

# Navigating Argumentation: Michael Gilbert's Multi-Modal Framework and Rational Integrity

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**Abstract:** Michael Gilbert challenges established norms in argumentation theory by introducing a multi-modal framework that incorporates emotive, visceral, and kisceral dimensions alongside logical modes in constructing arguments. This article critically assesses Gilbert's multi-modal argument framework, highlighting his departure from the rational structure of arguments. Gilbert proposes distinct evaluation criteria for different argument forms, a deviation from traditional rational frameworks. To address this discrepancy within Gilbert's framework, this paper advocates a middle ground. This position aims to appreciate extra-logical elements present in arguments while maintaining fidelity to logical structures. Bertrand Russell's notion of knowledge by acquaintance is utilized to construct this intermediary standpoint.

**Résumé:** Michael Gilbert remet en question les normes établies en théorie de l'argumentation en introduisant un cadre multimodal intégrant les dimensions émotionnelle, viscérale et kiscérale, ainsi que les modes logiques, dans la construction des arguments. Cet article évalue de manière critique le cadre argumentatif multimodal de Gilbert, soulignant son écart par rapport à la structure rationnelle des arguments. Gilbert propose des critères d'évaluation distincts pour différentes formes d'argumentation, s'écartant ainsi des cadres rationnels traditionnels. Pour remédier à cette divergence au sein du cadre de Gilbert, cet article préconise une position intermédiaire. Cette position vise à apprécier les éléments extra-logiques présents dans les arguments tout en préservant la fidélité aux structures logiques. La notion de connaissance non propositionnelle, directe, et immédiate de Bertrand Russell est utilisée pour construire ce point de vue intermédiaire.

**Keywords:** argumentation, Bertrand Russell, knowledge by acquaintance, multi-modal arguments

## 1. Introduction

In the realm of argumentation theory and critical thinking, Michael Gilbert emerges as a provocateur, challenging established norms with his exploration of multi-modal arguments. In his pursuit, Gilbert seeks to broaden the scope of argumentative discourse, urging a departure from the confines of traditional Critical-Logical Models (C-L). Arguments extend beyond the logical and linguistic, embodying emotive, visceral, and kisceral dimensions. (Gilbert, 2013, p. 79)

Gilbert's critique questions the prevalent C-L view, known for its emphasis on formalistic analyses and the separation of emotions, context, and intuition from the core of argumentative evaluation. He confronts this model's isolation nature, which he argues eclipses the significance of these alternative modes, perpetuating a reductionist approach that translates all arguments into formal propositions. This article embarks on a critical exploration of Gilbert's framework, dissecting its limitations. While acknowledging the importance of recognizing diverse argumentative modes, this analysis scrutinizes Gilbert's emphasis on emotions as autonomous warrants, posing queries about the potential oversimplification of their role in argumentation.

Moreover, leveraging Bertrand Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, this evaluation navigates the territory where Gilbert's radical proposition meets the established understanding of the rational structure of arguments. Russell's delineation offers a perspective on how immediate awareness and indirect understanding intertwine within these multi-modal arguments, challenging Gilbert's notion that acquaintances themselves constitute arguments.<sup>1</sup>

This inquiry seeks a balanced perspective, acknowledging the enrichment of critical thinking through Gilbert's extension of argumentative forms while advocating for a measured approach that preserves the integrity of logical and rational frameworks in argument analysis. As we delve deeper into Gilbert's multi-modal

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<sup>1</sup> Gilbert argues that what we are acquainted with in an argument such as emotions, behaviours, or kisceral insights can be argument in themselves. That is the idea I will be challenging below.

argumentation, I will seek an understanding that harmonizes multi-modality within the fabric of reasoned discourse.

I will begin with an introduction to Michael Gilbert's multi-modal argument model. Within this section, I will also expound upon Gilbert's critique of traditional frameworks, notably termed the Critical Logical view. Subsequently, I will illustrate how Gilbert diverges from the rational structure of arguments. Following this, I will advocate for a middle ground, aiming to strike a balance between the Critical-Logical view and Gilbert's multi-modality, drawing upon Bertrand Russell's concept of knowledge by acquaintance. Finally, I will anticipate potential objections to my reconciliation attempt and provide corresponding responses.

## **2. The Multi-Modal Argument Framework**

In the landscape of argumentation theory, Michael Gilbert emerges as a trailblazer, challenging conventional norms by proposing a multi-modal framework that extends the boundaries of traditional critical thinking. His paradigm-shifting approach contends that arguments encompass dimensions that extend far beyond the confines of mere linguistic and logical constructs. Embracing emotions, physical gestures, intuition, Gilbert's framework broadens the canvas of argumentative modes, urging a holistic understanding of persuasion and reasoning.

Gilbert's critique of the prevalent Critical-Logical Model (C-L) stems from its limited purview, focusing predominantly on formalistic analyses that isolate arguments to linguistic and logical frameworks. He contends that this restrictive view neglects the richness and diversity inherent in human communication, dismissing the significance of emotive, visceral, and kisceral dimensions in constructing arguments.

### *2.1 Expanding Horizons through Diverse Modes*

Central to Gilbert's proposal is his insistence on acknowledging the diverse facets of human expression within argumentation. For instance, he contends that an argument isn't solely a conclusion supported by premises but can also manifest through emotional reactions, physical interactions, and intuitive insights. Such dimensions,

often overlooked by traditional models, form integral parts of how individuals convey and comprehend arguments in real-life interactions. These four modes are logical, emotive, visceral (physical, environmental, contextual), and kisceral (intuitive, non-sensory, insight-driven). Logical arguments are the ones that are already known within the literature, they come in premises and evaluated through the rules of logic. Emotive arguments ‘demonstrate how we feel about certain claims or aspects of the argumentation procedure and communicate emotional reactions through a variety of means to a dispute partner. The second mode is visceral. He says that ‘These arguments are primarily physical and can range from a touch to classical nonverbal communication, i.e., body language, to force.’ (Gilbert, 2013 p. 84). The last and most controversial mode is the kisceral mode. He defines the kisceral mode as ‘that mode of communication that relies on the intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical.’ (Gilbert, 2013 p. 86)<sup>2</sup>

One note about multi-modal arguments should be made here. If we were to take multi-modal arguments as different forms of expressions, then there would be no error<sup>3</sup>. The error that I will show arises from Gilbert’s claim that these different modes of arguments are arguments, and thus they deserve different criteria for evaluating. These evaluating criteria can be different from the classic understanding of argument evaluation in the literature.<sup>4</sup> This what creates the problem in Gilbert’s framework because it separates different modes of arguments from logical evaluative processes.

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<sup>2</sup> A crucial point to note here is Gilbert’s interchangeable use of “mode of communication” and “mode of argument.” This choice stems from his perspective that arguments constitute a form of communication. According to Gilbert, communicative elements form integral components of arguments. However, he also asserts that these elements can function as standalone arguments. Thus, the term “mode of communication” encompasses both a subset of an argument and, at times, denotes the argument itself. See Gilbert, 1994 p. 165.

<sup>3</sup> In his article, Christopher Tindale presents a possible reading of Kisceral arguments as a mode of inter-personal communication rather than a form of argument. See Tindale, C. (2022). On the Kisceral Mode of Argumentation. *Informal Logic*, 42(3), 603-621.

<sup>4</sup> For such classical view of argument evaluation see; Johnson, R. H., & Blair, J. A. (2006). *Logical self-defense*. Idea. Also see section 3 for the view.

An illustrative example from Gilbert's framework sheds light on these diverse modes. Consider a scenario where a business negotiation unfolds between partners, Fran, and David. Fran, emphasizing cost concerns, argues against purchasing an expensive car, while David, driven by a desire to project authenticity, advocates for it. In this exchange, Fran's emotive stance emerges when expressing fear over the increased investment, appealing to emotions as a backing for the conclusion (Gilbert, 2013, p. 124). Gilbert's framework acknowledges Fran's emotional backing as a valid dimension in the argumentative process, challenging the notion that arguments must adhere strictly to propositional logic. This understanding of emotions as a valid warrant for arguments will be criticized below.

## 2.2 *Reshaping Norms and Criteria*

Gilbert's multi-modal framework fundamentally challenges the rigid norms that have long governed the evaluation of arguments. Traditionally, arguments have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny based on their logical coherence, linguistic precision, and adherence to formal structures. However, Gilbert's proposition advocates for a paradigm shift—a departure from this stringent adherence to formalistic analysis towards a more inclusive approach.

Let's look at one of the examples Gilbert uses to show this difference in evaluative criteria.

### Mr. Dorno's Grief

Mr. Dorno is grief stricken at the loss of his wife. At the reception after her funeral, a relative remarks that she was a very nice woman. The relative begins speaking about her at length, saying nothing but good things. Suddenly, Mr. Dorno explodes. He shouts to the relative that she did not know Ms. Dorno, that she never knew her, and she should not speak of her. Although there is some shock at his outburst, no one chides him. Instead, the offending relative slips away, and Mr. Dorno is told that it is all right, and that of course, the relative did not really know her that well at all. (Gilbert, 2013 p. 92)

Gilbert argues that on the logical level, Mr. Dorno's argument does not work (Gilbert, 2013 p. 92). Anyone at the funeral who may know her and have sufficient evidence or data can make a claim

about Mr. Dorno's wife. The reason why the relative is convinced not to speak is that Mr. Dorno uses emotional backing for his argument. The fact that he is grieving is the emotional support for his argument. His argument is that if you do not know my wife, you cannot speak about her, and the basis of this argument is Mr. Dorno's grief. In this case, the relative finds this emotional backing sufficient and accepts the claim because the grief is justified. In another setting, this grief might not be enough to support another argument, but the fact that Mr. Dorno's wife recently passed away makes his grief acceptable for such an argument. So according to Gilbert, acceptability here lies in the emotion expressed. However, grief does not play the role that Gilbert thinks here. It plays the role to convince the others, but it does not support the main conclusion of the argument. Let me explain by reconstructing the argument into premises:

**Premise 1:** Anyone who does not know a person should not speak about that person.

**Premise 2:** The relative does not know my wife.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, the relative should not speak about my wife.

Grief here does not serve as a reason to argue that people who do not know others should not make judgments about them. It only warrants Mr. Dorno's outburst, which is not an argument. This highlights the gap in Gilbert's framework. The emotion at play does not justify the argument Mr. Dorno is trying to make. It only justifies his outburst and assists him in convincing people at the reception not to speak. The argument does not benefit from the grief that Mr. Dorno has.

One last example to illustrate the acceptability issue could be a discussion between two theologians. Imagine that two theologians are discussing how the universe began. Any argument that relies on the existence of God will be acceptable for both theologians since they believe in the existence of God. From the CL perspective again, this would not be acceptable since there is no evidence or data that God exists. However, this does not concern theologians. They continue their discussion and make their claims that may be acceptable to other theologians.

Ultimately, Gilbert thinks that for an argument like Mr Dorno's, the expressed emotion can be a sufficient reason to be convinced by it. I will argue below that this creates a conflict with rational evaluation of arguments.

### 3. Gilbert's Framework and Logical Structure

In this section, I will present what is the classical view of a logically good argument is, and then show how Gilbert's framework is a fair distance from the logical backbone of an argument.

According to Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, a logically good argument necessitates premises robust enough to sway a reasonable mind toward the proposed conclusion. (Johnson and Blair, 1983, p. 50). This perspective eschews the demand for irrefutable proofs, recognizing the potency of a well-constructed argument. The first problem arises here when we remember that Gilbert takes an emotion as a justified warrant for the argument. Concerning Mr. Dorno's Grief, Gilbert contends that Mr. Dorno's grief serves as the argument's warrant. I find this assessment flawed. While grief and the argument's context undeniably influence others' convictions, they aren't the warrants presented. Mr. Dorno argues that the relative cannot speak about his wife because she doesn't know her, not because he is grieving, and she cannot speak about his wife. In other words, grieving cannot be the sole reason for Mr Dorno's argument. It must be accepted that emotion plays a role in the argument. It plays a supporting role for the claim made in terms of persuasiveness.<sup>5</sup> However, emotion, by itself, cannot be a justified claim for an argument if it is to be evaluated logically.

This brings us to the second problem regarding logicality and Gilbert's framework. Gilbert is aware of the above problem and that is why he suggests that different modes of arguments should have different criteria of evaluation. Even though he does not embark to develop these criteria, what this suggestion implies is problematic. If we are to judge emotional arguments through emotions, or visceral arguments through its physical demonstrations, we would have to let

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<sup>5</sup> Johnson and Blair call these supportive aspects extra-logical merits of a good argument. See (Johnson and Blair, p. 50) The problem with Gilbert is his claim of putting forward emotion as a logical merit itself.

go off the logical structures of arguments. Before we take on another example from Gilbert to show this error, let's turn again to Johnson and Blair to see what the logical principles of argument assessment are. In their comprehensive book, they develop RSA Triangle as a guideline for argument assessment. RSA stands for relevance that the premises of an argument must be *relevant* to conclusion, *sufficiency* that the premises must support sufficient reasons to support the conclusion, and *acceptability* that the premises must be acceptable and thus, testable. (Johnson and Blair, pp. 55-56).

Now, when we recall Gilbert's example of Fran and David, we can see that Fran's fear of investing more money into the business is accepted as an emotional backing for the conclusion. That is how Gilbert suggests that we read the case. We must ask here: does the emotion of fear satisfy RSA? In the first instance, it seems like it fulfils the standard of relevancy because Fran's fear is relevant to the conclusion. However, is it relevant to the conclusion that they should not invest more in the business? For that, we need to evaluate the sufficiency of the emotion. Fear can be supportive of the claim but, alone by itself, cannot be a sufficient ground to claim that they should not invest more in the business. So, it is neither sufficient nor fully relevant to the conclusion. As the last standard, we must ask: is it acceptable? For a premise to be acceptable, it must be defensible by the arguer. In this case, Fran can defend that she genuinely fears, but she cannot defend that her fear is a proper reason not to invest. The fear can be a good sign to understand the source of that reason. Maybe, that source is going to be a good reason not to invest. However, the fear itself fails from the last standard of argument evaluation.

However, there are instances where fear can be a sufficient argument for a certain claim. Emotions can, at times, serve as legitimate arguments that meet the criteria of being relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. For instance, consider the argument for the claim: "You should run out of the room because there is a lion on the loose in the room." This argument is rooted in fear, yet it is both logical and emotional. The fear of imminent danger from the lion provides a sufficient and acceptable reason for the immediate action of running out of the room. In this case, the emotion of fear directly supports the conclusion in a manner that meets all three standards of RSA—



relevancy, sufficiency, and acceptability. This example illustrates that while fear alone may not always be a sufficient argument, in contexts involving immediate physical danger, it can fully satisfy the criteria for a legitimate argument.

Let's have one more example from Gilbert. In his 1994 paper called *Multi-Modal Argumentation*, he gives the following example (Gilbert, 1994, p. 169):

Jill: But why should I marry you, Jack?

Jack: Because I love you as life itself.

Gilbert posits that what Jack presents constitutes an argument wherein he asserts a premise through an emotional mode. Specifically, Jack's love for Jill is purported to be a compelling reason for Jill to marry him. Gilbert contends that attempting to reframe this argument into premises akin to traditional logic would be akin to "forcing a square peg into a round hole" (Gilbert, 1994, p. 169). Essentially, he suggests that comprehending this argument does not necessitate reducing it to strictly logical terms.

Regarding Jack's reasons, Gilbert underscores that they do not adhere to logical reasoning; rather, their origins lie in introspection into Jack's emotional state. However, when measured against the sufficiency and acceptability standards of the RSA triangle, this argument might initially seem to fall short, as it lacks logical defense and Jill may not find it acceptable without additional information. But Gilbert's view on emotional argument evaluation suggests that emotional arguments should be evaluated emotionally rather than logically. Thus, Jill's assessment of the truth condition might not rely on external information. Instead, Jill could evaluate Jack's argument based on her emotional response:

Jill: I believe that what you are saying is true because I feel it in your touch, I can feel it in the way you look at me.

In this light, Jill's acceptance of Jack's argument is grounded in her emotional perception and response, aligning with Gilbert's theory that emotional arguments can and should be evaluated within the same emotional framework in which they are presented. This

approach allows for a more holistic understanding of the argument that transcends traditional logical evaluation.

To elucidate my assessment of Gilbert’s framework, I aim to address the notion of applying distinct criteria to different argument modes. Towards the conclusion of his 1994 article, Gilbert contends, “Special pleading, for example, is generally fallacious in a logical mode, but less often in kisceral where the requirement that one actually have an experience in order to understand it makes perfect sense” (Gilbert, 1994, p. 175). This assertion is in reference to an argument wherein a student appeals to a professor for a passing grade in a course. Gilbert posits that the student, using the kisceral mode, endeavors to convey to the professor the significance of the course for the student’s personal experience. While logically viewed, this might constitute a fallacy of special pleading, Gilbert suggests that from the kisceral perspective, it may not be considered as such. This, in my view, could potentially lead to an ‘anything goes’ principle in argument evaluation. Consequently, despite Gilbert’s assertion of not excluding the logical mode of argument, his proposition of multi-modal arguments appears to clash with the principles of logical reasoning.<sup>6</sup>

In this section, I’ve shown how Gilbert’s multi-modal framework diverges from the traditional logical structure of arguments by introducing evaluation criteria that do not neatly align with the principles of logical argumentation. In the subsequent section, I’ll propose an alternative perspective on understanding multi-modal arguments to bridge this gap and bring them into alignment with logical reasoning.

#### 4. Reconciling Logical Structure and Multi-Modality

In this section, I begin by considering work by Leo Groarke and Christopher Tindale that aims to supplement Gilbert’s work. I will then introduce Bertrand Russell’s concepts of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, and this will reconcile Gilbert’s multi-modality with the principles of logical structure. My

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<sup>6</sup> Gilbert explicitly states that he does not wish to exclude the logical mode, however, by suggesting the development of different criteria for different modes of arguments is excluding logical for those modes of arguments. See Gilbert, 1994 p. 163.

aim here isn't to refute Gilbert's perspective but rather to seek a position that can encompass logical structure within his framework.

In the literature on multimodal argumentation, Leo Groarke and Christopher Tindale both offer significant contributions that aim to supplement Michael Gilbert's multi-modal theory with rational integrity. (2022) Groarke acknowledges prior efforts, including those by Tindale and himself, to incorporate alternative modes into argumentation theory. He emphasizes that while these modes primarily address the material aspects of arguments, the need for formal logical structures persists in constructing and evaluating complete arguments. For example, Groarke illustrates that even non-verbal arguments, such as visual evidence, can adhere to logical forms like *modus ponens*, underscoring their logical validity. He interprets Gilbert's theory, which includes logical, emotional, kisceral, and later, visceral modes, as a groundbreaking expansion of rationality that enriches our understanding of reasoning. Groarke advocates for a synergistic relationship between non-verbal material modes and Gilbert's modes, suggesting that the emotional and kisceral modes are often linked to multimodal argumentation. (Groarke, 2022) He concurs with Gilbert's assertion that recognizing non-discursive, non-verbal elements is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of rationality, a perspective traditionally overlooked in argumentation theory. Groarke highlights that contemporary theories of multimodal argumentation now acknowledge these non-verbal and non-discursive components, marking a significant shift from traditional approaches and enhancing the analysis of real-life arguments.

In a parallel effort, Christopher Tindale expands on the kisceral mode, highlighting its importance for human understanding. Tindale (2022) argues that kisceral arguments form a crucial category that challenges the classical logic (CL) view, which demands logical explicability. He points out the paradox that arises when CL attempts to evaluate kisceral arguments, as these often rely on intuitive propositions that cannot be expressed in logical terms. Borrowing ideas from William James and Georges Bataille, Tindale suggests that kisceral arguments manifest "inner experiences" or "mediated emotions" that convey intuitive relations to one's inner spaces, such as the subconscious or emotions. These arguments provide a form of sensual knowledge rather than a conceptual one. However, Tindale cautions

that this mode of argumentation does not always aim for truth but may instead seek “inter-personal communication” (2022, p. 616). This perspective further underscores the need to integrate non-discursive elements in argumentation theory, aligning with and extending Gilbert’s multi-modal approach. Together, Groarke and Tindale’s contributions offer a robust enhancement to Gilbert’s work, advocating for a more inclusive and realistic understanding of argumentation that maintains rational integrity. In the next section, I will explore a further enhancement to Gilbert’s work by applying Bertrand Russell’s notion of Knowledge by Acquaintance.

#### *4.1 Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description*

In Bertrand Russell’s exploration of “Knowledge by Acquaintance” and “Knowledge by Description,” he illuminates two distinct modes of understanding objects. “Knowledge by Acquaintance” is characterized by a direct cognitive relationship, wherein one is immediately aware of the object itself, not involving judgment but rather direct presentation. This form of awareness extends to sense-data—such as colors or noises—and even self-consciousness. Conversely, “Knowledge by Description” pertains to comprehending objects through defining phrases or descriptions, distinguishing between ambiguous (“a so-and-so”) and definite (“the so-and-so”) descriptions. Universals and particulars often fall under this category, known through descriptions rather than direct acquaintance. While “Knowledge by Acquaintance” brings the object itself before the mind, “Knowledge by Description” allows for understanding properties belonging to objects, even without direct acquaintance with those entities.

To give an example of knowledge by acquaintance, imagine looking at a red apple. In this scenario, your direct sensory experience of seeing the redness of the apple, perceiving its shape, and feeling its texture when you touch it represents knowledge by acquaintance. It’s the immediate, unmediated awareness of the apple itself through your senses.

An example for knowledge by description would be the notion of “the tallest building in the city.” Even if you haven’t seen this building or directly experienced it, you might have knowledge about it through descriptions or information provided by others. You

understand this concept by the description provided—knowing that it refers to a specific building that holds the attribute of being the tallest among all the buildings in the city. This understanding doesn't arise from direct sensory experience but rather from the information conveyed through description or defining phrases.

#### *4.2 Integrating Knowledge by Acquaintance with Gilbert's Framework*

To reconcile Gilbert's multi-modal argumentation with the logical structure of argumentation, we can employ Bertrand Russell's concept of "Knowledge by Acquaintance." Gilbert's framework emphasizes various modes of argumentation, including emotional, visceral, and kisceral dimensions.

Russell's notion of "Knowledge by Acquaintance" pertains to immediate, unmediated awareness of objects or experiences through direct sensory perception. In the context of Gilbert's framework, we can interpret the various modes of argumentation as distinct forms of "acquaintance" with aspects of human expression and communication. Just as one perceives sensory qualities directly without mediation, the different modes of argumentation in Gilbert's framework represent distinct forms of immediate awareness and understanding. Reconstructing Gilbert's modes of argumentation as the things that we acquainted with save us from positing different standards of evaluation but at the same time, it appreciates and understands extra-logical, or non-verbal elements of arguments.

For instance, the emotional dimension of an argument, as per Gilbert, can be likened to "acquaintance" with feelings and emotional reactions. Similarly, the visceral dimension involves direct perception and expression through physical gestures, body language, and environmental cues. The kisceral mode, which involves intuition and non-sensory insight, can be seen as a form of immediate awareness or acquaintance with abstract concepts or feelings that don't rely on empirical evidence.

To reconcile this with the logical structure of arguments, we can view these diverse modes as different avenues of understanding and expression that contribute to the overall fabric of an argument. Rather than conflicting with logicity, these modes can be seen as complementary facets that enrich the understanding and presentation of

arguments. Rather than an argument in themselves, we can accept them as extra-logical elements of arguments.

For instance, consider a scenario where two individuals, Sarah and Mark, are debating the merits of a new policy proposal within a company. Sarah presents her argument, emphasizing its logical aspect by substantiating it with statistical data and factual evidence in support of the policy change. This adheres to the traditional framework of logical argumentation rooted in “Knowledge by Description,” conveying information through structured premises leading to a conclusion. Conversely, Mark’s argument encompasses a more experiential dimension. He emphasizes the physical and environmental aspects, vividly describing past experiences under similar policies, utilizing gestures and tone to underscore the real-life impact. However, while Mark uses gestures and tone in his delivery, his argument remains fundamentally verbal and logical, relying on past experiences expressed verbally.

The gestures and nonverbal communication enhance the delivery but do not constitute the core of his argument. A more accurate example of a visceral argument, in line with Gilbert’s notion, would involve elements where physical appearance and vitality directly support the claim. For instance, in a claim about the importance of a healthy lifestyle and physical activity, one’s physical appearance, energy, and vitality in movement could serve as the visceral dimension. This type of argument is often seen in advertisements. For example, a commercial for a fitness program might feature a highly energetic and fit individual performing various exercises, showcasing their vitality and physical condition as a testament to the program’s effectiveness. The visual and physical demonstration of health and energy becomes an integral part of the argument, providing a visceral and immediate form of persuasion that complements the verbal claims about the benefits of the program.

In evaluating these arguments, I concur with Gilbert that these non-logical elements should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric or unnecessary data; they warrant inclusion in the evaluation process. However, I differ from Gilbert in that I don’t advocate for the need for distinct modes and separate evaluation criteria for them. Rather, the middle ground, where we can appreciate these extra-logical elements while remaining faithful to logical structures, is found through

the application of Russell's notion of knowledge by acquaintance. This approach allows us to incorporate the value of non-verbal and experiential aspects without abandoning the logical principles that underpin sound argumentation.

## 5. Objections

In the previous section, I offered a middle position to place Gilbert's view into the logical structure of argumentation. In this section, I will give two possible objections and I will respond them.

### 5.1 Middle Position Reduces Multi-Modality.

One could argue that, similar to the CL view, my proposed middle position risks oversimplifying multi-modal arguments. By applying the concept of knowledge by acquaintance, it might seem that all modes are being forced into a single category of 'extra-logical elements,' attempting to cover them solely through that lens. However, the endeavor to align Gilbert's multi-modal argumentative framework with Russell's concepts of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description isn't about imposing rigid categorizations. Instead, it's an exploration to gain insights into the diverse dimensions Gilbert introduces. I acknowledge the richness of Gilbert's proposed modes, highlighting their complexity and uniqueness within argumentation theory. The offered position doesn't have to reduce all multi-modal categories to extra-logical elements; rather, we can uniquely understand each mode according to its style of expression by being acquainted with them. It's important to emphasize that this approach doesn't require leaving logic aside.

I acknowledge that Gilbert's framework encompasses a spectrum of argumentative expressions, including emotions, physical interactions, and intuitive insights, which might not neatly align with Russell's categorical distinctions. Rather than forcefully pigeonholing these modes into pre-existing categories, the article employs Russell's concepts as a guiding perspective to appreciate the diversity and richness of human expression within argumentation. The aim isn't to oversimplify these modes but to use Russell's insights as a tool for nuanced understanding, acknowledging that Gilbert's framework extends beyond conventional boundaries.

### 5.2 Neglecting the Impact of Contextual Factors in Evaluation.

One might argue that the proposed reconciliation framework might not adequately consider the contextual impact on argument evaluation. It's possible that certain contexts demand different modes of evaluation, and a rigid adherence to logical principles might overlook the relevance of these extra-logical elements in specific scenarios.

The reconciliation between multi-modal arguments and logical evaluation doesn't negate the importance of context; rather, it seeks to integrate these diverse elements within a structured framework. While logical principles offer a universal basis for evaluation, they should be flexible enough to accommodate contextual influences. Acknowledging contextual factors doesn't necessarily conflict with logical evaluation. The proposed reconciliation framework should allow for a contextual understanding of how different modes operate within specific scenarios. This means recognizing that certain situations might demand different modes of evaluation without abandoning logical scrutiny altogether.

The application of logical principles doesn't necessarily discount contextual relevance. The RSA Triangle (Relevance, Sufficiency, Acceptability), for instance, can encompass contextual considerations. Relevance specifically plays an important role in argument evaluation. An extra-logical element might be relevant when evaluating an argument. Remember the example about Fran and David. Instead of disregarding Fran's fear altogether, from the middle position that is offered, one may say that this fear is relevant to the argument at hand, so let's question and investigate the emotion to find out the reasons behind it. The offered position does not aim to be as strict as the CL view but should be flexible enough to appreciate different modes of arguments within the logical framework.

## 6. Conclusion

The journey through Michael Gilbert's multi-modal argument framework alongside traditional logical structures underscores the need for a nuanced approach. Initially challenging the rigid Critical-Logical Model (C-L), Gilbert ventures into uncharted realms, proposing a rich tapestry of argumentative expressions that encompass



emotions, physical interactions, and intuitive insights. However, Gilbert's departure from traditional logic introduces discrepancies that require reconciliation, particularly in the assessment of diverse argument modes.

The analysis draws a clear distinction between Gilbert's multi-modal framework and the conventional logical structure of arguments. While Gilbert champions emotional, visceral, and kisceral dimensions as autonomous warrants for arguments, this stance encounters criticism when viewed through the lens of logical evaluation.

To bridge this gap, Bertrand Russell's concepts of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are leveraged to construct a middle ground. This middle position doesn't seek to categorize all modes as extra-logical elements but aims to appreciate each mode's unique expression while staying rooted in logical structures. It emphasizes the importance of understanding these modes through an acquaintance lens, enabling appreciation without forsaking the logical backbone of argument evaluation.

Addressing objections, the article counters the notion that the proposed reconciliation might oversimplify multi-modal arguments or neglect contextual factors in evaluation. Instead, it asserts that the reconciliation framework enables a contextual understanding of diverse modes within a structured logical evaluation. It advocates for flexibility within logical principles, recognizing the relevance of extra-logical elements while upholding the RSA Triangle's standards of Relevance, Sufficiency, and Acceptability.

In essence, this proposed middle ground offers an integrated perspective. It neither rejects Gilbert's extension of argumentative forms nor disregards the logical basis. Instead, it encourages an appreciation of diverse argument modes within a structured logical evaluation, fostering a more comprehensive understanding of argumentation that embraces both richness of expression and logical coherence.

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