/V i \ \ G YMNASIUM SIVE SYMBOLA CRITICA. INTENDED TO ASSIST THE CLASSICAL STUDENT IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO ATTAIN A CORRECT LATIN PROSE STYLE. By the REV. ALEXANDER CROMBIE, LL.D., F.R.S., and M.R.S.L. _BOSTON COLLEGE Li CHESTNUT HILL, MASS. y Audieram etiam quas de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, in quae praecipitur pri¬ mum, ut pure et Latine loquamur; deinde, ut plane et dilucide, tum, ut ornate; post, ad rerum dignitatem apte, et quasi decore; singularumque rerum praecepta cognoveram.” Cic. IN TWO VOLUMES. THE FIFTH EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED. VOL. I. LONDON: PRINTED FOR R. HUNTER, N° 72, ST. PAUL’S CHURCH-YARD. 1834. BOSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY CHESTNUT HILL, MASS, PA IV\ ,c 131315 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. It will not be questioned by those, who are conversant in the study of philology, that the most successful means of acquiring a correct and critical acquaintance with a dead language, is to employ it, either in composition or trans¬ lation, under the direction of a skilful master. Nor will it be doubted, that a capacity to express our own, or the sentiments of others, in a foreign tongue, with ac¬ curacy and elegance, is the most unequivocal proof of a perfect acquaintance with its grammar, its idiom, and its purest phraseology. A knowledge of the vocabulary, com¬ bined with a slender proficiency in the etymology and syn¬ tax, aided by a tolerably acute judgment, will enable a person to translate a foreign language into his own, with considerable correctness. Where a critical knowledge of the principles fails him, the context will frequently direct him to the meaning of the author ; and, what the scientific translator executes by his critical skill, the other frequently is able to accomplish by the aid of sagacity, and an ac¬ quaintance with the subject. But the converse operation is a more arduous task. In translating into a foreign Ian- VI guage, or employing it as the vehicle of our own thoughts, neither intuitive sagacity of intellect, nor the most intimate acquaintance with the subject will avail, without a perfect knowledge of the grammar, the idiom, and the elegancies of the language. Hence we find many capable of translating a Greek or a Roman classic, with considerable facility and correctness, into their vernacular tongue, who are con¬ fessedly unable to render, with tolerable accuracy, a few sentences of their own language into Greek or Latin. To -clothe Cicero or Virgil in an English dress is an office, to which many may be fully competent; but to render a correct translation of these into Virgilian hexameter, or Ciceronian prose, would surpass the powers of the most accomplished classical scholar. To facilitate the attainment of a correct Latin prose style, as far as it is acquirable by us moderns, is the prin¬ cipal aim of the following pages. How mortifying soever it may be to our national pride, the charge alleged against us by some foreign critics, that the Latin prose, which has lately issued from the British press, is, with a few exceptions, glaringly disfigured with poetical idioms, pal¬ pable inaccuracies, and solecistic phraseology, is unques¬ tionably an imputation, which, without the blindest par- L „ • , 4 * * tiality to ourselves, cannot be pronounced to be entirely groundless. Whether this impurity of diction be ascrib- able to a premature initiation into the practice of versifica¬ tion, or to an excessive attention devoted to this exercise, while Latin prose is comparatively neglected, the author vi i does not presume to determine.—Thus much is certain, that there is a freedom of diction permitted to the poet, which is denied to the prose writer ; and that, when this licence has been early and habitually indulged, it requires more than common vigilance in the translator, to prevent its insinuation into a species of style, from which it ought to be most carefully excluded* The poet, it is to be ob¬ served, adopts a vocabulary, which, either in respect to the words themselves, or the sense in which he employs them, may be justly regarded as peculiarly his own. His diction possesses more of elevation and magnificence, than is suited to the grave and simple style of the philosopher, or the historian; and, when he condescends to employ, or is by necessity compelled to use, the humbler vocabulary of prose, he invests his words with a figurative meaning.— His language is the expression of ardent feeling, vehement passion, or fervid imagination. The cause he denotes by its effect, the genus by the species, the whole by a part, and conversely; substituting also one symbol of thought, or perception, for the sign of another, if the subjects are related by resemblance, or contrariety. Fettered also by the metrical laws of his art, he assumes a licence to deviate from certain syntactical rules, to which the prose writer is strictly confined. Such are the idiomatic licences of the poet; and, when the scholar has been early and much habituated to these, it is not to be wondered, if he transfer them into a species of composition, in which they can be regarded in no other Vlll light, than as palpable incongruities, or meretricious em¬ bellishments. In this way, perhaps, we may account for that grotesque commixture of poetic and prosaic idioms, which disfigures the diction of many of our modern writers of Latin prose. By these observations, however, the author would not be understood to signify, that the study of prosody, or the practice of versification, is either useless, or unnecessary. Though, in estimating the merit of prosodical science, either by the talents necessary to acquire it, or by its ten¬ dency to improve the intellectual powers, or by its general comparative utility, the mere prosodian may, perhaps, be regarded as occupying a subordinate rank in the literary scale, yet surely no person can be entitled to the appella¬ tion of “ classic scholar/’ who has neglected the study of this science. To the skill of the prosodian we are indebted for many valuable emendations of the ancient poets; and he who reads Horace without a correct acquaintance with his metres, tastes but imperfectly the beauties of the poet. And, though a knowledge of quantity , and the rules of prosody in general, may doubtless be acquired by other means, than the practice of versification, it must be ad¬ mitted that this exercise is not devoid of utility, having a direct tendency to invigorate the imagination, and to improve the taste. But still, if we consider, that the principal advantages, resulting from this practice, are attainable by other means, and if we reflect, how few there are, who are by nature qualified to become poets, and how rarely IX occasion presents itself for exhibiting a skill in the com¬ position of Latin or Greek poetry, we cannot help re¬ garding the art of versification, in its most classic style, as comparatively of secondary importance. Though La¬ tin prose has now ceased to be the general medium of communication in the literary world, to write it with cor¬ rectness is surely an accomplishment, which every classical scholar should be ambitious to attain. In translating a Greek author, and in critical annotations on a Roman classic, Latin prose is almost universally employed. And nothing, it is conceived, can be less consistent with pro¬ priety, or less creditable to the writer, in a work profess¬ edly critical on some ancient classic, or in a translation of some Greek author, than for the critic, or the transla¬ tor, to betray, in every page, an ignorance of that lan¬ guage, in which he undertakes to exhibit his own senti¬ ments, or to express the meaning of his original. Yet this is no uncommon fact. To produce examples would be invidious. The object of the author is not to offend, but to admonish. In the execution of this work, the author has endea¬ voured to accommodate his observations, as far as possible, to the capacity of the junior scholar, for whom chiefly this work is intended. In his selection of exercises, he has exemplified the several species of style, the colloquial, the epistolary, the historical, and the oratorical.—He thinks it necessary, at the same time, to observe, that, though the exercises are chiefly extracted from the Latin classics, X they are not to be regarded as mere translations. He has abridged the original, wherever it was necessary, in order to adapt the length of the exercise to the capacity of the scholar; and he has, on the contrary, occasionally intro¬ duced passages, which might serve to illustrate the critical observations. If, in the syntactical remarks, a few repeti¬ tions occur, he trusts the attentive and judicious reader will perceive, that they are found chiefly in those cases, in which, as the experienced teacher well knows, the young pupil is most prone to err. In the explanation of synonymes, two different modes present themselves to our choice. The one is to exhibit the primary idea annexed to the word, and then to evolve the accessory conceptions, with which it is associated. This very often necessarily requires a detailed explanation. The other is to display, and to contrast with each other, the two principal subordinate conceptions. Each of these two modes possesses peculiar advantages. The latter recom¬ mends itself by an epigrammatic conciseness, which seizes the attention, and assists the memory. But it is liable to this great objection, that, when the term involves more than one accessory idea, this mode of distinguishing is necessarily defective; for it is an error to imagine, that, in all cases, there is only one subordinate conception attached to a word. Were this the fact, it cannot be questioned, that the epigrammatic mode of distinction, if it may be so denominated, would be far the preferable one, and would be in all cases perfectly comprehensive. But, when along XI with the primary conception, the word includes several secondary ideas, it is evident, that the complete evolution of these is to be effected only by specific explanation.—Each of these modes the author has adopted, as the case required. And, if he has occasionally differed from some learned phi¬ lologists and critics in this, as well as in other parts of his work, he hopes the candid reader will not ascribe it to the arrogance of presumption, or to an overweening confidence of the author in his own judgment. Where there is so much scope for diversity of opinion, and so great room for miscon¬ ception, concurrence among critics is not to be expected, and error may reasonably claim forgiveness. Greenwich, 12 June, 1821. PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. The present edition is offered to the attention of the classical student, considerably enlarged, and it is hoped, in the same degree improved. Several of the easier Exercises have been omitted, and others, which have been translated from the originals with more freedom, and on subjects more difficult, have been substituted in their room. A work, intended to exhibit a correct theory of the subjunctive mood, to solve the difficulties, with which the subject has been surrounded, and “ to embody under one all the rules, given in the c Gymnasium’ for the government of qui ,” has recently been published by the Rev. R. Bathurst Greenlaw. This work, the author of the Gymnasium perused with attention ; he trusts, also, with candour, and a mind open to conviction. This he felt to be his duty; and, as it is always desirable, that learning and industry should be rewarded by the discovery of truth, it would be gratifying to him, if he could add, that Mr. Green¬ law’s attempt has been accompanied with success. Such, XIV however, he must frankly declare, is not his opinion. To have dismissed the work with a disapprobation of the theory as false, and of the rule, as not only vague, but also sometimes difficult, and often doubtful, in its appli¬ cation, without specifying some at least of the reasons, on which this judgment is founded, would have been unjust to its author, and unsatisfactory to the reader. On the other hand, to have entered into a minute exa¬ mination of Mr. Greenlaw’s doctrine, and the numerous examples which he has adduced in its support, would have extended this work beyond all reasonable limits. He has therefore adopted a middle course; and has selected a few of those objections, which oppose the theory of Mr. Green¬ law, and which appear to the author of the Gymnasium to be insuperable and conclusive. Of the validity, however, of these objections the learned reader will judge for himself. Thus much is certain, that, if a theory, which professes to un¬ fold and establish a universal principle, be found irreconcileable with numerous and incontestable facts, the theory, if not wholly false, can be only partially true. And it then becomes a question, whether the theory is to be received, as even the true explanation of those facts, with which it is consistent, —or whether their mutual concordance be not purely acci¬ dental, and another principle be not still required, which . * will serve satisfactorily to explain the whole. GYMNASIUM SIVE SYMBOLA CRITICA. •; • PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. Language is the medium, by which we communicate our thoughts, one to another ; its chief excellence, therefore, is perspicuity. If our words are obscure, the impression on the hearer must be indistinct; if they are ambiguous, they are liable to misconception; if they are unintelligible, we speak to no purpose. Elegance, vivacity, animation *, harmony, and strength, are, therefore, in comparison with perspicuity, subor¬ dinate excellencies.—These qualities, however, though confessedly of inferior importance, are not to be dis¬ regarded as destitute of value. They please the imagination, they gratify the taste, and by exhibiting the object in a more attractive and striking light, they render it more impressive, and thus heighten the effect.—Regarded, therefore, as beauties, they con¬ tribute to our pleasure, and demand a portion of our praise; and as subservient, though not essential, to the great purpose of speech, they possess a still higher claim to our approbation. * Vivacity and animation are not identical qualities: by the former, resemblance is attained; by the latter, life, feeling, and energy are communicated. VOL. I. B * 9 1! The several excellencies of style., whether princi¬ pal or subordinate, result from a combination of the three following requisites.—1st. A judicious selection of words. 2dly. A natural and lucid arrangement. Sdly. An observance of those grammatical relations among the words themselves, which reputable and general usage may have established. Of the common syntactical rules, it is presumed, the reader has al¬ ready acquired a competent knowledge. To assist him in the selection of words, and the arrangement of them in clauses and sentences, the following pre¬ liminary observations may be useful. CHAPTER I. ON THE CHOICE OF WORDS. In the first place; in choosing words, it is above all things indispensably necessary, that barbarisms be avoided; for these are especially hostile to perspicuity. A barbarism consists in the use of a word, w r hich has become antiquated, or which, by reason of its novelty, or confined circulation, is not generally in¬ telligible. When the accident, or inflexion, not the word itself, is either obsolete or novel, it may be re¬ garded as an offence against etymology ; as Tumid- tuis for Tumultus , Duint for Dent , Amasso for Ama¬ vero, Amassere for Amaturum esse , Jugos for Juga. • • • UK Or it may offend against lexicography, either when the word itself is obsolete, as Bitere for Ire; or when the term is novel, and not yet sanctioned by general usage, as was the noun Monopolium , in the time of Nero. When the term or the inflexion is obsolete, the error is a species of Archaismus ; when the word, or its accident, is novel, it is denominated. Neoterismus . To distinguish a barbarism in English, or in any living language, we have only to appeal to present and general usage, referring both to oral and written authority. If the word in question, by reason of long disuse, or very recent introduction, be generally un¬ intelligible, it may be warrantably pronounced a bar¬ barism. And if a rule for governing our decisions on such questions were necessary, that which has been proposed by a learned and ingenious critic # , may be safely adopted as correct. In his judgment, every word, which has been disused for a period, equal to the life of man, should be deemed a barbarism; it being fairly presumable, that the word then ceases to be generally understood. For the same reason, a novel, or newly invented word, whose use is yet con¬ fined to a small portion of the people, must be pro¬ nounced a barbarism. Of the former species, the words Acception, Addulce, Bursten ; and of the lat¬ ter Fabric able, Miser ism, Petitory —may, in Eng¬ lish, serve as examples. Whether the first three may * See Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric.” B 2 IV not be revived, or the last three be yet admitted into general use, we have no means of determining. Their admission, or exclusion, depends on circumstances which we cannot anticipate, and over which we pos¬ sess little, or no controul. Fashion, which usurps no common influence even over our opinions and modes of thinking, exercises a sovereign authority over all matters respecting language. By her decree, words once in general estimation sink into disrepute, and are consigned to oblivion ; while others start into existence, and under her patronage being introduced into general notice, establish a claim to be admitted as kindred of the common stock. “ Multa renascentur, quee jam cecidere, cadentque Quse nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus, Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi/’ Hor. De Art. Poet. In a dead language, the case is considerably dif¬ ferent. Here the value of the words is fixed, and their character unalterable. Here also we have no oral usage, to which we can appeal.—Scriptory lan¬ guage is the sole authority, to which we have access. Now, it will not be denied, that the practice of good speakers constitutes in every language a respectable tribunal, to which we may refer; nor will it be dis¬ puted, that many orations were delivered in the Ro¬ man senate, which, had they fortunately been trans¬ mitted to us, would have been received as productions of high classical authority, and admitted as evidence V of classical diction. And, though it would be folly to maintain, that scriptory language furnishes no criterion whatever, by which to decide, what was, or was not, sanctioned by colloquial authority, it .would argue * A equal fatuity to affirm, that, from the rare occurrence of any word in written language, we may, in all cases, legitimately infer its infrequent use in reputable collo¬ quial practice. These circumstances, peculiar to a dead language, namely, immutability in respect to the character of its words, and the absence of that authority, which is derived from oral usage, constitute, therefore, an important difference between it and a living language. Hence a difficulty arises in determining in the former, with strict precision, the character of a bar¬ barism, and in drawing a line, which shall correctly separate between barbarous and classic usage. Is every word, for example, to be pronounced a barbarism, which was not used by Cicero ? This, though the opinion of some critics, would circumscribe the province of classi¬ cal authority within much too narrow limits. To ex¬ clude Caesar, Livy, Nepos, and Sallust, with several other writers of the Augustan age, would argue a spe¬ cies of hypercritical fastidiosity, for which it would be difficult to imagine even a plausible argument. Should it be objected, that in each of these authors are found words confessedly barbarous, or at least unsanctioned by the other classics of the Augustan age, it may be answered, that, if this objection were admitted, we VI apprehend, that Cicero himself must resign his au¬ thority. Is every word then, it may be asked, which is not sanctioned by the most reputable prose writers of the Augustan age, to be deemed a barbarism ? To this query we are inclined to answer likewise in the nega¬ tive. Though Cicero, with the authors now men¬ tioned, must ever be esteemed the purest models of Latin style; yet to pronounce every word a barbarism, which was introduced and adopted by eminent writers of the succeeding period, would, in our apprehension, argue no common share of critical temerity and pre¬ sumption. In the age of Quintilian, it is true, the Latin lan¬ guage began to decline; but we have only to peruse the pages of that learned rhetorician (not to mention several of his contemporaries) to be fully satisfied, that the Latin language, in his time, presented no unfaith¬ ful copy of the purity, elegance, and beauty of the Augustan age. It may now be asked. What then is to be ac¬ counted a barbarism, and what is to be deemed re¬ putable authority ? By what criterion, or what standard, is the junior student, who must rely chiefly on his dictionary, to estimate the value of those authorities, to which the lexicographer may refer him ? To these queries, it is hoped, the following observations will furnish answers as precise, as the subject will admit. In questions of this nature, it needs scarcely to be remarked, that strict accuracy, or logical precision, is not attainable. Latin authors are generally distributed under four different periods, named, “ the golden ”, “ the silver ”, < it frequently occurs, that the translator cannot possibly find words himself never intended to invest it. This is a common error; and though it offends not against the rules of mere precision, it materially affects the character of that impression, which the sentiment in the original is calculated to produce. The truth of this observation, it would be easy to illustrate by a variety of ex¬ amples, did our limits permit. I shall only remark, that in no case, perhaps, is the young translator more prone to err in this respect, than by turning the verb into a participle, and an inde¬ pendent into a relative clause. He is informed, as is the fact, that conciseness and elegance are frequently consulted by this mode of constructing a sentence; and hence, without a discri¬ minating judgment to direct his practice, while he aspires to excellence, he is sometimes seduced into the commission of error. It is necessary also, that the translator, as far as the lan¬ guage will admit, should transfuse into his version the spirit of his author. It is a mistake to imagine, that this may be effected by precision in translating. Two versions may be, in every re¬ spect, substantially the same ; in neither may a single concep¬ tion be either omitted, or superadded ; and yet the one shall be consentaneous, and the other repugnant, to the spirit of the original. The manner also of the author must be correctly copied, by whatever character it may be distinguished, whether it be grave or gay, uniform or varied, easy or formal. In short, to constitute the translator, there must be combined with a correct acquaintance with the two languages, an intuitive and correct perception of beauty, dignity, and sublimity; a delicate and well- cultivated taste, joined to a sound and discriminating judgment. Ixxi to express, with strict precision, the sentiments of his original.— L Hence translation is, in some instances, not merely difficult, but absolutely impracticable. To those, who have devoted any considerable portion of time and attention to philological researches, and have been critically conversant in the practice of trans¬ lation, this assertion will not require either example to illustrate, or argument to evince its truth. For the sake, however, of the junior reader, it may be useful, if we endeavour to explain the causes, which render translation in some instances imperfect, and in others impracticable. In every language there are certain complex terms, to which two ideas are annexed, a primary, and a secondary. Two words therefore may concur, in expressing the same primary conception, while the secondary ideas suggested by them are materially dif¬ ferent. Taberna # and Officina agree in denoting a shop, or a place where manufactured goods are to be found ; but the latter signifies the place where they are made, the former, that where they are made or sold. Falsehood and Lie agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, a deviation from truth ; but they differ in this; the former denotes a violation of physical, the latter of moral truth. The former, therefore, does not necessarily imply an intention to * Tabernce, by metathesis for trabena was a shed or booth constructed of boards (ex trabe) and denoted any erection, con¬ structed of these materials. Thus we find it sometimes denoting “ a hovel” or “cottage.” See Hor. Car. 1.4. 13. Ixxii deceive; the latter denotes a wilful breach of veracity, and is a term of reproach. Clergyman and Far son denote each a minister of religion : but the secondary ideas are materially different, the former appellation being respectful, the latter rather contemptuous. If we say, “ Caesar was killed in the Senate-house,” we signify merely, that some violence or other deprived him of life. It may have been the stroke of an enemy, or even the blow of a friend ; it may have been de¬ signed, or unintentional; or his death may have been occasioned by some physical accident. The term “ killed” is generical. If we say “ He was butchered,” we express the same primary idea, but along with it, we denote also, that his death was effected by human agency. We signify likewise, that the act was per¬ petrated with some degree of cruelty, and that the body was disfigured with wounds. If we say “ He was murdered,” we express the deprivation of life by violent means, and by human hands ; we signify also the criminality of the action. These examples will suffice to shew, that two or more words may agree, in expressing the same pri¬ mary idea, while the secondary ideas annexed to them are materially different. They will also serve to ex¬ emplify the importance of the accessory idea, as con¬ stituting in some cases an essential part of the senti¬ ment intended. Now, it is the duty of* a translator to express nei¬ ther more nor less, than the strict sense of the original. He is bound to present his reader with a clear and correct transcript of his author. His translation should be a faithful copy not only of his sentiments* but even of his manner. If either expressly, or by implication, he convey to his reader more or less than the sense of the original, he is chargeable, if not with incompetency, or negligence, with what is much less pardonable, deliberate infidelity. I am aware, indeed, that where there is neither ignorance, nor negligence, nor studied misstatement imputable to the translator, prejudices in favour of certain theories and doctrines seduce him, uncon¬ sciously, into a misrepresentation of his author. These are universally hostile to accuracy and truth; nor can their intrusion be too scrupulously watched, or too rigorously opposed. How many errors, ascribable to this cause, have disgraced the page of the translator ? And such is the imperceptible influence of precon¬ ceived opinions, that, while we flatter ourselves that we are superior to prejudice, we at that moment be¬ tray our subjection to its dominion. In evidence of this truth, how often do we find two translators, of unimpeachable fidelity, assigning to the same passage tw r o different interpretations. Nay, in historical trans¬ lation, when mere facts are involved, while the author relates the simple transaction, the translator expresses also his opinion of its character. Carolus primus , Anglice rex , necatus est , would be differently ren¬ dered according to the political sentiments of the translator. It is by employing terms expressive of their own opinions, that historians become parties in lxxiv those very transactions, which they profess to delineate with candour and impartiality; and that translators in like manner pervert the sense of their authors, at¬ tributing to them such sentiments, as accord with their own favourite opinions and theories. But to return to the subject more immediately before us. It has bee ’ observed, that in all languages, are to be found certain complex terms, to which are an¬ nexed two ideas, a primary and a secondary; and it has been shewn, that the latter of these sometimes materially affects the complexion of the sentiment. A secondary idea, therefore, can neither be omitted, nor altered, nor superadded without mutilating, or dis¬ torting, or violating, in some shape or other, the sense of the original*. Now, if there subsisted a * But though it may be truly affirmed, that no idea can be superadded, or cancelled, without impairing the correctness of the translation, it must at the same time be admitted, that there are not any two languages, which so harmoniously accord, that in all cases, terms precisely equivalent shall be found in each. To express, therefore, the full meaning of the original word, might frequently require an enunciation so tedious, tiresome, and languid, that the translator, studious to preserve the spirit of his work,' is often compelled to drop the accessory idea. It is, on the other hand, equally evident, that the word in the ori¬ ginal may be so general, that the translator must either recur to a qualification of the term, an expedient confessedly awkward, and offensive, or express somewhat more than the author in¬ tended. This, however, is the fault of the materials, and not of the artist. In such cases, approximation to the meaning of the original, as far as the capacity of the language, with a due regard to simplicity and spirit, will permit, is all that is attainable. Let it be remembered, however, that these involuntary deviations ' c > Ixxv precise and perfect coincidence between the corre¬ spondent terms of the two languages, in which the translator is conversant, the task of translation from the one into the other, would be comparatively easy. But such perfect equivalence does not exist; nor, if we investigate the principles on which the association of the secondary idea depends, can it be expected to exist. Minutely to explain these principles,' and to illustrate them individually by examples, would occupy more space than our limits will permit.—We must, therefore, confine ourselves to a few general observa¬ tions. The “ primitive idea ”, annexed to any word, is the idea, which originally belonged to it, and it is opposed to that, which is “derived” or “acquired.” The “ primary idea ” is that, which the word chiefly im¬ plies, and is opposed to “ secondary.” The primary conception, though frequently, is not universally, the same with the primitive import of the word, the latter sometimes gradually sinking into a mere secondary conception, and sometimes being entirely repudiated. This dissolution of the original connection between the sign and the thing signified takes place, most fre¬ quently in those cases, in which the word has acquired a figurative meaning. The primitive import of the words Nuptus, Animus , Hostis , and of Curb , Belong , Edify , is now entirely supplanted by the figurative acceptation. In general, however, we find the primi- from the established principles of his art furnish no argument whatever against the principles themselves. lxxvi tive meaning, if it does not continue to constitute the principal import of the term, entering as a component part of the complex idea which it denotes. Thus, in the words Moliri , Crinis , Cernere , and Prevent, Far¬ thing, Cheap, Epistle, the primitive meaning of each, though not the primary idea, implied by it, still con¬ stitutes part of its signification. The secondary idea depends on a variety of circum¬ stances. It is sometimes associated, because the term, in its etymological signification, implies it. Thus, asinus, denotes “ an ass”; onager (ex ovos et aypos) “ a wild ass”; balneum, “ a bath of any kind”; thermce (a Oep/icu,) “warm baths”; anteire, “To go before, at any distance”; prceire (ex prce (7 rapat) et ire,) “ To go immediately before”, implying propinquity; exercitus, “ an army”; or “ men trained for warfare”, exerciti ; agmen from agere, ayeiv, “ a body of men on march”, or “in motion.” Sometimes its associa¬ tion is determined by the moral and physical circum¬ stances, in which the people are placed. An object, which in one country may be regarded with respect, may in another be viewed with contempt; what is here agreeable, may be there offensive—what awakens in one people the emotion of love, may in another ex¬ cite the sentiment of hatred.—And whatever emotion or feeling the object creates, with the same emotion is its name very generally associated. In one lan¬ guage, also, we find a subject named from its form, in another from its matter ; in one from its place, in another from its office; in one from its colour, in lxxvii another from its use; in one from its chief property, or quality, in another from an accidental circumstance belonging to it. All these diversities, more or less* affect the secondary ideas attached to words in differ¬ ent languages, though they express one and the same subject, and denote one and the same primary con¬ ception. It is to be observed also, that the secondary idea is, like the primary, liable to change. Of this it would be easy to produce a variety of examples. The words Parson, Dame, Lawyer, once terms of respect, have, the two first especially, been degraded to the implica¬ tion of something contemptible. Sometimes a fastidi¬ ous delicacy, for the origin of which it is not always easy to account, rejects a term once reputable, annex¬ ing to it an idea of vulgarity, or indecency, not origin¬ ally belonging to it, nor attached to the correspondent term in any other language. Were a modern fastidi¬ ous translator to render the curse pronounced on the serpent. In ventrem ambulabis, it would not be sur¬ prising if he cautiously avoided saying, “ You shall walk on your belly.” The secondary idea is not only liable to change, but in many cases, especially where the etymon, to which it was attached, has become obsolete, or where the affinity between the root and the derivative ceases to be known, is entirely dismissed. The word Clock, for example, no longer suggests the idea 6f clicking, though from this accident belonging to it, this piece of mechanism derived its name. lxxviii It is an opinion, delivered by Mr. Tooke, that “a regard to the individual etymology of a word will conduct us to its intrinsic meaning, and the cause of its application.” We cannot suppose, that by “ in¬ trinsic meaning,” the author intended to signify the primitive , or etymological signification; for his pro¬ position would thus be purely identical, as far at least as that signification is concerned. If by intrin¬ sic meaning , be understood the real, inherent, and inseparable meaning, we apprehend, that his doctrine is founded in error. That the primitive sense of every word is to be learned by investigating its ety¬ mological import, is a self-evident truth; but the pri¬ mitive sense, and its present acceptation, may be so different, as not to bear to each other the most remote resemblance; and a knowledge of merely the ety¬ mological meaning, may be incapable of conducting us to the cause of its real and current signification. K wfUKos and paganus may be considered as originally synonymous; yet no ideas can be more different than those suggested by comic and pagan . Nor should we have been able either to deduce the meaning of the word pagan from that of its etymon, or to explain the cause of its signification, had we not been inform¬ ed, that when Christianity became the established religion of the Roman empire, the Christians pre¬ ferred living in cities and towns, while unbelievers in¬ habited the country, or provincial villages # . Who by * Brotier has assigned a different origin for the derived meaning of paganus. See Tac. Hist. 1. 53. not. “ Pagam di- lxxix consulting etymology or analogy would imagine, that the verbs to tie and to loose have contrary meanings, and that to untie and unloose , have the same signi¬ fications ? Nor would Kadash , in Hebrew (sanctifi- cavit) ever lead us to conclude, that hedeshah sig¬ nified “ a harlot.” * Instead therefore of saying, that a regard to ety¬ mology will conduct us to the intrinsic meaning of any word, and the cause of its application , it would be more correct to say, that the circumstances of the subject, at the time of the application, explain the cause, why the term, in its primitive import, was ap¬ plied to it; but that without an acquaintance with these circumstances, the cause of the application can only be conjectured, but not perfectly ascertained. The doctrine of Mr. Tooke can be admitted to be true in those cases only, in which a connection necessarily or universally exists between the primitive meaning of the word, and the distinguishing or prominent cha¬ racter of the subject, to which it is applied. But, where this connection is not necessary or universal, but casual, temporary, or local, the cause of the ap¬ plication is not to be learned from the mere etymolo¬ gical import. Paganus means a villager . Does a knowledge simply of this fact explain the cause, why the word Pagan means a heathen? I apprehend cuntur ii, qui non militant. ita paganos dicimus, qui Deo non militant.” The fact, stated in the text above, affords a sufficient, and far more natural, explanation. * See Campbell’s Preliminary Dissertations , p. 116. lxxx not; unless it could be shown that there exists a necessary connection between heathenism, and a rural or provincial life. But, if etymology were an infallible guide not only to the primitive, but also to the derivative and now perhaps primary meaning of any term, still it could determine nothing concerning the accessory idea or ideas, which usage may have associated with that term. As the habits of a people are changed, and as their sentiments, moral, political, and religious, vary, the ideas, conjoined with many words, must undergo a correspondent alteration. And, as almost all the words in every language are complex in their signifi¬ cation, or, in the language of logicians, express com¬ plex ideas,' it is not surprising if we find few, if any, of these words, denoting precisely the same assem¬ blage of conceptions. Of these combinations one may express more, and another fewer ideas, while each denote the same principal notion. The things sig¬ nified may agree in use, and differ in form, and con¬ versely ; as pillar and column, chamber and room . They may agree in denoting the same act; but the one may imply indifference, and the other criminality, as to hill, and to murder . The one may signify the emotion simply, and the other the expression also of that emotion, as joy, gladness . They may agree in denoting the same act, as arising from the same im¬ pulse, and yet differ in expressing its degree, as de¬ traction, defamation . They may agree in signifying the same profession, but with different powders, as BOSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY CHtSTNUT HILL, MASS. lxxxi Deacon, Priest, They may agree in expressing the same temper, but the one may signify it to be natural, and the other artificial, as gentle, tame; the one as temporary, the other habitual, as angry, passionate. In short, when we consider the infinite modifications of which human thought is susceptible, and how variously ideas are combined or grouped under differ¬ ent names, though perhaps in each combination the leading notions are the same ; when we consider also the changes, to which all living languages are liable, we need not be surprised, that there should be few, if any, synonymous words in any language ; and that the primitive and primary, as well as the acquired and acces¬ sory ideas, annexed to words, are liable to alteration. These general observations may suffice to shew, that the secondary ideas attached to complex terms, expressive of the same primary sense, originate from a variety of different causes; and that the associations must be as various, as arbitrary usage, with the phy¬ sical and moral circumstances of the people, may ne¬ cessarily render them. Hence nothing is more com¬ mon, than to find two correspondent terms in two different languages, agreeing in their primary, and differing in their secondary ideas; or one perhaps denoting the principal idea only, the other annexing to it a subordinate conception. Hence arises the difficulty of the translator; hence also the imperfec¬ tion of all translation. For, if the language, which the translator employs, fails to furnish him with words precisely equivalent to those in the original, he is VOL. I. G lxxxii compelled either to content himself with general terms, and to exhibit merely the leading ideas of the original, or to express more than his author intended. Thus, either his translation is necessarily defective, pre¬ senting only the prominent features of his author; or, if he employ a special for a general term, his translation is censurable, not merely as imperfect, but as erro¬ neous and false.—The Latins, for example, had Poena and Supplicium, the former to denote any kind of punishment, whether mild or severe, whether public or private ; the latter to express punishment inflicted by law, and therefore implying a degree of severity. We have only the generic term Punishment to denote both. In translating, therefore, the special term Supplicium by Punishment, we omit the expression of the secondary idea. If we render " Ostentat cica¬ trices suas,” Ter. Pun. iii. 2, 29, by the generic term " Shews,” we suppress a prominent feature in the character of Thraso, an ostentatious display being implied in the original. On the other hand we find, that there are numberless words in English, which are incapable of a precise Latin translation. If we attempt, for example, to render into Latin the English words. Cower, Squat, Queer, Lumber , Boggy, Signal , and many others, which might be specified, we shall find w 7 ords significant of the primary idea, but none, which express the secondary also. Every English¬ man understands the difference between " He made a sign,” and "He made a signal,” but the Latins have only one expression to denote both, " Signum lxxxiii dedit.” Servitus , and “ Servitude,” agree in denoting a state of subjection to the will of a master ; but the former denotes a slavish and involuntary subjection, the latter, what may be termed a “ willing bondage.” The complex idea implied by Servitude , the Latins had no term to express. Before we quit this part of the subject, it may be observed, as it has been already hinted, that there are certain words in every language, to which are attached ideas of vulgarity, indelicacy, obscenity, meanness, and contempt, while the correspondent terms in another language, are associated with no similar conception*. Hence, if we translate any term of the former cha¬ racter, by the correspondent term of the latter, we strip the expression of its secondary idea; and in cases, where the author intended to be satirical, or to excite disgust in the mind of his reader, we defeat the purpose, for which the term is employed. If, on the other hand, we translate one of the latter by the correspondent word of the former character, we de¬ grade the expression, and do injustice to the author, by conveying an offensive idea, which he did not in¬ tend to express. Should we render, as I have heard it rendered, “ Patrem absentem extimesco,” Ter . “ I fear my absent dad,” we should express a senti¬ ment of contempt not warranted by the original: on the other hand, the English word is incapable of being * “ Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significent, quod o-wuwpicc. vocatur, jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, niti' diora, jucundiora.” Qubit. Inst. lib. viii. cap. 3. G 2 lxxxiv correctly translated into Latin, the term Pater being a respectful appellation. Were we to attempt to render the line of Spenser, “ And the rude wench her answer’d nought at all,” we should find no term in Latin expressive of the subject, with the idea of contempt denoted by the English appellation. In vain also, should we search for terms precisely equivalent to the words Prog, Pat, Pellmell, Flam, Pother, Brainpan, and many others of a similar cast, admissible in burlesque and low comedy, the Latin words Cibaria, Aptus, Con - fertim, Fraus, or Fabulce, Turba, Cranium, having nothing of that vulgarity, which belongs to the Eng¬ lish terms. Having now briefly endeavoured to explain the causes, which render it impossible, in many cases, for the translator to express the precise meaning of the author, I proceed next to consider whence it is, that translation is, in some instances, not merely imperfect, but impracticable. The language of every people is necessarily adapted to their wants and conveniences. Keeping pace with their moral and intellectual improvement, it is more or less copious, as their stock of ideas is more or less enlarged.— Whatever idea they have occasion to communicate, they must have a name to express it; whatever has not been perceived or ima¬ gined, cannot become an object of thought, or require a sign to denote it. The visible objects around us. lxxxv of which we have occasion to speak, are some natural, others artificial, some common to every nation, others peculiar to one, or a few. The great productions of nature are open to the observation of all men ; and in every language, there¬ fore, there are names to express them. And, though different nations may entertain different conceptions of their qualities and properties, their various names may be justly regarded as precisely synonymous.— Thus 'HXtos, Sol , “ Sun,” are equivalent words. So also, Uotclijlos, Fluvius , and “ River.” — A evSpov, Arbor , and “ Tree.” The names of the most obvious productions of nature have probably been coeval with the very infancy of speech ; and they are correctly translateable from one language into any other. There are some productions of nature, not com¬ mon to every country ; but peculiar to one, or a few places. The people, among whom they exist, have names to denote them ; but among other nations, by whom their existence is not known, no correspondent appellations can obtain. Their names, therefore, are not always translateable. When a knowledge of any one of these is first introduced into any nation, it is usual for the people to adopt the same name, as has been assigned to it by those, among whom it exists, or through whose medium its existence has been first communicated ; thus, E\e<£as*, j E lephas, as obtaining in two different nations, the names, though not precisely equivalent, may be rendered by each other: the translation, however, cannot be re¬ garded as perfectly correct. Where there is a less degree of resemblance, it becomes frequently a ques¬ tion of considerable difficulty, whether the name should be translated, or transferred. These obser¬ vations it may be necessary to illustrate by a few ex¬ amples. It has been remarked, that the names of arbi¬ trary combinations of simple ideas, and the names of mixed modes, are not translateable, unless they hap¬ pen to be common to the two nations, whose lan¬ guages are in question.—In vain should we search for English words equivalent to Terminalia , Nonce, Ictus, Consul , Tribunus , Talentum , Denarius , Tri¬ umphus. We have no festivals, no divisions of time, no offices, no coins, no processions, which bear the least resemblance to these; and, therefore, there are no single words, proper to our language, expressive of Ixxxix the same meaning with the words here adduced. In such cases, one or other of these alternatives is pre¬ sented to our choice, either to transfer into our lan¬ guage the Latin terms as they stand in the original, assigning them, perhaps, an English termination, or to admit a periphrasis descriptive of the things them¬ selves. The former of these expedients is very gene¬ rally, and, indeed, very properly adopted. Accord¬ ingly we have admitted into our language the words Consul , Tribune , Nones, Ides, Talent, Denarius, Triumph. In like manner we should inquire in vain, for single words in Latin expressive of many usages, arts, coins, measures, and institutions, which obtain in this country, as “ Easter,” “ Michaelmas,” “ Clergyman,” “ Chancellor,” “ Monday,” “ Shilling,” “ Guinea.” The things denoted by these names had no existence among the Romans, and they had therefore no words to express them. In such cases we have the choice of latinizing the English word, or adopting a periphrasis descriptive of the thing signified. In cases, as it has been already observed, where there subsists a pretty close resemblance between any office, observance, usage, or institution, in one country and that of another, the names in the two languages may not improperly be mutually translated. The only difficulty is to determine with precision, what de¬ gree of resemblance is necessary, to justify the trans¬ lator, in designating the one, by the name of the other. Thus, though the following offices and insti- xc tutions do not precisely correspond, yet there subsists perhaps a sufficient degree of resemblance, to justify us in rendering “ Treasurer” by Qucestor; “ A mem¬ ber of Parliament ” by Senator , “ Parliament ” itself by Senatus, “ A Beadle ” or “ Sergeant ” by Lictor y or Apparitor . By this procedure we avoid the intro¬ duction of barbarisms; but this evil is perhaps more than balanced, by the risk of seducing our reader into a conclusion, that the subjects are precisely identical, because the names are employed as mutually equiva¬ lent. Hence many translators, preferring barbarism and obscurity to pure Latin diction, when it is likely to produce a misconception of the subject, have not scrupled to latinize the English names, giving, for ex¬ ample, Parliamentum for “ Parliament,” Bedellus for a “ Beadle,” Baronetus for a “ Baronet,” Acra for an “ Acre.” Neither of these modes is wholly unobjec¬ tionable, and it is sometimes difficult to decide, which should be preferred, it being impossible to establish any correct and precise rule, for determining that de¬ gree of likeness or disparity, which shall justify either a translation, or a retention of the original word. In respect to names of offices, a very learned and ingeni¬ ous critic * recommends, that, when “ the resem¬ blances preponderate,” the name should be translated; but, when “ the peculiarities preponderate,” the original name should be retained. This rule must be acknowledged to be precise; but, as the learned * Campbell’s Preliminary Dissertations. XC1 author himself confesses, it is not at all times easy to be applied, it being impossible in many cases to de¬ cide, whether the resemblances, or the peculiarities, be the more numerous, or the more important. Be¬ sides, I must acknowledge, it appears to me some¬ what doubtful, whether a bare preponderance of simi¬ larity should justify translation; for in many instances, the peculiarities, though in weight somewhat inferior to the resemblances, may notwithstanding be of such magnitude, that a translation of the name might lead the reader into considerable error. In such instances, it appears to me much better to retain the original name. At the same time, I am perfectly aware, that this practice is liable to one great objection, namely, that to a person, unacquainted with the observances and institutions of that people, to whose language the original term belongs, the barbarism is wholly unin¬ telligible. But is it not better, that the reader should remain ignorant of the signification of the word, or should be obliged to inquire into its meaning, than that he should be led into a misconception of the sub¬ ject, while he flatters himself he correctly apprehends its nature ? An inquisitive reader will naturally seek for information; and if there be others, who will not take the trouble to inquire, still it must be acknow¬ ledged, that ignorance is always preferable to error. I am also aware, that barbarisms, especially those of that class, to which the present question refers, vitiate the purity of a language, and give a translation a motley and semibarbarous appearance. Even, when assimilated by termination to the language, into which we are translating, they have still, it must be owned, somewhat of an unseemly and exotic aspect. Fami¬ liarity, however, serves to reconcile us to them ; and there are numberless words in our language trans¬ ferred from the Greek and Latin, which have long ceased to be regarded as barbarisms. In many cases, indeed, there can be no question, because the trans¬ lator has no alternative, but to retain the original term. What office, for example, amongst us, bears even the most remote analogy to the Augur , the Pul - larius , the Dictator amongst the Romans ? In such cases, translation by an equivalent term is absolutely impracticable. And even in those instances, as it has been already observed, in which we find some office, usage, or institution, which bears a resemblance to that, which is denoted by the Latin word, if we em¬ ploy the terms as equivalent, we incur the risk of leading the reader into a misconception of the subject. Were we, for example, to render Tribunus Plebis by “ a city deputy ”, we should convey a very imperfect, and, in some respects, a false idea of the office. In some instances, indeed, the error may be of consider¬ able consequence. We render the Latin term Ju¬ gerum, by the English word “ Acre.” It will not be doubted, however, that when we translate the Licinian or Agrarian law, “ Nequis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret”, Liv . vi. 35. “ That no person should possess more than fifty acres of land ”, an Englishman and a Roman would form different estimates of the XC1I1 quantity, when it is considered, that thirty-one Eng¬ lish acres are nearly equal to fifty Roman, taking the Roman foot at 11. 6 of our inches. Hence, as I have remarked, some translators have ventured to employ the word Acra , to denote an English acre. Again. If we recur to a periphrasis, we not only impair the strength and the vivacity of the expression, but also perplex the reader by d multiplicity of words. Who would not prefer Dictator , to “ A person chosen in cases of imminent danger, in whom, for a limited time, was vested the sovereign authority of the state”? Can any barbarism be so offensive, as would be the constant repetition of this periphrasis ? Who, for the same reason, would not prefer Parochus for a “ Parish priest”, rather than adopt the tedious periphrasis, which would be necessary to express it in Latin, and which, after all, would fail to convey to a Roman a correct idea of the office ? But periphrasis is in general not only hostile to strength, to vivacity, and frequently even to perspi¬ cuity itself; but it likewise often leads an ordinary reader into erroneous conceptions. Were we to ren¬ der the following passage, “ Praemium, libero impuni¬ tatem ejus rei et sestertia ducenta decrevere”, (Sali. B. C. Cap. 31.) “ They decreed as a reward, one thousand six hundred and fourteen pounds eleven shillings and eight pence”; it might impress the mere English reader with a belief, that the Romans were wonderfully scrupulous and exact, in estimating the merit of public services, since they descended in their XC1V rewards to the accuracy of pence ; or that there was something very peculiar in the present case, which required this extraordinary minuteness, in specifying the sum. On the other hand, were we to attempt to render English money by Roman coins, we should find it, in some cases, impracticable, if perfect accuracy were required; and in most instances the translation would, by reason of the fractional parts, he insuffer¬ ably awkward. I observe, at the same time, that, where perfect accuracy is not requisite, and where the given sum, or quantity in English, corresponds pretty nearly to a certain number of Roman coins, weights or measures, translation may then be properly adopted. “ Three acres”, for example, may, with a very trifling error, be rendered by Quinque jugera. In the preceding account of untranslateable terms, I omitted to mention certain names of relationship. We have in our language the generic term. Relative or Relation , to denote relationship either by con¬ sanguinity or by affinity: but we have no specific names for Agnatus , “ a relation by the paternal line ”; Cognatus , “ a relation by the maternal line ”, and Affinis , “ a relation by marriage.” We have the terms, “ Uncle ” and “ Aunt ”, to express, the one “ a father’s” or "a mother’s brother”, the other “a father’s ” or