

Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order 1967-1969

Mahmud,* Dewi Yuliati, Alamsyah

Master Program of History, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Diponegoro
Jl. dr. A. Suroyo, Tembalang, Semarang, Central Java - Indonesia

*Corresponding Author: mahmud@students.undip.ac.id

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14710/ihis.v7i1.12720>

Abstract

This study discusses the resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Partai Nadhlatul Ulama/ PNU) towards the New Order government from 1967-1969. This study analyses the process of PNU's resistance to the New Order from 1967-1969. This study uses historical research methods, which consist of four stages of historical research methods, namely: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation and historiography. Using the historical method, this study answers questions regarding the form of PNU's channel of resistance against the New Order and the results achieved against the government during the 1967-1969 period. This study uses the farming community-based resistance theory developed by James Scott. Resistance theory is used to explain the PNU's resistance to the New Order through various existing political channels. The New Order government began to show signs of being anti-democratic by imposing political policies that put pressure on political parties and intervening in the PNU organization's internal realm. PNU's resistance to the New Order government was a reaction to various government interventions and actions that attempted to minimize the role and influence of the PNU. This research resulted in an analysis of PNU's resistance to the New Order, which had a more solid institutional structure through various existing political channels. The PNU's resistance is understood as a self-defence effort against multiple interventions by the government on the PNU's political institutions.

Received:
November 9, 2021

Revised:
June 20, 2023

Accepted:
June 21, 2023

Keywords: Nahdlatul Ulama Party; The New Order Era; Political Policy.

Introduction

The development of Indonesian politics after President Soekarno enacted the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, showed an authoritarian attitude with the dissolution of parliament because it was considered responsible for various political disputes in the preparation of the Constitution. The situation became increasingly uncertain after the Masyumi Party (Masyumi), which had an Islamic basis, was disbanded due to accusations of participating in an attempted rebellion against the Indonesian government (Karim, 1983, p. 132). This condition makes the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Partai Nadhlatul Ulama/ PNU) the only remaining Islamic political

force. PNU simultaneously appears so unique as an interest group and a pressure group.

Soekarno's tendency to be close to Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia/ PKI) did not directly make PNU take a stand against the President. Under the leadership of Rois Syuriah Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, PNU got closer to President Soekarno and supported every decision taken by the government. PNU supports Soekarno's conception of Nasakom by placing its cadres in government. Idham Chalid, Kiai Ahmad Dachlan and Kiai Masykur were three PNU cadres in government.

Beyond the ranks of Idham Chalid's leadership, young figures such as Subchan Zaenuri Echsan, Zamroni, Imron Kadir, and Mahbub Djunaidi represented PNU's critical voice against Sukarno's PKI-inclined policies. Subchan and his friends received support not only from organizations under the auspices of PNU and clerics in several Islamic boarding schools but also from army officers and youth organizations outside PNU (Fealy & Borton, 1997, p. 38). The agenda brought by this group was obvious, namely eliminating the influence of the PKI in the government.

The declining physical condition of President Soekarno further complicated the national political constellation. The increasingly chaotic political situation and requirements prompted the military (Army) entry into the political scene (Reeve, 2013, p. 221). The Army, which has long been opposed to civilian politicians running the country, was gaining momentum with the conflict between political parties in the government.

In the early hours of October 1, the army generals were kidnapped, a dark event known as the September 30th Movement (Gerakan 30 September/ G30S) tragedy. The G30S incident made the political situation worse and more complicated and immediately reduced President Soekarno's authority. The decline in President Soekarno's power after the G30S tragedy forced him to transfer power over state security to General Suharto, who then acted quickly by accusing the PKI of being the mastermind behind the various disturbances that occurred.

The G30S incident completely changed the Indonesian national political constellation. President Soekarno, previously seen as having a strong influence, began to doubt his leadership. In the end, opposition groups emerged from youth organizations supported by the Army by carrying out actions demanding the dissolution of the PKI and holding the President accountable. At the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly on June 22, 1966, the President's Nawaksara accountability speech was rejected by a majority of parliamentarians because it did not mention the G30S issue, which was a national issue that concerns presidential policies (Firdausi, 2020). Parliament took more severe steps by dismantling presidential powers one by one, culminating in Soekarno's removal as President and the appointment of General Suharto as acting President on March 7, 1967. The appointment of General Suharto as acting President marked the birth of the New Order era.

At first, the PNU leadership was divided in its attitude by showing an attitude of indecision in the face of rapid political change. Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, as the *syuriah rois* appealed to PNU to address this situation by not taking excessive attitudes and actions. Meanwhile, the youth under the leadership of Subchan urged PNU to take a firm stance by declaring that the G30S tragedy was an act of the PKI. Subchan even went so far as to form the Action Committee to Suppress the Thirtieth September Movement (Komite Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan September Tigapuluh/ KAP Gestapu). Even so, the two groups agreed to urge President Soeharto's officials to speed up the election (Fealy & Borton, 1997, p. 38).

To quell this criticism, the Soeharto government, with strong support from the army, moved swiftly to engage the bureaucracy and technocrats. The government also mobilized international support through financial and technological assistance (Mas'ood, 1989, pp. 166–175). Some supporters of the New Order believed that the future of Indonesia should be free from ideology-based politics. The government looked at previous experiences when political parties' domination and ideological diversity only resulted in prolonged political conflict and instability. The New Order government directed political management to a political system that was relatively free from the domination of political parties and the ideology they carried (Haris, 1991, p. 34).

PNU, in the view of the New Order authorities, was seen as an Islamic political force that had to be "tamed". In the XXIV Muktamar in Bandung on July 4-9, 1967, the government supported the reshuffle of the PNU leadership from Idham Chalid to another figure who had the spirit of the New Order (Crouch, 1999, p. 295). Idham Chalid, the party's general chairman, was also considered very close to Soekarno (Machfoedz, 1982, p. 291). Even so, the strong influence of Kiai Wahab Hasbullah as a syrian rois made the congress participants re-elect Idham Chalid as chairman. Kiai Wahab also continued to support Sukarno by re-nominating Soekarno in the elections made by the government, the time of which had yet to be determined (Feillard, 1997, p. 87)

In the end, the government acknowledged Muktamar's decision. It began to take a different approach to NU while including two PNU representatives, Idham Chalid and Achmad Dachlan, in the Development Cabinet (Arsip Keputusan Presiden No. 183 tahun 1968). Idham Chalid, as party leader, tends to want PNU to be accommodative and avoid confrontation by not criticizing the government directly.

Methods

This research on PNU's resistance to the New Order uses historical methods. According to Kuntowijoyo, historical research methods are based on the stages of selecting topics, gathering sources, verifying, interpreting, analyzing and synthesizing, and writing (Kuntowijoyo, 2000, p. 91). This study emphasizes the use of primary and secondary sources in the form of archives, newspapers, magazines, books and interviews with relevant figures. Some of the archival sources were

obtained from the archive collections at the NU Astranawa Gayungsari Museum in Surabaya, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia/ ANRI) Jakarta, and the private archives of the collections of several local PNU figures. Apart from that, this research also uses newspapers and books related to PNU which are very abundant to support this research. Interviews were conducted with informants know about events. After obtaining historical facts, interpretation is carried out, namely the activity of interpreting and determining the meaning of facts and the relationship between facts in the context of the events studied. The results of this interpretation are then compiled into works of historiography.

NU Support in the Formation of the New Order

The political crisis in Indonesia throughout 1965 was a tragedy for President Soekarno's power. Soekarno was very dependent on his political legitimacy as the great leader of the revolution, increasingly being dragged into the current political polarization between anti-communist forces and those supporting communism. The balance of political power he played with the PKI, the Army and PNU also began to falter. Even though PNU and the PKI both supported Soekarno's government, in practice, these two political parties were often involved in a psychological war down to the grassroots level in the regions.

The killing of army generals in a series of events known as the 1965 the September 30th Movement (G30S) became the momentum for rapid political change in Indonesia. The killing of 6 generals and one mid-level army officer, apart from causing security chaos, also led to a void in the army command. The increasingly heated situation paved the way for the military to come to power—Commander of Kostrad, Maj. Gen. Suharto was appointed by President Soekarno as the holder of the Order of Eleventh March (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret/ Supersemar) to stabilize conditions and order. Suharto moved quickly by declaring that the PKI was responsible for planning the G30S and killing the army leaders (Dewi, 2020).

Major General Suharto temporarily took over command of the Army. Suharto saw the power of Sukarno's fanatical supporters and the remnants of communist forces as a real threat to his newly acquired political power (Mun'im, 2013, pp. 132–139). Efforts to gain legitimacy for political actions brought army officers together with PNU leaders known to be anti-PKI. Yusuf Hasyim was the leader of the NU youth organization wing. On October 1, the Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor/ Ansor) issued a statement accusing a group of PKI of being the mastermind behind the G30S incident (Mun'im, 2013, p. 105). Yusuf Hasyim coordinated with Subchan Zaenuri, urging the Pengurus Besar Nadlatul Ulama (PBNU) to state that the PKI and its underbouw was the sole mastermind behind the G30S incident. On October 5, the NU leadership held a meeting at the PBNU office on Jalan Kramat Raya 164 Jakarta. The meeting resulted in an official PBNU statement stating that the PKI was responsible for the G30S incident. The statement was then signed by Kiai Masykur representing the Syuriah Council, M. Dachlan and Achmad Syaikhu representing

Tanfidiyah (NU Party), Yusuf Hasyim as Chair of Ansor, Zamroni as General Chair of Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/PMII), and followed by all top leaders of the autonomous PNU body (Mun'im, 2013, pp. 107–110)

After the October 5 statement condemning G30S, the NU leadership, represented by Kiai Masykur, Syah Manaf and Idham Chalid, held a meeting which decided the party's leadership in Jakarta was temporarily led by Subchan (Feillard, 1997, p. 78). Subchan was chosen as the party's interim leader because he was anti-communist. Apart from that, he was still 34 years old, and his position was single and not married. He has an extensive network with student activists and organizations outside PBNU, especially his closeness to General Nasution and several army generals. The election of Subchan as the interim leader of NU was also supported by old kiai, such as Kiai Asad Syamsul Arifin and Kiai Maksun Lasem, who from the beginning did not like PNU's actions and joined Dwikora Soekarno's cabinet together with the PKI.

Subchan's appearance was inseparable from the condition of General Chairperson Idham Chalid, who did not immediately decide because he was still waiting for clarity on President Soekarno's attitude towards the G30S incident. Said Budairy, a PMII activist, stated that Subchan was the leading actor in the birth of important decisions taken by PNU.

“... Yesterday, October 4, 1945, Mas Subchan, Deputy Chairperson IV of PBNU, chaired a general meeting at Taman Sunda Kelapa, Menteng, Jakarta. The general meeting demanded that strict action be taken against the movers and actors of the G30S” (Budairy, 2008).

Subchan moved quickly by inviting PNU youth figures such as Nuddin Lubis, Djamaludin Malik, Imron Rosyadi, Zamroni and Hasyim Latief to build political power within PNU to trap the PKI. He instructed PNU cadres in the regions to be prepared to face the development of an uncertain political situation, primarily regarding the movement of PKI cadres in the regions (Mun'im, 2013, pp. 112–113).

Subchan's closeness to high-ranking army officers accelerated his steps in making strategic decisions with the full support of the military. Subchan quickly formed KAP Gestapu by collaborating with Islamic youth organizations and nationalists and becoming anti-communist youth associations. In the following days, a wave of demonstrations from KAP Gestapu demanded the dissolution of the PKI and the organizations under it (Feillard, 1997, p. 79).

This large-scale demonstration movement supported by the army leadership caused panic and shock at the elite level. Protests from the demonstrators and pressure from the army leadership succeeded in cornering Soekarno, so March 11, 1966 (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret/ Supersemar) Order was issued, giving General Suharto authority to restore public order and security. On March 12, 1966, General Suharto dissolved the PKI and purged the government of elements of the PKI and its underbouw organizations (Isnaeni, 2016).

Suharto's statement that the PKI was responsible for the G30S incident provided enthusiasm and motivation for NU institutional elements in the regions to consolidate

themselves and coordinate with the military apparatus to destroy communist forces in the regions. In Situbondo, Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin blessed the movement to crush the PKI in the Situbondo area and its surroundings. Kiai As'ad supported the formation of the Pancasila Front and ordered his students to form the Pancasila Front in Situbondo (Anshari, 2016)

The socio-political situation in Indonesia in the following months became increasingly chaotic. The people's distrust of Sukarno's leadership and the government led to negative behaviour and disinformation at the grassroots level, resulting in people being incited to commit anarchist acts. Political disputes and violence from September 1965 to the end 1966 triggered large-scale tragedies in various regions, especially in East and Central Java.

In early February 1967, PNU politicians, Nuddin Lubis and Djamaludin Malik organized a vote of no confidence in President Soekarno in parliament. They demanded that parliament strip all powers attached to Sukarno. Nuddin became the first member of parliament to urge Soekarno to be dismissed as President. At the same time, H. Djamaludin Malik gathered strength in the Provisional People's Consultative Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/ MPRS) by launching the name General Suharto as a presidential candidate (Anam, 1999, pp. 321–322).

In the General Session of the MPRS on March 12, 1967, the MPRS stipulated TAP MPRS No. XXXIII, which revoked President Soekarno's powers and appointed General Suharto as acting President. General Suharto was then sworn in as Acting President at the parliament building by the Chairman of the MPRS, General A.H. Nasution. General Suharto's success in crushing the 1965 G30S coup attempt made him more recognized by NU youths than other army generals. Apart from that, support from Deputy Rois Aam and Kiai Bisri Syansuri for Soeharto helped speed up the transition process to his New Order government (Feillard, 1997, pp. 99–102)

Suharto then appointed the general chairman of PNU, Idham Chalid, as Minister of People's Welfare, and Kiai Achmad Dachlan was appointed Minister of Religion. Harmonious relations with the New Order government were also followed by the appointment of PNU cadres in the regions to occupy strategic positions in the government and the legislatures in the regions. In Central Java, H. Imam Sofwan, who was the Regional Leader of PNU Central Java, received support from PNU and Golkar to become Chair of the Central Java DPRD, and Maschun Sofwan was reappointed as the District Head of Temanggung (Interview with Ibnu Hajar Pranolo, September 12, 2020).

According to Ibnu Hajar, for Idham Chalid, entering the government could maximize PNU's role and support all actions needed during the transition period. PNU could influence the running of the cabinet and strategic decisions whose results could be directly enjoyed by PNU people below. Meanwhile, if PNU was outside the government, it would only become a "moon" and a political game tool that would impact PNU cadres at the grassroots level (Interview with Ibn Hajar Pranolo, September 12, 2020).

In a parliamentary plenary session on March 22 1968, the spokesman for the PNU Party, Hartono, stated: "For development, it is necessary to reform the government structure first. So that parliamentary approval is needed to appoint General Suharto as full president, so that the government's performance becomes more effective" ("Pembijtara Setudju Djend. Soeharto Presiden Penuh," 1968). Suharto was later confirmed as Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia. In his speech at the 5th General Session of the MPRS on March 27, 1968, Suharto, as Acting President and recipient of the MPRS mandate, gave remarks about his views on running the New Order government as follows:

".. from the beginning, the struggle for the New Order had two main themes: first, filling independence by increasing the welfare of the people at large; and second, upholding constitutional life, including restoring a healthy democratic life and improving democratic tools. Upholding constitutional life is a tool that is a sufficient guarantee so that the authorities hold no abuse of power. Hence, from the beginning, we have also seen that improving people's welfare and upholding constitutional life are not contradictory but that carrying out these two major tasks must be harmonized. ..." (ANRI No. 291).

Idham Chalid's support for Suharto must be understood primarily as a tool for political policy to establish good relations with the legitimate government. Idham's good relationship with the government can create a conducive political climate and access to various government institutions. Idham has played a game without pragmatic rules.

Resistance of PNU towards the New Order

New Order Intervention at the 24th Bandung Congress in 1967

The transition from Soekarno's government to Soeharto's New Order government, which was supported by the military forces of the Army, initially received support and support from most elements of PNU. There was an alliance between PNU and the Army in destroying the PKI movement, which was considered a threat to the country's religious and political authority. PNU and the New Order government provided mutual support to jointly build social, political and religious influence over Indonesian society.

This situation changed when the New Order government began to place the military, especially the Army, to dominate Indonesian political and economic affairs. The domination of the military occurred because of the views of the New Order rulers that the problems in Indonesia were caused by the life of political parties, which tended to be in conflict and could not be controlled (Reeve, 2013, p. 293) so that the New Order rulers began to interfere in the internal realm of political parties to limit the influence of political parties.

Developments in the political situation under the New Order government created anxiety and suspicion among the PNU political elite. Subchan ZE as a young NU politician, offers the idea of renewal within the PNU body by rejuvenating and

modernizing the party in the face of the dynamics of political change that were so fast, as well as intervention from the government. His idea of organizational renewal sparked controversy within PNU. Most of his young leaders saw Subchan as the correct figure to lead pNU because of his success in consolidating the organization during the difficult times of 1965-1966 amidst the political conflict with the PKI. Meanwhile, Rois Aam Syuriah, Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, still doubted Subchan's loyalty because of his close relationship with General Nasution and high-ranking army officers (Interview with Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017).

Subchan, who previously fully supported the New Order, became an opponent of government policies which, according to him, were anti-political parties. On one radio show, Subchan stated that the principles of the New Order had begun to blur and were no longer the basis for the struggle of all components of the New Order (Marijan, 1992, pp. 95–96).

Subchan then consolidated his power in parliament and garnered support from PNU clerics in the regions, especially Central and East Java, to oppose the New Order. Subchan criticized the policies of Idham Chalid, who tended to remain silent when he saw PNU's internal affairs being manipulated by the authorities. Idham Chalid himself believed that direct confrontation with the New Order authorities would only harm the NU organization and cadres. Even so, Idham agreed that the government's interference with PNU was intolerable (Interview with Amir Abdullah, November 18, 2020).

The various political events became a severe concern for PNU in holding the 24th Muktamar in Bandung from 4-9 July 1967. A total of 338 branch representatives and 23 regional delegates, and NU sympathizers in various regions attended as Muktamar participants. Senior Kiai also participated in the congress from the PNU extended family from all over Indonesia (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV Bandung Tahun 1967).

The Muktamar agenda was carried out with great care, mainly in discussing political issues because of concerns that the government would classify PNU as a revolutionary organization. The agenda for political discussion was only about the composition of President Soeharto's Ampera cabinet, the issue of general elections, and the proposed membership composition of the DPRS and MPRS (Anam, 1999, pp. 308–309).

The lack of a portion of the discussion in the political field seems to be related to the existence of security from the military apparatus in the Congress arena. The presence of the military apparatus was not only to secure the course of the congress but also to secure the direction of PNU's political policies, which was the most significant political Islam after the dissolution of Masyumi by the previous government (Interview Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017).

The army's intervention was seen in the general chairman election agenda. Harold Crouch noted that several high-ranking army officers at the time tried to persuade the congress participants not to elect Idham Chalid and Achmad Syaikh to return to the positions of general chairman and general secretary and to transfer the

support of the congress participants to Subchan and Imron Rosyadi, because of their services in forming KAP Gestapu when the G30S riots (Crouch, 1999, p. 295). Even so, the army's support for Subchan was not optimal because some of his officers considered Subchan a critical and unruly person (Interview with Choirul Anam, January 25, 2018).

The emergence of Subchan as a candidate for general chairman at the Bandung Congress was inseparable from the support of the clerics on the Java coast, especially Kiai Maksum Lasem as the elder and Mustasyar of PBNU, who did not really like Idham Chalid's leadership. According to Kiai Maksum, Idham's leadership character tended to bring PNU closer to power, both when the government was still in the hands of President Soekarno and when General Suharto was entrusted with becoming a presidential official (Interview with Abidin, Agustus 21, 2020). The conflict over the general chairmanship entered its final phase after Kiai Wahab Hasbullah and Kiai Bisri Syansuri intervened in the forum by publicly declaring their support for Idham Chalid's return as chairman.

The support of Kiai Wahab Hasbullah and Kiai Bisri Syansuri was a significant factor in Idham Chalid's victory. Kiai Wahab's open support, even in a congress forum, inevitably made the congress participants, predominantly from East and Central Java, also express their support for Idham's re-nomination. Kiai Wahab, who is known to be an admirer of former president Soekarno, will even nominate Soekarno again as president in the elections to be held by the New Order (Feillard, 1997, p. 87). Of course, Suharto, who heard these statements, began to doubt the available intervention made by army officers in the field. Suharto then instructed his military officers to change their approach to be more grounded so that the party would not be critical of government policies (Interview with Choirul Anam, January 25, 2018).

Suharto's New Order government then included two PNU representatives, Idham Chalid and Achmad Dachlan, in the Development Cabinet in 1968. Idham Chalid was the Minister of Social Welfare, while Achmad Dachlan was appointed Minister of Religion (Naskah Sambutan Presiden Soeharto Saat Diangkat Menjadi Presiden Ke-2 RI pada Sidang Umum Ke-5 MPRS Tanggal 27 Maret 1968, ANRI, Pidato Presiden Soeharto 1966-1998 No. 291., 1968). Soeharto eventually used Idham Chalid's victory at the Bandung Congress to rid the military of officers who disagreed with him. Soeharto also saw Subchan's criticism of the government as a tendency for Subchan's closeness to General Nasution (Interview with Choirul Anam, January 25, 2018).

Although in the end, he lost in the struggle for the leadership of the party, Subchan managed to sit as Deputy Chair I through a straightforward selection process from the participants of the Mukhtar (Arsip Keputusan Mukhtar NU Ke-XXIV di Bandung Tahun 1967). Subchan also succeeded in placing his people in strategic positions in the ranks of the Tanfidiyah board. The dominance of the Subchan group in decision-making at plenary forums, apart from the support from the older kiai in Java, was also influenced by many university graduates so that they had more knowledge in formal meetings than other delegates with no background of university graduates (Buku Daftar Riwayat Hidup Anggota Partai NU). The results of the XXIV

Nahdlatul Ulama Conference in Bandung appointed Kiai Bisri Syansuri as Rois Aam and Idham Chalid as chairman (Arsip Keputusan Mukhtar NU Ke-XXIV Bandung Tahun 1967).

An interesting decision in the Bandung Mukhtar was that the appointment of Kiai Bisri Syansuri as Rois Aam Syuriah was only part of a formality to avoid further intervention from the government. The meeting was under the direction of Kiai Wahab. Even so, Kiai Bisri was not pleased, and he stated in a particular forum that the designation of his name as Rois Aam was only a formality. Kiai Bisri and Kiai Wahab were close friends because they were both students of Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari. The bond between the two became stronger because Kiai Bisri married the younger brother of Kiai Wahab (Interview with Kiai Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2020).

Because of the tendency for divisions within PNU, which were more influenced by external factors, Idham and Subchan agreed to decide special requirements for members from elements of the government. The goal was obvious: to protect the PNU from interference by using PNU members from the government. Another decision made at the Mukhtar was a recommendation that there be intense communication and coordination between the central and regional leaders to avoid control from the government and the military (Arsip Keputusan Mukhtar NU Ke-XXIV di Bandung Tahun 1967).

The party's desire to minimize external intervention was realized by recommending the establishment of a body tasked with examining the tendency of party members to take advantage of their position or even to abuse party authority and facilities. In the recommendation, it was stated that the research body formed would consist of 7 regional representatives, namely: West Java, Central Java, East Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, and Aceh, whose membership would rotate with South Sumatra. The research agency was tasked with examining indications that members of the NU party board deliberately sought personal gain by using the facilities of PNU (Arsip Keputusan Mukhtar NU Ke-XXIV di Bandung Tahun 1967).

From Discussion on Political Sector Law Packages to Postponement of Elections

The process of transitioning power from Soekarno's government to General Suharto was marked by the commencement of deliberations on the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) on a package of laws in the political field concerning general elections (elections), political parties, mass organizations and functional groups, as well as rules concerning the composition and position of the Assembly. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the People's Representative Council (DPR) created a more democratic political system than the previous administration (Puspitasari 2005).

The General Session of the MPRS IV in 1966 resulted in a stipulation that the government and parliament completed the political law packet on January 5, 1967, and instructed the holding of elections to be held no later than July 5, 1968 (Ali Murtopo, 1984: 178.). In discussing the political law package in parliament, the PNU faction

rejected the substance of the political law package proposed by the government because it has the potential to give the president full power to dissolve political parties if they were deemed not following the national ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Fealy & Borton, 1997, pp. 46–47).

According to PNU, the draft law package on politics also mentions changes in the composition of the balance of power in parliament. This was related to implementing an electoral system based on proportional representation and awarding a quarter of the total number of seats to the armed forces (Arsip Deklarasi Tentang Demokrasi Pancasila yang ditandatangani tanggal 10 Juli 1967 di Bandung).

The draft law on politics proposed by the government was an act of Suharto's arbitrariness as an official. Soeharto wanted to maintain his power by appointing himself directly through the MPRS, where most of the members would be produced through the direct appointment without going through a democratic election process (Interview with Kiai Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017). With a proportional representation system combined with a list system, parliamentarians feel less loyal to those who voted for them because they were more bound to their parent organization. If this system is approved, PNU can potentially lose most of its seats in parliament because the most extensive base of influence is in East and Central Java (Jamiluddin, 2018).

In its implementation, the MPRS's decision regarding the elections, which were planned to be held on July 5, 1968, was again postponed unilaterally by the government. This delay is based on the argument that the law used as the basis for operational law has yet to be finalized because it is constrained by the slow political process in parliament (Suryadinata & Priyono, 1992, pp. 36–48). The government proposed postponing the election for five years so that the election would be held by 1973. According to Minister HMS Mintaredja, who also concurrently served as chairman of Parmusi, the performance of the political parties in parliament could have been faster in deciding legal products related to the election. It is similar to repeating the performance of parliament during the Guided Democracy period, where the old political parties in parliament only focused on the interests of their group without ever seeing the substance and benefits of the laws proposed by the government (“Penjerdehanaan Kepartaian,” 1971; Arninanto, 1999, 81).

Mintaredja's criticism regarding parliament's slow performance in deciding on political laws was rebutted by Ahmad Saikhu, Deputy Speaker of the DPR and an PNU politician. According to Saikhu, Mintaredja's criticism was an attempt to discredit PNU as part of a group that was seen as slowing down parliamentary work. The production of laws was carried out jointly with the government so that the speed of a law is determined by the seriousness and synergy of the two institutions. As a representative of PNU in parliament, Saikhu supports putting forward a consensus deliberation system which is the party's line of struggle. However, if the consensus deliberation system was deemed too difficult to implement on a national scale, causing the law's ratification to drag on, then PNU agreed to hold a vote (“Sjaichu: Bisa Sadja untuk Tjari Kambing Hitam,” 1971).

In January 1968, President Soeharto held a meeting with the leaders of the political parties at the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. This was done to overcome the political impasse in the polemic over the discussion of the package of laws in the political field which needed to show clear spots. At the meeting, PNU was represented by Idham Chalid, Subchan Zaenuri, Djamaluddin Malik, Jusuf Hasyim and Nuddin Lubis. The meeting temporarily quelled the polemic regarding the draft law package in the political field. Chairman Idham Chalid, in a statement to the press after the meeting, stated that he would consider the suggestions and solutions provided by President Soeharto regarding the problems of the law on politics proposed by the government ("Refreshing DPR Djadi Pembijtaraan Hangat," 1968).

In a separate forum following the meeting with the President, Subchan expressed his frustration at the outcome. According to Subchan, the government needed to push PNU more to agree to the proposed draft law package on politics. Subchan also deplored the option of postponing the elections made by the government because the situation and conditions were not possible, as well as the main reason for the lack of funding being the main factor. According to Subchan, the government's unilateral postponement of elections because the situation and conditions were not possible, was irrelevant because Indonesia's socio-political conditions during the transition to President Soeharto were very conducive and stable ("Konsultasi Presiden Dengan Parpol2," 1969). The government has also opened a lot of foreign capital assistance to Indonesia. Subchan's statement, as quoted in the Kompas daily, October 5, 1969, is as follows:

"That election financing does not need to cost Rp. 20 billion, as the President said. The amount of expenses required can be less than Rp. 10 billion. Consequently, there is no need to postpone elections if only based on financial considerations ("Subchan: Biaya Pemilu Dapat Kurang Dari Rp. 10 Miljard," 1969)

On October 14, 1969, President Soeharto held a meeting with the leaders of the PNU and PNI political parties at the Merdeka Palace. PNU was represented by Idham Chalid, Subchan Zaenuri, Djamaluddin Malik, Kiai Masykur, Imron Rosyadi, Jusuf Hasyim and Nuddin Lubis. Meanwhile, the PNI was represented by Isnaeni, Hadisubeno, Abdul Madjid, Hardjanto, Usep Ranawidjaja, Budi Dipojuwono and Abadi. The meeting reached an agreement between the government and political parties on the issue of the law on politics proposed by the government. The meeting resulted in an agreement between the government and political parties regarding the draft law on politics impacting the election schedule. The New Order government also agreed to reschedule the election by moving it forward from 1973 to July 5 1971 ("Konsultasi Presiden dengan Parpol2," 1969).

According to Harold Crouch, Suharto's concern for the legitimacy of his power was a determining factor in accepting the pressure from PNU and its political parties to speed up elections (Crouch, 1999, p. 248). The pressure from the PNU leadership received support from other political parties in parliament, thus forcing Suharto's New

Order government to review its policies regarding the draft law on political parties and the conduct of elections.

The consequence of agreeing to accelerate the holding of elections was that PNU must support a package of laws on politics that regulate the composition and position of members of the MPR and DPR, namely Law No. 6 of 1969 in the political field law package. The substance of Law No. 6 was the appointment of members of parliament from the creative element through a direct appointment mechanism by President Soeharto. A few days after the meeting with President Soeharto, the PNU leadership, represented by Djamaluddin Malik and Mahbub Djunaidi, signed a statement supporting the appointment of members of parliament, which was seen as refreshing parliament by the results of meetings between Islamic parties and the government. Even so, according to Mahbub, PNU has provided notes so that refreshing in parliament stays consistent with the constitution and applicable laws and does not change the balance of party forces in parliament. According to Mahbub, varies to the balance of party power in parliament can only be carried out through a democratic election mechanism and according to the mandate of the applicable law ("Refreshing DPR Djadi Pembijaraan Hangat," 1968)

Subchan saw the statement of attitude from the PNU leadership that approves Law no. 6 as an act of "playing it safe" for the party elite, which has the potential to destroy NU (Interview with Kiai Abidin at his house, Jalan Musholla al Wahdah Dusun. Sumberbendo, Sidomulyo Village, Kec. Wates, Kediri Regency, August 21 2020.). Subchan termed UU no. 6, which regulates changes to the structure of members of parliament by redressing (improving) but intends to destroy the strengths of political parties. According to Subchan, Law No. 6 was indirectly an "obsolete" legacy of Soekarno's government, which has positive and negative impacts on PNU. The positive impact was meant by the loss of PKI elements and, simultaneously, the negative mentality of the parliament that the Soekarno government inherited. Meanwhile, the negative impact was the reduced political power of PNU in parliament due to the increasing dominance and role of the military in parliamentary institutions (Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Subchan Zaenuri Ekhsan dalam Muktamar ke-XXV di Surabaya tahun 1971).

The impact of the approval of Law No. 6, which regulates the composition and position of MPR and DPR parliament members, makes the power balance map of political parties in parliament that were not directly affiliated with the government (Golkar) getting weaker and weaker. Subchan said Law No. 6 was very inconsistent with the "mandate" of the Constitution and Pancasila, so that it can cause the democratic strength of political parties becomes increasingly fragile. Before the law on the structure and position of parliament was passed, political parties in the DPR still held two-thirds of the votes. Meanwhile, in the MPR institution, 21 of 26 regional delegates had political aspirations that tended to side with Islamic groups (Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Subchan Zaenuri Ekhsan dalam Muktamar ke-XXV di Surabaya tahun 1971).

The political power of the New Order increasingly gained legality in power with the formation of a new form of politics with the enactment of Law No. 6 of 1969 concerning the composition of the membership of the DPR and MPR. With the approval of Law No. 6 of 1969, the total members of parliament became 460 people, of which 360 people were elected through general elections. As many as 100 people were appointed directly by President Soeharto. Of the 100 members appointed directly by the president, 75 were appointed from the military element based on a proposal from the Minister of Defense/Armed Forces Commander. As many as 25 people came from organizational or individual parts of Article 10 Law No. 6 of 1969 concerning the Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD. Thus the group composition in parliament only consisted of 11 factions, including NU, PNI, IPKI, Murba, PSII, Perti (temporarily suspended), Parmusi, Parkindo, Catholic Party, Golongan Karya (Golkar), as well as the Karya ABRI and Karya non-ABRI (Anam, 1999, p. 331).

Conclusion

This study uses the resistance theory framework developed by James Scott. As with James Scott's theory of resistance from the farming community, PNU's resistance to the New Order government was all actions taken by subordinate people or groups to reduce or resist the pressure exerted by superordinate parties or groups on these subordinate groups.

The resistance by Idham Chalid and the ranks of the Syuriah Council against the New Order government was an open form of resistance. Covert resistance takes the form of passive disapproval, more of the same massive silent evasion, which was often far more effective because the participants were joined in conspiracies that appear to be conspiring. Subchan and his supporters fall into the category of closed resistance by rejecting government policies detrimental to NU. Consistently, Subchan's closed resistance was carried out actively and often turned into short and powerful emotional outbursts openly with considerable risk after a prolonged struggle in various fields, which later gave birth to a radicalization of the movement, which was quite massive.

The intervention by the New Order authorities towards PNU at the Bandung Congress became a turning point that influenced the decisions of this organization in its relations with the state. The decisions of the Mukhtar taken in Bandung were still bold enough to oppose the government, although they were not confrontational. Idham Chalid and Subchan agreed that there must be an alternative solution in dealing with the New Order government. The New Order government's internal interference made most of the young NU politicians who previously fully supported the New Order become opponents of government policies, which he said were anti-political parties. Subchan Z.E, a key young PNU figure, organized open resistance by consolidating support from NU clerics in the regions, especially Central and East Java. Idham Chalid acknowledges that direct confrontation with the New Order authorities will only harm the organization. Subchan and Idham agreed that the government's interference with PNU was intolerable.

The New Order's political policies received a response from several NU youths who thought that the New Order was starting to show anti-democratic symptoms by imposing policies that put pressure on political parties. In turn, this policy discourse has become a different dynamic within PNU. Despite fighting, friction and internal competition, as a political institution, PNU has been fragmented into several factions from the start; PNU has remained solid in the face of pressure from outside. PNU has played a role by raising groups that support the government on the one hand, but on the other hand, it also raises groups that were critical of government policies.

The PNU resistance made many contributions to the renewal of its organization in the following years. The conversion of several PNU officials who launched resistance to the New Order rulers resulted from various government political interventions in PNU institutions. Regardless of the nuances, PNU's resistance can be understood from the perspective of the struggle for ideas in forming a government that upholds democracy. Resistance can also be understood as a self-defense effort against various government interventions against PNU's political institutions.

References

- Anam, C. (1999). *Pertumbuhan dan perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Bima Satu.
- Anshari, A. (2016). Kemenangan faksi militan; jejak kelam elit Nahdlatul Ulama' akhir September-Oktober 1965. *Khazanah: Jurnal Studi Islam dan Humaniora*, 14, 1. <https://doi.org/10.18592/khazanah.v14i1.1046>
- Arsip deklarasi tentang demokrasi Pancasila yang ditandatangani tanggal 10 juli 1967 di Bandung. Arsip tanpa nomor kodifikasi koleksi Museum NU Jalan Gayungsari Barat Kota Surabaya.
- Arsip keputusan presiden No. 183 tahun 1968.
- Arsip laporan pertanggungjawaban Subchan Zaenuri Ekhsan dalam Mukhtamar ke-XXV di Surabaya tahun 1971.
- Arsip risalah keputusan Mukhtamar NU ke-XXIV di Bandung tahun 1967 bidang organisasi dan aparat-aparat organisasi. Arsip tanpa nomor kodifikasi koleksi Museum NU Jalan Gayungsari Barat Kota Surabaya.
- Arinanto, S. (1999). Pemilihan umum, demokrasi dan paradigma baru kehidupan politik: beberapa catatan. *Unisia*, 22(39), 80–86. <https://doi.org/10.20885/unisia.vol22.iss39>.
- Budairy, S. (2008, March 12). *Subchan ZE: tokoh muda aneka citra*. [Http://Sbudairy.Blogspot.Com/2008/03/Subchan-Ze-Tokoh-Muda-Aneka-Citra_12.Html](http://Sbudairy.Blogspot.Com/2008/03/Subchan-Ze-Tokoh-Muda-Aneka-Citra_12.Html).
- Buku daftar riwayat hidup anggota partai NU. Koleksi Museum NU Jalan Gayungsari Barat Kota Surabaya.
- Crouch, H. (1999). *Militer dan politik di Indonesia*. PT. Surya Usaha Ningtias.
- Dewi, D. S. (2020, March 11). *Kontroversi sejarah Supersemar yang diperingati setiap 11 Maret*. <https://Tirto.Id/Kontroversi-Sejarah-Supersemar-Yang-Diperingati-Setiap-11-Maret-EEjg>.
- Fealy, G., & Borton, G. (1997). *Tradisionalisme radikal: persinggungan NU-negara*. LKiS.

- Feillard, A. (1997). *NU Vis-à-vis negara: pencarian isi, bentuk dan makna*. LKiS.
- Firdausi, F. A. (2020, March 7). *Kala MPRS melengserkan Soekarno dan menaikan Soeharto*. <https://Tirto.Id/Kala-Mprs-Melengserkan-Sukarno-Dan-Menaikkan-Soeharto-ECRV>.
- Haris, S. (1991). *PPP dan politik orde baru*. Gramedia Widia Sarana.
- Isnaeni, H. (2016, March 11). *Kontroversi di seputar Supersemar*. <https://historia.id/politik/articles/kontroversi-di-seputar-supersemar-p0mj7/page/1>.
- Jamiluddin, J. (2018). Fenomena Sosial Mikro-Makro Nahdlatul Wathan Era Orde Baru. *SANGKÉP: Jurnal Kajian Sosial Keagamaan*, 1(2), 198–223. <https://doi.org/10.20414/sangkep.v1i2.602>.
- Karim, M. R. (1983). *Perjalanan partai politik di Indonesia: sebuah potret pasang surut*. CV. Rajawali.
- Konsultasi presiden dengan parpol2. (1969, October 15). *Kompas*.
- Kuntowijoyo. (2000). *Pengantar ilmu sejarah*. Bentang Budaya.
- Machfoedz, M. (1982). *Kebangkitan ulama dan bangkitnya ulama*. Yayasan Kesatuan Ummat.
- Marijan, K. (1992). *Quo vadis NU setelah kembali ke khittah 1926*. Penerbit Erlangga.
- Mas'ood, M. (1989). *Ekonomi dan struktur politik orde baru 1966-1971*. LP3ES.
- Mun'im, A. (2013). *Benturan NU-PKI 1948-1965*. Tim PBNU.
- Naskah sambutan Presiden Soeharto saat diangkat menjadi Presiden ke-2 RI pada Sidang Umum ke-5 MPRS tanggal 27 Maret 1968, ANRI, Pidato Presiden Soeharto 1966-1998 No. 291.
- Pembitjara setudju Djend. Soeharto presiden penuh. (1968, March 23). *Kompas*.
- Penjerdehanaan kpartaian. (1971, June 1). *Kompas*.
- Puspitasari, S. H. (2005). Pengalaman Indonesia menuju demokrasi beberapa catalan atas pemilihan umum pada masa orde lama, orde baru dan pasca orde baru. *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum*, 12(28), 46–61. <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol12.iss28>.
- Reeve, D. (2013). *Golkar sejarah yang hilang*. Komunitas Bambu.
- Refreshing DPR djadi pembitjaraan hangat. (1968, March 23). *Kompas*.
- Sjaichu: bisa sadja untuk tjari kambing hitam. (1971, June 1). *Kompas*.
- Subchan: biaja pemilu dapat kurang dari Rp. 10 miljard. (1969, October 15). *Kompas*.
- Suryadinata, L., & Priyono, A. E. (1992). *Golkar dan militer: studi tentang budaya politik*. LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial).