their strength consisted in their great numbers; in their unexampled 
 power of combination from their being one vast brotherhood, with 
 common fatherland, language, religion, caste, and associations ; and their 
 possession of most of our magazines, many of our forts, and aU our 
 treasuries, while our weakness consisted in the paucity of European troops. 
 Moreover, while the native regiments were kept up to their full strength, 
 while our already overgrown native army was being gradually increased, it 
 so happened that we had not been so weak for many years past in 
 European troops as we were in 1857. Some regiments had been sub- 
 tracted from our complement during the Eussian war; two regiments 
 were in Persia. Those regiments we had were numerically weak ; some 
 corps had not received any fresh draughts for two years. These and all the 
 other weak points of our system were patent to a native army, having 
 many intelligent men in its ranks, employed promiscuously from Calcutta 
 to Peshawar, and consequently well acquainted with our military arrange- 
 ments. In short, it was a sense of overwhelming power acting upon men 
 exasperated by a fancied wrong that led the Bengal army to mutiny. In 
 the face of this grand motive cause for the mutiny existing in the army, 
 why need we look abroad for foreign causes ? 
 
 14. The real causes of the outbreak having been discussed, I am now to 
 advert to certain circumstances which are sometimes said to be causes, 
 but which in the Chief Commissioner’s judgment were probably not so. 
 
 15. In the first place, with reference to conspiracies, which have been 
 so frequently adduced as proximate causes of the outbreak, I am to state 
 that, in the Chief Commissioner’s belief, there was not any conspiracy in 
 the army irrespective of the cartridge affair, and no really organised 
 conspiracy even in respect to that. The Sipahis had corresponded in order 
 to unite in refusing the cartridges ; they had probably engaged to stand 
 by one another in resistance to the supposed oppression ; and being a 
 fraternity with hopes, fears, prejudices, feelings, all in common, they all 
 felt that such an engagement would be acted up to by the whole body. 
 No doubt the course of affairs at Mirath precipitated the outbreak, and 
 it is vain to speculate as to what could have been designed if that 
 outbreak had been postponed. But it seems certain that no regular rising 
 had up to that time been planned. A mass of Sipahi correspondence has 
 been inspected, the common talk of the mutineers in Dehli has been 
 reported, the records of the palace have been ransacked, and yet no trace 
 of any such detailed plan has been found. To show how little the 
 course to be followed had been pre-arranged at the time of the Mirath 
 outbreak, one or two significant circumstances may be cited. The well- 
 known moonshee, Mohan Lai, who was at Dehli, stated that some men of 
 the 3rd Light Cavalry told him that when the regiment broke out at 
 Mirath they had scarcely left the cantonments when they held a council 
 of war as to what should be done next. The general voice at first was for 
 taking refuge in Eohilkhand, but one of the men pointed out that Dehli 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 357 
 
 was tlie proper place to make for. There, he said, were the magazine and 
 the treasury ; there the strong fortifications ; there a large city population ; 
 there the king for a fitting instrument ; and there, above all, an important 
 point without European troops. This account of what took place on that 
 occasion was corroborated by minute and extensive inquiries made by 
 Brigadier-General Chamberlain after the fall of Dehli. Again, it is ascer- 
 tained from Mr. Ford, Magistrate of Gurgaon, that a large party of the 
 3rd Cavalry troopers actually fled through Dehli onward to the Gurgaon 
 district on the very next day after the outbreak, and that 10 men of this 
 party and 20 of the horses were seized by the magistrate. At the same 
 time there is no doubt that the troops at Dehli were prepared for the 
 occurrence of an outbreak at Mirath, and were fully resolved to stand by 
 their comrades. 
 
 16. It was when the native army at large saw the immense success of 
 the Mirath and Dehli mutineers, and the disasters of the British in the 
 first instance, that they resolved to convert what had been a combination 
 against supposed oppression into a struggle for empire and for a general 
 military domination. The Sipahis had the command of all the public 
 treasuries ; no attempt was made to secure the treasure at out-stations ; 
 the temptation to plunder was too great for the virtue even of our best 
 disposed regiments ; each corps acquired great wealth as it mutinied ; as 
 regiment after regiment fell away the power of resistance on the part of 
 the Government lessened ; in short, so manifold were the inducements, so 
 certain the spread of infection, so powerful the efi'ect of example, that no 
 man acquainted with India could fail to see that such a mutiny and 
 rebellion, unless trampled out at once, unless quenched in the blood of the 
 soldiers who first revolted, must extend everywhere like wild-fire. 
 
 17. Next I am to state that Sir John Lawrence does not believe that 
 there was any previous conspiracy, Muhammadan or other, extending first 
 through the influential classes in the country, and then to the native army. 
 If there were such a thing, how comes it that no trace has been discovered 
 in this part of India, the very quarter where any such conspiracy must 
 have been hatched ? How can it reasonably be explained, why none of 
 those who have adhered to our cause were acquainted with such a con- 
 spiracy? The number of those who were with us in Hindustan may 
 have been small, as compared with the number of those who were against 
 us ; but still the number of our adherents was considerable. Of these, 
 many remained true to us under all trials ; others again died fighting on 
 our side, yet not one of these has ever been able to speak of any general 
 conspiracy previous to the outbreak. Again, none of the mutineers and 
 rebels who paid for their guilt the forfeit of their lives ever confessed in 
 their last moments a knowledge of any such conspiracy, though they 
 knew that any revelations on this subject would have saved them from 
 death. Again, many papers of various kinds have come to hand, revealing 
 important secrets, implicating many persons, jeopardising many lives, yet 
 in all these there has been no allusion to such a conspiracy. In all his 
 inquiries the Chief Commissioner has never heard a word from a native 
 
358 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 mouth, nor seen anything in any native document, that could convey even 
 the impression that any general plot had existed. 
 
 18. Furthermore, the Chief Commissioner considers that the conduct of 
 the people generally negatives the supposition of a general conspiracy. If 
 the people had conspir^ with the army, why was not the first outbreak 
 immediately followed by a general insurrection ? If there was concert and 
 premeditation, then, why did not the population obey the first signals of 
 revolt, such remarkable and encouraging signals as they were ? Why did 
 not all Hindustan rebel directly that Dehli had fallen to the mutineers, 
 when the English there had been massacred, when the troops had raised 
 the bad characters of the city, and with their aid had seized the treasure, 
 magazines, and fortifications ; when the king’s sons, courtiers, and re- 
 tainers had joined, and when the king himself had consented to head the 
 movement ? Why had not the population everywhere taken advantage 
 immediately of our weakness ? Our power in a large portion of Hindostan was 
 temporarily paralysed. Our means were small ; and those means we had 
 were so placed as not to be capable of being at once brought to bear 
 against the insurgents. And the Mirath force did nothing. The fact is, 
 that at first our enemies were not prepared to profit by such unforeseen and 
 tremendous events. It was not tiU afterwards that the Muhammadans of 
 Hindustan perceived that the re-establishment of the throne of Dehli, 
 the gradual rising of the Muhammadan population, and the losses of the 
 British at so many stations, presented an opportunity when they might 
 again strike for empire with some prospect of success. The fact that 
 afterwards in many districts the people threw off or ignored our authority, 
 and that many indiividuals, and some classes openly rose against us, will 
 by no means prove a preconcerted conspiracy, but, on the contrary, will 
 admit of much explanation. In no case did popular tumult prec^e the 
 military outbreak ; but, invariably where it occurred at all, it ensued upon 
 a mutiny, like cause following effect. The population generally were 
 passive at first. Then, as it appeared that the British were being swept 
 off the face of the land, every village began to follow its own course. In 
 most districts there was, of course, more or less misconduct. But through 
 the whole time the people, even in the worst districts, never embarrassed 
 us half as much as they would have done had they been rebels at heart. 
 Large masses of people were coerced by the mutineers into insurrection, if 
 insurrection it could be called ; where, again, the mutineers were beaten 
 and expelled, the country rapidly settled down to peace and order. 
 Wherever our officers were able to hold their own, the people remained 
 wholly or partially tranquil; when British rule ceased, utter disorder 
 necessarily followed. And certainly the common belief in Hindustan was 
 that the British dominion had been extinguished. F iirthermore, it is to 
 be remembered that in India, as indeed in almost every other country, 
 there exists a discontented class ready for any change, in the hope of its 
 improving their condition. Moreover, in India especially, there are tribes 
 by nature predatory, who before our rule subsisted on plunder and rapine. 
 These were subdued more than half a century ago by our arms and our 
 
APPENDIX 0. 
 
 359 
 
 policy. But tlie characteristics of those people survive in their descendants. 
 The existing generation cling to the predatory traditions of their fore- 
 fathers. They long for a return of the days of misrule — the good old 
 times, when those might take who had the power, and those might keep 
 who could. Most of them had indeed never seen a shot fired, and, living 
 under the shadow of a strong Government, had become imwarlike. But, 
 when our power became eclipsed and our prestige dimmed, the old instinct, 
 the innate love of plunder revived, and the strong began to prey upon the 
 weak. Then, again, a considerable section of the people, and especially 
 the Muhammadans, are fanatical. This fanaticism, loosed from the bands of 
 half a century, became a powerful engine against us. Whatever may be 
 the intrinsic merits of our rule, the people of India can never forget that 
 we are an alien race, in respect of colour, religion, habits, sympathies ; 
 while we, on the other hand, practically forgetting this, and wrapping 
 ourselves up in our pride, self-reliance, and feeling of superiority, neglect 
 the most ordinary precautions for our own security, and throw off even 
 the slightest restraints on our freedom of action, though our very safety 
 may depend upon such precautions. 
 
 19. The preceding observations convey, in the Chief Commissioner’s 
 judgment, a fair idea of the condition of the people after the outbreak in 
 the Dehli territory, the Duab, of the Ganges and the Jamnah, and 
 Kohilkhand. In Oudh, however, the case was different ; there the popu- 
 lation had been long inured to danger and warfare ; their martial pride had 
 been fostered by constant success in resistance to their own rulers, and by 
 the vast numbers employed in foreign military service under the British. 
 They had always lived free from civil restraint, and they had never felt 
 the weight of our military power. After the province was annexed, we 
 had not at all a strong military position. We were virtually attempting 
 to hold the province by troops drawn from itself ; we had but one 
 European regiment, and some European artillery, while we had upwards 
 of 11,000 indigenous troops, and while we had no European troops ready 
 at hand in adjacent provinces. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we did, 
 while acting with the best intentions, carry out some measures which had 
 the effect of irritating various influential classes. As a counterpoise to 
 such disaffection, we might have produced contentment and loyalty among 
 other classes ; but our tenure of dominion had been too short to effect this 
 when the outbreak burst upon us. When the influential classes, whom 
 our policy had provoked, found that the native army were ripe for revolt, 
 the}^ added fuel to a rising Are ; and, when the crisis arrived, mutiny was 
 immediately followed by insurrection. Had we been able at once to march 
 European or other reliable troops into Oudh in sufficient numbers, we might 
 even then have beaten down opposition. But this we could not do ; and 
 many months passed away. During that interval our enemies consolidated 
 their power, and even those most friendly to our rule were, from sheer 
 necessity, driven to swell the ranks of our opponents. 
 
 20. It may be that the Supreme Government have received information 
 from othei’ parts of India; but the foregoing conclusions regarding the 
 
360 
 
 APPENDIX 0. 
 
 absence of any conspiracy, and the general conduct of the people, are 
 based upon Sir John Lawrence’s knowledge and experience of the 
 countries from the Jamnah to the borders of Afghanistan, a tract of full 
 100,000 square miles, with a population of 30,000,000, and comprising the 
 very centre and focus of rebellion; the place of all others where such a 
 conspiracy, if it had existed at all, would have beeu most likely to be 
 discovered. 
 
 21. It will be seen that in the Deputy Judge Advocate General’s 
 summing up at the trial much stress is laid on the overtures made by the 
 king to the Shah of Persia ; but, as already remarked, nothing was elicited 
 at the trial to show that these referred to a revolt either of the Bengal 
 army or the people of Hindustan. The physician Ahsan Ullah declares, 
 that these communications were indeed treasonable; that the king was 
 dissatisfied chiefiy because he was not allowed to set aside his eldest 
 son in the succession to the title ; and that he had an idea of obtaining 
 help from Persia and from Oudh, to which latter Court also he des- 
 patched an emissary ; but the physician adds, that although the subversion 
 of the British Government was mentioned in these despatches, yet a revolt 
 of the Sipahi army was never referred to as a means of accomplishing this. 
 During the Persian war there is reason to know that intrigues were carried 
 on between the Courts of Persia and Dehli ; but it were hardly reasonable 
 to suppose that if the Shah had really intended to give the King of Dehli 
 any aid, or had even believed that a violent attempt would be made to 
 subvert the British power in India, he would have made peace with us just 
 at the critical time of our fortunes, thereby releasing, for the succour of 
 India, the troops which would otherwise be locked up in Persia. Again, 
 if the Shah had really been cognisant of such an attempt, would he not 
 have sent his emissaries to Peshawar and into the Panjab ? Had he done 
 this, some signs of intrigue would have certainly been perceptible, but 
 none whatever were discovered ; in fact, all that we have learnt regarding 
 the intrigues of the king and his party show that that he did not look to 
 any conspiracy or combination in India itself, but rather to foreign aid 
 from beyond the frontier, from Persia or from Kussia. Indeed, the notions 
 developed are generally so absurd as to show that these intrigues were 
 destitute of any reasonable plan, and were conceived by persons in a great 
 measure ignorant of the subject. 
 
 22. The Chief Commissioner’s opinions and conclusions on this im- 
 portant subject have now been stated without reserve. The terrible 
 experience of Hindustan during 1857 must ever be applicable to all other 
 provinces of the empire; it should command attention in the Panjab 
 especially. The Chief Commissioner has every reason to speak well of the 
 Panjabi troops, and indeed it would be difficult to praise too highly their 
 services during the present war ; they have resisted sore temptations, and 
 undergone severe trials. Nevertheless, there was a time when it seemed 
 doubtful what course they would ultimately adopt ; and the Chief Com- 
 missioner fully believes that, had we failed to take Dehli last autumn, 
 even their fidelity would not have remained proof against the bad example 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 361 
 
 around them. At that juncture the Chief Commissioner himself could not 
 avoid apprehending the day when, besides the British soldiers, there would 
 he no man on our side. That such a day did not arrive is due only, in the 
 Chief Commissioner’s eyes, to the infinite mercy of the Almighty. The 
 misfortunes and calamities which we experienced in Afghanistan in 1842 
 were renewed and surpassed in Hindustan during 1857. The issue has 
 been less disastrous, because in the last instance the country was less 
 strong, the people less formidable, and our resources less distant ; but, 
 above all, because the Almighty Disposer of Events, though apparently 
 determined to humble, had not resolved to destroy us. Many thoughtful 
 and experienced men now in India believe that we have been extricated 
 from destruction only by a series of miracles. It is no exaggeration to 
 affirm, that in many instances the mutineers acted as if a curse rested on 
 their cause. Had a siugle leader of ability risen amongst them, nay, had 
 they followed any other course but the infatuated course which they 
 actually did pursue in many instances, we must have been lost beyond 
 redemption ; but such a destruction was not decreed ; it was a struggle 
 between Christianity and civilisation on the one side and barbarism and 
 heathenism on the other. That we escaped from destruction, and even 
 obtained success, can be accounted for in no other way than by attributing 
 it all to the operation of the Divine Will. And now, having been preserved 
 by Providence thus far victorious, it urgently behoves us to strive to gain 
 a right understanding of the real circumstances which brought on this 
 crisis. If we can but acquire this, then there is hope that we may profit 
 by a knowledge of the past, and in future avoid those errors which had 
 well-nigh led to our ruin. 
 
 23. In conclusion, I am to submit the Chief Commissioner’s recom- 
 mendation in regard to the future disposal of the prisoner Muhammad 
 Bahadar Shah, ex-King of Dehli. The Chief Commissioner suggests, then, 
 that the said prisoner be transported beyond the seas as a felon, and be 
 kept in some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from 
 all other Muhammadans. As regards the prisoner’s wife, Zinat-Mahal, 
 and his son, Jawan Bakht, no charges having been exhibited against them, 
 and the latter being only 17 years of age, but they both having been 
 present at Dehli, the Chief Commissioner suggests that they be allowed the 
 option of accompanying the prisoner to his place of transportation ; and 
 that, in the event of their declining to do so, they be confined as State 
 prisoners somewhere in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency. 
 
 24. While forwarding these proceedings, I am to state that the Chief 
 Commissioner commends to the favourable consideration of the Supreme 
 Government the able exertions of Major J. F. Harriott, of 3rd Light 
 Cavalry, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, in conducting this pro- 
 tracted trial. The Chief Commissioner also desires to bring to notice the 
 valuable services of Mr. James Murphy, Collector of Customs, who acted 
 as interpreter to the Court. This gentleman, unaided by any munshi, 
 translated all the numerous and difficult documents adduced at the trial ; 
 he also read the originals before the Court, and conducted the examination 
 
 VOL. V. 2 b 
 
362 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 of the native witnesses. The translations are believed to be exceedingly 
 faithful ; and the circumstance that he was able to dispense with native 
 assistance in the work ensured secrecy and other advantages, and evinced 
 his eminent attainments as an Urdu and Persian scholar. The Chief 
 Commissioner, I am to add, contemplates shortly proposing some reward in 
 behalf of this meritorious officer. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 (signed) R. Temple. 
 
 (True copy.) 
 
 (signed) J. W. Kaye, 
 
 Secretary in the Political and Secret Departments. 
 
 LONDON : FEINTED BY T. BRETTELL AND CO., RUPEET STREET, W. 
 

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